

**On the Grounds of a Transcendental Intellect
for a Philosophy of Leadership**

Submitted by

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Signed.....

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ABSTRACT

Aim: This thesis sets out to cover the matter of leadership as it is informed by science, art, and philosophy. The research involved entails a corresponding consideration of the sensibility and intelligibility, morality and ethics of leadership along with accounts of their relationship to the notion of the mature human intellect as well as to that of the idea of a university.

Scope: The work proposes that the transcendental intellect is the ground for notions and principles of leadership. Opting for a schema of the universe of the intellect over a Kantian model of the faculties of the intellect, the notion of leadership can be clearly seen to belong not in the general intellect of science, made up of understanding and reason, but in a transcendental intellect comprised of comprehension and judgement. A science of leadership is a contested idea because it does not and cannot take into account values and ends, regardless of whether or not those values are based on formal universal principles or on particular substantive judgments. The human understanding is the only intellectual grounds for a science of leadership and a critique of those grounds could be reinforced by a similar treatment of human reason being the grounds for the art of leadership.

Understanding alone is however insufficient grounds for a science of leadership and therefore marks out the science of leadership to be an empirical impossibility. The addition of reason to the search for a science of leadership compounds the problem, reason not only denying the possibility of a science of leadership and affirming the probability of a science of leading and leaders but also affirming the legitimacy of the grounds for an art of leadership.

This critique of the idea of a science of current leadership studies, then, is followed by a defence of the grounds for the art of leadership. This is necessary for a defence of the idea of comprehension being the grounds for a philosophy of leadership. Such a philosophy can only be reached by first proceeding through the classical tradition and not through the traditions of science not only because the tradition of science does not engender leadership but because the classical tradition encompasses the liberal arts, valued for millennia as the education needed to rule.

From the point of view of an amended Kantian approach put forward in the thesis, leadership requires both objective grounds -to give the notion content- and subjective grounds -to fit the notion to human life. The liberal arts are important objective grounds for the justification of the art of leadership while the transcendental intellect with its inclusion of the ideas of values and ends is the necessary subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. Values and ends are critical ideas, the subject matter of the transcendental intellect, contained within the notions of the righteous virtue of comprehension and the principles of the good and duty of judgment. The affirmation of the moral and ethical can be sought not solely within the universe of the intellect but also beyond the faculties of the mind.

Nevertheless, the moral and ethical grounds for a philosophy of leadership can be discussed and defended by reference to what is seen in the thesis as the contemporary degeneration of higher education. The decline in higher education invites a reciprocal rise in the need for a philosophy of leadership to redress the balance between the real and true of the general intellect and the right and the good of the transcendental intellect.

This moral action is justified by the ethical principles of the good and duty in the notion of judgment. To advance a philosophy of leadership is a moral obligation necessary to avert the ongoing threat to and undermining of the intellectual standards of higher educational institutions. To this end, the thesis argues for the relevance, importance, and usefulness of the transcendental intellect in the construction of a philosophy of leadership for the defence of the moral self in an academic role in state-run universities.

More explicitly, the purpose of the thesis has been to begin to prepare the ground for a much wider discussion on the position of the intellect in relation to the mind and the spirit of man under the rubric of leadership. The perception of the declining authority of the Christian tradition and the increasing hegemony of the state over higher education has led to the necessity for reform founded on the intellectual immersed in the spiritual and not on the spiritual anchored in the intellectual.

Conclusion: Because human individuals are natural, intelligent and moral beings, the mature transcendental intellect of the mind of the self is a necessary but not in itself a sufficient grounds for a philosophy of leadership. The thesis argues, however, that these grounds are achieved when the transcendental intellect is coupled with the classical tradition. Exhaustive grounds for a comprehensive philosophy of leadership would have to include so much more on the spiritual dimension in all its fullness. This latter would provide ample material for further discussion. In the meantime, this thesis has tabled fresh material towards the case for a philosophy of leadership subjectively grounded in the transcendental intellect and objectively in the classical tradition, thereby providing values and ends that are necessarily critical elements put towards the reformation of the idea of a university.

*

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Chapter 1

Statement and explanation of the thesis

Introduction: large-scale summary of the argument

The aim of this thesis is to find a firm foundation for an account of leadership in higher education. In this dissertation the thesis to be defended is that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. To safeguard the academic core of universities and all that is valued in it needs leadership. When leadership is spoken of in higher education it is meant leadership for the mature human intellect. The mature intellect engages in thinking about mature moral and ethical ends whereas the maturing intellect primarily concerns itself with developing its powers of understanding and reasoning. The formation of the maturing intellect is the task of primary and secondary education. The university addresses the mature intellect through academic faculty members who offer leadership not by teaching but through professing and researching, lecturing and tutoring.

In recent times the entry of the professional-scientific learning and teaching model into universities appears to have over-run the traditional academic schema of professing and researching, lecturing and tutoring with the implication that this model, one way or another, better contributes to higher education and to society. The view that leadership can be understood by analysing it into its different parts will be called the general view. This view is more aptly suited to the scientific learning and teaching model of leadership. Another view, that leadership can be comprehended in its dialectic with its followership and adjudicated upon using one's judgement through discussion will be called the transcendental view. Such a view of leadership is seen to be consistent with the academic schema traditionally associated with university faculty. To argue this is the aim of the thesis.

The dissertation argues that the transcendental view is a more powerful view than the general view because it is more useful, important and relevant to leadership in *higher* education. Therefore, the transcendental view should be accepted by those who would otherwise be sympathetic to the general view. Obviously, both views can be accepted since they are not contraries but complementary to each other but if the transcendental view allows one to hold a more powerful position, then it should displace the other.

It will not be argued that the transcendental view is better than any other view about leadership, for example an intuitive view, which does not provide a model of leadership because it may be seen as a personalised process (Surel, 2010, p.305). The thesis argues only that it is a view that is more advanced than that of the general view alone. Nevertheless, the thesis may be of interest to opponents of the general view because in it, it is argued that a much stronger case can be made in favour of the transcendental view. So, those opposed to the general view ought to find the transcendental view a more worthy alternative.

The thesis takes the following form. This first chapter provides an initial overview of the steps in the main argument of the thesis and then lays out a schema to explain what will be called the universe of the mature human intellect. From this schema the transcendental view of leadership is explicated and distinguished from the general view. Chapter Two is a critique of selected relevant literature on the science of leadership. Having pointed out the failure of the claims of the modern scientific view to authoritative expertise in the field of leadership it will be argued that this necessitates a reappraisal of its postmedieval foundations in a search for why and how modern science fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of leadership.

An examination of the post-medieval foundations of modern science in Chapter Two leads to the literary tradition of the liberal arts in Chapter Three and a defence of what is called the art of leadership. This chapter argues that the art of leadership supersedes the idea of a science of leadership and offers alternative objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. These objective grounds are the literary tradition of the classical liberal arts, being the literature of the art of leadership in the western tradition. It will be argued that this is the correct line to take in reaching towards a proper philosophical body of literature for leadership in higher education.

Having arrived at this point through the literature of the liberal arts, in Chapter Four the mature human intellect affirms that the preferred subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership is the transcendental intellect. Here, it is argued that the transcendental view of leadership carries with it from the faculty of judgement the grounds of the concepts of good and evil. This argument holds a number of counter-intuitive implications for the general view. It is also argued that the transcendental view, drawing from what may

be called the condition of global power, that is, from the faculty of comprehension, accounts for the broadest and most diverse range of perceptions concerning leadership.

Chapter Five will argue that the transcendental view, unlike the general view, is the more credible view because it is more compatible with the unified notion of a university. It will also argue that only the notion of the mature human intellect can support a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The argument in the fifth chapter, then, defends objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. Authoritative works in the philosophical literature are not only objective grounds but also a satisfactory means for the mature intellect in higher education to achieve its moral and ethical ends with purpose, a philosophy of leadership.

I

The argument of the thesis: summary in greater detail

I.i: The expansion of a Kantian cognitive psychology

A foundation for an account of leadership is offered in the expansion of the Kantian faculties (Kant, 2002, pp.44-45, 82-83) that includes the promotion of judgement to a faculty and the addition of a faculty of comprehension. Positing a faculty of comprehension is intended to complete a four part schema of the intellect in which understanding and reason make up the general intellect, while comprehension and judgement comprise the transcendental intellect. The general and transcendental intellects together form a universe of the intellect.

Now, the initial position taken is that an account of leadership is not possible without first apprehending the notion of the mature human intellect as the ultimate addressee of leadership in higher education. To date, the necessity for this seems not to have been considered. Yet, what leadership is and should be must depend in part on to whom it is addressed and in part on the point of the activity. Leadership in a sport differs if the sport is played by amateurs for fun or professionals for the sake of the best performance of the game. Leadership in sport differs from leadership in politics or in architecture.

In addition, leadership in higher education is different from leadership in secondary education. They have different addressees and different points. From the transcendental point of view the usefulness, importance, and relevance of the notion of a morality of leadership in the case of universities will be argued but neutrality will be advocated in

cases such as that of primary, secondary, trade and vocational schools. Some of the differences among these kinds of educational venture may be brought together.

The argument shall also be put that Kant's schema of the human intellect is under-powered. That schema is largely detailed in Kant (1999) and outlined in Kant (2002). Consequently, that schema is not by itself *useful* in grasping the notion of the mature human intellect. To be useful it first needs the addition of a fourth faculty, global understanding, that is, comprehension, for within the faculty of comprehension lay all one's notions. In the vocabulary of the thesis, notions are networks of inter-related ideas, including those of the ideas of morality and of leadership. Thus, on the view propounded, leadership requires morality, morality is a comprehensive notion and so morality requires a faculty of comprehension.

The notion of a faculty of comprehension is that of capacity for dynamic conceptual progress in human understanding. Only then, with a dynamic schema of the mature transcendental intellect, can the notion of leadership in universities be comprehended. The argument for this expansion of Kant's (1999, 2002) cognitive psychology will begin in Section II of this chapter and will be developed in greater detail with an eye to the notion of leadership in Chapter 2 Section IV.

It will be argued that the thesis is *important* because it reveals the workings of a proposed dual system of the general and transcendental intellects in the dynamic universe of the mature human intellect. This is distinct from Kant's (2002) unfinished static three-part schema of the intellect (Kant, pp.44-45, 82-83), which may be consistent with the notion of a maturing intellect but is inadequate for the mature intellect as an intellect in a search with purpose. It will also be argued that the thesis fills a lacuna in Kantian philosophical tradition in this way and that it recognises the separate moral identity of key academic faculty but not those who teach professional courses at universities.

The thesis is *relevant* because it not only provides a way forward for the latter to acquire a firm moral foundation for their thinking when moving from a professional to an academic role, along with the concomitant change in values this may entail, but also provides a way to distinguish the moral and spiritual heart of a university from professional education, which in the view taken in the thesis is honourable and worldly but not at all the essence of a university.

I.ii: The problem with a social scientific approach to leadership

The thesis addresses the problem of the dogmatic tendency to assume a scientific view of leadership in higher education. To address this problem the philosophical view of leadership herein offers a more humanistic alternative. The invasion of science into everyday life and the overwhelming influence of the scientific model of learning and teaching in an expanded university ignite concern as to why this should be so.

The problem, in other words, that motivates this thesis is the fragility of the academic heart of a university and the danger of an unchecked and uncritical scientific teaching and learning model founded in understanding and reason, the lower of the intellectual faculties, overwhelming the core values of western academic traditions. Engagement and revitalisation of the latter requires one to move beyond scientific thinking to the moral and ethical thinking engaged in by the higher faculties of the intellect, comprehension and judgement.

The major problem with a social scientific approach to leadership, then, is that it cannot address the morality and ethics involved in leadership because science uses only the faculties of understanding and reason to understand facts and causes and thereby immediately excludes any consideration of morality and ethics in the name of technique and facts. To do this is to ignore what is valued in a university education.

Hence, because leadership is a notion belonging in the transcendental intellect those who take the scientific approach have misconceived the nature of their topic and thereby fall short of a full understanding of leadership. Because human beings are not just theoretical-rational but also moral beings, when morality and ethics are neglected in favour of a fixation with the scientific approach one's sense of humanity is truncated.

I.iii: Where does an expanded cognitive psychology leave what the field of leadership studies could be?

A transcendental intellect is called for because the ethics, the good, of leadership, and the morality, the right, of leadership need to be taken into account. An adequate account of leadership cannot be grounded at all in the general intellect, which is an intellect comprised of a faculty of understanding and a faculty of reason. However, such an account can be firmly grounded in the transcendental intellect alone, which is made up of the proposed faculties of comprehension and of judgement. A philosophy

of leadership like this can be subjectively grounded in the transcendental intellect whereas the idea of the art of leading (as contrasted to *leadership*) is objectively grounded in the general intellect.

The idea of the art of leading as part of the notion of leadership is a means of egress from an overwhelmingly dogmatic reliance on the scientific way of thinking and calls for an alternative account, a philosophy of leadership. Such an account is needed because only in it can the morality and ethics of leadership appear. Individually, the notion of ideas of leadership in universities necessarily involves professing beliefs from a culture of values (not merely teaching in a culture of skills), the researching of facts and meanings, the exposition of and argumentation for knowledge by lecturing students and the tutoring of academic morality and ethics from within disciplinary matrices. However, without the faculties of comprehension and judgement in the transcendental intellect such a notion of leadership in universities will remain unintelligible to those uninformed by such as professing beliefs and the researching of facts and meanings.

The notion of the mature human intellect is a good subjective ground for a transcendental philosophy of leadership while experience with the writings of traditional authorities in the science, art, and philosophy of leadership is a good objective grounds. The thesis argues that a firm apprehension of the notion of a mature human intellect, indeed, of a transcendental intellect, is necessary before the search for the acquisition of objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership can begin. An expanded cognitive psychology raises awareness of all those intellectual faculties in the possession of an individual and enables a genuine engagement with the literature necessary to argue for a moral and ethical account of leadership.

I.iv: A search for why and how the failure of the claims of modern science to authoritative expertise in the field of leadership necessitates a review of its postmedieval foundations

Before university staff can take up academic roles they first need to hold a clear and distinct representation of the human mind. To achieve this some clarification of existing explanations of the human mind is needed. Arguably, modernity has been too preoccupied with scientific theories of learning. It has largely neglected the development of mentalistic constructs in favour of Behaviourism (Skinner, 1974, 1979), a doctrine that criticised Cognitivism for its mentalistic constructs.

Contrary to the trend favouring Behaviorism, contemporary Functionalist orthodoxy in the Philosophy of Mind tends towards the eliminativism found in Behaviourism in its treatment of the intrinsic nature of the inner life (Chalmers, 1996, pp.161-168, 375-379). On reflection, Behaviourism itself appears to be also just such a construct since it eschews any possibility of the existence of mind and ipso facto bars itself from discussion of a philosophy of mind. Thus, to further knowledge of leadership, especially in higher education, knowledge of the western canon is needed.

In the modern tradition, beginning with the Renaissance, Bacon (1973) resurrected the ancient Greek division between mind and body to place man's soul inside the mind of man. According to Bacon the spirit of man is made up of his imagination, memory, and reason. Bacon's model is thus unlike Descartes' (1912) dual model of mind and body. Further, notably, Bacon's model freed Kant (1999, 2002), and at the time of the Enlightenment, to offer the higher faculties of the mind, understanding and reason, with judgement spanning the two.

To understand Kant's (1999) work, Locke (1924) needs to be read first. However, as representative of the empiricist-scientific tradition, Locke merely furthers an understanding of the science of leading and not of the comprehension of leadership. Locke has little of direct relevance to leadership. An empirical scientific understanding of the concrete concepts of leader and leading can be pursued to a limited extent not only through a careful reading of Locke's *Essay* but also through Bacon (1952)¹. This approach denies the use of notions, thoughts no less, and the freedom to think, because the empirical-scientific way of thinking is about the use of understanding and reason only, that is, causes and effects and their patterns, not about purposes and duties.

Secular authorities have a long tradition of punishing liberal philosophers who have dared to think for themselves. The Athenian criminal Socrates died in defence of *freedom of thought*: "a new morality and faith...[is]...needed...since...traditions were no longer in harmony with the current conditions of life" (Durkheim, 1938, pp.71-72). Contrary to the secular, empirical-scientific outlook, Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c), who valued his faith above all else, was a contemporary and critic of Kant's. He protested against Kant's attempts at formulating the *laws of thought* by pointing out

¹ Book I only.

that what Kant was really doing was laying down the rules of language. Hamann, like Socrates, attested to deeper origins than the general intellect for values and meaning. Both point towards transcendent thought. Specifically, Hamann argues that language, that is reason itself, is a gift of God.

I.v: Researching the post-medieval foundations of modern science leads to the literary tradition of the liberal arts, thereby supplanting the idea of a science of leadership and offering alternative objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership

To verify Hamann's (1995a) assertion one turns to Capella (1977)², a major source document in the medieval-classical liberal arts tradition. Durkheim (1938) analysed Capella's organisation of knowledge into the trivium and quadrivium. His analysis of what constitutes social facts, education and socialisation points to the trivium being about the exploration of the word, that is, God; and the quadrivium about discovering the world (Durkheim, 1938, pp.1-7). In some ways affirming Capella but mainly in order distinctly to represent the trivium of dialectic, rhetoric, and grammar, this thesis chooses Augustine (1975), Cicero (1989b) and Varro (1938) because they are the best that Rome had to offer, along with Euclid (1956) and Plato (1977b, 2000), arguably the best of Athens, to represent Geometry from the quadrivium.

Hamann (1995a) was correct in saying what he did about Kant (1999) because, on comparison, a high degree of geometric *regularity* is found between the arrangement of or manifolds in Kant (1999) and those in Varro (1938), in which the latter argues in favour of the existence of Analogy. Kant's arrangement consists of the transcendental doctrine of elements, the faculties of cognition, the transcendental doctrine of method, the parts of a transcendental analytic and the parts of a transcendental dialectic.

Varro's (1938) arrangement of the argument for the existence of analogy from Book IX includes likenesses in speech, the cause of likeness in speech, the division of speech into its parts, the parts of a logical system of verbs, and regularities in the parts of speech. About this similarity, the thesis urges no other conclusion than that Hamann's (1995a) assertion about Kant (1999) was correct. Without laws of thought the idea of a science of leadership is not possible. That does not imply that the art of leadership is

² This text is based on Varro's long-lost *Nine Disciplines*. See Appendix for a remaining fragment of this.

impossible, nor should it since for at least two millennia the liberal arts have been the keystone in western culture for the education of men to become leaders.³

Not only Hamann's (1995a) objection to Kant (1999) but also an application of Bacon (1973) invites a review of Capella (1977), the germ of the classical tradition in formal education, to comprehend the art of leadership. As just noted, the foundational works of Augustine (1975) on dialectic, Cicero (1989b) on rhetoric, and Varro (1938) on grammar, being themselves a synthesis that this thesis sees as representing the trivium of the liberal arts, offer up substantial material for deliberation on the art of leadership.

However, these readings are objective grounds for furthering leadership and not the subjective grounds sought. The tradition of the liberal arts prompts a reconsideration of Boethius (1897), a Christian and near-contemporary of the pagan Capella. In Boethius (1897) *Philosophia* draws the distinction between fortune and divine providence. From this distinction can be extrapolated a desirable philosophy of leadership grounded not in the *fortune* of understanding and reason of the general intellect (science of leaders and leading) but in the *divine providence* of morality and ethics in the transcendental intellect.

Such is the eulogy for philosophy in, arguably, the source document for the medieval classical tradition of moral philosophy. This is because, *in toto*, the evidence points not to a science of leadership but rather a science of leaders and leading, on top of which the evidence also decisively indicates an art of leading and an art of leadership. On the art of leadership can be constructed a philosophy of leadership. From this vantage point those modern works that are limited to being involved in what is real and true about concrete concepts, theories, and statements about leaders and leading, their causes and effects, can be better discriminated in a preliminary fashion from those that are concerned with what is right and good but at the level of abstract concepts (ideas), notions, and principles of leadership. A philosophy of leadership concerns the latter.

Linking statement

The introduction to this thesis is divided into two parts. Thus far, the first part has provided an outline of the progression of the argument of the thesis in five sections. The first section opened by looking to an expanded Kantian cognitive psychology for a

³ Similar points can be made concerning the education of men to become leaders in Confucian traditions. This thesis confines itself to Western traditions.

foundation for an account of leadership. The initial position taken is that the mature human intellect is a subjective grounds but not by itself a sufficient foundation for an account of leadership.

The second section has asserted that the problem with a social scientific approach is that science is not capable of addressing the morality and ethics of leadership because it does not engage the relevant faculties of the intellect. In the third section an expanded cognitive psychology allows the correct faculties of the intellect to be engaged with objective grounds and this will thereby deliver a more powerful account of leadership than that offered by the general scientific view. The objective grounds advanced by the thesis are those that are articulated in the traditional classical literature.

The fourth section is a guide through what has been expressed by traditional authorities and deemed relevant to the main line of the thesis argument. Ultimately, after this deliberation on traditional classical western literature, the argument progresses in the fifth section through the supplanting of a science of leadership to, as a credible alternative, the idea of the art of leading coupled with the notion of the art of leadership as a means to an ends. That end is a viable account of leadership in universities, which articulates the final position to be taken in the thesis.

That position is that a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education spans both subjective grounds, those grounds being the mature human intellect, and objective grounds, being the liberal arts tradition. Thus the conclusion to the dissertation will be that only with both the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together can the foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education be well-founded.

The second part of this introduction establishes an expanded Kantian cognitive psychology as a new worldview. This part is made up of two sections. The first is on the structure, hermeneutical nature, strengths and limitations of the argument of the thesis. The second section is made up of five subsections. The first is a static model of the intellect of man. The second is a description of the mind and of the mature human intellect. The third subsection builds on the second by developing a revised version of Kant's (1999, 2002) static higher faculties of the mind into a proposed dynamic universe of the mature intellect. The schema of a dynamic universe gives a stronger and

more balanced foundation on which to develop an explication of the transcendental view and to distinguish it from the general view of leadership.

The fourth section, then, is about that schema of the dynamic and expanding universe of the mature human intellect formally expressed in three consecutive propositions: that the scientific view seems to place the concept at the centre of the intellect; that an alternative view puts the principle at the centre of the intellect, and that a philosophical view does not place an idea at the centre of the intellect but that ideas make up notions and the universe of the intellect is made up of clusters or networks of connected notions. A statement on arguing the position taken in the thesis is made in the fifth subsection. Chapter Two will be a critique of the literature on leadership and to a lesser extent on learning. In the meantime an explication of the proposed worldview is needed. The thesis now turns to that.

II

Explanation of the thesis

II.i: The argument of the thesis: structure, nature and scope

This section is designed to provide information on the organisation, composition and procedures used in the explication and evaluation of the argument of the thesis. This will involve demurring from historical analysis in favour of the development of tradition. Clear and frequent statements guide the reader through the progression of the argument of the thesis. These are usually found at the beginning of each chapter or in the different parts of a chapter. Reminders that link a particular stage of the argument back to the central argument of the thesis, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education draw out the importance of that part of the chapter. In the middle chapters on tradition these reminders are placed at the ends of different parts in a chapter or wherever such reminder is deemed necessary.

The aim of the thesis is to find a firm foundation for an account of leadership in higher education. The dissertation defends the thesis that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The research involved entails a corresponding consideration of the sensibility and intelligibility, morality and ethics of leadership along with accounts of

their relationship to the notion of the mature human intellect as well as to that of the idea of a university.

The purpose of the work is to reseat leadership in its proper philosophical context since it was and correctly remains a notion before it was misapprehended and repeatedly misconceived as a scientific concept. The guiding thought in the overall organisation and composition of the thesis is that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

To that end, the early chapters are concerned with the refutation of the idea of a science of leadership because science prohibits any consideration of values. Without values it cannot offer an adequate foundation for the art of leadership or for a philosophy of leadership. The ultimate end for a philosophy of leadership is faith whereas, to be fair-minded, science can provide only a behavioural foundation for the art of leaders and leading. As the thesis argues, behaviour is in and of itself insufficient for a science of leadership since the notion of leadership together with its values and ends, falls outside of the purview of science.

The thought guiding the middle chapters is that the only reasonable basis for an art of leadership or for a philosophy *for* leadership is the duality of language and cognition. Cicero (1989b) on rhetoric and forms of argumentation, Augustine (1975) on dialectic, and Varro (1938) on argument from analogy, regularity and the divisions of speech, provide objective grounds for a philosophy for leadership, with Varro providing the analogy of regularity in the divisions of speech for the schema of stability in a proposed philosophy *of* leadership.

The intention of the expository sections and sections on tradition in the middle part of the thesis is not to provide detailed historical appraisals of the works representing the different subjects of the trivium. Such appraisals in relation to leadership certainly remain a possibility for historical research since they do not appear to be readily available in the mainstream of contemporary research literature on leadership generally or on leadership in higher education. This appraisal of historical research is not the task of this thesis.

Wherever the thesis may vary in accordance with its overall purpose, to show that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, such variation is in accordance with certain volition. Namely that, in the latter chapters, the work proceeds as a piece of writing open to judicious appraisal by making recourse to selected texts in the proper literature of largely contemporary philosophy and not erroneously to writings in science.

II.i.i: Structure of the argument

That a science of leadership is not possible and only a science and art of leaders and leading signals an effective contrast with the art and philosophy of leadership. An art and philosophy of leadership become possible with the inclusion of morality where morality (doing the right thing) is justified by an ethos in which resides deliberation on the absolute Good, not the good relative to a community, organisation, society or the like.

The distancing of leadership from science through the established tradition of the liberal arts precipitates the stark contrast between a scientific and philosophical approach. How this is possible requires an understanding of the liberal arts. What distinguishes the liberal arts from a scientific approach is that it is a firm ground over which both the science of leaders and leading and a philosophy of leadership can pass. Good and moral leaders can be distinguished from real and true leaders by the moral justification they provide for their leadership. Real and true leaders, on the other hand, usually provide some alternative non-moral support to rationalize their leading.

That the work appears to follow a chronological ordering is a merely superficial observation since tradition and not history is the main organising idea of the thesis content. Underlying this ordering in content is the structure that underpins the argument of the whole thesis, which rationally articulates the development of a number of themes and issues. That structure is the classical structure of an argument.

Distinct parts of the structure of the argument are focussed on as the argument of the thesis progresses. The thesis opens with the upfront proposition that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. Positioning this proposition first is useful because the thesis advocates a new transcendental approach to the problem of

leadership. Strategically, the thesis cites the inadequacies of the general scientific view of leadership, as in the second chapter, to make way for a fresh solution to the problem of leadership. By citing the failures of science those models or analyses are put to one side, thereby providing a context for the thesis.

The introduction to each chapter provides the background and any facts necessary to understand that stage of the overall argument and to evaluate any illustrations given in support of the justification of that stage of the overall argument of the thesis. The introduction to Chapter Two, *Critique of the science of leadership*, describes the current situation with regard to leadership studies, pointing to the deficiencies of both theoretical and empirical works on what was assumed to be leadership and offers an explanation for this condition of moral and ethical deficiency. The introduction to Chapter Three, *In defence of the art of leadership*, refers to a small number of relevant issues that take in both literary and cognitive aspects in defending the art of leadership, explains the situation, and then briefly outlines the transcendental position with regard to the argument for the art of leadership.

In the introduction to Chapter Four, *Subjective grounds in the transcendental intellect for a philosophy of leadership*, the situation with regard to a defence of a philosophy of leadership, necessitating the defence of both objective and subjective grounds, is explained before the circumstances regarding the intellect are outlined. The introduction to the final chapter, Chapter Five, *Objective grounds for the defence of a philosophy of leadership*, provides a starting position for the chapter, some definitions, associations and procedures necessary to orient the reader prior to giving literary evidence in support of the last stage of the argument.

This background, provided in this chapter, Chapter One, the introduction to the thesis, is intended to afford the reader with the necessary information that enables an understanding of the issues in the argument that follows. It is a preparation for and orientation to the argument and not the argument itself. The introduction informs while the argument is intended to persuade. Hence, Chapter Two in the structure of the argument is the refutation of any science of leadership. The weakness in a scientific treatment of leadership is the central proposition that leadership originates in behaviour whereas a transcendental position identifies behaviour as merely a mode of expression of leadership and not leadership itself.

A proposition suggested by this thesis, that values and ends are at the heart of leadership, is a proposition that science cannot refute since it renounced any claim to matters concerning morality and ethics. This lack of consideration of values and morality is illustrated in Chapter Two, which is the refutation of a science of leadership. Here, in three works, each from politics, economics and education, not one considered morality or values in its conception of what was assumed to be leadership.

Hence, due to the limitations of its methods, science attempted to reach what was in reality an unattainable goal, the comprehension of leadership by means of the general intellect. Chapter Two will critique the evidence that science used in its investigations into leadership. It will be found that any treatment of leadership using scientific methods alone is unjust and short-sighted and statements such treatments made were uninformed by morality and ethics.

In refuting a science of leadership, the thesis claims that any so-called science of leadership would be so myopic that its goals in relation to leadership would be unattainable. Simultaneously advocating empirical results it excluded any consideration of morality and ethics. Thus it could not take into account individual cases of values and ends in leadership so it was unable to complete the process of comprehending leadership. However, the thesis does acknowledge that science continues to play a noteworthy role in understanding and promulgating knowledge of leaders and leading, taken as empirical realities.

The empirical knowledge acquired by science is necessary for a complete understanding of leadership; after all, the thesis realistically acknowledges that behaviour is a major mode of expression of leadership. Recognising a science of leaders and leading in Chapter Two is not unique. In the following chapter the thesis also recognizes an art of leaders and leading. Nevertheless, a science and an art of leaders and leading both exclude values and ends whereas this dimension is central to the art and philosophy of leadership.

If the inclusion of morality or ethics is raised as an objection to the thesis proposition that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education then the antagonist is reminded that including both the general and transcendental views has the distinct

advantage of including morality, that which is more relevant than science and its preoccupation with origins and value-neutrality because values and ends lay at the hub of both philosophy and leadership. A single objection does not invalidate the thesis statement and besides, the comprehension of leadership in its completeness is a far better solution to the problem of leadership than a detached, fragmented or partial understanding.

So far, after an introduction to the argument, the refutation of a science of leadership and a concession to a science of leaders and leading in Chapter Two and a concession to the art of leaders and leading in Chapter Three, the next stage of the overall argument will be opened. This stage of confirmation of the thesis proposition includes the three latter chapters of the thesis and concerns a defence of the art of leadership, subjective grounds in the transcendental intellect for a philosophy of leadership and objective grounds for the defence of a philosophy of leadership in higher education, respectively. The last of these is an exploration into the objective evidence for the need for a philosophy of leadership in the case of higher education.

The confirmation stage of the argument first needs a summary review of the main argument of the thesis. That is: (i) the failure of modern science in the field of leadership necessitates a review of its postmedieval foundations (Ch. 2); (ii) researching the post-medieval foundations of modern science leads to the literary tradition of the liberal arts. (Ch. 2); (iii) the mature human intellect affirms the literature of the classical liberal arts to be the literature of the art of leadership (Ch. 3); (iv) the mature intellect is subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership (Ch. 4); and that (v) the classical tradition is also objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in higher education (Ch. 5); with the thesis concluding that only then can it be seen that the mature human intellect and the classical tradition of the liberal arts together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

Each chapter in the thesis is a stage in a rational argument, an argument in which the evidence is collected in ways that can be checked. Now, the confirmation stage does not directly prove the thesis proposition but checks the method used to collect the cases in point. The method used to collect examples is the critical method. The critical method does not directly address the thesis proposition but addresses how the examples were collected. To understand how each demonstration supports the evidence for the

causal schema in the confirmation, a weighing of the facts and a setting out of the logic need to be related to the main proposition. The argument is logical if each step rises out of the previous step and is clearly linked to it. The evidence of this will be through testimony or by analogy.

In defence of the art of leadership the mature intellect may affirm that the literature of the classical liberal arts is the literature of the art of leadership. The argument arising from such an affirmation may relate to the fundamental proposition that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education by confirming that the audience for what Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), and Varro (1938) wrote were the leaders of Rome.

What Capella (1977) wrote includes works drawn from what these three paragons wrote. Capella's writing is a foundational work in the medieval literature of the classical liberal arts. If this pivotal work continues to be read in modern times by those intending to fill positions of leadership and by those who do fill these offices then with this evidence the argument that the literature of the classical liberal arts is the literature of the art of leadership would be compelling.

However, that the proposition that the mature human intellect is subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership relates to the main thesis proposition that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education confirms that by analogy with the work of Varro (1938) in the classical liberal arts tradition the mature human intellect through the use of its general intellect can prescribe only a philosophy *for* leadership and not deduce a philosophy *of* leadership from the work of Varro. A philosophy *of* leadership can arise only through the transcendental intellect of the mature human intellect. Without a transcendental intellect with its values and ends a philosophy of leadership is not possible.

In the fifth chapter, the generation and exploration of a philosophy of leadership in higher education is initiated by a mature subjectivity of the transcendental intellect cognisant of both subjective and objective grounds in the main thesis proposition that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition, which only together can comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. This demonstration is in support of the causal schema in the confirmation stage of the

argument. Essentially, this confirmation stage, an appeal to reason, shows how each argument relates to the main proposition and the stages of thinking that lead to the conclusion that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

In closing the argument and by way of conclusion, restated here is the main proposition that opened the thesis, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The evidence for this is worked through to reinforce the need for the transcendental view, the new stance that this thesis takes on leadership. Any treatment of leadership that includes morality and ethics, which are at the heart of leadership, is a just and worthwhile position to take since it closes a gap in knowledge. By rational argument deficit models that project misunderstandings of leadership are put to one side and replaced with a more rounded and convincing perspective that includes the transcendental.

Generally, the thesis, then, progresses through different stages by focussing on distinct parts of the underlying structure of the argument advanced. What determines where a particular point is discussed and where earlier stages in the development of the thesis argument are discussed is where an important stage in the development of the argument has been reached. In this way the focus throughout the thesis remains on the formulation of the argument and not on the models or main ideas of those leading thinkers selected to appear at a particular point in the thesis.

Neither history nor historical analysis but the need for the reorganization of an understanding of leadership guides the development of the thesis argument. This results in a critical departure from the dogma of science, a radical return to classical literature, and the restructuring of leadership in the province of philosophy to achieve through global thinking that which science could not do, full comprehension of leadership. With leadership properly reformed into a philosophy, the argument could then be extended into contemporary leadership in higher education. In this way the argument avoids contributing to a quasi-science or to the myth of a (social or psychological) science of leadership.

The argument breaks with contemporary *scientistic* misconstructions that have ignored most if not all the existing classical literature on leadership. This classical literature

provides firmer objective grounds for an art and a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude values, which is the essence of leadership. This established literature provides a unity and breadth for leadership that science cannot. The argument is motivated by the desire to uncover the truth about leadership. That desire involves the calculated rejection of a scientific view through the literary vehicle of the liberal arts to make a proper philosophical stand on leadership. Guiding movement along this path is a complex and difficult task. Interpretations of the exemplary models or ideas of leading thinkers punctuate but do not usurp the focus in each stage along the path the argument follows. Such a procedure thus allows the focus to remain on the formulation of the argument and not on the works that appear.

The argument passes from the rejection of any science of leadership to a defence of the art of leadership and of the philosophy of leadership. These clear stages in the development of the argument are guided by a single yet complex and dominant question that if leadership falls outside the domain of the dogma of science then where does it belong? Science cannot handle leadership because it rejects any consideration of values. Values are the essence of leadership.

That being the case, the thesis picks up what science cannot handle and, through the vehicle of the literature of the liberal arts, takes the inquiry into leadership to where it properly belongs, into the province of philosophy. The discipline of philosophy because values and ends are its very concern. After demonstrating the evidence for this, with support from the literature of the liberal arts, only then can the thesis draw the conclusion for the position it assumes, that indeed the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

The movement from art to philosophy is not an easy one because movement is not all in the same direction. One may argue that the literature of the liberal arts is the final resting place for leadership but this is not the case because the literature of the liberal arts conveys both the art of leading and of leadership, although in opposite directions. In one direction, real leaders point to what they do and what they have achieved and true leaders rationalise their role in society through oratory, publically accountable justification explained in speech. Such reasoning carries them in their position.

Going in the other direction, moral leaders stamp their leadership and their explanation of it with the ontological hallmark of the rightness of their deeds. Good leaders are deontological. They justify what they do also by using the justification of publically accountable speech but entirely on the basis of the rightness of what they do because they can see that their duty, what they do, relates to grounds, that is, the goodness of their cause.

To return to the point about the movement from art to philosophy, the classical literature of the liberal arts, the basis for an art of leadership or for a philosophy *for* leadership, is an objective representation of language while the universe of the intellect is a subjective representation of cognition. The literature of the liberal arts and the universe of the intellect are an analogy for language and cognition. The analogy signifies the importance of retaining a stable foundation that engenders the rendering of a comprehensive representation, a complete picture of leadership.

Unlike a repetitive string of attempts to merely analyse leadership, the whole picture reveals the dual nature of leadership. The thesis reaches for the end that faith is the only ultimate ground for a philosophy of leadership. This is an end that transcends the thesis' statement that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

II.i.ii: Hermeneutical nature of the argument

The argument is driven by a steady purpose to return leadership to its proper context and not to give an historical account of thought about leadership. Once this is achieved the thesis proceeds to argue how the notion of leadership works in higher education. If both aspects, analytical and dialogical, are not considered then the absence of one renders the whole notion inoperable. The argument is not contingent on a commonplace definition of leadership offered as a given at the beginning of the thesis but in the spirit of Augustine (1958) the thesis moves step by step towards a philosophy of leadership, not stopping at a description or explanation but arguing each step with authoritative contemporary philosophical support for the proof of the arrived-at schema of leadership.

In the latter chapters of the thesis support for a philosophy of leadership is largely sought amongst authorities in contemporary philosophical enquiry and debate.

Nowhere is it in the first instance intended to appeal to the history of philosophy per se,

although philosophy is partly constitutive of history and its history partly constitutive of philosophy. Further, at no stage is the philosophy *of* leadership equated to the history of science or to the history of the liberal arts. In the liberal arts, Varro (1938) and his system of regularity is ground for a philosophy *for* leadership but that is as far as the liberal arts can go. To go further would be to damage the borders between the art and philosophy of leadership. That system of regularity is an analogy, a stepping stone to a system of stability in the proffered philosophy *of* leadership.

A philosophy *of* leadership is broader in scope than any art of leadership since it recognises the role of values, faith and the Good, something that the art of leadership cannot immediately do by which is meant that the art of leadership can only discriminate the coterminous act of leading from the act of leadership by the latter's use of moral justification. The earlier and middle chapters or sections that are interpretive of documents in a tradition demonstrate that the thesis argument and its corroborative evidence is consistently hermeneutical in nature and neither polemical nor dogmatic in outlook.

An underlying theme that runs steadily throughout the thesis is that of the interplay between the idea of leadership and the notion of leadership in higher education and the narrowing and broadening of the scope of the thesis between the idea of leadership and a philosophy of leadership in higher education. Doing this prepares the reader for the final chapter on a philosophy of leadership in higher education. In that chapter for a philosophy of leadership in universities to be attained due attention needs be given to freedom of thought and traditional authority and the resolution of the conflict in priority of one over the other. Such a conflict is seen to be resolved in traditional authority making freedom of thought its priority. In this way, both freedom of thought, representing humanity, and traditional authority, representing justice, are served.

Only after the documentary evidence is tested and justified can the rational conclusion be drawn that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The use in this thesis of classical texts in the philosophical and liberal arts traditions are to be seen in this light. Neither the general intellect nor the transcendental intellect alone can arrive at this conclusion in some preconceived a priori way. However, after inductive analysis of the documented literature can the mature human intellect be certain, a posteriori, of

drawing a satisfactory conclusion to the thesis. In the following, consideration will be given to some of the strengths and limitations of the overall position taken and the procedure undertaken in the thesis. Firstly, a few strengths will be considered.

II.i.iii: Strengths of the argument and refutation of any implied affirmation of the primacy of historical analysis over the development of tradition

The focus of the argument on traditions and leadership marks a break with other works that merely assume that the scientific, historical or political science approach can be organised around leadership and that this is the correct approach simply because it is familiar or because it serves current needs. Since an imperative of a philosophical thesis is gradually to unfold the argument in a logical manner, the exegetical is merely indicative, by which is meant that no compulsion exists to consider it in detail given the inherent delimitations of the thesis and the priority afforded to expounding the argument of the thesis.

Now, if others, including those of a scientific inclination are to be addressed then, for any possibility of success in persuading them of the merits of the proposed approach and the justice of the espoused cause, one is obliged to use the empirical language with which they are familiar. This imperative is met to some extent in the examination of classical texts. However, this dialogue with scientific approaches to leadership studies is not the central point of that examination. The intention here being what it is, the relevance of the classical texts is to draw attention to what already exists in order for a philosophy of leadership not to lose its hold on tradition, since it is from history that the art of leaders and leading draws its rationalisation. This is unlike those who hold philosophies of leadership which look to tradition and authorities in that tradition to justify their deeds.

Further, the thesis does not work from an alleged a priori consensus or impose a false regularity on change. Rather it endeavours to highlight that changes wrought in tradition are brought about by conflict and agreement. Most notable was the deleterious effect of the 1864 Taunton Commission (Shrosbree, 1988), which upset the continuity of the literature of the liberal arts as the literature of the art of leadership, a tradition long-established from the decline of the Roman world. That tradition was the medieval classical tradition of the liberal arts and of moral philosophy.

This thesis argues for the reformation of this tradition, a tradition broken by that of science. In that revolution science damaged the form that leadership takes. Hence, the middle chapters do not focus on a narrow and juridical conception of leadership as the behaviour of leaders and leading in the court of science but are preoccupied with the tradition of the liberal arts in which the idea of the skills of leadership rest. By so doing the scope of what leadership is may be broadened to include the notion of morality and the idea of values in philosophies of leadership.

Moreover, a further strength of the thesis is that it offers the idea of the expansion of the intellect. This idea is based on the rejection of current scientific models of leadership and is intended to attract contemporary social science to classical heritage since science has failed to resonate with the persuasiveness of art, preferring to attempt to explain leadership away with social, psychological, economic, geographical, and political factors. Illustrations of this will be addressed in Section 2.II. Art shows that not only leaders and leading but also leadership can be better explained not just intuitively through analysis or geometry but also rationally and morally through rhetoric, dialectic and grammar. Although art indicates this, it is not within its province to do all of this. Rather, the burden of responsibility for explanation and argumentation on leadership belongs to philosophy. The weight of evidence is in favour of the argument proceeding correctly thus and not the way of the quasi-science that most of what is called leadership studies has become.

Refutation of any implied affirmation of the primacy of historical analysis over the development of tradition

The thesis is concerned with both the form and content of three different traditions, science, art and philosophy, and which combination or permutation is a best fit for leadership. It is not primarily concerned with the historical analysis of leadership. If it were then the analysis of source materials would be complemented with the evaluation of such analysis since this combination forms the basis for the writing of history. That does not mean to say that the analysis of source materials and the evaluation of source materials are scholarly disciplines exclusive to the writing of history.

Analysis and evaluation of source materials are also methods used in the establishment, development and diffusion of tradition. A distinction between history and tradition is that historical writing would follow the scientific tradition of evaluating its analysis of

source materials in terms of the method it uses. On the other hand, where tradition is concerned, source materials are directly evaluated in terms of the point of view taken. The thesis, then, certainly does not employ historiography, that is, the principles, theories, or methods of historical research or writing.

Historical analysis is about the movement between two points in the past or between the past and the present to study variations of and constancy in values, beliefs and practices over time and their interpretation in different ideological, social, and political frameworks. History attempts to explain trends and events. The present thesis does none of that. If historical analysis were used then in different sections in each chapter the evaluation following each explication would include, for example, comparison and contrast between Burns (1978), Porter (1990), Wang (2008) and Bacon (1952, 1973), Locke (1924), Kant (1999, 2002); between those of Bacon, Locke, Kant and Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), Varro (1938). The thesis simply neither does that nor is there any intention to so do.

What the thesis does is explicate and discuss certain works in a tradition to evaluate which is the best fit for leadership and thus clarify matters for argument. For example, from Varro in the traditional literature of the liberal arts is drawn a philosophy *for* leadership and by analogy with this a philosophy *of* leadership can be constructed. That an explanation of leadership can only be completed in the proper literary context of moral philosophy is argued for; such explanation is then illustrated in the setting of higher education. The illustration being, as classical rhetorical theory would put it, proof of the reason (Cicero, 1989b), is in its turn supported with appropriate justification.

This clarification is necessary because what is at stake here is, ironically, the credibility of the authority of modern science with regard to leadership. Although reliable in explaining leaders and the behaviour called leading when it comes to addressing the notion of leadership the fitness of science to the purpose of the thesis becomes clearly uncertain. Added to this is the dawning realisation that science itself may appear to be causing the very factors that it ostensibly analyses. Supporting this doubt is the use of the concepts of vision, culture, strategy, and structure in both leadership and learning studies (Denton, 1998; Wang, 2008). On this basis alone one is yet to be convinced that

leadership is a proper subject of study for social science. After all, not everything needs to be or can be investigated.

For historical analysis to request readers to relate values, beliefs, and practices found in one text to a time different from that in which the text was written is a misguided one. This is because although a sense of what was written by an author may be acquired, the precise meaning of what was written may not be captured by an unintended audience in different times. The confounding point here is that in thought, common sense says that conceptualising takes place in the intellect to arrive at a generalisation as a result of something observed, experienced or believed. Yet in writing the expectation is that one moves in the opposite direction, from the general to the specific, since without the general no argument is possible. This kind of explanation of the relationship between thought and language is vexatious.

One cannot here avoid saying that this thesis takes the classical structure of an argument by using the direct approach in terms of the point of view held. It opens with the thesis proposition, outlines it and then sets about demonstrating it. Summarily, the aim of the thesis is to find a firm foundation for an account of leadership in higher education. The dissertation defends the proposition that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. In brief outline, the research involved entails a corresponding consideration of the sensibility and intelligibility, morality and ethics of leadership along with accounts demonstrating their relationship to the notion of the mature human intellect, to the classical tradition, and to the idea of a university.

The thesis is committed to demonstrating the different parts of the thesis proposition. The early chapters concern the mature human intellect and the refutation of science alone in any credible account of leadership. The task of the middle chapters is to explicate what scientific, liberal arts and philosophical authorities have to say and to then relate this not to what others have had to say as in historical analysis but back to the main argument of the thesis. Without emphasising the distinctive and striking features of the major contributions of each authority and deliberating on each contribution in the argument of the thesis it would not be possible to arrive at the conclusion that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

At no stage is the thesis a *sequential* account, as it may superficially appear, but as attested to in the middle chapters and in that part on the classical tradition of the liberal arts, which include rhetoric, dialectic and grammar, it is a *developmental* account. The development of tradition is a problem for history and critique to be sure but that is not the issue here. Tradition is about the explication and implication of beliefs held in common and their critical development. It is about the endurance of values often expressed through vital issues raised by practical realities. The thesis is concerned with both the forms of tradition and with their content, so that it may be seen how, by explication and implication, values shape the idea of a philosophy of leadership and the notion of a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

The tradition of the liberal arts values the forms of rhetoric, dialectic, and grammar of the trivium and it is these values that the works of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), and Varro (1938) embody. Thus, the thesis acknowledges and indeed develops the theme of advancement in tradition, which is seen to be quite compatible with philosophical argumentation but not with historical analysis. Hence, the function of this refutation of any appearance that the thesis is an historical analysis is intended to avoid what is extraneous to the thesis, a debate between tradition and history, which are putatively irreconcilable extensions. Having considered a number of strengths of the thesis a few of the limitations of the thesis will now be considered. These limitations are due to the nature of the position the thesis takes and the procedure it follows, with some of its features being distinctive yet problematic.

II.i.iv: Limitations of the thesis argument

First, by summarising and paraphrasing the works of the authors chosen and the use of the distinction between global and linear thought literary justice is done to that author's traditional (not historical) setting; to the integrity of the work, especially to the orderly and systematic way in which each authority presents the content of the work; to the different rhetorical and methodological strategies each author uses; and to the important differences between authorities within the same tradition.

Next, the question of leadership is a traditional-philosophical rather than a descriptive-explanatory one. Thus, it is an issue for philosophical adjudication and not historical review. In the absence of a strictly formal definition of leadership the use of one's judgement is needed in determining the nature of leadership. In making that

determination readers should evaluate the role of values in leadership and then make up their own minds.

Outlining the key influences, changes and continuities the liberal arts may engender for leadership is surely defensible because this procedure buttresses philosophical argumentation by supporting the proof of the reason, that is, the work of Capella (1977). Capella's work is a demonstration of the objective grounds needed for a philosophy of leadership. This philosophical matter of form takes primacy over satisfying non-philosophical readers with historical needs that Capella is crucial in connecting the medieval and the modern with the legacy of Rome.

On the matter of historical needs, adopting the standpoint of different authorities without testing or demonstrating historical truth or plausibility implies the need for self-evaluation, which requires the recounting of what those authorities believed to be the case. This is a problem because what needs to be asked is on what traditional-philosophical grounds can the identification of leadership with values and with philosophies be justified. Readers expect the thesis' descriptions or explications of the works of these authorities to be at least supplemented with its own evaluations of these works in relation to leadership.

Again, the use of scientific factors fails to explain leadership because this approach does not furnish one with an adequate philosophical interpretation of leadership. Less irksome is to adopt the standpoint of one's protagonists. Doing this does not, however, provide any explicit evaluation of their works but this is a procedure that is entirely justifiable. The value of doing this illustrates the *coinherence* (Williams, 1943, p.92), by which is meant an inherent spiritual fellowship with like minds, of authorities in the literature of the liberal arts with the mature intellects of likeminded individuals to comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. Following this procedure is however problematic for the scientifically inclined because it does not instantiate *congruence* at the level of analysis between the literature of the liberal arts and the literature of the philosophy of leadership.

Due to this *coinherence* with authorities in the liberal arts and a lack of *congruity* between the literatures of the liberal arts and of philosophy, contemporary philosophy thus sets the agenda of issues and authorities throughout the thesis' argument. The literary approach taken to leadership is consistent with the mature subjectivity of the

human intellect. Authorities in the liberal arts tradition are chosen because only they and not the precluded scientific approach can collectively furnish a ground intermediary to a philosophy of leadership.

The thesis does not bring into conflict the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition to brook a sustained argument that only one of these is a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. *Coinherence* is a major reason for the procedure chosen to describe and explain art to be the vehicle that moves leadership away from science. This may go some way to assuaging any concern contemporaries may have regarding the plausibility of such a choice. For of immediate concern to the modern mind is that this particular selection of authorities may be seen to displace mainstream models like those of Hume (1975) or Hegel (1971), which are more representative of a contemporary philosophical culture that assumes these rather than debating alternatives.

Next again, but on an historical tack, since the 1864 Taunton Commission (Shroobree, 1988) contemporary perceptions of leadership have been alienated from, if not outright consciously opposed to, the classical tradition. If these authorities were to be engaged then the thesis would be obliged to expand into a tome extending far beyond the modest nature of this contribution. Suffice it to say, the Taunton Commission at least stood for changes in education that were made in the light of changes wrought by the industrial revolution.

Prior to the Commission, the classical tradition of the liberal arts was critical to the good education of future leaders. That Commission essentially argued to replace the liberal arts on the grounds of the effects of industrialisation, for example, a greater popular demand for education. Today, correspondingly, those who advocate that industrialisation has been superseded by the knowledge economy might be expected to admit that education must be reformed around the liberal arts or a satisfactory alternative. This admission is, however, nowhere to be found. Regardless, reformed it must be.

Lastly, the intention of the thesis is not to reconstruct contemporary philosophy but to revise the foundation on which knowledge of leadership is based and doing this not in some arbitrary fashion but to argue rationally what science and art have to offer with the innumerable riches that philosophy has to offer. The thesis chooses a philosophical

approach to leadership on rational and defensible grounds. It does not set about the complete and comprehensive development of a philosophy of leadership, for that is not its purpose, but seeks the beginnings of an exploration of leadership in higher education.

A purpose of the thesis is to show that leadership may be conveyed from the scientific domain by art and properly placed in the domain of philosophy in order to do this. Other contributors may use the authorities with whom they *coinhere* to enhance their fellows' understanding of leadership. Through rational argumentation and dialogue various interpretations and reconstructions of leadership will continue to be discussed in the light of morality. Until one can take a perfect view of leadership, the place of this contribution in the field of endeavour remains to be seen.

II.i.v: Summary

Summarily, to level the criticism against this thesis that it includes chapters of historical analysis that is improperly conducted is only a superficial criticism motivated by an historical bias. The real significance of these superficially historical chapters lies in relation to the thesis' argument and to critical interest in formal issues of methodology and conceptualisation (or generalisation). The thesis' argument moves against a science of leadership through the art of leadership to a philosophy of leadership. The methodology of the argument is manifest in its using the liberal arts as a replacement for further reflection on an impotent scientific approach to leadership, an approach that repeatedly assumes itself to be the mainstream approach but in reality is by itself an alternative marginal to the proper philosophical approach to leadership.

It is not the viability and credibility of the established but hidden philosophical approach to leadership that is at stake here but the motives of the arrogator. A spirit that is out-rightly dismissive of the liberal arts is neither in possession of the academic spirit of open minded enquiry or conscious of the intrinsic capacity of the liberal arts to re-appropriate artefacts from that which has devalued the literature of the liberal arts. Once re-appropriated, these objects, like the idea of leadership, are reinterpreted to generate philosophies of leadership, which is wholly justified despite potential disagreement as to what these may comprise.

Both the liberal arts and philosophy, then, reinterpret leadership. The liberal arts reinterprets leadership in terms of language and Philosophy reinterprets leadership in

terms of argumentation and in relation to schemas of values and ends. If the proposed philosophy of leadership is ultimately shared by others or not is immaterial since what is important is that leadership is recognised as having been re-seated in its proper domain, that of philosophy.

II.ii: Towards a new worldview for a philosophy of leadership in higher education

II.ii.i: A concrete model of the mature intellect of man

In that domain lays preoccupation with the human person being made up of mind, body, and spirit⁴. On the mind of man, this thesis posits that the mind is made up of the intuition, intellect, affect, and volition and that the faculties of the intellect are understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement. Through these intellectual faculties pass interpretations of the subject matter of authoritative writers in the classical tradition. This subject matter is the analytic, which is diversely exemplified in and by the geometry of Euclid (1956); the rhetoric of Cicero (1989b); the dialectic of Augustine (1975); and critical dialogue, which is represented by the grammar of Varro (1938). These can be aligned, but not in any fixed one to one correspondence, with the preliminary objects of the intellect, which are concepts, ideas, notions, and principles, to represent a starting position for a new cognitive psychology or worldview.

These preliminary objects of the intellect will be later superseded with more sophisticated forms of beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition).⁵ With the interpenetration of ideas this latter schema will be advanced with propositions, paragraphs, compositions and debates.⁶ Decidedly, the term composition refers to the classical rhetorical position but more largely to any relevant formulated position. Pro tem, these preliminary objects comprise a dynamic and expanding prototypical universe of the intellect through the *interpenetration* of ideas from the static faculties of the intellect.

Impressions upon the mind of man are of the following general kinds: empirically sensible; rationally intelligible; the righteous and wrongful, concerning virtue and vice, what is moral; and the good and evil, which concerns duty, what is ethical. The obverse of these kinds of impression comprise their preliminary methods of expression through

⁴ Discussion on the soul of man and issues of substance dualism is not the immediate concern of this thesis. Plato's (1977b) model of reason, emotion and appetite (Plato, pp.46, 97-105) is an example of what makes up the soul.

⁵ See in this chapter, Section II.iii, Progress through holding a worldview.

⁶ Ibid.

the word, sentence, paragraph, and composition. Demonstration, persuasion, conviction, and critical dialogue are the means by which impressions are rendered manifest in the mind.

Now, rather than being at a loss as to what to do with a chaotic manifold of representations of things lying unmoving in segregated faculties moving relative to only one another, these concepts of static and segregated representations can be taken and exchanged for a more profitable currency of knowledge. That currency is the explication and justification of a purpose that fixes a bearing in the universe of the intellect such that that aim is corrected to align with that purpose.

Here, the conception of the universe of the intellect is projected as dynamic. It is much like an expanding, moving orb or sphere⁷ regulated by *a law of partial order* over the objects of the intellect, governed by the purpose of the intellectual life. The important points in this section are, first, that the *interpenetration* of ideas between the parts of the mind is the dynamism for the mature intellect, its faculties, their operations and mutual relations and effects on one another. That the understanding processes sense data and that reason brings order to this sense data. Also, understanding and reason, comprehension and judgement all interact, relate to, and influence the other parts of the mind, namely the affect, the intuition and volition.

Secondly, each part or faculty has its corresponding object and discipline but because of this *interpenetration of ideas* they all affect one another. The importance of the *interpenetration* of ideas is stressed as a dynamism that gives the intellect direction towards a purpose that is justified and morally-grounded. Without it the dynamic activity, mutual relations and effects among and in the different parts of the intellect to the mind will be chaotic and arbitrarily governed by whim, cynicism, fashion or the like. The need for moral comprehension and ethical judgement is most important and this is stressed because without these the general intellect is moribund, without moral compass or direction, and, really, without point.

II.ii.ii: Description of an inventory of the mind and of the mature human intellect

Through a logic in which “the connections between human power and human knowledge are affirmed” (Bacon, 1973, pp.135-137), in other words, between the

⁷ Parmenides’ goddess may have imagined the static, unchanging eternity of Being as (the bulk of) a perfect sphere (McKirahan, 2010, pp.148, 163). However, the sphere in this thesis grows and moves.

faculties of comprehension and understanding, the purpose of this section is to begin to demonstrate the initial association of geometry, called analysis, with the faculty of understanding, rhetoric with reason, dialectic with the faculty of comprehension, and grammar, called critical dialogue or discussion, with judgement. Geometry is the analytic because geometry can break down shapes and place these into equations working on the basis of intuition that, for example, one is always one or a line is the shortest distance between two points. This need not be explicitly stated but if this piece of intuition is deviated from then mention needs to be made that in this alternative universe, for instance, a planar line is not the geodesic in non-flat spaces. Under Geometry, the first of Capella's (1977) quadrivium, a picture of what is to come can now be sketched.

The quadrivium is comprised of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and harmony while the trivium is made up of dialectic, rhetoric, and grammar. Geometry contributes to the proposed arrangement by emphasising the sameness in rhetoric, dialectic, and grammar and thereby claims to have knowledge of these. In so doing the clue, given by Hamann (1995a) and as in 2.IV.iv below, is followed up and the patterns of language and thought that are maintained in the universe of the intellect can be unveiled.

In a rational arrangement for the mature human intellect, the faculties of the mind are the intuition, intellect, affect, and volition. The faculties of the intellect are the understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement. The preliminary objects of the intellect are the concept, idea, notion, and principle, as already noted. The subject matter of the intellect is the analytic, rhetoric, dialectic, and grammar. The method of linguistic expression of the intellect is provisionally comprised of the word, sentence (proposition or statement), paragraph, and composition (largely the position formulated and taken in conjunction with the argument that follows), which is the possibility of the expression of complete understanding, that is, comprehension.

Next, being one faculty of the mind, the intuition is of the empirical, intellectual, pure, or relational kind. The parts of the intellect are the understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement. The kinds of affect are *inter aliis*, for a higher cause, aesthetic, for the appreciation of beauty, desire and pleasure, and emotion or passion. The kinds of will are of the individual, of society, which is of the collective and

associative by nature, of nature, which is commutative, and of God, which is distributive or providential.

In short, the faculties of the intellect are understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement. The understanding, following Kant (1999), is made up of quantity, quality, relationality, and modality. Reason can be inductive or deductive (syllogistic); analogical or -to add to Kant- ampliative. Comprehension is of the representation of the abstract thing (object), of the word (sign), of the notion (thought), and of the action. Again following Kant (1999, 2002), judgement is empirical, pure, reflective, or determining. The complexities of these determinations for the faculties of the mature intellect are of a compounding nature in their interpenetrations and have caused the utmost trouble in their construction but such details are another matter and need not detain the thesis here.

In addition, the objects of the intellect are the concept, idea, notion (thought), and principle. The *concept* is of the understanding, an idea is of reason, a notion or thought is of the comprehension, and a principle is of judgement. *Ideas* are simple or complex, great or common, which can be new, old, or current, concrete or abstract, or of the transcendental, that is, critical kind. A *notion* is a system of complex ideas. *Dialectica* are comprised of a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis of the two, all three making up a comprehensive, that is, *global* aggregations of ideas called a cluster or network of connected *notions* that can be ordered into a *linear* set of thoughts for their linguistic expression in for example paragraphs and compositions.

Following this and after Capella (1977) in the subject matter of the intellect, the *Analytic* or Geometric is made up of, in the terminology of geometry, proposition (axioms and postulates), definition, construction (of the argument), demonstration and proof, and conclusion. In terms of its purposes, *Rhetoric* is comprised of the matter, its arrangement, diction, memory and delivery. The canons of *Dialectic* include terms, complete utterances (which are non-propositional sentences called statements that include, for instance, questions and commands), propositions, syllogisms, criticism (of poetry), and oratorical style. The parts of *Grammar* are letters, literature, the man of letters, and literary style. The parts of *a speech*, according to Capella (1977), are introduction, narrative, statement of the case, proof and argument, and the peroration.

After that, the preliminary methods of the linguistic expressions of the mature intellect are: (a) the word, which covers kinds of words, parts of words, and according to Augustine (1975) their significance as *verbum*, *dicibile*, *dictio*, and *res*; (b) the sentence which is of the simple, compound, minor, complex, or compound-complex kind; (c) the paragraph, the kinds of which are of analysis, of description, of comparison and contrast, of analogy, and of definition; and (d) the composition, the kinds of which are narration, description, explanation, argument, discussion, and evaluation. The expressions of the mature intellect, firmly anchored in nature in their correspondence with different parts and functions of the brain in which such activity has been recorded (Marcotte, Cobb Scott, Kamat, & Heaton, 2010, pp.1-38), are verbal, both written (linguistic signs) and spoken (linguistic utterance, which includes oratory), spatial, and logical.

Subsequently, the parts of a complete thought in a standard paragraph are ordered such that a topic sentence is first given. This is then followed by an example, preferably from experience, followed by an appeal to reason, usually of the Socratic form of why and because rather than taking the form of the major premise in a mixed hypothetical syllogism, and by an appeal to authority. On these principles of experience, of reason, and of authority, kinds of principles, in part after Kant (1999, 2002), constitutive, regulating, universal, or particular, can be ordered.

Finally, from the analytic (geometric), concept, word, and intuition of understanding a first principle for the mature human intellect is formed: that of similarity, difference and indifference, called the principle of *analogy*. From the rhetoric, idea, sentence, and affect of the representation of reason a second principle is formed: that of for, against, and abstention, named the principle of *contribution*. From the dialectic, notion (thought), paragraph, and intellect of comprehension a third principle of strength, weakness, or neutrality is formed. This can be called the principle of *power*.

After these three principles, from the grammatic, principle, composition, and volition of judgement, the principle of *duty*, which is good, evil, or neither good nor evil, can also be formed. In an invention of the mind, principles for the mature human intellect have now been proposed: the principle of analogy, the principle of contribution, the principle

of power, and the principle of duty. They are not a merely arbitrary assignment but an integral part of a system of ideas in an architectonic of the mature human intellect.⁸

II.ii.iii: From receptacles in the intellect to a dynamic universe of the mature intellect

The move away from the objects of the intellect, concepts, ideas, notions, and principles, being merely divided up and placed into their respective faculties of the intellect, understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement begins when these preliminary objects of the intellect are not seen as confined to static faculties but are released into a universe of the intellect in which they become energised and filled with motivation.

Beginning free of the sacred forms and sacred proofs of a static intellect encourages the perception of coherence in the system of nature to be taken in by a dynamic intellect enquiring into the world. It is not about Kant or Aristotle saying it and then it being necessarily true. This is traditional and conservative thought. A more satisfactory conception of the intellect and of knowledge is about moving from static models of forces and laws to movement and motion. A concept is born not in the understanding but anywhere in the intellect from a principle.

A concept that is static is like a man standing still gazing ahead and having the scenery pass in front of him without turning his head. Instead, what is to be achieved is a coherent system that works, to have systems of dynamic principles and concepts growing, flourishing, and declining without hindrance or inconvenience, a system that is not a proof, is not always reasonable and tidy but is a conception of knowledge and enquiry that can be observed through language.

Through written language men and women have recorded the evolution of their reflections on their own thinking, for example, on the movement of Varro's (1938) eight senses in the soul (which included in addition to the five senses of modernity, thought, procreation, and the utterance of articulate words) to the modern five senses in the body, or say, from Plato's (1977b) reason in the spirit of man to Kant's (1999, 2002) reason in the mind of man.

⁸ These principles of analogy, contribution, power, and duty will be raised again, in the introduction to Chapter 4, V.i, and in Chapter 4.V.

In the general scientific view the strain of supporting a concept-centred universe is showing. By Kuhnian (1962) criteria of progressive and degenerating research programmes in science,⁹ the literature of educational leadership is degenerating. Seeing everything from the scientific point of view means having theories for just about anything. But holding an excessive number of scientific theories proves nothing. Reason has become an exercise in routine, producing scores of theories of leadership and hundreds of theories of learning.¹⁰

A hundred proofs can show that a state is static, regressive and decadent, and a thousand proofs can show that a universe is finite, bounded, and spherical, that both can be reduced to one and one to none and all proofs fail if it is denied that the universe of the intellect is in motion. If the objects in the universe of the intellect are moving then the idea of the universe of the intellect is growing and dynamic. That a concept moves around a principle is a schema that simply hangs together, for example that the concept of purpose moves around the principle of leadership. This is a reasonable system that satisfies one's sense of procreation; concepts are generated and develop, flourish and decline; this is what concepts do.

Because established authority, namely Kant (1999, 2002), says that the intellect has faculties where like are stored with like, which to Plato (2000) is knowledge, so sacred doctrine is tacitly accepted. If in an enquiry in search of a philosophy of leadership what Kant (1999) has said is to be denied then the proofs in his four conflicts of transcendental ideas (Kant, 1999, pp.467-495), the basis of his doctrines of elements and method, are going to have to be radically amended or abandoned altogether in favour of a better schema.

⁹ Lakatos (1978) noted Kuhn's (1962) conclusion that a scientific revolution is an "irrational change in commitment" (Lakatos, p.4). Lakatos then asks what criteria demarcates scientific progress from intellectual degeneration and answers this by saying that "where theory lags behind the facts, we are dealing with miserable degenerating research programmes" (Lakatos, 1978, p.6). In the Kuhnian history of science progressive research programmes replace degenerating programmes.

¹⁰ At least since Hobbes' (1994) Laws of Nature and Rousseau's (2008) Social Contract so many theories of what was claimed to be leadership were put forward that they were usually categorised along the lines of Great man theories (Spencer, 1860); Trait theories (Allport, 1949; 1930s-1940s); Behavioural theories (1940s-1950s) and their associated managerial grid models and role theories; Contingency theories (1960s) including Fiedler's contingency theory, the Hersey-Blanchard situational leadership theory, path-goal theory, cognitive resource theory, strategic contingencies theory; Transactional leadership theories (1970s), associated theories being that of Burns' (1978) transformational leadership theory, and Kouzes and Posner's (2003) leadership participation inventory. A similar situation exists with learning theories, for example social learning theory, cognitive and behavioural learning theories.

The concepts of the understanding, of reason, and of judgement are to be moved from the centre of the intellect since, as will become clear, the thesis supplies the argument that it is reasonable that from the spiritual dialectic of reason, concepts move and it is reasonable to give assent to the more aesthetic system of concepts in motion about principles. Hence, in this account of the intellect's operation, the notion of concepts in motion can be held over the thought of static concepts stored in receptacles.

No longer is a category merely a concept of the understanding, an idea merely a concept of reason, or a principle merely a concept of judgement. A principle and its concepts is a rational system called an idea. Complex systems of ideas for articulation are called notions, and clusters of notions are the flow of principles called thoughts, their natural order being only partially expressed through language though in principle entirely expressible in it. To express an order among concepts that is a state of the intellect is to express a contrived and doubtful construction. The concepts and principles of the faculties of the intellect are stations in the view of the general intellect but in the transcendental view ideas and notions are the objects of the universe of the intellect in motion.

With no one to one correspondence between them, the words for concepts, ideas, notions, and principles are linguistic representations of the objects of the intellect and the concepts of words, sentences, paragraphs, and compositions (formulated positions) are intellectual representations of the objects of language. No such correspondence exists because these linguistic representations and intellectual representations are separate and distinct notions. To create a composition, the three and four-dimensional ideas of the universe of the intellect must be rendered through the first and second dimensions, the points and lines, of language, to enter into and pass through a shared physical reality. The representations of ideas and notions are thus straightened into a linear form by their transposition into language. That transposition begins in the intellect.

But firstly, concepts generate no linguistic representations of their own but reflect the representation of a principle. In other words, concepts do not directly produce words, and vice versa, they are merely similar to them. Concepts are determinable only in their relation to a principle; they have no representation in themselves in much the same way as dialecticians say a word is confused until placed with other words to find its proper

meaning in a sentence. The contrast between thought and language here might be put this way, in terms of the spatial metaphor put forward. When a concept wants to move in a curved line to follow the influence of a principle, that is the power a principle exerts on concepts, and it cannot, then the reason for this is that the concept is following the straight lines made by language in intellectual space. Intellectual space is shaped and that is how influence works. Space tells intellectual objects how to move and intellectual objects tell intellectual space what shape to be.

The transposition of an intellectual representation begins by its making a shape around itself in intellectual space and when it becomes proximate to a principle then the principle is attracted to the representation such that it begins to follow the straight line of the intellectual representation. The principle is influenced by the representation. In other words the representation has semantic force with reference to the principle, and the different shapes of principles are straightened into one-dimensional lines by the representation.

If it can be shown that two intellectual representations are the same then it will be known that principles are arranged by intellectual representations into straight (parallel) lines. When a principle comes near an intellectual representation the principle moves into alignment ready for transposition into language, not as Kant (1999) would have it, from being in the form of something of importance into the form of something of use (Kant, pp.597-601) nor any longer into forces, motions, and laws. If during alignment a gap emerges between any two appearances of an intellectual representation; a word, sentence, paragraph, or composition; then the field of influence of the intellectual representation has shifted the position of the concept, idea, notion, or principle and a whole new, more sophisticated, explanatory model of influence is engendered.

In the new model of influence intellectual representations could be likened to lines and waves. The model used to view one concept from another concept, which becomes obscured by an intervening principle, can be used to view a notion perhaps obscured by a single cluster of notions. Viewing in either case is done through what can be called a sphere of receptivity. The perturbations of the intervening principle in the first case or a cluster of notions in the second case is caused by the turbulence of the subject matter in the fabric of intellectual space-time.

This model of influence does not work everywhere in the universe of the intellect. It does not work in violent and turbulent places in the intellect. Under such circumstances it is necessary to fall back on the previous model, where understanding is merely of strategic use. Alternatively, comprehension works everywhere since Kant (1999) could not explain with his manifold of the static state called intellect that understanding cannot be used everywhere. Kant's account of this can thus be seen as preparatory to a dynamic universe of the intellect. Different kinds of authority, different kinds of principle, will influence experience differently; authority weakens experience and experience accumulates more slowly when concepts are weak so that linguistic representations will distort the objects of the intellect.

Movement -conceptual or notional change- in the intellect creates waves, intellectual distortion in the reality of space-time. Waves cause the space-time fabric of the intellect to stretch and shrink to fit. A principle is at the centre of an idea, the antithesis of a thesis is at the centre of a notion and the expanding intellect as a whole has no centre. Waves fail at the centre of a notion because they cannot influence intellectual representations of the objects of language, which are too violent and turbulent, too coarse and general; lines of linguistic representations of the objects of the intellect appear to disappear into the centres of notions. Concepts do not have to be defined and redefined repeatedly to satisfy the senses that this is the way they are and this is what they do; their movements are not complicated, their shape changes from global to linear in the presence of intellectual representations and back again when such representations disappear.

This section has set out to show that a static Kantian model of the intellect can be enhanced to act as a starting point from which to build a dynamic and growing prototypical universe of the intellect. Such a universe is first made up of principles and concepts, ideas and notions that move and do not merely lie inertly in faculties. Subsequently, as it matures, it will then be shown to be constituted of beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view), and communities of inquiry (tradition). The following subsection goes into more detail about this alternative conception of the intellect and develops the schema of a universe of the mature intellect.

II.ii.iv: A schema of the dynamic universe of the mature intellect

That man is made up of mind, body, and spirit is called back to mind. The mind of man is made up of the intuition, intellect, affect, and volition. The faculties of the intellect are understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement. However, every mature adult human being is also unique, no two minds are the same, no two spirits are the same, and no two physiques are the same. Nevertheless, the human spirit and physique are shared in a collective, so too a human consciousness of sentience and sapience. Whether a mentalistic construction or the product of the workings of the brain, the faculties of understanding and reason, comprehension and judgement appear to reside within the mind of man. As the terms will be used, concepts appear to be born in the understanding, ideas are resident in reason, notions in comprehension, with principles providing a foundation for judgement.

The construction of a schema of the dynamic universe of the mature intellect starts by noting that in a static model of the intellect like is set with like. That is, understanding is understood as the receptacle in which concepts are to be found, reason is the receptacle in which ideas are harboured, comprehension in which notions live, and judgement is the receptacle in which principles rest. This static model is surrendered in favour of a dynamic schema in three steps, which can be represented by three successive propositions concerning points of view. The first proposition is that those who hold the scientific view seem to put the concept at the centre of the intellect, with a principle being in closest proximity to it with ideas being a further distance but still in congruence with it.

In the second step, the second proposition, from a point of view different from the scientific, is that the principle can be made to be the centre of the intellect and have concepts in congruency around it with ideas being at a greater distance from it. However, this schema or that which preceded it will not be adequate for the later purpose of developing a philosophy of leadership so it will be necessary to turn to a third proposition. That proposition states that an idea is made up of principles with concepts in congruency with it, that is, *ideas* are comprised of systems of judgement.

Furthermore, the intellect, which contains ideas, appears to be ever-expanding. The intellect has form and although having no centre, appears to have an unknowable beginning and an unknowable end. By that is meant that the mind of the individual has

no memory of its own beginning nor can it know what lies beyond its own end. In talking about beginnings and endings, what will be later speculated on with regard to leadership is that from combinations and permutations of principles in the intellect legal, doctrinal, and assumptive systems of judgement concerning leadership will arise only to pass out of the universe of the intellect through the centres of notions, for notions are of a form that does not appear to the self inside the universe of the intellect to produce but only consume matter, that is, principles and concepts in ideas.

In proximity to the centre of an idea other ideas may form. When ideas collide, are close-by or pass-by or through each other principles may join in combination, collide, or pass-by generating concepts or, where one is subsumed by the other, this may become a mere concept. Ideas may combine to become a super-idea; a complete system of ideas called a notion, or may destroy either one or each other. As intellectual space expands collisions become less likely through time thus preserving the space-time fabric of the intellect.

The beginning of the expansion of the intellect is not found in the intellect but in experience and observation. Experience is gained through the senses from that which is natural and social beyond the individual and from other parts of the mind, intuition, volition, and affect. The expansion of the intellect is generated from ideas drawn from experience. Primitive ideas, preliminary forms or *prototypes*, are the first to enter and expand across the growing intellect. The mature intellect is replete with different types of ideas, different arrangements of ideas in combination and permutation.

II.ii.v: Summary

This part of the chapter has been committed to a number of points that may be brought into service over the length the thesis. After the brief outline in subsection II.ii.i of the starting point of a concrete model of the mature intellect, subsection II.ii.ii sets out a traditional inventory of the mind and the mature human intellect. This includes the loose association of the different faculties of the mature intellect with analytic, rhetoric, dialectic and grammar, all from the classical literary tradition, largely of the liberal arts. This liberal arts tradition will be argued later to be objective grounds for the art of leadership.

Another possible association, albeit a misguided one, is that of words, sentences, paragraphs and compositions, which are preliminary methods of linguistic expression

of the objects of the intellect with concepts, sentences, paragraphs and principles. That some one-to-one correspondence applies here will be refuted in subsection II.iii.i. The execution of such possibilities is left to those whose territory is calculation. Rather, the level on which the proposed worldview relies is that of a more relaxed space, which a Davidsonian (1984) approach engenders.

The point of subsection II.ii.iii is to make headway with regard to the effect that movement in the intellect has on the subjective space-time fabric of the intellect. That is, to move away from the everyday model of forces and laws towards a new model of influence in which objects of the universe of the intellect, relative to their complexity and abstractness, form their own space and shape the intellectual space around them. By moving from static receptacles of the intellect that are subject to forces and laws towards a new model of influence made up of a dynamic universe of the intellect in which objects form their own space and influence the objects around them the possibility of a new worldview emerges. Such a view, as will be shortly perceived, is evidenced in the work of Davidson (1984).

II.iii: Progress through holding a worldview

The universe of the intellect is a radical arrangement of the human intellect which imbues it with a maturity and vitality that merely static faculties of the intellect cannot provide. In the drive from a preliminary Kantian model of the state of the intellect towards a fully-functioning schema of the universe of the intellect, more sophisticated forms of intellectual representation become observably and universally possible, indeed, necessary for a mature intellect. The more mature intellect does not stop with the preliminary forms of language and cognition. More specifically, as the mature intellect expands the preliminary intellectual subject matter of language, that is words, sentences, paragraphs and compositions become not the only methods of linguistic expression of the objects of the intellect.

Examples of the interpenetration of ideas are found in the networks or clusters of ideas that are the proper provenance of comprehension. For ideas to interpenetrate they first need to be in congruence. For example, with the interpenetration of ideas, propositions, paragraphs, compositions (formulated positions) and debates can be considered as the more advanced and substantive intellectual subject matter of language that supersede

the preliminary forms previously outlined.¹¹ Indeed, this is what is intended in this dissertation. This sophistication in linguistic form is also analogous with a more sophisticated and more substantive cognitive psychology, a new worldview comprised of beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view), and communities of inquiry (tradition) that supersede preliminary forms.

The proposed worldview is by definition subjective. Whereas a paradigm, model or prototype is an analogue of objective reality, in other words, a paradigm is an objective view of things as they are presented in themselves, a worldview allows individuals to make sense of things in the world as they are perceived. More than that, by holding a worldview the individual can project values and meaning onto universal and particular objects in the universe of the intellect. For example, the instrumental view chooses the truth value over the meaning of a proposition. These objects represent more than general and specific things in themselves and as such are what distinguishes a worldview from a paradigm such as the model of the mature intellect.

II.iii.i: Refutation of any universal one-to-one correspondence between the concepts of the notion of language and the concepts of the notion of cognition

The notion of language and the notion of thought are distinct. Even if there were any interpenetration between these notions their concepts would still remain quite separate. With regard to these notions the thesis does not operate at the level of analysis, as already noted but at the level of not merely connecting ideas but argumentation concerning the movement among ideas and notions and among particular formations of notions. For instance, leadership in the first instance is an idea but with its interpenetration with the idea of art it forms the notion of the art of leadership. Similarly, when it mixes or synthesises with the idea of philosophy the notion of the philosophy of leadership is formed. When notions spread into other notions these comprise complex and compound formations in the universe of the intellect.

Hamann (1995a) sought origins for values and meaning deeper than the general intellect, in transcendent thought.¹² His thesis that language and thought are one and the same invites conjecture on what the parts of language and thought are and how they might be aligned, if at all. However useful this kind of preliminary speculation is in the

¹¹ See II.ii.i: A concrete model of the mature intellect of man.

¹² See final paragraph in Ch1, I.iv.

early stages of the postulation of a new worldview such a construction has nevertheless demanded the provisional use of the rhetorical device of organising language and cognition into typologies that are contingent on the proviso that the content of these typologies may be superseded by more advanced subject matter.

The intention of this has been to assist the reader move from a static neo-Kantian conception of the intellect to a dynamic universe of the intellect, which is a step necessary for the progress of the thesis argument. Without any reform in thinking no advancement in relation to leadership is possible. Both expansion of the universe of the intellect and concomitant progress on leadership will follow.

To criticise the intended analogy between language and cognition by supposing the analogy drawn is a specific analogy between language being organised into word, sentence, paragraph, and composition and the concept, idea, notion and principle of the proposed cognitive psychology is to fall into error. Between concept and word, idea and sentence, notion and paragraph, principle and composition no such specific correspondence exists. No rational means of representation can be provided for this. The comparison is between the expansion of the sophistication of language and of cognition. Here, the analogy turns on sophistication of form.

An analogy can be drawn just as readily between two complex representations like language and cognition as between something complex and something simple to explain that which is complex. In other words, that does not mean to say an analogy cannot be drawn between two or three things that are all simple or all complex, or even all concrete or all abstract. However, sophistication of form is, of course, not restricted to analogy. Later, a philosophy of leadership in higher education is intended to exemplify a sophistication of form that cannot be achieved without prior deliberations on the art of leadership and on the philosophy of leadership in the new worldview.

In this thesis an analogy is drawn between what are advanced to be the most developed (not inevitably the most recent) forms of linguistic composition. Analysis of these reveals that the similarities among them are brutally real. The forms proposed include analytic, rhetoric, dialectic, and grammatic (critical dialogue) because these comprise the linguistic subject matter of the intellect not arbitrarily chosen but established in tradition. No rational comparison can be made between these enduring yet sophisticated representations and any recent suggestion of a simple and capricious

nature including any casual association of these forms on the level of a one to one correspondence with the faculties of the intellect. The faculties of the intellect will be taken up after making a point or two about the forms of linguistic composition.

First, in addition to the proposed forms already being recognized in tradition their philosophical importance arises from each being in possession of a means of representation, namely geometric demonstration (in modern terms examples in an analysis), the persuasion of rhetoric, conviction of dialectic, and the critical dialogue of grammar (the exchange of ideas using the rules of language). In any philosophical thesis rhetoric and argumentation are necessarily centre-stage.

That does not mean to say the stage cannot be shared. To deduce a one to one correspondence schema from philosophical premises would require some adjustment of these premises for satisfactory conclusions to follow. Hence, with these adjustments in form the ensuing improvement in logical coherence of the thesis argument would be at the expense of consistency in at least one premise. Admittedly, an overriding concern for congruence would do harm to consistency, which can generally lead to a schema that is not wholly conditional on the strict development of philosophical premises alone. In the construction of the line of argument such a schema is also dependent on analysis of the design of a tradition.

To take up on the faculties of the intellect, the advancement of judgement and the addition of comprehension to full faculties of the mature human intellect allows for the distinction between the empirical and theoretical of science, taken by the faculties of understanding and reason (understanding being passive and reason active) from the right and wrong of morality and the good and evil of ethics, of philosophy and theology, taken by comprehension and judgement. Due to the interpenetration of these faculties, a difficulty that may be experienced is the conflating of the definition of theoretical terms with notions. This is just so with modern social science in its mistreatment of the notion of leadership as if it were a concept.

The current profusion of quasi-scientific literature on leadership indicates that modernity has struck an impasse on its treatment of leadership and is now without direction on the matter. The proposed remedy for this is to reform this kind of treatment of leadership in the light of what both philosophy and tradition offer. These are both drivers for the thesis argument, which, as will be reiterated at the beginning of Chapter

Five in an outline of how leadership is to be applied to higher education, is exploratory rather than definitive.

II.iii.ii: Worldview, tradition, and the argument of the thesis

The thesis is positioned with the background of the traditions of philosophy and of the philosophy of education. It is not directly contingent upon any single doctrine established in the broader traditions of the discipline of philosophy. However, it does possess some affinities with the instrumental view (Davidson, 1984). Davidson is invoked to assist with later locating Hamann (1995a) in the Enlightenment debate.

The contemporary debate between Davidson (1984) and Sellars (1997) is a reaction to the work of Quine (2000) much in the same way as Hamann's (1995a) disagreement with Kant (1999) was a response to Hume's (1975) empiricism and scepticism. Notwithstanding this and the earlier observation in Section I.iv that Locke (1924) is not directly relevant to leadership, Locke is nevertheless relevant to educational philosophy in being the basis of Associationism in modern Psychology, which created interest in human learning and development.

Through the analysis of traditional literature relevant to the position it adopts, the thesis extends its search for common themes by first taking up what Davidson (1984) is saying and then what Hamann (1995a) is saying. This literature includes but is not limited to the works of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), Varro (1938) and the legacy of classical philosophy. These representative works have been chosen, then, because the outline of a new worldview with regard to a philosophy of leadership in higher education needs an accounting of both classical tradition and philosophy. The essential point is that rhetoric has a role to play in resolving the problem of leadership.

Because no such thing as a science of leadership exists and since science is committed to the idea of generalisation, the idea of discussing leadership in general or the specifics of leadership is not possible. The general-specific dichotomy cannot be validly applied because no science of leadership exists. What can be used is the dual system of the universal and the particular. Discussing the universality of leadership along with its particularities is possible because leadership is a philosophical idea. That is interpreted to be as in the universe of the intellect and its parts, namely the idea and ideas of leadership, and the notions and principles of leadership. In a mature intellect, propositions, paragraphs, compositions and debates underpin the connecting of beliefs,

theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition) for a new worldview.¹³

This new worldview heightens awareness of the open nature of philosophy and of tradition. In reaction, this encourages a more intense focus on the development of the argument. The thesis, then, is not concerned with an historical approach to leadership in the contentious field of the philosophy of education because it would not be able to do justice to the diversity of voices clamouring for recognition. Instead, to avoid a plethora of differences in context and assumptions leading to mutual incomprehension, an appeal is raised to authorities whose work more pertinently supports different stages of the argument.

For example, the works of the philosopher Rorty (1970, 1989, 1998, 1999, 2007) are fruitfully drawn upon in Chapter Five although Rorty himself was no philosopher of education. Similarly, viewing what traditional doctrines may say on leadership is also avoided for the same reason. Social, political and moral philosophy, represented by Rawls (2003) and MacIntyre (1990, 2006, 2007), are most relevant in the latter parts of the argument and their contribution will be acknowledged there. No single scholar, school of thought, or kind of philosophical writing can claim to represent the philosophy of education field.

The first step in the argument for a philosophy of leadership in higher education is to first perceive this philosophy as an instantiation of a universally essential and functional philosophy of leadership. In the course of the argument towards instantiation the establishment of a philosophy of leadership first needs to be examined and considered at an abstract or meta-level. The analysis of what is proposed as rightly fitting with educational leadership, that which draws on the art and philosophy of leadership, is transferred to the higher education environment. Limited to an outline, the proposed philosophy of leadership in higher education will thus come late in the thesis. Of more immediate concern is a need to find a locus for the thesis. In the following subsection this is done by explicating and discussing coinherence with the instrumental view (Davidson, 1984) and the importance of interpretation and the truth conditions of a sentence over its meaning.

¹³ See II.iii: Progress through holding a worldview.

II.iii.iii: Locating the thesis in the current debate

In this subsection the main relevant points that Davidson (1984) has made in putting forward matters regarding his instrumental view are interpreted, explicated where necessary, and then appraised. The proposed transcendental view is a view like that of the instrumental but is unlike that of realism. Realism assumes that something exists in reality. That which realism assumes to exist in reality the instrumental view takes as a legal fiction. The instrumental view places the truth conditions of a sentence and their role in reasoning/inferences as matters of higher priority than the meaning of a sentence. Truth conditions and meaning are not the same (Davidson, p.56, footnote 3). Manifestly, from this it can be determined that a theory of truth and a theory of meaning are not the same. That which Davidson (1984) does with logic and formal languages at the word and sentential levels this thesis adumbrates for the liberal arts and rhetoric at the paragraph and compositional levels.

Another point of difference between the transcendental view and the instrumental view relates to language. A scientific model or theory of meaning, such as that argued for by Davidson (1984), demands a precision and clarity that may well be technically achievable in the case of formal languages. However, in the transcendental view of natural languages this is not suitable. Hence, in taking a more relaxed attitude than Davidson's "programmatically view" (Davidson, 1984, p.35), the desire here is to avoid Davidson's "staggering list of difficulties and conundrums" (Davidson, 1984, p.35).

For example, Davidson (1984) says "A comprehensive theory of meaning for a natural language must cope successfully with each of these problems" (Davidson, 1984, p.36). However, that comprehensive theory is a contradiction in terms is without doubt because a philosophical schema is intrinsically comprehensive and such a schema would be better able to approach these problems. Further, because a theory can only lay claim to explanation, philosophy is better equipped to not only explain but also argue and discuss meaning and the morality of thoughts, words, and deeds.

Davidson (1984) earlier and rightly contrasted theories of truth from theories of meaning but then went on to defend the claim that a theory of truth adjusted to natural language can be used as a theory of interpretation (Davidson, p.135). This observation will not be pursued here as a criticism. Suffice it to note that where a theory or model demands clarity and distinctiveness a philosophical schema, with a built-in degree of

tolerance, better reflects the reality of levels of incoherence and ambiguity with which natural language is imbued. Because natural language, unlike closed synthetic or formal languages, is open to incoherence and ambiguity Davidson is able to equate his theory of truth with his theory of interpretation.

In extrapolating from what Davidson (1984) argues on the interdependence between belief and meaning (Davidson, pp.134-135), from true sentences and their meanings followers can infer the beliefs held by their leader. With beliefs held constant, meaning can be solved “by assigning truth conditions to alien sentences” (Davidson, 1984, p.137). In response to this the essential point is that in this thesis the importance of rhetoric in the role of leadership is addressed. To apply to leadership what Davidson has drawn from Quine (2008), that what remains is the trade-offs between beliefs attributed to a speaker and the listeners’ interpretations (Davidson, p.139), in the exchange between leader and follower what followers hear from the leader is the beliefs they attribute to the leader and their interpretations of the words of their leader.

Meaning, belief, and truth are the stuff of Davidson’s theories (Davidson, pp.141-142, 148-149, 154), ideas he largely attributes to Quine (2008) as “breakthroughs in the study of language” (Davidson, 1984, p.149). They are integral to a social theory of interpretation, making possible “a plurality of private belief structures” (Davidson, 1984, p.153). From the “indeterminacy of interpretation” (Davidson, 1984, p.153) of these belief structures, listeners come to understand and believe what a speaker says.

Davidson (1984) proposes that thought depends on speech (Davidson, p.156). The assumption is that beliefs define thought yet thought is independent of belief (Davidson, p.157). The argument he levels is that one cannot have thoughts without first interpreting someone else’s speech. This does not imply that thought can be reduced to speech (Davidson, p.157). An interpreter knows the truth conditions under which a sentence is uttered (Davidson, p.158). Clearly, what can be drawn from this is that patterns of relations between sentences and thoughts do not imply the primacy of one over the other.

A teleological explanation of an action differs from a general explanation in how it relates to reason. It provides coherence to a pattern of behaviour. In other words, Davidson (1984) says people act in a particular way for a reason, in accord with what they believe and desire (Davidson, p.159). A theory of interpretation, like a theory of

action, allows events to be redescribed in a certain way (Davidson, p.161). Listeners need to know a speaker's own interpretation of what he said under a certain set of circumstances, including what he believes how others will interpret what he said (Davidson, p.161). Some interpretations will be more plausible than others.

In interpretation, a sentence is held true because of what a holder of the sentence takes the sentence to mean and what he believes (Davidson, p.167). In an account of radical interpretation the concepts of objective truth and error "necessarily emerge" (Davidson, 1984, p.169). In a sentence, the difference between what is held true and what is in fact true is error (Davidson, pp.169-170). The attitude of holding true is held in tension by the concept of belief. To hold a belief one needs a concept of belief. A belief can be true or false and one needs to consider the possibility that one is in error.

Davidson (1984) says he has argued that the contrast between true and false belief can only emerge in the context of interpretation. To hold the concept of a belief one needs to first belong to a speech community. More generally, only one who can interpret speech can possess the concept of a thought. To paraphrase Davidson, a good theory of interpretation optimises agreement (Davidson, p.169). "The interpreter who assumes his method can be made to work for a language community will strive for a theory that optimises agreement throughout the community" (Davidson, 1984, p.169). The notion of true belief depends on the notion of an utterance, which cannot be without language. Charity in interpreting the words and thoughts of others is found in the Davidsonian equation of subtracting false sentences from true sentences, which is the margin for error, but no single principle of optimum charity emerges (Davidson, p.27). Where Davidson finds no single principle of optimum charity, Hamann (1995a) found God. The thesis will turn to Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) in Chapter Two.

II.iii.iv: Review of the Introduction and orientation to the thesis

A number of elements are interwoven throughout the various chapters of the thesis. Despite appearances in the middle chapters, the substance of the work is largely organised by theme and not by author in order to focus on explication and evaluation of the research material. Nevertheless, in this Introduction, the subject matter is placed in relation to the influential background work of Davidson (1984), which is not intended to represent the field of the philosophy of higher education but to instantiate coinherence with Davidson's work, for example with regard to interpretation. Salient

points are noted and discussed with the intention of foreshadowing themes imminent in the argument. The critical method will be used to address these major themes and not any thesis propositions themselves on the basis that if the themes are undermined then the propositions themselves cannot stand. This is the structural key to the whole strategy of the argument in the thesis.

The central chapters of the thesis present the results of exploration and analysis. These results are laid out systematically and clearly with the conviction that by so doing the relevant aspects of leadership have been considered and that the material uncovered confirms the central statement. The constant challenge has been to turn over a large amount of information in the following chapters while keeping the central point of the thesis in mind, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

II.iii.v: The position taken in the thesis

Having earlier completed in Section II.ii an outline of the subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership, that is, a new worldview for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, firm objective grounds will be sought in the following chapters. This is with the exception of the fourth chapter, which will be left for more on subjective grounds, to round out the dissertation in the light of its argument. The main line of argument for the position taken, then, is that science is inadequate grounds (Chapter 2) but the literature of the classical liberal arts representing the art of leadership is firm objective grounds (Chapter 3) and the mature human intellect, comprised of both the general and transcendental intellects, is firm subjective grounds (Chapter 4) on which to construct a philosophy of leadership (Chapter 5).

Grounding the art of leadership in the literary tradition of the classical liberal arts is morally permissible because the word leadership has been undervalued and the idea of leadership has been mistreated by the scientific community for more than half a century. Disconnecting leadership from the idea of its being a scientific concept (especially when the scientific approach has proven to be unhelpful in making further advances on the matter), then connecting it to the idea of its being an idea belonging to art (in order to relieve the concept of it from any further abuse by science) is surely a move with some merit. If leadership is not disconnected from the scientific approach the word will retire from overuse or expire as a result of sustained maltreatment.

Taking the word out of the scientific arena and placing it under the auspices of the classical liberal arts, where it rightfully belongs, will rejuvenate it. The idea of the art of leadership will then be able to survive on its own. The word is under no obligation to remain connected to art in this situation. It can be disconnected at any time even if this means the word will no longer be of any use. The acceptability of this disconnection of the word leadership from science is a matter for those of the general view.

However, from this assumption can be argued the transcendental view that hastening the obsolescence of the concept of leadership is permissible if the idea of the art of leadership can flourish. Those who take the general view are most likely to accept that disassociating the word leadership from art is morally acceptable by analogy with its disconnection from science. Of course, those who take the scientific view must remain mute in this argument since they have proclaimed no interest in the moral nature of any act, specifically the act of disconnection or disassociation.

The transcendental view is that the idea of leadership is subjectively grounded in the art of leadership,¹⁴ which is in turn objectively grounded in the classical literature of the liberal arts. From the transcendental point of view, under no circumstances should the idea of leadership be disassociated from the art of leadership because without it a philosophy of leadership would not be possible. The reason for this is that the notion of leadership is contingent upon the idea of leadership. The notion of leadership is constituted of ideas about leadership that are made up of the principles of leadership and their concepts, which will be examined in Chapters Four and Five.

A philosophy of leadership certainly may subsume concepts of leadership under it, although it has no obligation to do so, since the principle or principles of leadership in a philosophy of leadership has or have no need for any particular concept of leadership. A philosophy of leadership is in no way directly contingent upon concepts of leadership. On the other hand, as will be argued in Chapter 2, Part II.iii, and not only in that section, empirical science has dogmatically disregarded and actively discriminated against the notion of or any notions of leadership.

¹⁴ The philosophy of leadership belongs to the transcendental intellect but the idea of leadership arises in the general intellect so the idea of leadership has subjective grounds in the art of leadership, which belongs to the general intellect, while the philosophy of leadership has subjective grounds in the transcendental intellect.

With regard to a philosophy of leadership in higher education, having argued that science cannot be satisfactorily used because leadership is an ideal formed in the light of the ideal of the human intellect, Kant (1999, 2002) and his static model is a strategically important place to start in order to understand the mature intellect and to search with purpose through extant traditions and thereby not add to the contemporary surfeit of empirical studies, since this is a traditional-philosophical and not an historical-scientific issue.

Nevertheless, in Chapter Five it will be argued that currently in higher education, universities appear to be misinformed in their all-encompassing use of the teacher-learner model. This scientific model is heavily weighted in favour of the learner. Its use by government through reconstituted university administrative systems appears to have usurped the traditional academic schema of researcher and professor cum lecturer and tutor. This appropriation is most evident in the delivery of modern professional and science courses at the undergraduate level. In defence of the academic schema, this thesis will review western classical heritage to better inform the academic literature and subsequently the literature on education policy and practice.

Furthermore, this cannot be done unsupported. The main argument will follow the line that from these objective grounds alone, that is, the current scientific literature on leadership and literature on higher education, one cannot proceed directly to a philosophy of leadership but only mediately through a schema of the mature human intellect. For, in contrast to primary and secondary education, higher education addresses the mature intellect and its growth.

Hence, a notion of the nature of the mature intellect is called for in a philosophy of leadership in higher education. In terms of the account of the mature intellect presented, the thesis aims to establish the subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in the mature transcendental intellect. It will reject the notion that leadership is a concept of the understanding in favour of leadership being a notion of the faculty of comprehension with its grounds being the idea of the art of leadership in reason¹⁵ and its principles in judgement.

¹⁵ See Chapter 5, II.i.

Moreover, at various stages the thesis will indicate that thought is broken, linear, global, or sublime and can be aligned with understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement, more particularly with concepts, ideas, notions, and principles, and later with those more sophisticated forms, of beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition). Also, human beings not only think in terms of language but also logically and spatially. The thesis will affirm that the objective grounds for such a philosophy have been long-extant in the literature of classical tradition.

Having seen that a credible philosophy of leadership is objectively grounded in the traditional literature of the classical liberal arts and subjectively groundable in the mature transcendental intellect the main argument of the thesis will be brought to order by showing that the very existence of universities depends on their, indeed their representatives, being bound by both their objective grounds, by which it is meant traditional authority, and their subjective grounds, by which it is meant freedom of thought and expression.

Before concluding this introduction, the meaning of presenting the position of the thesis is the same as saying that the argument is being presented. Overall, the argument is deductive and not inductive although the latter kind of argument may be used in different places throughout the thesis. The argument is also logical because each step arises from the previous step. What is important is that the overall argument is a rational argument, with evidence collected in ways that can be checked.

In conclusion, the position taken in the introduction to the thesis, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, is that because a philosophy of leadership is mediately dependent upon the idea of leadership, through the notion of leadership, disconnecting leadership from the tradition of the liberal arts is not morally permissible, that is, in the case of its being taken by science in an excessive and fruitless number of attempts to analyse it.

Chapter 2

Critique of the science of leadership

The failure of the claims of modern science to authoritative expertise in the field of leadership necessitates a review of its postmedieval foundations in a search for why and how modern science has failed to satisfactorily explain leadership

Introduction

This chapter reviews the scientific literature on leadership. It is the first step in an argument from the failings of contemporary leadership studies to the problem of rationalising and demonstrating the morality and ethics of leadership. This leads to a treatment of the literature of the liberal arts in the third chapter, and on to the philosophical literature in subsequent chapters. The thesis claims that what is wrong with studies in the scientifically-oriented literature on leadership is that it misunderstands the nature of its topic. Because of this misunderstanding, these works, which represented what was assumed to be a science of leadership, included only the sensibility and intelligibility of leadership. This is inadequate to the needs of a credible account of leadership. A philosophy of leadership is the only convincing account of leadership because it includes the morality and ethics that lie at the heart of the notion of leadership.

Morality and ethics are the only grounds for a transition from a scientific study of leaders and leading to a philosophy of leadership because science uncompromisingly excluded any consideration of morality and ethics out of misplaced misgivings about the objectivity of value. The received body of literature on leadership studies, then, cannot be about a science of leadership but can only concern the empirical study of people and activities denominated in fact as leaders and leading. This is because such works are deficient in any treatment of the morality and ethics of leadership.

In the second part of the chapter dissatisfaction arises with the modern scientific approach to leadership. This dissatisfaction arises from an explication and critique of the conceptual work of Porter (1990), the theoretical work of Burns (1978), and the empirical approach of Wang's (2008) phenomenological study of what they mistakenly call leadership. This discontent motivates a reappraisal of canonical works in the tradition of science, beginning with Locke (1924), which is the focus in the third part of

the chapter. Attention then shifts to an explication and critique of Kant (1999) in the fourth part, out of consideration of shortcomings found in Locke, before settling on Bacon's (1952) Book One in the fifth part of the chapter. These classic texts are crucial for understanding why the scientific literature on what was assumed to be leadership has developed the way it has and for refuting the idea of a science of leadership.

Refutation of any science of leadership

Confirmation of the assumption that the mature human intellect, subjective grounds, and the liberal arts tradition, objective grounds, together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education cannot be achieved by adopting a scientific position like that of Burns (1978). The purpose of this chapter is to first put to one side the unthinking adoption of this position before further working towards the preferred position on leadership. This is done by presenting reasons, demonstrations of these reasons (the derivative works of Burns, 1978, Porter, 1990, and Wang, 2008), that is the evidence for these reasons, and the support for this evidence (the foundational works in science of Kant, 1999, Locke, 1924 and Bacon, 1952) before coming down in favour of abandoning the support for these demonstrations as unwarranted. *Ipso facto* the position adopted by scientism becomes untenable. This stage of the overall argument articulates opposition to supporting a scientific view of leadership alone.

The information that is given in each section is related back to the main position of the thesis before moving back. In the end, the unmodified position stated in the conclusion will be seen to agree with the position stated at the outset in the Introduction to the thesis. In this chapter a statement is given on the position held, that scientific methods are not suited to explaining leadership. This is in direct contradistinction to that of scientism, which holds that science alone can acquire knowledge in any field of inquiry. This refutation dovetails in with the main thesis statement that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

The chapter proceeds by way of providing the evidence: at the level of a short survey of the field of the so-called science of leadership, at the level of representatives of disciplines that profess to consider leadership, and at the level of elements from the backbone of the tradition of science in support of this demonstration, that science does

not consider values and ends. Each of these three pieces of evidence is related back to the main statement on the position of the thesis. The chapter finishes by restating the original position without modification.

With regard to the thesis statement, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, in this chapter the thesis argues against the possibility of a science of leadership because the literature of science cannot provide firm objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The very essence of leadership is values and ends and a scientific approach to leadership cannot consider this fact. Now, the short survey aside, at the level of representing a few disciplines that consider the *lemma* of leadership, three texts in this chapter illustrate this, allowing the thesis to advance a solid and specific argument against science and its refusal to consider values and ends, which refutes the possibility of a science of leadership.

In their treatment of what they perceived to be leadership, the writers of these texts could not claim to be doing social science and to be studying leadership. They could not have been doing both because of the nature of leadership, which falls outside of the domain of science. If they were truly studying leadership then they would not have been doing science. A critique of these works in this chapter reveals the absence of any consideration of values and ends. The deficiency of any account by science of values and ends thereby fortifies the rational, logical, and deductive position of the thesis. Refuting the scientific view clears the ground for the confirmatory stages that follow in the succeeding chapters of the thesis and thereby contributes to the overall argument.

The main thesis statement is that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The overall argument step by step advances that: (1) the mature human intellect is a secure subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership because it can recognise that the duality of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect is thoroughly human; (2) in a search for objective grounds for such a philosophy exploration of the tradition of science reveals that this does not comprise a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education because it fails to consider values and ends; (3) exploration of the liberal arts tradition exposes a lodestone of classical

literature that forms a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude any consideration of morality and ethics but engages with determination, matters of fact, and matters of value; (4) this vein of work can be directly traced to the classical literary tradition of philosophy and that the tradition of philosophy supplies a mother-lode of literature which is an enduring objective ground for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

On objective grounds, by showing that science overextended its domain when it purported to focus on leadership justifies the claim made by this thesis that a science of leadership is not possible. If a science of leadership is not possible then this raises the question of what is possible with regard to leadership. In the progression of the argument this is the direct concern of Chapters Three and Four, which provide confirmation for the art of leadership and philosophy of leadership, respectively. Meanwhile, this chapter has set about refuting the possibility of any science of leadership because the tradition of science excludes any talk of morality and ethics.

I

Short survey of literature on the science of leadership

This part begins with the suggestion that what is in reality a very extensive literature, but one which may nevertheless be briefly surveyed, is misguided in its preoccupation with solely analysing what was assumed to be leadership. Only after realising that leadership is not a concept of science, that it is not a concrete concept that can be analysed, can the reason be seen for more being learned about the methods used in the theories proposed than about leadership per se. The builders of these so-called theories of leadership did not seem to have the bigger picture in sight, why they were ultimately formulating these theories. Contributing to a school of thought is not an adequate answer to this question because that does not state why the school of thought existed and why they failed to endure.¹⁶

The tradition as a whole seemed to consistently misidentify the critical issues, on top of which its approaches were not competent enough to answer the questions it set. The argument of this thesis, admittedly somewhat tersely put at this time, is that leadership

¹⁶ A number of these schools of thought were noted in Chapter One: Great man, Trait, Behavioural, Contingency, and Transactional leadership theories.

is not an idea amenable to scientific study because it is an idea that rightly belongs to philosophy. With this in mind, Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) survey of the short modern tradition of the scientific study of leadership can now be outlined. This will be done because in the literature of the social sciences he was often referred to as an authoritative source (Bass & Avolio, 1990; Rost, 1993; Northouse, 1997; Bass & Bass, 2008; Wang, 2008; Young, 2009).

Stogdill (Bass, 1981) came to the conclusion that 1950-1965 saw much original and creative research on leadership. From 1965 to 1981 a due regard had been paid to scientific objectivity (Bass, p.616). Stogdill drew the major distinction between authoritarian-directive and democratic-participative leaders (Bass, p.314) and averred that the concept of leadership was a universal phenomenon that had been "a subject of research from a theoretical and from a problem point of view" (Bass, 1981, p.584).

According to Stogdill (Bass, 1981), the literature contained a vast number of definitions, theories and models as well as types and functions of leadership. In both theory and research the difference between transactional and transformational leaders was an important distinction. In the literature on the leader as a person, authoritarianism, values and charisma were important concepts; the dimensions of power, conflict, and legitimacy, including authority, were all included when leadership was considered as an influence relationship (Bass pp.584-590).

Stogdill (Bass, 1981) separated the interactive interdependence of leaders and followers from the management and styles of leaders (Bass, pp.590-591). Under this last, leadership was divided into democratic and autocratic leadership, participative and directive leadership, and was inclusive of laissez-faire and "motivation to manage" (Bass, 1981, pp.591-593). Stogdill summed up with the view that the performance of the group was the real test of leadership. The maintenance of goal direction, facilitation of task achievement, and ensuring group cohesion were the expectations of a group who selected a leader (Bass, p.598).

Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) encyclopaedic treatment of leadership within the scientific tradition is a demonstration of the second step in the overall argument of this thesis because of the text's lack of any consideration of values and ends. Within that tradition

leadership was approached theoretically and problematically, as an influence relationship, and as the management and styles of leaders. What representatives of each of these approaches have had to say can now be considered, each under the rubric of theory, conception, and empirical practice, respectively.

II

Recently influential scientific views of leadership

In this second part of the chapter the main scientific aspects of leadership will be covered. These aspects are conception, theory, and practical empirical research. A simple economic conception of what was assumed to be leadership is represented by Porter (1990), a political theory of leadership is represented by Burns (1978) and practical empirical research in education is represented by Wang's (2008) phenomenographic study of leadership. Each of these will be considered in turn in the three sections to follow. Reference to each, as elsewhere generally, is by individual interpretation of the text, by paraphrase, and by direct quotation. Points made by each author will be responded to directly, if not accumulated for a response at various junctures, depending upon what the material demands.

II.i: Porter's economic-conceptual view of leadership

In the discipline of Economics, Porter (1990) wrote about what he believed to be leadership in the framework of national competitive advantage. He wrote at the end of a decade that had seen the literature on leadership dominated by the post-industrial paradigm of leadership. This paradigm equated good leadership with good management (Rost, 1993, p.10). Since that time leadership as a political conception has been often associated with economics and entrepreneurship in the context of globalisation (Schwartz, 1996).

In expressing his view of leadership, which in the terms of this thesis, was really a conception of leaders and leading because it did not consider morality or ethics, Porter (1990), nevertheless, claimed that leaders worked subject to the determinants of national competitive advantage. The first of these determinants was firm strategy, structure, and rivalry while the second determinant was demand conditions. The third was related and supporting industries and the fourth, factor conditions (production factors required for a given industry, for example skilled labour, logistics and

infrastructure). All these determinants were influenced by chance and by government (Porter, pp.127, 129). Problems, challenges, and opportunities were tackled by leaders. A leader was “someone who understands and believes in the determinants more than other individuals” (Porter, 1990, p.130). Leadership determined the success of a firm. The successful leader possessed insight into and the tools to exploit opportunities (Porter, p.130).

Porter (1990) argued that in the modern firm the leader was responsible for the “challenge of action” (Porter, 1990, p.584). The success of the organization was dependent upon the visionary leader, who acquired his vision from the influence of the environment in which he worked. Innovation was also a result of environment, national circumstances attracting and encouraging the emergence of great leaders whose “perceptions and priorities” (Porter, 1990, p.584) produced change in organizations. Success could not be attributed solely to leadership. By itself leadership could not explain success although it often determined who exploited it. For Porter, to be the leader of a firm meant to create an environment for innovation and one that met the right challenges (Porter, p.585).

Porter (1990) also claimed to have described a conception of corporate leadership (Porter, p.615) beginning with the observation that the importance of the nation, before the turn of the twenty first century, had not at that time been superseded by globalisation (Porter, p.577). He backed up this claim by turning to applications of his model of determinants to assess the competitive strengths and weaknesses of firms in international competition (Porter, pp.600-601, 603).

Leadership can be considered an idea of reason, a notion of the comprehension or a principle of judgement, yet in purporting to analyse leaders Porter’s (1990) concrete conception of leadership was at best only intuitive. He talked about their beliefs in change, insights into competition and their preferably unconstrained execution of their alterations to competition. Leaders, apparently, energised their organizations for the sake of progress. They had a broad view of competition, worked hard to change their environment, and appeared to others, although not to themselves, to be statesmen. He said that many companies had lost this concept of leadership with the majority of managers being overly concerned with financial performance and government aid, as

well as with mergers and takeovers. Being preoccupied with these was not good for firms or for nations (Porter, p.615).

In relation to subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership, that is, the mature human intellect, Porter's (1990) conception of leadership was the mere imitation of a theory of leaders and leading because it was grounded in the characteristics of a leader and what a leader did. For Porter (1990) leadership was all about perceptions and his conception of it did not rise above the level of the concrete. In other words, leadership was misconstrued by Porter (1990) to be a concrete concept, a fact, and not an abstract concept or idea of reason let alone a notion or principle.

Because the attributes he ascribed to leaders were contingent on concrete historical circumstances Porter (1990) could not address leadership itself. He used concrete conceptual and operational statements about leaders and leading and therefore talked intuitively about the craft of leading and not at all about leadership itself. This equivocal use of the term is an excellent example that demonstrates how the general intellect cannot engage meaningfully with the term leadership, which is a moral notion because the idea belongs in the transcendental intellect.

Porter (1990), then, misconstrued the craft of leading to be about leadership because he limited himself to his intuition, which according to the schema proposed in this thesis lies inside the mind of man but outside of his intellect, coupled with his understanding in his general intellect. That is, he focused on empirical examples in historically contingent circumstances and sought descriptive or explanatory generalities about them without due regard for the moral dimensions of either the examples, behaviour, or attitudes or circumstances in which they worked. By using his intuition and general intellect and ignoring the use of his transcendental intellect Porter (1990) was unable to form a view of leadership. Without the use of the transcendental intellect the formation of a view of leadership is impossible.

With regard to objective grounds, that is, the literature of science, Porter's (1990) simple economic conception of leadership supported Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) observation that leadership had been approached in the scientific tradition as an

influence relationship. This is the first of the three scientific aspects of leadership that concerns this part of the chapter.

II.ii: Burns' political-theoretical view of leadership

The second scientific aspect of leadership is represented by the work of Burns (1978), in which the writer used the understanding and reason of his general intellect but this time not to put together a conception of leading but to devise a theory of leading. This section argues that this is misrepresented as a theory of leadership. In a reading of Stogdill (Bass, 1981) attention is drawn to the difference between transactional and transformational leadership. The origin of this difference will be found to lie in the work of Burns (1978).

Burns (1978) claimed to have distinguished among transactional, transformational, and transcendental leadership. The difference was that where transactional leadership was about an individual leading in the mere exchange of commodities to realise independent aims transformational leadership concerned the explicit end-values of liberty, justice, and equality. Burns stopped there. He did not consider transcendental leadership and did not make the connection to what this thesis proposes are the supra end-values of morality: the right, the good, and duty.

By pre-empting the last of these with the more generic term of intellectual leadership Burns (1978) failed to follow through on transcendental leadership because by all appearances he recognised a conflict of interest between the science of politics and the morality of leadership. Before remarking further on the distinction between the first two, what he said about what he called intellectual leadership will be explicated in the first subsection. In the next subsection some counter-arguments to what he assumed and argued will be offered.

II.ii.i: Burns' political theory of intellectual leadership

Burns (1978) stated that conflict was the catalyst that converts a society's generalised needs into specific acts of intellectual leadership. The intellectual was a figure simultaneously aware of the individuality of thought and the plurality of action. Intellectuals explained evil, interpreted societal experiences, instructed the young in tradition and skills and facilitated and guided aesthetic and religious experiences

(Burns, p.142). The error of the ways of the *philosophes*, men of letters, was to lead in politics and to suffer the consequences (d'Tocqueville cited in Burns, p.148) instead of fixing that which was faulty in the constitution. Their desire was to rebuild it according to a preconceived system that was to first lead to disaster and only then to limitless opportunities.

Earlier, seventeenth century English intellectuals defended liberty against governmental lust for power. Their thought was that passions and vices of men needed restraint most when they were in power. The relation between power and liberty was one in which a balance needed to be struck between individual liberty and government's "maintenance of justice and order" (Burns, 1978, p.150). Historical conditions made it difficult for intellectuals to determine the correct combination of executive, legislature, and judiciary to form a model of government that defended liberty against power.

The influence of collective intellectual leadership was hard to measure in general terms but could be analysed in a specific situation (Burns, 1978, p.153). The example of eighteenth century America was the example taken. Power and liberty were opposites for American thinkers of that time. Power preyed on liberty: power granted charters of liberty in Europe but liberty granted charters of power in America (Madison cited in Burns, 1978, p.153).

Power for Americans did not protect or advance liberty. Balancing powers within government became the American way: economic and sectional power would be dispersed away from government so government would not be a threat to liberty. Madison's ingenious system of checks and balances was based on a realistic view of the nature of man and a conflict theory analysis of the political situation of the time. This system of checks and balances was to stem factional violence and the chaos, instability, and injustices consequential to that.

Madison, a Virginian constitutionalist, could see that only the effects of faction and not its causes could be removed: the judiciary, legislature, and executive would each control the ambitions of the others if they were to rule over men. Madison's was a classic example of the "power of political leadership by intellectuals" (Burns, 1978,

p.156) to philosophically and operationally resolve how to protect the liberty of the people from the power of government.

Intellectual leaders of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were deeply concerned with the protection of individual liberties against public power and were resolved to limiting government by a heterogeneous constitution and a separation of powers. By using the powers of government groups of people, collectives, could expand their liberties in education, health, nutrition, and employment. This was a question set in the seventeenth century and one which remained worthy of constant review.

Eighteenth century England saw the expansion of private entrepreneurs of capital. English intellectual leadership responded to this by failing to broaden their conception of liberty from political, economic and social liberties of the private individual to a political system with a populace possessing mass political power, a means of harnessing that power to government, and an agency within government capable of enforcing decisions and laws.

Bentham (as cited in Burns, 1978) wrote that “All government is in itself a vast evil” failing to generate economic and social liberties for the common man (Burns, 1978, p.160). Liberty was protection from government because the state could not fulfil a man’s potential for freedom. In contrast, Thomas Hill Green, an Oxford philosopher, supplied the intellectual foundation for the change in focus from an entrepreneurial free market to government control and planning in the provision of mass education, health, and housing, to expand personal liberties. That is understood to mean that, in this interpretation of what Burns (1978) said, figures like James Madison in America along with Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green in Britain were exemplary of intellectual leadership though they dealt with the relation of freedom and state power in different ways.

To continue with this interpretation, intellectual leadership was proven by liberty and power. Negative liberty, “liberty from oppressive government,” (Burns, 1978, p163) was different from positive liberty, majority rule by a coalition of the less affluent. The idea of the doctrine of majority rule belonged to the Enlightenment so did not first emerge in nineteenth century America as an intellectual concept. After the turn of the

twentieth century, Ward (2004) had contended that human evolution was unlike animal evolution in that through *purposive action* man changed his environment to suit himself, that competition was wasteful, and that intellectuals must lead (Ward, 2004). However, collective intellectual leadership has failed to provide a comprehensive foundation that would unite men in purpose, government, and politics (Burns, pp.141-168).

The explication of what Burns (1978) said can be supported by the observation that his influence on international authorities in multidisciplinary studies on leadership and organisations was unquestioned. These experts frequently quoted and engaged with what he wrote about what he supposed was leadership. For example, in organisational studies, which were very closely allied to leadership studies, the distinction between transactional and transformational leadership had implications for the development of individuals, teams and organisations (Bass & Avolio, 1990, p.231). Further, Rost (1993) acknowledged his debt to Burns (1978) through the Preface to his work, more of which later. Northouse (1997) devoted an entire section on transformational leadership in his survey of approaches to and theories of leadership (Northouse, pp.130-153).

In addition, Rost and Barker (2000) began their article on leadership education by pointing out that most educators concentrated on leadership potential, which was based on the characteristics or abilities of a leader. They then agreed with Burns (1978) that this was problematic because it did not “focus on the complex process of leadership itself” (Rost & Barker, 2000, p.4). Incongruously, given this focus in his work, James McGregor Burns, having previously balked at discussing his idea of transcendental leadership (Burns, 1978), was to be found at the 2005 Leadership Research Conference discussing *moral* leadership with Warren Bennis, the latter often thought of as the pioneer of leadership studies (Bennis, 2005; Burns, 2005). This aside, prominent writers in the field of leadership continued to make reference to Burns’ (1978) influential text (Bass & Bass, 2008; Young, 2009).

II.ii.ii: Critique of Burns’ theory of intellectual leadership

Saying what is wrong in the case of Burns (1978) is prefaced with the observation that Burns was really talking about power and liberty, intellectuals (intellectual leaders) and government. Clearly Burns was theorising about the difference between the American

and English political systems. On this he speculated as to why the American system worked and the English system did not when it came to the governing of their citizens. Any tendentious historical assumption for this will not be pursued here.

What is wrong in the case of Burns (1978) is that at least twice he says he will do one thing but does another. Early in his first chapter leading was divided into transactional, transformational, and transcendental as if setting out to examine each of these but he fell short of pursuing transcendental leading. Nowhere in the text did he explicitly say that transcendental leading was intellectual leading, or was intellectual leadership for that matter. Secondly, in his chapter entitled Intellectual Leadership Burns said not that transforming leadership was a kind of intellectual leadership as one would have expected but that intellectual leadership was a kind of transforming leadership because it included the role of “conscious purpose drawn from values” (Burns, 1978, p142). This was in direct contradiction to his having divided leading into the three kinds mentioned above.

Further, while Burns (1978) did talk about intellectual leaders of the legislative and the executive, he failed to take judicial leaders into account to complete a comprehensive handling of transactional leadership. He not only associated intellectual leadership with reform and revolution but also placed heroes and ideologues (saints) under transforming leadership, which would have been better off under transcendental leadership. The reason for this will be given shortly. After having drawn the distinction amongst the three different kinds of leadership it seems an odd carriage of literary justice to have not developed transcendental leadership.

Moreover, Burns (1978) said at the beginning of the book that he would talk about the power of leadership, making the point that leadership was problematic. He did not say why it was problematic but this thesis ventures that this was because leadership was not a power and not a faculty of the intellect at all. What he was talking about was the power of the leader, not of the idea of leadership. In terms of this thesis, leadership is subject matter, an object of the intellect that of course has no power in the political sense that Burns meant. To do so, it must be instantiated by the leading of leaders and this they can do more or less well. But what it is that is instantiated, leadership, is a prior question, one the transcendental intellect can pursue.

Again, power, like learning, change, and innovation, is an equivocal term. It is a catch-all quasi-concept of generalisation used by social-science theorists to analyse social structures. With multiple definitions spread across the pages of the disciplines of social science, these quasi-concepts have lost their meaning through their erosion into everyday speech by overuse. The power of leadership is a redundancy because power is already contained within the subject of, indeed, is an element within the nature of leadership itself. One cannot lead without having some kinds of power to make one's leading effective. Thus, searching for the sources of the power of leaders as if it is merely an empirical and conceptual enquiry is a will o' the wisp. However, this was exactly what Burns (1978) attempted to do.

The third point is that without principles, and so, an abstract notion of leadership, liberty cannot be defined let alone redefined, nor can the confidence of those interested in change be secured. Without imagination and intelligence the analogies of experience in the practice of the intellect, being a response to the leadership of other individuals, cannot be put in their proper place.

Another point is that leaders and leading are explained by turning to the particulars of history, which was what Burns (1978) did. In contrast, the universals of philosophy are the first resort in a critical discussion on the abstract concept of leadership. Burns made a reasonable attempt at a scientific-cum-empirical theory about intellectual leaders and leading but his work was not an authoritative conceptual account of leadership. What is understood by what Burns was striving to say is that mature intellectual leaders are transcendental leaders, who are purely moral.

Reformist and revolutionary leaders like Tsar Alexander II of Russia and Mao Tse Tung of China were historical figures. These ostensible heroes belong in the state but saints belong in the church. Heroes are transformative leaders in the cause of justice; saints are transcendental leaders in the cause of morality and the life of the spirit. What Burns (1978) was also saying was that the key elements of ideology pursued by transformative leaders were cognition, conflict, consciousness, value, and purpose, which mutually fortified one another (Burns, p.250).

The most telling point was that Burns (1978), versed in the discipline of Political Science, nevertheless fell into error in his first chapter. In his drive towards the construction of a theory of leading, rather than of leadership, Burns began with transformational leading then merely substituted this with transformational leadership. This was and is without justification, to have leapt from a concrete concept to an abstract concept¹⁷. In addition, and worse still, to have taken the expression of leadership as transformation and then manipulated this into transformational leadership was also an error because it leapt directly to treating the simile or analogy of leadership as transformation as a thing in being.

More explicitly, the error was to allow the general intellect to treat the analogy or metaphor of leadership as transformation as a concrete thing, which it clearly is not. Then what kind of thing is it? When a thing out there is sensed a representation of it, the concrete concept of the thing, becomes an object of the general intellect. Now, leadership as transformation is not a *concrete* thing out there. What it does have is an identity in social reality as a social fact. The question to be answered is whether all social facts are to be treated as things. The answer appears to be supplied by Durkheim (1938) who said that “The first and fundamental rule is: Consider social facts as things” (Durkheim, 1938, p.14) but he did not specify what kind of thing. Filling the gap, specifically an *abstract* thing is proposed by this thesis.

Abstract things are what can be called the formal intellectual objects of language, namely concepts, ideas, notions, and principles or the more sophisticated forms of beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition). These are conveyed from one individual to another through the intellectual subject matter of language in words, sentences, paragraphs, and compositions or later with propositions, paragraphs, compositions (formulated positions) and debates. By as accurately as possible conveying the meanings or the truth values that are attached by agreement to the intellectual subject matter of language parties to the communicative process acknowledge that each has an understanding in the intellect capable of decoding this subject matter.

¹⁷ See Part III.iii.i of this chapter for the distinction to be made between these.

However, asking the general intellect to manipulate leadership *as* transformation to become transformational leadership is asking it to perform an un-acknowledged and rationally invalid move. To be rationally valid transformational leadership equates to the leadership of transformation. Not only is this a rationally invalid move but it is also a morally impermissible operation interceptable by the transcendental intellect. If the leadership of transformation has any meaning or truth value at all then it would concern good leaders being in a relationship to those they lead in a way that bears comparison to various kinds of transforming relationships, but that in itself does not support any particular inference about leading others, which requires that the specific leading be itself transformative.

In conclusion, this subsection has argued that Burns' (1978) theory of leadership is in reality a political scientific theory of leaders and leading because it has fallen short by not including a proper treatment of morality and ethics under transcendental leading, which would then be correctly called pure intellectual leadership, that is, transcendental leadership.

Remark on Burns

Leading for Burns (1978) was about motives, values, and goals and is ultimately only transactional or transformational. In each of these was the pursuit of higher goals as opposed to the mere exchange of commodities to realise independent aims. Values were instrumental in transactional leading: being honest, responsible, and fair but in transformational leading *end values*, which included liberty, justice, and equality, were achieved through leaders elevating followers through levels of morality to share these end-values. This is where Burns stopped. However, while his having included considerations of morality was already contrary to the edicts of social science, it was refreshing to see the inclusion of some consideration of morality, even if it was in the wrong place. Burns at least made a beginning where others in social scientific debates about what was assumed to be leadership did not take that step and in general confined themselves to an instrumental conception of value.

The difference between a theory of transactional and transformational leaders and leading and a philosophical schema of transcendental leadership such as that sought by this thesis is the inclusion of morality and ethics in the core of the latter. Proposed in

addition to the end values Burns (1978) talked about, supra end-values of the supererogatory go beyond the teachings of transformational leaders and away from social institutions and the political into the transcendental leadership of the life of the spirit and moral values grounded in the good itself.

In other words, although an element of morality does exist in transformational leading because it includes the possibility of action being drawn not from a rational base but from a moral base in practice and custom, that is, tradition, transcendental leadership is pure intellectual leadership: the *intended* or moral action determined does not follow from a rational consideration as in transactional leadership or from a mix of the two as in transforming leadership but from the purely ethical consideration of a situation.

What has just been witnessed is exactly how Burns (1978), in his bid to develop a rational theory of leadership, for his work was not a purely empirical one, misrepresented a science of leading as a science of leadership. Like Porter's (1990) attempt, this was eventually impossible to get away with. With respect to the second step in the advancement of the overall argument of the thesis, after Porter, who represents the first scientific aspect of the study of leadership, which is to approach leadership as an influence relationship in a simple economic conception, Burns represents the second approach to leadership, the aspect of treating leadership theoretically and problematically, in the tradition of science. Importantly, by including some considerations of morality Burns breached the edicts of social science. Consequently, this undermines the ability of this aspect to support Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) demonstration of leadership in the scientific tradition.

To complete the support for Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) demonstration of leadership in the scientific tradition, that science approaches leadership as an influence relationship, theoretically and problematically, and as the management and styles of leaders, Wang's (2008) practical empirical work will represent the last of these scientific aspects. Notwithstanding this representation, Wang's investigation, also to be classified under a science of leaders and leading but not of leadership, due to a failure to admit morality and ethics, will be seen in the following section to contribute to "a superabundance of facts about leaders far outrun[ning] theories of leadership" (Burns, 1978, p.2).

II.iii: Argument against phenomenographic method and Wang's educational-empirical approach to leadership

By way of introduction to this argument, Phenomenography, according to Marton (1981), the original designer of the method, did not study the world directly or ask other people about their ideas of and experiences in the world (Marton, 1981, p.31; Marton, 1986, p.180). The focus of the researcher (interviewer) was on studying the awareness and reflection of subjects, their conceptions of that phenomenon and not the researcher's own. Marton (1981) said that different people could experience a particular phenomenon in only a limited number of qualitatively different ways. These ways could be categorised and the underlying meanings of these conceptions along with their relationships to one another could then lead to their being (hierarchically) arranged in what was called an outcome space (Marton, 1981, p.190).

According to Svensson (1997) phenomenography claimed neither to be based on metaphysical beliefs like idealism or materialism nor to assume anything about the nature of reality. However, it did assume that conceptions were the result of what individuals thought about the world external to them and were accessible through language (Svensson, 1997, p.165). Svensson said the method used was an open, that is unstructured, and deep, that is exhaustive, interview. He also said the aim of each interview was to reach a mutual understanding between interviewer and respondent about the meaning of the accounts of the experiences discussed; from unreflected to reflected awareness of aspects of accounts of the experience of the phenomenon.

This brief outline of phenomenography is necessary in order to understand Wang's (2004, 2008)¹⁸ study as illustrative of the phenomenographic approach to leadership and learning. By her own admission: "[t]he aim of this study is to explore the conceptions of a specific cohort of Chinese educational leaders in an international education context using a phenomenographic approach" (Wang, 2004, p.103). Wang's work is therefore subject to the more generic criticisms¹⁹ levelled against phenomenography. This has been done most cogently by Webb (1997). For instance, that short instrumental interviews do not capture the spirit of phenomenography but of

¹⁸ Wang's unpublished thesis and the published work are identical except for page numbering. Both are referred to due to publication timing and ease of access at different times in the preparation of this thesis.

¹⁹ More specific criticisms will be held in reserve until later in this section.

positivism, that categories of understanding were based on prejudice, that participants were talked into adopting what was espoused to be the correct view, and that the power of interpretation remained with the researcher.

Before engaging in a more detailed critique of Wang (2004, 2008) a major criticism of phenomenography will be pointed to and Webb's (1997) generic critique of phenomenography will be outlined. This will be followed by showing how Ekeblad's (1997) rebuttal to Webb's critique went wrong. The main criticism this thesis levels against phenomenography, then, is that phenomenographic researchers tended to conflate a subject's *account* of the experience of a phenomenon with that subject's experience of the phenomenon. This is borne out by the difference between what a researcher observed and what a subject said. Phenomenography, thus, could not have concerned itself with the truth because it was unable to accurately depict experience.

Now, in support of this Webb (1997) has tabled several generic arguments against phenomenography. First, he has argued that a short, controlled, instrumental interview does not develop understanding in the exegetical tradition but seeks the generalisations of positivism. In the tradition of interpretation, care, openness and much time is needed for conversationalists to discover each in the other (Webb, pp.197-198). Second, simply because phenomenography had "no view of humanity and the social consequences of education" (Webb, 1997, pp.198-199) it could not validly claim a value-neutral position. In agreement with Webb this thesis contends that no such position can exist because "recourse to social values and ideology" (Webb, 1997, pp.199) is part of being human. Phenomenography's pretence to value-neutrality was thus disingenuous.

The next argument that has been levelled against phenomenography by Webb (1997) is that it cannot take account of the "historical and social construction of thought" (Webb, 1997, p.200) because no researcher can be in possession of perceptions uncontaminated by language and culture. In their construction and interpretation of categories of understanding the researcher's understanding was informed by his or her social and historical background: in other words, prejudice (Webb, p.200).

The construction and interpretation of phenomenographic categories has been a basis for Webb's (1997) fourth argument in support of the main criticism of the thesis against

Phenomenography: “Invariably, one of the categories²⁰ displays ‘correct meaning, correct knowledge or correct understanding’” (Webb, 1997, pp.200-201) aligned with modern science and the history of the discipline reconstructed through the interviewees.²¹ Any other account was questionable. Those who held these other accounts were in phenomenographical terms assisted towards the correct view (Webb, p.201).

A final argument has been that only one of the participants in the conversation has “the power to categorise and judge” (Webb, 1997, p.202) and this has been not an agreeable basis on which to develop educational relationships. Thus, through method and not any explicit claim to the contrary the search for positivist generalisation was sanctioned and any phenomenographic claim to qualitative explanation and subjectivity tended to be void of substance. Webb (1997) has summed up by questioning the ability of phenomenographic researchers to “have pristine perception, make neutral observations, build objective categories and give neutral interpretations” (Webb, 1997, p.201). The conclusion Webb (1997) has drawn from his critique has been that each of these activities was informed by theory and prejudice.

Ekeblad’s (1997) attempt to rebut Webb’s (1997) attack on phenomenography went wrong in a number of places. First, Ekeblad clearly objected to the picture that Webb sketches of phenomenography as if the whole education community depended on it in the face of the threat of postmodern relativism (Ekeblad, pp.220, 222). While her accusation of relativism was a merely uninformed allegation against Webb (1997) if the charge were reversed and levelled against phenomenographic studies, phenomenographers would be hard pressed to defend against it²².

Second, for Ekeblad (1997) to defend phenomenography by using a metaphysical idea like “ontological gerrymandering” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.220) demonstrated a certain paucity in the phenomenographic storehouse. Phenomenography should be defensible through the use of its own ideas and in the terms of phenomenology, from which it

²⁰ And invariably, Webb says, the number is five. Checking for this, Wang’s work reveals: “Based on the analytical framework, five themes about leadership are examined” (Wang, 2004, pp.217, 234).

²¹ For example: “There was [also] a shift from task/directive-orientated conceptions about leadership to motivation/collaborative-oriented leadership conceptions” (Wang, 2004, p.ii).

²² As will be demonstrated by this thesis in its imminent critique of Wang’s (2008, 2004) study.

developed, without the necessity for recourse to the language of metaphysics, from which it is removed in terms of cultures of skill and of values.

Next, Ekeblad (1997) was at variance with Webb (1997) on the interest in “measurement scales for assessment of student approaches to learning” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.221). However, nowhere to be seen in Webb’s critique is there any reference to measurement scales. Although she may speak about “teaching and learning at all levels of the educational system” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.221) she said Webb goes too far when he talks about “academic communities” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.222). Academic communities do not have “subject specialists and educational generalists” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.222). Professional communities do.

Ekeblad (1997) then criticised Webb (1997) for “plunging into a postmodernist relativism” where “nothing can ever legitimately be more valued than anything else” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.222). This is ironic because Phenomenography itself denied values a place in its categories. Ekeblad (1997) then in effective said that Webb (1997) is against bringing students to science (Ekeblad, p.222). However, this is disputed because not all students want to be inveigled into the science trap. Ekeblad’s talk of “ideas and modes of reasoning” (Ekeblad, 1997, p.222) does not make sense when phenomenographic studies are concerned with concepts and theory and do not engage in debates in Logic. Much of what remains in Ekeblad’s (1997) article is pure argumentum ad hominem and as such should be dismissed by the informed reader.

So far, this section points to a major criticism of Phenomenology, which is supported by a number of generic criticisms that have been made by Webb (1997). An attempt to rebut these criticisms was made by Ekeblad (1997) in support of Phenomenography but these are found wanting. The brief critique of Wang’s (2004, 2008) work that follows will be prefaced by the observation that her study was typical of the abundance of post-modernist empirical studies that used interpretivism, structuralism, and post-structuralist phenomenology as epistemologies and methodologies of the philosophy of the social sciences. Wang claimed to have conducted an intercultural study on

leadership and learning²³ “underpinned by the interpretivist philosophy” (Wang, 2008, p.81).

The methodology used was phenomenographic, as just mentioned a development from phenomenology, and stood “against the rationalist tradition of thinking” (Wang, 2008, p.81). This claim is contentious because the empiricist-rationalist debate between advocates of Hume (1975) and of Kant (1999)²⁴ has not yet been settled. This study is inadequate because it simply *described* the phenomena of experience, which was typical of phenomenography; no *explanation* or argument was given on the appearance of differences in accounts of the phenomenon of leadership.

Wang (2004, 2008) also said that her study was useful. However, the problem with this claim is that the study was concerned with a small cohort, the results of which she said were not generalizable to a larger population. Instead, the results were useful for understanding a phenomenon and informing theory (Wang, 2004, pp.135-136). However, by hypothesis this does not help the researcher intending to replicate the study with an eye to generalisation. The added question whether or not the methodology and results are transferable to other similar-sized cohort-studies remains. As a consequence the reliability and repeatability of the study are thrown into doubt.

On reliability, the categories²⁵ that Wang (2004, 2008) used may well not be those uncovered by another researcher. Furthermore, exactly how such categories are to be used is nowhere clearly articulated by her although Wang says:

The researcher aimed to improve the usefulness of the findings to other researchers in two ways: first, by providing a description of the dimensions of participants’ experience so that anyone else interested in transferability has a base of information appropriate to the judgement; and second, by establishing the typicality of the case so that users can make comparisons with their own situations.

(Wang, 2004, p.136)

Firstly, about situations, classroom pedagogy, a course: “The participants were Chinese educational administrators undertaking a leadership development course” (Wang, 2004,

²³ However, that she has done no such thing will be argued.

²⁴ On Kant’s (1999) wider conception of experience see in this thesis Chapter 2, III.i.

²⁵ Leadership as positional power, as non-positional power, as practical art, as teamwork leaders and as vision and strategic planning; See Table 7.8 in Wang (2004, pp.214-215).

p.139). This was perhaps not the best platform for using phenomenographic method to find out what participants thought about leadership because some were less responsive than others.

Secondly, if Wang was truly concerned with “intercultural contexts” (Wang, 2004, p.135) then why was the study restricted to a “bounded sample” (Wang, 2004, p.135) of subjects in China with no bounded sample in Australia for instance? Surely this would have gone some way to completing the study and validating her claim that this was an *intercultural* study. Because phenomenographic research espoused no interest in accounts of the experiences of the researchers or interviewers it was irrelevant what nationality they were.

In a second claim, one subsequent to the mention of a stand against rationalist tradition, having completed ostensibly open and deep interviews, to have met phenomenographic requirements, before and after the leadership development course, she advised that the conceptions of leadership that emerged from her data analysis were analogies. As already noted, these analogies were leadership as positional power, as non-positional power, as practical art, as teamwork leaders and as vision and strategic planning (Wang, 2008, p.120). To this second claim, two points can be made. The first point is that none of these cover the moral essence of leadership²⁶.

The second point is of a more detailed nature. The analogies just enumerated appear to be thinly-veiled variations of Weber’s (1927) charismatic, traditional, and bureaucratic-rational authority. Arguably, Weber’s categories were regurgitated by Burns (1978) as transcendental, transformational, and transactional leadership respectively. Further, it is worth noting that Denton (1998) conceived of the “characteristics of organisational learning” (Denton, 1998, p.91, table 4.1) as *strategic*, flexible *structure*, blame-free *culture*, *vision*, external awareness, knowledge creation and transfer, quality, supportive atmosphere, and *team working* (Denton, p.91).

Wang’s (2008) analogies of leadership were: leadership as positional power, as non-positional power, as practical art, as *teamwork* leaders and as *vision* and *strategic*

²⁶ This will be taken up in Chapter Four on the Philosophy of Leadership.

planning. When Denton's (1998) characteristics of organisational learning are compared with Wang's conceptions of leadership the similarities are striking and hence noteworthy.²⁷ Even after brief consideration there is little room for doubt that Denton's characteristics and Wang's conceptions or analogies are not unique to either learning or leadership. Wang, then, was not saying anything new about leadership or learning that could not have been found as general features of society or in organisations²⁸. Moreover, her post-course category of L-F leadership as consultation and collaboration looks too much like a later-expanded L-D leadership as teamwork leaders category (Wang, p.131) to be helpful. Both are too alike for such a distinction to be helpful because the issue of whether leadership or learning was being properly characterised remains unresolved.

In the light of the above generic criticism of Phenomenography²⁹ this second point implies that what is learned more about than either leadership or learning is the methodology of Phenomenography. Using phenomenography is doing quasi-science and in doing quasi-science Wang (1980) misconstrued her topic. Both learning and leadership are ideas that are not suitable for the supposed empirical method of phenomenography. The method is not up to the task because learning and leadership are not concrete concepts of things that can be simply described and through multiple descriptions resolved as being merely subject to interpretation.

Descriptions of reported or perceived changes "from a task-focused/directive orientation to a motivation-focused/collaborative orientation" (Wang, 2004, p.244) did not explain leadership. This relativism to task or motive denies the true nature of learning and leadership; namely that they are abstract objects of the intellect³⁰, shared ideas set in academic and cosmopolitan intellectual communities that need to be explained and critically evaluated³¹ in a debate proper to the operations of the transcendental intellect.

²⁷ Denton's (1998) study, largely his doctoral thesis, was undertaken in the UK, outside of phenomenography's geographical sphere of influence, Scandinavia and Australasia. Wang's (2008) study grew out of Australia and was undertaken in China.

²⁸ See in this chapter, Chapter 2, II.i, Porter's (1990) determinants of firm strategy, structure and rivalry.

²⁹ See earlier in this section Webb's (1997) fourth argument on the categories displaying: "the history of the discipline reconstructed through the interviewees".

³⁰ This term has already been explained in the first chapter.

³¹ Namely, Sociology; under the rules for the observation of social facts Durkheim says: "We must, therefore, consider social phenomena in themselves as distinct from the consciously-formed

Due to this relativism, brought on by the misapplication of phenomenography, Wang (2008) lacked a normative concept of what good, exemplary leading is but she should have because such a concept provides a unified ground on which to criticise leaders and episodes of leading. Her use of a phenomenographically-inclined pre- and post-course interviewing technique for collecting data appears to have overshadowed the possibility of including a normative concept of leader or leading. This raises doubts about what standards she could have come up with for evaluating leaders' performances. The use of phenomenography seems to have somehow absolved the researcher from the responsibility of making a direct contribution to such a question. Nothing her subjects said gave her any material to provide critical, evaluative concepts to use in relation to her obligation to take responsibility for the lack of a normative concept of leader or leading.

A third claim made by Wang (2008), following that about analogies, was that the categories used were messy. Yet the real question as to why they were messy was not broached. It is hard to believe that these so-called categories arose from the participants themselves and did not pre-exist in the mind of the researcher, being imposed upon the material gleaned from the subjects,³² thus accounting for "messiness" (Wang, 2008, pp.185-186). A second point to be raised against this third claim is that readers were told that participants individually held several different conceptions of learning and leadership (Wang, p.185) and again readers were not told why. What remains is speculation on this diversity, not so much on whether this indicated confusion among subjects with regard to the complexity of leadership and learning or their attempts to understand these two ideas in the absence of adequate grounding in moral codes.

representations of them in the mind; we must study them objectively as external things, for it is this character that they present to us. If this exteriority should prove to be only apparent, the advance of science will bring the disillusionment *and we shall see our conception of social phenomena change, as it were, from the objective to the subjective*. But in any case, the solution cannot be anticipated; and even if we finally arrive at the result that social phenomena do not possess all the intrinsic characteristics of the thing, *we ought at first to treat them as if they had*. This rule is applicable, then, to all social reality without exception...facts most arbitrary in appearance will come to present,..., qualities of consistency and regularity that are symptomatic of their objectivity" [Both, my italics] (Durkheim, 1938, p.28). The point put forward by this thesis is that ideas should not be treated as concrete concepts of things.

³² See footnote 6.

Further to this and before the matter of morality and ethics in leadership is considered, two things come to mind. The first is on the matter of the interviews Wang (2004) undertook. They cannot be justified by Wang in terms that her study was cross-cultural. Vignettes are simply individual cases. Morally sensible or wise analysis and resolution of them requires virtue, good judgement and knowledge of relevant institutional, historical and circumstantial facts. Wang did not provide the latter factual knowledge to her respondents nor did she defend their virtue and good judgement. Yet respondents were portrayed in the study as authorities, of some kind, on leadership. And nothing is otherwise exceptional about the nature of this study to stop it from being subject to a standard rule of good research that the opinions of anonymous respondents be inadmissible to any argument on leadership, given its moral dimensions.

The second thing is that this phenomenographic study was not high in insight or in advancing understanding of leadership because, like so many similar empirical studies in the social sciences, the ratio of ideas to facts is low. What was emitted was an “endless accumulation of empirical data” (Stogdill, 1974, p.vii). The *comprehension* of leadership was not advanced at all. Rather than asking anonymous candidates their opinions, and then changing those opinions allegedly for the better, no attempt was made to consult the wisdom of a tradition that is found in classical western literature to advance the field of leadership studies.

To claim to be investigating leadership and not to take morality and ethics into account is to pursue a project flawed by an erroneous conception of leadership. Studying what was assumed to be leadership as if factually, without morality and ethics, is not to be examining *leadership* but to be talking about leaders and leading. The study of the latter is to some extent an empirical matter. Leadership is not an idea belonging to any empirical or quasi-science like phenomenology, interpretivism or post-structuralism. Rather, leadership is an abstract idea properly belonging to the morally-engaged intellect, which this thesis characterises, following Kant (1999) and some byways suggested but ignored by Burns (1978), as the transcendental intellect.

Quasi-science generates conceptions of leaders and leading and pretends to explain these with what are, in fact, superficial factors of vision, culture, strategy, and structure. In doing so such study is impotent in the face of any consideration of virtue and duty,

what is right and what is good, values that make up the proper notion of leadership that can only be discussed, not by any objective, detached observer, but by well-informed active participants with accumulated years of relevant cultural experience needed to pass judgement on the notion of leadership. In the light of the lack of consideration of morality and ethics, which consideration is at the heart of the notion of leadership, this thesis is compelled to conclude that, although the work that has been done in received leadership studies is respected, the discipline in general has yet to gain respect since its investigations have not been about what it claimed it was about.

Remark: the moral of the failure of mainstream Leadership Studies

In relation to subjective grounds, that is, the mature human intellect the field of leadership cannot belong to modern science because leadership is concerned with the morality and ethics of comprehension and judgement, whereas the domain of science begins and ends with the sensible and the intelligible of understanding and reason and serves only to describe and explain causes. The failure of modern science-oriented leadership studies to grasp the reality that it has unwittingly and dogmatically strayed into the field of leadership-understood-morally has compounded the generation of an excessive number of inadequate conceptions, theories, and ineffectual attempts at empirical studies that are ultimately of little use. A call for change is needed.

II.iv: A common neglect of morality

With respect to the argument of the thesis, Section II.iii concerned the work of Wang (2004, 2008), which represents the third scientific aspect of leadership, treated after that of Porter (1990) and Burns (1978). None of these have been shown to satisfactorily support the demonstration of a science of leadership found by Stogdill (Bass, 1981) in the mainstream of leadership studies. Approaching leadership in the scientific tradition by aspect of Porter's simple economic conception as an influence relationship, by aspect of Burns theory as theoretical and problematical, and by aspect of Wang's practical empirical study as the management and styles of leaders, patently fails because such an approach cannot consider values and ends.

Works that deliberate on values and ends are needed for a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. To complete this second step in the overall argument of the thesis a review of the foremost representatives of the

postmedieval foundations of science is required to discover how the tradition of science has come to meet this impasse with morality and ethics.

Under the common deficiency of not considering morality and ethics in their treatment of leadership the strands of critique of Burns (1978), Porter (1990) and Wang (2008) are brought together. Although Burns hinted at a transcendental leadership by passing over the opportunity to produce an account of it he failed to explore the morality and ethics of leadership. Neither Porter nor Wang apprehended this in their approach to leadership. That these writers foundered on the neglect of morality points to the task ahead.

In what lays ahead the traditions of art and philosophy, as well as canonical works in the tradition of science, need to be considered in order to find a place for the *lemma* of leadership. Because of the lack of any just consideration of transcendental leadership in the scientific literature, the whole scenario around leadership is not what it should be. Burns (1978) focussed on what he called intellectual leadership rather than transcendental leadership with its moral and ethical essence. Without the moral light of a mature subjectivity the human intellect cannot engage with the notions of the art and philosophy of leadership.

This is why Berlin's (2000a) philosophical distinction between critical leadership and inspirational leadership is to be preferred over Burns' (1978) three-part political scientific conception. Berlin's critical leadership, like Burns' transcendental leadership, places morality and ethics at the centre of leadership but, unlike Burns, in his writings Berlin pursued this moral core. To engage with the morality of leadership the distinct traditions of science, art and philosophy need to be taken into account because these become relevant to varying degrees in a Carnapian-like rational reconstruction of leadership.

In the argument against science in favour of art and philosophy, that the evidence supports qualified claims is important but so too precision is needed wherever possible. Precise and verifiable information is given to support the demonstration of a reason through debate. Both unqualified argumentation and lack of precise information invite criticism. On qualified argumentation, that the evidence supports the position of the

thesis, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, is a requirement that the claims made be qualified in different ways thus necessitating the modification of some sentences or propositions with such terms as some and may or will.

The overall argument that is put forward is rational, logical and deductive. Comment on the deductive nature of the argument will be reserved until the prologue to Chapter Three. Meanwhile, rational because the evidence can be both observed and verified, logical because one step in the argument can be seen to rise out of the previous step. The rationality of the argument for the reader is academic because the evidence given can only support the proposition that only some works in some disciplines appear to exclude any consideration of values and ends. The thesis cannot and does not claim that all works in all disciplines exclude values and ends even if that is only because it cannot enumerate all works.

On the other hand, that a scientific position can be taken on leadership can be and is refuted by the evidence given, being mindful that any claims made in the argument are subject to qualification. Since no universal model or theory of leadership appears to have been discovered or invented it remains that leadership has not yet been satisfactorily explained by science. In a search for why and how this is so necessitates a review of the post-medieval foundations of science.

Linking statement

That science is deficient in the capacity to grasp values and ends is to deny the critical essence of leadership. This deficiency involves the whole tradition of science. In support of this claim precise and verifiable information of a moral or ethical nature is sought in works acknowledged to form part of the backbone of the tradition of science, namely Kant (1999), which is prefaced in the next part of the chapter by Locke (1924), and Bacon (1952). After detailed exploration at this level, nowhere can such information, other than a few isolated observations, be extracted from these works. That this is so does not work in favour of what Porter (1990), Burns (1978), and Wang (2008) represented but reinforces opposition to Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) demonstration and highlights the need to refute the assertion that science is a plausible means of comprehending leadership.

III

*The importance of Locke's **An Essay concerning Human Understanding** for understanding the field of leadership studies*

*III.i: Explication of Locke's **Essay***

The need to find stronger support for a science of leadership than that hitherto sought for Stogdill's (Bass, 1981) demonstration of a science of leadership in the mainstream of Leadership Studies leads to the first aspect of the tradition of science, that represented by Locke's (1924) empiricism. The importance of explicating Locke's *Essay* is in the first instance found in its being a foundation for understanding Kant (1999). Such an explication can begin with a few observations made by Pringle-Pattison (1924).

In the Preface to Locke's (1924) *Essay* Pringle-Pattison (1924) said "it is impossible to understand...Kant without reference to Locke" (Pringle-Pattison, 1924, p.iv). He followed this in the Editor's Introduction with the comment that Locke reacted against scholastic Aristotelianism (Pringle-Pattison, p.ix) and that "both Locke and Kant present Philosophy as a doctrine of the limits of human reason" (Pringle-Pattison, 1924, p.xiv)... "(t)he understanding has no innate principles; knowledge is gained from experience" (Pringle-Pattison, 1924, p.xvi). Kant's wider conception of Experience involving the rational as well as the empirical opened the way to a theory of knowledge more satisfactory than either Rationalist or Empiricist could provide alone (Pringle-Pattison, pp.xxx-xxxi).

To begin the explication proper, Book I of the *Essay* opened with Locke (1924) asserting that the understanding was the highest faculty of the human soul, that it included the whole of human intelligence and that it discovered new knowledge in judging things (Locke, p.3). The design or purpose of the work of human understanding covered the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge³³. The grounds and degrees of knowledge were belief, opinion, and assent. The method was to search the bounds between opinion and knowledge by firstly enquiring into the origin of ideas and how the understanding was furnished with them, then by showing what knowledge the

³³ That Locke attempted to use the understanding to understand the understanding signalled the need for and existence of a faculty of comprehension.

understanding had through these ideas³⁴. Such a demonstration would include a consideration of the certainty of knowledge, followed by the evidence for and the extent of that knowledge, all held by the understanding. Locke followed this by saying that he would also enquire into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion and examine reasons for the degrees of assent (Locke, p.3).

In Book II, Locke (1924) enumerated and revealed how he believed different ideas could be sorted. He distinguished between simple ideas, which were ideas of sensation, and complex ideas, which were the ideas of reflection. The ideas of primary qualities of things were really in things to be discerned by the senses. Complex ideas were those of substance. In the simple ideas of sensation, simple ideas came to mind in one of four ways: by one sense, by more than one sense, by reflection, or by all ways of sensation and reflection. In the complex ideas of reflection, the species of complex ideas were modes, substances and relations. Simple modes were called *species* and mixed modes were called *genera*, with substances being either single or collective.

Further, the relations between ideas included their consideration and comparison. The ideas of primary qualities of things included bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion. In addition, Locke (1924) defined immensity, figure, and place; solidity, motion, and space; along with infinity, under which he considered duration-expansion, space, time, and number. After that, under complex ideas of substance, Locke included the powers of substances to provide ideas in human beings through their senses, called sensible secondary qualities. These were ideas that were not in the things themselves.

³⁴ This sentence refers to the method Locke (1924) was to use to determine what the nature and limits of human understanding were; that is, that sentence is not about the method human understanding uses to work out, for example, if apple branches can be grafted successfully onto orange trees. If this is right, the sentence before, bar one, could be clearer because the design and purpose of human understanding is to, for example, work out whether the sun goes around the earth or vice versa as well as practical problems like the horticultural one above. However, human understanding does not normally try to work out Lockean origin, certainty and extent of human knowledge. Doing that is doing Philosophy, indeed, doing Epistemology, not astronomy, horticulture or mathematics. So, that sentence is a characterisation of Locke's design and purpose in the *Essay*, rather than the design and purpose of human understanding per se. Locke can be ambiguous and imprecise but in responding to Locke his ambiguity and imprecision need not be mimicked to expound what his real design and purpose is in the *Essay*: to plot the origin, certainty, and extent of human understanding.

Finally, he included among complex ideas of substance active and passive powers in a thing that terminate in simple ideas³⁵.

From the above, the ways simple ideas, which were the ideas of sensation, came to the human mind was first, by one sense, which was by sight, hearing, taste and smell, and touch. Second, when simple ideas came to the mind by more than one sense, then it was through space [extension or expansion], figure, or rest [station] and motion. Third, when such ideas came to mind by reflection, then it was by understanding (power of thinking, that is, perception), by will, by mode of reasoning, or by mode of judging. Finally, when simple ideas came to mind by all ways of sensation and reflection then it was by pleasure and pain, by existence and unity, or by power³⁶.

Having shown how simple ideas could be sorted, Locke went on to talk about the origin of ideas. The origin of ideas was in experience, this origin was in either sensation or reflection. Sorts of ideas that were not simple ideas were complex ideas, and if not complex then both simple and complex. If ideas were neither simple, nor complex, nor simple and complex then they must have been abstract. A simple abstract idea was an adequate copy of its *archetype*. A complex abstract idea of substance was an inadequate copy called an *ectype*. Original complex ideas of modes and relations, which were archetypes of simple ideas, were in this way adequate.³⁷ Having claimed to have mapped out the origin of ideas and their sorts Locke (1924) could then turn to the extent of ideas, which included all things and their names.

Locke (1924) said that for the simple idea human beings had concrete and abstract names and for substance few names. However, relation had an abundance of concrete and abstract names. Relation was either proportional or moral. When in moral relation the measures of moral relation were divine law, which concerned sin and duty, civil law, which was about crime and innocence, and philosophical law, which related to

³⁵ Book II, on sorts of ideas, (XXIII, pp.159-160). This citation to Locke (1924) and those that follow as footnotes are not in-text for clarity and ease of reference to part numbers since pagination in alternative editions of the *Essay* is different.

³⁶ Book II, on ways simple ideas come to our minds, (XXV, pp.175-179).

³⁷ Book II, (XXXI, pp.209-214).

virtue and vice, opinion and reputation. After relation Locke considered mode, for which he said sufficient concrete and abstract names were kept³⁸.

Book III concerned words or propositions, in other words, the nature, use, and importance of language. The nature of language was such that when two simple ideas were put together by the understanding, the understanding abstracted from these two ideas to form one abstract idea with a distinct essence called a *classis*³⁹. In the use of language, words were used rightly or wrongly. Words were the sensible marks of ideas, which was their proper and immediate importance (Locke, 1924).

Words stood for the ideas in the mind of the speaker who used them but their secret reference was to the supposition that his words were the marks of the ideas in the minds of his listeners; not only this, but that the supposition that his words stood for real things. Names excited ideas as if they were the things exciting the senses and men often set their minds on the words rather than on things because they learned the words before the ideas they represented.⁴⁰ Furthermore, language had certain natural advantages, but was not without its defects and remedies. However, Locke (1924) later said language was important because all things could be given a concrete or abstract name: for simple ideas of substances, for which few names were held, for simple ideas of relation, and for simple ideas of mode⁴¹.

In Book IV Locke (1924) argued that the intelligence of man was made up of the faculties of the mind. These included sense-perception, which was the power of thinking or understanding. This took the reader through to the faculties of reflection or intuition,⁴² and further, to the power of willing or volition. The voluntary or involuntary then took the reader through to reason and from reason back to sense through discernment, which was the power of judging or judgement⁴³.

³⁸ Book II, (XXVIII, pp.201-203).

³⁹ Book III, on the nature, use, and importance of language, (III, p.232).

⁴⁰ Book III, (II, pp.225-226).

⁴¹ Book IV, (VIII, pp.253-254).

⁴² Reflection or intuition was retention or memory in Book II, (IX-XI, pp.73-91) interestingly so because Bacon saw the memory or thought not only as one of the two arts of the custody of knowledge, writing or language being the other, but firstly as part of the spirit of man (Bacon, 1605, p.135).

⁴³ Book IV, on the divisions of the objects of knowledge (of science), (XV, pp.334-336).

The objects of knowledge or science were divided into things or *physica*, which were under the jurisdiction of natural philosophy, actions or *practica*, being the province of ethics, and the right use of signs being the province of the doctrine of signs called *logic*. Book IV opened with the maxim that “The mind’s own ideas are its immediate object” (Locke, 1924, p.255) and closed with the cry of the rationalist century that “Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything”.⁴⁴

III.ii: Implications of Locke’s Essay for the field of leadership

Pringle-Pattison (1924) said that to understand Kant (1999) what Locke (1924) had to say needed to be looked at first. This has been done. Now, some implications of working from concrete concepts of leaders and leading will be looked at, keeping in reserve working from ideas in notions of leadership for the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis. Locke rejected the Cartesian (1912) notion that ideas were innate and put the case that all knowledge, ideas, began in experience, from sensation or reflection and was the object of human understanding. For Locke, thought was a kind of sensation, the ideas of things and not real things were the object of understanding. The intellect abstracted ideas from images acquired from sensations.⁴⁵ These images, the imagination, were located in the mind of man, not in the spirit of man, as was proposed by Bacon (1973, p.120)⁴⁶.

However, before the implications for leadership of Locke’s (1924) doctrine are detailed, the argument implicit in the phenomenological work of Wang (2008) needs to be brought out first. Her assumption was that abstract concepts, that is, ideas like leadership, could be analysed using the same tools that empirical science uses. This assumed that ideas had the same qualities or characteristics as things. Patently, as is about to be revealed here, Lockean simple ideas, which are concrete concepts in the schema proposed in this thesis, do not.

In this thesis concrete concepts are acquired through the senses, whereas abstract concepts are acquired by reason through reflection. Reason makes the discrimination

⁴⁴ Book IV, XIX, p.362.

⁴⁵ Locke’s (1924) *Essay*, Book I, II, pp.16-27ff.

⁴⁶ Bacon (1973) distinguished between the mind and the spirit of man by placing the spirit of man in the mind of man but Locke (1924) ignored this not because “the understanding is the highest faculty of the human soul” (Locke, 1924, p.3) but because the idea of spirit did not fit into his doctrine of empirical science.

between the two different kinds of objects of the intellect and treats them differently. The one object, the concrete concept of leader, corresponds with a real thing. The other, the abstract concept of leading, corresponds to a complex idea in reason. Yet Wang (2008) treated these as of a piece and investigable using a single, empirically-oriented method. This was an error.

Nevertheless, because human beings appear to have no sense experience of such ideas as good and evil, then reflection must be included. Good and evil may belong in the Baconian spirit of man but the *idea* of good and the *idea* of evil properly belong in the intellect. By dismissing reflection from what in this thesis are called notions, the empiricism of Locke (1924) could not account for anything in man beyond empirical ideas, which in this thesis are called concrete concepts. It was to be Kant (1999), correcting Locke, who would proffer ideas of pure reason, which are extended in this thesis to include non-pure or practical, moral ideas called abstract concepts under principles.

Now, in turning to the application of Locke's (1924) cognitive theory to leadership, first, from Book II, the temptation is to infer that the simple idea of a leader is an idea of sensation, perhaps a feeling or impression. In Locke's view some ideas were simple and others complex. For example, blue hue was simple but ocean was complex. It was not as if there were simple and complex ideas of the same object. So, it should not be thought that one can speak of the simple idea of a leader. Leader would have been a complex idea in Locke's picture.

Social scientists might, however, speak of those simple ideas that reside in the complex idea of a leader. The complex idea of a leader would then be an idea of reflection. Following from that, any ideas of the primary qualities of leaders would really be in leaders to be discerned by man's senses. The complex idea of a leader would be found in the substance, the essence of being a leader. In addition, simple ideas in the complex idea of a leader would at that point come to the human mind through one sense, more than one sense, by reflection or by senses and reflection.

Having said that, it is plain to the critical reader that there is no Lockean simple idea of leader or leading. Simple ideas are restricted to such ideas as colour, hue, shade,

patches, sounds, scents, and felt shape. Complex ideas are formed by combining simple ideas so a leader and leading are complex ideas but this is of no real consequence here so one cannot speak of any simple idea of leadership. Not all primary qualities cause man to have corresponding simple ideas. Although simple ideas are caused in human beings by primary qualities, as a result of the causal-impact primary qualities have on human beings simple and complex ideas that are kept can misrepresent the nature of the primary qualities as they are in themselves.

In the complex idea of a leader the species of the complex idea of a leader would be the mode or style of leading, the essence of being a leader, and the relations between the idea of the leader and other ideas, for example the idea of follower. The simple mode of the idea of a leader would be the *species* of a leader or the mixed mode of the idea of a leader would be called its *genera* with the essence of the idea being either single or collective. The relations between the idea of a leader and other ideas like follower or teacher would of course include their consideration and comparison.

Next in Book II, all Locke's (1924) ideas were either simple or complex and if complex then either of substance or reflection. In the general intellect these *genera* and *species* of ideas, that is, general and specific ideas, replace universal and particular ideas otherwise found in the universe of the intellect in the scheme outlined in this thesis. Nowhere in his account of the understanding did Locke refer to universal ideas, which are seemingly excluded by force of will from the general intellect, although, as shall be seen later in the fourth chapter, universal ideas of leadership belong in the universe of the intellect, in both the general intellect and the transcendental intellect.

Though strictly Lockean (1924) primary qualities of things are those which Physics and Chemistry posit, by extension to a social scientific study of leaders, leaders can be taken to have these kinds of primary quality: the physical stature of the leader, how many appearances a leader has made, the circumstances of the leader, and the activities of the leader. Where the leader is to be found, how strong the leader is, his physical movements and what physical freedom he enjoys might also be included. The duration for which a person is a leader and whether he leads a few or many. In Lockean terms the primary qualities of things are their physical attributes but to consider the physical attributes of leaders to be their primary qualities, as in the above, sounds artificial and

forced. Instead, in a Lockean spirit one could see the primary qualities of the leader as those which social science is justified to hypothesise in order to describe and generalise explanations of the role, and the activities and performance of leaders.

With the experience one has of a leader, the simple abstract idea of a leader that is held would be a copy of the *archetype* of a leader and the complex abstract idea of the substance of a leader would be an inadequate copy called an *ectype*. Original complex ideas of modes of leading and relations would be archetypes of the simple idea of a leader and thus adequate. For sure, this is the antecedent of Kant's (1999) pure concepts of the understanding: of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality and their logical use in judgements (Kant, pp.206, 212).

The point that is being driven here is that one does not merely consider the concepts of quantity and quality when talking about leaders and leading because this appears superficial and contrived. Hence Lockean (1924) terminology is inadequate to the task of revealing much about leaders and leading. However, when one talks about these concepts in non-Lockean, Kantian (1999) terms of relationality and modality then progress can be made. By modalities Kantian possibility and necessity are meant.

Also in Book II, Locke (1924) wrote little on relation. He conceded that relation was either proportional, of which is an immediate concern, or moral. The moral relation of a leader is measured by divine law in terms of sin and duty; by civil law in terms of crime and innocence; and by philosophical law in terms of virtue and vice, opinion and reputation. This distinction based on relations, provides the first objective grounds for a transcendental view of leadership. Kant's (2002) work will provide a second. Why moral relations have disappeared from social science, except as ethology or targets of explaining-away, and demystification is unclear.

Following up the suggestions in Book III, when the understanding puts together two simple ideas of leader to form one abstract idea, then *classis* is the essence of that abstract idea. From this one may extrapolate a class of leader, two different sorts of leader making one kind of leader. In Book IV Locke (1924) asserted that man's intelligence was comprised of the faculties of the mind, which were the understanding, reason, judgement, intuition, and volition, this arrangement being not altogether in

accordance with that of the schemata of the faculties of the mind and of the intellect proposed in this thesis. What he offered was an incomplete prototypical model, not a complete schema of the mind and intellect. Locke did, nevertheless, offer Kant (1999) sufficient grounds on which to build his model of the higher faculties of the mind, that is, understanding and reason, with judgement spanning the two.

The schema offered in this thesis includes a faculty called comprehension, which Locke (1924) like Kant (1999) did not posit. In support of what may be a controversial assumption, that the mature human intellect is in possession of a faculty of comprehension as well as a faculty of understanding, what needs to be pointed out is that through reflection reason discriminates between the concrete concept of leader and the complex concept of leading. The suggestion is put that judgement cannot compare these concepts with the abstract idea of the notion of leadership without a faculty of comprehension. This faculty of comprehension evaluates leaders and acts of leading in the light of standards of good and excellent leadership, thus furnishing the material for judgement.

A possible objection to the argument for the inclusion of a faculty of comprehension is that the affect proposed by Mill (1910) can do the job of comprehension just as well. This is not right because the Millian affect, which is made up of higher order emotions like altruism, consists of feelings that are too vague in nature and interpersonally variable. This is unlike the representation of the boundaries between good and bad leaders and leading, provided by comprehension, which are definite and clear, even though subject to controversy in debate.

Further support for the claim for a faculty of comprehension comes from the distinction between the strategic nature of understanding and the linearity of thought. The linearity of thought is language, *logos*, which is the logic of reason in contrast to the composition of judgement. Judgement is composed of the principles of thought, that is, the rules of language. The matter of thought and language will be approached in Part IV of this chapter, which is on the work of Kant (1999) and Hamann's (1995a) objection to what he was doing. By coupling thought and language together one can have what is needed, a complete understanding of leadership. The faculty of comprehension proffers the *notion* of leadership, the global nature of a notion allowing

for the expansion of the idea of leadership unlike anything provided by an inaccurate and ill-fitting concept of it.

In this section what has been argued is that although Locke (1924) will help the reader to understand what Kant (1999) maintained, what Locke himself claimed is nonetheless also important to the overall argument because his work helps to distinguish between the concepts and ideas of leaders and leading and the abstract idea and transcendental notion of leadership, to which the next section turns.

III.iii: Towards a more intellectual view of leadership

The preliminary objects of the intellect that are incorporated into the cognitive arrangement submitted are concepts, ideas, notions, and principles. The focus in this section is on ideas because ideas are either concrete concepts of the understanding or abstract concepts of the faculty of reason and make up thought as elements in the notions in the faculty of comprehension. Ideas are the objects in all their combinations and permutations which issue from principles in the faculty of judgement and upon which experiments and experience are constructed.

Awareness or consciousness of one's own cognitive life and the workings of one's faculties of mind and the faculties of the intellect can lead to generalised assertions being made about one's experience of these. Experimentation can overthrow mere speculation on the faculties and their functioning: for instance, not all thought involves imagery; images are not often intrinsic to thought but merely accompany the thought: ideas and their meanings have no image associated with them in their being thought; an idea is not an image and the intellectual occurs independently of the use of the senses.

The image of a leader that one holds in one's mind can be associated with the meaning of leader but it is the intension or comprehension of the idea of leader or the word leader that defines its meaning. One may not say that the idea of a leader and the image of a leader that is held are identical. What one means by leader is often more than identifying the name one has for it with an individual leader or with one's concept of a leader; the intellectual account of the representation of the individual leader, that is, when the individual leader becomes the object of the intellect, also needs to be considered when the meaning of the word leader is being questioned.

Concepts of the understanding are concepts of comprehension that have an object of the thing representing it in the understanding and have been proven to exist by their appearance in the real world. Such concrete concepts in the understanding have been in ideas in the universe of the intellect but science takes great satisfaction in confirming or denying the existence of the thing that an object of the intellect represents.

III.iii.i: Concrete concepts and abstract ideas

A thing in reality is represented by an object in the understanding but anything can be called an object, even a notion or judgement, to distinguish it from the subject such as, in the first instance, I. When the image of an object comes through one's imagination, memory or from one's senses then the intellect forms its own representation of the image of the thing or object; to pick up on Locke's (1924) omission, this may be called a *concrete concept* because the object or thing is originally found in the concrete reality of nature, out there, outside of the mind. This concrete concept is quite different from an *abstract* idea.

Concrete concepts are formed in the understanding when sorting like from unlike, similar objects from different objects. Abstract ideas are formed in the faculty of comprehension when complex ideas are in congruence with other complex ideas to create notions. Some notions are imageless, they cannot be seen by the mind's eye but by what they do the intellect is aware of their existence within. The abstract ideas making up notions can be *concreted* from the faculty of comprehension into the faculty of reason but in themselves are notions of comprehension called *abstract* ideas or thoughts in reason.

A concrete concept is always individual and specific in content. With a concrete concept a conception of all the elements in a set of individual objects cannot be formed. By contrast, because an abstract idea is universal it fits all the elements in a set of objects. A concrete idea must remain *simple*⁴⁷ because if it becomes increasingly complex it becomes increasingly harder to discern. The thing out there is given a name so when the name is uttered doing so calls an image of the thing to mind. But when an

⁴⁷ Lockean (1924) simple ideas do not include the concept of leading.

object in the faculty of comprehension, an abstract idea or a complex of abstract ideas, for example virtue, freedom, or power, cannot be seen by the inner eye of the intellect, nor the outer eye of the imagination, then one resorts to giving such an object a name and calling it by its name although one has an intelligible grasp but no sensible picture of it.

Ideas are simple or complex, although complex ideas like sentences may be compounded as well. The principle and the concept are the parts of ideas in a universe of the intellect. The nature of ideas, their essence and their elements, can be used to better discriminate among different kinds and sorts of ideas of leader and leading and leadership. By distinguishing ideas, anomalies, antinomies, just as concepts are distinguished, the idea of the concept of leading and the idea of the idea of leadership can be shown to be different. A concept of leadership is impossible because the idea of a concept is too simple and concrete. The idea of a principle with at least one concept is sufficient for leadership, though the idea of leadership is simple yet abstract as contrasted with, for example, the notions of the art and the philosophy of leadership which are complex and abstract ideas.

Through the senses the understanding forms the complex concrete concept of a leader, which is the object in the understanding that represents one and only one thing out in the real world, the person called a leader. The understanding can add and subtract different instantiations of leaders to represent a complex concrete concept of leader without abstraction. Reason does what the understanding cannot do since the understanding cannot abstract ideas from concepts because, as shall be seen, Kant (1999) found that neither principles nor ideas can be abstracted from concepts although concepts and principles can be derived from ideas.

On simple concrete ideas, reason can be given the simple concrete concept of a leader from the understanding and abstract from it those qualities or characteristics that it can claim. Further, reason can specify the simple concrete concept of a leader to generate a simple concrete idea of leader. In reason the intellect seeks evidence or proof for holding a concrete idea by relating it directly to one and only one individual person in

the real world without seeking proof mediately, through that is, by consulting, understanding⁴⁸.

Next, on complex concrete ideas: reason can also be given by the understanding a complex concrete concept of leader and form a complex concrete idea of leader. It does this by taking the simple concrete concept of just one leader, a simple concrete idea of leader is combined with other closely related concepts, and for example, leading or following. Then one holds a complex concrete idea, in other words a conception of but not necessarily a theory about a leader. Using reason the intellect seeks evidence or proof for holding such an idea by relating it directly to more than one individual person in the real world without consulting understanding.

Finally, on simple and complex abstract ideas: reason cannot generate a simple abstract idea of leader by taking a simple concrete idea of leader nor can it generate a complex abstract idea of leader from a complex concrete idea of leader, both concrete ideas already in its possession, because that is to say that reason is something other than what it is; something other than the hollow faculty Kant (1999) said it was. Both the simple and complex abstract idea of leader may come to reason from the notion of leadership in the faculty of comprehension.

III.iii.ii: Towards a comprehension of leadership

Knowledge is made up of ideas. An idea is found in a kind of sentence called a proposition, which expresses a judgement, which articulates the existence of *harmony* or conflict between ideas. In a critical spirit how ideas are formed from an experiential point of view can be examined, thereby gaining an understanding of the nature of an

⁴⁸ The proposed difference between the concept of a leader and the idea of a leader is that although both focus on the individual person the understanding says that the concrete concept of a leader relates to one and only one individual person in the real world. Reason takes two or more cases of leader from the understanding and matches these to form the abstract concept of leader, which does not relate directly to any one specific individual in reality. The abstract concept of leader merely reflects the principle of leader in the concrete idea of leader. Using the principle of leader in the concrete idea of leader reason may seek to identify as leaders a set of representations of individuals in the real world it has acquired through the senses. In contrast to understanding and reason, comprehension may give to reason a simple or complex abstract idea of leader from the notion of a leader that it holds for adjudication. Certainly the abstract idea of leader is to be found in the universe of the intellect and has no need to directly refer to any individual or set of individuals in the real world but further than this, the notion of leader relates to a principle or set of principles in the transcendental intellect, for example leadership and followership and not to any individuals nominated as leaders. Nevertheless, judgement may take the notion of leader from comprehension and apply the principle or principles of the notion or notions of leader to individuals in reality to adjudicate on their status as leaders.

idea. Objects can be perceived in reality through the senses and through the imagination and memory (Bacon, 1973, p.120) with images of these objects being presented to the faculty of reason. However, the faculty of reason also draws thoughts from the faculty of comprehension and words associated with an image or a thought recall that image or thought to mind.

The intellect makes its own representation of the image of the object or thought, not the object or thought itself. With experience similarities and differences are noticed when a new image of an object or thought is represented by the intellect. On similarities the intellect builds up the essence of an object or thought in an intellectual image called an idea of the object or thought. This process is called abstraction.

The *mechanical harmony* of the imagination and intellect relies upon the senses to provide the imagination with matter, whence the imagination is able to inform the intellect. The *organic harmony* of the general intellect depends upon reason being supplied with concrete concepts from the understanding and with abstract ideas from the faculty of comprehension. The *comprehension* of an idea is the revelation of all the elements, the attributes, which constitute an idea in its representation of an intelligible object. The comprehension of a complex of abstract ideas, a notion, or series of thoughts, relies upon the *relationality* of the intellectual matter of notions, how the *species* within each notion relate, one complex set with another and the application of this content to the individual systems of principles and concepts and clusters of ideas and notions in which comprehension is at first found.

Comprehension, which is complete and mediate understanding, is not only a faculty but also an element to be found in every notion. To hold the idea of “the concept of a leader”⁴⁹ does not imply leaders exist in nature but the idea can be expanded to include the concept of only a specific individual leader, the better or best leader who was democratically elected, or expanded to include the notion of all the ideas relating to all the concepts of the leader ever thought of by man, that ever existed, or will exist in social realities and in the narratives, myths and legends belonging to those social realities.

⁴⁹ Not leader alone, because that is merely the word symbolising the concept of it.

If one uses the existing model of willpower, understood as the force driving how an idea is changed, then one would need to be cautious about how to expand the idea of a leader. Misunderstanding may be caused by language or culture. The meaning of a statement, if working from the faculty of comprehension in the general intellect, or of a proposition formed by the intellectual space around it, may include only a *species* and not the whole *genus* of an expanded idea.

In an argument care must be taken to identify early on if it is to the *genus* or *species* to which the proposition refers. When the expansion of an idea is wilfully limited by stipulative convention and not by reason and logic then it has no value for reason, this arbitrary imposition being called a universe of discourse. The distinction has been made now between the concrete concepts and abstract ideas of leaders and leading, which is quite separate from the abstract idea and transcendental notion of leadership. Such a distinction may be used more fruitfully in an argument on rather than in general discourse on leadership.

Linking statement

In the first section to this part of the chapter, Section III.i: Explication of Locke's *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, what Locke (1924) was saying was expounded. This was followed in Section III.ii with an appreciation of some of the implications this may have had for the field of leadership. What Locke claimed has been examined and if his conception of ideas were used then this would produce a severely limited view of the field of leadership because it disregards the morality and ethics of leading, and thereby the notion of leadership.

Having shown that Locke (1924) is seminal to a general view of mainstream studies of leaders and leading, his work, which represents the first aspect of the tradition of science in the search for stronger support for the demonstration of a supposed science of leadership, is still largely of no direct relevance to a transcendental view of leadership, that is, the notion of leadership. Mindful that the aim of this thesis is constructive and not merely expository, a task remaining is to maintain that Kant (1999) is only mediately relevant to a transcendental view of leadership through critical

dialogue because to do so is to show that a science of leadership is not possible. This task is set about in the next part of the chapter.

IV

*The relevance of Kant's **Critique of Pure Reason** to science and the mainstream field of leadership studies*

*IV.i: Explication of **Critique of Pure Reason***

This section does not simply reveal what Kant (1999) said but includes direct responses to a close following of the material. Kant's work is complex, often due to density of material, so interpretation of it is punctuated by a remark or observation that needs to be made immediately after Kant unfolds a proposition. In other words because of the notable depth of analysis required to extract precisely what Kant said what arises first is strategically met on a point by point basis rather than keeping these in abeyance for a later accumulation of points half-forgotten.

At this stage the reminder is lodged that this point by point approach is a legitimate and long-established means of argumentation. To take the first point as an example, Kant (1999) said space and time are a priori forms of intuition. As forms of sensibility they act as the basis, that is, principles, for all synthetic a priori cognition (Kant, p.212). This statement prompts the immediate response that that may well be true for the static state of the intellect but not so for the dynamic universe of the intellect. This is because the principle of time-space or spacetime is naturally formed through experience and public debate and not by private artifice.

The example of a point by point approach having been thus promptly furnished, a part by part approach also demonstrates the genuine depth of intellectual engagement that is demanded by Kantian material, nevertheless appositely and to extend the content of the example just given the understanding has logical functions or uses in judgement in terms of quantity, quality, relation, and modality (Kant, 1999, pp.206, 212). These four are the fundamental elements of the concepts of an object in general, being the basis for the twelve conditions of the possibility of any experience whatever (Kant, p.206).

The uses or functions of each of these four fundamental concepts of understanding in judgement were analysed by Kant (1999) into three divisions. These divisions were the

quantity of judgements as universal, particular, or singular; their qualities were affirmative, negative, or infinite; their relations categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive; and their modalities were problematic, assertoric, or apodictic (Kant, p.206). Observably, these logical functions were intended to represent a clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding or the table of categories.

Kant (1999) analysed the four fundamental concepts of quantity, quality, relationality and modality as follows. Quantity was analysed into unity, plurality, and totality. Quality was analysed into reality, negation, and limitation. Relationality was analysed into inherence and subsistence (*substantia et accidens*), causality and dependence (cause and effect), and community (reciprocity between agent and patient). In addition, modality was analysed into possibility or impossibility, existence or non-existence, necessity or contingency, (modality was about generation, corruption, alteration). These twelve analysantes plainly comprised the table of categories of the pure concepts of the understanding (Kant, p.212).

The question remains as to exactly how Kant (1999) moved from the logical functions of the understanding in judgements to the categories of the pure concepts of the understanding (Kant, pp.204-218). Similarly, in the following (Kant, pp.219-244), although Kant attempted this movement in two different editions of the work, he was not able to provide a convincing deduction from pure concepts of the understanding to principles of the pure understanding to justify the latter.

In his first section, on the principles of a transcendental deduction in general (Kant, 1999, pp.219-226), a transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories was explained in terms of a movement from spiritual sources or grounds for the conditions of the possibility of all experience to the consequences or conditions of the possibility of all experience. The point here interposed is that this movement is from grounds to consequences although the reverse movement may have been found to have been more fruitful. Nevertheless, the movement was a typically transcendental one-to-one correspondence from sense to a synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense, from imagination to a synthesis of this manifold through the imagination, and from

apperception⁵⁰ to a unity of this synthesis through original apperception, and respectively.

In the second section of the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding Kant (1999) considered the a priori grounds for the possibility of experience (Kant, pp.226-236), which is interpreted to be a preparation for the representation of the four elements of the understanding in the third section. Those grounds were the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, the synthesis of recognition in the concept, and a provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions, the categories being the conditions of thinking in a possible experience.

The grounds or subjective sources of cognition, the representation of the subjective sources of cognition in their empirical application, the manifold of the transcendental principle of the synthetic unity of all human representations, and the manifold of the concepts of the formal unity of actual experience of appearances that objectively validate empirical cognition, comprised the four elements of the understanding.

In the third section of the deduction, Kant (1999) defended the relation of the understanding in general and the possibility of cognising these four elements a priori, (Kant, pp.236-244). Each of the four elements of the understanding were analysed in a set of movements such that a one-to-one correspondence between each relation was maintained. In the first relational movement from grounds or subjective sources of cognition to the representation of the subjective sources of cognition in their empirical application Kant related sense to perception, imagination to imagination in association and reproduction, apperception to apperception in recognition (Kant, p.236).

The second relational movement was from the representation of the subjective sources of cognition in their empirical application to the manifold of the transcendental principle of the synthetic unity of all human representations beginning with the motion from perception to pure intuition, which grounded the totality of perception a priori, from imagination in association and reproduction to the pure synthesis of imagination,

⁵⁰ Apperception is Kant's own term.

grounding association a priori, and from apperception in recognition to pure apperception, which grounded empirical consciousness a priori (Kant, 1999, pp.237-238).

The third relational movement was from the manifold of the transcendental principle of the synthetic unity of all human representations to the manifold of the concepts of the formal unity of actual experience of appearances that objectively validated empirical cognition starting from pure intuition (grounding the totality of perception a priori) to apprehension (in intuition), from pure synthesis of the imagination (grounding association a priori), to association and reproduction (in the imagination), and from pure apperception (which grounded empirical consciousness a priori), to recognition out of apperception of empirical consciousness (containing empirical elements of experience) (Kant, 1999, pp.239-240).

The fourth relational movement from the manifold of the concepts of the formal unity of actual experience of appearances that objectively validated empirical cognition to the grounds or subjective sources of cognition similarly tied their respective and corresponding concepts to each model, as the manifold of the transcendental principle of the synthetic unity of all human representations was related to the grounds or subjective sources of cognition (Kant, 1999, p.241).

The interpretation of these relational movements is not accomplished easily, their extraction from the text and reformulation for the contemporary reader being somewhat challenging. Of lesser demand, models of the understanding, according to Kant (1999), could be acquired in five ways: through a spontaneous cognition as opposed to receptivity of the sensibility, through a faculty for thinking, through a faculty of concepts, through a faculty of judgements, and as a faculty of rules (Kant, p.242).

Kant (1999) undertook not only an analytic of concepts but also embarked upon a transcendental analytic of principles. He opened with general logic as a starting point for his transcendental logic. Here, the relational movement was from the higher faculties of cognition to the corresponding analytic of the higher faculties of cognition, a motion from understanding to concepts, from the power of judgement to judgements, and from reason to inferences (Kant, pp.267-277).

The schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding were comprised of time series, content of time, order of time, and sum total of time, these being a priori time determinations in accordance with rules (Kant, 1999, p.276). More closely, a preliminary sketch of the “transcendental schemata of pure concepts of the understanding...according to the order of the categories and in connection with these” (Kant, 1999, p.274) reveals that although in time series, in accordance with the categories of quantity, Kant (1999) stipulated a schema of magnitude but the discovery made here is that he did not lay down what this could be analysed into, merely remarking that it was through this schema that time itself is generated (Kant, p.274).

Secondly, in content of time, in accord with the categories of quality, the schema of reality, the schema of negation, and the schema of limitation were all specified but again investigation into this discovers that Kant (1999) remains reserved on details. Thirdly, in order of time, in agreement with the categories of relationality, the schema of substance, the schema of cause, and the schema of community (reciprocity) were laid down. Fourthly, in sum total of time, the schema of possibility, the schema of actuality, and the schema of necessity were all given (Kant, pp.267-277). What is noteworthy at this point, suffice it to say, is that Kant’s sum total of time possesses a certain concurrence with the categories of modality.

The schemata of time series and content of time were not pursued by Kant (1999) in either the first or second edition of the first *Critique* as assiduously as he detailed the order and sum total of time in the ensuing chapter on the transcendental analytic of principles of the understanding, namely Section III, entitled Systematic Representation of all Synthetic Principles, which followed Section I, On the Principle of Contradiction being the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements (Kant, 1999, p.279) and Section II, On the Principle of the Possibility of Experience being the Supreme Principle of all Synthetic Judgements (Kant, pp.281-283).

The axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and postulates of empirical thinking in general were all the principles of the pure understanding (Kant, 1999, pp.284-285). Surprisingly, readers, for some reason known only to Kant (1999), are given only the principles and not the analysis for the axioms of

intuition (Kant, p.286), and similarly for the anticipations of perception (Kant, p.290). In the analogies of experience it is seen how directly Kant relies on the schemata of the order of time, namely the schemata of substance in the first analogy (Kant, p.299), cause (Kant, p.304), and community⁵¹ (Kant, p.316). Also seen is a similar dependence on the schemata of the sum total of time, that is, the schemata of possibility, actuality and necessity, in the postulates of empirical thinking in general (Kant, p.321).

So, although the manifold for the analytic of concepts of the understanding was substantially complete this appears to be not the case for the manifold of the analytic of principles, Kant (1999) being unable to complete the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception. Even after a second attempt (Kant, pp.278-337) at a deduction of principles from concepts Kant had to remain content with the fact that a deduction may not have been possible and to settle for the relations between principles of the pure understanding and of the pure concepts of the understanding remaining as an *analogia*.

Kant (1999) rounded-off the first part of the transcendental logic, the transcendental analytic, with an appendix on the concepts of reflection (Kant, pp.366-383). Here, one recalls that in the Enlightenment debate reflection replaced animal instinct in man. Identity and difference, agreement and opposition, the inner and the outer, matter (determinable and general) and form (determination and specific) were the four relations of the concepts of reflection⁵² (Kant, pp.367-370).

An amphiboly in the concepts of reflection was created when the empirical use of the understanding was confused with its transcendental use⁵³. In a consideration of nothing it seemed that nothing itself could not be analysed, broken down into its parts. However, according to Kant (1999), the *concept of nothing* could be divided, once again, “under the order and guidance of the categories” (Kant, 1999, p.382).

⁵¹ reciprocity.

⁵² These relations will be met with again in the work of Varro (1938) in Chapter 3, IV.i.

⁵³ Notably, the appearance of amphiboly, or logical fallacy, is a portent to Kant’s (1999) intention to take the way not of rhetoric but of dialectic, (Kant, pp.370-377). Gillespie (2008) said: Kant, as is well known, was no friend of rhetoric. That being said, Gillespie’s work is seen as a good example of subjectification. It seems that Gillespie attempts to subjectify Kant’s third antinomy in terms of classical rhetoric, failing to see the obvious, that a conflict in ideas is dialectical, which is quite different from mere rhetoric.

More specifically, the concept of nothing could be divided into *ens rationis*, empty concept without an object, under the guidance of the categories of quantity, consisting of none, unity (one), plurality (many), and totality (all). Under the categories of quality nothing, *nihil privativum*, was the empty object of a concept, including reality, negation, and limitation. Under relation it was *ens imaginarium*, the empty intuition without an object, made up of inherence and subsistence, of causality and dependence, and of community. Under the categories of modality, the concept of nothing, *nihil negativum*, the empty object without a concept, contained possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency (Kant, 1999, pp.382-383).

In the introduction to the second part of the transcendental logic, The Transcendental Dialectic, Kant (1999, pp.384-393) began by considering reason in general, the logical use of reason, and the pure use of reason, all as parts of the dialectic of pure reason as the seat of transcendental illusion. Unlike that which is proposed in this thesis, where judgement is a faculty of principles, Kant said reason was generally perceived as a faculty of principles by *analogy* with the understanding, a faculty of rules. Hence, Kant's notion of cognition was one in which the senses provided the matter of intuition, in which the understanding drew inferences mediately, and in which reason contained those concepts and principles not drawn from the senses or understanding (Kant p.387)⁵⁴.

In On the Logical Use of Reason syllogisms, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive, were met. Through a synthesis with the disjunctive syllogism, a disjunctive synthesis, Kant's (1999) *logos* of man, nature, and God arose.⁵⁵ The task in the pure use of reason was "to bring the highest possible unity of reason into our cognition" (Kant, 1999, p.392), which, after some in-depth searching ahead by the reader, Kant would finally reveal to be grounded in the principle of the unity of ends.

⁵⁴ This is contrary to what III.iii.i says. What it says there is that, in addition to what Kant (1999, p.378) said, that reason contained concepts and principles from the senses and understanding, reason also contained thoughts drawn from the faculty of comprehension, as well as what Bacon (1973) had indicated, those objects presented to reason through the imagination and memory (Bacon, p.120).

⁵⁵ Kant (1999) claimed that his *logos* grew out of the disjunctive syllogism (Kant, p.392) but he was also clearly aware of Bacon's (1973) three beams of knowledge since he honoured *Baco de Verulam* in his preface to the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*. Refer footnote 84.

In the first book, *On the Concepts of Pure Reason*, (Kant, 1999, pp.394-408) the transcendental ideas were the concepts of pure reason, “just as we called the concepts of understanding ‘categories’” (Kant, 1999, p.395). The *Transcendental Ideas* was sectioned off into *On the Ideas in General* (Kant, pp.395-399), *On the Transcendental Ideas* (Kant, pp.399-405), and *The System of the Transcendental Ideas* (Kant, pp.405-408).

The first section of this first book imparted a Kantian progression of the species of representation. Representation was a *genus*, perception was a *species* of representation that could be divided into sensation and cognition, and cognition was either intuition or concept. A concept was either empirical or pure. A pure concept was a notion and an idea was a concept made up of notions (Kant, 1999, pp.398-399). Between this progression and that of the current thesis differences arise, namely in that the idea of a concept is surrendered and that notions are made up of complex ideas, though otherwise, the arrangement of this thesis is greatly indebted to this part of Kant’s arrangement.

In the second section, *On the Transcendental Ideas* (Kant, 1999, pp.399-405) an idea, which was the conditioned, could generally be explained by the concept of the unconditioned: the unconditioned for the *categorical* synthesis in a subject, the unconditioned for the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series, the unconditioned for the disjunctive synthesis of the parts of a system (Kant, p.400). In the third section, *The System of the Transcendental Ideas* (Kant, pp.405-408) was comprised of three classes: the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, which was the object of psychology, the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearances, the world being the object of cosmology, and the absolute unity of all objects of thought in general, the supreme being being the object of theology (Kant, p.406).

In the second book of the transcendental dialectic, *The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason*, Kant (1999, pp.409-410) considered in separate chapters the species of dialectical syllogism, that is, sophistical inference: the transcendental paralogism, the antinomy of pure reason, and the ideal of pure reason. In the first chapter (Kant, pp.411-458) the paralogisms of pure reason were the *topoi* of the rational doctrine of

the soul, which were four: the soul was substance (substantiality), in its quality simple (simplicity); in the different times in which it existed, numerically identical, that is, it possessed unity not plurality (personality); and in relation to possible objects in space (ideality, that is, of outer relation). These emerged under the guidance of the concepts of reflection (Kant, pp.382-383). To all four Kant lodged criticism against what these topics revolved around and that was a synthetic procedure based on “I am” (Kant, 1999, p.413).

Still under the guidance of the concepts of reflection, Kant (1999) asked what the soul cognised in itself: the unconditioned unity of *relation*, that is, itself, not as inhering but as *subsisting*; the unconditioned unity of quality, that is, not as a real whole but rather *simple*, that is, a “single thing” (Kant, 1999, p.446); the unconditioned unity in the *multiplicity* in time, that is, not numerically different in different times, but rather as *one* and the very *same object*, that is “the identity of myself in everything manifold...” (Kant, 1999, p.446); as well as the unconditioned unity of *existence* in space, that is, nothing as the consciousness of several things outside itself but rather *only of the existence of itself* and of other things merely as its representations.

Towards the end of this first chapter in the first edition Kant (1999) said: “‘I am’ ...extends itself further than any possible experience can reach” (Kant, 1999, p.444). In the second edition Kant added an analytic procedure based not on I am but on I think: “All thinking beings as such are substances” (Kant, 1999, p.451). What pertains to a thinking being in general was I think, as subject, as simple subject, and as identical subject, in every state of my thinking.

The second chapter was on the antinomy of pure reason (Kant, 1999, pp.459-550) and opened with a system of cosmological ideas. This system was made up of four parts: the absolute completeness of the *composition* of a given whole of all appearances, the absolute completeness of the *division* of a given whole of all appearances, the absolute completeness of the *arising* of an appearance in general, and the absolute completeness of the *dependence* of the existence of the alterable in appearance. The reader will observe that these are in accord with the headings of the *categories*, quantity, quality, relation, modality, but of only “those that... carry... a series in the synthesis of the manifold” (Kant, p.464).

The antithetic of pure reason sat at the heart of the antinomies and is comprised of conflicts, not arguments, of the transcendental ideas. On this model the schema of leadership in this thesis will be drawn. The first conflict was between the world having a beginning in time, and in space it is also enclosed in boundaries⁵⁶ in opposition to the world having no beginning and no bounds in space, but is infinite with regard to time and space.

The second conflict was between, on the one hand, every composite substance in the world consisting of simple parts, and nothing existing anywhere except the simple and what is composed of simples. In opposition to this is, on the other hand, that no composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and nowhere in it does anything simple exist. Simples bring the monads of Leibniz (2000) to mind, monads being metaphysical points and not lines (Euclid, 1956). Where Locke (1924) saw both simple and complex ideas Kant (1999) saw only complex ideas.

The third conflict of ideas in the antithetic of pure reason was that to the one side causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality, causality through freedom in order to explain them and that to the other side there is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature. In response to this, the one raises matters of multiple causes as an explanation for a single effect in science and the other matters for debate of where there is no freedom there is no justice or where there is justice there is no freedom⁵⁷.

The fourth conflict: to the world there belongs something that, either as a part of it or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being, as opposed to the proposition that there is no absolutely necessary being in existence anywhere, either in the world or outside the world as its cause. Each proposition and counter-proposition in the antithetic of pure reason led to a proof and remark (Kant, 1999, pp.467-495).

⁵⁶ cf Boethius (1874).

⁵⁷ Kant (1999) used a view of antinomies as conflicting arguments presented side by side, which is a form that probably goes back further than Quintilian (2006). For a philosophical argument concerning the third antinomy, which raises matters of causality and freedom, matters of the utmost importance for not only this thesis but all modern science and morality, see Gillespie, M.A. (2008).

The point to be made here is that as he did between the pure concepts of the understanding and the principles of the pure understanding Kant (1999) did not reason by analogy, which, as Cicero (1989b) stated, belongs to judicial oratory,⁵⁸ but rather reasoned by using the canons of dialectic, and by falling back on the terminology of Euclidean geometry⁵⁹.

In the third chapter (Kant, 1999, pp.551-589), after concluding that of the possible kinds of proof offered by metaphysics or speculative reason, the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological, were all impossible (Kant, pp.563-583), Kant (pp.590-623) appended an interesting transposition of the logical principles of form, namely, the transcendental law of homogeneity, the transcendental law of specification, and the transcendental law of continuity, into an order in accordance with their experiential use, that is, manifoldness, affinity, and unity, to comprise the respective principles of unity that remain in a one-to-one correspondence with the logical principles of form. These two sets of principles and the movement which he called an orderly transposition is what the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason looked like (Kant, pp.597-601).

To complete the *Critique of Pure Reason* the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements was followed by the compact Transcendental Doctrine of Method, which was made up of the discipline, canon, architectonic, and history of pure reason. Kant (1999) considered the discipline of pure reason in its dogmatic use, with regard to its polemical use, with regard to hypotheses, and in regard to its proofs. He then analysed the canon of pure reason into his deliberations on the ultimate end of the pure use of reason, on the ideal of the highest good, as a determining ground of the ultimate end of pure reason, and on

⁵⁸ In Cicero (1989b), Book II, section 2.13-18, Reasoning from Analogy is listed as the sixth kind of proof for a legal cause, that is, a question concerning textual interpretation.

⁵⁹ Bringing together Euclid's (1956) geometric, Cicero's (1989b) rhetoric, Augustine's (1975) dialectic and Varro's (1938) grammar means that these can be manoeuvred into an arrangement for the proposed subject matter of the intellect. After Capella(1977), the terminology of analytic (or geometric) is comprised of proposition, definition, construction of the argument, demonstration and proof, and conclusion; the purposes of rhetoric of matter, arrangement, diction, memory, and delivery; the canons of dialectic, which are terms, complete utterances, propositions, syllogisms, criticism [of poetry] and oratorical style; and the parts of grammar are letters, literature, man of letters, and literary style. In addition, the parts of a speech, being the introduction, narrative, statement of the case, proof and argument, and peroration, are also included in the proposed arrangement of the subject matter of the intellect. In Chapter Three Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), and Varro (1938) will be brought together as evidence for the art of leadership being objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership.

having an opinion, knowing, and believing (Kant, pp.627-704). Kant moved on to identify ontology, rational physiology, rational cosmology, and rational theology as having comprised the entire system of metaphysics, the *architectonic* of pure reason, before he finally settled with a brief statement that if a history of pure reason were ever undertaken object, origin, and method would all need to be considered (Kant, pp.702-704).

Linking statement

In the following section a small but important number of criticisms of Kant (1999) will be offered. In the main, Kant set out to show that the mind of man could not go beyond the consciousness of nature, being able to know only its internal states. Objects conform to the mind and not vice versa. Kant's aim was to find out if a priori knowledge, knowledge independent of experience, existed with its origins in the mind, unlike a posteriori knowledge with its origins in experience. The universal and necessary a priori arises directly from the mind while experience discloses to human beings a posteriori only the particular and contingent.

*IV.ii: Concession to any future criticism of **Critique of Pure Reason***

At this juncture, the thesis will not immediately consider Kant (1999) in relation to leadership. Instead, before considering the implications for a critique of Kant for a scientific approach to leadership, it will first concede to certain future criticisms of Kant, including both the aesthetic and then the analytic. Under the aesthetic, space and time, then, were two innate forms of sense that arranged the chaotic manifold of impressions. The results were intuitions⁶⁰ presented to the intellect through the senses.

The representation of things-in-themselves appeared as being in a temporal and or a spatial order. Space and time were universal and necessary conditions that had to be present in the mind before sense impressions arrived to make up experience. In this delivery Kant (1999) did not say if those things that existed in the real physical world were spaceless and timeless, or even if an objective space-time existed, because they

⁶⁰ Intuition and perceptions were largely synonyms for what human beings experience once chaos has been organised by the concepts of space and time. Impressions, which will be met with in Chapter Four, may be the best term for the pre-conceptual, pre-spacetime-shaped impact of the things in themselves on the senses.

remained eternally unknowable; human beings could only get to know them⁶¹ through how they appeared to the senses.

Intuition, that is, perception, preceded the intellectual, firstly and namely the categories, which were the elemental or formal a priori concepts of the pure understanding. Kant (1999) said that in a proposition, which was a universal and necessary judgement, a judgement being a thought, the universal and necessary relation between subject and predicate was expressed by the categories.

The twelve relations were unity, plurality, and totality; reality, negation, and limitation; subsistence and inherence, causality and dependence, and both active and passive reciprocity; possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency. Human experience provided the substance of intellectual knowledge that filled these intelligible but indeterminate forms. The forms of space and time shaped and ordered the chaotic manifold of impressions that came from the senses.

By now the necessary and universal knowledge of the intellect had resulted from applying the categories to these sense intuitions, that is, the well-formed and orderly manifold of perceptions that arose from the use of space and time. Man's intellectual knowledge could never go beyond this: the way things present to human beings, phenomena, to things-in-themselves, the noumena of the real physical world. However, the question as to how human beings know that things are in themselves in the real physical world remains unsettled.

The ideas of the immortality of the soul, freedom, and the existence of God were inherent in the inferences of reason. However, reason could not prove them. That they existed only from the moral law was known because intellectual knowledge extends only as far as phenomena. These a priori ideas were regulative phenomena like form, space, time, and the categories, such that human knowledge was always restricted by the a priori forms of the mind.

⁶¹ Space-time is a necessary condition for human thought to have objects and not collapse into something that cannot be made sense of. In this sense, thoughts about space and time are objective in that they make objects possible for human beings.

Armed with the above, preparation to undertake a brief criticism of a number of aspects relating to Kant (1999) is now complete. First, Kant said that man's intellectual knowledge is in essence an illusion. Human intellects could only know the impressions that things leave on the senses and not the things in themselves, as they were in reality. These impressions were phenomena and it was these that individuals judged.

However, the functions of the intellect and the intellect itself must be noumena not because they have no effect on the senses⁶² but because they are prior to perceptual knowledge insofar as it is intelligible to man. Now, either it is true that humanity can never know noumena, which means man can never know the intellect and its faculties because they are noumena; or it is false that man can know noumena and the intellect and its faculties are only phenomena and there is no synthetic a priori knowledge, which the existence of Mathematics and morality belie.

The point is that either way this has ramifications for imminent deliberations on educational leadership in higher education: the validity of a phenomenological view of intellectual leadership must be in serious doubt if the intellect is noumenal since this would mean all phenomenological research into intellectual leadership and learning would put the cart before the horse. On the other hand, if noumena are not known, what is held is a phenomenon, the intellect, investigating another phenomenon, educational leadership, which in itself depends upon the nature of the intellect. This will make the point that clarity about educational leadership is not in the first instance susceptible of investigation prior to a philosophical account of cognitive psychology or epistemology and value theory. Either way, the study of educational leadership cannot proceed without first doing the relevant philosophy.

Secondly, the noumenal world must be assumed to exist because external objects called things-in-themselves are the cause of impressions on the senses. However, for Kant (1999) causes, causality and causal dependence were empty forms of the mind which were not in application to things-in-themselves valid. There is incoherence here though. When Kant said that the physical world of noumena was a chaotic manifold he was

⁶² The intellect and its functions have an effect on the senses. Moreover, noumena are partly posited (as things in themselves quite generally, not merely external things, that is, both external things and internal things like the intellect either are or can be noumenal) because phenomena need causes.

informing his audience of something about the objective reality of which humanity was not meant to have any knowledge. This yields an unstable contrast between the world and man's knowledge of it and it is this that should be avoided if practicable.

Thirdly, Kant (1999) asserted that space and time were subjective forms that existed prior to experience. But modern psychophysics has established that sensory experience, in terms of the magnitude and motion of an object, also contributes to the human perception of space-time (Burr, Ross, Binda & Morrone, 2011; Grondin, 2010; Oliveri, Koch, & Caltagirone, 2009). For example, the neuro-imaging and neuropsychological findings of Oliveri et al, according to the authors, point to spatial and temporal information converging and interacting with each other mainly in the posterior parietal cortex of the brain.

In other words, the human perception of an object conditions that part of the mind that holds knowledge of space and time; no form exists in the mind utterly prior to experience and immune to its impact on man's concepts. Instead, experience can condition human perceptions of space and time. Kant's (1999) conception of purely a priori conceptions of space and time are not borne out by contemporary psychophysics.

Fourthly, Kant's (1999) speculations ultimately failed to justify his original aim of defending scientific knowledge against Humean (1975) scepticism; although he provided his readers with mentalistic constructs called phenomena he left them with no clear perception into the nature of things as they are in themselves. That noumena are unknowable and that the principle of cause and effect is merely an abstract form for phenomena that regulates human judgements are both contrary to the conviction of all rational enquiries⁶³ that such enquiries touch and know about real things that exist outside of the mind.

A Kantian (1999) conception of Nature as nothing but a whole of phenomena contradicts the rational positing of physical reality as operating according to principles independent of man's thinking. Kant's audience does better to leave behind the Kantian

⁶³ Here the idea that science can be done without philosophical foundations is being criticised. That does not mean to say that in this philosophical criticism of Kant (1999) the aspiration to grasp and know about the external world is being limited to science.

problematic of dogmatic realism and transcendental realism if they can. Reality and their best efforts to understand it are preferred options without phenomena as intervening objects of knowledge.

Fifth, such Kantian (1999) speculation appears to the scientific dogmatist to run contrary to the foundations of knowledge. The dogmatist would say that ideas and judgements are meant to reflect an objective reality. However, in a way that is not to relapse into Kant's problematic, that is not entirely true. Truth and error reside in judgement. Thus, first of all, what needs to be understood is the substance of the concept of an idea. An idea can be either a concrete concept or an abstract concept. The concrete concept reflects the thing in external reality but an abstract concept, a concept of reason⁶⁴, can reflect or represent another idea inside the mind.

A *subjective* principle attracts intuitions of the senses into abstract a priori categories in a way to which *pace* Kant (1999) his readers are not privy. If they do not know how the categories are filled they have no valid perception of the nature of things in reality through the ideas and judgements that are meant to represent it. They are however not compelled to draw the conclusion that mental forms are absolutely false simply because these forms do not currently represent humanity's objective external reality. Enquiry, again *pace* Kant, is dynamic, capable of self-correction and progressive when at its best. Enquiry gradually discloses reality to mankind, neither with inevitability, but nor without reason for optimism. Kant was largely closed off to this dynamism in enquiry.

Linking statement

In this section a small number of criticisms of Kant (1999) were considered. These points are important because they weaken the ground on which modern and postmodern phenomenological works on leadership rest. With unsound claims so-called works of empirical science cannot stand in the literature on leadership. The next section considers some implications of this account of Kant for a scientific approach to leadership.

⁶⁴ This was not covered in III.iii.

IV.iii: Implications of a critique of Critique of Pure Reason for a scientific field of leadership

In that which is part of what can be ascribed to the tradition of science the consideration of leadership as a science can be speculated on in Kantian (1999) terms. Consistent with Kant's own injunction against the application of the pure concepts of the understanding, although the notion that these can be applied to the *thing* called a leader or leading could be entertained it cannot be applied to the *object* called leadership, so leaders and episodes or processes of leading can only be experienced under the twelve conditions of possibility given in the categories (Kant, 1999, pp.206, 212). This is not of concern here.

When social scientists attempt to make judgements about the abstract concept, that is, the idea of leadership they erroneously suggest that leadership is to be perceived as a concrete concept defined in a set of explanatory theoretical statements: leadership under quantity is misperceived as universal, particular or singular; under quality: affirmative, negative, or infinite; relation: categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive; modality: problematic, assertoric, or apodictic (Kant, 1999, p.206). This standpoint is erroneous because leadership is thus misjudged as a concrete concept and not as an idea.

Nor can the abstract idea of leadership be spoken of in terms of the pure concepts of the understanding, that is, the categories of understanding, (Kant, 1999, p.212) for these would appertain to leadership as if it were a thing in experience, which it is not. Instead, it is an ideal against which leaders are to be evaluated, measured and the like and to which they are to aspire. As such, leadership is properly the target of consideration by the faculties of comprehension and judgement wherein matters of value, obligations and ideals are addressed.

What can be gathered from Kant (1999) is that after two attempts he was unable to deduce principles of the pure understanding from concepts of the understanding (Kant, pp.219, 225). This is in agreement with the abstract concept, that is, idea of the universe of the intellect established in this thesis: it is more likely, indeed, possible, to deduce concepts from the effects that concepts have on the performance of principles of the pure understanding because of the standpoint of the observer inside that universe,

that is, because of the grounds of subjective sources of cognition that in Kantian terms do *not* belong in their empirical application (Kant, pp.236, 242) but belong in another grounds, a transcendental temporal schemata.

All abstract concepts, that is, ideas like leadership, are subject not to the Kantian (1999) temporal schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding (Kant, pp.267-277) but to a subjective temporal schematism only indirectly related to that transcendental temporal schemata, in accordance with the categories made up of schemata of magnitude, cause, necessity, and reality, as indicated by Kant in relation to his notion of objects of experience. According to Kant not only was the principle of contradiction the supreme principle of all analytical judgements (Kant, p.279) and the principle of the possibility of experience the supreme principle of all synthetic judgements (Kant, pp.282-283) but the axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and the postulates of empirical thinking in general comprised all the principles of the pure understanding.

Now, these principles of synthetic judgements are, on closer inspection, merely extensions of or abstractions from the transcendental temporal schemata arranged and amended in a system of principles (Kant, 1999, p.285). Kant (1999) pursued these schemata of magnitude, cause, necessity, and reality and their thematic emendations into the relations, relations that will prove to be important to deliberations on leadership in this thesis because it is proposed they operate according to an *interpenetration* of the concepts of reflection, specifically his division of the concept of nothing (Kant, pp.367-370, 382-383) where confusion between the empirical and the transcendental use of the understanding causes an amphiboly.

Kant (1999) saw the transcendental use of reason, outside the limits of understanding, as leading to intellectual failure, not to knowledge or understanding of any kind. He saw the dialectical character of the transcendental use of the concepts of pure reason as symptomatic of this failure or degeneration of understanding. This thesis rejects such a dismal assessment of the deployment of the intellect outside the range of the disciplines of empirical evidence, observation, and experiment. However, it does accept the dialectical character of the transcendental use of the intellect. In other words, what is

seen in a dialogue between different positions on the transcendental use of the intellect is opportunity for conceptual and moral insight and progress⁶⁵.

Nevertheless, the thesis argues that the transcendental use of the intellect in its fully dialectical nature⁶⁶ engages what may be called the faculties of comprehension and judgement. The transcendental faculties of the intellect take matters of value, normative judgement, evaluative understanding and the like as their central exigencies. So long as it takes its proper objects, for example, ideal abstract concepts like leadership and not concrete concepts like leaders and leading, the thesis can take tensions, inconsistencies, paradoxes and the like, among abstract concepts and in the debates involved, resolve them coherently and insightfully, enabling conceptual, moral, and spiritual progress through the resolution of such intellectual debates at this transcendental level.

Admittedly, an amphiboly in the idea of leadership would exist if the faculties of *understanding* and *reason* were used to treat of leadership as these are concerned with empirical and scientific theories of explanation. Alternatively, when the faculties of comprehension and judgement are deployed no such amphiboly ultimately exists because in these faculties leadership is first and foremost a notion and a principle respectively. A notion and a principle are objects of the intellect, the former being a system of complex of ideas and a principle being at the centre of an idea⁶⁷. The understanding is used in the case of the concrete empirical, that is, as addressing he who is a leader and the act of leading. The faculty of comprehension is used in addressing the abstract transcendental; that is to say, in this case, leadership itself.

In his notion of the transcendental dialectic, as opposed to the analytic of principles, which has just been of concern in relation to leadership, Kant (1999) maintained that pure reason is the grounds for a transcendental illusion, which he called dialectic (Kant, pp.387, 390). Reason was useful logically, in terms of syllogisms, and purely, to facilitate the entry of the principle of the unity of ends into cognition. Pure reason was itself empty, to be filled with transcendental ideas, which were the concepts of pure

⁶⁵ This is a deliberately Hegelian (1971) use of Kant's (1999, 2002) cognitive psychology.

⁶⁶ In which amphibolies, paralogisms and antinomies are explored.

⁶⁷ As already explained in Chapter 1, II.ii.

reason “just as we called the concepts of understanding ‘categories’” (Kant, 1999, p.395).

In that by analogy the great ideas of the world, such as God, self, freedom, and immortality can be considered as concepts of reason in general, Kant (1999) led the way by outlining a pedigree for transcendental ideas in general before offering a general explanation for the conditioned (idea) by way of the unconditioned concept, before attending to the classes of transcendental ideas in their absolute unity (Kant, pp.395, 398-399, 400, 406).

His treatment of the self was a paralogism of pure reason entirely consistent with the philosophy of leadership that is nurtured in the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis: “I am...extends itself further than any possible experience can reach” (Kant, 1999, pp.444, 409-410, 413, 443, 451). The thesis builds on this by taking the subjective self of the faculties of the intellect and objectifying it in the universe of the intellect. The composition, division, arising, and dependence of the appearance of ideas comprise a system of ideas, according to the four headings of the categories but of only “those that...carry...a series in the synthesis of the manifold” (Kant, 1999, p.464) followed by a contest among cosmological ideas within the antinomy of pure reason (Kant, pp.469, 467-495).

Kant (1999) holds no hegemony over the form of antinomies of the dialectic, so in the comprehension of leadership in the transcendental intellect of the universe of the intellect an antinomy can be constructed, not of pure reason but of leadership as an exercise of the transcendental intellect, an antinomy being a conflict in ideas, before arriving at any ideal of leadership in the resolution of this antinomy.

The first conflict in ideas concerning leadership is that on the one hand it can be said that leadership has an absolute beginning in social time and in social space, and that it is also enclosed in absolute limits; the proof of this is that appearances of leadership in leaders and leading are bound by the manifold of the human condition. On the other hand, it could be said that the appearance of leadership has no absolute beginning and no absolute bounds in social space but is eternal with regard to social time and infinite with regard to social space; the proof of this follows from the hypothesis that although

leadership appears in different individuals it is however an omnipresent ideal waiting to make an appearance that is contingent upon circumstances, and evaluating the performance of individuals, never disproved by their failures.

The second conflict in ideas is that the combined essence in leadership consists of simple things called elements and nothing exists anywhere except elements or what is composed of elements. The proof of this is that the human condition including reason and judgement, that is, wisdom, is subject to analysis. The antithesis of this is that what is combined in the condition of leadership, taken together, is *sui generis* and evaluatively ideal and as such, is not reducible to its parts; the proof⁶⁸ being that real leadership is exemplary and there is no inferring an ought from an is (Kant, 1999, p.398).

The third conflict in ideas of leadership is that causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of leadership can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another cause through freedom⁶⁹ in order to explain them; the proof is that the essence of leadership is to be found in human virtue and vice. The antithesis of this is that the human virtue of freedom either does not exist or everything in and about leadership happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature; the proof of this is in that the laws of man and of the good are subject to the laws of nature.

The fourth conflict in ideas of leadership is that to the condition of leadership there belongs something that, either as a part of it or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary ground. The proof of this is that the ground for an appearance of leadership is a quality, that is, a trait natural to the individual; or leadership is a consequence of the set of circumstances of the kind which surround any individual in nature. The antithesis of this is that no absolutely necessary ground exists either in the condition of leadership or outside leadership as its cause. The proof is that if the reverse position is assumed, that an absolutely necessary ground exists either in the condition of leadership or outside of

⁶⁸ The proofs in these amphibolies (inconsistencies) are *prima facie* plausible reasons for the thesis or antithesis that are capable of spelling out in an argument for the thesis or antithesis.

⁶⁹ That is, the laws of morality.

leadership as its cause, then leadership is not a consequence of any necessary ground and is contingent, a brute fact, or does not manifest at all⁷⁰.

Four conflicts in ideas have been now laid out in an antinomy⁷¹ of leadership. From an antinomy, a conflict in ideas, one may consider the cause of leadership from sensibility, according to the workings of leadership and its appearance in the sensible world or from intelligibility, it being the practical thing in itself (Kant, 1999, p.535). Each event that is an appearance of leadership may have a sensible cause through a necessity of nature and an intelligible cause through spontaneity of concepts, that is, transcendental freedom (Kant, p.539).

Now it may appear that what is being set about here is the taking of these antinomies to directly resolve them, and in their resolution to yield a coherent abstract concept of leadership. However, what is really being said is that from the scientific view, from the use of the general intellect alone, they are irresolvable. Because of this irresolvability no decision with regard to either thesis or antithesis is possible because the answer lies beyond the purview of understanding and reason in the general intellect.

These antinomies have been laid out to show that their denial can be used to formulate and defend the abstract concept of leadership established in this thesis. No result is possible when using the general intellect because the synthesis of the dialectic (each thesis and antithesis), in other words the answer to each issue, transcends human understanding (Kant, 1999, pp.496-550). By thus denying the antinomies what is defended is not only the transcendental view of leadership formulated in the faculties of comprehension and judgement but also what is found in the moral and ethical nature of a coherent abstract concept of leadership.

To be true to the ideal of leadership more needs to be said on method (Kant, 1999, p.627). In the regulative use of the ideas of leadership logical principles of form and systematic unity (Kant, pp.590-604) would need to be involved. These matter because

⁷⁰ The opposite of the appearance, that is, the phenomena, of leadership arising from a necessary ground is that the appearance of leadership is merely contingent on brute fact, without explanation necessitating causes, or the appearance of leadership does not arise at all in nature. The necessary grounds of the appearance of leadership is intrinsic to the thing with leadership appearing, which is a possibility in the thesis.

⁷¹ Unlike an amphiboly, which is a logical fallacy, an antinomy is a set of conflicts in ideas.

striking parallels can be drawn with principles in the work of Varro (1938). Let it be shown how. Kant's (1999) logical principles of form were the transcendental laws of homogeneity, specification, and continuity (Kant, pp.597-600). Kant transposed these principles into an order in accordance with their experiential use; that order comprised the respective principles of manifoldness, affinity, and unity (Kant, pp.600-601). These principles and what happens around them is important because they are central to the upcoming analogical development of a philosophy *for* leadership.

Now, Hamann (1995a) said that Kant (1999) was merely laying out the principles of language and not the laws of thought at all. For the principles of language the work of Varro (1938) will be consulted. Kant's transcendental law of homogeneity equates to Varro's analogy and what this thesis calls sameness, similarity, which will be justified by an examination of the classical tradition. Kant's law of specification is what this thesis calls order and Kant's law of continuity Varro called regularity, which the thesis will later call stability or mature subjectivity in a philosophy *of* leadership.

The first principle of judgement, to be known as duty, can be put aside for the moment and from judgement draw the principles of sameness, order and stability. These can be transposed into the Kantian (1999) principles of experiential use in the faculty of comprehension, recorded above as manifoldness (multiplicity), affinity (attraction), and unity (Kant, pp.563-583, 597-601). What is being said here is that the principles of experiential use also exist in the faculty of comprehension, thus demonstrating that Hamann (1995a) is right. Kant's laws of thought and Varro's (1938) principles of language appear to be one and the same.

The ideal of leadership takes into account language and thought. The task of moving towards a coherent abstract concept of leadership will be undertaken in Chapters Three and Four from the proposition that traditionally the literature of the classical liberal arts is the literature of the art of leadership because from that the best of what the leading authorities of Rome have had to offer has been and is taken.

The second main thing is a central part of the method of the argument of the thesis and foreshadows Chapters Three and Four. While the focus remains on the exercise of the transcendental intellect, both subjective and objective grounds are needed for

developing the concept of leadership. This is because these two kinds of grounds take account of the principles of the freedom of thought and of the tradition of authority used in Chapter Five on leadership in higher education. The need for objective grounds for leadership will be met with in an exposition of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), and Varro (1938) in Chapter Three. For subjective grounds in Chapter Four a brief and complete exposition of the points to be discussed will be set forth, including the morality of principles (Ch.4, III) and the principles of morality (Ch.4, IV).

Finally, the four antinomies alone are given specific attention because they give an early coherence to the development of the explication of and justification for the art of leadership to come in Chapter Three, an objective ground for the abstract concept of leadership. In other words, from the above outline of the four antinomies of leadership these can be initially used to stress what seem to be *irresolvable issues*: (i) the relationship between leadership in itself and spacetime, or concrete spatio-temporal manifestations of leadership; (ii) the reducibility of leadership as an ideal and standard of evaluation to its analytical parts; (iii) the relationship of leadership to freedom, virtue and vice, and moral responsibility in the natural world; and (iv) the explanation of leadership and its manifestations, whether this explanation is brutally naturalistic or evaluatively requires realisation in nature. These may be seen to organise the exploration of the concept and notion of leadership by resolving the antinomies in the exercise of comprehension and judgement, thus foreshadowing the unfolding of the argument of the thesis in terms of objective and subjective grounds.

In brief, the overall shape of the argument vis-à-vis Kant (1999) is that Kantian understanding and reason is not sufficient for grasping what leadership is about, values and ends. To posit comprehension and judgement as faculties of the transcendental intellect is to go beyond Kant. Acceptance of the transcendental intellect is an implicit acceptance of its yielding moral knowledge. Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) counter-argument to Kant goes some way to establishing an alternative to the general-scientific view of leadership in the thesis. That alternative view allows a better account of the overall argument in the thesis and of a vision for leadership in higher education, which is seen to reflect leadership in the society of which it is a part. Awareness of this reflectivity is most important for a reading of Chapter Five.

Linking statement

The highlight in what follows is a critical dialogue between Kant (1999) and Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c). This dialogue is debatably a turning point for those sceptical of the transcendental view of leadership. Not to go beyond Kant and science would be to fail to provide a fair account of leadership. A proper account of leadership cannot afford to rely upon either a failed attempt to deduce principles from concepts, a deduction that Kant demonstrated as impossible from his strategic view of the nature of human understanding, or upon a failed attempt of reason to grasp the infinite.

To go beyond science a more radical account of the intellect than that given by Kant (1999) is needed. By working through Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) critique of Kant and reflecting on what Hamann is offering the weight of evidence bears down in his favour because Hamann's rendition of language is explained by reason and thought and not by a Kantian view of language being explained by knowledge and reason. This largely fills the need for a global understanding of leadership. The similarities of this thesis with Kant's work notwithstanding, because leadership does not belong to science, neither Locke (1924) nor Kant can satisfactorily explain leadership. The failure of science alone, besides language laying at the heart of leadership, provides sufficient reason for reviewing the classical tradition on grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic.

The critical dialogue between Kant (1999) and Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) represents a debate between the general view and the transcendental view, respectively. Hamann's view positively supports that of this thesis, which includes the faculty of comprehension in the transcendental intellect. Arguing from a position of complete global understanding of language, reason, and thought makes for the strongest possible argument for the transcendental view. Against this, the Kantian argument fails, convincingly demonstrating that the scientific view of leadership is indefensible.

*IV.iv: Critical dialogue on **Critique of Pure Reason**: Language explained by thought, more than by the knowledge of understanding, and by reason, strengthening the drive towards a proper universal explanation for leadership*

Kant (1999) said a science was based on an idea; the whole of his first *Critique* concerned how men came by scientific ideas. The thesis ventures that ideas are found not only in the general intellect and the transcendental intellect but also in all other

parts of the mind as well as the spirit of man. This is why ideas are universal. To develop a philosophy for leadership at least three ideas are needed, not a simple notion of merely two ideas; but a complex notion. In the case of what is unfolding at this stage of the argument and in this section, ideas are needed at least of language, thought, and reason. This thesis will claim that such a philosophy *for* leadership is consistent with ideas of humanity and justice in the secular state and the populace at large. Further, a philosophy *of* leadership, which may include notions of righteousness (morality) and duty, is compatible with the faith and belief of the person of exemplary virtue and wisdom.

This section includes the explication and implications of the work of Kant's antagonist, Hamann (1995a), a self-proclaimed man of faith but also one charged with determination. Before proceeding, four points first need to be made with regard to the mystery that man can have knowledge of objects of experience independent of experience: (1) that language precedes reason; reason is not independent of culture, experience and language; pure reason cut off from these misunderstands itself thereby mystifying sensibility and understanding. When working from the intuition of a word (its letters and syllables, meaning and use) to the concept of a word the intuition and the concept will not agree. (2) That man's understanding of all things comes through the senses: man devises from experience that the origin of language is natural and human. However, the law of freedom to be good, the good being the final end of humanity, determines one's humanity. (3) Reflection (thought) is the language of the human spirit and is used by humanity to invent language. (4) One acquires from experience that the origin of language is natural and human but through reflection one discovers that the origin of language is ultimately divine.

Next, although Hamann (1995a) has been saying that scepticism would not have been possible without idealism and Kant (1999) should be grateful to Hume (1975) for that, the great mystery, of the possibility of man knowing about objects of experience as they are independently of experience and of having a sensible intuition of an object independently of the conditions of sensation of it,⁷² remains. By what Hamann has been saying, then, the whole of Kant's first *Critique* depends on Kant's primary division of

⁷² A representation of it or a non-veridical appearance.

the matter and form of the transcendental doctrine of elements and methods as well as on the division of judgement into analytic and synthetic, and on the impossibility of the above mystery.

Over against Hume's (1975) "idiosyncratic distinction" (Hume cited in Hamann, 1995a, p.519) between reason as object, source, and mode of knowledge lay Kant's (1999) assertion that reason was none of the three but was still their foundation. Reason needed none of them since it was the source of these subjective conditions. Reason as object: the object comes from something in the real world; reason as source: the content of reason was nothing since reason was but an empty form; reason as a mode of knowledge has its origin in intuition. Reason was not independent of culture (custom, tradition, belief), of experience and its induction, or of the traditions and use of language. These three purified philosophy. The dogmatic, sceptical and critical elements of pure reason, Hamann (1995a) has been saying, arise from the dual ambiguity of the "*receptivity of language and spontaneity of concepts*" (Hamann, 1995a, p.520), ambiguity being an inherited defect.

The proposition that "If mathematics is so noble in its 'universal and necessary reliability' then human reason is less than an instinct" (Hamann, 1995a, p.521) can only come from a plethora of analytic judgements being conjoined to the concept of a mathematics prejudicially mediating the synthesis between subject and predicate. While the sensibility of Geometry excludes all misunderstanding, metaphysics for Hamann is nothing more than a transcendental superstition, an *ens rationis*. Hamann (1995a) has been saying that language precedes reason, which cannot understand itself because of an intolerable misunderstanding of the parts of reason not only within reason itself but also with the parts of the rest of the mind (Hamann, p.521).

Hamann (1995a) goes on, sounds and letters⁷³ are the only pure forms a priori, nothing else, not anything relating to sensation nor anything relating to the concept of an object, nor elements of knowledge or reason. He has been saying that these forms are found in music as measures of time and in painting and drawing as the definitions and limitations of spatial systems. These correspond to hearing and sight without which

⁷³ Letters in the sense of shapes.

understanding would not be possible. Rightly, Hamann (1995a) has been offering not the division of a cloven tree but the life-giving alternative of understanding above and sensation below, with thought, properly understood, posterior and language prior, that is, as previously, knowledge has given to or has been taken by intuition (Hamann, pp.522-523), though without the distortions of modern philosophy⁷⁴.

Pure reason has been needlessly making a mystery of the knowledge of sensibility [intuition] and understanding, their definitions and limitations, their explanation and amplification (Hamann, 1995a, p.523). Hamann (1995a) has ridiculed Kant's (1999) central concepts: of a priori and a posteriori, of subject and predicate, of intuitions rising into pure understanding and concepts descending into sensibility (Hamann, p.523). He has concluded that words "have aesthetic and logical capacities"⁷⁵ (Hamann, 1995a, p.524), first, since they belong to sensibility and intuition in-so-far-as they and their elements are objects that are seen and heard; and second, since they belong to understanding and concepts in their meaning and use.

Words have remained undetermined objects of empirical intuitions, that is, aesthetic appearances until, through their use and meaning, they have become determined objects of the understanding (Hamann, 1995a). Through the repetitive connecting of the word-sign and the intuition of the object "the concept is communicated to the understanding" (Hamann, 1995a, p.524). Hamann has closed with the possibility of categorical and idealistic materials, that is, the analysis and synthesis of knowledge has been understood as nothing more than knowledge geometrically shaped to suit categorical and idealistic materials. If intuition has been the essence of pure reason and of critical idealism then producing the form of an empirical intuition without an object or word-sign being taken from the mind or spirit, becomes a possibility.

From the *matter* [word] and form [meaning, use] of Reason it is not possible to produce the concept. The intuition and the concept do not agree when working from the intuition of a word to the concept of a word. Nor is it possible to find the *matter* -letters and syllables-, that is, the empirical intuition of a word, when working from the

⁷⁴ According to Hamann, then, language is prior to thought but that is not all. The capacity to think is being competent in language. No thought is prior to, independent of, underlies or gives meaning to language. To be a thinker is to be a speaker and one who understands language.

⁷⁵ This reflects the division of Kant (1999).

understanding [the concept of the word] from this *form* of the word. Spelt out, Hamann (1995a) has been saying that “the sacrament of language, the letters of its elements, the spirit of its institution” is all that remains (Hamann, p.525).

Second, humanity is gregarious and organised in life, for example, like a leader to his followers. The freedom to be good or evil is mankind’s final natural purpose (end). The perfect law of freedom, not instinct, nor *sensus communis* (universal healthy reason [Hamann, 1995b, p.475]) determines an individual’s humanity. The energies⁷⁶ of freedom are: “consciousness, attentiveness, and moral conscience” (Hamann, 1995b, p.478). These all tend to the universal and infinite⁷⁷ (Hamann, p.479).

Sense and understanding have related such that sense is prior to understanding and nothing enters the understanding except through the senses (Hamann, 1995b, p.479). The revelations and traditions of reason (intellect) have been taken to be humanity’s own through experience (Hamann, p.479). That the origin of language is natural and human is acquired through experience but in the sense of a generic origin of language as such, language has a common genesis in having been created by God. Man’s experience is merely *re-cognition* and hardly *invention* at all, according to individual proclivities, capacities and opportunities.

Third, before this next point is made, the Platonic argument for the human origin of language is that man is both animal and not animal. To this Hamann (1995b) has said that no animal or god can invent language (Hamann, p.485). What has been misunderstood is a self-developing human spirit and language. Humanity stands above animality in kind not degree; humanity is a political animal holding both critical and political⁷⁸ office (Hamann, p.488).

The point is that Hamann (1995b) has been saying that in humanity *reflection* replaces the *instinct* found in animals and that the condition of reflection is freely used by humanity to invent language, which is an external characteristic of being human just as reason is the internal characteristic of being human. Language is “the natural

⁷⁶ That is, the powers or capacities of freedom.

⁷⁷ cf Boethius’ the infinite now.

⁷⁸ Magistral, Hamann’s term is archontical.

instrument of understanding, a sense of the human soul” (Hamann, 1995b, p.483).

Reflection is an essential and peculiarity of humanity as is language and language’s invention of language (Hamann, p.483). The sensations of man’s senses flood his apperception, the first indication of thought, and the invention of the language of the human spirit.

Fourth, Hamann (1995c) has proposed that all is divine and the origin of evil is mere word play and the idle chatter of scholastics. All that is divine is also human and without this communication knowledge is impossible. The origin of language is divine and evolution is a mindless veil covering the truth that the origin of language is divine. The certainty of the heavenly theories of Galileo, Kepler and Newton are suspicious until bent by morality (Hamann, p.464).

Hamann (1995c) has pointed to Hume (1975). Hume said that the connection between cause and effect is mere superstition but Hamann has said the link between cause and effect is spiritual, the cause is spiritual and the effect is physical, which pre-empt Hume’s assertion (Hamann, p.465). Hamann has been saying the origin of language is not only in nature and is not only an invention of human art and wisdom but is also divine. Clearly this is identified in an Aristotelian sense that the efficient and final cause of language is divine⁷⁹ and the effect is a phenomenon of nature. On top of this discovery is the connection that every phenomenon of nature, all that man senses, is divine, the living Word, that is, God, in whom, Hamann has avowed, language originates (Hamann, p.468).

In summary, the four points made in this section are: (1) that language precedes reason; reason is not independent of culture, experience and language; pure reason cut off from these misunderstands itself thereby mystifies sensibility and understanding. When working from the intuition of a word (its letters and syllables, meaning and use) to the concept of a word the intuition and the concept will not agree. (2) That man’s understanding of all things comes through the senses: man devises from experience that the origin of language is natural and human. However, the law of freedom to be good, the good being man’s final end, determines one’s humanity. (3) Reflection (thought) is

⁷⁹ Aristotle is invoked only to drive home the point in support of Hamann that language has more than one cause.

the language of the human spirit and is used by humanity to invent language. (4) Man acquires from experience that the origin of language is natural and human but through reflection discovers that the origin of language is divine.

What is ultimately extracted from Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) critique of the Kantian (1999) point of view and from his own alternative account stems most plainly from the fourth point, that the origin of language has more than one cause⁸⁰. To say this is to rebel against the scientific dogma of a precious one-to-one correspondence. The mystery that man can have knowledge of objects of experience independent of experience is thus resolved in what one comprehends⁸¹ and what one values⁸². Surely what one should value most highly is the divine source of judgement and of authority. Before moving on to a consideration of the art of leadership the limitations of the scientific approach are recapitulated.

From Kant (1999), screened through Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) critique, the weakness of the scientific approach to leadership makes sense. The scientific approach treats the abstract concept of leadership as if it is properly an object of the general intellect, of understanding and reason, whereas it is properly the task of the transcendental intellect, in comprehension and judgement, to explicate it in its moral and ideal character in the transcendental intellect. This task of comprehension as engaged with the manifestations of leaders and leading raises the matter of the art of leadership. The art of leadership, instantiating under conditions of man's natural empirical life the ideals of leadership, takes over where science falters. So, to understand that the art of leadership is a means to a comprehension of leadership the thesis turns to a defence of the art of leadership.

This move to the art of leadership needs to be made not only because the science of leaders and leading has been shown thus far to be inadequate for an account of leadership but also because science cannot take account of the moral and ideal character of leadership, the values and ends that have been part and parcel of what human beings have practiced in the tradition of the art of leadership for centuries. This

⁸⁰ The origins of language, according to Hamann, are humanity, nature, and the divine.

⁸¹ Comprehension, to recall, is global understanding, that is, full understanding.

⁸² The most enduring feature of culture is values, not customs, rituals and manners (Brick, 2004, pp.37-38).

accumulated experience is a wellspring for knowledge based on sound practice rather than on untested hypotheses. The art of leadership is objectively different from the science of leaders and leading in that its immediate concern is with the practice and not the theory of leadership.

Because the art of leadership is about the practice of leadership and not the study of the application of theories it has no literature of its own but draws from the literary tradition of the classical liberal arts⁸³. Furthermore, the art of leadership is subjectively different from a philosophy of leadership in that it is grounds for a philosophy of leadership that remains within the general intellect because although morality underpins leadership it does not *consciously* enter into it. Morality becomes of prime concern when one has a philosophy of leadership, which will later contribute to the explanation of leadership in higher education.

Kant's (1999) *logos* in the transcendental dialectic, was comprised of man, nature, and God and he was to become most concerned about the immortality of the soul, freedom, and the existence of God. Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) has seen the origins of language in man, nature, and God. From Kant's *logos* and his concerns with the soul, freedom, and God's existence the transcendental intellect drew its subjective concern with divine providence and freedom. The general intellect can only go so far as humanity (man) and justice (the opposite of freedom as its limitation).⁸⁴

To extend Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) argument, from divine providence one's thought is objectified in language and from nature language is subjectified in thought⁸⁵

⁸⁶. Evidence will be provided in Chapter Three for the argument that language is the

⁸³ Leadership is about exceptional language.

⁸⁴ Bacon "...dealt with two of the three beams of man's knowledge; that is *radius directus*, which is referred to **nature**; *radius refractus*, which is referred to **God**, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the medium. There resteth *radius reflexus*, whereby **man** beholdeth and contemplateth himself" (Bacon, 1973, p.105). Refer footnote 56.

⁸⁵ In the rules relative to establishing sociological proofs Durkheim said: "If sociological phenomena are only systems of objectivised ideas, to explain them is to rethink them in their logical order, and this explanation is in itself its own proof; at the very most, it will require confirmation by a few examples." (Durkheim, 1938, p.144).

⁸⁶ Consider the opposite, where thought is subjectified in language, discrepancies occur, for example, Wang's (2008) "messiness". Another example was in Gillespie's (2008) attempt to subjectify Kant's third antinomy, (dialectic), in terms of classical rhetoric where he noted the absence of a *narratio* and a *peroratio* as variations. Gillespie argued that the Proofs and Observations (Remarks) serve the same functions in Kant's antinomy as *confirmatio* and *refutatio* do in classical argument. Gillespie's stated aim

objectification and not the subjectification of thought. That evidence is Cicero's (1989) offering of the rules of oratory and argument; Augustine's (1975) offering of an older dialectic alternative to Kant's (1999), which treated letters, syllables, and words as things first⁸⁷, which Hamann has been also saying; and Varro (1938) offering argument on grammar for and against regularity and ambiguity. The thesis takes the view that besides being an objective ground for a philosophy of leadership Varro's argument on the existence of analogy has been a prime example of the argument of rhetoric, as laid out in Cicero's rules of argument.

Chapter Four will argue that thought is the subjectification, not the objectification, of language. To objectify the abstract notion or ideal of leadership will be to express it in a form that can be experienced by others but to subjectify the art of leadership is to interpret it in terms of subjective experience, that is, in terms of one's notion or philosophy of leadership of the subjective conditions of the transcendental intellect. Hamann (1995a) is taken to have been saying that one cannot, for example, subjectify Varro's (1938) grammar of language into laws of thought. It is impossible to objectify the rules of language into laws of thought. They must be subjectified.

Finally, before turning to a treatment of Book I of Bacon (1952), although the objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership can inform the reader of what individuals like Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1935), have believed the rules of language to be, no way appears to exist to discover what the laws of thought are, unless they are taken to be the same thing. All one holds are the rules of language, only these rules point to any formal laws of thought. In the meantime the rules of language represent the unknown or unknowable laws of thought, which can be called cognition. The objects of the universe of the intellect are representations of written or spoken things called symbols, which are the devices of rhetoric.

Linking statement to Part V

The explication of and response to Kant (1999) has been important. This is because it has demonstrated his failure to deduce principles of understanding from concepts of

to try to draw a parallel between Kant's dialectic reasoning and classical rhetoric is questionable since as already footnoted Kant was no friend of rhetoric. Besides, argument does not exist in dialectic.

⁸⁷ An observation corroborated by Durkheim (1938, p.28).

understanding, which implies that science cannot make the leap from a so-called concept of leadership ostensibly in theories of leadership in the general intellect to principles of leadership in the transcendental intellect. Furthermore, the argument has been put that an explication of Locke's (1924) *Essay* was necessary before what Kant was saying could be understood. Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) opposition to what Kant was saying has strengthened the argument of this thesis against science in favour of the treatment of the art of leadership on the objective grounds of language in Chapter Three and on the philosophy of leadership on the subjective grounds of thought in Chapter Four.

Before treating of language in Chapter Three, just as Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) has been important for the argument progressing towards a philosophy of leadership, Bacon's (1952, 1973) works are central to first establishing both objective and subjective grounds in a *philosophy of mind*, that is, the general and transcendental intellect and the universe of the intellect. To complete a treatment of the failure of science to explain leadership and to motivate work on the art of leadership, Bacon (1952) needs to be considered first. This representative work will constitute the third aspect of the tradition of science in what will be a vain search for stronger canonical support for any demonstration of a science of leadership, vain because it denies the idea of notions and so cannot be used to engage in moral aspects of leadership.

V

*On Book I of Bacon's **Novum Organum** for an understanding of the transition from a science of leaders and leading to the idea of the art of leadership*

To hold a justified true claim to knowledge of the science and art of leading and of the art of leadership is to hold a philosophy of leadership. As has been argued, the *understanding* draws a conception of both a science of leading and an art of leading from sensible experience in the real world but these cannot represent knowledge of the art of leadership. Knowledge of the art of leadership comes logically prior to the possibility of the exercise of the practical art of leadership, in which the concepts of leaders and leading are made intelligible in the idea of it.

In reasoning around the concrete concepts of leaders and leading and the rhetoric associated with these, sensible knowledge of these concepts from the understanding is

abstracted into intelligible knowledge of the art of leadership. Intelligible knowledge of the art of leadership is understood as an ideal and standard of leadership. Following this, complete knowledge of a moral philosophy of leadership is held in the *notion* of leadership, the thought of it in the faculty of comprehension. The *principle* of leadership emerges from the paradox of the intellect, beyond the comprehension of, the notion of, leadership.

To gain an understanding of the science and art of leading one needs to search not modern rhetoric but to consult Bacon (1952) on understanding. What Bacon has been saying is relevant and essential to understanding the art of leading. To do so, according to Bacon, one is obliged to first surrender notions in favour of things, notions like substance, attraction and repulsion, element, matter and form being often ill-defined (Bacon, pp.108-109). Bacon has been correct to encourage this but not because these are false notions, for notions are neither true nor false, which is what he has repeatedly asserted, but because they are strong or weak. Bacon, in fact, has been confusing understanding with comprehension.

Further evidence pointing to this confusion is in his saying that the nature of the human understanding is such that it imposes *regularity* where none exists, inventing “parallels, conjugates, and relatives” (Bacon, 1952, p.110). The counter to this is that Regularity is a matter for and a feature of comprehension not of empirical or scientific understanding. When he wrote that the understanding must not give its assent to notions and systems easily lest they be false notions (Bacon, pp.114-116) it is not the understanding that gives assent to notions and systems for that is not its function. Rather it is a function of the mind as a whole.

Bacon (1952) has claimed that he was busy founding a real model of the world in the understanding (Bacon, pp.131-133), so it is that in the understanding a model of leading can be built according to what is in nature. However, Bacon has not been able to escape the fact that men and all that makes up a man are also found in nature, so although sensible experience and experimentation in the real world of the art of leading can by themselves represent knowledge of the art of leadership, man needs to rationalise what he is doing to make what he is doing intelligible and one does that

through what one thinks and says, that is, as embodied in Hamann's (1995) thought-language equation.

That equation is the preferred alternative to Kant's (1999) demonstration of pure reason as the subjective grounds for a transcendental illusion called dialectic (Kant, pp.387, 390). To go further is to escape the general intellect and enter the moral world of comprehension in the transcendental intellect in which the dialectic of the philosophy of leadership resides. On objective grounds, this brief consideration of Bacon (1952) is the third and final aspect of the tradition of science and this aspect, too, fails to canonically support any demonstration of a science of leadership. In terms of the overall argument of the thesis, the second step is now complete, values and ends is a matter, by all ready accounts explored, disavowed by science.

Summary of Chapter 2

The purpose of this chapter is fulfilled. The result is to say that to reach further into space is to go further back in time. The chapter began by looking at what representatives of the modern scientific approach to leadership claimed or have claimed. Against these claims the thesis has argued that after a century or more of puzzle-solving science cannot definitively state what leadership is. For all its theories and methodologies the tradition of science and its canonical works have come no closer.

The thesis argues that this is because leadership does not fall within the domain of empirical science. It will go on to argue in the remaining three chapters that the objective grounds of the notion of leadership properly belong in the art of leadership and its subjective grounds in a philosophy of leadership informed by a philosophical cognitive psychology explicating the mature human intellect to which leadership in higher education addresses itself in the first instance.

Although many phenomenological studies progressed in a systematic and orderly manner their methods were inadequate for getting at the heart of leadership and learning. For example, Wang's (2008) phenomenographic study of educational leadership, Porter's (1990) economic understanding of leaders and leading and Burns' (1978) political distinction between the so-called concepts of transactional and

transformational leadership. This distinction plays a major role in new literature on globalisation, entrepreneurship, and the knowledge economy, a literature that makes no reference to the transcendental.

Transformational leadership is a persuasive *lemma* infused into the literature on the disciplines of the professions in universities and of the practitioner and policymaker. Much of this post-modern contemporary literature is concerned with peripheral matters of leadership and learning; none of it strikes at the heart of leadership. Therefore, dissatisfaction with the inventions of the present compels a review of the foundations of modern science in order to become cognizant of the traditional literature, for example of Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) objection to Kant's (1999) *purism of Reason*, and what traditional literatures may reveal about leadership.

In this short survey of the scientific literature, accounts of contemporary and canonical writers in the tradition of science are found wanting on the matter of values and ends. Further, in response to Locke (1924) the thesis finds that Pringle-Pattison (1924) has been right to say his idea of an idea is needed to understand what Kant (1999) said because Kant built on the work of Locke. In reply to Kant the thesis gives what is believed to be a fair and charitable account of his work but like the work of Locke it is found inadequate on its own to meet the need to comprehend leadership. The key point is that Kant so loved the form that he was blinded by it in writing his first *Critique*⁸⁸.

The critical dialogue between Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) and Kant (1999) represents the debate between the transcendental view and the general view, respectively. Hamann's view positively supports that of this thesis, which includes the faculty of comprehension in the transcendental intellect. Arguing from a position of global thinking about reason, language, and thought makes a stronger argument for the

⁸⁸ This thesis turned to Locke (1924) to understand Kant (1999) but Kant honoured *Baco de Verulam* in his preface to the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* because, the thesis speculates, by that time he realised he should have written that work using linear thought and *Critique of the Power of Judgement* using global thinking. The one is on science the other on philosophy. This is inconsistent with Bacon's (1952) use of linear thought to write *Novum Organum*, which is about science, and global thinking to write *The Advancement of Learning*, which concerns philosophy. *The Advancement of Learning* came earlier than *Novum Organum* and was written in the traditional style that reflected traditional global thinking and the latter the new linear way of thinking. General Arrangements have been constructed in the course of writing this thesis for those two works, among others, that use global thinking; evidence that can be readily laid before the reader's eyes that is important for the proposed philosophy of mind, but is however of only mediate relevance to a philosophy of leadership, the argument of the thesis.

transcendental view. Against this, to use Kant's argument is to fail, convincingly demonstrating that the scientific view of leadership is indefensible.

Linking statement to Chapter 3

These first two chapters argue that leadership is not a concrete concept but an abstract concept, an idea, like *followership*, *ownership*, or *stewardship*. The idea of leadership is not at the centre of the notion of the art of leadership but is nevertheless in it. When leadership is viewed in static faculties by the general intellect the idea of leadership is problematic, unlike leader or leading, because it is not a concrete concept for the understanding to make sense of. However, when the idea of leadership in the universe of the intellect is viewed by the transcendental intellect then the problem of leadership is resolved. This is the argument subjectively restated.

The recovery of leadership from its confinement as a concept of science is found in its proper treatment through the practical art of leadership. Through the art of leadership the idea of leadership becomes intelligible. When it takes its rightful place in the notion of a philosophy of leadership the idea can then exercise the moral potency intrinsic to its importance. In Chapter Three the argument to be tabled will be that the idea of leadership is nowhere more manifest than in the written works of the best authorities of Ancient Rome, namely Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), and Varro (1938). However, rotation through the works of Bacon first needs to be completed by opening Chapter Three with his *The Advancement of Learning* in order to assume the position preferred for a defence of the art of leadership.

Prologue to Chapter Three

This prologue concerns the argument, subjective grounds, and objective grounds of the thesis. First, on argument, with regard to the main thesis statement, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, the thesis concedes a science of leaders and leading and seeks confirmation for an art of leadership.

The overall argument of the thesis step by step advances that: (1) the mature human intellect is a secure subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership because it can recognise that the duality of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect is thoroughly human; (2) in a search for objective grounds for such a philosophy exploration of the tradition of science reveals that this does not comprise a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education because it fails to consider values and ends; (3) exploration of the liberal arts tradition exposes a lodestone of classical literature that forms a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude any consideration of morality and ethics but engages with determination (intent), matters of fact, and matters of value; (4) this vein of work can be directly traced to the classical literary tradition of philosophy and that the tradition of philosophy supplies a mother-lode of literature which is an enduring objective ground for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

First, on the overall argument, because it is not only rational and logical but also deductive, what the thesis considers is what is relevant. Where the argument is going is already known, since it is rational, by which is meant the literary evidence is observable and verifiable, so little in the way of background information is needed. Instead, the information presented is that which is closely related to the position of the thesis, an exploration of the problem of leadership. The argument is logical because the steps through which each chapter and the parts of each chapter rise are identified clearly and distinctly from the outset.

The deductive nature of the argument determines that it starts with the thesis statement that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The mature human intellect is comprised of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect, which

provide subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership, while the liberal arts tradition provides objective ground for an analogy between a philosophy *for* leadership and a philosophy *of* leadership to be represented in higher education.

The position taken includes a transcendental approach to the problem of leadership. The general scientific view of leadership is inadequate because theoretical and empirical works are morally and ethically deficient since science rejects any consideration of values and ends. The literature of the liberal arts is more relevant than that of science because it does not explicitly exclude morality and ethics and thus makes it a more satisfactory and feasible means by which to progress the argument of the thesis.

That progression has so far involved the setting aside of a scientific view of leadership, that is, refuting a science of leadership. However, that is not all. The evidence for an art of leadership now needs to be considered in this chapter. That evidence is found in the seminal work of Capella (1977), which is supported by the works of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938). The evidence or demonstration of the reason for the art of leadership being more relevant than any purported science of leadership in a deductive argument demands that it be supported with other works. The argument, in being rational, is also supported by these works because they verify the work of Capella and not only that are *seen* to verify Capella's work.

Next, on subjective grounds, in some ways reviewing the first step in the overall argument of the thesis, the general position taken in the whole dissertation can be clarified. Although the form of the soul and its relation to the mind is contentious this will not hinder focusing on the intellect. For example, Bacon (1973) divided the soul of man into imagination, memory, and reason, which this thesis calls spiritual reason, which is distinct from the reason of the intellect. Unlike Bacon's model the ancient form of the soul was comprised of reason, emotion, and appetite (Plato, 1977b, pp.97-105), to place man in the universe but be not of it, the soul of the universe being possessed with reason, harmony, the same, the different, and existence (Plato, p.46).

The position of the thesis assumes a tripartite division of the human person into body, soul, and mind. The mind of man is divided into intuition and volition, intellect and

affect, with no one-to-one correspondence existing between these parts of the mind and the parts of the intellect. The maturing intellect is divided into the understanding and reason of the general intellect and the comprehension and judgement of the transcendental intellect with the proviso that the general intellect is not an end in itself and needs to be bound by the transcendental intellect for the good of the whole person. All this is as continually articulated (Ch.1, II.ii and Ch.1, II.iii; Ch.2, II.ii.i and Ch.2, II.iii.ii; Ch. 4, *Introduction* and Ch.4.V).

The reason for not admitting to a one-to-one correspondence is because such a static model is superseded by a dynamic schema of the universe of the intellect in which not these faculties but what is contained within them are released. Dispensing with the confinement of the faculties allows the objects of the universe of the intellect, concepts, ideas, notions, and principles, to be viewed as interacting dynamically under a law of partial order.

A main area of concern is that of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect, which together constitute the universe of the intellect. This is the dynamic system of the mature human intellect made up of concepts, ideas, notions, and principles. In an argument on leadership the position of the thesis is that the existence of the transcendental intellect first needs to be acknowledged because leadership is not possible without it. The reason for this is that leadership is a notion, a notion of leadership is a philosophy of leadership and giving an account of leadership is not possible without assuming the existence of the transcendental intellect in which all notions reside. The thesis argues that morality and ethics are at the heart of leadership. The notion of morality is not contained within the general intellect because it is a notion and notions, put to one side by Bacon (1952, pp.107-110) but to which the thesis gives key place, fall within the domain of the transcendental intellect.

The second point is that social science writers like Denton (1998) and Wang (2008) dogmatically ascribe leadership with characteristics like vision, culture, strategy, and structure, which are really just synonyms for purpose, values, understanding, and form; words long-extant in the philosophical literature. The third and final point is that, although it may seem strange from a logical point of view, although one argues *for or against* something one may also argue *from or towards* a position. In a teleological

argument a person argues *for* something and moves *towards* a position, say, a stronger position, which means that in a mechanical argument a person argues *against* something but does not move *from* a position, for example, from valuing distributive justice conceived in a particular way.

To put things in their proper context, looking back, the second chapter argued mechanically against a social-scientific and, to some extent, a general view of leadership from the position that because morality and ethics is at the heart of leadership, social science and the general intellect do not have the proper means to explain leadership. Looking forward, the fourth and fifth chapters will argue for a philosophical and transcendental view of leadership, towards the position that philosophy and the transcendental intellect, comprehension and judgement or notions and principles, morality and ethics as well as conviction and justification, dialectic and grammar (that is, critical dialogue) can better throw light on leadership.

This third chapter argues that the art of leadership is a means to an end and not so much a position on leadership at all. It is a transition, the movement from the general station *from* which, as is argued, leadership could not be viewed, to the transcendental intellect *in* which leadership will be viewable. As argued in Chapter One (1.II.v) the transcendental view of the idea of leadership is subjectively grounded in the art of leadership understood as the means to view the idea of leadership, and objectively grounded in the classical literature of the liberal arts (Chapter 1.II.v).

Arguing against the scientific view of leadership defends the present position, that the classical liberal arts, being the literature of the art of leadership, are firm objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. From the present position five arguments for this view can be used, which are contained under the sub-thesis or proposition that the traditional language of the classical liberal arts is the language of the art of leadership.

Together these arguments can be collected to make a case for accepting that the literature of the classical liberal arts is firm objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. The intention of bringing these arguments together is to persuade the reader of the moral decency of accepting the proffered objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. Being sensitive to other than a scientific view of leadership appears to lead

naturally towards the liberal arts as a viable alternative. Restricting scientific dogma and moving along the course offered by the liberal arts is a means of moving towards a better-informed philosophical view of leadership.

Third and with more on the exploration of objective grounds, that is, on the art of leadership, the third step in the overall argument of the thesis, that a reason be given for saying something is not sufficient. That a demonstration of the reason be given is necessary to secure the reason in the statement of a proposition. The demonstration of the reason, whether that demonstration or illustration is the encyclopaedic text of Stogdill (Bass, 1981) or as shall be seen the canonical text of Capella (1977), the purpose of understanding matters and themes occupying authorities in a tradition remains the same. In a search for the affirmation of a science of leadership support for Stogdill (Bass, 1981) was sought initially in the contemporary works of Porter (1990), Burns (1978) and Wang (2008) and then, given the failure of this, in the traditional texts of Locke (1924), Kant (1999) and Bacon (1952). However, to of no avail.

In the chapter that follows and at this stage of the argument support will be sought for an art of leadership and will be found in the demonstration of the reason, that is, the work of Capella (1977). To understand the text demonstrating the reason in a proposition the names and points of view of Capella's predecessors need to be known. This is not only to substitute for a competing scientific view that has failed but also to throw light on the problem of leadership and not on the development of this tradition of human thought.

The works of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938) are consulted not to seek any further criticism of a science of leadership but to seek a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership. Such confirmation buttresses Capella's (1977) work, regardless of some variation in fragments or sources formed under different circumstances. What is important is that the form of oratory has endured in tradition and not that a text has been interpreted or paraphrased or quoted in this way rather than that. That what has been written, by those whose work already belongs in the canon of a tradition, is first reviewed, before what is offered in Chapters Four and Five, is an acceptance of the importance of the enduring principles of language and thought that followed Hamann's (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) insight, as indicated in Chapter

2, Section IV.iv. Thus, this thesis includes reviewing the traditions of science, art and philosophy in the light of the problem of leadership.

The works of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938) in this chapter are all considered to belong to the classical tradition of the art of leadership because they all exhibit so many similar characteristics. For example, along with Varro (1938) and Euclid (1956), although each has his own view on what constitutes the different parts of a particular form of language the similarities among Euclid's geometry from the quadrivium, and the rhetoric, dialectic and grammar of the trivium are remarkable.

Selecting these philosophers has not been systematic in some scientific sense but they are simply the best examples taken from ancient Rome, hinted at by Bacon (1973), which can represent the trivium of Capella's (1977) seven liberal arts. Their views have been simply explicated and reconstructed according to the timeless manner provided by global thinking supplemented if not complemented with context and argument relating to leadership. Chronological order is not important so they are organised according to Capella's order of treatment of the liberal arts and to their similarities and differences. Without the critical apparatus of global thinking the presentation of the different parts of the thesis, although a linear argument overall, may be deceptive to the reader as an historical treatment of leadership, to reiterate what the thesis has already articulated (Ch.1, II.i.ii-i.iv; and II.iii.ii).

That Capella's (1977) sources had different purposes is clear. These purposes shape the design of their works and it is this that may affect the reliability of the *Seven Liberal Arts*. Obviously the thesis is not about reconstructing a common source for these three but it is about laying together all four works for comparison and contrast, even if that exercise is only implicit for the reader. The form of each art has been retained by Capella but it is not always certain that his renditions reflect the views of the original texts. What is of importance are the variations in the works and not any connections between positions taken and notions had among individual philosophers. When using global thinking to reconstruct the *Seven Liberal Arts* the influence of the transmitted texts of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938) is unquestionably recognisable.

That texts in the science and art of leadership are discussed prior to any philosophy of leadership is assumed not only because they may represent *doxographies* on physics, metaphysics and ethics but also because although what is contained in the philosophy may not be derived from their consideration as steps in the overall argument is of paramount concern. That concern is that a fair impression of works in these faculties be given prior to presenting more pertinently the philosophical view of this thesis on leadership. In later chapters that consider the views of others, that a number of writers characterise one writer with the same view does not necessarily mean that that view accurately reflects the view of that writer. This form of ascription is simply a commonplace in the philosophical tradition.

Keeping in mind that:

It is perhaps not entirely clear whether the word “doxographus” was actually coined by Diels...[since he]... never devotes any attention to explaining, or stating explicitly, what he means by it,... the term is taken to be self-explanatory. Presumably the term *doxographus* is coined on the analogy with and in opposition to the word *biographus*, itself also a neologism but of longer standing. (Mansfeld & Runia, 1997, p101)

and that although this seems to be the case, the broadest sense of the term has nonetheless been taken to concern the development of unlike doctrines and the impressions that different philosophical schools of thought gain from their arguments for and against one another’s positions.

Where original works are lost or are no longer available a *doxographical* work, the representation of which this thesis in part strives to meet, may unexpectedly become important for an accurate evaluation of later interpretations of those original philosophical accounts. In the event of such works becoming unavailable in the future the value of a *doxography* is realised, even if that is simply a systematic account of the doctrines in a tradition or, as is partly the case in this thesis, the laying out of a manifold of themes or issues in different traditions. The next chapter is apprised of such a manifold for tracing through a variety of works.

*

Chapter 3

In defence of the art of leadership

Researching the post-medieval foundations of modern science leads to the literary tradition of the liberal arts, thereby largely eliminating further consideration of the idea of a science of leadership and offering alternative objective grounds in the art of leadership for a philosophy of leadership

Introduction

In defence of the art of leadership the distinction between global and linear thinking can be first clarified and secondly why this distinction is important to understanding leadership, that there be global thinking about it. These two points are mentioned in the first and third propositions below, in the outline of the transcendental position on the argument for the art of leadership being objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. This will complete the brief introduction to this chapter.

The irresolvable issues⁸⁹ extrapolated from the antinomies of leadership are perennially irresolvable if linear thinking is used to frame these issues as problems with solutions. They can similarly be framed in terms of theory and practice. Framing leadership in terms of a theory merely repeats the error of treating it as a scientific problem. Either way simply goes over the same ground as the other and advances the dialogue no further. Alternatively, global thinking takes into account multiple points of view and can take into account any number of approaches to these issues for discussion⁹⁰.

These issues in the art of leadership are approached as a vehicle in the drive of the thesis towards a philosophy of leadership. Rather than dogmatically limiting itself to the use of problem and theory the thesis observes the availability of a number of other means. To further knowledge of leadership analogy can be used, which calls Varro's (1938) grammar to mind, while linguistics invokes Augustine's (1975) dialectic, and argument Cicero's (1989b) rhetoric.

The concern of the transcendental intellect, global thinking, in its fullness and completion, and as demonstrated in the representative works of Cicero (1989b),

⁸⁹ See Chapter Two, section IV.iii, or ahead in this chapter, section III.iii.

⁹⁰ The intuitive and common sense views come immediately to mind.

Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938), can be depicted geometrically using *diagrammatica*, thus making for a fuller intellectual accounting of leadership possible. Global thinking provides the thesis with an in-depth comprehensive picture of leadership that includes its moral and ethical dimensions. This is something that general linear thinking cannot do because it is attentive to the external sensible world, its matters being of immediate concern to the general intellect in making intelligible that which is offered to reason by understanding from the senses.

Nevertheless, the transcendental position on the argument for the art of leadership can be outlined in the following propositions: (1) that Bacon (1973) is flawed in that it did not achieve in practice what Bacon set out to achieve: to form “a small globe of the intellect” (Bacon, 1973, p.221), that is, a complete rendition on what was preventing learning from progressing by using global thinking. (2) What prevented Bacon from completing his task is found in Hamann’s (1995c) insight into thought-language identity when reflecting on what Kant (1999) believed he was doing: laying down enduring laws of thought. (3) The key to global thinking is reviewing the masters of the rules of language in the Liberal Arts tradition: Cicero (1989b) on Rhetoric, Augustine (1975) on Logic/Dialectic, and Varro (1938) on Grammar/Critical Dialogue. (4) These three works, distinctive representations in support of Capella’s (1977) trivium, offer sound objective grounds for the art of leadership.

I

*Transition to the art of leadership: the refutation of Bacon’s **The Advancement of Learning** and the confirmation of Capella’s **Seven Liberal Arts** being the proof or demonstration of the reason, objective grounds, for a philosophy of leadership*

*I. i: Explication of and response to Bacon’s **The Advancement of Learning***

This section turns from the new way of thinking in Bacon (1952) back to the language of the traditional global way of thinking in Bacon (1973). A global interpretation of Bacon (1973) begins by observing that Bacon (1973) united history, poesy, and philosophy under the rubric of human learning (Bacon, 1973, p.69). History was natural, civil, ecclesiastical, or literary (Bacon, p.69); poesy was narrative, representative, or allusive (Bacon, p.83); and philosophy was of the divine, natural, or human kind (Bacon, pp.85, 88).

Human philosophy was either congregate or segregate (Bacon, 1973, p.105). If philosophy was congregate then it was either in conversation, in negotiation (with rules for self-advancement), or in government (with notes on Laws). If segregate, then human philosophy had to consider body and mind. But when philosophy was concerned with mind then what was to be considered was not only its nature, which was of substance, of divination and fascination (Bacon, p.117)⁹¹, but also its functions, which were of its faculties both moral and intellectual. If moral then of moral culture and of the nature of good, both man as a private individual and as a citizen or social being. The arts of the intellectual faculties were invention, judgement, the custody of knowledge (memory and writing), and tradition (delivery). From rhetoric, Bacon's proofs or demonstrations were immediate consent of the mind or sense, induction, syllogism, congruity, and an Aristotelian demonstration in orb or circle (Bacon, p.135).

The general model of learning (hearing) obtained from Bacon (1973) incorporated kinds of philosophy, faculties of the mind, methods of reporting the general state of learning, parts of the intellectual world, and parts of the moral function. The arrangement of the parts of the moral function and the parts of the intellectual world first laid down, in the method of reporting the general state of learning, Bacon enumerated and discussed diseases, errors, and defects, then, less urgently, omissions and deficiencies.

Bacon (1973) saw affectations, contentions, and appearances as kinds of *diseases* or vices of learning. Next, he saw that the main *errors* of learning were that mankind lived in the most recent of times and that observations were prematurely reduced to methods (Bacon, p.28). Other errors were that otherwise pure works adulterated by what a man admired most, merely shuffled and added nothing to what humanity already knew, and that the end of knowledge was placed in its professional use.

After that, the defects of learning were that the knowledge transmitted led to only partial understanding in minds not first informed by logic and rhetoric (Bacon, 1973, p.63). Further, that matters of morality for leaders in universities may have ranged from an over-emphasis on learning just-invented or extemporaneous speech, through the

⁹¹ Bacon was very sceptical about fascination and really saw fascination and divination in explanatory passages as contributing to the agenda of the *Advancement* in a kind of clarifying role.

possibility of a lack of communication, and to the need for enquiry into what was needed to be on-going. Observably, Bacon found many omissions and deficiencies but he did not maintain the pattern of his advance. These omissions and deficiencies were integrated (Bacon, pp.153) into the more dominant themes of the work so their accounting is more obscure. In the closing chapters of the *Advancement* the general reader is drawn away from form and into the obscurity of the content of the remainder of what Bacon (1973) was saying.

I.ii: Determination against the Renaissance work of Bacon in favour of the tradition of the classical Liberal Arts

Bacon (1973) criticised the state of learning at a time of growth during the Renaissance, little having been done, he maintained, about the apparent state of disarray of learning since the time in which Capella (1977) had seen fit to bring together the trivium and quadrivium in the marriage of learning and the intellectual pursuit of learning. Bacon divorced learning (philology) from the intellectual pursuit of learning (Mercury) on the grounds of the former's disease and vices, errors and defects, omissions and deficiencies and introduced learning to what is known today as empirical science.

Nevertheless, Bacon (1973) claimed to have formed a "small globe of the intellect" (Bacon, 1973, p221). He meant this small globe to represent a complete system of the understanding. Remarkably, he did not complete this clearly and distinctly but like Hamann (1995c) left a clue: "For in the time of the two first Caesars there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro; and the best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the memory of man are known" (Bacon, 1973, p.14).

The thesis discerns that this clue is connected to that of Hamann's (1995c) insofar as Hamann's (1995c) clue refers to the constitutive role of language in thought. Such a conception makes concern for rhetoric, grammar, and logic central to philosophy, ushering in a concern for the classical tradition in these areas. Bacon's (1973) clue pointed to the Liberal Arts quite generally as expressions of thought. From this clue and

what is known of the trivium neither the poetry of Virgil (1934-1935)⁹² nor the historiography of Livy⁹³ will be taken up but because they are exemplary of Capella's (1977) trivium, part of the traditional literature of the classical liberal arts, Cicero's (1989b) work on Rhetoric and Varro's (1938) work on Grammar become central to the thesis statement, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

Rhetoric and Grammar, along with Dialectic, have been taught to the leaders of not only the Roman Empire⁹⁴ but also the British Empire⁹⁵ as essential readings for individuals destined to rule: to persuade others of the rightness of one's views one needs to have a command of words, and to have such a command of language one needs to think clearly. For leaders, then, the art of *Rhetoric* is about persuading others that one's thoughts are sound. The art of *Grammar* is the art of accurately expressing one's thoughts in symbolic form, that is, in the words that make up a language. In addition, *Dialectic* is the art of how to think properly about reality.

Since Capella (1977) includes Dialectic in the trivium of his medieval classical work, *The Seven Liberal Arts*⁹⁶, the work of Augustine (1975) is also included as representative of the medieval classical liberal arts tradition. In the progression of dialectic, the post-medieval Enlightenment dialectic of Kant (1999) has already been discussed, as at least mention of the Hegelian (1971) dialectic may be made. However, before pursuing more on the dialectic a rounder explication and response to what is germane to this thesis in Capella needs to come first.

⁹² The fame of Virgilius Maro or Virgil (1934-1935) rests on his *Eclogues*, *Georgics* and *Aeneid*, the last of which is an epic poem on the founding of ancient Rome often compared with Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The founding of ancient Rome is not the immediate concern of this thesis.

⁹³ Livy's *Ab urbe condita* (*History of Rome*), as the title suggests, concerns the history and triumphs of Rome. Reference is made here to the 2002 Penguin Classics edition of the early history of Rome. *Ab urbe condita* is a renowned but fragmented work in the style of Cicero but is, once again, not of immediate concern.

⁹⁴ Which number among Varro's *Nine Disciplines*, the text of which is now lost bar a few fragments (See Appendix).

⁹⁵ Although a classical education was the domain of the English aristocracy the tone was lowered in the nineteenth century when the aristocracy were to be judged on what they could do rather than who they were, which was a criterion more suited to judging the English gentleman (Shrobsbree, 1988, pp.3-4; Balls, 1964, p.451). Shrobsbree (1988, p.28) notes perhaps ironically that Eton, which had the closest links with Court arguably had the worst record in classical scholarship in the eighteenth century and Shrewsbury, a public school on the borderline with grammar schools arguably had the best.

⁹⁶ Alternative titles of this work are *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury* or *Satyricon*.

*I.iii: Explication of and preliminary responses to Capella's **The Seven Liberal Arts***

In this section Capella (1977) is explicated and a response given by first taking up the clue left by Hamann (1995c). The clue is that when Kant (1999) talked about concepts and categories he wasn't laying down the fixed and eternal laws of thought but forms of language. These forms are held by the thesis to mean analysis⁹⁷ and rhetoric, dialectic and grammar of the classical tradition. These disciplines inform Hamann's (1999a, 1999b, 1999c) conception of the forms of language.

The purpose of *Grammar*, according to Capella (1977), is to ensure the correctness of reading and writing. Its latter purpose, a duty shared with philosophy and literary critics, is to understand and criticise knowledgably (Capella, p.67). Grammar teaches letters, literature is Grammar that teaches, the person taught by Grammar is the man of letters, and the person skilled by Grammar has literary style.

Capella (1977) says that speech is formed from nature and once added-to it is put into practice. It is taught from natural or artificial letters. Natural speech is used to address those who are present and artificial speech, writing, those who are absent. Speech is also taught from syllables, their connections, accentuation, and length (Capella, pp.68, 76-86) as well as from words, their analogies and anomalies, as treated by Varro (Capella, p.68). Schemata, figures, faults, embellishments, tropes and metaplasms, solecisms and barbarisms are elements of Grammar, among the fundamental parts of speech.

Another point made by Capella (1977) is that *Dialectic* is the only art that has the supreme right to speak and teach because without it nothing can follow from it or stand opposed to it. Since it provides the elements of speech a word remains ambiguous until it is combined with other words to possess a standard meaning (Capella, p.106) and since a logical argument is rigorous and complete, deduced step by step to a conclusion, all the arts use reason. So, concludes Capella, *dialectic* claims authority over them. All other disciplines (Arts) come under the power and authority of Dialectic and have come to rely on its canons of terms, complete utterances, propositions, syllogisms, criticisms (of poetry), and oratorical style.

⁹⁷ Here, analysis is put to one side because this is in reference to Geometry, represented in this thesis by Euclid (1956), which is of the quadrivium. Present concern is with the trivium of the Liberal Arts.

To continue this exposition of a global interpretation of Capella (1977) on Dialectic, under *terms* come *genus* and *species*; difference; accident; property; definition; whole and parts; difference between division and partition; the meaning of equivocal, univocal, and plurivocal. Also under terms comes words and their senses; substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, attitude, state, activity, passivity (Aristotle's, 1938, categories), opposition and its modes. Similarly, under complete utterance: noun, verb; subject and predicate; proposition, syllogism, all of which are treated at length by Capella (p.111).

A list of the ten categories understood to be in a subject can be extracted from Capella (1977) as follows: a quality, what something is like; a quantity, how much of a thing; a place, like a city, is the limit of the surface of a substance⁹⁸; interval, the movement of things by which time is measured; attitude, for instance is lying or is sitting; state, having-armour-on or having-shoes-on. Man is the substance, these referring to him: activity, for instance, cutting or burning; passivity, being cut or being burned. A primary substance can move from a location, is not predicated of a subject and can be separated from it; a secondary substance is predicated of a primary substance and is understood to be the *genus* of the primary substance (Capella, 1977, pp.120-121)⁹⁹. Capella (1977) follows this overriding enumeration with a lesser description of the properties of a substance, that is, of the four kinds of qualities and a brief discussion on different aspects of the individual categories in a subject (Capella, pp.121-130).

All human *utterances* come from these ten overriding categories (Capella, 1977), which have just been outlined and are understood to be in a subject. Capella (1977) excludes from this list words necessary for speech but without meaning by themselves. This leaves opposites. All contraries are opposites but not vice versa. The kinds of opposites are relative, contrary, intermittent, affirmative, or denied (Capella, p.130). Next, a proposition is a sentence subject to affirmation or denial. It is the union of the nominative noun with a finite form of the verb. "Cicero is discussing" is true, false, or doubtful. Propositions can be evaluated for such semantic value. Various cases can be

⁹⁸ Not substance itself (Aristotle, 1938, *The Categories*, p.17).

⁹⁹ This is mainly taken from Aristotle (1938, pp.17-23ff) but there are small differences of detail, for example, secondary substance in Aristotle (1938, p.23) is *species* (man, not the *genus*).

added to the predicate but we can only add what is in the nominative noun to remain within the subject (Capella, pp.135-136).

Capella (1977) then very clearly delineates Dialectic such that a sketch of this can be drawn by the reader. Dialectic asserts the supremacy of the universal and particular, being quantity, and the affirmative and negative, being quality, together being the universal affirmative and negative, the particular affirmative and negative.¹⁰⁰

Subsequently, in subordinating the science of logic to the practical art of debating and, despite an opponent, that premises and conclusion are rightly-connected is granted (Capella, pp.143-144). This moves the thesis to a consideration of Rhetoric as integral to the nature of thought in the forms with which language furnishes mankind.

Capella (1977, p.162) says that Cicero wrote in his *de Inventione* that the purpose of *Rhetoric* is to persuade. Purpose, according to Capella, is comprised of five matters. The first matter is that of invention. Invention is the search for issues and arguments to prove a case. The next matter is to put what is to be said about the case in order by arrangement. The matter after that is about diction: to use words in the case both properly and figuratively. Then, matter and diction are both to be guarded with memory. Finally, the whole speech is to be delivered with controlled voice, movement, and gesture. Invention is the most powerful of these¹⁰¹, uncovering issues and then arguments to prove a case (Capella, p.162).

Issues in a case, as claimed by Capella (1977), are found by assertion and rebuttal. The audience is implied and consists of a *judge*, who decides the matter according to equity; a *deliberator*, who doubts a course of action and seeks persuasion elsewhere, and an *assessor*, who freely judges the propriety of an action.¹⁰² These correspond to the judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative (epideictic) kinds of cases in an *hypothesis*, a *limited quaestio* arising from a particular section about a given individual, as opposed

¹⁰⁰ A clear and distinct *diagram* can be constructed from what has been written here and can be compared with Porphyry's second or third century construction. See Franklin, J. (1999). who seems to assume that science has hegemony over diagrammatic reasoning. However, this predates Plato by at least two thousand years (Lawlor, 2007).

¹⁰¹ More clearly, invention is more powerful than arrangement, diction, memory and delivery.

¹⁰² The matter refers to the act the defendant is accused of performing in the past that needs adjudication. The course of action refers to the speech the speaker is now delivering about it. And the propriety of the action refers to the result of the adjudication to be handed down in the (near) future.

to an unlimited *quaestio*, or aspect of it, called a thesis, which is the making of a universal affirmative and is engaged-in in the prospect of leisure and argument (Capella, pp.161-165).

During a consideration of issues, five kinds of legal judgement of a document as proof are mentioned by Capella (1977). These are ambiguity or *amphibolia*, in which the defendant relies upon the spirit of the law and the accuser on the letter of the law. This sets up a dialectic of proof, contradictory laws or laws in conflict with each other making it confusing as to which is to be obeyed. The *syllogism* that arises from written documents is extracted to be used in whatever way in an unwritten argument (Capella, pp.166-175).

The consistency or direction of a case is simple, subtle, or oblique (Capella, 1977). If subtle then one cannot speak of something directly but figuratively lest it give offence. If oblique because of fear one cannot speak freely. If one's freedom of speech is removed by shame or fear in the figurative or oblique case, respectively, then the direction of the case is mixed, being determined by the cause of the controversy. In arguments credence is formed by "winning goodwill, by instruction, and by emotional appeal" (Capella, 1977, p.177): ethically, demonstratively, and emotionally, respectively. Accusation and denial both need to be confirmed by proof to be found in the topics of the argument (Capella, pp.174-184).

The disposition of a speech, Capella (1977) maintains, is the order in which topics are presented to the audience. The natural order of a speech is: Introduction, narrative, outline of main points, thesis presentation, argument, conclusion and peroration. In an artificial order the structures or arrangements of the speech are not in a chronological order but are in an order that is of greatest advantage to the case. For instance one may rebut accusations as they arise then discuss past times or address matters of fact then the letter of the law (Capella, p.188).

The five parts of a speech are: introduction, narrative, statement of the case, proof and argument, and peroration (Capella, 1977). The *exordium* in the introduction makes the listener attentive, well-disposed, and receptive. The *exordium* is of either the fundamental or insinuatory kind. If it is of the insinuatory kind then the plaintiff's case

is not good. A case that is not good can be of the doubtful, important, or obscure sort. If the case is of the doubtful sort then the plaintiff speaks to dispose the listener well. If it is of the important sort then the plaintiff makes the audience attentive. If the case is of the obscure sort then make the audience receptive. If a case is good the subject is honourable so the *exordium* in the introduction is either of the fundamental kind or not necessary.

No need exists to substitute topic for person and vice versa as an explanation (Capella, p.207). Narrative can be historical, fabulous, fictional, legal, or commercial, and can be clear, credible, and brief. Clarity is about truth with no confusion in familiar language. When everything is laid out naturally and without affectation it is credible. Brevity in a speech is without more length than what is necessary.

The statement of the case is of the defendant, accuser, or both. The division briefly outlines “all the sections in the speech” (Capella, 1977, p.209). In *proof arguments*, the proof and refutation are expressed. An argument is artificial if it is before, in, around, or after the act and inartificial if it includes precedents, hearsay, torture, public records, oaths, and witnesses. Unlike these proofs of affirmation, in a refutation part of or the whole of the argument is rebutted when the opponent’s premises are shown to not imply the conclusion sought or if a matching argument is offered by the plaintiff without diagnosing the opponent’s fallacy. In the conclusion the case is recapitulated, indignation is excited, or pity aroused through commiseration and compassion.

In the *rhetoric of leadership* the subject is honourable so no such introduction is needed. The narrative is on its foundations historical. The arguments of the thesis are not artificial with sources being precedents, public records, and accounts by witnesses in affirmation of the case, drawing towards an inevitable conclusion in which only a recapitulation of what has been said is needed.

This global interpretation of Capella’s (1977) treatment of Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric covers the trivium. In the *quadrivium* Capella speaks at length on Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy and Harmony. In Arithmetic numbers are grasped by the intellect while in *Geometry* lines are apprehended by sight. The point or mark is the incorporeal beginning of Geometry; a line is produced between the Earth at the middle

of the universe and the earth at the bottom of the universe; a commonplace depiction in antiquity with which Euclid (1956) begins his *Phaenomena*; Geometry starts and ends with this (Capella, pp.219, 272).

Capella (1977) reminds his readers that the importance of Geometry ought not to be forgotten since, like logic, it is a way of thinking different from but supplementary to language. It is based on planes and solids, the two “primary categories of figures” (Capella, 1977, p.265). The plane begins with a line, the solid with a surface with plane figures being *demonstrated* using problems and theorems.¹⁰³ Solidity brings primary bodies, basic figures like pyramids and cubes, into being and the more noble figures from them, the octahedron, dodecahedron, and icosahedron¹⁰⁴, the regular solids discovered in the Academy by Theaetetus (Plato, 1977b, p.77).

I.iv: Deliberative response

In this section the clue used is that left by Hamann (1995c). Namely that thinking may not be governed by its own laws but by those of the forms of language. The position of the thesis on this is that both language and thought work together in the art of communication: the already rich tradition of reflection on the forms of thought-language in the classical tradition of Capella (1977) can be further enriched from contemporary developments in Logic and the descendant disciplines of the quadrivium. But this is the universe of the intellect defining the mature intellect. This is the point that leadership in higher education serves. The medieval liberal arts tradition exists to inform research on the art of leadership as well as on other matters. Without this kind of tradition only non-purposive experience, reason and judgement remain.

The forms of language used by leaders are handed down by the greatest authorities of Rome, through the medieval classical tradition best represented, in the view of this thesis, by Capella. These authorities are the firmest possible objective support obtainable for reliance upon the work of Capella, their being objective evidence for, and the proof of the reason that a philosophy of leadership is contingent upon, not the learning of the art of leadership, not the art of leading, but upon the experience of

¹⁰³ *Diagrammatica* (the thesis writer’s own term) are demonstrated using problems and theorems, that is, the diagrams are not stand alone: they are made sense of (demonstrated) in language by using the linguistic forms of problems and theorems.

¹⁰⁴ (Stahl in Capella, 1977, p.271).

performance in, a demonstration of, the art of leadership. Such experience is attested to in the enduring relevance of the tradition of the classical Liberal Arts.

The argument is that Capella's (1977) account of the Liberal Arts should be relied upon because he brings together clearly and in a unified fashion a tradition that was itself a great leaderly tradition, that is, the art of leadership of ancient Rome. So the reason for relying on Capella is that in his written work he lays in front of his readers the epitome of the art of leadership, the ancient Roman art of leadership, and that tradition of the art of leadership was a great one.

In other words, and more explicitly, then, Capella's (1977) doctrine is the culmination of the tradition of the education of the leaders of Rome and, as such, encapsulates the framework of the western art of leadership. This traditional framework has the greatness of the leadership of Rome to recommend it. So, Capella can be relied upon because his framework for the art of leadership is central to what made the leaders of Rome great leaders, or, more precisely, what made the ideals of leadership to which they were answerable, worthy and honourable ideals.

Further, these ideals and the framework have been tested in the experience of these leaders, confirming the common sense thought that leadership manifested in the concrete world of fact depends on experience, like that of the great leaders of Rome, not merely on detached learning as a schoolroom exercise. Thus, the tradition of the Liberal Arts as expressed by Capella (1977) provides a defensible and fruitful objective ground, as an art of leadership, for a philosophy of leadership.

I.v: Return to the main argument and linking statement to Part II

To recapitulate, the main thesis statement is that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The overall argument step by step advances that: (1) the mature human intellect is a secure subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership because it can recognise that the duality of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect is thoroughly human; (2) in a search for objective grounds for such a philosophy exploration of the tradition of science reveals that this does not comprise a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education because it fails

to consider values and ends; (3) exploration of the liberal arts tradition exposes a lodestone of classical literature that forms a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude any consideration of morality and ethics but engages with determination, matters of fact, and matters of value; (4) this vein of work can be directly traced to the classical literary tradition of philosophy and that the tradition of philosophy supplies a mother-lode of literature which is an enduring objective ground for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

This is the main line of argument to which the thesis now returns by short appraisal of progress thus far. The failure of science to close with values and ends indicates its lack of ability to consider leadership. On this basis alone none of the three canonical works in the tradition of science, that of Locke (1924), Kant (1999), or Bacon (1952), can be used as an objective ground for a philosophy of leadership. On the other hand, Capella (1977) is fundamental to the medieval classical tradition of the liberal arts and it is this work that can be and is supportive of an art of leadership. Clearly, where Capella speaks of rhetoric, dialectic and grammar the art of leadership can talk of the rhetoric of leadership, the dialectic of leadership, and the principles or rules in a systematic treatment of leadership.

However, the immediate use of the trivium like this, *for* or *in* a philosophy of leadership, is premature. At this stage of the overall argument, step (3), this Capellan demonstration of the liberal arts tradition needs to be recultivated before discerning the profile of a good reclamation of the abstract idea of the morality of leadership in step (4) of the main argument. Such reclamation naturally includes the theme of tradition. An entirely compatible alternative to the definition of tradition already given in this thesis is that of MacIntyre (1985), who states that: “A living tradition...is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (MacIntyre, p.222).

Further, to paraphrase what follows in MacIntyre, when virtues, which are the goods central to a tradition, are not exercised a tradition weakens and disappears. Corrupted virtues, like a deficiency of justice, truth, courage or intellectual virtues, destroy tradition and one’s sense of tradition (MacIntyre, pp.222-223). The thesis proceeds partly in this MacIntyrean vein. Virtues, like values and ends, morality and ethics, the

right and the good, are thus one of a number of interwoven themes that run through tradition as well as this thesis.

The morality of leadership is undergirded by a tradition of identifiable figures since morality cannot be talked about merely in the shadow of the collapsed trajectories of science. With an eye to understanding the nature of leadership the intellectual works of three figures that support the demonstrations of Capella (1977) in the classical tradition of the liberal arts, as already mentioned, that of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975), and Varro (1938), are considered in the parts that follow in this chapter.

Returning thus to the main argument is due to the subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership relying upon objective grounds, that is, the verbal expressions of past leaders are the objective foundations for the impressions of leadership received by the listener-reader through the faculties of the maturing intellect, through the universe of the intellect, and in the mature transcendental intellect.

Acknowledgement of the limitations of Bacon's (1973) diagnosis of learning and the affirmative impression of Capella (1977) is solid objective grounds for a notion of the art of leadership. It is the first step in defence of a measure of the position taken in this chapter, that the traditional language of the classical liberal arts is the language of the art of leadership: the literature of the art of leadership provides firm objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. The next part of this chapter will lay out the second step in defence of this position.

II

*Cicero's **Rhetorica ad Herennium** and the art of leadership: objective grounds for the notion of rhetoric for the idea of the art of leadership and support for Capella's demonstration of the liberal arts.*

*II.i: Explication of **Rhetorica ad Herennium***

This step, as with the first, is a global interpretation of the text ascribed to Cicero (1989b). Such an interpretation uses the schemata of diagrammatic reasoning in the tradition of Plato (1977b) and not of Porphyry (Porphyry cited in Franklin, 1999). The difference between the two is that the former can be translated into three dimensions whereas the two dimensional proto-scientific and scientific models of diagrammatic

reasoning in the tradition of Porphyry cannot. Individual analysts need to be identified to reconstruct the philosophical schemata used by Cicero to delineate his three-dimensional formations of rhetoric. These can be used with reasonable success in the construction of a rhetoric of leadership.

Cicero (1989b) begins his first book by introducing oratory to the reader. He starts by divining that a piece of oratory has a cause which is either of the epideictic, the deliberative or the judicial kind. The speaker's faculties are invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery (Cicero, p.7). These faculties are acquired through theory, imitation, and practice in order to become a skilful orator. The parts of an oration are the introduction, statement of facts, division, proof, refutation, and conclusion (Cicero, pp.9, 11).

Book I is taken up with the most difficult to secure of the three kinds of cause, judicial oratory, in which a judicial cause is of the honourable, discreditable, doubtful, or petty kind. The introduction to a judicial oration is contingent upon the kind of cause it has. A petty cause is not pursued but in a doubtful cause a direct opening built on goodwill is used to buttress the discreditable part. In a discreditable cause the subtle approach is to be used to arrive at the same vantage point as that of the direct opening of the honourable cause.

In the direct opening an audience can be made receptive by briefly summarising the cause. They can then be made attentive by promising to discuss important news and unusual matters affecting the commonwealth as well as the hearers, by bidding them to listen attentively, and by enumerating the points that are going to be discussed. To make an audience well-disposed speakers discuss the facts about their own work, the work of their adversaries, the work of their hearers, and the facts themselves. These are the methods for making an audience receptive, attentive, and well-disposed but what is important is that the composition must appear to have grown out of the cause itself in such a way as to have an intimate connection with each speaker's statement of facts (Cicero, 1989b, pp.11-21).

In judicial oratory the statement of facts or narration sets forth the facts such that every detail is turned to advantage to win the argument, the facts which *pertain* to the causes

on which a decision is rendered. Another kind of narration enters a speech as a means of winning belief, incriminating the adversary, effecting a transition, or setting the stage for what is about to be spoken of. Those statements of fact which are not used in a cause in court but afford convenient practice for handling the first two kinds more advantageously in actual causes are a kind of narrative based on exposition of the facts in legendary, historical, or realistic form or a kind of narrative based solely on the persons. The type of statement of facts which belong in *actual* causes, judicial, deliberative, or epideictic, considers the narrative's qualities of brevity, clarity, and plausibility, its plausibility containing what is usual, expected, and natural (Cicero, 1989b, pp.23-29).

In the division of the cause, first clear statements are made on what the accuser (plaintiff) and the defendant agree and what remains contested (Cicero, 1989b, p.29). In the second part of the division, called the distribution, by means of a simple statement how many points are going to be discussed is enumerated, and in the exposition this is followed with a setting forth of a brief and complete account of the points intended to be discussed (Cicero, p.31).

In the proof of a judicial oration arguments in support of the cause are submitted and in the refutation the aim is to destroy the arguments submitted by the opposition. However, to do this the participants all need to know the type of issue or *stasis* of the cause. The *types of issue* are conjectural, which is a question of fact where the truth is sought by conjecture; legal, which is a question of the letter of a legal text or an implication arising therein; or juridical, in which agreement has been reached on the act but the right or wrong of the act is in question (Cicero, 1989, pp.33-43). The cause rests on any one or more of the following subdivisions of the divisions of the types of issue, and several points to adjudicate may also require attention (Cicero, p.31).

In a conjectural issue an accusation and denial are made and the question for decision is the point to adjudicate. In a legal issue the subdivisions are letter and spirit, conflicting laws, ambiguity, definition, transference, and reasoning from analogy (Cicero, 1989b, p.47). In a juridical issue the subdivisions are by absolute issue, in which the contention is whether the act was in and of itself right, without extraneous considerations being taken into account (Cicero, p.49), or by assumptive issue, which is when, the defence,

in itself being insufficient, “is established by drawing on extraneous matter” (Cicero, 1989b, p.45).

These extraneous matters may include an acknowledgement of the charge, rejection of responsibility, shifting of the question of guilt, and a comparison with the alternative course. Unlike the conjectural issue, in which the point to adjudicate is based on accusation and denial (Cicero, 1989b, p.53), in legal and juridical issues the point to adjudicate arises from the justifying motive of the defence and the central point of the accusation (Cicero, pp.49-53). On finding the point to adjudicate all else in the speech is directed to it (Cicero, pp.59-61).

Cicero’s (1989b) second book takes up under the rubric of types of issue, or topics of invention, where the first book left off. The three schemata are those of the conjectural, legal, and juridical issues. The schema of the conjectural issue consists of the probability of the deed having been done, in relation to which motive and manner of life are considered. This is followed by a comparison of who benefited from the deed, the signs of this, which is made up of a consideration of place, the point of time at which the deed was done, the duration of time taken, the occasion, the hope of success, and the hope of escaping detection (Cicero, p.71).

Sign is followed by presumptive proof of the benefit, that is, what preceded, was contemporaneous with, and followed the deed or event.¹⁰⁵ After laying out any

¹⁰⁵ In Bacon’s (1973) terms “relatives, parallels, [Kant’s (1999) paralogisms] and conjugates” (Bacon, p.133). A doxographical approach notwithstanding, Bacon’s parallels bear comparison with Kant’s paralogisms. *Prima facie*, the general reader may find it puzzling why these connections are made across such a long period of time so easily. Also *prima facie*, Cicero (1989b), Bacon, and Kant have very little to do with one another, as they are so widely separated in time and overall doctrine. But comments such as these, that imply or allude to similarities, have more substance than is at first apparent. Why? Primarily because of the legal influence and interests relevant to understanding all three: Cicero was, in effect, a lawyer, Bacon was a Queen’s counsel -a senior lawyer- and Kant, while not a lawyer, knew and was impressed by the law. Indeed, Kant’s *Deduction of the Categories* borrows from the law in that the concept of deduction in his usage of it is a legal concept, meaning justification or vindication and was a way an advocate could defend a client’s action or cause by deducing it, that is, by justifying it with argument. The influence of law is also clear and apparent in his moral thought. Hence, it is reasonable to see the law as a thread binding Cicero, Bacon, and Kant. More particularly, outside Philosophy and Logic, no other field pays as much attention to the rules of good reasoning as the law (similarly regarding speechmaking, law and Rhetoric – though Homiletics cared about speechmaking too). So, legal ideas about good and bad reasoning could be expected to influence each of them. Finding points of comparison among Cicero, Bacon and Kant on such matters must be worth exploring. Considerations like these arise from a number of comments that are placed in footnotes. The point is that these comments may appear to

presumptive proof the subsequent behaviour of the person responsible for the deed is considered. Finally, any confirmatory proof is measured out and covers the *special topics of the prosecution*, which are drawn from the oratorical faculty of invention, the *special topics of the defence*, and the *topics in common* called *commonplaces*. These last are for or against witnesses, testimony, presumptive proof, and rumour (Cicero, 1989b, p.61).

The scheme of the legal issue considers the letter and spirit of the law, conflicting laws, ambiguity, definition, transference, and reasoning from analogy. Juridical issues are either absolute or assumptive. The absolute is divided into laws of nature, statute laws, legal customs, previous judgements, laws resting on equity, and law founded on agreement (Cicero, 1989, p.81).¹⁰⁶

The constituent departments thus involve a comparison with the alternative course, shifting the question of guilt, acknowledging the charge, and rejecting responsibility (Cicero, 1989b, p.97). “These, then, are the divisions of law, by means of which one should demonstrate the injustice or establish the *justice*¹⁰⁷ of an act – which we see to be the end sought in an Absolute Juridical Cause” (Cicero, 1989b, p.97). The second book finishes with a consideration of the conclusion, the last part of a judicial oration, which in classical Greek three-part form is comprised of the summing up, amplification, and appeal to pity (Cicero, p.157).

Having provided for judicial oratory, the most difficult of the three kinds of oratorical cause, Cicero (1989b) makes available the six parts of a deliberative oration. The introduction is either a direct opening, the subtle approach, or as in a judicial cause, the narration or statement of facts as in a judicial oration and only if needed, and in the division. The aim in a deliberative cause is advantage, which is a consideration of

be superficial or casual but in the light of the doxographical approach and with due consideration and concern for tradition they impart a greater substance.

¹⁰⁶ That the subdivision of the absolute juridical issue into its constituent departments can be considered as a pretext for Cicero (1989b) to give a name to the divisions of the assumptive issue constructed in the first book, the constituent departments of an assumptive juridical issue. While doing this he reverses the order of the divisions as they were originally presented in the first book thus bringing to mind Kant’s (1999) transposition, a sophisticated reversal, of his logical principles of form, his transcendental laws, into an order in accordance with experiential use (Kant, pp.597-601). Kant did not reference Cicero here or anywhere in the *Critique* but by the same token the use of reversing the order of divisions or principles by both authorities is found noteworthy.

¹⁰⁷ My italics.

either security or honour¹⁰⁸. If of security then it is of might¹⁰⁹ or of strategy¹¹⁰ or if of honour then it is either right or praiseworthy, and the right is done in accord with virtue and duty (Cicero, p.169).¹¹¹

Following division, proof and refutation are used when the topics of division are established in favour of the plaintiff and contrary topics are refuted. The conclusion to a deliberative oration is made up of a summary, the commonplaces in discourse, and the amplifications in commonplaces. In the conclusion Cicero advises the use of as many examples from the past as is possible (Cicero, 1989b, pp.169, 173). Book III, which is not of immediate interest to this thesis, is about the parts of an epideictic oration, in which a person is praised or censured. An epideictic considers the external circumstances surrounding the person being talked about, the person's physical attributes as well as his qualities of character (Cicero, pp.173-185).¹¹²

II.ii: Response to Cicero

According to Cicero (1989b), oratory can be generally arranged to include the kinds of oratorical causes, oratorical faculties, the means of acquisition, parts of an oration, and the parts of an argument. When this arrangement is applied to the works of Kant (1999, 2002) what is found is that the proof in the model of the parts of an oration, which unlike the refutation that attacks what is wrong, defends what is right and is made up of a logic of relationality. Relations figure large in Kant (1999), dividing what is and what is not manifest, probable, possible, logical, fitting, or profitable. In contrast, the proof in the model of the parts of an argument is comprised of a mature logic of modality. Modality also figures large in Kant (2002). The proof of the argument divides what is from what is not in accord with legality, justice, expediency, practicability, decency, and consequences.

¹⁰⁸ Cicero (p.169) claims that security concerns either might or strategy. He also points out that security is synonymous with use, and honour is synonymous with significance, importance.

¹⁰⁹ Might in everyday speech implies strength and structure but for a structure to endure might needs to be strength over time, that is, power. In a Kantian sense this is a faculty and in a Platonic sense a receptacle. Form and space are of course common to both Kant and Plato. Hence, might implies strength, power, structure, faculty, form, receptacle, space.

¹¹⁰ Strategy implies craft, understanding; more than that, flexibility and opportunism.

¹¹¹ Most of this work is matter of fact but here, in its culmination matters of value, security and honour come to the fore. The thesis notes that security is about the Roman public virtues of courage and discipline while honour concerns temperance and wisdom.

¹¹² Leaders need to be able to praise and censure their followers and having the skills necessary for epideictic speechmaking could be valuable for this.

Although Hamann (1999a) was correct in saying that Kant was talking about the forms and rules of language and not some set of immutable laws of thought, in reality both language and thought are involved in their reflecting each other. Nevertheless, in both works Kant (1999, 2002) did not cover all the principles of oratory, focussing instead mainly on the modalities of possibility and necessity in the one and legality and practicability in the other. Besides that, *the ultimate interest of this thesis is not in being judicial or juridical as in a court of law but deliberative and conjectural as befits a philosophical exploration* in a critical dialogue.

This thesis has not been written using judicial oratory to gain a conviction against Kant (1999) but it is merely pointing out at this stage that if such an avenue were to be pursued then a case against him in support of Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) would be successful. In the meantime it is sufficient that, in its deliberative cause, the thesis has succeeded in its aim to secure this strategic advantage over Kant with the assistance of Hamann, keeping the insights of both Kant and Hamann intact.

Consequently, in the introduction to an oration Cicero (1989b) said one's own authority is established by using ethical appeals (*ethos*) but in the statement of facts, division, proof, and refutation one uses mainly logical arguments (*logos*). An oration typically ends by using appeals to the emotions (*pathos*) in a conclusion. If different views of leadership were being debated using oratory then matters concerning what is manifest, probable, possible, logical, fitting, or profitable about leadership would be considered.

By common agreement among organisers and participants, or from legislation, precedent or custom the debate would be based on rules¹¹³ of rhetoric, persuasion, and dialectic and not be eristic and merely disputatious. This would mean that arguments for and against the legality, justice, expediency, practicability, decency, and consequences of what is proposed about leadership would need to be covered. That was for the ancient Romans to do. This thesis is not saying that it is going to adhere slavishly to doing all that here but this gives an indication of where it is heading, what the best of Rome would have done in any credible debate on leadership.

¹¹³ The critical reader may reflect on whether these would be Cicero's (1989b) rules, something like them, or a more general set of rules developed by updating those of Cicero's.

The current poor or non-existent use of Cicero's (1989b) forms of oratory and argumentation may be of considerable moral concern to some. An argument they might put for the wholesale return to the practice of these forms may be based on certain assumptions. These may run something like what is suggested in the following propositions. The first proposition is that the better use of the forms of oratory and argumentation ascribed to Cicero will always result in a better performance by the speaker.

But this can be disproved by saying that if the forms of oratory and argumentation were always put to their best use then people would not need to speak except to present truths; there would be no debate so there would be no public speaking resulting in silence and thus no oratory. That is worse than the currently poor use of the forms of oratory and argumentation, therefore the proposition is false. Enquiry and debate have to be conducted because truth is not possessed by mankind in a self-authenticated way.

A second proposition can also be disproved by similar *reductio ad absurdum*: that if nobody used these forms then there would be no public speaking. If these were the only forms of oratory in debate, this may be true. No use of oratory and argumentation is worse than even minimal or poor use of forms of oratory and argumentation, thus the proposition is false. Debate, while its contributors may approximate Ciceronian forms more or less well and fully, takes many forms.

II.iii: Return to the main argument and linking statement to Part III

Because the consequences of these propositions are absurd there is no real problem here and although it may be of moral concern to some, these concerns are less important than the proposal that while Cicero (1989b) has provided an exemplary form of oratory and argumentation, Varro (1938) provides a demonstration of the form, in other words, offers an excellent example to emulate.¹¹⁴ It is enough that Cicero (1989b) has been located in support of Capella and that reflection has begun on this work being firm objective grounds for the notion of a rhetoric for the idea of the art of leadership.

¹¹⁴ Since Cicero provides only the form or rules of oratory and argument but no example, Varro's work has been chosen as an example of this. He argues both for and against the existence of Analogy; arguing both sides is a skill many people do not naturally possess but to see from the other side of an argument is of great importance for a leader.

Cicero (1989b) is firm objective grounds for the notion of a rhetoric for the idea of the art of leadership is the second step in the defence of the position in this chapter of the thesis, that the traditional language of the classical liberal arts is the language of the art of leadership, in that the literature of the art of leadership provides firm objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. The next part of the chapter will lay out the third step, that is Augustine (1975) being the second authority in support of the work of Capella (1977), in defence of the position in this chapter of the thesis, apropos and subservient to step (3) in the overall argument of the thesis that the exploration of the liberal arts tradition exposes a lodestone of classical literature that forms a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude any consideration of morality and ethics but engages with determination matters of fact and matters of value.

III

*Augustine's **de Dialectica** and the art of leadership: further support for the work of Capella and objective grounds for the notion of a dual cognitive-linguistic dialectic between the art of leadership and a philosophy for leadership*

*III.i: Explication of **de Dialectica***

As with its treatment of Cicero (1989b) the thesis uses global interpretation and the schemata of diagrammatic reasoning to explicate Augustine (1975). Each chapter in the text runs noticeably to a few pages only. Chapter One opens with: "Dialectic is the science of disputing well" (Augustine, 1975, p.82). Augustine (1975) first decides that words used are either simple, which signify a thing, or combined. A combined word also signifies the person who speaks. The truth of a word can be confirmed; the speaker causes himself to be understood; only a third person verb is simple, first and second person verbs are combined. In Chapter Two Augustine says some *combined words* make a statement; others need something further to make a statement. Of the first these are either subject to being true, or they cannot be subject to confirmation, for example, a wish, order, or praise and cannot be disputed (Augustine, pp.82, 85).

In Chapter Three Augustine (1975) distinguishes between *simple* and *combined* statements of dispute. Simple statements of dispute are unconnected with other statements. Combined statements are connected and require judgement to reach a

conclusion. Cicero is arguing. (simple, true). If Cicero is arguing, he is talking. (combined, true). Whoever is arguing is talking. Therefore, Cicero is talking. (By connection of the statements, the conclusion must follow and be agreed to or given assent (Augustine, p.85).

Dialectic is divided into two parts in Chapter Four: about simple words and about combined words. The first is on naming and the second is divided into three: on expressing, on asserting and on concluding from assertions. Respectively, these are about unquestionable complete statements, complete statements needing the judgement of simple statements and about making a judgement on the connection of statements to come to a conclusion (Augustine, 1975, p.87).

Under *Signification*, in Chapter Five, “A word is a sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and can be *understood* by a hearer” (Augustine, 1975, p.87). A thing is sensed, *understood*, or hidden. A sign points to something beyond itself. Words are sounds and when written they are the signs of things. What is written down is the sign of the word and not the word. Dialecticians are not concerned with sounds, Grammarians are, but any dispute over sounds becomes the concern of Dialectic. Words are things that can only be spoken about with words. Things are signified by words that the mind recognises. *Verbum* signifies the word itself. *Dicibile* signifies “what is *understood* in the word and what is contained in the mind” (Augustine, 1975, p.91). *Dictio* signifies the word itself and what that word produces in the mind. *Res* signifies what remains.

Augustine (1975) sets out in Chapter Six by saying that of any word, not its sound, can be asked its *origin*, force, declension and arrangement. On the origin of a word, Augustine says this is a useless task as long as the hearer “*understands* what it signifies” (Augustine, 1975, p.93). Words used to interpret the word whose origin is sought would need to have their origins sought (Augustine, p.95). The impressions the sounds of words leave on the mind is “the cradle of words” (Augustine, 1975, p.95).

The *similarity* the word has to the sound of the thing is the point to stop searching. From similarity to the *transferred use* of words whereby the name of a thing comes not from the thing itself but a nearby thing, for example, in Latin *piscina* for baths from

pisces, fish (Augustine, 1975, pp.95, 97). *Proximity*, not similarity, is the origin of the word; contrariety, for example, *bellum*, war, because it is not *bella*, pretty. A broad notion, proximity, is divided into influence; effects; container and contained; transference; the whole from a part and the part from the whole. Hence, the origin of a word is found in similarity of things, proximity, or contrariety (Augustine, p.97).

In Chapter Seven: “[t]he *force* of a word is that whereby the extent of its efficacy is *learned*. It has efficacy to the extent to which it is able to affect a hearer.” (Augustine, 1975, p.101). To paraphrase what Augustine discriminates, on its own account it affects the hearer’s senses, which is affected by nature or custom, by art, which leads to the hearer investigating further the verbal disciplines, or by both, when reason notes what is said and a name for it is given. On what it signifies: when the word is received the mind considers it to be nothing other than what it signifies. The force of a word is most efficacious when both the sound of the word and what it signifies affect the hearer. The dialectician contests the force of words through presenting the truth; the orator by “observing propriety” (Augustine, 1975, p.103). In other words, in a dispute the hidden power of dialectic convinces the hearer whereas the overt colour of rhetoric persuades the hearer (Augustine, p.103).

Augustine (1975) asserts in Chapter Eight that the discernment of the truth, the business of dialectic, may be hindered by *ambiguity*. To distinctly emphasise what Augustine points out, ambiguity is where more than one thing is given and the receiver does not know which is to be *understood* and *obscurity* is where what is intended to be seen is invisible. *Obscurity* is of three kinds: clear to the senses but closed to the mind, which is seeing something and not knowing what it is; clear to the mind but closed to the senses, which is knowing what something is but not seeing it in the dark; closed to the senses and the mind, which is neither seeing nor knowing what something is (Augustine, pp.105, 107).

Augustine (1975), in the next chapter, Chapter Nine, asserts that dialecticians say that all words are *ambiguous*. He says this is true of words in isolation with what may be ambiguous being “explained through non-ambiguous discussion” (Augustine, 1975, p.109). Ambiguity is of the spoken or the written kind. About ambiguity in what is spoken, first, a single name with a single definition is not ambiguous but, second, a

name that can be *understood* in more than one way with a variety of definitions is ambiguous. The first, a single name with a single definition, is *univocal* and can be exemplified thus: man is common to boy, youth, slave, freeman, by definition all being a rational, mortal animal; and unlike the first the second is *equivocal* (Augustine, pp.111, 113).

Chapter Ten concerns equivocation. *Equivocation* is full of ambiguities. Ambiguity based on equivocation is of three main kinds: from art, from use, and from both of these together. A single name can have many definitions and this circumstance arises from art. From the very thing that is signified, not from the study of the word but the art, ambiguity may arise. From art and use together, for example: A citizen lived in a city, for example, Paris. The reader does not know if Paris refers to a citizen, which is a product of art, or to the city, which stems from use. From art, words can be divided into those that are examples of and those that are not examples of themselves. Name is a noun and is an example of itself but adverb is a noun and is not a word that is an example of itself since it signifies something other than what it is, a noun or naming word.

From use by the speaker, Augustine (1975) continues in his tenth chapter, equivocals are from the same source or different sources, if from the same source then by *transference* or by *declension*. If it is equivocal by *transference* then by similarity, from the part to the whole, the species from the genus, the effect from the cause, the contained from the container, or all of these vice versa (Augustine, p.117). If by *declension*, by utterance, which is voice, or by signification; the defeat of this kind of ambiguity is an endless task.

If a word, Augustine (1975) finishes, is equivocal from different sources, then ambiguity arises from either the diversity of languages or from a single language, and if from the latter then either under the same part of speech or from a different part of speech (Augustine, p.121). In the combination of art and use, the third kind of equivocal, ambiguity exists to the same extent with written ambiguities being of three species: length of syllable, accent, or both (Augustine, p.121).

Before responding to Augustine (1975), a summary arrangement of his dialectic, still using global interpretation, that is the schemata of diagrammatic reasoning, would include the theory of signification, what may be asked of a word, hindrances to the discernment of the truth (dialectic), the second part of dialectic, and the first part of the dialectic. The signification of a word is *verbum*, *dicibile*, *diction*, and *res*. What may be asked of a word is its origin, force, declension, and arrangement. The hindrances to the discernment of the truth (dialectic) are obscurity, ambiguity, and equivocation. The second part of the dialectic is comprised of naming, expressing, asserting, and concluding from assertions. The first part is made up of simple words, combined words, and simple and combined statements.

III.ii: Response to Augustine: argument against an Augustinian dialectic of leadership: reasons for rejecting and accepting this proposition¹¹⁵

In relation to the interest of the thesis in leadership in higher education, the argument for rejecting Augustine (1975) is namely that what he says upholds the general scientific view of leadership and leads, in the transcendental philosophical view, to the error of confusing leadership with management in the industrial age. However, the argument for retaining Augustine is a stronger one and that is precisely that it is a prime demonstration of what this thesis calls a linguistic dialectic. This is counter to the example of what it calls a cognitive dialectic, the Kantian (1999) antinomy or conflict in ideas. Jackson (1969) claimed that Augustine is logically incomplete. That is disproved in original material produced for this thesis¹¹⁶. When constructing the four ways to apprehend a word and its significance Augustine drew heavily on Varro (1938) but to exactly what extent is not clear. The thesis will return to Varro in Part IV. Meanwhile, suffice it to say that this issue of completeness is not the central issue pertaining to its relevance to leadership.

What is of relevance is the problem with a linguistic treatment of leadership. With such a treatment the common meaning in everyday life of leadership is not the same as its intellectual meanings because people tend to treat the word primarily as a functional

¹¹⁵ On rereading this section it may occur to the critical reader how natural it is to talk about the linguistic subject matter of the intellect and the intellectual subject matter of language especially in the light of the Hamannian revision of what Kant said. This is raised now so as to first clear the way to developing the thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic of leadership.

¹¹⁶ In an unpublished manuscript *diagrammatica* are used to demonstrate that *de Dialectica* is in fact complete as to its global form.

sign and not as an ontological sign, an ontological sign signifying the metaphysical nature of leadership. Before what Rost (1991) said about what was accepted to be leadership can be considered, as if it were a functional sign and his equating this with management in the industrial age, a few points concerning signs need to be first noted.

Although Augustine (1975) draws largely on terms found in the Stoic philosophy of language¹¹⁷ Augustine modifies the sense of these terms especially with regard to his doctrine of sign (Augustine, pp.87-90). Augustine favours sign as a reifying concept, which is in line with the Latin tradition in rhetoric through Cicero (1989b). According to Augustine a sign shows itself to the senses and to the mind something other than itself (Augustine, p.86). That a sign is a sign of something to some mind makes up the concept of sign, which is the foundation for Augustine's theory of language. To give a sign in an articulate voice is to speak (Augustine, p.86).

A word is the sign of something that can be understood by the hearer when the speaker pronounces it (Augustine, 1975, p.86). When Augustine (1975) later says that signifying conveys what is in the mind of the sign-giver to the mind of another, what he is doing is defining sign functionally rather than ontologically. To leave behind the ontological definition of sign and to define it functionally is to lay the basis for a sceptical position, later assumed by Augustine (1958).

If leadership, which is abstract, is reified then it is being treated as if it existed as a real and tangible object, which, as this thesis argues throughout, it clearly is not. In responding to Rost (1991) the thesis is also indirectly responding to what Augustine (1975) said about signs because the concern of both is the concern of semiotics, the study of different kinds of signs and symbols and how they relate to the things or ideas to which they refer. Semiotics is also the study of the way in which signs and symbols are used by people to communicate. With respect to both of these definitions signs and symbols relate to not just things and ideas, as with the general meaning of leader and leading as things and the transcendental meaning of the idea of leadership, but also to people communicating, as with the common everyday meaning of leadership.

¹¹⁷ See Pinborg (1962) and Jackson (1969) for the role of Stoic semantics and semiotics in Augustine's works.

To enquire if Rost's (1991) work is somehow dependent on Augustine (1975) is to ask not quite the right question since only the statement that Rost's work belongs to the tradition in *semiotics*, which passes through the works of Augustine, especially Augustine (1975), is being made. The thesis briefly explicates and responds to this with regard to leadership in these two sections. Nevertheless, to proceed with the task in hand, Rost gave a rather complete etymology of the word. Leadership was first defined as "the state or condition of a leader" (Rost, 1991, p.39), from which he claimed that what a leader did was the *notion* of leadership (Rost, p.40). An example of a dictionary definition of leadership was "the office or position of a leader; the quality of a leader, capacity to lead; the act or an instance of leading; a group of persons who lead" (Rost, p.41).

Rost (1991) concluded that leadership was *a word* not in popular usage before the twentieth century and that many writers erroneously assumed that the concept of leadership was in use since antiquity. Rost then speculated that the increased popularity of the word was due to the democratisation of the west. However, in immediate response to this conclusion, the thesis cannot condone democratisation as a plausible reason. More likely, simplistic dictionary definitions that treat the word as a concrete concept and popular acceptance of this view of leadership compounds the error. Dictionary definitions are of little use in understanding the idea of leadership. Even if they lack the word, of more use is what the ancients grasp in the idea of it.

According to Rost (1991) dictionaries have inflamed "the view that leadership and management are synonymous terms" (Rost, 1991, p.43). From this point of view leadership is simply a matter of occupying a position in management. The thesis responds to this by arguing that although people at large can understand management this does not imply that they understand leadership. To use the faculty of understanding is a commonplace error. In contrast, the idea of leadership demands that it be apprehended at least in the static faculty of comprehension in conjunction with the reciprocating idea of followership (to form a notion) in a maturing intellect, without which it cannot be comprehended. Collecting empirical data or theorising (social-) scientifically does not suffice. Concern for leadership requires concern for its moral dimensions, which demands the exercise of a (Kant-like) transcendental intellect.

Rost (1991) then said that leadership resided in the relationship between leader and follower, which sounds right, better than “leaders and followers do leadership” (Rost, 1991, pp.97-128), which does not sound right. However, this is not the whole story; that “leadership is *good*¹¹⁸ management” (Rost, 1991, p.94): not only was leadership *good* management in the industrial age but to understand “leadership as *good* management is the industrial paradigm of leadership” (Rost, 1991, p.94). To which the thesis replies: to say leadership is *good* management is a *philosophical explanation* unwittingly used by Rost, though not argued on philosophical ground.

The essential elements of leadership were then talked about by Rost (1991). This is to contradict what he wrote earlier in an empirical vein, about leadership being in the relationship of leader and follower. The thesis argues that the elements of the abstract idea of leadership are to be found in the abstract relationship of the two abstract terms leadership and followership that represent the notion of leadership and followership and not in any purported concrete concept of leadership.

Conclusively, Rost’s (1991) treatment of leadership was a modern-day linguistic successor to Augustine (1975), that is, it was grounded in language and not in thought. For that reason, although a Kantian (1999) view of leadership is argued against in this thesis, to make the point that leadership cannot be satisfactorily grasped by merely a linguistic view of it the Kantian dialectic¹¹⁹ can be taken as a basis for the treatment of the notion of the dialectic of leadership, to progress the intellectual view of it as an example counter to Rost’s handling of leadership.

III.iii: Counter-example to Rost’s empirical conception of leadership: a Kantian dialectic of leadership

This section develops the notion of the dialectic of leadership, as in the Kantian (1999) transcendental use of reason. Such a use involves the kinds of conflict in ideas a thesis-antithesis conflict covers in the antinomy of pure reason. As part of the transcendental dialectic Kant may have thought his synthesis was intellectually degenerative because it seemed to make no progress, perhaps due to its having lacked in the disciplines of empirical evidence from observation and experimentation.

¹¹⁸ My italicising of good throughout this paragraph is for emphasis.

¹¹⁹ The idea of dialectic goes back further than Plato.

However, that is mere speculation. Before arriving at any ideal of leadership, antinomies, or conflicts in ideas, of leadership, first needed to be constructed. This was done in Part IV, Section iii of the second chapter. From the outline of these four antinomies of leadership the thesis drew what seemed to be *irresolvable issues*: (i) the relationship between leadership in itself and spacetime, or concrete spatio-temporal manifestations of leadership; (ii) the reducibility of leadership as an ideal and standard of evaluation to its analytical parts; (iii) the relationship of leadership to freedom, virtue and vice, and moral responsibility in the natural world; and (iv) the explanation of leadership and its manifestations, whether this explanation is brutally naturalistic or evaluatively requires realisation in nature.

These issues are seen to organise the exploration of the concept and notion of leadership to resolve the antinomies by the exercise of comprehension and judgement. By so doing they foreshadow the unfolding of the argument of the thesis in terms of objective and subjective grounds. The distinction between language being objective grounds and thought being subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in higher education the thesis has already drawn.¹²⁰ Patently, these issues cannot be discussed without reflection but tarrying here would merely duplicate effort¹²¹. What is important is that the duality of language and thought be kept in mind as the larger argument progresses.

To advance the counter-argument, the Kantian (1999) approach to dialectic, the notion of leadership needs to be considered first. A *notion* of leadership is emphasised because the Kantian dialectic largely helps to explain the notion of leadership in the universe of the intellect. In a static model of the intellect a Kantian notion of dialectic can be more readily seen to be made up of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Even when accurately expressed in language, notions such as these may appear to be vague because that is often their nature, unlike principles that can ossify, even though they operationalise abstract concepts.

¹²⁰ See the linking statement in Chapter 1, p.10.

¹²¹ See the Introduction in this chapter.

Concepts are easy or difficult, principles are constitutive or regulating, ideas are simple or complex, concrete or abstract, while notions are clear or obscure, distinctly-formed or vague and formless. However, language too may not be as refined as thought, which may lead to difficulty in the expression of thought. The dialectic of antithesis, thesis and synthesis helps to explain human thoughts but it does not create thought and is typically post hoc relative to thought, as found in debate. A thesis is simply the proposition negated by the antithesis. This goes to the content of the proposition.

The thesis is the fact that the issues (i) - (iv) are in need of philosophical debate and conceptual resolution, which the antithesis denies. Rost's (1971) linguistic approach denied that the philosophical debate and conceptual resolution of issues was needed because in his approach, he settled things by appeal to the common usage of words. It seems, then, that the synthesis is to hold what is insightful about both. That is, to accept that common usage has some weight but to deny that accepting this invites the issues (i) - (iv) to withdraw. Hence, to resolve these issues the need to engage with actually doing the philosophy remains. In this, what is helpful is being mindful of the contemporary use of the term leadership and contrasting this usage with earlier concepts of leadership, as registered in the traditional literature, even though that literature may be devoid of the term for the abstract concept. So the synthesis is all of this.

III.iv: Return to the main argument and linking statement to Part IV

The Kantian (1999) dialectic of antinomy, that is the conflict in ideas posited as thesis and antithesis, are grounded not in language but in thought and for that reason this has been chosen as a counterexample to Augustine's (1975) language based dialectic and to those of his successors, namely Rost's (1991) linguistic rendition of leadership. First, the Kantian dialectic is helpful in drawing out the conflicts inherent in the general scientific view of leadership and in establishing the schema of the universe of the intellect because at the centre of the notion of the idea of a faculty of comprehension thesis and antithesis are synthesised through the interpenetration of ideas, which was explained in the first chapter and further explained in relation to leadership in the section immediately preceding this one, Section III.iii.

The critical reader will have observed that Fregean logic and its successors among the Liberal Arts for leadership has not been discussed. The reason for this is that the

tradition of logical enquiry, Fregean Dialectica, can be seen as having two branches, one more purely theoretical, one more as an account of excellence in human reasoning. The former is taken as already included under the Mathematical Liberal Arts (Geometry, Algebra) as theories of formal languages constituted as pairs of syntax and semantics. The latter is meant to be included among the successors of Augustine (1975) in the Aristotelian tradition of logical enquiry, rather than the Aristotelian syllogistic. The substance of Fregean logic and its successors, in their differences from logical theory that went before it, makes no essential difference to the point emphasized, that the language of the Liberal Arts, understood in this broad-minded way, is the language of the idea of the art of leadership in higher education.

That Augustine (1975) and its successors are objective grounds for the notion of a dialectic for the idea of the art of leadership is then, the third step in the defence of the position in this chapter of the thesis, as expressed in the proposition that the language of the tradition of the classical liberal arts is the language of the art of leadership, in that the literature of the art of leadership provides objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership.¹²² Now, of the classical Liberal Arts, Rhetoric and Dialectic have been defended. The next part, on Grammar, will lay out the fourth step in defence of the position assumed in this chapter.

IV

*Varro's **de Lingua Latina** and the art of leadership: third textual authority used in support of Capella's demonstration and objective grounds for the notion of a grammar for the idea of a philosophy of leadership*

*IV.i: Explication of and preliminary responses to **de Lingua Latina***

Varro (1938) represents Grammar, the third of the three arts of the trivium. This section explicates and offers preliminary responses to some Varronian remnants. The main strategy, which will emphasise the importance of this work as a pivotal template for breaking out of Kant's (1999) pessimistic dialectical treatment of the antinomies, conflicts in ideas, of pure reason, will be kept in reserve until the fourth chapter.

¹²² Demonstrating the contrary with a counterexample (in favour of thought) does not necessarily imply the elimination of the original example (on language) from the main argument, which is why Augustine (1975) remains among the objective grounds. Generally, annihilation of an alternative view is not necessary for the establishment of one's own; such a view has just been shown to be useful in dialectic.

The argument in Chapter Four will concern a cognitive model based on the arrangement of Varro's (1938) argument, which is an excellent example of the structure of argumentation provided by Cicero (1989b). The cognitive model to be discussed in that chapter uses words, phrases and axioms often alternative to or opposite to those of Varro's, since he was concerned with language, whereas a concern of Chapter Four will be the thought of mature subjectivity, as will be explained there. The cognitive model to be constructed will also then, of course, relate to the treatment of leadership in higher education.

Having paused to provide a short outline of the direction in which the thesis is heading, this section now turns to the explication of Varro (1938) and some preliminary responses to that fragmented work.¹²³ In this work Varro argues both sides of a case, for and against the existence of the grammatical concept of analogy, coming down in favour of analogy. Before engaging with the argument against and for analogy, it is worth noting that Varro said in Book V all things can be divided into the universal elements, that is, phases or "the primal classes of things" (Varro, 1938, p.13). These phases can be matched by the primal classes of words and these elements are body, place, time, and action. In the division of things "time is never without motion; motion never without place and body; place is where the body is moved; with motion is action" (Varro, 1938, Book V, p.13).

The origin of words can be explained by their being obvious to the senses, by old-time grammar, *by their nature being explicable only by philosophy*,¹²⁴ and by conjecture "after consultation with high-priests" (Varro, 1938, p.13). Using global interpretation and diagrammatic reasoning to seek to extract the main lines or themes of what an authority is saying, the thesis now engages with Varro's (1938) argument proper.

Varro (1938) argues in Book VIII *against* the existence of analogy. His argument can be arranged in the orderly fashion of global interpretation. Three points are made in his argument against the existence of analogy. First, the *differences* in the parts of speech

¹²³ Nothing prior to Book V of Varro (1938) is extant. A few pages at the end of the text are also lost. However, the complete trunk has been handed down. As for the remaining fragment of his *The Nine Disciplines* (Varro, 1910), on which Capella (1977) based *The Seven Liberal Arts*, the thesis offers a translation of this in the rough (See Appendix).

¹²⁴ My italics. A fundamental contention of this thesis is that philosophy is central to a satisfactory accounting of leadership.

have multiple causes: the reason for having that part of speech, to what end or purpose that part of speech has, and how words are declined. Second, the parts of speech are affected by how names are put on things; by how *differences* have been derived and by how the expression of an idea is affected by the rational unity of words. Plainly, *differences* are important to Varro's refutation of analogy because "[t]he principle of difference is not to be rejected in human speech" (Varro, 1938, p.395). Third, no regularities exist in certain individual parts of speech: the case forms of nouns, the time forms of verbs, in adverbs, and in adjectives or conjunctions. Nevertheless, "a logical system of Regularity is in the nature of speech and the world" (Varro, 1938, p.463).

Similarly, in Book IX Varro's (1938) argument *for* the existence of analogy can be arranged in a similarly orderly fashion. The existence of analogy is contingent upon likenesses in speech, the cause of which is the extent to which people observe a likeness in speech, the division of speech into its parts, the subdivision of verbs into a logical system, and regularities in parts of speech. That is, the inflection of words is determined by the nature of the situation in which people find themselves.

Now, what Varro (1938) calls categories may be looked at in a little more detail. The likenesses in speech are verbs with their tenses, speech with its three persons, likenesses in commands, wishes and questions; and complete and incomplete matters. Next, likeness in speech is caused by the convergence of how poets¹²⁵ and the general population use words, where regularities in words affect all the senses of man's soul in the same way¹²⁶.

After that, in Book X, Varro (1938) solves the conflict in views in favour of the existence of analogy by making the distinction between the divisions and the subdivisions of speech. According to Varro, in the divisions of speech some words have an unchanging form, others change by derivation or inflection or are inflected by their nature. In the subdivisions of speech, words are categorised in regular systems according to tense and case.

¹²⁵ In Varro's time poets were the specialists, much as scientists today are considered specialists.

¹²⁶ The senses according to Varro (1938) include sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, thought, procreation, and utterance of articulate words. These are noted here as the eight senses of man's soul and not the five senses of man's body with which contemporary thought is familiar, thought and speech once being taken to be spiritual senses.

Having looked in some detail at the contingencies supporting the argument for the existence of analogy, Varro (1938) turns to his solution to the conflict in views in favour of the existence of analogy. He says that Regularity is a relational system different from that of Anomaly, and justifies this distinction in Book X as being necessary for deciding what form words take. The basis for a regular system of relations among words is either the will of man or the nature of the word. Regularities ought to be sought in the existence of the thing, in the use of the thing, in the name of the thing, and in the natural inflections of the word for the thing. For example this thesis proffers that *leading*, *leader*, *leadership* are all inflections of the word lead, which is consistent with what Varro is saying.

Furthermore, words are limited by their likeness¹²⁷, by their relationship according to *logos*¹²⁸, and in their usage (Varro, Book XI). Words are either abandoned, in current popular use, or in poetical use¹²⁹. Varro (1938) argues that analogy is regularity in the relation of form to form whereas anomaly is irregularity based on popular use. From what Varro is saying the least conclusion that can be drawn is that leadership is clearly a word used by the general population and by specialists but with different meanings.

IV.ii: Return to the main argument and linking statement to Part V

Grammar is the linguistic structure for discourse and so, for discourse on leadership, because leadership is not only about language but also about thought. Thus when this thesis uses grammar it means critical dialogue, which is the objectification of the form of thought. The form of thought is the cognitive psychology raised in the first chapter and developed in Chapters Two and Three. Before attending to the cognitive counterexample to Varro's (1938) arguments for and against the grammatical concept of analogy, which is the main response of the thesis to his work, in the second part of the next chapter, a critical dialogue about Kant (2002) on judgement and about leadership first need to be considered so the thesis can shift from objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership to subjective grounds involving judgement, with which the next chapter will open.

¹²⁷ The thesis abstracts that synonyms of likeness are similarity, regularity, analogy.

¹²⁸ A *logos* relationship is the relationship of a word to principles of substance and form.

¹²⁹ In poetical use means in use by the specialists of the time, that is, poets. *cf* footnote 125.

However, before proceeding to that, it may be noted that no consideration of contemporary Grammar and grammatical theory is included while discussing the Liberal Arts and the art of leadership. The reason for this is that although modern comparative linguistics has been preoccupied for the past fifty years in a debate between successors of Chomsky's (1957, 1965) theory of Universal Grammar and Greenberg's (1963, 1974) Particularist approach to Grammar, in which "descriptive categories and comparative concepts are quite different kinds of entities" (Haspelmath, 2008, p.19), no essential difference exists between the substance of this debate and Varro's (1938) arguments for and against analogy, which may indicate how little real progress has been made in the last two millennia to understand grammar.

So, a duality between the Universalist and Particularist approaches is a legacy that can be applied without impediment to the relevant issue of leadership, a Particularist approach focussing on the instantiation of the language of leadership in the social world. This duality, of Grammar in a universal sense being critical dialogue, but specifically in this part of the chapter being a dialogical argument on analogy as a grammatical form, makes no essential difference to the point that the language of the Liberal Arts is the language of the idea of the art of leadership in higher education.

That Varro (1938) is firm objective grounds for the notion of a grammar for the idea of the art of leadership is the fourth step in defence of the position taken, that the traditional language of the classical liberal arts is the language of the art of leadership, in that the literature of the art of leadership provides firm objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. The next part will lay out the fifth and final step in defence of the position taken in this chapter.

V

Critical Dialogue on Leadership

*V.i: Explication of Kant's **Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgement***

Unlike the three ancient texts that fortify the demonstration of Capella (1977) as central, to the proposition that the literary tradition of the classical Liberal Arts and that of the art of leadership are one and the same, Kant (2002) enshrines what may be perceived as a failed or inadequate cognitive counterargument to Varro (1938) on

language. Whereas the works in the classical Liberal Arts tradition are subject to the use of diagrammatic reasoning because these authorities use global thinking in the construction of their texts, Kant (2002), like Bacon (1952), has been written using linear thought.

These two texts have not been amenable to similar treatment although they remain open to interpretation but of a linear rather than global nature. Nevertheless, by closely following what Kant (2002) is saying, his main line of thinking, a thematic line, can be identified and abstracted. The work is pivotal for rounding the thesis from a consideration of objective grounds to subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in the next chapter.

Hence, the thesis now traces the twenty-one pages at the end of Kant (2002) that have pre-occupied Kantian scholars. It was an appendix entitled Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgement. In it Kant begins with the assertion that Teleology does not belong to Theology but to judgement because the cause(s) of the products of nature lie beyond nature and are not part of science, since teleology does not provide any objective grounds for the effects of nature (Kant, p.285). The purposiveness of nature cannot be explained by the principle of mechanism (Kant, p.286). To explain something as a natural end is to subordinate the principle of mechanism under the principle of teleology. To explain an organised being as a natural end product the mechanism of nature is subordinated to an intentionally-acting cause (Kant, p.290).

The mechanism of nature is the origin of the products of nature. The products of nature are not merely the ends of nature. Human beings are means to ends in nature, although in moral relations a human being in himself is an end, and an end in the intentional ground made by an intelligent cause or in the mechanism of nature. When one thing in nature acts as the means for another's ends then this is *external purposiveness* (Kant, p.293).

Happiness and culture is the end of human nature (Kant, 2002, p.297). The human being has been judged the ultimate end of Nature and everything else is a rational system of ends with man's final end lying outside Nature. To achieve those ends mankind nurtures its talents for culture through education under the condition of

civilised society, which oppresses the majority so the minority can maintain culture and the arts and sciences (Kant, pp.299-300). A final end does not rely on any other ends for its possibility; in Nature a thing depends on only the idea of a final end. The human being is considered a *noumenon* (Kant, p.302) that is free to aim at the highest end, the highest good. Man need not be justified as a moral being because he is the highest end, with the capacity to be a final end, which can subject Nature to his will (Kant, pp.302-303).

Reason attempts to infer the supreme cause of Nature and its properties from natural ends, in Physicotheology. Ethicotheology infers the supreme cause from the moral ends of rational beings. The former cannot reach the question of a final end of creation (Kant, 2002, p.304). The human being as a moral being is the final end of creation (Kant, p.309); mankind cannot cognise a Natural end at all. The principle under which man must judge is the principle of beings under moral laws (Kant, pp.311, 314), which is the only final end that reason can provide because the moral law is the formal rational condition under which human beings use their freedom to strive for the highest good (Kant, p.315).

Subjectively, the highest possible good as a final end is happiness under the objective condition of humanity under moral laws as the worthiness to be happy. Only humanity's freedom can be used to connect these two requirements with a moral cause to set before itself a final end (Kant, 2002, p.316). A righteous atheist would have to give up a final end, the happiness of all, although he would still live under moral laws but without a basis on which to judge his own inner purposive determination (Kant, pp.313-318). Combining universal happiness with lawful morality to promote the greatest good with the highest condition of the good is determined for humanity by its reason. This does not allow man to understand the purposiveness related to the moral law. Human beings can think of God's properties only in terms of analogy and not theory (Kant, pp.318-325).

Proof does not persuade but convinces the understanding, determining what an object is in itself or what it is for mankind. All theoretical grounds for proof are rational inferences, inferences from analogy (representation), probable opinion, or hypotheses. Concepts of Nature cannot lead man to the supersensible; they cannot prove that God

exists (Kant, 2002, pp.325-331). Cognisable things are of three kinds: matters of fact, opinion, and faith (value). Of the three ideas in reason, the existence of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, freedom is the only supersensible concept that “proves its objective reality... in Nature” (Kant, 2002, p.338) and does what concepts of Nature cannot do (Kant, pp.331-346).

*V.ii: Response to Kant’s **Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgement:** implications for a philosophy of leadership*

In summary, what Kant (2002) has been saying is that science cannot tolerate more than a mechanistic view of nature since to introduce God or value into science is to introduce what, from a scientific explanatory point of view, is a deceptive fallacy. Yet all men are moral beings and leadership is among other things about taking individuals to be moral ends in themselves. Man’s final end lies with God not with nature.

Happiness and culture are natural ends and education nurtures them but man is also free to reach for the highest end, which transcends them and which is the highest good.

God, the supreme cause of nature, cannot be inferred from natural ends but only from the moral ends of man.

Man judges all things under the principle of beings under moral laws, using his freedom to struggle for the highest good. However, mankind does not understand what God’s purpose is and cannot use theories but only analogies to raise questions about it. Human beings cannot prove God exists. Only mankind’s freedom put to good use proves the reality of freedom and this is the rightful goal of leadership. More particularly, in the case of intellectual leadership the end human beings seek is the search for that intellectual freedom which individuals find in the universe of the mature transcendental intellect.

To be merely against something in an argument is to hold a point of view that is incomplete. So, too, a critique is incomplete. However, to be for something assumes an affinity or agreement with what is defended. On judgement, firstly, the thesis will argue that a common sense view of judgement is *subjective grounds* for a critique of the art of leading and secondly, suggests that the literature, namely Kant (2002) is *objective grounds* for a *dialogical* treatment of principles relating to the philosophy of leadership. In other words, the subjective grounds for the art of leading lies in a common sense

view of judgement and so, provides the subject matter for the universal intellect on the concept of the art of leading; whereas the objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership lies in a teleological Kantian view of judgement and so offers the subject matter for the transcendental intellect on the idea of a philosophy of leadership.

This being so, the common sense view of judgement can now be talked about and the manner in which it relates to the art of leading, on which the thesis has already spoken. This will be followed by the Kantian (2002) view of judgement and a discussion of the extent to which it can be related to a philosophy of leadership. The thesis will treat of the latter in more detail in its defence of the philosophy of leadership in Chapter Four. The point to be driven home here is that although a common sense view of judgement is subjective grounds for the science of leading and the arts of leading and leadership, this is not possible for a philosophy of leadership because common sense really belongs in a different universe of discourse, that is, the general intellect, whereas the philosophy of leadership belongs in the transcendental intellect.

By insisting on this distinction the extreme distance and degree of difference between leading and leadership is being highlighted. Similarly, a Kantian (2002) view of judgement is at the furthest reaches of the intellect and cannot extend back down to a craft or science of leading. Conviction is most relevant to a common sense view whereas purposiveness is most relevant to a Kantian view. Common sense states that truth resides in a judgement that conforms to reality whereas what Kant has been claiming is that human beings make judgements that conform to what is useful, that is, they conform to that which advances their purpose and the end of that purpose may lie beyond humanity as understood naturally. As such, it must engage the transcendental intellect in a philosophical dialogue.

Towards a summary of and conclusion to Chapter 3

A global counter-argument against the scientific advance of learning, when leadership is being talked about, would run along these lines. If what science is doing is affirmed as right, that by incessantly analysing leaders and leading in the hope that more will be learnt about leadership without philosophers engaging them and arguing that they in fact do not have the proper tools for the job, then, to do nothing is to do more harm than

good. To stand by and say nothing is problematic because science is seen to be squandering scarce resources better used elsewhere.

Social science should defer to the search for a philosophy of leadership with grounds that have stood the test of millennia and continue to yield good fruit in abundance. What is being advocated is not that all men should lead a benign existence with dampened curiosity but that better tools for the job of understanding leadership should be created together since the social scientific approach is not advancing the cause by ignoring serious philosophy. Therefore, by accepting the five good arguments put in defence of the *art* of leadership being objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership the thesis can push on towards the philosophy.

The false dilemma that is now at risk is that all social science should stop working in the field of leadership or that science, art, and philosophy should work solely on creating better tools for solving the problem of leadership. However, the choice is not all or nothing at all but science should be more receptive to and better acknowledge existing non-scientific literature on leadership and that it has erred by trespassing on another's domain.

The conclusion here is that the evidence is more than circumstantial in the case against the scientific view of leadership in favour of the defence for the art of leadership. If the given account of the art of leadership has been successful in these five respects then the current commitment to an existing philosophy of leadership is correct. The thesis has already shown that science, which claims to be studying leadership, is in fact not studying leadership. The burden of proof now lies with science to show that what it is doing in the field of leadership has the resources to explicate on rational foundations the moral content of leadership, without unwittingly doing amateur philosophy. But to do so is to already enter philosophical debate, a debate in which one remaining and essential point will have to be made.

Criticism of accepting a philosophy of leadership tends to stem from vested interests, entrenched political preferences passed down to successive officeholders, traditional values in the academic leadership studies community and lack of awareness taking no notice of philosophical argument. Even if science does take notice of art and

philosophy it is unlikely to cease its investigations. But whatever science does decide to do with regard to leadership is a question for open dialogue. In the meantime the conclusion is drawn that the literature of the liberal arts is the literature of the art of leadership, and is a firm objective ground for a philosophy of leadership.

This chapter has aimed to explicate and argue a position relative to the best representatives of the Renaissance and of the early medieval classical tradition, as well as to three of the best classical authorities of the trivium. It has also aimed to give reasons for accepting the propositions offered and to formulate possible arguments against them, that is, to considering counter-arguments and potential objections to these propositions. In defence, the thesis has aimed to rebut counter-argument by criticising these potential objections on moral grounds before iteratively returning to the main argument. However, doing all of this to the highest degree of proficiency may not always be possible given the restraints of the thesis.

Analytically-oriented philosophers may be tempted to somehow reduce the comprehensive writing of the classical authorities that are used in the thesis to a mechanical sequence of syllogisms. However this would be wrong because what is at stake here is not so much a question of giving the wrong impression but of sacrificing the spirit of reason to the letter of reason and losing the full import of what they are saying.

On the whole, the position of the thesis is to simply show how a philosophy of leadership can be informed by the ancient tradition of the classical liberal arts. The reason for accepting the thesis that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education is that a science of leadership is not possible, although a science of leaders and leading is, because the way of science precludes any consideration of morality and ethics thereby denying the freedom to argue that morality and ethics is at the very heart of leadership.

What science is demonstrating is that it is not the correct forum in which to resolve such matters and by so doing is implying that that is the responsibility of, or a shared responsibility of, art or philosophy. An art of leadership must of course come before a

philosophy of leadership otherwise there would be nothing in reality, no shared reality, on which to base a philosophy of leadership.

A critic might allege that by referring to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment as well as to medieval and classical times, this thesis is somehow rejecting modern works on language, thought and reason, in other words repudiating contemporary logic, theories of grammar, or modern pragmatics in the philosophy of language. The answer to that in the light of what doxography and tradition are, is that this is not what is being done in this thesis because rejecting modern scholarship would be quite unreasonable.

In other words, the reply to this objection is not to conflate Universal and particular studies, that is, language, with global and linear thinking because that is the way of confusion. Evidence for this confusion lies in the second chapter where Wang (2008) and Denton (1998) were seen to conflate leadership and learning. Modern linguistics distinguishes between those theories that belong to the Universalist tradition, represented by those like Chomsky (1965) and his universal theory of linguistics, who see themselves as successors of Kant, and those like Greenberg (1963, 1974) who belong to the Particularist tradition and trace their lineage through the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Sapir, 1921) back to beginnings with von Humboldt (1999) and Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c).

Kant (2002) said that man's final ends lay with God not with nature. By that it is taken to mean that human beings cannot infer God from natural ends, only from the moral ends of man. Linguistics alone, Universalist or Particularist, cannot explain the idea of leadership because linguistics is concerned with nature. The idea of leadership rightly comes under the principle of morality and as such is not about natural ends but about the moral ends of man. To go further is, therefore, to go beyond what this chapter has set out to do.

This chapter expounds the transcendental position on the argument for the art of leadership that is again outlined here, in the following propositions: (1) that Bacon (1973) is flawed in that it did not achieve in practice what Bacon set out to achieve: to form "a small globe of the intellect" (Bacon, 1973, p.221), that is, a complete rendition on what was preventing learning from progressing by using global thinking. (2) What

prevented Bacon (1973) from completing his task begins with Hamann's (1995c) insight into thought-language identity when reflecting on what Kant believed he was doing: laying down enduring laws of thought. (3) The key to global thinking is going back to the masters of the rules of language in the Liberal Arts tradition: Cicero (1989b) on Rhetoric, Augustine (1975) on Logic/Dialectic, and Varro (1938) on Grammar/Critical Dialogue. (4) These three works, representing Capella's (1977) trivium, offer sound objective grounds for the art of leadership.

This outline, specifically the first and third propositions, returns the thesis to the clarification of the distinction made at the beginning of the chapter: firstly between global and linear thinking and secondly on why this distinction is important to understanding leadership, that there be global thinking about it. Rational linear thinking, as exemplified by syllogistic reasoning, namely the third (disjunctive) syllogism, provided Kant (1999) with his *logos* of Man, Nature, and God. With this *logos* Kant (1999) could merely point to the matters of immortality of the soul, freedom, and the existence of God.

However, global thinking, criticised by Bacon (1952), provides an in-depth and comprehensive picture of leadership that includes its moral and ethical dimensions, which general linear thinking cannot do because it is attentive to the external sensible world, its matters being of immediate concern to the general intellect in making intelligible that which is offered to reason by understanding from the senses. The concern of the transcendental intellect, global thinking, in its fullness and completion, and as demonstrated in the representative works of Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938), makes possible a fuller accounting of leadership.

Linking statement to Chapter 4

The objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership have now been considered. Language is what causes the reader to think and that which someone writes in a language is caused by thought. What Cicero (1989b), Augustine (1975) and Varro (1938) say is evidence or support for what Capella (1977) has written. These foremost examples of the classical liberal arts offer rhetorical, dialectical, and grammatical (formal) grounds for a philosophy of leadership, respectively. What is to be kept in mind is that this thesis has been arguing for both language and thought. Language and

thought, the objective outer and the subjective inner respectively, reflect each other. Language-thought is a process: Kant (2002) provides a counterargument to language (Varro, 1938) whereas Hamann (1995a) upholds Varro (1938) on language.

Having now argued the way through the literature of the medieval-classical tradition of the liberal arts, considering it to be the literature of the art of leadership, such literature is found to be adequate objective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. This account now continues by turning to the mature human intellect, the requisite subjective grounds for the necessary support of an adequate treatment of leadership in which the original position of the thesis, that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education, remains unmodified.

Chapter 4

Subjective grounds in the transcendental intellect for a philosophy of leadership

*The mature intellect, having secured the literary tradition of the classical liberal arts, being the literature of the art of leadership, affirms this to be an objective ground for the establishment of a subjective ground for a philosophy **for** leadership but not for a philosophy **of** leadership.*

Introduction

The overall argument of the thesis is recalled to step by step advance that: (1) the mature human intellect is a secure subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership because it can recognise that the duality of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect is thoroughly human; (2) in a search for objective grounds for such a philosophy exploration of the tradition of science reveals that this does not comprise a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education because it fails to consider values and ends; (3) exploration of the liberal arts tradition exposes a lodestone of classical literature that forms a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude any consideration of morality and ethics but engages with determination (intent), matters of fact, and matters of value; (4) this vein of work can be directly traced to the classical literary tradition of philosophy and that the tradition of philosophy supplies a mother-lode of literature which is an enduring objective ground for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

This chapter may be considered to be the riser to the fourth step in the argument that takes the thesis to the next level in Chapter Five. More particularly, the classical literature of the liberal arts through subjective grounds can be traced directly to the classical literary tradition of philosophy. This involves a transcendental reading of and not merely a general reading of texts, which demonstrates the how as well as the what in the thinking of the best of authorities, that is, a reading that includes the moral and ethical as well as the sensible and intelligible.

To defend a philosophy of leadership is to defend both its subjective and objective grounds. Objective grounds for the mature human intellect include propositions,

paragraphs, compositions and debates¹³⁰. These underpin the subjective grounds sought for any new worldview adopted by a mature human intellect. In the mature human intellect subjective grounds include beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition)¹³¹. To attend to subjective grounds motivates the drive of the thesis towards an account of leadership in this chapter and the next.

At the very heart of a subjective account of leadership is the universal idea of leadership in congruence with the notions of right and wrong under the adjudication of the Good, this notion of leadership being fundamental to a philosophy of leadership. A universal idea is an idea that belongs to the universe of the intellect whereas a general idea belongs to the general intellect but includes a principle of the universe of the intellect, which is called a universal principle, with either one or more or no concepts.

A moral principle is a personal rule of right conduct. The principle of the Good is the law from which the rules of right conduct are generated, that is, how one knows that one is doing the right thing. Using their general intellect many may see a principle as a general truth or rule but by using the transcendental intellect one may see that the principle of morality is the Good from which all rights are generated. Principles in the universe of the intellect not only generate concepts but are also the source of the power that is reflected in and engaged by concepts. For instance the principle of the Good is the power that generates concepts of the right.

A moral or critical idea is not spoken of in the first instance because when the universal idea of morality in the universe of the intellect is congruent¹³² with a general idea, then this is by definition a notion. A philosophy is a set or cluster of notions that must include a system of morality. Universal principles are contained within the universe of the intellect and similarly for general and moral principles. When the inner eye of one's mind focuses on concept-centred thinking it can see only a principle and all other ideas as the same.

¹³⁰ See Ch.2, II.ii.i; Ch.2, II.iii.ii.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Here, the word is used in terms of propinquity (nearness in space, time, or relationship) to broadly mean coherent with or in logical relations with but on other occasions in the thesis the term may be used in the more particular sense of nearby (nearness in space) in the universe of the intellect, or in close proximity to (nearness in space or time) depending upon context.

When the inner eye focuses on a principle-centred system of concepts it sees other ideas as principles in a subjective manifold of theories or constellations. However, when the inner eye focuses on ideas, which are made up of principles and concepts, then the mind can think clearly and distinctly because the mind can then grasp the bigger picture of ideas forming notions. Notions have no centre but complexes of notions, called thoughts, which are the subject matter of cognition, can expand. This expansion of thought is fuelled by new ideas, and as thinking expands, where thought is the substance and cognition is the form, the intellect matures.

Leadership is dialectical more than analytical, that is, not enough can be learned from analysis of it alone; leadership is not bound by analysis but by morality. Hence, the idea of and thinking about leadership is *prior* to any consideration of it *as* a concept or principle applied under empirical conditions. It is an idea often in congruence with another idea moving alone or together as a notion. Not being a concept of the understanding it can nevertheless be rationalised and adjudicated upon.

By saying that notions have no centre is to say that at the centre of every notion lies neither concept nor principle but the antithesis of the notion, into which matters of thought, objects of the universe of the intellect, may be drawn, which in so doing can pass into matters of speech. Ideas are the matters of thought and their verbal *expression* matters of speech, their combination or any part of them together becoming a matter of invention, which is amplification. Next, the idea is the thesis, which contains at its centre its antithesis, which is resolved in their synthesis, thus forming the thetic dialectic or dialectic and propositional thought. Thirdly, reason and its proof are resolved through argument in their conclusion.

I

*The subjective grounds for a philosophy **for** leadership*

Now, unlike science, which Kuhn (1962) in some of his moods would have agreed is commonly promoted as what communities of scholars¹³³ do (Kuhn, pp.43-48), philosophy is personal and is grounded in the thinking of the individual, that is, it is in a

¹³³ Kuhn (1962) also speaks of communities of professionals (Kuhn, p.164), communities (usually of) scientists (Kuhn, pp.166-168, 176-178), and communities with members made up of specialists (Kuhn, p.182).

sense a subjective source. The contrast between science as intersubjective or objective, what the community of scientists does, and philosophy as personal has to be formulated very carefully in order to infer from philosophy's being personal to its being subjective.

None of the nuances of the common sense meaning of personal captures what is meant by saying that philosophy is personal in a way that contrasts with the intersubjective, communal practice of science, which is, in a certain way, impersonal. The relevant sense in which Philosophy is personal is suggested to mean that it involves one in finding one's own voice: to be a philosopher in the best sense is not to be a retail philosopher but to own a philosophical perspective that is one's own, to speak in one's own philosophical voice.

One's very self has to be authenticated in the philosophy one propounds. However, this sense of philosophy's being personal is not opposed by objective but requires it to answer, and involves one in answering, objectively to the disciplines of the best standards of serious intellectual enquiry. Only in this way can one's philosophical thinking be one's own, be personal. Nevertheless, this very objectivity is what enables one's philosophy to express one's own voice authentically, so that one owns for oneself the responsibilities of answering for and defending one's views, according to one's own best lights on the issues.

Yet this is subjectivity: one's own voice, secure of judgement, considered deliberation and honest, authentic ownership of the views one defends, in the ways one defends them, is to be a subject, an authentic subjectivity, to have a rich, complex and deep inner life. Such is philosophy at its best: both personal and subjective but also objective and universal. So when subjective grounds are spoken of for a philosophy of leadership, one speaks in this way, or a way much like this, and not merely in terms of the way someone can fail intellectually by being subjective in the sense, for example, of allowing the wrong emotions to cloud their openness to evidence and reasoning.

This voice of one's own expressing the depth of the inner life is the sense of subjective that signals intellectual success or achievement unlike in the sense of failure. As an achievement it has its own disciplines and rigorous standards, which distinguish, for example, those who are really deep thinkers and those who pretend to be or mistake

themselves for deep thinkers. Subjectivity in this sense is a kind of intellectual virtue, something like intellectual integrity or intellectual depth. Philosophy demands this virtue of one. Science does not. This achievement-virtue structure is also what enables one to think of the subjective grounds of leadership in an objective kind of way that appeals to the distinction in the structures of the intellect between the general and the transcendental intellects, and why when one speaks of subjective grounds this does not invite nor should be mistaken for a laissez-faire approach.

In broad terms, thought at its best and deepest is the firmest possible subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership, and language as knowledge and the medium of understanding the firmest possible objective grounds. From the classical tradition a composition such as a written article or speech can be said to be constitutive of and regulated by the communicative principle of the rule of language, called grammar. One can express one's subjectivity in a composition of one's own making but in compliance with rules or guidelines to the benefit of all in the communicative process.

One such guideline that bridges language and thought is the rhetorical device of one sentence to one (main) idea and although no one-to-one correspondence is being conceded here an attempt to generalise this device could be illustrated with the following. In both written and spoken compositions paragraphs express complete thoughts or notions while ideas and concepts are expressed in sentences and words or terms. In knowing this through the general view, the self in the universe of the intellect could say that the grounds for the composition of a philosophy of leadership are momentary ideas and the objects found in those moments. Now, what is meant by moment needs to be explained here.

When reading and writing, listening and speaking, the ideas represented in sentences are expressed by the writer/speaker or are impressed upon the mind of the reader/listener. These are momentary insofar as "the Moving Finger writes and, having writ, Moves on" (FitzGerald, 1967) -to the next sentence and idea. In this sense ideas are meant to be momentary. Sentence follows sentence and thus, insofar as sentences represent ideas, idea follows idea, series after series to complete a composition.

To create a credible and compelling composition the rules of grammar need to be followed, grammar providing a consistent structure for the expression of thought in language. The reverse, laws of thought, is what Hamann (1995a) railed against as in Kant's (1999) work. Laws of thought are not being proposed here, merely that this consistency or regularity in grammar is matched in thought by what may be called cognitive stability. The thesis would argue that without this stability, which may also be thought of as mature subjectivity, the clear and distinct expression of thought, notions, in a composition would not be possible.

The current chapter is about thought, specifically that of mature subjectivity, which will be related to or tentatively called stability in response to Varro's (1938) system of Regularity¹³⁴, which was encountered in Chapter Three on language. In that chapter representatives of Capella's (1977) trivium have been considered, with Cicero (1989b) representing Rhetoric, Augustine (1975) representing Dialectic and Varro (1938) representing Grammar. The first two representatives have been responded to as fully as possible but the main response, to Varro (1938), has been kept in reserve until this moment¹³⁵ because here the concern of the thesis is more with thought than with language.

Now, a cognitive alternative to Varro's (1938) linguistic arguments is being constructed in this chapter in order to demonstrate that Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c) was right: Kant (1995) was not constructing the laws of thought but was following the rules of language. Reasonably, this has been taken to mean grammar. In the research undertaken to prove Hamann (1995a) right or wrong the discovery made, with Varro's (1910) *Nine Disciplines* being lost, is that the only extant similar work is Varro (1938), which is here to be ultimately established as a foundation for the representation of the subjective grounds of a philosophy of leadership.

These subjective grounds concern ideas and the objects of ideas. Both concrete and abstract concepts, the latter also being called ideas, are found in the universe of the

¹³⁴ This has been explained in the penultimate paragraph of Chapter 3, Section IV.i, as a relational system necessary for deciding what form words take. Stability is a system necessary for the form that concepts take in thought.

¹³⁵ See in this thesis the first few paragraphs in Chapter Three, Section IV.i: Explication of and preliminary responses to *de Lingua Latina*.

intellect, by and large the former in the general intellect and the latter in the transcendental intellect, which is introduced at the beginning of the thesis. The object of an idea means its substance or essence, that is, *principles*, found in the universe of the intellect, which includes aspects such as the importance and use of concepts, the purpose of concepts, one's lines of thought, the reason for concepts changing, and the reason for the purpose of concepts. Now, each of these objects can be considered in turn because many of them are to be found in written and spoken compositions that appeal to one's intellectual convictions by which in turn is meant one's faith or fundamental beliefs.

First, concepts are important because of the purpose to which they are put in art and practice and which they possess in philosophy, respectively their application to objects found in the understanding, which reflect things in the real world, and in comprehension, which reflect the principles found in judgement. On top of purpose and use is their fitness for, or expediency in, ideas. Second, a concept may be put to one's own purpose, have a foreign or unknown destination or it may simply be obsolete with a forgotten end.

Third, in one's lines of thought all objects can be delineated into the universal essence. This means the primal categories of objects can be matched by the primal categories of concepts. These can be explained in relation to Varro (1938) and his universal elements, which are the primal classes of things¹³⁶. Unlike Varro's universal elements primal categories of objects are proposed to be concepts and principles making up ideas and ideas making up notions or thoughts, with principles being a pure concept of the transcendental intellect.

These can be placed in a certain correspondence with the fundamental categories of concepts, these being *spirit, moment, space, and stability* in such a way that one can say that intellectual space is never without station and station never without moment and spirit, moment being when the spirit is stilled. Station is stability, stability being a likeness of peace, harmony, faculty, power. Now how these fundamental categories of concepts are arrived at require explanation.

¹³⁶ See Chapter 3, Section IV.i.

These ideas have been chosen because they are opposites or at least contraries to what Varro (1938) said in his Book V, that all things can be divided into the universal elements, that is, phases or “the primal classes of things” (Varro, 1938, p.13). These phases can be matched by the primal classes of words. These elements are *body, place, time, and action*. In the division of things “time is never without motion; motion never without place and body; place is where the body is moved; with motion is action” (Varro, 1938, p.13). In the above paragraph what Varro said about language is converted into saying something about thought, matching *body, place, time, and action* with *spirit, moment, space, and stability*, the thesis using this as a foundation in an argument from analogy.

Fourth, the reason concepts change is on account of two sets of four grounds: if a part of the thing the object is representing is lost or forgotten, if a concept is transposed with another concept, if the size of the parts of the objects are distorted, or if the concept is lost, that is, forgotten or added to the idea perhaps through faulty memory or embellishment. Fifth, the reasons for concepts having purpose is because the purpose of the concept is obvious to the faculties of the mind, that is, to the intuition, affect, volition, and intellect, or because it is the product of a principle of the primordial or prototypical universe of the intellect, or because the honour or decency of the concept is obvious only to Philosophy or because the purity or goodness of the concept is established by conjecture after consultation with moral and intellectual leaders.

What the thesis is arguing is that one cannot think about the stability of the intellect solely by using reason and understanding. To do so is to attempt to use the principles of analogy and contribution -as has been just attempted above- or humanity and justice of the general intellect without much success. However, one certainly can adjudicate upon the stability of the intellect using a different set of principles, that of power and duty or providence and freedom of the transcendental intellect and meet with some success in achieving comprehension of intellectual stability because this latter set of principles connects directly with the Good.

The position to be arrived at by the end of this chapter is that one cannot impose a philosophy *for* leadership on leadership using reasoning by analogy.¹³⁷ A philosophy of leadership emerges from one's transcendental perception of and reflection on leadership. This means that leadership is not contingent upon one's experience of it as a phenomenon or observable fact but nevertheless exists within the realm of knowledge. With this position in mind the following section engages with arguments for and against the existence of stability.

I.i: Arguments for and against the existence of stability

In the composition of formulating a principle, which represents the primal categories of objects, one may argue for and against the existence of stability, perhaps as a mature subjectivity, which represents the primal categories of concepts. These ideas, the primal categories of concepts, are being focused on because signs of these would be expected to be seen in the thoughts expressed by a leader using his intellect. This does not mean to say that the intellects of followers do not also have these characteristics. Something is different about the spirit of a leader, the moments a leader shares with his people, how the leader and his followers are organised in and by the physical, social, psychological and intellectual space around them, and the nature of the mature subjectivity that a leader possesses. The intellect of the leader is supposed to be stable and these ideas are indicators of the stability of his thought.

If the intellect of the leader is not stable then nobody will follow him. The reason for this is, for example, if the leader's purpose continually changes then his credibility is at stake because he will effectively not be embodying the desires and the hopes or fulfilling the needs of his people. This is of concern to the argument regarding leadership at this point in its development because this chapter is seeking how leaders think: if they think differently from followers and candidates -and what this will mean for the development of a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

¹³⁷Reasoning by analogy, as will be seen, does not achieve the task the thesis set for it: to generate a philosophy of leadership from objective grounds, that is, the work of Varro (1938). It can only go so far as a philosophy *for* leadership. To reach a philosophy of leadership using dialectical thought based on the Kantian antinomies is more effective. Posner (2008, pp.180-191) speaks on reasoning by analogy and concludes that reasoning by analogy does very little work in the law (Posner, p.191). The thesis is in agreement with him on this.

The arguments for and against the existence of stability need to be rehearsed because they need to be fairly considered. Both sides need to be put, before trying to resolve the conflict in these views in favour of the existence of stability, that is, with an eye to mature subjectivity. These arguments are similar to those of Kantian (1999) style antinomies as well as Varro's (1938) arguments for and against the existence of Analogies in Grammar and the resolution in favour of them. This chapter picks up on the antinomies and Varro's example as a method of making intellectual progress in the argument of the thesis. An alternative way of unfolding the argument on leadership is being sought by using a representative work in the traditional literature of the classical Liberal Arts as a vehicle to better articulate the thoughts offered on leadership in a search for a philosophy *of* leadership in higher education.

The picture being presented on the subjective grounds of a philosophy of leadership starts with the problem that arises from a dynamic intellect, which, engaging with the world and reflecting on issues of the transcendental intellect, has to make the best sense of things it can. It can do this poorly, moderately well, or well, and achieve maturity or not. This mature subjectivity consists of what the thesis calls stability. One can be consistent, steady, confirmed in one's views and those views be uniform or cohere with each other so no reason exists to not examine mature subjectivity and whether it is possible, or exists, or not.

To do this the method used first needs to be explained. The subjective grounds of a philosophy of leadership require an ideal of the maturity which leaders in higher education either address or seek to nourish and form in their students. Since this is a question of the transcendental intellect the thesis will proceed as explained in Chapter Three, as with the example of Varro (1938), examining the antinomy of mature subjectivity. This requires composing a principle based on the non-existence or impossibility of mature subjectivity; and a composition that formulates a principle based on the existence or possibility of mature subjectivity. So, arguments both for and against stability need to be examined. However, setting out to resolve the conflict of ideas in favour of the existence of stability is to follow Varro's kind of example, as in his argument about analogies of grammar.

Also, the reader will now better understand why Varro (1938) on analogies and grammar is so important. Without his example, the thesis is not in possession of any demonstration of the possibility of the proposed method of working out of the conflicts of ideas in the transcendental intellect. For Kant (1999, 2002) supposes there is no rational resolution to the conflicts of ideas in the transcendental intellect, just the endless, rationally unarbitrable round of thesis, antithesis and synthesis without real progress.

By defending Varro's (1938) resolution in favour of analogy and grammar the thesis can break out of Kant's (1999, 2002) pessimistic view of the possibility of intellectual progress in the transcendental intellect. This, then, is reason to hope that the subjective development of the intellect, or the culture at large indeed, engaging any conflicts in ideas of the transcendental intellect can resolve at least enough of those conflicts in ideas, well enough (a) to show that stability or mature subjectivity exists or is possible; and (b) to enable mature subjectivity to actually develop and exist.

Having explained the strategy of this section the steps in the strategy will now be executed. In the proposed argument *against* the existence of stability the principle of that which is *wrong* (*vice*), is not to be rejected in human thought just as, and here the thesis is arguing by analogy, Varro (1938) did not reject the principle of *difference* in language. The *grounds* of that which is wrong (*vice*) in the parts of thought are morality, from what grounds, and how groups of concepts can change their appearance or form by using the same model or design. The categories of the individual *parts* of a thought, a notion, in which no uniformity is found, are the forms or appearances of the objects. By the forms and appearances of objects is meant their being conceived and the concepts produced by their being conceived, as well as the forms of space that facilitate thinking and the appearance of principles.

In the parts of thought, a thought being a notion, concepts are attached to objects by variation or by imposition, what is wrong is given purpose, and the ethical unity of concepts gives the impression of a notion. When that which is wrong is given purpose either the purposes of the purity or goodness of the principles themselves, which relate to the thinker, the thought from, and the thought about, or the purpose of one's notions of space or spacetime, being there in the past, here in the present, and somewhere in the

future, or the forms of objects, which are common, artistic, philosophical, or theological forms are given purpose for the thinker, there being no scientific form of or for an object since science is without purpose.

The reader, who sees the stability of the intellect as mature subjectivity, or at least as part of that notion, may say that if one argues against mature subjectivity then argument against stability becomes redundant. But in a way that is getting ahead of the intended purpose of the thesis and the patient development of the argument towards that. The most direct way of arguing against the existence of mature subjectivity is to argue that it is impossible, that is, that the very idea of it is a self-contradiction. For example, one might argue that the idea that cognitive achievement lives up to the highest standards and disciplines of rational enquiry leads to a kind of subjectivity that is absurd because such enquiry could only lead to objective thought and never cancel out the objectivity of the enquiry. Besides, the answer to this would be to point out that it fails to account for the different senses of subjective distinguished in an explanation of mature subjectivity.

In the proposed argument *for* the existence of stability an ethical system of uniformity is in the goodness of, the purity of, thought and the world. When one considers in favour of the existence of stability (power, strength, faculties) one needs to talk about consistency in thought. Consistency in thought is stability among at least ideas, notions, and principles and the grounds of consistency in thought, which include ethical principles providing that stability. According to ethical principles, moral and intellectual leaders are responsible for the goodness and correctness of concepts. The intuition, affect, volition, and intellect, being all the faculties of the mind of man, are made stable or mature by that subjective source called the grounds of uniformity in the mind. Modalities of goodness and use, of expansion and limitation, are a further subjective source for consistency in thought.

In listening to and reading about the thoughts of leaders, those who succeed and those who fail, it is hoped that this enumeration of qualities of thought can be perceived by the critic and astute observer that, arguably, uniformity and consistency are the most wanted characteristics in the thinking of leaders and vice the least. What uniformity is will be explained in the next section. So, having given arguments for and against the

existence of stability, in the next section an attempt at a solution to the conflict in these views will be provided and will come down in favour of the existence of stability. The endeavour covers what uniformity is, modalities among the issues in uniformity, the issues for adjudication in the variation of concepts, lines of thought, and waves or species of thought.

*I.ii: Attempt to resolve the conflict in these views in favour of the existence of stability*¹³⁸

First, the parts of uniformity are grounds, order, and goodness, which is decency. Second, the modalities among the issues in uniformity are that which is in the object, that which is in the concepts thought, or that which is in both the objects and the concepts thought. Third, the issue for adjudication in the variation of concepts is what consistency and inconsistency are, what a moral modality is, what absolute consistency or according to morality is, and what usage is. Fourth, unchanging or eternal form is one's first line of thought, concepts being changed by purpose and variation one's second, and concepts being varied by their purity, that is, by their goodness being one's third line of thought. Following on from lines of thought are, fifth, waves or species of thought. In the first wave or system of thought one has concepts with objects but not things, in the second, concepts with things but not objects, the third with both things and objects and the fourth, concepts with neither things nor objects.

In an attempt at a resolution of the antinomy concepts that are varied can be seen to take one of three forms, according to the principle of consistency or inconsistency, in a disparate system of modality, that is, possibility also called opportunity, or in a uniform system of modality, that is, necessity, which is providence. An architectonic or system of uniformity, would include the grounds, order, and purity of the uniformity. The grounds of uniformity would be in either the volition of man imposing the names of concepts on objects leading to a modality, or in the goodness of the concepts being made impure by varying concepts without reason or in both such that a change in one causes a change in the other.

¹³⁸ This whole section is important for it is an attempt at the resolution of the conflict of ideas about the possibility of the alignment of stability with mature subjectivity. The argument is by analogy with Varro's (1938) argument. In this way, the assumption is that stability and mature subjectivity are possible but not necessarily their alignment: If Analogy, Regularity and Anomaly can exist for Varro then by using reasoning through analogy Stability and Uniformity can be shown to exist.

Now, an order for uniformities in the solution to the conflict in views in favour of the existence of stability has been provided. In that order a uniform system of modalities has been mentioned. Next, the modalities among issues in uniformity need to be considered. These modalities are through that which is in the objects, through that which is in the concepts thought, and through that which is in both the objects and the concepts thought. The issue in that which is in the objects concerns that which is wrong, that is vice, in objects modulated to thought as opposed to that which is wrong in objects *not* modulated to thought.

The second issue, on that which is in the concepts thought is about those objects in thinking which are wrong as opposed to the necessity of the right, that is virtue, in the representations of the concepts thought. The issue in that which is in both the objects and the concepts thought involves the necessity and possibility of the right (virtue) in objects and in the concepts thought. Of particular concern on the side of in the concepts thought is whether or not the kinds of uniformity in thought are innate, introduced, or mixed and if mixed then was this an initial unanticipated mixing, a previous mixing, or a mixture currently made up.

In the effort at a solution to the conflict in views in favour of the existence of stability the issues for adjudication in the variation of concepts were enumerated. These will now be represented. The contending parties to the conflict agree that consistency and inconsistency are tacitly defined by analogy to and in association with Uniformity and Right, that moral modalities are those kinds of modalities of consistencies and inconsistencies that can be tested on the kinds of principle of the good and duty, that absolute consistency or according to morality is of the conjoined, disjoined or both conjoined and disjoined kind of Uniformity or Right, and that usage is either abandoned, current, academic, or that which does not belong to any one category.

Also enumerated in the argument for the existence of stability, the parts of an ethical system of principles are noted to be things, the self, the kinds of principle, and the lines and waves of thought. The last of these shall now be brought to order. In this attempt at a solution to the conflict in views in favour of the existence of stability, it was stated that the three lines of thought are of an unchanging form, are of concepts changed by

purpose and variation, and of concepts changed by their purity. In picking up on by purpose and change by variation whether the change is in accordance with the concept's purity or if in accordance with the volition of man is an issue. This leads to the third line of thought on concepts varying according to their purity, that is, because of *decent* purpose or providence, which is the obverse to one's having waves or species of thought.

This endeavour has touched on the four waves or species of thought but has not yet treated of these, which shall now be remedied. The first wave represents concepts with objects but no things, which are abstract concepts that are called ideas. The second wave represents concepts of things with no objects¹³⁹, on which more in the next paragraph, are called concrete concepts that are subjectively real. The third and fourth waves or systems of uniformities represent both things and objects and neither things nor objects respectively.

Ideas being momentary, sentences and groups of ideas and sentences make up the parts of the first system of uniformities, that is, the first wave of thought. Sentences are definitional statements or non-definitional propositions whereas ideas are either concrete or abstract. The relationalities of two abstract concepts are compared by inclination, by kind, by object or by purpose. When by object, then one is in possession of kinds of object, these being common, scientific, artistic, philosophical, or theological.

The second wave of concepts with things but no objects are either with the self, being the subject, without the self, or with and without the self. If with the self then one speaks of the thing, the self, and broken or complete, linear or global thought. If

¹³⁹ Arguably, objects are held only in the general intellect, not in the transcendental intellect. Things held in the transcendental intellect are subjective things, subjects. If a concept is a thing it does not necessarily have to have an object. But it would have to have content presumably otherwise it would be an empty concept -one which says nothing. One can have a concept of a thing but have no object of it in the understanding. In the general intellect, through the senses the object of a thing in the real concrete world is acquired. Things with no objects are those things that have not passed through the senses to be objectified by the understanding. In the transcendental intellect the concept of a thing may be held in the comprehension, for example, from popular lore one fully understands the idea of a unicorn (the concept of a horse plus the concept of a single horn on its forehead making the idea of a unicorn) or from myths and legends the Minotaur (body of a man, head of a bull). Building on this one cannot find a concept in the real concrete world (except of course the word for it) but it is nevertheless a thing, however abstract, contained within the universe of the intellect; the notion or thought of the thing called concept is not an objective thing but a subjective thing called the thought of concept held in the comprehension.

without the self then one speaks only of broken and complete, linear and global thought. With or without the self, one speaks of at least the form of concepts, ideas, notions, and principles in a universe of the intellect. For thought to originate through the senses is not necessary. The interplay of the substance in the relations between judgement and comprehension is sufficient for thought to take place. Thought is not contingent on the reality of things and need not continually pass on to the reality of things but thought may refer back to determinate and indeterminate objects in the universe of the intellect.

What has been inventoried here, taken as contrary to Varro's (1938) arguments for and against regularity, can only add up to an argument for a philosophy *for* leadership but not a philosophy *of* leadership. This means that the subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership cannot be deduced from objective grounds. Although the thesis has attempted to use Varro's work to deduce a philosophy *of* leadership, the best that it can achieve is a philosophy *for* leadership.

The ideas of stability and mature subjectivity can be brought into proximity with each other as if they were synonymous with each other but they do not point to any affirmative result. Simply put, objectivity and reason cannot be used to reach a philosophy *of* leadership from concepts alone. The only alternative at this stage is to turn to judgement and principles in the mature transcendental intellect, which may be seen to form part of a mature subjectivity, to be able to address moral values and ends in a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

II

The subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership

II.i: On the subjective grounds of judgement

Judgement can be distinguished from other kinds of thought but the notion is heavily loaded with philosophical freight. Generally, the term has been asked to select the outcome in thought of deliberating over some particular matter, such as a particular case in morality; or how to apply a concept or principle to a particular example or a new kind of example. It suggests that there has been a problem, dilemma, or conundrum, one has thought it over and made a decision about what one thinks about it: one's judgement. The second major use of judgement is to choose thought about

particular subject matter, that is, aesthetic questions of taste, broadly contrasted with perceiving facts, scientific theorising and explanation. Judgement in this sense is a faculty or capacity defined primarily by its object.

This is central to what Kant (2002) means by judgement; contrasting the sense of beauty or the sublime to moral thought (Kant, 1993) and explanatory, factual, experiential, scientific thought (Kant 1999). Of course there is more to Kant on judgement than captured by this sentence but that is central. So far in the thesis judgement has been chosen to mean something more like the former, deliberately coming to a view especially on a particular case, but now it is necessary to be more explicit. In addition, the connection to moral topics has been central to the notion of judgement, so far in the thesis. The analogy of judgement with grammatical competence has also suggested judgement is judgement on particular cases.

A determining judgement is quite distinct from a reflective judgement. This difference made by Kant (2002) will be honoured when reflective judgement is briefly discussed under the nature of morality. The intellect grows to attain skill in adjudicating circumstances and events as fair and just or otherwise. Man's moral competencies are extraordinarily complex: to appraise the relevance of facts, weigh the importance of these considerations, to make judgements, to give explanations for those judgements and then to provide proof or demonstrations of these explanations are cognitive achievements whose nature continues to be the focus of considerable debate.

That a set of ideas constitute a notion and infinite clusters of notions comprise a universe of the intellect is raised in the first chapter of this thesis.¹⁴⁰ Man's moral competencies or sentiment arises from joining what he knows and believes about a set of circumstances to a set of principles. The latter becomes part of the premises in an argument that generates corresponding judgements. However, one arrives at what these principles are, although one might do so to varying extents, by first covering a range of cases.

¹⁴⁰ Global thought is about clusters of ideas and of thoughts (notions). Linear thought is about ideas and notions in series, one after the other, a string of thoughts. Global thinking also addresses the question of whether one can hold more than one thought at a time.

The analogy made here is between the two like situations of grammar in English language. Grammatical competence allows one to hold clear principles that permit particular well-made sentences to be recognised. Similarly, arguments in morality allow one to hold principles that allow well-formed judgements on particular cases to be recognised. One cannot reasonably assume that the presumptions of common sense and obvious principles of learning can adequately delineate the proposed notion of leadership let alone guide speculation over the possibility of a principle of leadership. Norms and standards of everyday life can hardly be adequate in a correct construction of an account of the moral elements in leadership. These moral elements are most likely to be accurately displayed in the reflective judgements associated with leadership under conditions favourable to wise deliberation and judgement.

Any judgements that pay excessive attention to one's own interests are likely to be erroneous. Hesitantly-made judgements, judgements laced with a lack of confidence or made under affective duress like fright or in terror, can be discarded as being made in distorted conditions. The leader or follower who makes a judgement must have the desire or the will to make a decision, the opportunity and of course be capable of making a decision. One's notion of leadership is *exercised* in reality and within that reality conditions need to be favourable for reflective judgements to be rendered. Circumstances unfavourable for making reflective judgements are those that pertain to the making of excuses and unsuccessful attempts at rationalisation.

Judgements made in favourable conditions may, nevertheless, still be subjected to distortions and irregularities. When an account of leadership is given that is intuitively appealing to a reader the reader may adjust his judgements to conform to those in the account. His confidence in his original judgements about leadership is lost if he can find an explanation, perhaps in the text read, for the differences between judgements before and after reading the account of leadership which has yielded up a set of acceptable new judgements.

The best account of a notion of leadership is not one held before a reading or after a reading but the one that has been weighed-up after a variety of examinations of cases to be the best account. This is the one that matches a judgement made after balanced reflection and expressing the moral standpoint taken by its propounder. His initial

conviction endures or his judgements are revised in the light of other readings of the case. Science does not like handling the questions it cannot answer. Alternatively, sometimes social scientists have the answer first and then seek the problem. These are both moral questions for them and those they serve. Unlike those, including social scientists, who commit to some particular agenda, be it conservative or progressive, left wing or right wing, critical leaders answer to morality and the good and see the judgements they must make in that light rather than in the light of some pre-determined agenda.

II.ii: A philosophy of leadership and moral values

To address the matter of the moral status of a philosophy of leadership one must first agree on the meaning of a philosophy of leadership. Those situations outside higher education which are of moral importance and those that are outside someone's control are beyond the purview of this thesis. A philosophy of leadership, therefore, refers to those moral values of a leader designed to encourage those in possession of similar values to use them in a position of leadership in the intellectual life, in the first instance, and, in the second instance, to act morally to acquire those skills necessarily supportive of the interests of higher education.

When moral action is discussed what is implied is the protection and fostering of those things that are good and of those values that are morally right. If the actions of a leader are of moral value then these are sanctioned by the Good. An argument defending a philosophy of leadership may conclude that leadership is about what is morally right. Now, the question may arise as to who can hold a philosophy of leadership. The answer is that not only leaders themselves, but also candidates for a position of leadership, and also the followers of leaders and candidates. No reason can be seen for others, like observers, to not hold a philosophy of leadership.

In the general view, for followers and some candidates for positions of leadership, to learn the skills of a true leader does not make one a leader, only the imitation of a leader at best. In the real world the actions of those in imitation of a leader are superficial: "He has grasped and preserved well, he has learned, and is a plaster cast of a living human being" (Kant, 1999, p.693). Followers and others who imitate true leaders can merely attempt to rationalise their actions but cannot justify what they are

doing as right, that is, justify the morality of their actions with a moral purpose. The moral practice of leadership is the use of the arts of leadership imbued with moral values and it is this mature subjectivity, not the learning and mere imitation of the actions of leaders, that is at the heart of acts of leading in the art of leadership.

That being said about followers and candidates, in the argument tabled by this thesis on why non-leaders have the right to hold a philosophy of leadership and its values, focus is best *not* on the future as valuable to the candidate¹⁴¹ or to society but on the good of higher education and so the good of society. Now, *that* raises the question of why it is good that non-leaders have a philosophy of leadership and hold its values. The answer to this is that it means debate over the exercise of leadership is possible. If only the leader has the right to a philosophy of leadership, who could challenge his decisions and commands? What could require him to give an account of them and justify why he is doing what he is doing and asking others to do what he is asking them to do?

In contrast, in a community or form of life whose leaders, when making their decisions and issuing commands, can be challenged and called to account to explain their decisions and commands, the leaders can be heard and understood by those who challenge them. The leaders are called upon to justify their decisions and what others are being asked to do. This serves the goods of higher education, a community in which collegiality, mutual respect and transparency are clearly valued and which is unified around the values of higher education: truth, reason, and open and honest debate.

If these values are cherished, in understanding the numbers, the nature of space, time and matter, the merits of literature, and the nature of language, then how can one not be also answerable to these values (truth, reason, open and honest debate) in the way a community conducts its affairs and in the way its leaders lead? A philosophy of leadership in higher education, therefore, refers to those moral values of a leader designed to encourage those in possession of similar values to use them in a position of leadership in the intellectual life, in the first instance, and, in the second instance, to act morally to acquire those skills necessarily supportive of the interests of higher education.

¹⁴¹ The relevance of the value of the future to the follower or candidate is not here ruled out.

Remark and linking statement to Part III

In a general sense, when moral action is discussed what is implied is the protection and fostering of those things that are good and of those values that are morally right. If the actions of a leader are of moral value then these are sanctioned by the Good. An argument defending a philosophy of leadership in higher education with propositions such as those outlined, discussed and clarified in this section may conclude that leadership is about what is morally right.

As will be argued in Chapter Five, to make mention of the moral values of leadership in the transcendental view of a philosophy of leadership in higher education is to say that these are providence and freedom, to be nurtured in a culture of values, with the right of appeal to the Good and duty in judgement. The principles of flexibility and opportunism shared in strategic understandings of the craft of leaders outside of higher education, for example in the military and business, are not only unlike the standards of humanity and justice in the art of leadership but stand in stark contrast to the moral values of providence and freedom.

III

The principles of moral leadership

III.i: Humanity and justice grounded in reason

Good leadership is leadership that is valued by good followers. The moral value of leadership is explained by what is meant by the good and the right. A doctrine of ethics proceeds from the notion of reason to an arrangement of principles. Every individual's notion of what is good for them is different in important ways but their notions of what is right must be sufficiently the same for society to be safe and orderly and so that when adjudicating upon the same case, their judgements are similar.

Everyone should be able to see the *order* of the claims that others make upon them to be the same in the same or a sufficiently similar way. When another's point of view is adopted to see what is to his advantage one cannot make decisions for that person but one certainly can give one's opinion and advice if asked. The reality of such communication and mutual understanding in relation to moral matters requires extensive agreement on them, differences notwithstanding.

People see things differently and see different things being good for them. Different notions of what is good is in itself a good thing because everyone has different talents and desires and one may vicariously experience what it is like to be someone or something other than who or what one is. An individual's notion of his good refers to his own peculiar set of circumstances where he alone may know all the facts to make a good judgement. Practical necessity is a far better guide than feelings for making a decision. One's considered judgements are more readily acceptable than ordinary judgements. Ordinary judgements are one's moral judgements made before philosophical reflection. One's point of view is thus revised and expanded as a result of philosophical criticism and construction and better expresses the affirmation of a true interpretation of the object of one's judgement.

The good man loves justice and that is his motivation. He does not aspire to unjust rule. He merely seeks the esteem of others in moderation and for virtuous action, and he nurtures self-realisation. The good man achieves his ends by doing what is right and just. He seeks a just measure of power and authority over this. He never seeks an excess of power that can be arbitrarily wielded to illegitimately acquire wealth and security. These are sought by an unjust man. These different sorts of moral value are contingent upon one's notion of the good and what one sees as reasonable self-interest. The supererogatory act is performed by one in the interests of the good of another, beyond satisfying natural duty.

The principle of mutual aid requires that an act be undertaken in the fulfilment of the good of another even at some cost to the person performing the act. Life by such a principle protects those helped from great harm or injury. It is a supererogatory act when the hero or saint performs an act of such benevolence at great cost or risk to himself. To clarify this, one can say that an act is *benevolent* when much good comes to the other at great expense to the agent; it is an act of *beneficence* when it promotes the good of another and stems from the desire for another to have this good; and it is a

good act when it is freely done for the sake of another independently of any natural duty to do so¹⁴².

Kant (2002) says that others are not to be treated as a means but as an ends in themselves, not to be used for an ulterior purpose. In being a member of society one cooperates with individuals and groups in many different ways. This natural set of circumstances is particularly suited to the account of reflective moral judgement in this thesis because it is this that allows it to precisely describe what is meant by good so that it covers individual notions of moral value and permits the thesis to expand the meaning of the good in the above passage.

A man's associates are rational members of society. They seek out the features of moral character in a man that they believe they would find in a good person. Such a man would also desire that his colleagues would have adopted similar moral sentiments (as above) necessary to conform to these principles of the good. A person of moral value, a good person, has the features of moral character to a higher *degree* than found in most others even though his natural powers or faculties may be found wanting.

These natural faculties can be developed through training or education and exercised along certain lines but moral virtues, moral sentiments, are principles of *right* on which men act. Intellect is a natural asset. If one is endowed with a superior intellect then it needs to be regulated by moral sentiments and moral values, so that it can be harnessed for right conduct and to also later conduct itself so no harm can come to others or to just institutions in the exercise of their legitimate claims.

To be a good person one needs to have characteristics within one which are seen as desirable by others; by analogy, to be a good leader one would require certain desirable characteristics to a higher degree than others to fulfil that role. Moral sentiment (moral value) bridges any gap between what it takes to be a good person and a good leader. The elements of goodness hold for the case of moral value because the principles of right and of justice are in place to cover any judgements to be made. The idea of

¹⁴² In English, these terms actually overlap. However, in Latin etymology benevolence pertains to the motive to do what is good to another (from *volo*, I will or want) whereas beneficence pertains to the outer deed of actually doing something that is to the good of another (from *facio*, I do or act).

goodness covers non-moral values like friendship, beauty, and knowledge as well as artefacts and roles; people desire greater liberty, although Machiavelli's Prince says more power (Machiavelli, 1984, p.37), more opportunity, more wealth and a means for achieving their ends.

When the idea of good is talked about its meaning is not prescriptive but descriptive; a descriptive definition of the idea in which its elements reside. When something, some object, is good it has these desirable properties or elements with elaborations depending upon the different purposes these things are wanted for: they need to be judged according to their purposive features or characteristics: a case is taken and its different features are assessed against a definition or model to which a set of features called properties have been previously assigned. In this way goodness is a descriptive principle; consistency in meaning for the purposes of philosophy is important so one may evaluate why and how principles vary from one kind of object, that is, from one idea, to another in a notion.

The notion of good leadership relies upon a notion of virtues. This presupposes the principles of right. For example, consider a judge. Certain virtues are desirable in a judge: to have no personal considerations in a case, not to be prejudiced against a party, to be able fairly to weigh up the evidence, and to be impartial. These are moral principles particular to the role or position of a judge and they are contingent upon more universal moral principles of right and justice for them to be morally good.^{143 144}

¹⁴³ For a contrary view see Posner (2008). Posner observes that "The word that best describes the average American judge is '[constrained] pragmatist'" all that is left after legalism, attitudinalism, and comprehensive theory have been rejected as "inadequately descriptive of judicial behavior" (Posner, 2008, pp.230, 236-238). For example the legal process school is too thin on procedure but adjures judges to be impartial, to deliberate patiently, to have an open mind and respect other institutions, to be mindful of the limits of their knowledge, to be aware of sources of bias and to base decisions on neutral principles and not on consequences. But what is needed, Posner says, is agreement on the substance of these (Posner, p.236). Posner concludes that legalism fails to refute the hypothesis that personal and political bias influence judicial decisions (Posner, p.371). However, he goes on to say that: "The principal force tending to stabilize judicial decision making is the existence of a limited, a field specific, ideological consensus in such fields of law as contracts and commercial law[reasoning to outcomes from a coherent body of doctrine, reasoning syllogistically, analysing policy from an uncontested ideology treated as common sense]. American law has achieved the necessary minimum of coherence, stability, and objectivity (in the sense in which an objective proposition is one that commands the assent of persons of otherwise antagonistic views)" (Posner, 2008, p.371).

¹⁴⁴ See Solum (2005) for variations on this. Solum explicates a theory of virtue for judges by countering the empirical question: "What is judicial excellence?" (Solum, 2005, p.1366), in which people will disagree about what the criteria for judicial excellence should be, with the essential normative question: "What makes for excellence in judging?" (Solum, 2005, p.1368). In answer to this question Solum

From the judge's point of view, or any point of view, nothing is morally correct (right) about the point of view itself: points of view vary case by case and there is nothing in any definition of goodness for determining the moral rightness of the view. When one speaks of a good object of a certain kind, say, good political leadership, useful information is communicated in that the features of the object meet the principles, or standards, that have been set for this sort of object. An object and the nature of the object are experienced from one's own point of view, given one's circumstances, interests, and abilities. In more complex cases value judgements of the object can be often adjusted to meet specific situations and desires.

Something is good not because it fits into principles of what is right but one does what is right because what one does is consistent with what one knows is good, which is teleological and preferable because in this way one's actions are justified by what one believes is good. Without an idea of the good what is right cannot be known; simply doing the right thing does not make it right, justifying the explanation for its being right through the proof of goodness makes it right.

III.ii: Providence and freedom grounded in faith not in reason

Morality is doing the right thing with its justification in the Good. The Good is the ideal of the right. Because one is human and lives in the world one is often faced with the decision of what to do in the variety of circumstances thrown up by living life. Thus in *Meno*: "doing what's right is the same as being good, isn't it?" (Plato, 2005, p.89). One can choose to do the right thing or not. Because morality concerns real human conduct under the ideal of the right it comes before ethics so the thesis is compelled to speak of *The Principles of Morality*. In no particular order, that a man honours God and loves his country is widely acknowledged. He should also respect his parents and provide and care for his children. His character should be such that he is honest and just in what he

(2005) articulates a theory of *uncontested* judicial virtues of incorruptibility and sobriety, courage, good temper and impartiality, diligence and carefulness, diligence and learnedness, craft and skill (Solum, p.1376). Contestable judicial virtues are those of justice and practical wisdom, which Solum adds to the list (Solum, p.1385). Two competing conceptions of justice are justice as fairness (Rawls, 2003, pp.10-15) and justice as lawfulness. The former "necessitates intractable disagreements" (Solum, 2005, p.1377) but the latter opens the discussion on who is just because it emphasises excellent judges being lawful. The wrong qualities to seek in a judge are citation, which competes with the rule of law; when productivity becomes more important than carefulness; and when fame is sought over excellence (Solum, p.1385).

does and in his actions he bears misfortune with courage and yet is benevolent towards his fellow man.

To use these existing natural principles better is better than finding new principles. Religious faith affirms that a man cannot observe moral principles through right moral action independently of belief in God because of the nature of morality. Reason can know the moral principle, which prescribes man's duties; the final obligation of the moral principle is to the will of God. Though this will not be argued for in this thesis, the role of faith is crucial to the preferred view. For those unconvinced by Theism, however, versions of a view like the preferred view are possible without the Theistic assumption.

Without basing his actions on belief in God, then, many base them on the good of the State or on a notion of human dignity. Neither is an entirely satisfactory ethical basis for morality in the view preferred. In that view man cannot grasp the true moral principle for any great length of time¹⁴⁵. Individuals have a sense of justice it is true but they also have a sense of right and wrong which can be impressed by education. Education can dissociate morality from faith thus the ancient pagan Greeks conceived of the idea of *aidos* (natural shame) but as to what is natural to man one needs to seek for such knowledge in civilisation. Wherever spiritual conceptions and the moral code are inadequate immature individuals cannot clearly grasp their relation in their thoughts (notions), words, or deeds.

Civic duty is not sufficient motive for an act to be considered moral for civic institutions can be corrupt. In contrast, a clear connection between moral obligation and Goodness renounces any belief in a purely natural morality. Rejection of a spiritual sanctioning of this connection by the mature intellect arguably leads to moral decline. The dialectical spirit is the essential grounds for morally right action and the responsibility of nurturing this spirit rests first, with the education of the maturing human being. Secondly, it rests on fit and healthy public views on matters of concern, and third on just legislation.

¹⁴⁵ This is part of Plato's (2005) point with the doctrine of recollection (Plato, pp.101-102, 112-113, 126, 133-134). Also see Gaita (2004): "Morality... is seen as essentially occasional..." (Gaita, 2004, p.128) and "we should no longer see the ethical as essentially occasional... but constitutive of what it is to be a human being..." (Gaita, 2004, p.135).

Firstly, the education of the maturing individual is the inculcation of moral virtues, like obedience and truthfulness, in the family. Without family the foundation of morality is lost; a culture of morality and a culture of the intellect are vital components during school life. If one is lost then the other is in danger. Secondly, most human beings accept the standards of morality that surround them without question. Populist politics tend to separate morality from spirituality and thus do not keep a true view before the minds of those who recognise the authority of their religious traditions. Thirdly, the laws of the state affect the morality of a nation. Laws that seek to modify people's behaviour can immediately affect public morals and so too those laws that affect the circumstances of their lives. For example, the just state does not manipulate laws that determine the conditions of labour such that they lead to no work, to the ensuing degradation and despair of its work force and to the impossibility of a moral life.

Moral philosophy seeks to obtain knowledge of the order of being independent of religion. Morality prescribes the moral conduct of a man. Each man naturally makes for himself a code of moral concepts and principles applicable to daily life. Mankind's fundamental moral notions descend from ethics although ethics ascends to first principles. To investigate what constitutes good or bad, what is duty and virtue or vice, just or unjust is not within the scope of this thesis. And yet it needs to presuppose these principles as grounds and guides for its argument to advance.

Ethics seeks out the causes of vice and virtue then collects from the first principles of morality conclusions that direct the conduct of man in his life circumstances towards the end which is the point of his life. Only conclusions based on experience and philosophical principles and not supernatural revelation are permitted but an assertion antagonistic to revealed truth is to be avoided and if not then one is to presume that error in reasoning has led to discordance with faith because no contradiction exists between faith and knowledge. Contrary to Kant (1999), reason rises above the phenomena of the visible world so that it too, as well as faith, can point the way to the supersensible and the moral. The truth through faith is not simply about accepting what an authority says is true but, through making certain judgements, an individual arrives at certain convictions which are the result of his own inner experiences and they thereby have an exact worth to him.

The moral order is treated by ethics in a philosophically systematic way. Socrates believed that happiness is sought by every man and the way to reach it is through the virtue of wisdom, which is passed on by instruction. Plato (2000) disagreed and said that man cannot reach the *summum bonum* but through rational conduct. That is, by the virtues of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, man can become Godlike by acting in harmony with one another even though the absolute good, which is the perfect imitation of God, is beyond reach in this life. Plato said virtue was to be trained into citizens by the State, which in his quest for a deeper understanding of justice, he saw being reflected in the inner man (Kraye, 2003, pp.349-351).

Aristotle (1938) never really saw the relations of man to God, and as with Kant (1999, 2002), this seems to be because in his observations he started out from the facts of experience, unlike Plato (2000) who started out from ideas and the ideal. Aristotle was able to explain the nature of family and State, with material goods supplying a fair share towards that highest good which had to be worked for, true happiness. Rational activities arising from man's virtues were proper to human nature and constituted this happiness. Perhaps virtue alone is enough for happiness. Shunning passion and affection may well be wise but that depends upon each man, or when man lives according to his reason in harmony with pure reason happiness can be attained since an individual's nature is part of the natural order of things and God is the architect that has shaped the whole of nature.

Cicero (1989a) maintained that the general object of all virtues is moral goodness which separates rational man from the beasts. With virtues come obligations or duties but the intrinsic nature of actions is good or bad, just or unjust and not because of institutions or customary ways of doing things. The principle of nature is the expression of God's rational will and is above all the laws of man, his States, and for all time. All men are bound to obey the principle of nature and no human authority can change that. A sophisticated alternative to the natural moral code that frees the wise man from its presuppositions is a moral order based on human custom. Both Socrates and Plato (2000) were against this.

Proceeding philosophically, Augustine's (1958) authoritative treatment of eternal law (*lex aeterna*), the origin and prototype for all temporal laws, natural law, which is the principle of nature, conscience, the final end of man, virtue, and marriage, established firmly the truths of Christian morality. Augustine's works became a prominent source for the Church to give its members a clear and definite abstract conception of the world's relation to God, the unity and destiny of mankind, and the nature of the principles of morality. When the authority of the Church is rejected each individual becomes his own teacher in faith and morals and thereby becomes a poor teacher indeed, rather like Diamond's (1988) critique of the Kantian moral code in her parody of the dog that gave himself the law.¹⁴⁶

The universal code of morality is of divine genesis and binds all men forever. In contrast, neither Utilitarianism, nor Evolutionism, nor Socialism can secure all that is called-for in an argument for a philosophy of leadership. Utilitarianism argues that what is right is determined by whatever maximises outcomes. However, this makes the goodness of a man's actions subject to life's circumstances and provides no serious grounds for the evaluation of subjective preferences.

Evolutionism illustrates how ethological analogies show that mankind has reached higher levels of morality from, has lifted moral ideas out of, an animal state. In doing this it denies that man has an immortal spirit or free will and deprives him of an order of justice, good and evil, by which he can order his life. Socialism posits that ideas of morality and justice constantly change with economic circumstances. This leaves humanity with only a relativistic succession of historically contingent systems of morality and no standards by which to judge the times.

Relativism is the harbinger of chaos. No absolute, objective and eternal truth can be known by mankind. Men are all different and keep changing. Their points of view about the world also keep changing. The judgements men make are contingent upon their character, interests, and proclivities. To be pragmatic is to consider not only that

¹⁴⁶ The upshot of this article seems to be the alternative: each according to his needs because no point is served in tying a Kantian moral thought to "unKantian virtue" (Diamond, 1988, pp.178-179). Modern Moral Philosophy apparently does not need Kant's legacy of the absolute necessity of the moral law and to closely paraphrase Anscombe's view [c1950s] from that article: whatever is intelligible meets our real ethical needs (Diamond, pp.178-179).

which is true but also that which experience proves to be useful and since the utility value of the same thing changes at different times, reliable moral truth is impossible.

Wherever a chaotic manifold appears, as in the above, scepticism in the form of levelling accusations that traditional morality is nothing but deception and illusion is not far away. In contrast to this, no man is exempt from the moral code, neither the downtrodden nor the powerful but each man is at liberty to emancipate himself from the existing order of the morality of the master and of the slave, to rise above it by the use of his intellect. The mature subjectivity of the intellect, which is also a form of objectivity and rational intellectual discipline, provides one with the principle of knowledge that guides one in the attainment of virtue in a morally good life. Morality is not independent of faith nor can it ever be.

The teaching of faith cannot be supplanted by moral instruction alone, which is without obligation to a higher authority and therefore without meaning, and without the principle of nature and without faith, hope, and charity. Faith is the setting for education and without it a true education is not possible. Reason in the general intellect may be used to examine and substantiate the behavioural characteristics and actions of leaders in the concrete reality of the world but it cannot replace morality. Nor can it be used to examine and substantiate principles of morality. For in a critical discussion on leadership the role of judgement is to use the principles of morality to affirm the morality of the claims of the contending parties; the social scientist who claims to be doing that is tilting at windmills as he is bereft of such resource from which to draw.¹⁴⁷

IV

Good leadership is the morality of principles informed by ethics

*IV.i: The morality of the principles of good leadership*¹⁴⁸

This section sketches out a general substantive moral outlook on leadership without arguing for the moral elements of this viewpoint in detail. Many aspects of the moral outlook to be expressed in the section are only outlined for the sake of filling out somewhat the substance of the moral dimensions of the philosophy of leadership, so is

¹⁴⁷ Some rather large assumptions are being made here. These would require argument and defence if more space were had. In the making of a defence seminal texts would include Adams (1999).

¹⁴⁸ This section is indebted to recurrent readings of Rawls (2003).

open to contention and debate. However, here is not the place to go into the detail of this, given its role in the thesis. The matter that does arise is that of what comprises good principles for a philosophy of leadership. First principles could be those of right and justice, right being derived from the *natural law* tradition of the West¹⁴⁹ and the justice of ancient Rome and Greece¹⁵⁰; or of the kind that includes self-realisation and the love of *humanity*, two principles on which to build a state.

Classical natural law tradition is well-represented by Aquinas (1981) where the point is made that for all human beings the true ultimate end, realized through the beatific vision, is God alone. This is the first principle of practical reason, that is, the first principle of morality. Aquinas (1981) argues that both the beatific vision and God are absolutely fulfilling; the beatific vision is the ultimate end. Aquinas (1981) concludes that a perfect good is one's final end.

However, Grisez (1965) questioned the Thomistic conclusion with the case of one who commits a venial sin having two ultimate ends: the intention of the venial sin and God. This means the Thomistic conclusion is unsound. New natural law theory (Tollefsen, 2005) revises the ultimate end of human beings to be not God but a cooperative community, human, angelic, and the divine, called the kingdom of heaven, in the pursuit of certain basic goods. The new theory is also contentious in that it argues against Rawlsian imperfectionism to include the morality of every individual to be the concern of the state, thus extending political authority over the common good.

In the congruency of notions that include universal principles the right and just can be arranged by four principles for the proposed notion of the mature intellect: analogy, contribution, power, and duty¹⁵¹. These can be formed into a coherent architectonic for a comprehension of these notions. The norms of right and justice are not contradicted

¹⁴⁹ The natural law tradition is a recognisably philosophical and legal tradition which takes the Bible as fundamental, especially the Ten Commandments. Posner, (2008) says that if common law is not natural law translated into positivist law then it must be something made up by judges (Posner, p.234). Positive law is constrained by universal moral principles (Posner, p.311). In new natural law theory Finnis (1983) is amongst those Catholic philosophers who, since Grisez (1965), continue to engage secular thinkers in debate.

¹⁵⁰ Rawls' (2003) position can be seen as descending from Ancient Rome and Ancient Greece.

¹⁵¹ These were first raised at the end of Chapter 1, II.ii.

but expanded upon by the self in the kind of morality of principles that includes self-realisation and the love of humanity¹⁵².

Before attending to a remark to be made on freedom and then to a more detailed outline on the morality of right and justice on the one hand, and on self-realisation and humanity on the other, the difference between the morality of right and justice and self-realisation and the love of humanity needs to be explained first. The morality of right and justice is about obligation and rights but the morality or principle of humanity is about virtues. When self-realisation is being talked about it is being placed alongside humanity. Only then can both of these be contrasted with the morality of right and justice because they are both needed in the exercise of justice and in obedience to the morality of right. After all, to be just to another in the distribution of some good, one needs to be able to realise one's place in moral relation to others so as not to take more than what one is due and so deprive others of their just share.

In talking about self-realisation and the love of humanity, a supererogatory morality of the love of mankind the saint and the hero exceed the demands of duty, responsibilities and obligations in the performance of their office or position. They not only with ease fulfil the requirements of the right and justice, which is concomitant with self-realisation and a display of the virtues of courage and discipline to fulfil their office, but transcend natural duty and advance what is good for all with a display of the virtues of benevolence, heightened empathy for others, humility, and a lack of concern for themselves. A notion that may feel right is that of individuals cooperating, from the perspective of living and working together, on principles that are fair and reasonable. The lives of individuals are thus regulated by moral sentiments and the principles that would be consented to are those that best express human nature, which is that of being free, being equal, and being rational beings.

In turning to the right and justice the work of Rawls (2003) and his followers is a good starting point. They say that knowledge for the sake of knowledge is a doctrine and

¹⁵² Rawls (2003) attempts to exclude "comprehensive visions of the good from public reason" (Koterski, 2000, p.418) and so twists the debate towards a comprehensive view favourable to modern liberalism. Here both visions are being pointed to as possible in the universe of the intellect; it is not a question of one or the other but of both being provided for in the morality of principles organized by the self.

remains irrational until it is justified. Once justified it either remains irrational or is raised to being a rational doctrine¹⁵³. So, a doctrine ought not to be rejected until the reason for its being has been justified by the evidence. Analogously, the purely conscientious act remains an irrational doctrine until justified. The doctrine holds that because it is right and just the desire to do what is right and just is the highest moral motive attainable.

To do the right thing in virtue of its being the right thing to do is of a greater moral worth than to do what is right and just because it increases human happiness or promotes equality, these motives being of a lesser moral value. These are not desires for what is right although they are morally worthy desires that are connected with the right. If actions that are a man's duty can be characterised by a specific and unanalysable property then his desire for a distinct and unanalysable object is a sense of what is right (Ross, 1930, pp.157-160).

Freedom can now be demarcated from justice in a certain way. Men do no wrong in prioritising morally worthy desires. Once a rational being has experience and full knowledge of a society in which everyone is truly free and equal he would desire little else: in a just society the pursuit is for freedom. In a just society one's fellow man wishes one to be good, not free, but in a free society individuals are free to pursue their own happiness. Whether the pursuit of happiness in a just society can meet with success is another matter. The utilitarian should only wish for individual happiness and not the happy society but the good society which can take account of individual happiness.

A more detailed consideration can now be turned to, a consideration of the morality of self-realisation and the love of humanity as well as right and justice. Only by acting upon moral principles can man express himself as a free and equal rational being, a morally principled being. Mankind's joint rational aim should be to promote these moral principles so everyone can express their common nature. The motive of one and all is a sentiment, the love of humanity, no less. To secure the ends of human interests,

¹⁵³ What Rawlsians are saying here contradicts Finnis (1983) on natural law theory, who takes knowledge as an intrinsic good in itself without further need of justifying its goodness and value (Finnis, pp.1-55, 68-70, *et passim*). Following Grisez (1965), Finnis (1998) does not take up a position that conflicts with the Thomistic position, his work remaining primarily exegetical (Finnis, p.ix).

even under the strain of benevolence being at a loss when individuals, the objects of its love, oppose one another, using moral principles of right and justice chosen by rational beings in the adjudication of competing claims is mankind's common aim.

The morality of principles is contingent upon circumstances of accident neither in the world nor by the assent of other individuals and groups but is shaped by what is believed to be right. The free association of ideas and their relation to one's affect and volition in the virtue of mature subjectivity now determine what is right, not one's association with other individuals or groups and their approval of one's moral conduct, as is the case in the maturing intellect; not the authority of parents, community, state or church and their proscribing one's conduct, as in the case of the immature intellect.

Reference is made by one to the morality of principles as the legislation of judgement when one has been offended. The values that are secured by one's understanding of principles need to be revisited until one has achieved a mastery of the comprehension of an existing set of values or a set of values adjusted to better suit the attainment of the individual to the highest-order set of principles possible: advancing the morality of institutions in society or that of society itself.

An individual's explanation of his experience of moral sentiment, namely the love of mankind, has invoked a moral principle and moral notions associated with that. His account of the moral sentiment refers to an acknowledgement of what is right and what is wrong; how right is it to love the whole of mankind but fail to love just one other person? Clearly the moral sentiment relies on the principle of right while other moral feelings would relate to the principle of goodness. Moral worth cannot be determined when society expects individuals to be good but individuals do desire happiness: to love the whole of mankind is good but to love just one other person is happiness. The saint is happy to love the whole of mankind and the hero has done *well* when he has saved a life.

Concern for others and concern for self are equal and when this balance shifts to the direction of the former the self freely elects to move to the morality of supererogation. When this moral affect is offended the love of humanity and self-realisation, the kinds or forms of moral excellence, are offended and one feels shame because what is right

has suffered; the shame is undone by proving that defects have been made good or by renewing confidence in the excellence of one's character.

Whenever an individual wrongs another's rights or harms them in some way that individual may feel guilt. To assuage that guilt the individual recognises that the legitimate claims of another have been transgressed by their action and that their conduct is to be penalised. Such transgressions arouse indignation and resentment in others and in turn the transgressor feels remorse and the need to restore things aright. Guilt and all that goes with it invokes the principle of right just as shame with its derision, contempt, and scorn invokes the principle of the good. However, these are but parts of a moral outlook on life and work. The moral sentiment, duty and responsibilities, as well as self-control and self-worth are also subject to the respective feelings of shame and guilt.¹⁵⁴

In a moral outlook one also needs to take account of the *equality* of man. The thesis has been discussing fraternity but this is not enough because fraternity is but one principle in a moral view. Calling to mind Kant's (1999) *logos*, how men conduct themselves towards Nature and God would take the thesis beyond what can be discussed here. This discussion is limited to a consideration of equality that regards how individuals conduct themselves towards their fellow human beings. Kant (2002) said to treat one's fellow man as an end in himself, which is the right thing to do. However, further than that one can say that he should be treated fairly, as one would expect him to treat others, which is also the right thing to do. In this way and not by, say, relying on natural abilities or due consideration, in working out what the morality of right and justice requires what is found is that they are a fair basis for a universal principle of equality.

That everyone should have equal opportunities seems fair but too many social barriers prevent a fairer or more just distribution of wealth. The notion of birthright mainly makes for an unfair access to wealth. In addition, the means of acquiring wealth through society's fluctuating and often manipulated division of labour work against a more just distribution of wealth. Social inequalities arise even in families, which invokes the need to view people as being equal independent of their social position as

¹⁵⁴ On the nature of such moral emotions as guilt, shame and remorse *see* Gaita (2004, pp.43-63).

opposed to viewing them as equal, independent of the distribution of wealth and opportunity that gives them higher status. Many social and natural inequalities need to be corrected by social intervention for to do so, caring for the vulnerable and infirm, is one of the telling features, a hallmark, of civilisation.

How one views equality, independent of the status that labour and wealth provides a person, may be better achieved by perceiving one's fellow man as a moral being first, not ranking individuals by what they do for a living or what goods they possess or physical criteria. Some have natural abilities that give them a greater claim on society's resources and that affects their idea of what is good for them. In applying the standard, the strength of each claim becomes an arbitrary contingency in a moral view of equality. Each person's idea of what is good for them cannot be the basis of equality. Society needs a basis for equality that goes beyond the individual.

Collecting personal ideas of what is good for each individual is a procedure that does not support the principle of equality as well as the general facts of nature. While the term may be vague, each and every individual has the capacity to be a moral being, although this may not be realised. It seems that the idea of a moral being is a far better foundation for equal rights than natural abilities since the latter undermines equal justice for all. Equal justice for all is not equal treatment of each and every case; equality of consideration is the essential equality in and for each case. However, the problem with equal or due consideration is that it is a procedure that takes no account of the grounds used to rationalise inequalities. Such a procedure cannot be a fair basis for equality.

That every human being has the capacity to be a moral being, which will be realised in time¹⁵⁵, is a sufficient basis for coming under the protection of justice and the

¹⁵⁵ Moral being is being used here in a normative sense. It is not obvious that all human beings are capable of being moral beings. Sociopaths and autistics have natural abilities that leave them without serious prospect of coming to a moral view of things and living a life in the light of it. This might be called the moral agency view of moral being. Admittedly, moral being is an equivocal term. The thesis does not seek to capitalise on any ambiguity that might arise in the mind of the reader between the moral agency notion of moral beings and the notion of moral being as something worthy of our moral consideration. The thesis is talking about human beings, not animals. Neither is the intention here to draw into extended consideration the notion that some animals could be thought of as moral beings or moral agents in some sense or other and hence have some kind of priority over sociopaths, autistics, and

entitlements of equal liberty. Moral beings have an idea of the good and a desire to be just: all men seek equal justice and all human beings have equal basic human rights. That being said, the notion that not all individuals share in basic goods such as liberty, health, knowledge, and friendship is an uncomfortable one.

That the institutions of society are organised for certain individuals to the exclusion of others denies the excluded their fair share in such basic goods. Saying that social institutions *ought* to be just is not enough. Does government really reallocate the goods of society to an equitable extent? Why does it take government so long? The powerful and their interests are at work here and they are wrong to say that social institutions *are* just institutions; certainly they may hold the form of equal justice for all and treat each case according to public laws, such as those rules that are found in statute books and precedent, but their argument fails at the individual level.

This is because the more complex material level of private moral beings, not the level of institutions where argument about what *ought* to be or what *is* just can be guilt-free, finds the greatest need for justice and a heightened need for a principle of equality. Institutions can systematically exclude individuals from basic goods with devastating effect but except for the powerful, most individuals cannot by themselves starve institutions. What ought to be and what is at the institutional level and at the individual level are two different things.¹⁵⁶ Why should the pursuit of those goods be made harder for the poor, and the rich, in possession and command of more than their fair share, have no need to pursue these goods? (Gaita, 1999).

Man's natural duties, however, cannot all be brought under the principle of equality. Natural duties include doing positive things like helping others in need or negative things like staying out of the way, not hurting others, or making them suffer. All men have these natural duties as moral beings and these duties do not pertain to the roles of individuals in institutions. Individuals do, however, have a natural duty to comply with the just institution of a just society to do their part in the greater scheme of things.

persons in a coma. By the same token, what is not being said is that equality among human beings is based exclusively on their capacity to be moral agents (See Warren, 2000).

¹⁵⁶ To shift from talking about what is to what ought to be in a moral argument without justification is to commit a naturalistic fallacy: Moore's (1903) formalising of Hume's (1975) objection.

That does not mean to say a contract, written or otherwise, exists between society and the individual. A society that binds its citizens in general is not as such a free or democratic society but a society driven by justice. Justice in a state is the source of the obligation on citizens to comply with its laws. Those who assume public office or are better placed to advance their aims are privileged and acquire the obligation of being bound to a system that is largely to their benefit and not to the general benefit of the citizenry at large.

Thrasymachus, in an argument with Socrates, put it this way: “that justice is the interest of the stronger” (Plato, 2000, pp.12-13). More clearly, for a better understanding, different forms of government include tyrannies, democracies, and aristocracies. In each of these states the government is the ruling power. The government in each kind of state makes laws which serve its own interests. This is the *injustice* which they deliver to their subjects¹⁵⁷. Subjects who break these laws are punished. The principle of justice, which is the interest of the government, works in all these states to a greater or lesser degree. Because the government is supposed to have power, the conclusion is that the interest of the stronger is the only principle of justice and that principle is everywhere.

Those who assume public office are bound to an institution that preferentially rewards them and their families over those in the general populace. An individual in an institution conducts himself in a way consistent with public rules. These rules exclude the principle of utility as a general account of duty and opt for the principle of justice in so far as the option has already been made for him by the institution in which he has chosen to work. To choose the institution is to choose the principle. In this way one is bound by the principles of the institutions, as one has given consent and abdicated from the principle of liberty.

No longer can the individual in office shirk from doing his duty. His self-interest and the principle of liberty must come second since he is benefiting from the public good that has invested in him and he is now directly bound to the principle of justice and the

¹⁵⁷ The injustice is that governments do not serve the interests of the people, especially of the weak and vulnerable, with as much vigour as that of the stronger. (Where there is justice there is unforgiveness; not through justice but through forgiveness one achieves happiness).

natural duty of justice. The principle of justice tends towards stability in arrangements between institution and individual.

Furthermore, over and above the natural duties that have been mentioned, to comply with just institutions and to establish just arrangements at little personal cost are the most important of natural duties. These are most important because they define an essential element in the principle of right. That essential element is that if a natural duty allows anyone to easily do some great good at little expense they should not release themselves from doing it but where the cost is great then they are under no moral obligation to do so.

This essential element can also be found in a brief examination of the case of mutual respect and of mutual aid. In the case of mutual respect, to support one's own self-worth is to defend against the contempt and indifference levelled by others against one's own system of ends, which one values above all else. To have another criticise one's system of ends is to bear a heavier cost than that incurred by injury to self-interest.

To lose what one values most deeply is to destroy one's confidence and self-respect. That this should not happen, individuals need to be assured of the esteem that their colleagues hold for them. To express their social awareness of another person's aspirations and feelings, which arise from the volition and affect of that person, small courtesies, which are of no intrinsic value, are afforded them except that to be willing to so do in good faith is often sufficient to respect the aims and interests of another moral being whose conduct is constrained by his taking into account the common welfare, which is to the good of all. In this way one's natural duty is fulfilled, by showing another moral being, who knows what is good and just, the respect due to him.

In the case of the natural duty of mutual aid, situations will come up when one will need the assistance of others. To deny this duty to others is to deprive oneself of their assistance when one needs it. One's own self-worth is affected when one expresses indifference to the needs of others. Acknowledging the needs of others practically is to participate in the order of respect for one another in community. If one rejects one's duty to help others then they won't be there for one when one needs help; their good

intentions, and the trust and confidence engendered, are the measure of value and not the actual help received. Knowing that one lives in a society where one can rely on others in a time of need is of immeasurable value and the argument is sufficient ground for adopting such a principle. Natural duties, then, do not support merely the principle of equality but other principles as well.

The first chapter shows how a principle and its concepts (concrete ideas) form an idea and how ideas make up a notion. How these principles are known and what can be derived from them relate to the purpose of the thesis and not merely an exploration of the universe of the intellect freed from the shackles of being viewed as a faculty of the mind with its own faculties to form a state. Purpose is not possible without freedom from power. It is far better to harness the power and put it in service of purpose.

Good leadership takes account of the morality of principles because the morality of principles determines the nature of the relationship, the critical dialogue, between leadership and followership. Moral principles of humanity and justice, providence and freedom, guide or direct the conduct of the notions, ideas and concepts in the intellectual space-time they make around them. They *do not influence* these objects of the intellect at all but mediate the conduct of them. When men do their duty as individuals in the institutional service of others their guiding moral principles are humanity and justice and when, as educated and civilised members of society, providence and freedom mediate the conduct of their thoughts in the space-time of their intellects, the universe of the mature intellect.

These first principles are axiomatic (Ross, 1930, p.18). To utilise a linguistic explanation for a cognitive event, a relation between a judgement and its grounds, the grounds spoken of are an architectonic of principles that define the grounds for a judgement's simply being a relation not between a subject and a predicate but between propositions. So when Ross (pp.18-33) speaks of a duty *prima facie* and other things being equal and all things considered he is saying duties do not combine with simple propositions to make a compound proposition but are complete ideas in themselves, in abstraction from the conditions of their application in concrete reality. A duty other things being equal for Ross means only some principles have been taken into account

and the kind of judgement that is being passed is of that which is based on only some explanations of relevant kinds of facts.

In contrast, when one speaks of a duty all things considered then the speaker claims to have made a moral judgement based on toting up all the relevant identifiable features in a complete account of the right, which acts as the reason for making the judgement. First principles discriminate out salient features that make up the reason for an ethical judgement.

Not all the principles available in an intellectual universe can be covered. The injunction to have only a few principles available is often heard when in dialogue with others but the reality is that when a few are selected these are from an infinite set or a multitude. In personal dialogues between two persons the use of a few principles is agreeable and convenient but in a public address argumentation needs to be provided to assert and defend a moral view. A single idea usually has a single principle around which it revolves, rarely more. A notion can be comprised of a daunting number of principles and their abstract concepts (rational ideas), not all necessarily in an orderly system.

Somehow human beings are able to make moral judgements, using rules or descriptions when made from the faculty of intuition, intuitively, to act from available reasons and proofs of these moral reasons defined by salient principles. When those reasons are omitted in a moral judgement, because of their less relevant importance, the closer one comes to the principle of the right without risk of error. One way or the other the principle of right, either constitutively or reflectively, is finite for human beings in practice.

This is the very point, Kant (1999, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d)) failed because reason could not explain infinity and here the principle of right under judgement meets with the same limitation. However, that does not mean to preclude the principles of fraternity, equality, and liberty in a mature moral outlook. The greatest of these principles is *liberty*; without liberty life is not worth living. It is the benchmark on which a democratic society should tease out and discard the graver wrongs it inflicts on its people.

From this point it may be taken that in the remainder of this section the issue to be discussed is how to weigh the importance of various liberties in a just society. Hence, a brief but satisfactory account of liberty must rely to some extent on one's judgement and sense of balance. Equal citizenship represents liberty. The capacity of individuals and groups to advance their ends in a structure defined by society is what liberty is worth. Freedom is the same for all. This is an equal liberty which raises no questions. The worth of liberty is a matter of concern since it is valued more by some than by others: those who are better able to achieve their ends are the wealthy and those with greater authority. The wealthier and more powerful value liberty more than the poorer and less powerful because, as has just been argued, when they joined the institution of government to advance their own interests they surrendered the principle of freedom in favour of the principle of justice. In a very real sense for them these two principles are at the opposite ends of a scale.

Social justice is about arranging the structures of society to maximise the worth of liberty for the least advantaged so that they can achieve ends they would otherwise not be able to realise. Liberty and equality can be reconciled in a structure that enables the poor and ignorant to take advantage of the rights and opportunities to release them from the constraints on liberty and from factors which make it less valuable to them.

The equal citizen represents the standpoint from which the plan for liberty is to be adjudicated. The prime directive is for liberty to be protected for the sake of itself; from thence all other liberties flow: freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial, which are liberties of the person protected by the rule of law. Political and religious liberties are liberties to congregate as protected by law; the liberties of conscience and freedom of thought are all equal liberties that need limiting and adjusting, prioritising, under different circumstances in different cases.

As some equal liberties expand others contract. They become unequal when one group has more liberty than another or where liberty is somehow restricted in its expansion. Each member of society is entitled to the liberties of equal citizenship. The regulation and restriction of liberties specify what a liberty is worth. The value of liberties is maintained by the use of reasonable procedures to regulate them, rules of order

intervening in the normal self-regulation of the worth of one liberty as it is being shaped by the worth of other liberties.

Associated with any particular liberty is a complexity of rights and duties. For instance, in a liberty of conscience individuals are free to practice their religious, moral or philosophical interests without interference from the law or other agencies. More generally, a model of liberty refers to three items: the free agent, the restrictions or limitations from which they are free, and what it is they are free to do (Berlin, 1969, pp. xxxvii - lxiii, 118-172).

Freedom is often supported by the principle of utility. When man has freedom of choice under conditions encouraging that freedom then man is a progressive being: when two activities have been experienced under circumstances of liberty man chooses the better activity, the valued activity. Free institutions nourish men's capacities and powers. Experience within institutions of liberty allows men to make rational and informed decisions in the pursuit of value. Institutions of liberty are mankind's preferred form of life to determine how to settle their affairs for free will never abdicates liberty. These are the three grounds for free institutions (Mill, 1910, pp.114-131).

The grounds for free institutions may justify the equal liberties under at least some circumstances but the rational pursuit of value, a single end, denies the liberties of equal citizenship, which teeter insecurely on the formulation of a single teleological principle. To say everyone is of an equal intrinsic value adds nothing other than a reassurance in the truth of a premise in a liberal argument. Adjusting the rights of individuals is not a sound means for maximising value. The argument here is towards saying that liberty of conscience and freedom of thought are the two best ways for a society to maximise value.

To clarify this argument, what is meant is in order to have a rational way to balance different liberties against each other in trade-offs in the political life of a society, a teleological principle is needed. That is, rational trade-offs are only possible between, for example, freedom of association and freedom of movement. A practical instance of that is when anti-criminal gang legislation restricts the association of some for the sake of the freedom of others to travel in safety. If the overarching objective of social life is

known a single guiding teleological principle would be shared by all but in ordinary circumstances there is no such thing¹⁵⁸. Under ordinary circumstances different people are guided by their own life plans.

However, regardless of life plans, a sound foundation for an equal liberty of conscience needs to be sought elsewhere. This is discovered when society acknowledges that each citizen can be represented as a moral being that is prepared to limit freedom of conscience in the interests of social order and public safety. The principle of an equal liberty of conscience is a particular priority under the principle of an equal right to freedom (Kant, 1965, pp.43-45).

*IV.ii Ethics informs the morality of principles*¹⁵⁹

The popular lexical meaning of morality and ethics is substantially the same in English. Etymologically, ethics comes from the Greek word for morality, *ethike*, and the Latin translation of this is simply morale but their meanings are the same. Also, the preferred view, common sense makes no distinction between what the two words settle on. Now, technical and often stipulative distinctions are drawn by different authors in the moral literature of both philosophy and theology. They do not merely distinguish between a morality that has to do with reason and an ethics that has to do with God.

What is in mind is more substantive than that. In the distinction between morality and ethics morality concerns particular cases of right and wrong action drawing from judgements made using the principle of the good and the bad or such action being based on virtue and vice. This is in contrast with ethics being the reflective justification of such judgements in a way familiar from Moral Philosophy. This substantive distinction having been made, it is not at all obvious that God has anything to do with the latter. Indeed, Utilitarian, Contractarian and Kantian doctrines all reject the view that God has any role in the justification of moral judgements.

¹⁵⁸ In war, for instance, a society's single (teleological) purpose is to win the war. However, a devastating effect of being focussed on this is that prosperity suffers from neglect of economic activity, this being the result of a nation's response to crisis. But response to crisis is not moral political life. In peacetime political life Utilitarian trade-offs among liberties, as a concession to defenders of equality, assumes that everyone is intrinsically equal but the interests only of some are given serious weight and the morality of this is questionable.

¹⁵⁹For a discussion of Augustine's *lex aeterna Dei* and *lex naturalis*, as well as *civitas dei* and *civitas terrena* see Chroust (1944).

In this section the account of ethics expounded is done in a summary way, as needed for the philosophy of leadership that the thesis is defending rather than as in providing a full account that would be needed in a proper defence of the notion. From the point of view of the general intellect morality is what reason invokes from the understanding about how to live well but this is a strategic conception limited in its rational force and scope. However, from the point of view of the transcendental intellect morality is also an exercise of the faculty of comprehension. In contrast, ethics concerns an outlook on the world in which morality is conceived. The conceiving of morality is also an exercise of the faculty of judgement.¹⁶⁰

In a *dialogue between the notions of morality and ethics* the right in comprehension is seen to appeal to the Good, which resides in ethics. The fundamental distinction is that while universal principles and ideas about the moral code are expounded in and substantiated by ethics in *theology* in the ethics of *particular* cases these universal principles and ideas are applied to the relations of man and thereby determine his duties.

Currently, numerous philosophers hold the view that God is required for the justification of morality and thus present their view as meta-ethical theories about the nature of moral values.¹⁶¹ For example, Gaita (2004) reworded but carried the sentiment of Plato's moral philosophy to mean "the real object of love is the Good and it is the only thing of absolute value" (Gaita, 2004, p.237). On top of that, Adams (1991) identifies the Good with God in a theistic theory of the Good (Adams, pp.13-49), where God is considered as the Good (Adams, pp.27-28). Good things faithfully image the divine nature because they are dependent upon certain qualities of the divine. These qualities do not define divine goodness. In other words the "standard of goodness is defined by the Divine nature...." (Adams, 1991, pp.48-49).

¹⁶⁰ These are two different ways of explicating the distinction between morality and ethics. They need not line up neatly at all since they are separate distinctions in the general intellect and the transcendental intellect. With this explanation the critical reader is being alerted to what is being done in this section.

¹⁶¹ See Adams (1999) for a highly sophisticated version of Platonism and Finnis (1983) for a neo-Kantian view of natural law theory. From a different angle but substantially similar view to the picture being painted in this section is Finnis (1998) on the natural law and foundations of morality.

Reason cannot surrender full knowledge of nature; as rational beings mankind looks at nature with awe. Although awe is broken knowledge it is sufficient to give rise to the certain knowledge of God's existence; that He made all things; that He is the beginning and the end of all things. Man serves and glorifies God by means of the principle of nature to manifest His Goodness and Perfection with the ultimate ends of achieving eternal happiness.

God has held for eternity the idea of the world, its creation and His government of it. This is the eternal law of God (*lex aeterna Dei*), the origin of all earthly laws. Instinct resides in the nature of animals and it is by instinct that they live and move around. Man lives by reason and free will so he cannot be led by instincts because this does not conform to his nature. Rather, his conduct depends upon guiding principles and judgements which lead him by their light to do what he must. In heeding this light individuals will not be influenced by others to do their will without their consent. Locke (1924) said the *idea* of a principle must first be innate before a principle could be innate but these do not exist so there can be no innate principles (Locke, pp.36-41). This light in the intellectual universe is not Cartesian (1912) innate ideas but an energised Kantian architectonic or logical structure given by reason.

Through complete understanding individuals form their principles of good and evil and through the use of reason they form judgements about being attracted to good and repelled by evil; that it is good they do and evil they shun. By reflection they see the astounding order of the natural universe, in turn, reflecting the will of the almighty Creator. This reflection leads them to the necessity to obediently lead a well-regulated life since man's faculties were gifted to him and not made by him. This is the universe of the intellect, made for the man within, as a reflection of the universe without.

The principle of nature is an expression of the will of God and His divine law that allows His rational beings to participate in *lex aeterna Dei*. Man's ensuing obligation is not to nature in itself but directly to God, the guardian and protector of the moral order. The noblest among men are willing to undergo any trial in the act of performing their duty since heavenly treasures and not material goods are at stake. The moral code is thus observed because it comes under divine law. From these premises it is impossible

to divide morality from faith without denying morality its duly authorised task, its purity and its transcendental importance.

From the principle of nature flow the necessary conclusions that are prohibitions and commands that man formulates with the aid of instruction and training. In this account of ethics the astute reader would have noted that when placed on a Cartesian (1912) coordinate system there are three 'axes': nature/ the principle of nature, God/ the will of God, and reason. Any sense of tension or conflict between these elements, for example, any perceived contrasts of oppositions between what is of God is not of reason; what reason comes up with is not of God; apparent oppositions such as these are intended to be minimal because of the nature of this account of ethics. That said, when principles are applied to what one does, they guide one's conduct. Human beings can use reasoning to tap into the moral order and arrive at a conclusion, which is one's conscience, normative judgements concerning conduct. If one does the right thing and follows one's conscience then the spirit is calm and peaceful but if one does not then one feels uneasy and sorrowful.

The principle of nature is the basis for all human principles and notions. Because individuals know of the need for authority in society they also know of the possibility for authority to impose laws that in good conscience all citizens are bound to obey and because the principle of nature commands that regularly constituted authority be obeyed. All human principles and notions are the particularities or conclusions of the principle of nature and so for this reason every conscious act against what is bound in conscience is an offence against God.

The investigation of these problems of ethics in theology bears upon the principle of nature. It is within the scope of the ethics of theology to explain and prove the origin, nature, subject matter, and properties of the principle of nature. The idea of a doctrine of right is a part of the moral code contained in the juridical order, as Cicero (1989b) had it, and is not the separate science attempted by Kant (1993, 1999). The connections between the morality of justification borne upon the principle of nature in theology and the juridical order's containment of the moral code exist because these connections are contingent upon the types of issue that bridge the disciplines of theology and philosophy. More specifically, this thesis contends that both disciplines address

conjectural, legal, and juridical issues, with several points that may require adjudication, the forms of which are laid out by Cicero (1989b) and which are explicated in Chapter Three.

Briefly, to rehearse this, a conjectural issue is a matter of fact, the truth is sought by conjecture, from accusation and denial the point to adjudicate is arrived at. In a legal issue, the letter and spirit of the law, ambiguity, and reasoning from analogy figure prominently¹⁶². Unlike in a conjectural issue the central point of the accusation and the justifying motive of the defence lead to the point to adjudicate in both legal and juridical issues. In the juridical issue although agreement on the act has been reached between the contending parties what remains in question is the right or wrong of the act. An assumptive juridical issue is established when the defence, in itself insufficient, draws on extraneous matter but an absolute juridical issue is had when it is argued that the act was in and of itself right, without extraneous considerations.¹⁶³

The notions of divine providence and freedom should be the origin of many ideas on humanity and justice. The first principles of right in any notion of morality should be the ideas of humanity and justice. In the practice of notions of morality each man is treated properly and given what is due to him. Because the practice of the ideas of humanity and justice come under the jurisdiction of nature, if they are departed from in some way, then an individual has not fulfilled his duty, has a conscience plagued with guilt, and has a fellow man downtrodden with his rights transgressed.

The notion of morality in dialogue with the notion of the ethics of particular cases¹⁶⁴ applies the principles of theological ethics to the relations of man with God, to himself,

¹⁶² When considering the similitude between language and thought, over Hamann's (1995) assertion that Kant (1999) was merely tracing the rules of Grammar and not the eternal laws of thought the issue begged to be treated as a legal issue, hence the prominent role that stability in thought, being the opposite of ambiguity, and reasoning from analogy have played in the treatment of thought by this thesis.

¹⁶³ The actions of a leader in a community of higher education, that they were right or wrong, may be criticised by others in Ciceronian terms of an assumptive or absolute juridical issue.

¹⁶⁴ The critical reader will note that ethics has been previously used to justify morality, that is, the good in ethics justifying the right in morality. Now, the reader rises to say that ethics is being used in a different way. Yes is the reply but first these two ways of using ethics is not seen to be contradictory in any way. Here, it is asserted, ethics is being used in connection with the morally relevant detail of particular cases as contrasted with the principles of theological ethics. That is correct. So, the reader who speaks now affirms, the contrast is between one way of conceiving questions of what individuals ought to do and another way of conceiving what ought to be done. Then the critical speaker may try a different tack and ask: Or is the contrast between a rationalised way of understanding the ethical issues raised by a

and to his fellow man and thereby deduces the particulars of his duties. The notion of theological ethics teaches that man must do what is good and to shun evil, inflicting injury upon no one while the notion of the ethics of particular cases descends to the details of the practicalities of right and wrong, good and bad, in human relations.

The chief concern of man is to serve God. Man accepts this revelation in the spirit of faith and orders his life in accordance with this. Morality cannot be divorced from faith; the duties of the faith refer directly to God, these being man's cardinal moral duties. Of those duties that refer directly to man, the greatest is his concern for the wellbeing of his immortal soul and to do what it takes to realize eternal happiness. Man is the servant of God. God has undisputed ownership over His creation. However, Man, not God, has a self-regardant duty of care for his own health and well-being. The spirit of man is master of his body and has a duty of care to give and take all things in moderation. Man's lot is to work to acquire material goods sufficient for his own good and to make a contribution to the good of society.

Man has a duty to his fellows: to be humane, to be just, loyal, true, and grateful. New acquaintances are to be looked upon as children of God and not as enemies. Humanity, which is a manifestation of love, and justice, are principles congruent in the same notion: that of how one relates to one's fellow man. One respects another's rights to life, family, property, and reputation. One desires similar in return, resenting disloyalty and ingratitude, the lies that lead a man into error. Because man is thus a social as well as a natural and moral being, since his needs and proclivities predispose him to being a member of society, being so irrefutably makes him a subject of philosophical inquiry. These considerations must be of importance for any account of the nature of leadership in higher education.

particular situation, and a theologised way of conceiving the same situation? This is basically the same question but let the thesis respond to it anyway. In particular cases, even with mitigating circumstances, there may be no difference in the result but what is important is the way that that result has been achieved because, for example, to progress this dialogue, the atheist may use reason to achieve the same result but the theist may use a theologised way of arriving at that result. How they justify their approach is what's important because this comes back to *values* and ends. Here, the thesis is saying that man realises what he should do in his duties by applying the principles of theological ethics to his relationships. By conceiving of a discussion that connects the Good in a thing (a case) with doing the right thing the individual uses the comprehension and judgement of his transcendental intellect to assert his moral being over his physical or social being, which the rational atheist, using the understanding and reason of his general intellect, will not or cannot do, yet still managing to make particular judgements for reasons.

Comment on Chapter 4

This chapter demands not so much a summary but a statement that points to what it is saying about the subjective grounds, the form that is needed before speaking about providence and freedom, humanity and justice. In the antithesis to a prototype of this thesis, the formal intellectual objects of language (notions, concepts, ideas, and principles) are held in the faculties of the intellect: comprehension, understanding, reason, and judgement. On the other hand, the linguistic subject matter of the intellect (analytic/geometric, rhetoric, dialectic and grammar) is not restricted purely to the intellect but may be shared with other faculties of the mind: intuition, volition, and affect.

However, in advancing the original manifold of this thesis, the mature intellectual subject matter of language (propositions, paragraphs, compositions and debates)¹⁶⁵ exist in the leadership of higher education, in its search, composition, presentation and publication. Furthermore, the formal linguistic objects of the intellect (comprehension, understanding, reason, and judgement) that underpin the connecting of beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition) for a new worldview¹⁶⁶ exist in the maturity of the more advanced and sophisticated intellect that comes with experience, in its synthesis of the appearance of a presentation by reading and listening, its representation, recomposition through writing and speaking, and the intellectual affirmation of research and reason.

The maturing intellect in higher education contends with the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of traditional authority, expressed in the language of or spoken with authority on the one hand, and his free and rational thoughts on the other, often an accumulated series of impressions gained through an array of academic experiences. Seeking to reconcile this dialectic is impossible to do without a sufficiently informed understanding of both language and thought.

¹⁶⁵ See the introduction to this chapter, Ch.2, II.ii.i and Ch.2, II.iii.ii.

¹⁶⁶ See Ch.1, II.iii: Progress through holding a worldview.

The leadership of higher education, then, has gathered and accumulated vast storehouses of traditional knowledge through recurrences in search, composition, presentation and publication. On this wealth of knowledge called academic tradition it claims its authority. Those who fill leadership roles in higher education are concerned with not only synthesising new knowledge with old but also putting all that to good use by engaging all the faculties of the mind (intuition, volition, affect, and intellect). In higher education, unlike those in leadership roles, those who possess *maturing* intellects begin to synthesise the appearances of a presentation, a representation, a recomposition, and intellectual affirmation of research and reason, in their intellectual faculties (understanding, reason, comprehension and judgement) alone¹⁶⁷.

The life of the intuition, affect, and volition in the maturing mind is of secondary importance in higher education. Formal higher education traditionally concerns the expansion of the dynamic universe of the mature intellect compounded of the general intellect and transcendental intellect. With regard to not the expansion of the universe of the mature intellect but the growth of the maturing intellect, the intellect is not mature until the general intellect is under the full governance of the transcendental intellect. This will not be possible if one persists in seeing one's intellect solely in terms of a static set of faculties.

The self that sees its own intellect to be mature sees that its intellect is a universe that will inter-relate with other parts of the mind in ways qualitatively different from that of the maturing intellect. This will affect how the mind and the spirit interrelate, which in turn has implications for how one thinks and speaks about substantive notions such as analogy and contribution, humanity and justice using the general intellect and power and duty, providence and freedom using the transcendental intellect. Universal moral principles are what give one a sense of ethics and morality.

¹⁶⁷ This synthesis of appearances points to the student's correlate of search in the researcher/lecturer. The present list of elements in the learning process is open to the criticism of seeming too passive on the learner's part. A more active but not exhaustive enumeration would include their native curiosity and intellectual hunger being engaged to have them do some searching themselves, after the manner and in a way appropriate for their stage of development in the discipline they are studying.

Linking statement to Chapter 5

The complex and abstract nature of moral principles and moral judgements is profound and no man in a lifetime can do justice to a complete rendering of them, indeed, this is not possible since what convinces one man leaves another in doubt. Some may say this thesis is primitive and gravely defective or it may be just plainly wrong. However, what is important is not that the argument tabled secures the agreement of all rational subjects to the details of its proposal but rather that one can so far see that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise *a* firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership, which guides one in the moral conduct of one's intelligence. Others may be possible. But any worth exploring should engage philosophically with the nature of the mature intellect as a knowing subject, the nature of leadership as answerable to the engagement of this intellectual capacity and with the moral nature of this engagement. Anything else will be a misrepresentation of higher education and potentially a confusion of it with secondary or vocational education or the like.

Prologue to Chapter Five

Prior to introducing this final chapter, objective grounds need to be sought for the affirmation of the moral principles of providence and freedom which are asserted in the previous chapter (4, *IV.ii*) to be subjectively grounded in the transcendental intellect. Those proposed grounds are to be found in Boethius (1897), an allegory in which a dialogue takes place between Boethius, a senator of Rome imprisoned by order of the emperor he had served for many years, and *Philosophia*, the female personification of the discipline of Philosophy. In this dialogue, the upshot of the first book is that if one forgets that God is the end of existence for a moral being then one will not see God governing the earth but Fortune alone, where evil men are happy and powerful (Boethius, p.29) and there is no reason or justice underlying events.

This is the important lesson to come out of this first book, with the dialogue between Boethius and *Philosophia* providing secular and spiritual grounds for assent to the notion of a comprehension of morality in a philosophy of leadership. In other words, in this way men will ultimately comprehend the Good in their beliefs and values. On this foundation, leadership in higher education is seen to be a moral vocation serving the ends of human life as the life of the mind contributes to them.

In the second book what *Philosophia* is saying in short is that to “seek Good in material wealth is to lower our God-like intellect to below the lowest of things” (Boethius, 1897, p.52). In other words, when one does well at things one has full self-knowledge but when one loses or obscures the moral dimension of one’s humanity one decorates oneself with worldly treasures that do not in the end contribute to one’s ultimate purpose (Boethius, p.53). The office of a leader, leadership, comes from virtue, not vice versa. If a bad man holds office no honour will come to him merely because he occupies the office, rather, honour comes to virtue. The bad man, who is without virtue, will have his unworthiness displayed when dignity is conferred upon him. Men are not made good by fortune: as Boethius (1897) says, celebrate that you have true friends and do not bemoan the loss of your material wealth (Boethius, pp.64-65). Only a good man can hold the office of a leader; fortune will not make a bad man good but only God can.

Philosophia continues in Book III to argue that happiness is the supreme good for which all mortal creatures aim (Boethius, 1897, pp.67, 68). Perfect happiness, in

shadowing the true and perfect good, affords men independence in wealth (affluence), real power in sovereignty, reverence (rank, public office) in dignities, fame in glory and joy in pleasures (Boethius, p.75). Each of these is substantially the same but human error reaches for these separately from virtue: true and perfect happiness contains all these as valued by virtue. God is the source of all good things but in nature they fall away into the imperfect and its parts. God is supreme happiness (Boethius, p.105) and men gain happiness by getting Godship: happy men, being virtuous, *participate* in the nature of God and are thereby gods. Goodness and unity are the same. Different things are not good as such.

The message in Book III is that the error of the ways of man is such that by implication individuals in universities may reach for leadership alone as if it is a promotional or career option in a matrix of worldly success, without honour, authority, dignity, or desire. However, in so doing, this pursuit never fulfils its promise. In good leadership both leader and followers participate through their relationship in the divine unity of the nature of the relationship between leadership and followership. This unites and binds them, and they are truly and perfectly happy in their unity, in the service of a higher good, not each focussed on their own advancement and success.

In Book IV *Philosophia* asserts that the good are strong, and the bad weak; that virtues are rewarded and vices punished. By strength of will the good and wise aim at and achieve their happiness because they can reflect on the nature of things and their own reasoning (Boethius, 1897, pp.132, 133). The righteous are happy and for a leader to share this happiness with his people is wise and just. When God uses evil things to bring forth something good it appears that wicked men are rewarded and the good punished.

Boethius replies, telling *Philosophia*, who agrees to this, that it is her office to reveal the hidden causes of things (Boethius, 1897, p.155). Her rejoinder is that causes transform elements into new combinations. Boethius also says she is called to explain principles in a reasonable order because men cannot see the divine order. To this she counters that if men do not know the principle of divine order then all appears “confused and disordered” (Boethius, 1897, p.159). By one’s own will one makes one’s

fortune and because it is either just or useful all fortune is good fortune. If it neither disciplines nor amends then it is punishment (Boethius, p.169).

The moral here is that good leadership shadows the divine order, to discover the causes of the combinations and permutations of the elements of things and to explain principles in a reasonable order: from a steadfast mind causes, order, and form are discovered and explained; with no room for randomness. This is the providence of leadership, the fate of the followership, assigning the appearance of these things to their correct position, form, and time.

Philosophia tells Boethius in Book V that divine providence orders all and chance has no room to exist (Boethius, 1897, pp.174-175). Man's reason cannot conceive of divine foreknowledge so men cannot understand how free will can be. Man is seen through the faculties of his senses, imagination, thought, and pure intelligence, the last of these covering the whole sphere of the universal and cognising the first three by its own higher faculty alone (Boethius, pp.189-191). "For that which hath the natural use of reason has the faculty of discriminative judgement and of itself distinguishes what is to be shunned or desired" (Boethius, 1897, p.177).

This is glossed by this thesis with the analogy that by divine foreknowledge the knowledge of leadership is a human providence that limits the boundaries of the followership to what is right and just, to the virtuous and its hopes. The wisdom of good leadership places no bounds on divine intervention; on what is providence and what freedom can be in the dedicated fulfilment of duty. Good leadership has no room for the much-vaunted pragmatism of many of those in positions or who aspire to positions of leadership in society today.

*

Chapter 5

Objective grounds for the defence of a philosophy of leadership in higher education

The mature human intellect seeks affirmation in objective grounds of authoritative works in the philosophical tradition that it has achieved its ends with purpose, a philosophy of leadership for higher learning. The defence of a philosophy of leadership is not only the defence of its subjective grounds but also that of its newly-revealed objective grounds, the literature of the philosophical tradition on higher learning or education, which is the concern of this final chapter.

The introduction to this chapter is prefaced with the reminder that the main thesis statement is that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. The overall argument step by step advances that: (1) the mature human intellect is a secure subjective ground for a philosophy of leadership because it can recognise that the duality of the general intellect and the transcendental intellect is thoroughly human; (2) in a search for objective grounds for such a philosophy exploration of the tradition of science reveals that this does not comprise a firm objective foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education because it fails to consider values and ends; (3) exploration of the liberal arts tradition exposes a lodestone of classical literature that forms a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership because it does not exclude any consideration of morality and ethics but engages with determination, matters of fact, and matters of value; (4) this vein of work can be directly traced to the classical literary tradition of philosophy and that the tradition of philosophy supplies a mother-lode of literature which is an enduring objective ground for a philosophy of leadership in higher education.

In addition to this reminder the following statement is made about the position of the thesis, keeping in mind that the thesis finishes with an exploration of more than just a few transcendental principles, as for a private discussion, but the selection of a larger number of these principles, which may be both implicit and explicit and which is preferred in any public demonstration of a philosophy of leadership, in this case, in higher education. Focussing on a philosophy of leadership in the field of higher

education is intended to exemplify a universal philosophy of leadership, since the institution of education, arguably, reflects most closely the society of which it is a part.

That statement is that western universities have traditionally perceived knowledge to be open-ended and in theory at least available to all. Again arguably, practice has shown that different domains of knowledge are available to only the right groups, for example, to only the very rich, the highly qualified, or those who belong to preferred elites. To judge what is to be included in a domain of knowledge may come with a level of risk. Intuition may indicate that history would legitimise current social science knowledge about leadership.

However, careful analysis of different traditions may provide evidence demonstrating that the contrary is the case. Attention is drawn to tradition being not the mere collection of doctrines or dogma but is the explication and implication of beliefs held in various texts analysed and interpreted hermeneutically. Such analysis and interpretation is deemed necessary since the reader may not have copies of texts present during a reading of the thesis. A doxographical approach secures the survival and transmission of the texts collected for interpretation.

The works referred to are not only those representing the liberal arts but also philosophical works such as the dialogue between Pelikan (1992) and Newman (1959a, 1959b). Although Newman's works are unlikely to be lost in the near future, this dialogue is intended to demonstrate in part how at least the sense of a text may survive and be transmitted through another text. The presence of a text for interpretation is presupposed because the text is the evidential source for direct and indirect quotes used for affirmation and criticism in ongoing academic debates.

Hence, a scientific approach to leadership furthers understanding of leadership in a much more limited way than the social scientific literature intimates because science repudiates notions, values and ends. Understanding that science is just one of a number of traditions better informs the position held in this thesis, that leadership includes doing what is right, which has its source in the Good. To ignore man the moral being is not to comprehend leadership at all.

I

Introduction

Whatever their more specific purposes, the ultimate purpose of a leader is the absolute Good. Leaders draw from what is real and tease out the imaginary; create true and false propositions, accept the true and deny the false; know and act on the difference between what is right or wrong and what is legal or illegal; all the while the ideal leader maintains the unity of the self with the absolute Good. With regard to the office such leaders occupy, the starting position of this chapter will now be clearly outlined.

Leadership can be aligned with the faculties of comprehension and judgement in the intellect. Leadership is not intended to be aligned with understanding but the *real* leader and *real* leading are spoken of in preference to this and sometimes, as necessary, *true* or flawed leaders. Talk of real and true leaders and leading properly belongs in the general intellect and its empirical operation. However, when one uses one's faculty of comprehension leadership is naturally associated with virtue and vice because the State, namely the traditional and juridical authority of the State, comes immediately to mind. This is called *legitimate* leadership. Furthermore, when leadership is thought of and associated with right and wrong this is called *moral* leadership.

A major difference between these is that legitimate leadership seeks the affirmation of reason while moral leadership draws its authority from the Good. Right thoughts and right actions are a manifestation of the Good. The Good is universal but its diminution by evil is not so much a quantitative measure of varying in extent and in different degrees for different periods of time but is a slackening of form (Aquinas, 1981, p.251). Good leadership from a human and transcendental point of view is a divine gift because it depends on the faith of the leader and of the followership in the Good.

By arguing for the connection of real and true leaders and leading with understanding and reason, and moral and good leadership with comprehension and judgement the thesis is not saying that these are strict and binding categories but loose associations among the ideas and notions of these in the universe of the intellect. It seems impossible to strictly segregate all ideas and all notions into faculties, or the general or transcendental intellect, or categories and classifications of any human kind. When *Philosophia* asks Boethius in Book I (Boethius, 1897) whether he believes in God, he

says yes. But then she asks him if God or fortune alone is the end of existence and Boethius replies fortune. *Philosophia* then knows he is confused and sets about enlightening him.

So one does not simply share in this confusion, one needs to begin with *Philosophia*'s distinction between divine providence and fortune. In the universe of the intellect providence and freedom (morality) along with the notion of the right and wrong of faith are held together in the view of the transcendental intellect. Similarly, in the view of the general intellect fortune and justice are held together with the virtue and vices of the State. Further, in the use of judgement leadership unites with the Good.

In the argument of the thesis for each of these substantial notions, which are complex abstract ideas, representatives of the appropriate literature will be referred to as substantiation in support of making these connections. Having outlined this starting position, the main argument of the thesis will be reviewed before proceeding to a treatment of leadership in works selected from the literature on higher education in the light of what the thesis has just said concerning connections made in the view of the general intellect and of the transcendental intellect in the universe of the intellect.

I.i: Review of the main argument of the thesis

Through an explication of and response to *The consolation of philosophy* in the prologue to this chapter the subjective moral principles of providence and freedom¹⁶⁸ have been objectively grounded in the literature of philosophy.¹⁶⁹ Picking up on where Chapter Four ended, the moral conduct of man's intelligence in higher education is distinctive. Many in agreement with this distinctiveness would immediately suggest the use of science, the different disciplines, doctrines, and methodologies like Phenomenology and Interpretivism to analyse and learn more about those marks that

¹⁶⁸ Prima facie, the reader may have a problem here. A principle governs human behaviour whereas providence may be considered as God's behaviour. What is meant by the moral principle of freedom is that all human beings ought to enjoy as much freedom to be self-determining as possible, consistent with all being equally free. However, by the moral principle of providence this is, in the first instance, being distinguished from fortune. To consider this distinction more deeply see the prologue to this chapter, especially the last four paragraphs.

¹⁶⁹ Consider now the yawning gulf between the real leadership of phenomenography and good leadership.

distinguish higher education from other forms of education. For these are more contemporary manifestations of the need or urge to know.

However, to recapitulate, the thesis has seen that science cannot be satisfactorily used because leadership, especially leadership in higher education, is an ideal formed in the light of the ideal of the human intellect and not just empirical facts. Instead, it started out with Kant (1999) and his static model to understand the mature intellect and with purpose search through the traditions already in the possession of academia and to not produce yet another empirical study to add to the surfeit of these, since this is a philosophical and doxographical matter and not a scientific and historical issue.

Nevertheless, in higher education today, universities that may have entirely dispensed with the traditional academic schema of researcher and professor cum lecturer and tutor in favour of the blanket use of the teacher-learner model in all disciplines may have been well-intentioned but may also have erred. By this is meant that the traditional academic schema may be a better means of delivery in some disciplines than the scientific teacher-learner model. This model is inclined to favour the learner because, after all, the good of the learner is central to higher education.

However, perhaps motivated by this, it seems that government (Dawkins, 1988) through reconstituted university administrative systems has generally branded the use of the traditional academic schema as obsolete (Biggs, 2002, pp.143-145; Butler, 2007, pp.28-53; Coady, 2000, pp.14-16). This is most evident in the delivery of modern professional and science courses at the undergraduate level. In defence of retaining, or wherever necessary reintroducing, the traditional academic schema, this thesis returns to classical heritage, the better to inform academic literature and subsequently the literature on education policy and practice.

Furthermore, this could not and cannot be done unsupported. The main argument of the thesis has followed the line that from these objective grounds alone one cannot proceed directly to a philosophy of leadership but only mediately through the proposed schema of the mature human intellect. For, in contrast to primary and secondary education, higher education addresses the mature intellect and its enquiries. Hence, a notion of the nature of the mature intellect is called for in a philosophy of leadership in higher

education. In terms of its account of the mature intellect, the thesis has aimed to establish the subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership in the mature transcendental intellect. It has rejected the notion that leadership is a concept of the understanding in favour of leadership being a notion of the faculty of comprehension with its grounds being the idea of the art of leadership in reason¹⁷⁰ and its principles in judgement.

Moreover, at various stages the thesis has indicated that thought is broken, linear, global, or sublime and can be aligned with understanding, reason, comprehension, and judgement, more particularly in the first instance with concepts, ideas, notions, and principles, respectively and then with beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition). As indicated at the outset, with the interpenetration of ideas this latter schema has been advanced in the thesis with propositions, paragraphs, compositions (formulated positions) and debates, no less so in this chapter. In addition to this, human beings not only think in terms of language but also logically, and spatially. Further, the thesis has affirmed that the objective grounds for such a philosophy have been long-extant in the literature of classical tradition.

So far, then, a credible philosophy of leadership is seen to be objectively grounded in the traditional literature of the classical liberal arts and is subjectively groundable in the mature transcendental intellect. This chapter will complete the main argument of the thesis by showing that the very existence of universities depends on their, indeed their representatives, being morally bound to participate in an ongoing dialogue on those matters that demand to be addressed. The reason for this is that their own interests are closely tied to the interests of local communities and society at large, both of whom they serve. This is on top of universities and their representatives being bound correctly by both their objective grounds, by which it is meant traditional authority, and their subjective grounds, by which is meant freedom of thought and expression.

Having reviewed the main argument, the thesis now proceeds to a treatment of leadership in works selected from the literature of higher education in the light of

¹⁷⁰ Although leaders and leading are directly connected with the faculty of reason, leadership is not connected so. That does not mean to say that the *art* of leadership can be dismissed as not connected with reason: leadership is mediately connected to reason through its art.

connections made in the universe of the intellect through the general intellect and the transcendental intellect. These works represent the appropriate philosophical literature and attest to the connections made in reasoning for the substantive notions that comprise real and true leaders and leading, legitimate and moral leadership as well as good leadership. These distinctions were made at the beginning of this chapter and will now be worked through, starting with real and true leaders.

I.ii: Real and true leaders

Real leaders in higher education use the faculty of understanding, which is incomplete strategic thought, when filling the office or a position of leadership. When a real leader uses his understanding he is connecting with fortune, opportunism and flexibility, that is, advantageous chance along with what is in a shared reality and what is formal or imaginary. Such a leader takes risks. Contrary to what real leaders do, formal leaders have the appearance of a leader but in reality they demonstrate through their behaviour that they are not real leaders because they lack the skills necessary to operate strategically with the opportunities that fortune presents to them: they are leaders in name only.

Also, true leaders have been distinguished from real leaders. True leaders, including those in higher education, are concerned with reason and the reasonable man, justice and the truth, the acceptance and rejection of true and false propositions. A true leader possesses *all* the necessary qualities and demonstrates that he has the skills necessary to fill the office of a leader. Contrary to true leaders, leaders are said to have flaws when an individual who inadequately fills the role of a leader does not possess all the qualities or characteristics required to fill that role.

Burns (1978) is recalled as having offered an alternative general-scientific view of leaders and leading with his tripartite division of these into the transactional, transformative, and transcendental. However, his attempt to subsume or bury the transcendental in what he called intellectual leadership was noted. Apparently, his reason for this was that he realised that to develop the idea of transcendental leading would be in breach of his position. Burns said all he wanted to say about morality in his treatment of what he called transformative leadership before moving on to speak about

what he called intellectual leadership in which he drew examples of individual leaders from history.

By substituting transcendental leadership for intellectual leadership Burns (1978) thus avoided the burden of speaking from the moral standpoint that transcendental leadership demands, a position too litigious for his political science view of leaders and leading. What Burns could not impart Berlin (2000a) has appeared to supply in his distinction between the notion of a critical leader and the inspirational leader. Like Kant (1999, 2002), the thesis interprets critical and transcendental to be synonymous. After further enquiry, the following interpretative explication is based on a reading of Berlin (2000a, pp.186-194), which is aligned with a development of his outlook. Thus:

When my followers and others identify me as the embodiment of the group, or recognize my authority to represent them, then I am the personification of the office of the leader, the active spirit that creates and destroys, rejecting opportunism and flexibility in favour of the diversity of humanity on the one hand and rejecting arbitrary power, tyranny and inhumanity for justice on the other. More than this, being a leader is about defying the given, quietly holding sacred the principles and beliefs of divine providence and freedom, that no one has dictated to me, undistorted values for human life, conscience, and rights.

Creating these answers myself to the perennial philosophical problems that face us all I create the truth, which is not a form outside me but inside me. It is to realise that we learn the truth in the study and converse about the nature, origins, importance, and sanctity of people and things placed by the architect and creator for me to discover; the great presupposition that enchants the seeker of answers to the purpose and nature of life: realising that not all is cause and effect, means and ends in the interaction between facts and ideas, ideas and notions.

To represent a group among representatives of other groups is a noble image: to see reality clearly and treat ideologies and theories for what they are, to uphold true liberty and contentment and to distinguish between these two sets of notions, the one trivial and the other important; to forsake the waste of human lives in the name of ideals and doctrines; to investigate realities and not possible scenarios; to not transact and not

transform but to cast a critical eye over and conserve what is; to build on old ruins instead of saving strength for what might be; to pick up historical threads and weave together the strengths and weaknesses of humanity and human institutions into a formidable tapestry that is the cause held sacred against all the odds; this is the *transcendental* leader in all his goodness and rightness.

It is not about what is offered by *inspirational* leaders (Berlin, 2000a, p.190), in which people are spellbound by an illusion that something exists or is about to come into being and the inevitability of recognising the imminent. Inspirational leaders do not build confidence in those who doubt and hesitate to make a decision with dignity and forbearance. The inspirational leader motivates people to act for an abstraction, ideal or form: the Church, the State, liberty, or equality. Alternatively, the *transcendental* leader lives a shared reality with people, with the facts and how they dance with ideas; there is no vision, no fantasy to die for but the *critical* leader is someone who understands people, their virtues and vices, strengths and weaknesses, and has made it his duty to nurture them so they can transcend themselves into what they desire to be.

Inspirational leaders take lives. The *transcendental* leader, the *critical* leader, gives people opportunities to build their lives anew and on new rules, by new principles. The inspirational leader holds his cause above all else and believes in victory by overcoming overwhelming odds while ignoring dangerous obstacles, with faith and sheer willpower. In contrast, the critical leader is not somehow outside of his people but belongs to his people; he is regarded with affection and admiration, he holds the confidence of the people, and they forgive him his human failings. It is not faith and willpower that carries him through but his moral confidence and responsiveness; he understands men, the situations they share, and the timing needed to act on the whole picture, a picture acquired in detail, piece by piece, from a common experience.

So, as reflected in this interpretative rendering, although it appears that Berlin (2000a) has accomplished what Burns could not, that is, an account of transcendental leadership, in fact this is not so because although he is distinguishing between the inspirational leader and the transcendental leader he is not talking about transcendental leadership. When Burns (1978) talked about intellectual leadership and drew from actual historical figures he was talking about real leaders but Berlin did not draw from

history, focussing upon the differences in characteristics and skills between inspirational and transcendental leaders. So, in the terminology of this thesis he was talking about true leaders but, although the sentiment was there in pointing to moral confidence, Berlin did not go far enough towards an account of the transcendental leader involved with reason, justice and the truth. Now the need is to seek elsewhere for an account of leadership.

I.iii: Outline and Response to specific aspects in a few of Rorty's works

Generally, Rorty (1989, 1998, 1999, 2007) and this thesis agree to varying extents on (1) the need for more than science, (2) the value of studying the liberal arts and especially the history of philosophy, (3) the resistance to relativism and scepticism and the desire to move away from the impasses of old debates about realism, relativism and scepticism. Altogether the thesis parts company with Rorty on his post-analytic pragmatism. In the examination and criticism of his works very specific aspects are being pointed to because some common ground is shared, especially with the early Rorty. However, central parts of his views are rejected, particularly that in a post-realism-relativism debate relevant to traditional authority.

(1) The early Rorty (1970) made substantial contributions to analytical philosophy in the philosophy of mind, especially his articles on eliminative materialism and transcendental arguments. In the latter he claimed that if one “possesse[d] the concept of an experience ... one possesse[d] the concept of a physical object” (Malachowski, 2009, p.97) thereby building on Strawson’s version of Kant’s (1999) *Transcendental Deduction*, in which Kant argued for the possibility of the experience of objects contributing to the possibility of experience. Rorty (1970) thus demonstrated his early concern for the need for more than science alone.

(2) On the value of the history of philosophy, the middle Rorty (1998) challenged the traditional authority of philosophy (Rorty, 1998, pp.63-83) and attempted to disconnect philosophy from theology (Rorty, 2007) and replace it with literature by claiming that philosophy is a transitional genre (Rorty, 2007, pp.89-104). To do this is absurd because philosophy has a tradition of its own, grappling with perennial problems to solve and questions to answer. To disconnect theology from philosophy and replace it with literature generally is going too far for the proposed philosophy of leadership

because the Good, which is the concern of theology, provides affirmation of the Right. Without this justification of the Right by the Good abstract notions of leadership in the thesis would not be possible.

Just because one believes that one can turn language, self, and community (Rorty, 1989, pp.3-69) into historical *contingencies* that does not mean to say that this is a licence to “render traditional philosophical problems redundant” (Malachowski, 2009, p.101). This is simply wrong. These contingencies are dependent not upon chance, fortune or some great unknown but on divine providence. Divine providence is the unconditioned rejected by Rorty (pp.72-90).

(3) The post-analytic pragmatism espoused by the late Rorty (1999) had little to do with traditional philosophy. Pragmatism aims to avoid the academic-dogmatic dialectic by compromising with an observed reality and by manipulating different relativisms, the truth being whatever one agrees it is. Unlike Rorty, one may believe in an absolute Truth and strongly agree that outside interference is contrary to what a university is about. However, surrendering traditional epistemological justifications (Rorty, p.69) for fashionable socio-political justifications (Rorty, p.69) in the name of academic freedom is not the responsible thing to do because, not the least of it, this social scientific infringement upon the prior claim of the humanities would fail to sufficiently characterize the nature of a university.

Leadership needs morality and ethics and not just a democratic consensus in a market place that offers sufficient value. Hence, only a philosophy of leadership is adequate to that task also because science is contingent upon one being grounded in external reality even though philosophy includes the internal reality of the objects of the universe of the intellect. One’s reasoning does not exclusively involve the manipulation of representations offered by one’s senses but also those by one’s comprehension and judgement.

Pragmatic aims and technical expertise are not enough. By moving away from worldly aims to the transcendent, values intrinsic to the life of the mind itself (Arendt, 1978) are revealed to lie. So, by and large, when Rorty (2007) argues that going directly from art to literature, that is the novel, is sufficient for leadership because there is no longer any

point to philosophy, that is morality, morality being just what one decides to do, he is rejecting the proposition that the subjective grounds of divine providence and freedom are the first principles (MacIntyre, 2006, pp.143-178) of the transcendental intellect.

Linking statement

Real and true leaders and leading have been distinguished from moral and good leadership near the beginning of this chapter. Moral and legitimate leadership in higher education can now be considered. In this, the relationship of freedom of thought with traditional authority is of an importance tantamount to one's understanding of leadership in higher education. If Rorty (1999, 2007) and his post-analytical pragmatism had his way this would not be possible. In arguments for these substantive notions the thesis will refer to Pelikan (1992) and Newman (1959a, 1959b) on freedom of thought as well as MacIntyre (1990) on traditional authority, as substantiation in support of making connections among these notions.

II

Moral and legitimate leadership

In a search for what the moral principles of the idea of a university are, the conflict between the ideas of *freedom of thought* and of *traditional authority* is an antinomy of leadership in higher education that only the transcendental intellect can reveal and resolve. This appears to those of the general-scientific view to be an irreconcilable duality in the collective consciousness of a university. However, to the contrary, this apparent conflict is resolvable in the office of a leader and relates to the sharing of values and ends through the use of language. Now, language precedes thought because men are born into an already existing linguistic environment, which indicates that Hamann's (1995c) proposition that language and thought are one and the same is correct. Both authority and genius use language to transmit between individuals, groups, and generations traditions of academic excellence in universities.

Embodied in the leadership of higher education is an unbroken chain of authority used to preserve and to protect the tradition of the right of individual human beings to freedom of expression and ipso facto of freedom of thought in a safe environment. Without authority fostering freedom of expression and freedom of thought tradition in higher education would not be possible. Tradition in universities is the tradition of

allowing and fostering in individuals the freedom to think and to connect thoughts among human beings in a civilised way, for instance, through argumentation, which is universally possible through the use of language.

In support of *freedom of thought* being a first principle of what it means to be a university, in the section following, the critical dialogue between Pelikan (1992) and Newman (1959a, 1959b) is a doxographical demonstration of how the sense of one text can be transmitted in part through another, as already avowed at the beginning of this chapter, but also objective grounds in favour of a philosophy of leadership in universities. In the section after this, what the thesis calls MacIntyre's soliloquy appears to be against freedom of thought as a first principle and in support of *traditional authority*, a legacy of Rome traced through Augustine (1958), being the first principle on which to base what it means to be a university.

II.i: Freedom of thought: critical dialogue between Pelikan and Newman for a philosophy of leadership in universities

II.i.i: On a consensus over the idea of a university

The critical intellect is nowhere more often found than in traditional universities with strong and enduring faculties of theology and philosophy, arts, especially the liberal arts, and sciences. To say the object of the university is "intellectual, not moral" (Newman, 1959b, p.7; cited in Pelikan, 1992, p.9) is one thing but to have said "Knowledge is an end in itself" (Newman, 1959b, p.7) is a stronger claim and is especially inflammatory to the utilitarian. In natural response to this the thesis observes that the relationship between university and community is indeed thoughtlessly broken by those who will not accept both the philosophical and theological assumptions on which a university rises and progresses. More reflectively, the connection is certainly intimate yet problematic, essential yet complicated.

Nevertheless, Pelikan (1992) discerns that man advances understanding through research and transmits knowledge through lecturing; preserving what is known in libraries; and disseminating intellectual endeavours through publication, with lecturing and professing being included in this. He asserts that universities are about more than being a possible means for everyone to earn a living or the prevention and curing of disease. By including that knowledge is an end in itself Pelikan thus endorses Newman.

In other words, he has been saying that the useful arts are dutifully pursued by those who help others to overcome the disasters that nature throws at them, and that the liberal arts forsake the moot point that knowledge is a virtue to lead the charge.

All universities are technologically and intellectually connected in a spirit of academic freedom and free enquiry says Pelikan (1992). He argues that the perceptions of the value of apprehending first principles are far more important than their application to a given set of circumstances. Minds meet in acknowledging first principles; if not, then no argument can change a mind. Within a tradition one is not free to redefine one's idea of a university without reference to its heritage although the meaning of intellectual virtues can be agreed upon. The fulfilment of one's desire to know transcends the self but knowledge, being an end in itself for the university, does not guarantee the scholar, and by scholar the thesis includes the grammarian and the man of letters, the wisdom to transcend that knowledge (Pelikan, p36).

Through quoting Newman (1959b), Pelikan (1992) is saying that "'University teaching without Theology is simply unphilosophical...' (Newman, 1959b, I.ii.9, p.80)... 'it is a place to fit men of the world for the world' (Newman, I.ix.8, p.236)" (Pelikan, p39). Pelikan (1992) and Newman (1959a, 1959b) both draw back from saying it explicitly but here it shall be: to remain philosophical far better to abandon teaching without Theology and turn to professing and lecturing with Theology.

Pelikan (1992) is saying that separating knowledge and faith, society and Church, is to impart knowledge in a deficient scholarship. That a university *teaches* universal knowledge (Newman, 1959b as cited by Pelikan, 1992, p.41) is some kind of ideal, a first principle to be integrated under a comprehensive set of first principles of intellectual virtues (Newman, pp.152-153). However, contrary to what Pelikan and Newman said, the thesis argues that it may well have been necessary to *teach* in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries when 12 to 16 year olds were admitted to universities but in the twentieth century only those over 17 were admitted. This makes it unnecessary to teach because the concern with the university is with the development of the intellect alone and not the whole person, as was necessary when handling a maturing intellect.

In the position this thesis takes, teaching is about the whole person, the whole mind. However, professing, lecturing, and tutoring are about the whole intellect only. The motivation of a lecturer and that of a teacher are different: lecturers impart knowledge at a certain level of abstruseness and abstractness, always with a view to advancing knowledge and understanding, and having the audience reach up to that level of thought. In contrast, teachers take the varying levels of intellectual development of their students into account and teach to these varying levels of attainment. This clearly requires that teachers attempt the Sisyphean task of nurturing whole individual beings: modern universities are about the enquiries of the mature intellect and have never been about nurturing the whole individual, nor should they be.

In his dialogue with Newman (1959b), Pelikan (1992) has been saying that Newman (1959b) defined the university to be “‘a place of *teaching* universal knowledge’¹⁷¹, ‘its object [being]... intellectual, not moral’”¹⁷², tutors being responsible for the *moral care* but not the intellectual care of pupils (Pelikan, p.44). Exception is taken with both on these two points. First, university today should not in the first instance be a place of teaching but of professing and researching, lecturing and tutoring. Second, because contemporary experience of the role of tutors in universities is that, where they are available, the role of the tutor is often confused with that of the teacher. Indeed, tutors are often promoted to being teachers, even though this contradicts the conception of a tutor, that is, one responsible for the moral care of those under tutelage.

The five defining characteristics of the university (Pelikan 1992) the thesis explains thus: first, universities advance learning, knowledge, and understanding through research. They expand not just the idea of the faculty of understanding but also that of reason and comprehension. In comprehension, morality according to the state is doing what is right according to the public virtues of the times, according to *justice* and other virtues of common life. Next, in contrast to this, through the morality of the church one performs one’s duty of righteousness according to the Good. The Good lies in the domain of the discipline of ethics, without which one has no idea of the functioning of the faculty of judgement. After that, training in professional knowledge and skills should be undertaken separately from the university proper in special schools,

¹⁷¹ Consider the truth of this definition for today’s universities.

¹⁷² Pelikan (1992, p.44) quoting from the Preface to Newman (1959b, p.7).

institutes, and colleges. Further, knowledge should be preserved in libraries and other store houses and finally, be disseminated by the publications of scholars (Pelikan, p.76). Strands of this will now be picked up and discussed.

First and undeniably, the Church has been the mother of the university down through the middle ages. Disputes and callings to account from dissenters within the sanctuary of the academic freedom and rights of the university have protected them from both Church and State. To silence dissent, secularisation of the university separates state and college, church and college: church universities and state universities are defined differently by their values but these values can be transcended by another set of values they have in common, intellectual values based on a principle of nature and truth, not on a principle of revelation and duty. The value of freedom of enquiry along with the value of intellectual honesty are the grounds upon which researching, professing, lecturing, and tutoring in university life are contingent.

University life values reason, its limitations and weaknesses. As part of this, the publication of research findings is a moral obligation. Affirmation of publication is ipso facto a university's proclamation of the *continuity and universality* of intellectual life. So, one may conclude that the intellectual virtues of free enquiry, intellectual honesty, as well as intellectual and moral courage, reign over established authority and over the novice researcher. The morality of research is corrupt if the individual scholar is not considered: the will to power is blind to the difference between the idea and the person who performs the work. The need of the university to maintain its awareness of aggression and the need for caring of individual scholars is constant.

A further virtue is the tolerance of diverse beliefs and values coupled to one's own conviction; and another value is the discipline of the intellect, nay, of the mind, knowing the joy of research and lecturing making for an ascetic life. The university is a community of scholars involved in a shared quest for knowledge: he who calls himself a lecturer makes his intellect the measure of all things for his students. Ultimately, this is why the thesis rejects teaching as a core activity of professors and senior lecturers at universities. At university one is addressing the intellect of an adult, the mature intellect, so one cannot present oneself as a lecturer who is the measure of all things for his students, which is the way a teacher may address the needs of developing intellects.

Pelikan (1992, p.78) again citing from Newman's (1959b) Preface, says that the university is where universal knowledge is taught so its object is intellectual and not moral. Both authors are in agreement on the distinction between academies for research, discovery being the purpose of research, and universities for teaching, the purpose of teaching being to induct adults into existing knowledge and its disciplines (Pelikan, pp.80-81). Pelikan (1992) points to the tension in the relationship between the two, between research and teaching or instruction at universities (Pelikan, pp.84-86), emphasising the effort in the late twentieth century in eastern and central Europe to bring the academies of sciences and universities closer together again (Pelikan, p.86).

The thesis distinguishes between two kinds of Professors: those scholars who lecture and have their scholarly research published in academic journals and those that *teach* at universities and may have the bulk of their research published in professional journals. Professors who *lecture* have no moral obligation to teach. Pelikan (1992) cites Uppsala in Sweden where Professors customarily spend at least half to three-quarters of their time on research and post-graduate students while lecturers attend to the *teaching* of undergraduates (Pelikan, p.90). That leaves a half to a quarter for undergraduates.

From this may be drawn that a preoccupation with advancing knowledge and scientific discoveries adversely affects *teaching* by professional teachers at university and thereby the learning of undergraduates seeking professional qualifications. Professors who traditionally lecture do not fall into this gruelling and likely unrewarding predicament. Undergraduates at university, Pelikan (1992) argued were entitled to a half to a quarter of the traditional professor's time. That it is this amount of time is not for this thesis to justify. Those directly interested in this can seek its calculation elsewhere since a thesis is intended to be purely informative and not educative. What is important to the thesis argument is that, to students, these university professors seek to impart that things are real and true, no less at state and church run universities. They are to advance scholarship with a moral dimension for the sake of knowledge as an end in itself or for the sake of the good by which adding this alternative is a position different from that taken by both Pelikan and Newman (1959a, 1959b).

New knowledge is not possible without old knowledge in universities. This thesis concedes that no matter how distasteful to the intellectual, the university provides for the professions now, as it once did for the sciences, and the arts before that, and philosophy and theology before that. The way that it is providing for the professions, then, is through the use of the teaching and learning model and not the traditional university schema. The argument being proposed is that without the retention of old knowledge universities have no future except as what the older professional training colleges used to be before they became rebadged as universities. The ideal and value of knowledge for its own sake, handed down through the traditional university schema, is being inevitably diluted and enucleated by the shift towards professional and vocational education.

The diffusion of knowledge, let alone reason, is not possible without a university press: to deprive postgraduates of the knowledge of the existence and favourable use of the university's press is a grave error indeed. For, like their professors, they have written up the results of their scholarly works. The very mission of the university as such is the publication of scholarly research that thereby spreads the light and truth (Pelikan, 1992, p.121).

The basic distinction between two kinds of Professors is worth reiterating. Those who lecture in traditional disciplines at the heart of universities and those that *teach* in professional disciplines; both undertake research. That research customarily goes hand in hand with lecturing and tutoring is easy to come to terms with but professors in professional disciplines appear to find it harder to pursue both research and a university teaching curriculum, which the case in Uppsala demonstrates are in reality two different occupations requiring different personal characteristics and sets of skills.

Reason suggests that whereas lecturing concerns the transmission of knowledge to mature human intellects then analysing what has been received, teaching is about the development of the whole human mind, such minds learning what has been imparted to them. It seems that the burden of responsibility in the first case falls on the student whereas in the second case the larger part of the burden of learning falls on the teacher, who is encumbered with the results of teaching to a curriculum.

In traditional disciplines making up the university proper that one person fills what are in effect two positions cannot be sanctioned especially when lecturing is exchanged for teaching and the teaching of a discipline is then expected to go hand in hand with research. Just as the individual has duties to society, when the individual joins an institution he exchanges the basis for the sense of himself as a member of society from the principle of liberty to the principle of justice. So, it may not be just to expect someone to competently fill what may be not two contrary but two diametrically-opposed roles with great potential for conflict.

Pelikan (1992) says the university as an institution of society has the same duties to other institutions in its city, its nation-state, and to humanity. He has been arguing that teaching and learning are the “business of a university” (Pelikan, 1992, p.139) even though this thesis strongly regards the traditional schema to be the unique hallmark of a university. Regardless, the preference of modern scholars is to devote themselves to their research. Funded by the nation state through universities, their duties are to their national society and not international society, but the ideal being for their research to benefit the whole of mankind.

The duty of the university is to presage and uphold the “international context of research and publication” (Pelikan, 1992, p.142) with the duty to *teach* regional, national, and international students without surrendering the meaning and standards of the university to assist in the upward social mobility of those otherwise excluded from sharing equitably in the wealth of a nation, as well as training students from second and third world nations to professional standards above those of their own countries.

The usual difficulty with the education of students from second and third world countries has been that on return to their homelands the lack of those resources extant in first world nations has led to their abject frustration (Pelikan, 1992). However, this is becoming less often the case as this gap has been closing in recent years with the advent of cooperation between sister-universities and sister-professional bodies both electronically and otherwise. The duties of the university to the regional, national, and international levels has needed a mindful and timely consideration of curricula on top of a conscientious awareness of ethnocentric bias (Pelikan, 1992, pp.142-145).

Educational self-reform of the university is a continuing duty of the university to society. For the university often is the centre of cultural and national life for many. The confidence at least to initiate such and to do so continually without public opinion comes from the authority that comes with the office of the administrative leader of the university, not from, as Pelikan (1992) put it, administrative leaders themselves (Pelikan, pp.168-179).

So far, this section has supported *freedom of thought* being a first principle of what it means to be a university by detailing and commenting on the critical dialogue between Pelikan (1992) and Newman (1959a, 1959b) as objective grounds in favour of a philosophy of leadership in universities. Enumeration on the consensus of the idea of a university started by placing the university in community and then indicating that it is about knowledge for the sake of knowledge ever more than earning a living. Further, to separate knowledge and faith is to make for a deficient scholarship.

The five defining characteristics of a university were then seen to be the advancement of knowledge, doing what is right according to justice and in the light of the virtues of the times; doing one's duty according to the Good; the separation of professional training from professional disciplines at universities; the storage of knowledge; and its publication. The thesis has baulked against teaching in traditional disciplines in favour of the custom of lecturing to mature intellects. The distinction has been made between two kinds of Professors at universities: basically, those who lecture in traditional disciplines and those who *teach* in professional disciplines. Pelikan's (1992) and Newman's (1959a, 1959b) dialogue has been traced and the positions they took revealed that they placed the university and its accountabilities not only in community but also in global society and that they pointed to its responsibility to be self-reforming.

II.i.ii: Response to the critical dialogue on a consensus over the idea of a university

As part of what appears to be a global redefinition of what it means to be a university, Commonwealth countries like Australia have undergone attempts to merge other tertiary institutes into the universities (Coady, 2000; Gaita, 2000). Coady (2000) believes that a typology of learning is at the centre of Newman's (1959a, 1959b) idea of a university, with communities of learning in pursuit of the truth being central (Coady, p.6). Knowledge in itself has value as well as its effects; professional courses

are also motivated by a search for the truth and similar virtues; those who benefit from higher education should use their power, privilege, and advantage for the benefit of the community. Coady points out that Newman says attainment of intellectual virtues does not equate to holiness (Coady, p.9).

Those who have taken an economic input-output model of universities with a chief executive officer, management, and workers aim to train undergraduates for the workforce. These myopics, as Coady (2000) calls them, fail to experience an expansion of their understanding and thinking to dialogue, however humbly, with the great thinkers (Coady, pp.10-11). For Coady this experience justifies the existence and value of real universities (Coady, p.11). Through the 1990s in Australia the government drastically cut public revenues to universities and the socialist experiment, public life in Australia, was reduced to rubble by the economic mystics (Coady, p.13). Going further than Coady, this economic thinking alone has crippled Australian society for decades to come. Universities now appear to be largely under the control of a managerial culture of skill and not of intellectual values. The displacement of the correct culture by the alien culture of a different kind of institution has toyed with the destruction of the very fabric of universities and their traditions (Coady, pp.14-16).

Bureaucratising universities increases the administrative burden on academic staff (Coady, 2000). The cult of innovation devalues traditional administration, and the traditional schema of researching and professing, lecturing and tutoring; internet degrees make for a seriously defective education; the varying quality of doctorates is caused by government and not university-driven priorities in mega-universities; democratic ways have been replaced by authoritarian structures, such arrangements promoting uniformity and grade inflation; the abolition of academic tenure has diluted the loyalty and independence of thought of academic faculty, hallmarks of the intellectual; the intellectual workers of the university industry are now more easily subjected to harsh and unrealistic regimens with reduced conditions of employment, one's once-hallowed peer sacrificed for more management (Coady, 2000, pp.16-23).

Third, postgraduate research students spend most of their time in the last of these dimensions, thereby upholding tradition (Coady, 2000). The guiding and nurturing role of the supervisor and collaboration with peers in the research culture of the discipline

apart, solitude allows these students to become well acquainted with thought at the deepest levels and at the farthest reaches, using principles around which their thoughts grow in a free and responsible order (Coady, p23).

Gaita (2000) says that not all human values can be explained through desires and interests. Some central values *sui generis* are in need of explanation through such ideas as happiness and flourishing. Gaita enquires: “What *should* we want of the varying kinds of institutions of higher education?” (Gaita, 2000, p.27). He then answers this by saying that it is the treasures of the university that really matter. These are the intellectual achievements and people of the university and its great and enduring tradition in the west. Gaita challenges universities to articulate their intellectual values from within their traditions and not sell them out by talking about universities in alien economic terms such as the employment and training of the next generation of economic innovators.

Socrates claims that an unreflective life is not worth living (Plato, 2003, p.66), Gaita (2000, p.36) takes this claim and associates it with Arendt’s (1978) life of the mind and with Newman’s (1959b) community of scholars. He then puts it nicely that “A university community of scholars exists when its members acknowledge their obligation to reflect on the nature and value of the life of the mind,” drawing on the great minds and their own experience (Gaita, 2000, pp.40-41).

In response to the critical dialogue between Pelikan (1992) and Newman (1959a, 1959b), Coady (2000) and Gaita (2000) are intellectually satisfying objective grounds in favour of the defence of a philosophy of leadership in universities. Through their moral leadership they are able to express as freely as possible realistic accounts of recent events in higher education, which rounds off Pelikan’s (1992) and Newman’s (1959b) dialogue in support of the freedom of thought being a principle of what it means to be a university.

Linking statement

On the other hand, in the following section, legitimate leadership is represented in what is called MacIntyre’s soliloquy, which appears to be against freedom of thought as a central principle and in support of *traditional authority*. This authority goes back

through Augustine (1958) and is, also arguably, the first principle on which to base what it means to be a university. Prima facie, this argument stands in tension with the value of freedom of thought. This matter is important for the position of the thesis because, as is argued so far, the university must advance knowledge, for instance with research. It cannot do this without retaining, even if critically, its old knowledge, and its tradition.

So, for each new generation the tradition of each academic discipline has to be reappropriated and criticised in order for the discipline to be advanced. However, interpretation of tradition raises the question of how to do this; what is the right way to interpret the tradition-holding texts of a discipline? For this, MacIntyre's (1990) reflections are highly germane. After responding to MacIntyre on traditional authority, in the third section of this part of the chapter a resolution will be sought to the conflict in ideas between freedom of thought and traditional authority in the antinomy of leadership.

II.ii: Traditional authority: explication and response to MacIntyre for a philosophy of leadership in universities

II.ii.i: MacIntyre's soliloquy

MacIntyre (1990) opens by saying that correctly learning what a text teaches depends on correctly reading it so what the text teaches can be correctly learned and only broken by a learner trusting in the authority of his teacher. How a text is read, by a virtuous reader, is different from a self that has not been reordered and converted. A learner endowed with the virtues of republican Rome would read scripture quite differently from one imbued with Christian virtue (MacIntyre, pp.82-83). Rational understanding would need to follow from a faith in authority, humility being the first step in education towards and not from first principles (MacIntyre, p.84).

A passage of text can be read in at least three or four senses: in an historical, moral, allegorical, and or anagogical (spiritually educative) sense (MacIntyre, 1990, p.85). Classical texts have their place in secular learning (MacIntyre, p.86). So, MacIntyre surmises, by the twelfth century, in what grew to be the Augustinian tradition, one could learn from the application of dialectic to theological questions: firstly, the increasing use of *questiones* in a systematic sequence in the glosses of scriptural texts

superseded mere commentary and interpretation, drawing from grammar and dialectic for arguments pro and contra (MacIntyre, p.88).

Next, when drawing on dialectic one argues towards first principles but when using demonstrative reasoning one's argument is not constructed but descends from first principles to conclusions (MacIntyre, 1990, pp.88-89). Here, in spontaneous response to MacIntyre (1990), what he appears to be saying is that dialectic is inductive or hypothetical and the demonstrative is deductive reasoning. After that, *distinctiones* of sense are but a further technique for dialectic and *questiones*.

MacIntyre (1990) goes on, observing that in the twelfth century Abelard was obedient to authority. Authority and dialectic are then clarified by MacIntyre as two elaborations of Augustinian tradition (MacIntyre, p.89). Abelard's *distinctio* between the essential nature of a thing in the mind of God and the human *intellectus universalis* which grasps mundane things under *nomen nominale*, showing that although man's understanding moves "towards a *comprehension* of the genuinely universal" (MacIntyre, 1990, p.90) the essence of things remains beyond the human intellect.

That belief must be accepted on authority implies that understanding follows from "rationally unjustified belief" (MacIntyre, 1990, p.91). Again, one is prompted to respond albeit in an unrehearsed manner, that one believes so one may understand in the Augustinian tradition, not understand that one may believe. Man has no position from which to evaluate the evidence for or against the content of his basic faith. If one's teacher, in whose authority one trusts, limits dialectical enquiry then one must accept that lest one's movement towards the truth be forestalled. Whether there be a disconnection between text and subject matter is immaterial to the Augustinian.

Continuing with MacIntyre (1990), the authorities that God has put in his place to speak bring interpretation and evaluation with them, drawing from nature, history, and Holy Scripture. Thus, one apprehends not just the text but also the interpretation and evaluation of the text supplied (MacIntyre, 1990, pp.93-95). Anselm said that "In every act of apprehension and judgement" (Anselm cited in MacIntyre, p.95) made by the human mind, God is present to that mind. The point of Anselm's famous ontological

argument for God's existence is that the very possibility of thought involves a universal acknowledgement of God, not only as existing within the mind but also externally to it.

Only the mind that is adequately prepared and directed by faith can understand a concept as all concepts point toward perfection (MacIntyre, 1990, pp.95-96). From the *artes liberales* arose the prototype of the encyclopaedia, filled with secular knowledge to be called back to Scripture and Augustine (1958). The ensuing debate on curriculum structure for clergy went to the very heart of *what it is to be a university: to submit all learning to theology and the quest for human perfection through moral enquiry and rationality*, as at the Augustinian University of Paris, or through the study of academic subjects like law at the University of Bologna to make learning useful in the service of political power (MacIntyre, pp.96-98). From the Augustinian scheme of belief, in the *cogito*, his *si fallor, sum*, the parts cannot be abstracted and treated separately but the whole must be believed before any of it can be understood (MacIntyre, pp.98-99).

The Augustinian tradition places the authority of Scripture before any commonplace premises can be laid down for an argument. In contrast, "Modernity asks for argument" (MacIntyre, 1990, p.100). Modernity grapples with three problems: first, the nature of the relationship between a particular and its universal that makes a particular *intelligible*; secondly, "that human beings in a state of nature lack understanding altogether" (MacIntyre, 1990, pp.100-101). The position of the thesis on this latter point is that it is the faculty of understanding and not the quantity or level of understanding that is uniquely human. Kant (2002) said at one end the understanding of some men is below that of animals, and at the other, this thesis posits, comprehension is the understanding filled with divine Illumination, which answers Augustine's problem. Thirdly, the will guides the intellect thus derailing humanity from the good, leaving the rationality of values' appeal to the will problematic (MacIntyre, p.101).

Augustinians, the thesis perceives, do not work from universal first principles of reason but work towards them, ever-seeking under the tradition of authority how to interpret (understand) and evaluate. Intellectual enquiries based in history, as Augustine foretold, and, as this thesis defends, not based in tradition, will manifest their own lack of coherence and cohesion. Examples, the thesis avers, are Kant's (1999) failure to deduce principles from concepts, and empiricism and positivism's collapsing to the point of

unjustified belief or incoherence. Modern philosophy's attempt to do without the authority of tradition has been without fruit and has failed. The question is not how to advance knowledge and understanding without tradition but how to develop tradition to advance knowledge and understanding. Modern science is not innocent of this point, its common ahistorical self-image notwithstanding.^{173 174}

The ramifications of the Augustinian corpus of knowledge, MacIntyre (1990) observes, were first felt by the University of Paris, and the thesis notes, are still felt in the university curricula of today: to integrate secular knowledge under that of scripture or, more generally, sources of transcendental meaning, or not, is a dilemma that perhaps only each individual can resolve. While Aquinas was at the University of Paris moral, natural and metaphysical philosophies were added to the arts curriculum, which up to that point was the sole province of the *artes liberales* (MacIntyre, p156). In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Liberal Arts became fragmented and the Augustinian synthesis of the curriculum was threatened and dispersed by an Aristotelian invasion (MacIntyre, p.157) favouring variety and heterogeneity.

An educated and enlightened public of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became fractured and specialised in their own professions in the following two centuries. Enquiring into moral truth became a private matter not for public debate (MacIntyre, 1990, p.217) and is something in which one does not now generally publicly participate. Universities today combat what are seen to be antagonistic and hostile schemata of beliefs not by prohibition but by admitting a diluted and distorted version of an otherwise hostile schemata of beliefs about moral truths that is “an ineffective contender for intellectual and moral allegiance” (MacIntyre, 1990, p.219).

Thus the true intellectual may be outside tertiary institutions, denied access because he is swimming against the tide of currently permitted academic modes and hence “morally committed modes of dialectical enquiry” (MacIntyre, 1990, p.220). He finds no place in the heterogeneity of academic disciplines on offer in contemporary

¹⁷³ “What follows from the position thus formulated? It is that scientific revolutions are epistemological crises understood in a Cartesian way. Everything is put in question simultaneously” (MacIntyre, 2006, p.17).

¹⁷⁴ Again, but to paraphrase MacIntyre (2006, p.71): When the adherents of a particular moral standpoint are beset by a persistent and intractable problem it could be that their own conceptual and argumentative framework generates such incoherencies and prevents their resolution.

universities. Lectures once aimed at an educated and enlightened public now fall on ears deafened by a managerialist culture sagging under the weight of its own moral impoverishment and administrative load. The resources and privileges enjoyed by universities are harder to justify rationally when alternative modes of enquiry are excluded; the currently dominant mode will in time become less relevant, convincing nobody (MacIntyre, 1990, p222).

MacIntyre (1990) believed the injustice of excluding dissenters is an error that led to the appointment of insignificant individuals to otherwise prominent offices or positions (MacIntyre, p.224). Picking up on this, today these insignificant individuals do nothing but maintain the continuously aetiolated diminishment of ever-marginalised institutions. Liberal universities have been founded on an error: that they could rectify the injustices done (a true premise); but that they could improve rational enquiry and technical expertise freed from the constraints of morality and religion (a false premise) (MacIntyre, p.225).

This is false because enquiries are today often based on fashion more than on intellectual progress and genuine intellectual values in enquiry. Rational enquiry into the prioritising of goods enables a university to answer its critics. However, liberal universities must remain mute because most of them cannot do this since they lack any overarching worldview and system of meaning. MacIntyre (1990) said philosophical and professional rhetoric conceal the arbitrary nature of resolutions to the problem of lack of moral integrity of the modern curriculum and hence of the university itself (MacIntyre, 1990, p.226).

A great books approach to curriculum is entangled in conflicts which may not be articulated in liberal universities (MacIntyre, 1990, p.230). What is possible is the initiation of students into conflict, the dual role of teacher being to champion a particular view and to engage in controversy with other views in a systematic enquiry both moral and theological; secondly, to adjudicate or chair controversy in a pre-ordained way such that all views are expressed and heard, where disagreement on the interpretation of a text is acknowledged.

Lectures need to be connected to controversy so assent and dissent can be rationally justified (MacIntyre, 1990, p.232). Many of those who are subject to a pragmatic input-output model of higher education are meant to see only what contemporary society wants them to see and allows them to learn only what the dominant reality wants them to learn. The political aspect is such that now any attempted subversion of the status quo is measured by the very standards that measure the legitimacy of the status quo (MacIntyre, p.235).

II.ii.ii: Response to MacIntyre's soliloquy

The first point to be made in a cohesive response to MacIntyre (1990) is that the danger to the status quo in the educational leadership literature is that contemporary writers have to share the stage with authorities of the Enlightenment and Renaissance like Kant (1999, 2002) and Bacon (1973, 1952) and medieval-classical authorities like Capella (1977), Cicero (1989a, 1989b), Augustine (1958, 1975) and Varro (1938). The fear is that representative works on the contemporary scene, like those of phenomenology and its offspring phenomenography, will be measured against standards revealed by great minds. The threat, then, is that the contemporary status quo in the educational leadership literature fails to uphold the standards of the great minds of the past.

Traditional authority is sanctuary from this ongoing threat. For example, any historical reading aside, MacIntyre (1990) is a contemporary authority conducting one to the Augustinian tradition. *Traditional authority* and academic values, not market values, grant one grounds for assent to the notion of the comprehension of morality in a philosophy of leadership in universities. Learning, in Augustinian terms, is not only an equivocal but also a *plurivocal* term; it is simply the acquisition and retention of knowledge, that is, learning is a synonym for understanding, for knowledge, it is not reasoning nor is it comprehension or judgement.

That one can learn to lead is by itself not a contentious proposition. This is because the general scientific intellect can be used to understand leaders and rationalise leading. However, that one can learn leadership is contentious because only the transcendental intellect can be used to comprehend and judge leadership through moral and philosophical reasoning since leadership concerns values and ends, which may or may not be learnable, and not more or less so in a university.

Everyone has the duty to obey authority, which in its turn is circumscribed by limitations. Again, no less so is this the case in universities where primal faculties called schools of thought are joined with others to form larger faculties, not to supplant departments or schools of thought, which may range beyond a single university, but to protect them and their rights and to support them in the discharge of their duties to serve their discipline and the truth. The university has a duty to circumscribe the efforts and activities of individuals if these impinge on the prosperity and order of the body politic. But otherwise it is duty-bound to provide the conditions that uphold and encourage the schools of the university and their students in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom. The principal condition of this pursuit is the freedom to carry out their moral duties as academic faculty.

The function of the university is to concern itself with principles of morality; regulations must uphold morally good behaviour, which a totalitarian way of doing things cannot do. Although Church-run and state-run universities have been separated with individual liberty of conscience and worship the education of adult students belongs not primarily to the faculty but to the department or school of thought. The suppression of immorality and vice and pastoral support of students is a duty of the university. However, it must not limit free individual endeavour, which a dictatorial bureaucracy is set up to do. Rather, it should assist the individual to secure an education and for his benefit establish lectures, tutorials and other practical laboratories where required.

The university has vital functions: to protect private and yet to share public intellectual property; to make sure that justice be done in the carrying out of rules and regulations affecting a student in his studies and staff in their work life; to secure what is needed for an adequate education for all, extreme wealth and dire poverty being a hazard to the individual and to society. So, the university must have in place effective and equitable rules and regulations concerning admission on the grounds of wealth or income to

ensure the flourishing of a large and robust undergraduate programme, that protect the interests of all faculties of the university and all sectors of society.¹⁷⁵

The authority of the university has traditionally come from either the students or the academic staff. The former is the traditional Mediterranean model and the latter the northwest European model, with the governance of the university coming from a warrant of the state or the church empowering a few to maintain the wellbeing and good order of the faculties of the university, which extends beyond its boundaries in the sense that it communicates with other universities. Enhanced communication among universities is becoming more necessary and pressing with the changing nature of the composition of civilised societies.

The clarification of rights and duties among universities is not an issue for history or science but is a philosophical matter that will not stand to be ignored. Universities cannot decide to base what they do on agreements, as a matter of convention, that are either necessary or to their advantage. Natural duties and rights are common to all universities. While it is natural that disputes arise among them, conflict cannot be tolerated as a natural consequence of inter-university disputation. Differences among universities need to be settled by them as moral entities motivated with the principles of humanity and justice, providence and freedom, existing as duties *binding* universities together in their dealings with one another. These absolute and universal values are the only sound foundation for principles bound by a shared morality.

II.ii.iii: On the resolution of the conflict in ideas between freedom of thought and traditional authority in the antinomy of leadership

The perennial tension between the *legacy of authority* and *freedom of thought* reflects the importance of the position of the thesis. The legacy of authority is a fight for the survival of academic tradition but the fight for freedom of thought is to fight for the success of popular education and the right of the common man to have the opportunity to strive for a better education. This may be the education of a professional, so as to better earn a livelihood but more particularly, even in professional education, what this

¹⁷⁵ Few would disagree that the furnishing of scholarships that enable less wealthy students with capacity to benefit from participating in higher education is certainly meritorious.

means is to become appropriately immersed in the depths of the intellectual tradition of which his professional knowledge base and discipline is a part and by which founds it.

The problem of how a peaceful coexistence can be maintained between an academic tradition representing authority and the right to freedom of thought is resolved in the edict *that freedom of thought be the tradition*. The power of comprehension (morality) gives the mature human intellect control over the expansion of the general intellect with appeal to the power of judgement for ethical affirmation of right action under the Good. What is important is that tradition recognises the justice of intergenerational freedom of thought and expression. A university, then, being in a community, keeps its academic tradition but it also has a responsibility to cater to the current educational needs not only of the local community but also to the needs of a wider community and to society at large.

To treat the notion of leadership in an argument from analogy and not in dialectical terms is tantamount to an admission that leadership cannot be explained, which science, after a century of trying, has shown that it cannot do by using only its own resources. Philosophy does not pretend to explain leadership but leadership, which cannot be made neat empirical sense of, can be made intelligible by art, which science cannot do, and because the morality of that art lies in the province of philosophy, philosophy can do. The principles and arguments that each work offers edge one ever closer to the philosophical ideal of leadership but that gap is never closed. For, like any great ideal worth having, it is infinitely explorable. What each master brings helps the writer and the reader to make clear and distinct their own views of leadership in the spirit of a critical dialogue long-overdue in an age of disjunction from tradition.

In seeing the whole picture the antinomy between the complex abstract ideas of freedom of thought and expression and traditional authority is transcended or sublimated in the mind of the leader who is in pursuit of the morally worthy, giving people a new foundation for changing their lives, that is, the good, which is of the highest spiritual value in the idea of a university.

Hamann's (1995c) message is that the antinomy between thought and authority can be objectively transcended through the use of language. This means that the written and

spoken word are in the tangible world and can be known by the senses but the meaning that they convey can only be known or identified by the intellect, more particularly as the objects of the intellect: at first as ideas and notions, concepts and principles and then more maturely as beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view), and communities of enquiry (traditions).

The message of this thesis is about much more than objects of the intellect. It captures in a written manifold the diagrammatic reasoning, that is, the three-dimensional global thinking that the greatest traditional authorities of the liberal arts invested in their classical and medieval works, with the intention of preserving these, the highest forms of language, for future analysis and interpretation. It has expanded this process of verbal mapping to include other works that include those of Bacon (1973), Kant (1999) and Locke (1924). Texts that have been written using abstract two dimensional linear forms of thought, as in argumentation, discussion and evaluation, have proven to not lend themselves as readily to this form of verbal mapping, for example, Bacon (1952) or Kant (2002). However, the thesis does begin to demonstrate how works involved in contemporary debate can nevertheless encapsulate at least elements of the works of others, for example like that of Newman (1959a, 1959b) in Pelikan (1992).

If this thesis has at least preserved a few classical works, so that future work relating these texts to leadership and other similar ideas can be undertaken, then it has gone some way to completing its purpose. In the meantime, the thesis is content with having made a contribution to the field of the doxography of philosophy in particular, by invigorating texts that would otherwise continue to remain idle and unrecognised. The loss of these texts, germane to the academic sphere, cannot be suffered because they are important and useful blueprints relevant to the continuing pursuit of knowledge.

The thesis argues for the preservation of at least a sense of these texts for the future. It does so as part of a larger argument, not only the whole of which can be traced rationally, logically and deductively but also by preserving the global thinking that is invested in this work for future readers who, in caring to unearth the design of the diagrammatic reasoning used and by tracing this in its entirety, will not be disappointed with the abundance that can be gathered for the fruition of the intellect. Thus, the

position taken is much like that of Hamann (1995a, 1995b, 1995c), remaining one of faith and determination as well as being a substantive contribution to higher education.

Hamann's (1995a, 1995c) ultimate message, then, is that the antinomy between thought and authority can also be subjectively transcended through that which exists independently of man's senses and intellect, through faith, through the faith of the leader in the Good and of followers in the leader. The transcendental intellect recognises that it is ultimately faith that is the grounds for a philosophy of leadership in higher education. In pursuit of the Good the tension between freedom of thought and traditional authority in universities is thus dispelled by the notion not of transcendental or critical leadership but of good leadership, to which the thesis now turns.

III

Good leadership

Having regarded real and true leaders and leading and then moral and legitimate leadership, the treatment that will now be completed is that of these distinctions of leadership in higher education. These were set out at the beginning of this chapter and are to be taken into account in part by now deliberating on good leadership. Further, in the use of judgement good leadership unites with the absolute Good, and seeks out divine providence. The contrary of good leadership is tyranny because it is considered to be disconnected from the absolute Good, is self-serving, and exploits or at least fails to take care of the interests of the followership.

As has been seen in considering some parts of the works of Rorty (1989, 1998, 1999, 2007) care needs to be taken with relativism and pragmatism, dogmatism and scepticism because they disconnect leadership from the Good and thus place good leadership in jeopardy. In arguing for a few of the substantial notions connected with the Good this thesis refers to a few representatives of the appropriate literature in support of making connections between good leadership and these notions. Gaita (1999) on Goodness beyond Virtue is first considered because what he says has ramifications for both moral and good leadership since moral leadership looks to the Good as a wellspring for what is right. Walzer (1983), who supports a pluralistic conception of justice, will then be considered.

III.i: Explication of and response to Gaita's Goodness beyond Virtue

Gaita (1999, pp.17-27) argues in his second chapter that we desire to ground unconditional respect for all human beings in the nature of things (Gaita, p.18) but assent to the revelation of our full humanity does not depend upon our knowing “the grounds of that love” (Gaita, 1999, pp.20,21). The purity of love proves the reality of what it reveals (Gaita, p.21). Because love cannot be commanded (Gaita, p.23) we cannot take the biblical command to love our neighbour literally (Gaita, p.25, indirectly quoting Kant) so we should treat others as an ends in themselves and never as a means to an end.¹⁷⁶

But that love cannot be commanded is not that straightforward. Without the language and intrinsic standards of all the forms of love there can be no love (Gaita, 1999, pp.25-26). Adhering to the standards of love we express our respect for the autonomous reality of the beloved (Gaita, p.26). Love in all its forms commends itself to morality. Beyond reason and merit, what is best in our morality is our faith in the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the individual (Gaita, p.27).

What can be drawn from the above explication of Gaita's (1999, pp.17-27) argument is that good leadership in higher education is also about treating all persons with whom one comes into contact with the reverence for human life that one's love of humanity reveals. In the fulfilment of one's duty one can work from this foundation and from that the language of philosophy, and not the language of science or of art. Philosophy is the language of leadership. In conjunction with that one can also work from analogy, between the forms of love and the forms of leadership.

With the intrinsic standards of the different forms of love one can say that each of the forms of leadership, legitimate and moral leadership as well as good leadership, contain standards or principles to which one adheres. So, the autonomy of each person can be respected by seeing each individual as a representative of, in this case, intellectual human endeavour. That endeavour is the striving for such ideals as the pursuit of excellence in higher education. Additionally, in each person one may see an autonomous life of the mind (Gaita, 1999, pp.230-231).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

The autonomous life of the mind, of the intellect of each individual in particular, may be freely expressed in a critical discussion on universities and the just distribution of their goods. Universities and their representatives are morally bound to engage in those matters of concern to not only the university but also to the wider community, as earlier stated near the end of section I.i: Review of the main argument of the thesis. In the light of the principle of good leadership, which the thesis has just been discussing in the preceding section, the thesis now finishes on its final turn, that of the commonplace matter of an argument from distributive justice.

III.ii: Argument from distributive justice

Good leadership is motivated by faith in the absolute Good and divine providence. Good leaders love not only the Good, the right, and the virtuous but also justice. In a debate on leadership from grounds for a fairer distribution of the goods and burdens of living in society one may argue that students who take professional courses at universities perpetuate a system that harms other individuals who have a prior claim to the scarce resources of a university. To choose such courses points to a disregard for others and is a stain on a person's moral character. Those who indulge in the luxury of such courses, especially the wealthy and their children, deny poor intellectuals their rightful place in universities.

Because poor intellectual-type individuals need adequate facilities there needs to be a principle of distributive justice to legislate that those who are wealthy opt for non-university courses and boycott the self-indulgent luxury of professional degrees that lead to careers producing nothing for the good of society. Doing this puts pressure on governments to reduce the use of the economic input-output factory model of degree acquisition thus freeing up badly-needed funding for the dysfunctional academic hearts of universities.

The moral character of those who are involved in professional courses can be criticised for squandering university resources to support their exploitation of universities: they should be content with non-university qualifications gained from training organisations and institutes especially set up for those who need professional qualifications to pursue their professions and leave universities to those who are more academically inclined.

In addition to this, to make room for the children of the economically well-off governments persist in having policies and procedures, rules and regulations that displace poor intellectuals from universities forcing them into unemployment or jobs below the level of their intellectual potential. The upshot of this is that by offering large numbers of places in professional degree courses to the economically well off so they can propagate status at the expense of intelligent individuals from impoverished backgrounds wanting to properly and correctly pursue academic courses harms the academic heart of the university.

The critical reader will see that this argument needs serious qualification for several reasons. (1) Not all those doing professional degrees are from wealthy families and in fact, many are from poorer families. (2) Arguably, the children of lower socio-economic status families benefit from doing professional courses as this gives them the opportunity to improve their living standards. (3) Traditional university disciplines like the pure sciences, Literature, the Arts, Philosophy and Theology patently need students. Most of these come from the ranks of secondary school students who have gone to the better schools and usually these come from the better off (middle class and wealthier) socioeconomic groups. This cannot be all bad as these new generations are needed if these disciplines are to have a future. (4) Universities are making real attempts to get students with lower socio-economic status and who are capable of university studies into a wide variety of courses. Government policy also indicates this.

Students are the ones who ultimately apply to universities and offers of places are blind to socioeconomic status. Poorer students have not usually heard of disciplines like Philosophy and Theology and tend to see university as a professional meal ticket and so they apply for professional rather than academic courses. Hence, the critical reader will conclude that any lambasting of the wealthy needs heavy qualification thus.

Now, from the original argument needing serious qualification and the response by the critical reader, someone of a contrary view to both may start by agreeing that the transcendental view suggests that what is good should be distributed from a basis of the morally deserving. However, in the general view distribution according to virtue cannot distinguish adequately between the morally deserving and legitimate expectations: a fair share in what is good is not defined by an individual's moral value but by his

legitimate expectations. When he enters into a contract he claims certain entitlements to do things facilitated by existing rights.

Justice does not recognise the distribution of rights according to moral virtues because justice and duty need to be talked about before moral virtues and what is valued. A just plan takes into consideration what each individual is entitled to have according to legitimate expectations in fulfilment of his duty, which is his role in the existing order of things. So, one can see that the principle of justice is intended to ensure that an individual has a fair share in the things of this world, which is often under less than ideal conditions. An attempt to rebut this could say that to distribute the Good according to the morally deserving works under the principle of freedom, the opposite to that of justice, because the Good is not a finite resource but an infinite source in which the individual can fully participate without restriction.

Now again, the audience following this debate will observe that this attempted rebuttal breaks down because ultimately, whether society wants to support the operations of universities cannot be a matter of freedom and the morally deserving but of justice and legitimate expectations. To be sure, differences do exist between the goods of this life and the Good understood as the ultimate object of the service university work provides. But the principle of freedom as understood in the rebuttal may not support the conclusion that others in society who do not have or expect to participate in the value of the intellectual life must support those who do.

So, justice implies that universities should be subject to the legitimate expectations of their duty, which is their role in the existing order of things. Instead, the rest of society should support the life of the mind even though doing so may appear to be contrary to justice. From the point of view of justice, this argument is virtually indefensible because it assumes that justice is all about and only about dealing with the distribution of limited resources. To demand material support from others for anything that is not about the distribution of limited resources is unjust.

How could this be though? Reasonable conceptions of justice arise from the intellectual life: one has to do justice to another's ideas in evaluating them; one has to foster the young in a discipline as a matter of justice to them; an ideal of sober reflection that

involves doing justice to the subject matter one thinks about requires that one respectively avoids light-mindedness at one extreme and misplaced gravity and solemnity at the other. One needs to weigh the importance of relevant considerations in a debate justly, and neither put too much weight on unimportant matters or too little weight on important matters. So, such a concept of justice is proper to and emergent from intellectual life.

To further understand justice, justice need not be a single substantial notion that determines all questions of the distribution of goods and the burdens of life together in all aspects of life. As Walzer (1983) argues, justice has an abstract core notion, generally, to give people their due, which is interpreted in different ways in different spheres of life, for example, the life of religious faith, the life of the arts, the sporting life, the military life, the economic life, the life of politics and its institutions, the life of the judicial system. Each aspect of life provides interpretative practices to give the core notion of justice content and detail. No aspect of life should dominate the general social life that is shared together.

However, Walzer (1983) reasons, today the economic sphere does so and to society's detriment. So, economic notions of justice tend to control one's understanding of these other spheres. This is a mistake. To think that ecclesiastical office and leadership should be given to the most popular, those with good market profile and whom the religious would go to some trouble to see, is a poor way to allocate ecclesiastical office. Similarly, to allocate professorships to those who are the best money-earners but whose thinking is shallow and awkward would be a mistake for universities. Economic criteria of justice have no place here; the life of the academy and the life of the mind have their own criteria of justice.

What is being suggested is that an argument *from* justice need not be surrendered for the proposition that the state has an important role in supporting with material resources the life of the mind in a society affluent enough to support it. Such support gives a society depth of understanding and knowledge as intrinsic goods. Societies flourish with these in them though are not necessarily made wealthier and fatter by them. From considerations of justice one may argue for state support of universities because such goods as knowledge, understanding, and deep interpretation of intellectual tradition are

partially constitutive of civilisation itself. So it must be just to provide for the life of the mind.

Conclusion to Chapter 5 and Final Remark

Conclusion: This chapter has concerned the exposition of a transcendental philosophy of leadership in higher education, which is not only a demonstration in support of the proof of the reason in the thesis argument that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher education but also shows how one institution in society reflects the larger society of which it is a part. The chapter considered the principles of divine providence and fortune. It then deliberated on the principle of the freedom (morality) of thought, its secure expression and the impression this may leave on one's fellow man.

This principle, which includes the more advanced linguistic representations of the objects of the intellect, these being beliefs, theories, outlooks (points of view) and communities of enquiry (tradition) is in contrast with the principle of traditional authority, where tradition is the explication and implication of ideas by honourable communities of scholars who speak with authority and dignity using more sophisticated intellectual representations of the objects of language, that is, propositions, paragraphs, compositions (formulated positions) and debates. This is followed with reference to the deontological principle of duty or love, the chapter finishing with a debate on distributive justice in higher education. The principles involved are certainly diverse and for those for whom this is of concern be assured that these are ultimately integrable under the Good in a universe of the intellect.

Ethical leaders in higher education can find the ends they seek. What is certain is that if the teaching and learning model permeates through the academic heart of a university at the expense of the traditional schema then this will impede the growth of the mature human intellect by denying or neglecting the transcendental intellect, the intellect of the moral being. Further, as reasoned in this chapter, academic freedom and the authority of the tradition of the West are not inconsistent through how they relate to an ongoing issue. Finally, the chapter has argued that as a matter of social good and justice the life of the mind deserves the support of the state.

Final Remark: In this final remark on change through a philosophy of leadership the matter of the extent to which leadership is informed by science, art, and philosophy has provided a shape for the thesis as it has progressed in the light of what it has set out to do. The research involved has entailed a consideration of leadership corresponding with the general intellect and the transcendental intellect along with accounts of their relationship to the notion of the mature human intellect and with an account of the relationship of the morality and ethics of leadership to the idea of a university.

The work has argued that a science of leadership is a contested idea because it does not and cannot take into account values and ends, regardless of whether or not those values are based on formal universal principles or on particular substantive judgements. The human understanding is the only intellectual grounds for a science of leadership and a critique of those grounds has been reinforced by a similar treatment of human reason being the grounds for the art of leadership. The thesis, therefore, not only proposed that the transcendental intellect is the only subjective grounds for the art and philosophy of leadership but also that the classical literary tradition is the only objective grounds for notions and principles of leadership.

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Thesis summary and conclusion

The thesis aimed at beginning to cover the matter of the extent to which leadership is informed by science, art, and philosophy and thereby provided a shape for the progression of the thesis in the light of what it has set out to do. The research involved has entailed a corresponding consideration of the sensibility and intelligibility, morality and ethics of leadership along with accounts of their relationship to the notion of the mature human intellect as well as to that of the idea of a university.

The work proposed that the transcendental intellect is the grounds for notions and principles of leadership. A science of leadership was found to be a contested idea because it does not and cannot take into account values and ends, regardless of whether or not those values are based on formal universal principles or on particular substantive judgements. The human understanding is the only intellectual grounds for a science of leadership and a critique of those grounds was reinforced by a similar treatment of human reason being the grounds for the art of leadership.

The thesis argued that understanding alone is however insufficient grounds for a science of leadership and that that therefore marks this out to be an empirical impossibility. The addition of reason to the search for a science of leadership compounded the problem, reason not only denying the possibility of a science of leadership and affirming the probability of a science of leading and leaders but also affirming the legitimacy of the grounds for an art of leadership.

This critique of leadership, then, was followed by a defence of the grounds for the art of leadership and by a defence of the idea of comprehension being the grounds for a philosophy of leadership. Such a philosophy could only be reached by first proceeding through the classical tradition and not through the traditions of science not only because the tradition of science does not engender leadership but because the classical tradition encompasses the liberal arts, valued for millennia to be the education needed by men to rule.

The thesis established the distinction between the liberal arts being important objective grounds for the justification of the art of leadership, while the transcendental intellect with its inclusion of the ideas of values and ends being the necessary subjective grounds for a philosophy of leadership. Values and ends are critical ideas, the subject matter of the transcendental intellect, contained within the notions of the righteous and virtue of comprehension and the principles of the good and duty of judgement. The affirmation of the moral and ethical was sought not solely within the universe of the intellect but also beyond the mere faculties of the mind.

Nevertheless the moral and ethical grounds for a philosophy of leadership were discussed and defended within the universe of the intellect, without immediate resort to the life of the mind or the Cartesian remedy, by referring to the contemporary degeneration of learning. It was argued that the decline of learning in higher education, namely universities, invited a reciprocal rise in the need for a philosophy of leadership to redress the balance between the real and true of the general intellect and the right and the good of the transcendental intellect.

This moral action was justified by the ethical principles of the good and duty in the notion of judgement. To advance a philosophy of leadership during a time of apostasy was affirmed to be a moral obligation considered necessary to avert the ongoing threat to and corruption of higher educational institutions. To this ends the thesis argued for the relevance, importance, and usefulness of the transcendental intellect in the construction of a philosophy of leadership for the defence of the moral self in an academic role in state-run universities.

More explicitly, the purpose of the thesis is to begin to prepare the ground for a much wider discussion on the position of the intellect in relation to the mind and the spirit of man under the rubric of leadership. The perception of the declining authority of the church and the increasing hegemony of the state over higher education has led to the necessity for reform founded on the intellectual immersed in the spiritual and not on the spiritual anchored in the intellectual.

In conclusion, one can now see that the mature human intellect and the liberal arts tradition together comprise a firm foundation for a philosophy of leadership in higher

education. The thesis secured in this statement and in what it implies is written in the spirit of reason and not the letter of reason, which is the common theme that runs through all the works of man. The sensibility of the science of leadership, the intelligibility of the art of leadership, and the morality of a philosophy of leadership are steps in the argument that guide one to the inescapable conclusion that science cannot answer for leadership because it cannot treat of the dimensions of values and ends, which art can only appear to begin to do through the classical tradition, and which only philosophy can do, with no convincing philosophy of leadership being possible without a mature transcendental intellect.

Because man is a natural, intelligent and moral being the mature transcendental intellect of the mind of the individual self was found to be a necessary but not in itself a sufficient grounds for a philosophy of leadership. The thesis argued that these grounds are, however, achieved when the transcendental intellect is coupled with the classical tradition. Exhaustive grounds for a comprehensive philosophy of leadership would have to include so much more on the spiritual dimension in all its fullness, which would provide ample material for further discussion. In the meantime, the thesis has tabled fresh material towards the case for a philosophy of leadership subjectively grounded in the transcendental intellect and objectively in the classical tradition, thereby providing values and ends that are necessarily critical elements put towards the reformation of the idea of a university.

APPENDIX
RELIQVORVM DE GRAMMATICA LIBRORVM
FRAGMENTA
DISCIPLINARVM LIBER I
DE GRAMMATICA

. ars grammatica quae a nobis litteratura dicitur scientia est <eorum> quae a poetis historicis oratoribusque dicuntur ex parte maiora. eius praecipua officia sunt quatuor . . . : scribere legere intellegere probare.

. audiri absentium verba non poterant. ergo illa ratio peperit litteras notatis omnibus oris ac linguae sonis atque discretis. nihil autem horum facere poterat, si multitudo rerum sine quodam defixo termino infinite patere videretur. ergo utilitas numerandi magna necessitate animadversa est. quibus duobus repertis nata est illa librariorum et calculorum professio velut quaedam grammaticae infantia quam Varro litterationem vocat. . . . poterat iam perfecta esse grammatica, sed quia ipso nomine profiteri se litteras clamat, unde etiam latine litteratura dicitur, factum est ut quicquid dignum memoria litteris mandaretur ad eam necessario pertineret.

. artis grammaticae officia . . . constant partibus quattuor lectione enarratione iudicio. lectio est . . . varia cuiusque scripti pronuntiatio serviens dignitati personarum exprimensque animi habitum cuiusque. enarratio est obscurorum sensuum quaestionumve explanatio . . . emendatio est . . . recorrectio errorum qui per scripturam dictionemve fiunt. iudicium est . . . aestimatio qua poemata ceteraque scripta perpendimus.

. vox est, et Stoicis videtur, spiritus tenuis auditu sensibilis, quantum in ipso est. fit autem vel exilis aerae pulsu vel verberati aeris ictu. omnis vox aut articulata est aut confusa: articulata est rationalis hominum loquellis explanata; eadem et litteralis vel scriptilis appellatur, quia litteris comprehendi potest; confusa est irrationalis vel inscriptilis, simplici vocis sono animalium effecta, quae scribi non potest, ut est equi hinnitus, tauri mugitus.

. litterarum partim sunt et dicuntur, ut A et B; partim dicuntur neque sunt, ut H et X; quaedam neque sunt neque dicuntur, ut Φ et Ψ.

. syllabae . . . aliae sunt asperae aliae leves, aliae procer<a>e aliae retorridae, aliae barbarae aliae Graeculae, aliae durae aliae molles: asperae sunt, ut trux crux trans; leves, ut lana luna; procerae sunt quae vocalem longam extremam habent aut paenultimam, ut facilitas; retorridae sunt quae mutam habent extremam, ut hic hoc; barbarae sunt, ut gaza; Graeculae, ut hymnos Zenon; durae, ut ignotus; molles, ut aedes.

APPENDIX

THE REMNANTS OF THE FRAGMENTS OF THE GRAMMAR BOOK¹⁷⁷

THE DISCIPLINE OF GRAMMAR: BOOK I

- . Grammar, which is called by us the art of literature, is largely to the poets about the science of the things in the history of oratory. His principle duties are four...: to write, to read, to understand, and to seek approval.
- . The words of those who are absent cannot be heard. A letter from them can be read so that their voices can be judiciously heard. This would not be possible if the audience were not open to many things within a short time. The advantage of this is when it is absolutely necessary to include someone's vote. Two Grammarians would have a natural tendency to agree that the writer of a letter declares himself by the infantile nature of or what Varro calls...perfect grammar, in a letter read out loud, and so also in Latin language it is said that it came to pass that whatever is worthy of mention about letters was entrusted to it {Grammar} to which what was said came to belong.
- . The official arts of grammar...consist of four parts in the narrative reading in a trial. The reading is...the proclamation of the dignity of each person from the outset, in which the various habits of mind of each is written down. Through questioning, the senses of the dark narrative of truth are explained...and by continual refinement...the errors made by writing down words or things, are corrected. By judging...thus we weigh the value of poetry *and other writings*.
- . Without a voice, the Stoics would say, nothing could be heard. Punishment is so much hot air beating the air. Every voice is either articulate or confused: the voices of rational men are articulate speech and are called literal or written because letters can be comprehended but the confused voice is irrational and cannot be written just like the sounds made by animals, the neighing of horses and the roaring of bulls cannot be written down.
- . Some {sounds} are partly of letters and are called as A and B; some are not partly of letters as a re H and X; some are said to be neither of these, just as Φ and Ψ.
- . Syllables...are harsh or light, some from the printer and some wizened, some from barbaric Greek and others soft or hard: harsh as the other side of the cross of a savage, light as the wool of the moon; extremely long as those with a long penultimate vowel and as easy; struck dumb are those that are last, as with this one; are barbarous as treasure; Greek as the hymns of Xeno; hard as the unknown and as soft as [the comforts of] a house.

¹⁷⁷ Varro, M.T., *De Lingua Latina Quae Supersunt Accedunt Grammaticorum Varronis Librorum Fragmenta Recensurunt*. G. Goetz et F. Schoell (1910) lipsiae in aedibus b.g. teubneri mcmx, pp.227-241.

. cum ceteris de partibus orationis Probus et Varro altere utrum in duas partes <di> scribit et reliquas subiectas facit, alter in quattuor.

. latinitas est incorrupt[a]e loquendi observatio secundum Romanum linguam. constat autem . . . his quatuor: natura analogia consuetudines auctoritate, natura verborum nominumque inmutabilis est nec quicquam aut minus aut plus tradidit nobis quam quod accepit: nam si quis dicat scribo pro eo quod est scribo, non analogiae virtute, sed naturae ipsius constitutione vincitur. analogia sermonis a natura proditi ordinatio est neque aliter barbaram linguam ab erudite quam argentum a plumbo dissociat. consuetudo non ratione analogiae, sed viribus par est, ideo solum recepta, quod multorum consensione convaluit, ita tamen ut illi artis ratio non accedat, sed indulgeat: nam ea e medio loquendi usu placita adsumere consuevit. auctoritas in regula loquendi novissima est: namque ubi omnia defecerint, sic ad illam quem ad modum ad aram sacram decurritur: non enim quicquam aut rationis aut naturae aut consuetudinis habet, cum tantum opinione secundum veterum lectionem recepta sit nec ipsorum tamen, si interrogentur, cur id secuti sint, scientium.

. Varro in libris disciplinarum scripsit observasse sese in versu hexametro, quod omnimodo quintus semipes verbum finiret et quod priores quinque semipedes aequae magnam vim haberent in efficiendo versu atque alii posteriores septem: idque ipsum ratione quadam geometrica fieri disserit.

. With the rest of the parts of that subject the prayer of Probus and Varro is that it is divided into two parts and the rest into four parts.

. Latin is incorruptible, a speech that accords with the observance of the Roman tongue. The following four are obvious: the customs of the authority of the nature of analogy, the nature of the words of the name is unchangeable at any time: we do not receive more or less than what he delivers to us, for if a man say I write, I write for what is, not with the power of analogy but with conviction from the foundation of nature itself. The analogy of the word is betrayed by its very nature in a barbarous tongue, and is as the learned ordering of silver from lead. In the reply to what has been received it is proper to draw the strength of the reply from custom and not by reason of analogy. The consent of many has been often recovered in such a way that the art of the argument has been approached, I beg forgiveness, for the use of pleas in the practice of speaking from the midst of it [custom]. Authority is the last in the rules of speaking: for where all things are found wanting we make recourse to the altar of the sacred: for anything, of reason, of nature, or of custom we seek a reading of the received opinion of the ancients and if asked why we follow them who knows.

. Varro wrote in the books of disciplines that they gave themselves up to hexameter in verse, he speaks of the fifth half-a-foot being of equally great importance among the five half-feet of which it is one, the same with seven, to ensure that [ancient] verse be written by reason of a certain geometry.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ That is, that the fifth foot in the hexameter usually be *dactylic* and the sixth an *ancep*.

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