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"Love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love" : An exploration of reason, love, and their interrelation in selected works of Joseph Ratzinger in the light of work by Bernard Lonergan

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"Love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love": An exploration of reason, love, and their interrelation in selected works of Joseph Ratzinger in the light of work by Bernard Lonergan.

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Statement of Authorship and Sources

This dissertation contains no material published elsewhere or extracted in whole or in part from a dissertation by which I have qualified for or been awarded another degree or diploma.

No parts of this dissertation have been submitted towards the award of any other degree or diploma in any other tertiary institution.

No other person's work has been used without due acknowledgment in the main text of the dissertation.

All research procedures reported in the dissertation received the approval of the relevant Ethics/Safety Committees (where required).

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Abstract

While some scholars have highlighted the importance of reason in Joseph Ratzinger's theology, and others love, less attention has been paid to their interrelation. The thesis in this dissertation is that reason, love, and their interrelation are of critical interest to Ratzinger—that he pays considerable longitudinal attention to each. Further, that he upholds reason and love as inseparable. Moreover, Bernard Lonergan's articulation of the same subject matter acts as an informative and constructive interlocution to Ratzinger's assertion of the interrelation between love and reason. Lonergan's presentations of conscious intentionality, conversion, a scale of values, and his four-point hypothesis with created participations bring particular clarity to Ratzinger's work on the relation between reason and love, especially as they pertain to our understanding of God, the human person, apologetics, and an outworking of the common good.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1. Background and personal context

Three personal factors lie behind my dissertation: eleven years of work in public policy in compulsory and tertiary education (culminating in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in New Zealand); an increasing awareness of the role that digital technology, and especially machine and robotic intelligence, plays in education (and many other areas of life and research including manufacturing, medicine, police work, parole decision making, defence and warfare, and predictive modelling in climate change); and a frustration that Christian theology and reflection often seem to be removed from the sort of developments just described.

In early 2010, I had just finished writing the majority report for an advisory committee in parliament on educational reform. The committee made five recommendations, but none of these recommendations spoke to me. It was the work of John Hattie, the Prime Minister's personal advisor, professor, and director of the Melbourne graduate school of education, that troubled me. In short, his synthesis of over eight-hundred meta-analyses relating to student achievement had shown that by far the biggest factor in successful learning related to the teacher—not school culture, a principal, school leadership, department heads, and not family context, the numbers of books in a home, or social background. Purely and simply the teacher was what mattered.¹ Perhaps common sense when one considers one's own education. We excel in great teachers' classes. And conversely, fail, accepting the narrative that we are weak in Maths or in English, etc., when it is more likely that failure is the consequence of poor teaching. Why was I so struck by this finding, and how does it relate to my comments around technology?

I was disturbed by Hattie's findings because research I was also familiar with suggested only a very small percentage of teachers are exceptionally competent, with less than 20 percent being highly competent. One of the basic educational problems, thus, is one of capacity.² There are not enough able teachers to teach all our primary and secondary school children well. If human resourcing is the challenge, is there an

¹ J. Hattie, *Visible Learning, A Synthesis of Over 800 Meta-Analyses Relating to Achievement* (Oxford: Routledge, 2009); J. Hattie, "New Zealand Education Snapshot with Specific Reference to Years 1–13" (Knowledge Wave, the Leadership Forum, Auckland, 2003).

² Mark Harrison, *Education Matters. Government, Markets and New Zealand Schools* (Wellington: Education Forum, 2004).

alternative that can meet that need? Can something positively supplement poor teaching or replace bad teaching? Yes, possibly: digital technology and artificial intelligence, using formative assessment, that not only uncovers weaknesses in reasoning and gaps in knowledge, but also tailors learning in response to these on an individual basis.³

In consequence of my work in research and public policy, and the growing sense that technology, and particularly machine and robotic intelligence would grow in ubiquity, I took on a role in an EdTech company in the US. Over the span of four years, I became more and more concerned that in relation to the development of artificial intelligences there was little to no reference to Christian tradition or to theological conceptions of reason or intelligence. I also became aware that discussions on intelligence were not couched in terms of human intelligence, but of a disembodied, abstracted intelligence, and furthermore, that they paid little to no attention to the sociology or historical context of human reasoning, or the interconnection between reason, discourse, dialectics and importantly, human affections. This absence proved to be a goad. I read and consulted widely with friends and mentors and settled on the need, if it were possible, to write a dissertation on reason, and on its relation to love, with the secondary and much later goal of shaping public policy and the development of technology in a way that modestly, and if indirectly, takes account of the insights of leading theologians. The question became for me: who recently has written on these subjects and where is there a gap in the analysis of their works on the relation between the two?

I acknowledge that the study of reason is an established and major subject of scholarship and reflection among theologians, and that it is usually paired with a discussion on faith. And likewise love. I realise, too, that at best, the following dissertation makes a small contribution to a complex matter. I hope, however, that as I describe and evaluate Joseph Ratzinger's and Bernard Lonergan's approaches to reason, to love, and to their relation, that I will be able to show how prescient and important their work is.

2. Aims of research

The primary aim of this research is to describe and evaluate Joseph Ratzinger's (Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect for the Sacred Congregation of the Faithful [CDF], Benedict

³ S. Clarke, H. Timperley, and J. Hattie, *Unlocking Formative Assessment* (Auckland: Hodder Moa Becket, 2003).

XVI) accounts of reason, love, and their relation to and effects on each other—to show their importance and inseparability.

The secondary aim of this research is to show how Bernard Lonergan's writings on conscious intentionality, conversion, a scale of values, and his four-point hypothesis with created participations bring clarity to Ratzinger's work on the inseparability of reason and love. Discussion of the grace–nature distinction complements this.

In using Lonergan as an interlocutor to Ratzinger, I aim to sharpen thinking on matters that seem central to Ratzinger's theological vision and personal commitments, especially as they pertain to our understanding of God, the human person, apologetics, and the common good.

3. Hypotheses and Thesis

A series of hypotheses will be tested during this thesis. These include: that Ratzinger has a complex understanding of reason; that he regards some forms of reason positively, and others negatively; that his latter-year writings demonstrate a positive reevaluation of reason, especially as it relates to love (or as it is made meaningful by love). Love is an ongoing and crucial concern for Ratzinger, and despite appearances, a coherent understanding of love is present in his works. I argue therefore that love and its relation to reason forms a consistent if underrated theme in Ratzinger's works. I also argue that Lonergan's analysis of the same subjects clarify (1) Ratzinger's understanding of reason, love, and their relation to and effects on each other, and (2) enable readers to evaluate Ratzinger's teachings, writings and reflections on love, its relation to reason and its impact on moral reasoning and behaviour. Overall, I contend that Ratzinger has opened a very important avenue of discussion on love and reason that offers a rich apologetic to contemporary society.

The thesis in this dissertation is that reason, love, and their interrelation are of critical interest to Ratzinger—that he pays considerable longitudinal attention to each. And further, that Ratzinger upholds love and reason as inseparable, and that Lonergan's articulation of the same subject matter acts as an informative and constructive interlocution to Ratzinger's assertion of the interrelation between love and reason. Love and reason must be considered together. "Intelligence and love are not in separate compartments: love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love."⁴

⁴ Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n. 30.

4. Why Ratzinger?

It is widely accepted that Ratzinger is one of the most important theologians writing in the last fifty years; general consensus suggests one should not ignore his work.⁵ Yet scholars note that unlike Hans Urs von Balthasar or Karl Rahner, he has no theological system that he claims as his own.⁶ This was to me a gain. I saw value in studying the subjects of reason and love through someone expert and steeped in tradition—not in a bad sense, but as one who would present a broad and yet highly informed account of the church's teaching on both matters. Extensive reading indicated that a substantial body of writing existed on reason and faith, and on love, generally, but not on reason and love's interrelation, especially as they find articulation in Ratzinger.

Additionally, I chose to study Ratzinger because of the timeframe of his life. I think it reasonable to state that he has lived through one of the most dramatic periods in history. He experienced the Great Depression, World War II (as a German), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, the Cold War with its proxy states, the 60s and 70s, Vatican II, European union and, arguably, decline—the list could go on.⁷ My point is Ratzinger is a person who understands trauma, lost love, suffering, social upheaval, and economic turmoil. In consequence, his writings on faith, human affections, human failure, and moral reasoning, for instance, hold understanding, gravity, and the type of urgency that I think relevant. Not only are his writings within a tradition, but they also interleave with contemporary political, cultural, and social realities. Reason and love are important for all their existential impact, and not just as ideas for theological reflection. This bears directly on my work on the development and use of artificial intelligence.

In short, I chose Ratzinger for this dissertation because of his theological expertise, and his life experience with its relevance to our times (whether we agree with him or not)—and in particularly with respect to his exposition of reason, love, and their interrelation.

⁵ Johannes Kristiansen and Svein Rise, eds., *Key Theological Thinkers: From Modern to Postmodern* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 301.

⁶ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 302.

⁷ "I myself have seen the frightful face of this atheistic piety unveiled [forms of political and cultural Marxism], its psychological terror, and the abandon with which every moral consideration could be thrown overboard as a bourgeois residue when the ideological goal was at stake." Joseph Ratzinger, *Milestones: Memoirs, 1927–1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 135.

5. Why Lonergan?

I have chosen Lonergan as an interlocutor to Ratzinger for slightly different reasons. Ratzinger and Lonergan share much in common: roughly the same lifespan; both loom large in the twentieth century as leading Catholic intellectuals; both hold a strong commitment to the Catholic Church; and have a revulsion towards totalitarianism, political corruption, and injustice; and view history, knowledge, truth and love as pivotal concerns. However, they slightly differ in focus, and greatly differ on methodology. Ratzinger's writings arguably accord with his duties as a professor of fundamental theology at Bonn (1959–63); as a professor of dogmatics at Münster (1963–66), Tübingen (1966–69), and then as chair of dogmatics at Regensburg until 1977. They are also prescribed by his roles of archbishop of Munich (1977–82), head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Rome (1982–2005), and finally, pope (2005–2013). He concentrates on revelation, fidelity to the tradition, ecclesiology, Christology and the relationship between culture and religion. In contrast, Lonergan has more of a focus on history and method. His work is in relation to concerns over intelligence and reasoning, claims to knowledge and truth, the nature of reality, and theological method; and it addresses the "turn to the subject", the problem of relativism, and historical consciousness. Importantly, for this dissertation, it offers a robust means for making claims to objectivity. It also provides a detailed analysis of human intentionality, and the role a scale of values and conversion take in the interrelation of reason and love. It is said Ratzinger tends toward Platonism and an Augustinianism, and that Lonergan, as a transcendental Thomist (a label about which he was ambivalent), tends towards an Aristotelianism, that they have little or nothing in common. I think this claim inept. I aim to show that apart from anything else, a preoccupation with the earthy reality of history, with reason, and with love unites them.

6. Literature review

The opening of Pope Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris* speaks of the apostolic mission to set people free by speaking truth to them. It reminds readers that the Church Fathers spoke of the relations between reason, science, and faith, and that the church stands in a tradition which is in dialogue with philosophy (n. 3). The encyclical argues for the interrelation of philosophy and faith, and how each aids the other. In response to certain trends in philosophy, it calls for a revival of the type of scholastic theology exemplified by Thomas Aquinas (n. 14, n. 17-31). Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange,

Henri Grenier, and others took up this challenge, with theologians like Henri de Lubac acting in response during the twentieth century.

John Paul II's 1998 encyclical *Fides et Ratio* builds on *Aeterni Patris* underscoring that reason and faith work together in relation to truth, especially in combatting relativism and nihilism (n.5, n. 80, n. 46, n. 90-91). My point is both encyclicals point to a longstanding commitment to dialogue between faith and reason.

The importance of the relation between reason, science and faith has been explored and restated in recent years by Étienne Gilson,⁸ Antony Kenny,⁹ Dorothy Soelle,¹⁰ Paul Helm,¹¹ Richard Swinburne,¹² Paul Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter,¹³ Robert Audi,¹⁴ Donald Crosby,¹⁵ Aidan Nichols,¹⁶ Oliver Crisp and Gavin D'Costa,¹⁷ Neil Ormerod,¹⁸ and others. It is a highly valued relation, and as I shall illustrate, Joseph Ratzinger as a theologian and an office-bearer is attentive to it. The focus of my dissertation, however, is less on the relation between reason, science, and faith, and more on Ratzinger's understanding of the interrelation between reason and love.

In a similar way, to reason, love has drawn much scholarly attention. And like reason it has been at the forefront of theological enquiry. Paul's encomium on love in 1 Corinthians, carries through the Church Fathers, the mystics, the writings of the Reformers, to the twenty-first century. Recently, Martha Cravan Nussbaum,¹⁹ Francis

⁸ Étienne Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York: Random House, 1962).

⁹ Anthony John Patrick Kenny, Faith and Reason (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

¹⁰ Dorothy Soelle, *Thinking about God: An Introduction to Theology* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1990).

¹¹ Paul Helm, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹² Richard Swinburne, *Faith and Reason*, Faith and Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹³ Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter, *Reason and the Reasons of Faith*, Theology for the twenty-first century, (New York: T & T Clark International, 2005).

¹⁴ Robert Audi, *Rationality and Religious Commitment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹⁵ Donald A. Crosby, *Faith and Reason Their Roles in Religious and Secular Life* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011).

¹⁶ With Chapter 11 summarising Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of reason. Aidan Nichols, *The Conversation of Faith and Reason: Modern Catholic Thought from Hermes to Benedict XVI*, ed. Aidan Nichols (Mundelein, IL: Hildenbrand Books, 2011), 190–206.

¹⁷ Oliver Crisp et al., *Theology and Philosophy: Faith and Reason* (London: T &T Clark, 2012).

¹⁸ Neil Ormerod, *Faith and Reason: The Possibility of a Christian Philosophy* (Minneapois: Fortress Press, 2017).

¹⁹ Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Watson,²⁰ Jean-Luc Marion,²¹ Zygmunt Bauman,²² Bernard Brady,²³ Carter Lindberg,²⁴ and Werner Jeanrond,²⁵ as well as John Paul II's *Theology of the Body*²⁶ have contributed to this tradition.

There is scholarly agreement that love is an important concern for Ratzinger, and particularly of his papacy as Benedict XVI. Yet surprisingly, there is a comparative lack of writing and analysis on the matter. Biographies and theological guides to his works note the subject but fail to give it sustained attention and definition.²⁷ Alternatively, they reframe it, diffusing it into familiar categories of theological reflection. While I will use similar categories for analysis, which I name as *ecclesio-traditio* and Christotelic methodologies, I hope to illustrate that for Ratzinger love is central to these—and importantly, it is more than just an associated phenomenon. Notable, too, is the paucity of literature exploring the inseparability of reason and love in Ratzinger's theology, and the importance of that same relation. There is a gap in the literature.

Just so, Aidan Nichols early in his introduction to the theology of Ratzinger²⁸ turns to the theme of love, but it is with reference to Ratzinger's reading of Aurelius Augustine's eschatology, and the questions he raises on the ordering and foci of human love. Nichols writes: "[Ratzinger sees that] in this way, Augustine is able to oppose to the ancient Roman city of the gods and their *cultus* the City of God now revealed in the Church as the site of lawful and saving worship. The fundamental constitution which forms it from

²⁰ Francis Watson, *Agape, Eros, Gender: Towards a Pauline Sexual Ethic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

²¹ Jean-Luc Marion, *Prolegomena to Charity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).

²² Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²³ Bernard V. Brady, *Christian Love* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2003).

²⁴ Carter Lindberg, *Love a Brief History Through Western Christianity* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).

²⁵ Werner G. Jeanrond, A Theology of Love (London: T & T Clark, 2010).

²⁶ Initially delivered in a series of lectures between 1979 and 1984.

²⁷ John L. Allen, *Pope Benedict XVI: A Biography of Joseph Ratzinger* (London: Continuum, 2005); Peter Seewald, *Benedict XVI: An Intimate Portrait* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008); Peter Seewald, *Benedict XVI: A Life: Volume One: Youth in Nazi Germany to the Second Vatican Council 1927–1965* (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2020).

²⁸ Aidan Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (London: Burns & Oates, 2005).

within is *love*."²⁹ His observation, however, goes without further elaboration. Rather, Nichols draws attention to Ratzinger's developing and subsequent interests in ecclesiology—to "people and the house of God"³⁰ and "sacramental brotherhood"³¹—and to the eschatological focus (Christ and history) that he will pursue in his work on St. Bonaventure.³² Nichols does not respond to Ratzinger's signalling on love, or on the interrelation between love and reason. Even in his sections on "The Fourth Session of the Council"³³, "…in Jesus Christ"³⁴, and "The primacy of Truth",³⁵ where love and truth emerge again as themes, Nichols does not follow Ratzinger's overt leads and clear interest in the subject.

The surprising omission of love as a focus of Ratzinger's attention is also seen in Lieven Boeve and Gerard Mannion's Ratzinger reader,³⁶ and to a lesser degree in Tracey Rowland's work.³⁷ The scholars touch love, but gingerly: their interests reach for other objects.³⁸ Boeve brings love into his analysis of Ratzinger's "Formation of Tradition"³⁹ where creative love as the divine *Logos* encounters the Greek understanding of God as pure thought. He also points to love as one facet of Ratzinger's work on Bonaventure in "Christian faith challenged by a modern context"⁴⁰—where faith wishes to understand, because it is moved by the "love" upon which it has bestowed its consent. The richest commentary Boeve has on love is in relation to salvation, where he shows that for Ratzinger human love alone is insufficient for human ends; and that such ends can only be

²⁹ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 30. Emphasis added.

³⁰ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 29.

³¹ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 26.

³² Joseph Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989).

³³ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 69.

³⁴ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 84.

³⁵ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 217.

³⁶ L. Boeve and Gerard Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey* (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010).

³⁷ Tracey Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

³⁸ Indeed, Mannion is critical of Pope Benedict's engagement with love: Gerard Mannion, "Charity Begins at Home ... an Ecclesiological Assessment of Pope Benedict's First Encyclical," *New Blackfriars* 88, no. 1018 (2007).

³⁹ Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, 1.2. 2b.

⁴⁰ Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, 1.3 C.

met by a universal and divine love that is also human.⁴¹ Despite the prevalence of love in Ratzinger's work, Boeve (and Mannion) leave it under-scrutinized. Their fulsome reader aims for breadth but misses the chance to exegete a critical interest for Ratzinger.

Rowland promises a fuller account of love from Ratzinger. Her "Beyond Moralism, God is Love" (Chapter 4), however, fails to grasp an open opportunity. She refers to a response "which the young Ratzinger gave to his own question in the third of his Münster sermons"—and how "Ratzinger proposes that the antidote to moralism is the theology of the First Letter of St John: God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God and God abides in him."⁴² But nothing much then happens. A discussion follows of the *Communio* School, Hans Urs von Balthasar and transcendentals, *perichoresis*, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche and the sexual revolution: only in the final pages of the chapter does Rowland tighten her line on Ratzinger and love, observing what has already been clearly seen—"that the actual advance registered by the Christian idea of God over that of the… world lies in its recognition that God is love".⁴³ In closing, Rowland reports that for Ratzinger love beggars every pagan and negative cultural practice in its relation to truth, goodness, and beauty, but she leaves this thought with its linkages in its infancy.

One of the exceptions to this general trend is found in James Corkery's *Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate Hopes*.⁴⁴ He notes that "in fifty years of writing, there is hardly a theological subject on which Joseph Ratzinger has not expounded. Ecclesiological themes abound: liturgy, Eucharist, Petrine primacy, the nature of the Church, episcopal collegiality, the Second Vatican Council, the Churchworld relationship, and ecumenism."⁴⁵ He comments, too, on Ratzinger's "major preoccupation"⁴⁶ with eschatology, and his Christology. He then moves in a different direction, tracing four facial features of Razinger's theological corpus—one of which is love. He argues that "from Ratzinger's earliest to his most recent writing, love is a pivotal

⁴¹ Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, 2.2.

⁴² Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 66.

⁴³ Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 74.

⁴⁴ A second exception is found in John C. Cavadini, *Explorations in the Theology of Benedict XVI* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013). Here, however, in the eighth chapter, "God is Love", written by Francesca Murphy, love is viewed in terms of an ecumenical ecclesiology.

⁴⁵ James Corkery, *Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate Hopes* (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 28.

⁴⁶ Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas, 28.

focus."⁴⁷ This facial feature becomes in Corkery's work a way to evaluate Ratzinger's assessment of what it is to be human, the nature of salvation and of liberation, and of Europe as a continent in crisis. Two other facial features "Christianity is true: The God of Philosophy and Faith are One" and "'In the Beginning': *Logos* before *Ethos*, Receiving before Making" deepen this evaluation.⁴⁸ Corkery is not uncritical of Ratzinger's theology, but he highlights that reason and love are important to it, and that consistency and continuity are the hallmarks of his thinking. He observes:

If there has been any "organizing principle" in the work of Ratzinger over the years, it has been the principle of love, which was the heart and center of his *Introduction to Christianity*, even though he himself never said so.⁴⁹

Of course, Nichols, Boeve, Mannion, Rowland and more critical authors such as Thomas Rausch⁵⁰ are offering readers a survey of Ratzinger's theology. With such maps, there are necessarily many items; but it is also true that Rowland's prose becomes more animated during her discussion of *Gaudium et Spes* and "Liturgy since Vatican II,"⁵¹ that Boeve and Mannion's focus is on ecclesiology and missiology, especially in relation to church governance and structure, and that Nichols, after a promising biographical beginning, focuses on expositing Ratzinger's *Introduction to Christianity* before examining in more detail his eschatology and ecclesiology. Given the common dictum that Ratzinger is all about love,⁵² it is surprising that these widely read books on his life and work pay scant attention to the subject. If love is mentioned, it is pressed into theological systematics and not given the weighting or explanation it deserves as a matter of major interest to Ratzinger. In an early work, *What it Means to be a Christian* (1965) Ratzinger has seventy-five passages on love;⁵³ in *Principles to Christian Morality* (1975), he has

⁴⁷ Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas, 34.

⁴⁸ Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas, 30–31.

⁴⁹ James Corkery, "The Relationship Between Human Existence and Christian Salvation in the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger," 501.

⁵⁰ Thomas P. Rausch, *Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to His Theological Vision* (New York: Paulist Press, 2009).

⁵¹ Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 127.

⁵² Alternatively, the media portrays him as an archconservative.

⁵³ Joseph Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006).

seventy-two passages;⁵⁴ and in *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology* (1982), one hundred and thirty-one.⁵⁵ These, and other major works are laden with references to, or reflections on love not only in relation to the Godhead, but to reason, and the natural order as well. What is happening?

The same general observation seems true of other secondary literature and journal articles on Ratzinger. There is extensive interest in his political theology, on Europe's past and future, on his rejection of orthopraxis for orthodoxy (or "eschatopraxis" for "eschatology"),⁵⁶ on his conservatism, his creedal analyses and meditations, on secularism, and on his examination of the primacy of grace and eucharistic ecclesiology.⁵⁷ Literature on love, however, is minimal; and on its relation to reason even more so. Pablo Blanco,⁵⁸ Francis Woehrling,⁵⁹ Daniel Philpott,⁶⁰ John Breen⁶¹ and Andrew Kaethler,⁶² each address Ratzinger's appropriation of love in a given context—from human identity to economics, but there seems to be a gap in the literature on (a) *how* Ratzinger thinks about love, other than in general terms (it is important, and important to him); and (b) on how love relates to reason and *vice versa*. It might be argued that this is because love resists analysis—but this seems pedestrian. At any rate, love has not been synthetically addressed across the

⁵⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, Heinz Schürmann, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986).

⁵⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987).

⁵⁶ Terms Ratzinger uses. Joseph Ratzinger, *Co-Workers of the Truth: Meditations for Every Day of the Year*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy and Lothar Krauth, ed. Irene Grassl (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 243.

⁵⁷ Thomas P. Rausch, *Pope Benedict* XVI, 105.

⁵⁸ Pablo Blanco, "The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger: Nuclear Ideas," *Theology Today* 68, no. 2 (July 2011): 153–73.

⁵⁹ Francis Woehrling, "Caritas in Veritate: Love Shaping the Real World through Rational Understanding," *Catholic Social Science Review* 16 (2011): 11–15.

⁶⁰ Daniel Philpott, *Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 157–211.

⁶¹ John M. Breen, "Love, Truth, and the Economy: A Reflection on Benedict's Caritas in Veritate," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 33, no. 3 (2010): 897–1029.

⁶² Andrew T. J. Kaethler, "I Become a Thousand Men and yet Remain Myself: Self Love in Joseph Ratzinger and Georges Bernanos," *Logos* 19, no. 2 (2016): 150–67.

Ratzinger canon, especially in its relations with reason.⁶³ It remains a subject that is taken for granted, but not clearly delineated, or understood in its operations and effects.

In his final interview in the *Last testament in his own words*,⁶⁴ when asked whether he has "felt love, tasted love, experienced love with profound feelings? Or [has it been] a more of a theoretical, philosophical matter?" Ratzinger exclaimed:

No. No, no. If one has not felt it, then one cannot talk of it. I felt it first at home with my father, my mother, my siblings. And, well, I wouldn't like to go into private details now, but I have been touched by it in different dimensions and forms. To be loved and to love another are things I have increasingly recognized as fundamental, so that one can live; so that one can say yes to oneself, so that one can say yes to another. Finally, it has become increasingly clear to me that God is not, let's say, a ruling power, a distant force; rather he is love and he loves me—and as such, life should be guided by him, by this power called love.⁶⁵

If love for Ratzinger is fundamental, it seems prudent to consider exploring his passion as it pertains to his theology. And while, for instance, Christopher Collins has written on *The Word made love*⁶⁶ his work remains more of an exploration of Christology, ecclesiology, and the Eucharist than an examination of love's relation to reason and *vice versa*.⁶⁷

In summary, in selected works by Ratzinger there are hundreds of passages on and references to love. Scholars note love's importance to Ratzinger, and likewise his persistent commentary on reason; yet despite such acknowledgements, there appears to be limited analysis of the interrelation between reason and love.

⁶³ An interesting exception is Thomas O'Brien's analysis that finds Ratzinger incoherent. In his conclusion, and speaking of truth and reason, he judges "the use of *veritate* in order to "clarify" *caritas* would appear to be something of a fool's errand. Far from making the meaning of love more transparent, the concept of truth simply muddies the water even more." Thomas O'Brien, "A Thematic Analysis of 'Love' and 'Truth' in Caritas in Veritate," *Political Theology* 14, no. 5 (2013). Kozinski is more generous, but he reframes Ratzinger as a friend to postmodernity, which is possibly tenuous. Thaddeu J. Kozinski, "Whose Love? Which Truth? A Postmodern Encyclical," *Catholic Social Science Review* 16 (2011).

⁶⁴ Pope Benedict XVI and Peter Seewald, *Last Testament: In His Own Words*, trans. Jacob Philips (New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2016).

⁶⁵ Benedict XVI and Seewald, Last Testament, "Conclusion".

⁶⁶ Christopher Collins, *The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2013).

⁶⁷ This despite his sections "The Unfolding of the meaning of the *Logos*", "From *Ratio* to *Verbum*", and "*Logos* as Person": Collins, *Word Made Love*, 71–77.

7. Method

The methodology I adopt in this thesis is in line with three of Lonergan's functional specialities: interpretation, history, dialectic. I also work with two other areas of specialization: foundations and systematics.⁶⁸

I do not initially define reason or love. For Ratzinger these are complex subjects; and he generally avoids single definitions, often writing by way of analogy. However, Chapter Two works towards an interpretation and definition of Ratzinger's understanding of reason, and Chapter Three yields the same with love. Both definitions are multifaceted. The following chapters on Lonergan bring precision to these. In this way, the dissertation works towards definitions and distinctions; it does not start with them.

I closely analyse forty-three of Ratzinger's works and fourteen of Lonergan's. In preparing for this analysis, using both hard copy and digital books in Logos,⁶⁹ I read and annotated each work three times. Working with Microsoft Excel, I created individual worksheets for each text with columns indicating the context of a discussion on either reason or love, the authors' attitude to each (negative, neutral, affirmative), a description of their argument, whether the author was addressing an attribute or an effect, definitions of reason or love, a one-word summary for each quotation I selected, as well as columns for section and page referencing from the cited text. Using Excel was helpful because I was able to analyse the collection of data through pie, column, scatter and distribution charts, and determine which words and themes clustered around higher level concepts relating to reason, love, and their interrelation. This helped me evaluate the material in terms of weighting—of the degree of interest and importance an observation, description or definition carried for an author, but not necessarily their significance. It also uncovered patterns in Ratzinger's methodology. Using Excel, I was able to narrow my focus to threehundred and six statements on reason, and two-hundred and seventy-two on love. In consideration of these, I divided my analysis and evaluation of Ratzinger's understanding of reason, love, and their interrelation into four parts. These are: correlation; retroduction; ecclesio-traditio, and Christotelic. They refer to Ratzinger's methodological approaches. Correlation and retroduction are recognised methodologies. Ecclesio-traditio and

⁶⁸ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972).

⁶⁹ https://logos.com.

Christotelic are my terms, though they are not entirely original.⁷⁰ They aim to describe two further methodologies Ratzinger uses—methodologies that became increasingly evident from a close analysis of the primary texts.

In reading Ratzinger and Lonergan, I adopt a critical realist approach, which tries to be attentive to my biases, acknowledging my formation and the subjectivity I bring to a reading, while also holding to authorial intention.⁷¹ Additionally, I use techniques of literary analysis to focus on word meanings, and identify the genre and mode of writing in front of me. Further, I consider the historical and cultural context in which Ratzinger and Lonergan write. What historical, philosophical, theological, economic, and political debates are they responding to, and how do their life experiences influence these? This approach meant turning to biographies and histories. It also meant grappling with temporal, geographical, cultural, linguistic, and stylistic distances. Finally, I have approached this thesis as a matter of faith seeking understanding. I am a Christian, I want to understand the interrelation of love and reason, and in a missional way, I hope this dissertation proves valuable.

The task of reading has been made difficult by the fact that Ratzinger is a prolific writer. He is at home in a wide variety of literary genres. He is an author of books, an essayist, an op-ed writer, and a speechwriter. He is also someone who writes devotions and sermons, as well as conference papers, journal articles and academic prose.⁷²

This difficulty is compounded by the duration of his writing career, positions of office he has held, coauthorships, and ghost-writers. As a cardinal and a pope, factors of

⁷⁰ Matthew Levering, "Readings On The Rock: Typological Exegesis In Contemporary Scholarship," *Modern Theology* 28, no.4 (October 2012):707-31; Mark Strom, *Reframing Paul: Conversations in Grace and Community* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000); Dan Lioy, *Facets of Pauline Discourse in Christocentric and Christotelic Perspective* (New York: Peter Lang, 2016).

⁷¹ My reference texts here are: David Daiches, *Critical Approaches to Literature* (London: Longman, 1981); Henry A. Virkler, *Hermeneutics: Principles and Processes of Biblical Interpretation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981); Grant R. Osborne, *The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1991); Roy B. Zuck, *Rightly Divided: Readings in Biblical Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1996); Anthony C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992); Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998); José Granados, Carlos Granados, and Luis Sánchez Navarro, *Opening up the Scriptures: Joseph Ratzinger and the Foundations of Biblical Interpretation*, Ressourcement: Retrieval and Renewal in Catholic Thought, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2008).

⁷² For an illustration of the range of genres see, Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*.

targeted audience and weight of authority, arguably, only add to the confusion. Who is speaking, here? The person, an authority, a tradition, or the church?

The task is also made challenging because of Ratzinger's seeming definitional inconsistency and imprecision: by the plasticity of his language. Ratzinger uses the term reason (reasoning and rationality, rationalism, intellect, intelligence, etc.) in a range of differing ways and contexts. This contrasts with Lonergan, who, for instance, will differentiate intelligence from reason in an unmistakably and consistently delineated fashion. Ratzinger is less circumspect—at times, being intelligent and reasonable can appear to be much the same thing in his writings. His apparent lack of rigour with definition can confuse readers, hampering their understanding of when he is being affirmative or negative, or when he is being polemical. And arguably, he is known more for his attacks on technical reason, sterile, loveless rationality, scientific reasoning, and a secular intelligence than for his affirmation of creative reason, and a moral intelligence that sustains human concord—either way, readers can remain confused.

The difficulty with precision presents itself with Ratzinger's use of the term love, too. A casual reading of his works discovers love is an attribute, a charism, a fruit of the Spirit, Christological, pneumatological, and, among other things, a mystical agent and power. Identity and attribution merge, and love in Ratzinger's thought appears confusing.

In Chapters Two and Three, and by the end of this dissertation, I aim to meet these concerns. I aim to explain and evaluate Ratzinger's analysis of reason and love, limiting ambiguity where possible. I also aim to show the central importance of their inseparability in his theology.

8. Structure

In the following chapter, I describe Ratzinger's understanding of reason. I trace his use of the term *reason* in its various forms and contexts. I then analyze and synthesize his understanding of reason—bringing definitions together, comparing, contrasting, categorizing, and systemizing them.

I do the same with Ratzinger's understanding of *love* in Chapter Three, concluding with observations on love, reason, and their interrelation. In both chapters I work closely with primary texts.

In Chapter Four, I introduce Lonergan as an interlocutor to Ratzinger. I describe Lonergan's transcendental method. I also offer analyses of conscious intentionality, his descriptions of conversion, and a scale of values. These yield a provisional account of Lonergan's understanding of reason, love, and their interrelation. This account is enriched by an examination of Lonergan's broader discussion of love, his contribution to the discussion on the grace–nature distinction, and his development of a four-point hypothesis and created participations.

In Chapter Five, I bring Lonergan into conversation with Ratzinger. I compare and contrast Ratzinger's work with Lonergan's. I show that love, reason, and their interrelation are critically important discussion points for both theologians; and that the latter theologian aids Ratzinger readers not only in understanding why this is so, but also in understanding that this same relation is central to conversion, sanctification, and the habit of charity—as well as political decision making, cultural engagement and the pursuit of theology. More directly, a discussion of love, reason, and their interrelation explores key understandings of the Triune God, God's relation with creation, the nature of reality, intelligibility, human persons and their fulfilment, and to responsible living.

My dissertation closes by restating the main lines of argument in the thesis: that reason, love, and their interrelation are of critical interest to Ratzinger—that he pays considerable longitudinal attention to each. Further, that he upholds reason and love as inseparable; and that using Lonergan as an interlocutor to Ratzinger sharpens thinking on matters that are central to Ratzinger's theological vision and personal commitments. I also suggest that more research and reflection on the interrelation between reason and love is necessary if theologians are to begin to help meet the exigencies of the twenty-first century.

9. Limitations

The limitations of this dissertation pertain to the restricted selection of works by Ratzinger; the use of English texts only; a limited ability to understand works on Ratzinger in other languages (Italian, French and Spanish); the limited attention given to the examination of love as it relates to *faith* and reason; inattention to critical theory and what it might bring to Ratzinger's engagement not only with liberation theology but also with the abuse of power, and the politics of sexual preference and gender; and, a lack of expertise in Thomistic thought and parlance, which would lend itself to a deeper understanding of Lonergan, and by way of comparison, where Ratzinger relates to and differs from the Thomistic understanding of reason and love as they are expressed theologically, anthropologically and politically.

10. Biographical background

Before moving to discuss their approaches to love and reason, it is important to offer a brief overview of the life and times of Ratzinger and Lonergan.

10.1 Joseph Ratzinger

Joseph Ratzinger was born to a devout Catholic family on 16th April 1927, in Marktl, Bavaria. He was the youngest child of Joseph Ratzinger Sr, a commissioner of the gendarmerie, and Maria Ratzinger (née Peintner), whose family originated from Italy. He spent his childhood in Traunstein, southeast of Munich, where, in 1939, at the age of twelve, he became a seminarian.⁷³

In 1941 he was enrolled in the Hitler Youth, the same year his cousin with Down's syndrome was forcibly removed from his home to be later euthanised by *Aktion T4* for being an unproductive expense on the state, and a blemish on the Aryan race. In 1943, Ratzinger was drafted into the German military, serving in antiaircraft units in Munich, Unterföhring, Innsbruck, and Gilching. He witnessed first-hand Allied bombing raids. In 1944, he was sent to Hungary to place tank traps to slow the Red Army's advance.⁷⁴ He watched Jews being transported to death camps. In April 1945, he deserted the German Army. Soon after, he was captured by American forces and held as a prisoner of war in a camp near Ulm, before being released on 19th June.⁷⁵

In autumn of the same year, Ratzinger re-entered seminary training, this time in Freising. He studied further at the *Herzogliches Georgianum* of the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich. On 29th June 1951, he was ordained to the priesthood by Cardinal Faulhaber.⁷⁶ He acted as a curate for one year, and continued academic study, writing a dissertation (1953) on Augustine, entitled "The People and the House of God in Augustine's Doctrine of the Church." In 1954, he was made professor of dogmatics and fundamental theology at the University College in Freising. After much revision and heartsearching, as a result of a critical report by Michael Schmaus, he completed his

⁷³ Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 24.

⁷⁴ Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 33.

⁷⁵ Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 38.

⁷⁶ Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 98.

Habilitationsschrift in 1957 on St. Bonaventure.⁷⁷ As I mentioned above, Ratzinger's career then took him to Bonn, Münster, Tübingen, and finally to Regensburg—ending in 1977.

In 1962, at the age of thirty-five and in addition to his educational work, Ratzinger became the personal advisor to the Archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Joseph Frings. In this capacity, he acted as an official conciliar theologian (*peritus*) to the Second Vatican Council, working closely with Yves Congar and Karl Rahner.⁷⁸ His main contribution was on texts about revelation, the church as sacrament, and mission. In addition, he developed a working relationship with Hans Küng, becoming part of a small group producing the journal *Concilium*. He left this to join with Hans Urs von Balthasar and Henri de Lubac, who had earlier stepped out of the *Concilium* circle and begun a new journal, *Communio*. De Lubac greatly influenced Ratzinger. Ratzinger had already turned aside from neoscholastic theology; now history and *ressourcement* became central to his thinking. His earlier work on Augustine and Bonaventure foreshadowed this intellectual move. A second element in this directional shift was the reinforcement of his position on the positive value of Greek philosophy and culture on reason, and in relation to biblical thought. A pure gospel separated from culture became fiction for him.⁷⁹

In March 1977, Pope Paul VI named Ratzinger as Archbishop of Munich and Freising, and on 28th May 1977, he was consecrated as the first diocesan priest in eighty years to take over the pastoral ministry of the significant Bavarian diocese.⁸⁰ Paul VI elevated Ratzinger to the College of Cardinals in the consistory of June 27, 1977. Four years later, he was nominated by John Paul II as Prefect of the Congregation for the

⁷⁷ "Schmaus called me aside for a brief private conversation, during which he told me very directly and without emotion that he had to reject my *habilitation* thesis because it did not meet the pertinent scholarly standards. I would learn details after the appropriate decision by the faculty. I was thunderstruck. A whole world was threatening to collapse around me." Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 110; Kristiansen and Rise, *Key Theological Thinkers*, 303.

⁷⁸ And note: "[Rahner's] was a speculative and philosophical theology in which Scripture and the Fathers in the end did not play an important role and in which the historical dimension was really of little significance. For my part, my whole intellectual formation had been shaped by Scripture and the Fathers and profoundly historical thinking. The great difference between the Munich school, in which I had been trained, and Rahner's became clear to me during those days, even though it still took a while for our parting of ways to become outwardly visible." Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 120; Kristiansen and Rise, *Key Theological Thinkers*, 305.

⁷⁹ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 405.

⁸⁰ Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 152.

Doctrine of the Faith. In 1998, Cardinal Ratzinger was elected Vice Dean of the College of Cardinals; this was followed by his election as Dean on 30th November 2002.

After the death of John Paul II in April 2005, Cardinal Ratzinger was elected as the 265th Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church. He resigned in February 2013 but remains pope emeritus. He is the oldest-living pope in history. He is multilingual, and one of the papacy's most prolific authors.

10.2 Bernard Lonergan

Bernard Lonergan was born on 17th December 1904, in Quebec, Canada, as the son of Irish Catholic émigrés. His father was a land-surveyor and spent long periods of time away from the family covering enormous tracts of landscape. Lonergan spent his childhood in Buckingham, and his early adulthood in Montreal. He was schooled by Christian Brothers and Jesuits. He studied for four years at Loyola College, before entering the Society of Jesus on the feast of St. Ignatius in 1924.⁸¹

In 1926, Lonergan was sent to Heythrop College, in London for further training in philosophy and theology. He also studied French, Latin, Greek, and Mathematics through the University of London. He returned to Montreal to teach at Loyola College in 1930. He witnessed the economic agony of the Great Depression in both Europe and North America.⁸²

After a further three years, Lonergan began further training at the Collège de l'Immaculée-Conception in Montreal. After only three months, and as someone gifted with a creative intellect, he was sent to the Gregorian University in Rome,⁸³ where he studied theology for seven years, with a one-year break for tertianship—a period of strict discipline before final vows—in Amiens, France. Between 1938–40, and back in Rome, he completed his doctoral dissertation, "*Gratia operans*. A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas" (awarded in 1946). Having been

⁸¹ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 239–40.

⁸² Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 240.

⁸³ "In [Hingston's scholarship] interview with Lonergan in Montreal he put to him the question, was he orthodox? Lonergan replied that he was but that he thought a lot about things." W. Matthews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 66.

witness to the rise of fascism in Spain, Germany, and Italy, he was now called back to Canada and to Collège de l'Immaculée-Conception because of war.⁸⁴

Lonergan taught at the Thomas More Institute (1945–46), Regis College in Toronto (1947–53), and the Gregorian University in Rome (1953–64), with a focus on the Trinity and Christology. He also turned to questions of human understanding. He published *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* in 1957. The work was recognised as an original contribution to the *aggiornamento* of theology and created a strong reaction. Lonergan claimed *Insight* addressed three questions: "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?" Answering these questions paved the way for personal authenticity and methodological objectivity.⁸⁵

Lonergan returned to North America to be treated for lung cancer. After recovering, he continued working at Regis College, publishing *Method in Theology* in 1972. He also became Stillman Professor of Divinity at Harvard University (1971–72) and was made a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Boston College (1975–83).⁸⁶

On a personal level, Lonergan suffered from depression, restlessness, and stomach ulcers, as well as wrestling with alcoholism.⁸⁷ He also struggled with a sense of not being understood. Like Ratzinger, he understood tragedy and human pathos.

Lonergan died at the Jesuit infirmary in Pickering, Ontario, on 26th November 1984. Over his lifetime, he had received nineteen honorary doctorates, was invested as Companion of the Order of Canada (1971) and named Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy (1975). Although there is not much evidence he played an active part, he was a *peritus* at Vatican II. Additionally, he was nominated by Pope Paul VI as an original member of the International Theological Commission. His written output, like Ratzinger's, was prolific. The *Collected Works* currently consists of twenty-three volumes but will amount to twenty-five. He remains one of the most original, if underrated, theologians of

⁸⁴ William Matthews notes: "Lonergan spent the last three weeks of September in Heythrop before returning to Rome just as the Munich Conference, with its promise of peace, was taking place. That prospect was devastated on 5 October when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia." Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight*.

⁸⁵ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 241.

⁸⁶ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 241.

⁸⁷ P. Lambert and P. McShane, *Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2010), 100–01.

the last century; and like Ratzinger or Karol Wojtyła the true impact of his legacy might not be appreciated for many years to come.

11. Philosophical, social, cultural, and theological contexts

Although Ratzinger was born in the old world of Europe and Lonergan in the new world of the Americas, they lived as Catholics in the same revolutionary times. They also found themselves engaged in theological debates that were not of their own making. These were in consequence of the Age of Enlightenment, romanticism, modernity, and postmodernity. Additionally, their lives were entangled in the major events of the twentieth century; nor could they escape the impact of tremendous technological innovation.

Jean Rousseau's *Emile, or on Education* (1762) and *The Social Contract* (1762), and the writings of François-Marie Arouet (Voltaire) are said to have fostered revolutionary sentiment in France; either way, the effects of the French Revolution (1789) rippled through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. It lit a fire not only among liberals, but also conservatives.⁸⁸ It highlighted the tension involved in embracing something new while retaining what is of value from the old.

This political tension was mirrored philosophically. The turn to the self, initiated by René Descartes, became Copernican under Immanuel Kant.⁸⁹ Subjectivity came to be central to the process of understanding and to liberty. Yet, at the same time, and in contrast, utilitarianism, scientific method, and technological innovation, particularly in industry, argued for a dispassionate objectivity. They started from a position which viewed people, nature, and reality mechanistically. Whence, the response of romanticism, siding with Kant in a surprising way, with its emphasis on subjectivity, intuition, and imagination—elements, apparently, which could not be boxed into a mechanistic and deterministic horizon.

The seeming and unintended consequences of Kantian thought and romanticism is that they prepared the way for the radical dismissal of tradition and sets of established values. In *The Gay Science* (1884), Friedrich Nietzsche makes clear Europe's relationship

⁸⁸Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien (London: The Folio Society, 2010), 71–73.

⁸⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Vasilis Politis and J. M. D. Meiklejohn (London: Everyman, 1993), Transcendental Logic: First Division. 2.2.

with Christianity was not just in decline (*pace*, Matthew Arnold, *Dover Beach* and Alfred Lord Tennyson, *In Memoriam*); it was dead.⁹⁰ But he viewed this as a great opportunity: new codes to live by would create new and improved civilizations. It is said, leaders of Germany's Third Reich agreed with him, and adopted the slogan of "will to power" with the mythology of the *Übermensch*. Other political leaders in Russia, and later China, took up and adapted the work of Marx. But both fascism and communism expressed antipathy to the conservative values and religious commitments of Catholic and Christian belief, and to traditions and institutions which had shaped Europe for centuries.

It is too difficult a task to enumerate the factors that led to World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War, but it is not unreasonable to argue that they are tied together by a narratival chord with the threads of epistemic innovation and revolution; ideology; scientific discoveries and technological advances; poorly regulated markets and banking; weak and inept leadership; and, conversely, powerful, but not necessarily ethical leadership. All compounded by pride, ambition, arrogance, greed—and human sin. And this was the lived history Ratzinger and Lonergan had to grapple with; and live through.

The same epistemic, philosophical, and historical trends and debates were twined in theology, and theological method. In the nineteenth century, theologians at the University of Tübingen gravitated towards romanticism, whereas those at the University of Louvain in Belgium and at the academies in Rome were disposed towards Enlightenment foci.⁹¹ The concern of the former might be characterised as the relation of history to theology; the latter, on the truth of Christianity. Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), responding to the epistemic rejection of tradition and anticipating the dangers of relativism as an advance on epistemic scepticism, called for renewed attention to Thomas Aquinas, which in turn generated different schools of Thomistic scholarship. The genius of Aquinas was to answer the methodological shifts and polemics of the hour, proving, or showing, Catholic faith to be objective, reasonable, and true. Jesuit Louis Cardinal Billot and the Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as scholastic, neo-Thomist leaders were held at the time to have done this effectively.

⁹⁰ Friedrich Neitzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. J. Nauckhoff, ed. B. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3.125; 5.343.

⁹¹ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 37–38.

The criticism of Jean Daniélou that scholasticism located reality in essences, rather than in the subjective and dramatic world of persons and of human experience, explains the very different approach taken by *ressourcement* theologians to that taken by neo-Thomists.⁹² *In nuce*, a theology with an abstract superstructure that stood outside history was deemed of little use. Even so Maurice Blondel, Marie-Dominique Chenu OP, Yves Congar OP—and Henri de Lubac SJ, and Romano Guardini, who both strongly influenced Ratzinger⁹³—looked to frame their theology from within tradition as a form of Catholic historical consciousness.

The tension between transcendental Thomists, who had accepted and moderated aspects of Kantian epistemology, Suárezian Thomists, and *ressourcement* theologians carried through to Vatican Council II and after. But other practical matters were also forcing their attention on theologians. The 60s were in full swing. The sexual revolution, civil rights, the assassination of political leaders, student unrest, chic Marxism, the Beatles, rock'n'roll, heroin, amphetamine and cocaine use, the Vietnam War, the threat of a nuclear holocaust, and shocking reports of famine were posing intellectual and moral questions that Christians seemed ill-equipped to answer. How should these realities be thought of—were all of them really that bad—and could politics with new sets of values deal with them? All these questions and each of these trends and movements were porous with Ratzinger and Lonergan's lives. The social, cultural, philosophical, and theological landscapes they traversed were novel, pitted, vivid, and tough; but an understanding of reason, and, as I hope to illustrate, its relation to love, have been critical to their navigation. The next chapter analyses and evaluates Ratzinger's understanding of reason through selected works.

⁹² Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 39.

⁹³ Ratzinger, *Milestones*, 43.

Chapter Two: Joseph Ratzinger on Reason

Introduction

In the opening chapter of this dissertation, I referred to a suite of theological methods that Ratzinger uses for his analysis and evaluation of reason. While scholars provide differing accounts of these, highlighting, for instance, a Christological approach over and against an ecclesial and tradition-based model,¹ Francis Schüssler Fiorenza argues that Ratzinger's principle theological method is one of correlation.²

As this chapter progresses, I will raise the question as to how methodologically deliberate Ratzinger is. I will argue he adopts specific methodological frameworks, but inconsistently, and that these represent a fit for purpose approach rather than a methodological development. In agreement with Fiorenza, however, I will pay closest attention to Ratzinger's use of correlation. I do this because the textual evidence spanning forty years of writing seems to support Fiorenza's claim. I do this, too, because correlation methodology, for better or worse, usefully breaches a discussion on reason, operating and embedded in culture—in its literature and art, philosophy, epistemic approaches, and moral life—and on nature, in relation to reason and intelligibility.

Additionally, a focus on Ratzinger's method of correlation, not only enables a comparison with other secondary theological methods he employs, which will in turn draw out further distinctions in his appraisal of reason, but also clarifies how it becomes an instrument of apologetics and mission, and of affirmation or critique. That is—where there is commonality, overlap and overlay in theological appropriations of reason with secular ones, or, in contrast, sharp dissimilarity or discontiguity.

My aim is to advance the thesis in this dissertation that reason, love, and their interrelation are of critical interest to Ratzinger—that he pays considerable longitudinal attention to each—and that he upholds love and reason as inseparable. The chapter analyses Ratzinger's longstanding interest in and understanding of reason from selected works.

¹ Central to the thesis in Christopher Collins, *The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2013).

² Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, "Systematic Theology: Task and Methods," in *Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives*, ed. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Philadelphia: Fortress, 2011), 44-45.

As previously stated, part of the difficulty in discussing Ratzinger's overall analysis and evaluation of reason is that his polemical passages on, for instance, technical, positivistic, and scientific reason are so forceful and numerous that it is easy to lose sight of the positive, more subtle, and substantial commentary on reason that also permeates his writings. In this chapter, I draw attention to Ratzinger's negative statements on reason, but I also argue that by way of contrast (*pace* Hans Küng) such commentaries work to highlight the genuinely constructive power and value that reason holds for Ratzinger. I will argue that Ratzinger's withering and strenuous attacks on certain forms of reasoning, speak more to a counterfeit reason—that is to a "reason" that is not reason at all; and that a detailed consideration of the broader body of his writing illustrates he is highly attentive to reason as a good, not simply in terms of utility, but also as integral to or indivisible from personhood, and to becoming human in an eschatological sense—something that Lonergan closely attends to.

In investigating the range of Ratzinger's theological methods, the chapter takes as its starting point (1) the correlation between reason and faith, exemplified in the early church's inter-illumination with Graeco-Roman thought, its metaphysical concerns and categories; then it explores (2) the possibility that Ratzinger's spiritually insistent prose acts retroductively against cultural elites, which tend to offer diminished and manipulative accounts of reason with improper ends; and finally, it asks whether an (3) *ecclesio-traditio* or a (4) Christotelic methodology, which decentres the self and attenuates individualism, while simultaneously questioning the liberal tenet of progress, provides a better framework for understanding Ratzinger's theological method.

In sum, while this chapter dwells on correlation methodology, I will argue Ratzinger employs a complex mesh of theological methods, each acting to make distinctions in his developing understanding of reason. I will also suggest that while scholars generate methodological frameworks for describing Ratzinger's theological method, that his extensive commentary on reason does not neatly fit into any methodological schematic, and is, at times, simply aphoristic, or meditative.

1. Joseph Ratzinger: method of correlation

Ratzinger demarcates his method of correlation in his 1995 work *The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates.*³ It moves in the tradition of *fides quaerens intellectum* where understanding is possible because truth is accessible by faith. Further, in willingly "standing" within the Christian tradition, the faithful individual correlates with the intelligible world. C.S. Lewis writes "I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else."⁴ In a similar manner, Ratzinger's method (1) sets conditions for recognising and responding to intelligibility in creation, and (2) the means for evaluating cultural products. It also affirms the proposition that truth is not locally determined and relative, or an accident of history, rather it is primary and theological:⁵ primary in the sense that it *is* theological, i.e., truth is present to God. For Ratzinger, like Karl Rahner, faith does not neglect intelligence and reasoning; on the contrary, it supports them and provides them with many of the answers to the questions with which they wrestle. Furthermore, and recursively, faith feeds on truth.

Here, Ratzinger's method of correlation usually distinguishes between analogy and soteriology. He generally separates the created analogous capacities humans possess from their need for salvation. This means that despite the despoliations that sin inflicts and produces in a sinner, she is still ordered to the true and the good as one made in the image and likeness of God. This temper, however, does not guarantee her salvation; and Ratzinger's distinction places him at variance with Karl Barth, and more generally with the Reformed tradition, which in its emphasis on human "inability" seems to conflate and confuse God-imaging vestiges or positive capabilities within a fallen creature with that same creature's salvation. The former does not ensure the latter. It operates out of a grace–

³ Joseph Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates*, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 23–28.

⁴ C. S. Lewis, *They Asked for a Paper: Papers and Addresses*, (London: Bles, 1962), 34.

⁵ Even so, Rowland on Ratzinger notes: "His strong preference for Augustinian and Bonaventurian over Kantian epistemology places him comfortably at the point of intersection between the pre-moderns and the post-moderns. With the post-moderns he agrees that we should not pretend that reason is theologically neutral. With the pre-moderns he agrees that there is something called Truth which the human intellect has the capacity to discern." Tracey Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 46.

sin dialectic and not a grace–nature distinction; ⁶ and fails to grasp what a metaphysical notion of human creatureliness is. This said, Ratzinger, at times, does seem to veer towards a grace-sin dialectic, possibly as a result of the experience of being born and raised in prewar Germany, and then living under the shadows of totalitarianism and the Cold War.⁷ He witnessed maximal human depravity. As I hope to illustrate, Lonergan takes the surds of sin seriously, but his methodology probes and helps remove the confusion that is present in a grace-sin-nature mix.

Furthermore, the grace-nature distinction is important because it is the basis for Ratzinger's correlative method. In its origination, this holds together in two parts, and is bound by a third. Firstly, Ratzinger argues that the weight of historical and cultural evidence, even in the face of postmodern scepticism and its overriding concerns for deformative power, suggests people continuously ask metaphysical questions on origins, purpose, ends, mortality, human goods, the human condition bound by sin, and God. Such questions become a point of connection for a method of correlation: they are of nature, and they act as a meeting point where Christian testimony and theological insight can listen to, moderate, and engage with a culture's heartfelt concerns. Secondly, Ratzinger's method of correlation not only speaks to a culture's metaphysical intuitions, but it also addresses ontology. Ratzinger finds the persistent and natural need for grounding human perceptions of the true, the good and the beautiful to be a second point of connection; the need for "being" affords the theologian an opportunity for exploring a culture's understanding of Being in relation to biblical and ecclesial conceptions.⁸ Thirdly, Ratzinger brings love forward to his correlative method. Ratzinger recognises that a valid argument or sound

⁶ Neil Ormerod, "Quarrels with the Method of Correlation," *Theological Studies* 57, no. 4 (December 1996): 714–15, https://doi.org/10.1177/004056399605700406.

⁷ James Corkery, "Reflection on the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)," *Acta theol.* 32, no. 2 (2013): 25–26, https://doi.org/10.4314/actat.v32i2.2; James Corkery, "The Relationship Between Human Existence and Christian Salvation in the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger" (STD diss., The Catholic University of America, 1991), 481–84.

⁸ See, also: "Catholic 'foundationalist' thinkers like Rahner and Lonergan … thought that some foundationalist ontology was necessary if one was adequately to defend fundamental Catholic positions on doctrine. If one accepts postmodernity more fully, thereby abandoning some form of foundationalist ontology, one's entire understanding of revelation, especially the role of Christian doctrine, is deeply affected. Either the truth of the gospel must simply be asserted, breaking its link with a rationally elaborated infrastructure, or by opening a fissure between ontology and theology, one develops a quite different understanding of what the deposit of faith is…." Cited in Tracey Rowland, "Ratzinger on the Timelessness of Truth," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 44, no. 17 (2017): 252–53.

reasoning does not always translate into right action. He notes the natural, apologetic force of love, referencing 1 Peter 3:15. Love naturally leads to engagement in a method of correlation; it seeks out truth and the good of the other, lifting people out of themselves into an "Ich und Du" relationship—actions in concert with Lonergan's own analysis of the relation between reason and love. Ratzinger's method of correlation rests on the premise of creational good. This does not secure an individual's salvation, but neither does it mean that it is worthless or that it plays court with the Devil. On the contrary, it is a tool in mission, highlighting the common and recreational possibilities of grace and nature.

Before turning directly to Ratzinger's writings, I want to highlight what critics have described as one serious failing in the method of correlation. If it is a true failing, then it undermines the credibility of the entire methodology. I think Ratzinger senses this. Hence, possibly, the variety of other methodologies he employs. The failing runs parallel to his awareness of the difficulty of trying to determine the Jesus of history.⁹ And as I shall show, it is also reflected in the rationale for adopting an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology in preference to one of correlation. It is a form of naivety—a presumptuous conviction that a perfectly rendered Jesus, or a pure form of Christianity can be plucked as objects from history and placed into conversation with contemporary cultures. Stated differently, it is the contention that then and now, and tradition and situation are not as disparate as some would wish them to be; and it marks a failure to recognise that "if revelation has been culturally transformative, then the present situation is, in part, constituted by the tradition of rationality that revelation initiated, sustained and prolonged."¹⁰ This suggests that tradition and situation are not foundational sources for theology and that they cannot and do not provide criteria for discrimination in acts of correlation. Rather, the grounds for

⁹ And in relation to his work on St. Bonaventure, his reflections on tradition in *Theological Highlights of Vatican II*, and his privileging of eschatology in methodology: "It is in the multivalent message of the entire history, and its overall critical evaluation, the truth is disclosed and with it the possibility of fresh knowledge. Something analogous to this is true of such a foundational text as the Bible. Here, too, and especially where the heart of the scriptural message is concerned, there is no such thing as a definitive acquisition of scholarship... one thing is certain: to employ in this domain the paradigms of knowledge characteristic of the natural sciences is fallacious. Only by listening to the whole history of interpretation can the present be purified by criticism and so brought into a position of genuine encounter with the text concerned." Joseph Ratzinger, *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life*, trans. Michael Waldstein (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 24.

¹⁰ Ormerod, "Quarrels with the Method of Correlation," 718. See also: Robert Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990), 500–27; Matthew Lamb, *Solidarity with Victims* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), 75–82.

reasonable engagement and responsible action with contemporaneity are located in the religious, moral, intellectual, and psychically converted theologian.¹¹ In short, it seems probable that the methodology of correlation is seriously flawed.¹²

This said, in the following subsections I explore Ratzinger's use of correlation in an attempt to make visible his analysis and evaluation of reason. I begin with forms of reasoning that for Ratzinger are not reason at all. They are (1) "counterfeit." Then follows subsections illustrating, in contrast, his broad confidence in reason as (2) basic; (3) intelligible; (4) synthetic; and finally, (5) instrumental. In the rest of the chapter, I address three other theological methods Ratzinger employs, and the further understanding these bring to his largely positive appraisal of reason.

1.1 Reason as counterfeited

My dissertation references forty-three books and multiple articles by Ratzinger. Of the three-hundred and seven discussion points on reason taken from these, seventy-four focus on what I term "counterfeit" reason. The weight of this ratio (roughly, 1:4) does not mean Ratzinger introduces a plethora of arguments against reason and its uses; rather it shows his persistent belief that certain forms of reasoning represent a threat to the power and value of "true" reason, and that these threats cross from the French, English, and German Enlightenments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into modernity, and postmodernity more generally. The span of his writing from the 1960s to the 2000s

¹¹ Ormerod, "Quarrels with the Method of Correlation," 713.

¹² Yet note, David Tracy contends that correlation only entails the notion of relation, even if it is synthetic: "The concept 'correlation' in correlational theology does not entail a belief in harmony, convergence, or sameness. Correlation logically entails only the notion that some relationship is involved. That relationship may (rarely) be one of identity—as in some of the proposals of liberal Protestant 'culture Christianity' and some of the Catholic Modernists. That relationship may also be one of nonidentity (existentially, confrontation)—as in the challenge of correlational theology to much of secular modernity's interpretation of secularity as secularistic and thereby nonreligious or antireligious. The relationship may also be one of similarity-in-difference—as in analogical theologies; or identity-in-difference—as in dialectical theologies. The point of correlation is the need to relate critically interpretations of both tradition and situation. The method of correlation, like all good method, provides only a heuristic guide to the inquiry. The inquiry is always hermeneutically determined by the question, the subject matter. No theologian can decide before the actual inquiry whether identity or nonidentity or identity-in-difference or similarity-in-difference should obtain. Method is always and only a heuristic guide: a useful, critical guide which, if allied to flexible criteria, can aid but never replace the actual theological inquiry." David Tracy, "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Postmodernity. (Fiftieth Anniversary Volume, 1940–1989: Systematics Issue)," Theological Studies 50, no. 3 (1989): 562–63.

consistently calls for a high attentiveness and a critical acumen in response to firstly, the "mutated"¹³ forms of reason of late modernity, and secondly, the epistemic cynicism that has grown with millennials. More specifically, Ratzinger focuses on natural,

"autonomous" reason, highlighting the limitations of its self-referential methodology and the dangers of its totalising epistemic claims that do not necessarily validate tradition, and which arguably reject "truth" in favour of the merely repeatable. Ratzinger's contention is such "positivistic," subjective accounts of reason lend themselves to a crassly worked out ethic, carrying serious political as well as interpersonal ramifications. Bluntly stated, and in terms of correlation, autonomous, positivistic, technical, and scientific reason in their worst iterations correlate negatively: metaphysics collapses into a tabetic and immanent activity, rejecting wide ranging historical commitments; ontology is eviscerated;¹⁴ and love is consigned to the affective domain as irrelevant to facticity. Mutated forms of reason are defined negatively by correlation.

Ratzinger writes at length on the incoherence, contradiction and folly that stems from reasoning that pays no attention to an authority beyond itself. In *Principles of Catholic Theology, Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology*, he notes:

It is said that the modern age is founded on a break with tradition, that it owes its progress to the fact that it has abandoned tradition in favor of rationality.... Because man is endowed with critical rationality, tradition is seen as an unwarranted assumption of *auctoritas*; but there is only one *auctoritas* to which man must submit himself unconditionally—namely, *ratio*.¹⁵

Later, in *Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions*, Ratzinger is more explicit on the origins of the desire for rational autonomy, self-potentiation, and the political nature of a methodology that boasts of an "abandoned tradition":

What the whole Enlightenment has in common is the desire for emancipation in the sense of Kant's *sapere aude*—dare to use your reason for yourself. It is a matter of the individual reason breaking free of the constraints of authority, which should in every case be subjected to critical examination. This philosophical program is of its nature also a political program: reason alone should rule; there should ultimately be no authority other than reason.¹⁶

¹³ Joseph Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 158.

¹⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," Communio 11, no. 4 (1984): 22.

¹⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 86.

¹⁶ Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 237.

Ratzinger acknowledges Kant's genius, but also points to the dereliction his *Prolegomena*¹⁷ generates of a rich strain of reasoning.¹⁸ With his introduction of the "transcendental unity of apperception," Kant fathers a form of constructivism, which claims a subject perceives something (an act of apperception), conceives of its relations and locates it in a frame of reference (an act of unification or unity), and brings cohesion and understanding into a world (an act of transcendence), which otherwise remains "a blooming, buzzing confusion."¹⁹ Critically, transcendence for Kant is actuated immanently: it is not a given, which is unveiled and received, it is something achieved, "positivistically."²⁰ Thus, Ratzinger notes, post-Kant, "the farther the Enlightenment advanced historically, the more it fell into the habit of narrowing the concept of reason: Reason was what was reproducible.... Reason became positivistic."²¹ And as reason turned more positivistic the emerging epistemic trend leaned less on tradition, ecclesial insight, and practical wisdom, and more on evidence arising from repeatable demonstrations of effects arising from known causes.

Ratzinger laments the move towards positivistic reason because it is short-sighted. It abandons truth for certainty, or at least degrees of certainty, and buckles under the weight of its proper ends:²²

¹⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Vasilis Politis and J. M. D. Meiklejohn (London: Everyman, 1993), A. 103; Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science: With Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Gary C. Hatfield, Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Ratzinger points out the non sequitur in constructivism noting: "Reason is the product of the unreasonable; truth does not precede man but comes into being as his construct." Joseph Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 155.

¹⁸ "Since Immanuel Kant, the unity of philosophical thought has more and more become disrupted. The thing to suffer most has been the reliable certainty that man can feel his way, by solid intellectual argument, behind the realm of physics to the being of things and their ultimate cause." Matthew T. Eggemeier, "A Post-Secular Modernity? Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Ratzinger, and Johann Baptist Metz on Religion, Reason, and Politics," *The Heythrop Journal* 53, no. 3 (2012): 461.

¹⁹ William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1998).

²⁰ And therefore, "Enlightenment in this sense is illogical reason, for which only the knowable is valid and which, therefore, loses itself more and more in the makeable." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 341.

²¹ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 150.

²² "Many, unduly transgressing the limits of the positive sciences, contend that everything can be explained by this kind of scientific reasoning alone, or by contrast, they altogether disallow that there is any absolute truth." Joseph Ratzinger, *Theological Highlights of Vatican II*, trans. Gerard Thormann Henry Traub, Werner Barzel, Deus books, (New York: Paulist Press, 1966), 19.

Under the pressure of its standards for certainty, reason abandons the question about the truth and investigates nothing more than feasibility, [and] in doing so, it has fundamentally abdicated as reason.²³

Positivistic reason is also hegemonic, and being so necessarily excludes fuller accounts of reason²⁴ which are beneficial for human growth and concord.²⁵ He observes: "The fundamental idea of the Enlightenment was quite simple: insight must step in to replace inherited social rules; the reasonable society will be a society of reasonable persons."²⁶ Here, reason is not in communion with a tradition; "its only remaining acting subject is the private reason of the individual, and this means, as we have already explained, that it becomes either positivistic or ideological."²⁷ Apparently, reason does not interleave with inherited and prior sets of values and judgements; it acts in a vacuum.²⁸

Thus, for Ratzinger, a society and an epistemic community that moves away from testimony, tradition, the arts, and various forms of lore as vehicles for insight, jettisons whole domains of knowledge²⁹ in favour of positivism and constructivism. It simultaneously skews the means for making moral decisions³⁰ and acting ethically:

²³ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 150.

²⁴ Writing on another aspect of positivistic and scientific reason, Ratzinger notes a similar trend where "the approach of the modern period [is seen] in the fact that [it] models this intellectual certainty on mathematical certainty and elevates mathematics to the position of prototype of all rational thinking." Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity (Revised Edition)*, trans. J. R. Foster (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 61.

²⁵ "If religion and reason cannot be brought into the proper correspondence, man's spiritual life disintegrates into a flat rationalism dominated by technique, on the one hand, and into a dark irrationalism, on the other." Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, 102.

²⁶ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177.

²⁷ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 158.

²⁸ And hence is self-referential with the challenge this poses epistemically: "From the perspective of the logic of modern science, which obeys the inner demand of enlightened reason, the problem is even more fundamental: science can find its norm only in itself." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 322.

²⁹ "Reason, in turning away from the ultimate questions, has rendered itself indifferent and boring, has resigned its competence where the keys to life are concerned: good and evil, death and immortality." Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 209. And Rowland: "In stark contrast to Kantian projects, Ratzinger asserted that 'there is, and must be, a human reason in faith; yet conversely, every human reason is conditioned by a historical standpoint so that reason pure and simple does not exist." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 34.

³⁰ Thus: "When we come now to the question we have posed for ourselves concerning the method of moral knowledge, we see very clearly the poverty of the modern world about which we have already spoken: its lack of ideas when faced with the moral problem, the underdevelopment of moral reason as compared with calculating reason." Joseph Ratzinger, *On Conscience: Two Essays* (San Francisco: The National Catholic Bioethics Center; Ignatius Press, 2007), 46.

This independence of reason has led in the modern era with increasing rapidity to its total emancipation and to an unlimited autonomy of reason.... Reason thereby assumes the form of positive reason, as Auguste Comte understood it, which takes as its only standard what is experimentally verifiable.... The radical consequence of this, however, is that the entire realm of values, the entire realm of what "is above us", drops out of the sphere of reason, that the sole binding standard for reason and thus for man, politically as well as individually, becomes what "is under him", namely, the mechanical forces of nature that can be manipulated experimentally.³¹

Reasoning shrinks in service of utility.³² In contrast, as I demonstrate in Chapter Three, Lonergan holds a more favourable view of positivistic reasoning (though he does not use the term) and how it interacts with tradition and moral decision making.

Ratzinger's analysis of autonomous reason continues by showing how it readily bifurcates into scientific and technical reasoning because they use clear, immanent processes with measurable results. But he argues that such scientific rationality and its concomitant utility cannot be the only measures of morality, truth, goodness, and beauty;³³ and secondly, that its totalising epistemic impulse pushes out or excludes "competing" epistemologies, leading to greater self-referentialism, the generation of a non-falsifiable, closed-system of operation, and a deleterious distortion of reasoning itself.³⁴ Even so:

the one-sidedness of the modern concept of reason, as it was first explicitly formulated by Francis Bacon and then in the nineteenth century became increasingly predominant: Only quantitative reason, the reason of calculation

³¹ Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 213. And: "The real danger of our time, the crux of our cultural crisis, is the destabilization of ethics, which results from the fact that we can no longer grasp moral reasoning and have reduced reason to what is calculable." 205. And: "Everywhere—from science to society to the individual life—European and Western man has produced and experienced a schism, a separation between that which is and as such can be verified scientifically (with 'what our senses experience' and 'the demonstrations of science') and that which ought to be and which is based on sources that are not scientific or rational (customs, beliefs, the faith)." Pope Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 11.

³² And: "Only what is verifiable or, more precisely, what can be proved, is said to be reasonable; reason is reduced to what can be confirmed by means of experimentation. The entire field of morality and religion is thus relegated to the domain of the 'subjective'—it falls outside the scope of common-sense reason." Joseph Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow: Addressing the Fundamental Issues*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 94.

³³ "The rationality of a self-centred use of technology proves to be irrational because it implies a decisive rejection of meaning and value." Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n.74.

³⁴ "The real untruth of the world view of which drugs and terrorism are symptoms consists in the reduction of the world to facts and in the narrowing-down of reason to the perception of what is quantitative." Joseph Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe? The Church in the Modern World: Assessment and Forecast*, trans. Brian McNeil, Second Edition ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 40.

and experimentation, is considered to be reason at all; everything else is nonrational and must gradually be overcome and likewise brought into the realm of "exact" knowledge.³⁵

Or in *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures* written eighteen years later, during his pontificate as Benedict XVI:

This same rationality leaves its imprint on all the world today in a much deeper way, thanks to the technological culture that science has made possible. Indeed, in a certain sense, scientific rationality is imposing uniformity on the world. In the wake of this form of rationality, Europe has developed a culture that, in a manner hitherto unknown to mankind, excludes God from public awareness. This is a purely functional rationality that has shaken the moral consciousness in a way completely unknown to the cultures that existed previously, since it maintains that only that which can be demonstrated experimentally is "rational."³⁶

Such a methodological decision that "detaches itself from what we might call the basic memory of mankind, without which reason loses its orientation, [and] this mutilation of reason means that we cannot consider it to be rational at all."³⁷

³⁷ Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, 41. In the context of *anamnesis*, Ratzinger will also comment on formalism with the subsequent loss of truth: "In many places today, for example, no one bothers any longer to ask what a person thinks. The verdict on someone's thinking is ready at hand as long as you can assign it to its corresponding, formal category: conservative, reactionary, fundamentalist, progressive, revolutionary. Assignment to a formal scheme suffices to render unnecessary coming to terms with the content.... The sole standard is that of formal, technical mastery. We now have arrived at the heart of the matter. Where contents no longer count, where pure praxeology takes over, technique becomes the highest criterion. This means, though, that power becomes the preeminent category whether revolutionary or reactionary. This is precisely the distorted form of being like God of which the account of the Fall speaks. The way of mere technical skill, the way of sheer power, is imitation of an idol and not expression of one's being made in the image and likeness of God." Joseph Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth," *Communio* 37, no. 3 (2010): 533.

³⁵ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 197.

³⁶ Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, 30. As an aside, Ratzinger notes that hermeneutics, biblical and systematic theology are negatively affected by a reductive epistemology that abandons metaphysics: "Flight from Jesus to Christ produced Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums* at the beginning of the [twentieth] century, a book that offers a form of Christianity drenched in the pride and optimism of reason, the Christianity to which liberalism had reduced the original Creed by a process of 'purification.'" Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 198. Ratzinger mounts a similar critique of Karl Barth, noting his "electrifying" Christocentrism is flavoured by antagonism to a stilted understanding of reason and intelligibility present to creation: "With Barth, therefore, emerged a vision of great boldness, which excited and inspired the men of those days: faith is not something explicable, grasped by the reason at the end of a long and wearisome chain of argument, but the lightning of divine action, which falls upon us and subdues us by its might, without our assistance and against our calculations. A kind of neo-orthodoxy emerged—impressive, but, precisely by reason of its lack of rational foundation, questionable." Pope Benedict XVI, *Faith and the Future* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 68.

Furthermore, Ratzinger maintains the political analogy, contending that the effects of a mutilated yet defiantly self-sufficient reason parallel those of an injured body politic: "The essential thing is this: reason that is closed in on itself does not remain reasonable, just as the state that tries to become perfect, becomes tyrannical."³⁸ A *sola ratio*— autonomous reason "alone"—that precludes alternative modes of rationality proves dreadful for its users and recipients alike: it creates the "gulf that yawns between science, morality, and religion which is the basic characteristic of modernity."³⁹

Ratzinger sees the results of mutilated and deformed reasoning in the agony of historical events. Persistently, he argues for reason that is shaped by a tradition—ideally, the Christian tradition, but accepting people to be religious by disposition, from the wider history of religions, too. Even so: "Reason needs to listen to the great religious traditions if it does not wish to become deaf, blind, and mute concerning the most essential elements of human existence."⁴⁰ Reason that is peccantly inattentive to religious intimations jeopardises human dignity for a Benthamite-like calculus which insufficiently explores the value of human life and the nature of its ends:

If we have noted the urgent question of whether religion is truly a positive force, so we must now doubt the reliability of reason. For in the last analysis, even the atomic bomb is a product of reason; in the last analysis, the breeding and selection of human beings is something thought up by reason.⁴¹

And more drastically:

There are more and more voices of philosophers such as Singer, Rorty, and Sloterdijk telling us that man now has the right and the duty to construct a new world on a rational basis.... The criterion of rationality is drawn exclusively from experiences of technological production on scientific foundations... in certain cases, if it is in the interest of building the future world of reason, it can be a good thing to kill innocent people.⁴²

³⁸ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 201.

³⁹ Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, 11. And: "A specifically European feature in this situation today appears to be precisely the separation from all ethical traditions and the exclusive reliance on technological reasoning and its possibilities.... Rationality can become devastating if it becomes detached from its roots and exalts technological feasibility as the sole criterion." Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 42–43.

⁴⁰ Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 252.

⁴¹ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 40.

⁴² Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 41, 95.

Other passages will show that Ratzinger has a high view of right reasoning as the process of making sense of intelligible data, guided by a theological realism.⁴³ But his analysis and evaluation of reason more generally, or of reason that stands outside of the bounds of tradition, especially ecclesiological tradition, is that it runs the risk of structural failure, with the tragic consequences which stem from this.⁴⁴ Thus, "the epitome of the modern era appears—in the final analysis—to be that completely autonomous reason which no longer recognizes anything but itself and has thereby gone blind and, through the destruction of its own foundations, becomes inhumane and hostile to creation."⁴⁵ Not only does this "self-limiting reason" as "an amputated reason" prove harmful, but it also shows itself to be incoherent and self-defeating.⁴⁶

Just so, for Ratzinger, it is self-evidently absurd to maintain that reason springs into existence from an irrational universe; it cannot be self-actualising, self-authenticating and dominical. Rather, it must be framed theologically, and evaluated in relation to human memory, tradition, and a description of revelation:

The question is whether reason, or rationality, stands at the beginning of all things and is grounded in the basis of all things or not. The question is whether reality originated on the basis of chance and necessity (or, as Popper says, in agreement with Butler, on the basis of luck and cunning) and, thus, from what is irrational; that is, whether reason, being a chance by-product of irrationality and floating in an ocean of irrationality, is ultimately just as meaningless; or whether the principle that represents the fundamental conviction of Christian faith and of its philosophy remains true: "*In principio erat Verbum*"—at the beginning of all things stands the creative power of reason.⁴⁷

⁴³ "In a criticism of the modern period, which has long been going on, one must not reproach its confidence in reason as such but only the narrowing of the concept of reason, which has opened the door to irrational ideologies." Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe*?, 110.

⁴⁴ "Reason becomes cold and loses its standards of judgment; it becomes cruel, because nothing is superior to it anymore." Pope Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 91.

⁴⁵ Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 218–19.

⁴⁶ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 158. And earlier: "There are many reasons for the current collapse, but I would say that the most important consists of the self-limitation of reason, which is paradoxically resting upon its laurels: the laws of method that brought it success have, through being generalized, become its prison." 156.

⁴⁷ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 181. This argument is consistent with work written twenty-one years earlier: "Ultimately, there is but one alternative: the alternative between the absolute dominion of technical reason, which would presuppose the absurdity of being, and belief in creative reason, which, as the tradition on which reason rests, also gives reason its meaning." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 99.

More simply, Ratzinger asks: "Can reason really renounce its claims to the priority of what is rational over the irrational?"⁴⁸ Thus, autonomous reason that works its way out in scientism, positivistic reasoning or technical reasoning, with some irony, fails to understand the context it operates in and to acknowledge the prior claims fuller forms of reasoning have over it because of their accession to creational and theological norms which place them in harmony with what is basic itself—divine, triune, creative-reason-in-love.⁴⁹

In summary, Ratzinger repeatedly warns his audience that reason can be counterfeited. Since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, reason has progressively shown itself as diminute or unreason. Forms of reason typified by scientific method and denominated as technical, scientific, and positivistic easily fall into an autonomous frame: and they run the risk of being counterfeit and inhumane in inverse proportion to the degree that they consider tradition and historical, artistic, revelatory, and faith-based modes of reason. Their failure, for Ratzinger, corresponds with an intellectual pride which refuses to be influenced by classical metaphysics, ontology, and the horizon-shifting force of redemptive love. Their mode of operation, when closely scrutinised, reveals itself as hegemonic, exclusive, self-referential, and incoherent, as it presupposes rationality can originate in the irrational. Finally, counterfeit reason has nothing to say about truth; it deals with probability and degrees of certainty, holding no interest in or minimising the theological assertion that something is true even when it is not repeatable. Counterfeit reason is pointedly unmasked when it is placed in correlation with that which is true, where truth corresponds with a critical and theological realism. I now turn from Ratzinger's critique of counterfeit reason to his appreciative analysis of reason as basic.

1.2 Reason as basic

Despite Ratzinger's persistent critique of specific types of reason, the larger body of his writing shows a more positive commitment to it. He regards it as basic; universal; creational; divine; and divinely communicated.

⁴⁸ Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 181.

⁴⁹ "Christian faith in God tells us also that God—eternal Reason—is Love." Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 97.

Firstly, for Ratzinger, reason is basic: it "is not a random by-product of the ocean of irrationality from which everything actually sprang."⁵⁰ Rather, reason is basic as present to human experience. It is also timeless; that is to say that:

while it is true that human processes of intellectual decision are connected with the body and to that extent, as we have said, can be dated indirectly, in themselves they are something different from corporeal movement and to that extent transcend the measures of physical time.⁵¹

More profoundly, reason is an attribute or perfection of God. This means "everything that is, is reasonable in terms of its origin, for it comes from Creative Reason."⁵² Furthermore, intelligibility in creation, and the human ability to perceive structure, data and purpose within it, confirm "the fundamental conviction of the Christian faith that in the beginning was Reason and, thus, it brings forth man and human reason in the first place as beings capable of the truth."⁵³ Reason is basic, and intelligibility is integral to creation in its widest context and to human creatures themselves. Human intelligence with its aptitude for perceiving, handling, and organising data is grounded in its participation in creation, which is made intelligible by "the *Logos*, the ultimate origin of things."⁵⁴ It is both a substantive quality of image bearing and a feature of a Christological

⁵⁰ Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 148. And later Ratzinger writes: "Precisely this ought to give Christianity its philosophical power today, since the problem is whether the world comes from an irrational source, so that reason would be nothing but a "by-product" (perhaps even a harmful by-product) of the development of the world, or whether the world comes from reason, so that its criterion and its goal is reason." Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, 49.

⁵¹ Joseph Ratzinger, *Credo for Today: What Christians Believe*, trans. Michael J. Miller et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 165.

⁵² Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 111.

⁵³ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 155.

⁵⁴ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 181. And further, "The conviction that being in all its totality is the creature of God brings with it what may be called 'creatural optimism'. It implies the joyous certitude that being is good, down to its very roots. It encourages us to give our 'Yes' to matter, which was no less willed by God than was spirit. It also entails a freedom of the God-created natural being to be itself—though in such a way that this being remains in intimate relationship with God. Redemption is not the suppression of nature, or of the human subject. Redemption is the perfecting, the completing of natural being. It follows, then, that believing is not opposed to thinking, to our intellectual self-engagement, but, on the contrary, demands such thinking, presupposing it and bringing it to maturity. Philosophy thus becomes a necessity for theology, and respect for its autonomy an implication of faith itself." Joseph Ratzinger, "Consecrate Them in the Truth: A Homily for St. Thomas' Day" (Dominican-run Pontifical University of St Thomas Aqunas, Rome, 1987).

and incarnational "logocentricity" within creation which becomes intelligible in consequence of a spoken Word.⁵⁵

Ratzinger's contention that reason is basic to creation and that its ontology and authority are undergirded by a creating divinity leads him to question the political and cultural initiatives of contemporary society. Reason which is not anchored in revelation, tradition and divine law is counterfeit; it assumes too much, running the risk of marginalising information and practices that enrich life. Ratzinger notes that: "Enlightenment ethics, which still holds our states together, is vitally dependent on the ongoing effects of Christianity, which gave it the foundations of its reasonableness and its inner coherence."⁵⁶ But in contrast, he notes of modernity, policy making and upheavals in Europe, that:

the sacred foundation for history and for the existence of the State [have been] rejected; that history [is] no longer gauged on the basis of an idea of a preexistent God who shaped it; and that the State [is] henceforth considered in purely secular terms, founded on reason and on the will of the citizens.⁵⁷

Reason in this context is characterised by a failure to recognise the sources which nourish it.

In sum, and possibly contradictorily, Ratzinger hold reason to be basic. It is basic to creation and reflective of intelligibility within it. Yet simultaneously its basis is preexistent. It appears to be a creational feature, basic in its own right, and also an eternal attribute of the Godhead. Ratzinger resolves the "Which is it?" tension in the activity of the economic Trinity; but if this strain is not met theologically, he will consistently highlight the dangers of positivistic reason. I will argue later that the clarity which Lonergan brings to the grace–nature distinction might also relax this tension; but, in short,

⁵⁵ Ratzinger has already noted in contrast the constructivism that flows into modernity through technical and scientific reason with these theological givens: "We shall be able to distinguish, unless I am mistaken, two stages in the intellectual revolution.... The first, for which the way was prepared by Descartes, attained its full development in Kant and, even before that, in a somewhat different intellectual context, in the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who was almost certainly the first to formulate a completely new idea of truth and knowledge and who, in a piece of bold anticipation, coined the typical formula of the modern spirit when it comes to dealing with the question of truth and reality.... For the ancient world and the middle ages, being itself is true, in other words, apprehensible, because God, pure intellect, made it, and he made it by thinking it.... [Today] the combination of mathematical thinking and factual thinking has produced the science-orientated intellectual standpoint of modern man, which signifies devotion to reality insofar as it is capable of being shaped." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 64.

⁵⁶ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 205.

⁵⁷ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 21.

Ratzinger holds reason as basic—not that this means it should act autonomously. With this caveat, reason as basic corelates well with ecclesial and theological tradition. The same is true of reason as intelligible, the subject which I now address.

1.3 Reason as intelligible

Ratzinger insists reason is intelligible. It carries features of intelligibility, and it operates intelligently—that is, it responds to intelligibility in creation, recognising, interacting, and finding patterns within it. It finds coherence indicative but not necessarily reliable as a condition for truth. Ratzinger holds intelligibility to be a witness to divinity, and the gathering and organisation of intelligence (data) to be in service of reason,⁵⁸ which when properly rendered, in turn, serves to excegete the character of God and determine the calling and duties of the human creature. This means "The love of God is not founded on a discipline imposed on us from outside but is constitutively established in us as the capacity and necessity of our rational nature"⁵⁹ and moreover, that "The rational structure of history is decisively affirmed."⁶⁰

As early as 1968, in *Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and world Religions*, Ratzinger is concentrating on reason and intelligibility. His theological method of correlation shows how metaphysics is at once feasible and meaningful when it presupposes them:

If man cannot use his reason to ask about the essential things in his life, where he comes from and where he is going, about what he should do and may do, about living and dying, but has to leave these decisive questions to feeling divorced from reason, then he is not elevating reason but dishonoring it.⁶¹

"Man" dishonours reason by not acknowledging it origins, power and the responsibility that comes with it. Ratzinger writes:

This means nothing else than the conviction that the objective mind we find present in all things, indeed, as which we learn increasingly to understand things, is the impression and expression of subjective mind and that the

⁵⁸ Here the intellect, however, can be inspired: "The great moments of intellect always come from a source we had not foreseen." Joseph Ratzinger, *Co-Workers of the Truth: Meditations for Every Day of the Year*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy and Lothar Krauth, ed. Irene Grassl (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 331.

⁵⁹ Ratzinger, *On Conscience*, 31.

⁶⁰ Joseph Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989), 19.

⁶¹ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 158.

intellectual structure that being possesses and that we can re-think is the expression of a creative pre-meditation, to which they owe their existence.⁶²

And:

To put it more precisely, in the old Pythagorean saying about the God who practices geometry, there is expressed that insight into the mathematical structure of being which learns to understand being as having been thought, as intellectually structured; there is also expressed the perception that even matter is not simply non-sense that eludes understanding, that it too bears in itself truth and comprehensibility that make intellectual comprehension possible. ⁶³

Intelligibility, nevertheless, is not purely mathematical or relational and cohesive; it

is telling of divinity, and it is indivisible from the personhood of God.⁶⁴ This means "there is a question here also of an act of humility; the acceptance of the fact that one's own intellect has been called by the eternal intellect."⁶⁵ And that, whether human creatures accept it or not, creation still speaks of God⁶⁶ and to God:

However much we may rebel against proofs for the existence of God and whatever objections philosophical reflection may justifiably make to individual steps in the arguments, the fact remains that the radiance of the original creative idea and of its power to build does shimmer through the world and its intelligible structure.⁶⁷

Ratzinger insists on a structured and intelligible creation as matters of common sense, tradition, and religious revelation.

Finally, Ratzinger argues that to the extent that intelligibility is a God-purposed and a creaturely phenomenon it carries moral and ethical implications.⁶⁸ This is understood

⁶² Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 152.

⁶³ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 153. Ratzinger also notes affirmatively that "Einstein said once that in the laws of nature 'an intelligence so superior is revealed that in comparison all the significance of human thinking and human arrangements is a completely worthless reflection." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 153.

⁶⁴ Writing two decades later, Ratzinger maintains that "the rationality that is to be seen in the structure of the world is understood as a reflection of the creative wisdom that has produced it." Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 150.

⁶⁵ Ratzinger, Credo for Today, 28.

⁶⁶ Rom 1:19–20, New Jerusalem Bible.

⁶⁷ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 256.

⁶⁸ Matthew Eggemeier writes that "in order to restore a truncated form of reason to its former grandeur, Ratzinger argues that it is necessary to resist the Scylla of instrumental-positivistic reason while also avoiding the Charybdis of post-metaphysical reason and its commitment to the position that truth is socially constructed (i.e., Habermas). In response to these alternatives, Ratzinger proposes a retrieval of a metaphysical approach to reason in which truth is discovered in the order of reality. This retrieval of metaphysical reason commits Ratzinger to the position that there is an objective moral order inscribed in

through an act of faith, where belief in God not only explains intelligibility in creation but recognises it as a feature of the true and the good, too. He states, "Faith in the *Logos*, the Word in the beginning, understands moral values as responsibility, as a response to the Word, and thus gives them their intelligibility as well as their essential orientation."⁶⁹ Intelligibility seems to be a fundamental condition of divine and in consequence creational reality.⁷⁰

To summarise, Ratzinger consistently sees reason and intelligibility as related. He anchors both in the personhood of God, which expresses itself in creative activity and things made. To this extent, intelligibility acts as an apologetic and is a resonant witness. It also enables human societies to chart their way and order their relations with moral and ethical confidence.⁷¹ In terms of correlation, Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of reason in relation to intelligibility as the major premise of a scientific method which underwrites empirical research and inductive reasoning is wholly congruent.⁷² As I will illustrate, Lonergan is in agreement with Ratzinger on intelligibility, its relation to divinity, apologetic, moral reasoning, and ethical acts. He accents the natural order more positively, and I think thoughtfully, than Ratzinger, but his work on "horizons" and a scale of normative and hierarchical values, together with other elements, complements Ratzinger's account of the synthetic power of reason.

reality that is accessible to human reason, but which is not the product of human reason." Eggemeier, "A Post-Secular Modernity? Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Ratzinger, and Johann Baptist Metz on Religion, Reason, and Politics," 456.

⁶⁹ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 27.

⁷⁰ And as such congruent with human experience where "the rational structure of history is decisively confirmed." Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, 19.

⁷¹ Especially as they are in response to God's initiatives: "Jesus adds mind as a fourth dimension in order to make it clear that intellect has a place in our relationship with God and in our love of God." Ratzinger, *Coworkers of the Truth*, 226.

⁷² "All our ideas about natural science and all practical applications are based on the assumption that the world is ordered according to rational, spiritual laws, is imbued with rationality that can be traced out and copied by our reason." Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 157.

1.4 Reason as synthetic

To argue that Ratzinger does not at times heavily attack "reason" is indefeasible, but while his analysis of counterfeit forms of reason—scientific, technical, and positivistic reason—leads to a harsh evaluation of its pretensions and results, this does not mean he denigrates reason more broadly. It is quite the opposite. He understands it to be divine, basic, intelligible, apologetic, and instrumental in the pursuit of truth, beauty and goodness. For Ratzinger reason exhibits intelligibility, recognising the presence and patterns of information in creation; additionally, it can capaciously organise its intuitions into explanatory systems or narratives that serve human ends. Here, Ratzinger recognises reason to be synthetic—to be capable of binding together heterogeneous concepts in order to make sense of things and predict possible futures. This is especially evident in dogmatic and systematic theology. In his 1993 work, The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates, he favourably notes that Aquinas "defines truth as the adequation of the intellect to reality" and that theology is an example of "rational reflection upon God's revelation."⁷³ Furthermore, a distinguishing feature of Christianity is its determination to thrust reason into action. In a similar argument to the one he uses on the relation of reason to metaphysics, where reason is only really exercised when it engages in matters of substance, so theological enquiry acts as a catalyst to reason. The result is a "rationality" that is a synthetic, coherent organisation of concepts which carries explanatory power. Ratzinger states: "[The] desire for rationality, which still constantly pushes reason to go beyond itself in a way it would rather avoid, is part of the essence of Christianity."⁷⁴ He will also argue that: "Reason can speak about God; it must speak about God, or else it cuts itself short."⁷⁵ And when it does so it synthesises revelation with perception and fact. In terms of correlation, Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of reason operating synthetically is affirmative. In contrast to counterfeit reason and a scientism or positivism that resists metaphysics and tradition as legitimate voices in the quest for knowledge and understanding, reason when it is synthetic is magnanimous, catholic, and far-reaching.

⁷³ Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, 39, 16. With reference to *De Veritate q.1, a.1* and *Sentences I, d.19, q.5, aa.1–3*.

⁷⁴ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 83.

⁷⁵ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 26.

1.5 Reason as instrumental

Ratzinger balances a high view of natural reason's capabilities with an insistence that it is "merely" instrumental. At this point a seeming tension arises: on the one hand, Ratzinger affirms that reason is basic, and further that it is necessary for grasping the intelligibility of reality as the basis for metaphysics; but on the other hand, he points to reason's limits, and its instrumentality—suggesting reason is not an end itself, or that it has a limited or natural term, rather it plays a discrete role in service of other ends. Moreover, he emphasises that understanding occurs, at times, with reasoning and reflection coming later: reason remains a powerful explanatory tool, yet, for instance, something which is beautiful, or a practice within a tradition can generate or call out intimations that do not immediately depend on reason for their subsistence.⁷⁶ As I will show shortly, Lonergan has much of value to say on each of these observations. Speaking on beauty, Ratzinger states:

One who is genuinely touched by it knows, somehow, with inner certainty that [it] is true even if he has still many steps to take before he can accept this insight with [his] intellect and will.⁷⁷

A person can come to "know" something without reasoning it out. "Reason" is thus "an organ, not an oracle."⁷⁸ Here, Ratzinger is not raking over arguments he has made against scientism; rather, he is proposing limits to the scope of reason. Writing in *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, he approvingly observes:

In their discussion of the reasonableness of Christianity, the Fathers distinguished between *ratio*, mere reason, and *intellectus*, man's ability to see things spiritually, to discern, which goes farther than mere reason.⁷⁹

("Mere") reason has instrumental value, but ratiocination, apparently, does not guarantee insight. Yet such limits do not undermine reason's value. Ratzinger insists:

The Church Fathers found the seeds of the Word, not in the religions of the world, but rather in philosophy, that is, in the process of critical reason directed

⁷⁶ Ratzinger here inhabits a nonplatonic and Romantic landscape, familiar to people such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and William Wordsworth. Just so: "The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,/ Hath had elsewhere its setting/ And cometh from afar; /Not in entire forgetfulness,/ And not in utter nakedness,/ But trailing clouds of glory do we come/ From God, who is our home:/ Heaven lies about us in our infancy!/ Shades of the prison-house begin to close/ Upon the growing Boy, /But he beholds the light, and whence it flows, /He sees it in his joy." William Wordsworth, *William Wordsworth, The Major Works*, ed. Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 299.

⁷⁷ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 250.

⁷⁸ Ratzinger, On Conscience, 68.

⁷⁹ Joseph Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 75.

against the [pagan] religions, in the history of progressive reason, and not in the history of religion. 80

Paradoxically, or contradictorily, reason is of critical value to apologetics and for attaining knowledge.

In sum, Ratzinger's method of correlation searches for and requires the basis for metaphysics that intelligibility and reason provide. A tension remains, however, because Ratzinger does not clearly resolve Neoplatonic, anti-rational Bonaventurian and Romantic leads which arguably undermine such a quest.⁸¹ He acknowledges the intelligibility of creation and its relation to divine, creative intelligence,⁸² but at the same time he wants to circumscribe reason by insisting on its "mere" instrumentality—even when this instrumentality furnishes great power. A similar tension arises when Ratzinger speaks of reason as being creative. He is prepared to hold to the creative, cohering powering of reason as a phenomenon of the created order; but he is hesitant to leave it at that, preferring to reframe reason as non-independent and always situated in a divine context. This strain becomes more evident in an analysis of Ratzinger's *ecclesio-traditio* and Christotelic methodology. Lonergan's approach to the grace–nature question coupled with his work on conversion, and creative and healing vectors, can aid in mending this burden.

1.6 Summary

This section has focused on Ratzinger's use of the method of correlation. It accepts the claim that it is Ratzinger's most commonly used theological method. It shows how

⁸⁰ Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, 72. See, also: "When the Church was just beginning philosophy made possible the first images of Christ.... In its earliest days, Christianity considered itself to be philosophy, as we have seen, and, indeed, to be *the* philosophy." Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 350–52.

⁸¹ Corkery argues that "The Bonaventurian position is one that is essentially embraced by Ratzinger. He is at home with Bonaventure's fondness for leading everything back to God and, as I have shown already, the same 'all is grace' tendency is present in his own work. But what are the shortcomings of this Bonaventurian approach? Etienne Gilson, despite his great admiration for St. Bonaventure, has nevertheless drawn attention to some of the difficulties that stem from his way of thinking. And while he appreciates Bonaventure for the saintliness and piety of attitude that wishes to retrace all to God, he wonders nonetheless if such piety, while so noble in the religious sphere, is properly at home in the rational one. In fact, he makes the statement: 'In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God!'" Corkery, "The Relationship Between Human Existence and Christian Salvation in the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger," 471–72.

⁸² "Everything that is, is reasonable in terms of its origin, for it comes from Creative Reason." Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe*?, 111.

correlation pertains to his analysis and evaluation of reason. It recognises that correlation moves between the polarities of distrust and embrace—that theologians throughout history have evaluated a culture's intuitions, politics, civil practices, artefacts and reasoning more harshly or more generously depending on their presuppositions, with, for instance, Tertullian, Martin Luther, and Barth generally offering more hostility to the "spoils of Egypt" than Clement of Rome, Aquinas, and von Balthasar. The section shows that by correlation Ratzinger finds reason in its modern forms to have been counterfeited. These forms, strongly associated with the European Enlightenment, tend towards constructivism (post-Kant), scientism and positivism. They are typified by a rejection of revelation, theological knowledge, tradition, and metaphysics; and an insistence on limiting reason to an immanent frame. Neither are they usually moderated by insights gleaned from art, literature, or history. Ratzinger determines these forms of reason to be incoherent, self-referencing and hegemonic. Their refusal to be affected by the horizon-shifting gift of divine love is especially egregious. They correlate negatively.

Four other descriptions of reason fall under the scope of correlation where current conceptions of reason are critically evaluated by theological understanding. These are: reason as basic; intelligible; synthetic; and instrumental. With regard to reason as basic and intelligible, Ratzinger moves between affirming that reason is basic to creation and basic in itself, and that intelligibility is a phenomenon of creation—and that reason itself speaks to intelligibility—to claiming that reason is basic to God. It is possible to maintain it is basic to both, but it seems that Ratzinger struggles slightly with the former claim as his writings are always quick to link the human capacity for reason, and intelligibility *per-se*, back to God. This propensity might point to an unresolved tussle with the grace—nature distinction and/or the curtailment and under-development in the doctrines of creation, humanity, and eschatology—in other words the extent of God's gifting in creation and purposes for human creatures.⁸³ Either way, reason as basic and intelligible generally correlates well with ecclesial and theological tradition.

⁸³ Corkery maintains: "The deficiencies in Ratzinger's concept of 'world' are, like his deficiencies with regard to human nature and human activity, ultimately attributable to his short-changing of the human side in the nature-grace problematic. When human nature itself is emptied, by him, of any real content, then it must follow that human activity is not of much value either and, similarly, that our world— shaped by, and itself shaping, human activity— cannot be of very much value in its turn. ... No wonder Joseph Ratzinger ends up, only ten years after the end of Vatican II, speaking not of dialoguing with the world, but rather of overcoming it. Nor is this a radical change in him from some previous, liberal, optimistic view. No. A critical attitude to the world was always there— in his preference for the spiritualistic, neo-Augustinian and

With reference to reason as synthetic and instrumental, Ratzinger is keenly aware of the need for making sense of data and proffering theories that can be tested for validity in the marketplace. He recognises the value of explanatory and predictive frameworks, and utility. What he objects to is totalising narratives or a form of utility that sets itself up as an absolute value (and thereby justifies, for instance, a culture of death). His use of the method of correlation brings Christian premises and values into conversation with the synthetic accounts of politics, society, culture, science, and ethics for the purpose of evaluation. Sadly, too often, it finds them wanting.

Although Ratzinger uses a method of correlation, he does not stick with it. This might be because he senses a serious flaw in it.⁸⁴ *In nuce*, tradition and situation appear not to be the foundational sources for theology they claim to be; they are difficult to unpick and are already woven together into the fabric of salvation history: therefore, as a continuum, they cannot not provide criteria for discrimination in acts of correlation. Rather, the grounds for reasonable engagement and responsible action with contemporaneity are located in the prudential judgements and practicalities of a converted life. It is to these and a discussion of retroductive; *ecclesio-traditio* and Christotelic methodologies that this chapter now turns.

2. Joseph Ratzinger: method of retroduction

Writing in Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church, Fiorenza explains:

"Retroductive" is a philosophical term that refers to an argument that is neither deductive nor inductive. Where a deductive argument moves from axioms to theorems, an inductive argument generalizes particular cases. A retroductive warrant, a much weaker confirmation than the above two, argues from the variety and diversity of inferences that can be drawn from a hypothesis. The argument is not accepted because of logical cogency as in deduction or because of the generalisations of data as in induction. Instead, the argument is accepted because the hypothesis generates illuminative inferences. Retroductive is explained by Charles Pierce with the example of making inferences from a

Bonaventurian trajectory; it undoubtedly achieved greater expression in his later writings, but it has accompanied him for as long as Augustine has." Corkery, "The Relationship Between Human Existence and Christian Salvation in the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger," 492–93.

⁸⁴ Possibly signified in his chapters in the five-volume *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II* (edited by Herbert Vorgrimler), and something that would have become increasingly evident as he began to focus on biblical hermeneutics and the Jesus of history.

person's traits, knowledge, carriage, ability, and the like to that person's character or profession.⁸⁵

In a similar manner, retroductive warrants in theology and the humanities draw on a canopy of inferences to test the fecundity of an idea, thesis, and explanatory framework. They do this with an eye to the future. Within social, political, and theological spheres, they are characterised by an interest in practical wisdom. They accept the formative effects of life in general in shaping character, which in turn influences the reasoning and judgements people make on an everyday basis. Retroductive warrants are attentive to tradition, family, friendship, civil associations and the threads within a social fabric that weave people's lives together, forming them; and they take seriously the experience of those many individuals who have small residues of political, social and financial capital, acknowledging that their experience and understanding of history and consequent aspirations for the future have a distinctly different shape to those of the governing and "cultured" classes.

Retroductive warrants give sense-making accounts of the past, but this is more to test an idea or thesis for the purpose of advancing into the future. John P. Galvin, referencing the scientific paradigm, states that:

a retroductive warrant is not so much an inductive confirmation as it is the theoretical and practical fruitfulness that flows from the imaginative construal of all the available evidence. A warrant is retroductive to the extent that it offers the most feasible and comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon, accounts for unexpected and unanticipated phenomena, and enables the scientific endeavor to move on in practice.⁸⁶

In anthropological terms, by investigating the formative influences in a person's experience such a warrant is exposing the conditions which when combined lead to prudential judgements. To this extent, retroductive warrants lean towards phronesis and the exercise of practical wisdom as a means of intentionally entering into the future. Galvin's notion captures Ratzinger's interest in the formation of individuals and the important effect this has on their capacity for moral reasoning. Indeed, Ratzinger argues that true reason in its practical expression is responsible; and that it is exegetical of a converted life. Lonergan, on both these points is in agreement.

⁸⁵ Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, *Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1984), 307.

⁸⁶ John Galvin, *Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives*, ed. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Philadelphia: Fortress, 2011), 58.

Just as it is inaccurate to claim Ratzinger's writings are governed by a method of correlation, so it would be wrong to argue his methodology is one of retroduction.⁸⁷ He does not use the term. It is, however, reasonable to maintain that Ratzinger uses a complex mesh of methodologies which pay very careful regard to human formation and how this plays out in the pursuit of personal holiness, communion with other people, and in nurturing the common good.⁸⁸ A method of retroduction is one of these. Ratzinger frequently directs his work by using a heuristic that interrogates accounts of reason; its origins and development; and its ends. He does so because he is strongly committed to prudential judgements. From his own negative experiences of fascism, communism, and human failure, he understands that right reasoning—translated to action—results in pursuit of the good and avoidance of evil.⁸⁹ So calibrated, it has a powerful bearing on society. Reason, using Lonergan's language, is to be responsible.

2.1 Reason as responsible

For Ratzinger, reason can be responsible because it is "grounded"—it has an ontology; yet, oddly, it also needs to be "purified." The grounds for reason, the possibility for moral reasoning and for responsible action lie in creation and natural law.⁹⁰ Creation:

carries rationality within itself, and not just a mathematical rationality—no one can deny that the world is mathematically structured—not, that is to say, just an

⁸⁷ Especially, if this were to suggest it was steered by an over-attentiveness to the 'oppressed' which was driven by the political ideology and 'praxis' of Liberation or Marxist theologians.

⁸⁸ Even so, Ratzinger is alert to the conditions in which people are formed, and to the smothering of those intuitions that discern such good: "No one may act against his convictions, as St. Paul had already said (Rom 14:23). But the fact that the conviction a person has come to certainly binds in the moment of acting does not signify a canonization of subjectivity. It is never wrong to follow the convictions one has arrived at-in fact, one must do so. But it can very well be wrong to have come to such askew convictions in the first place, by having stifled the protest of the anamnesis of being." Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth," 538.

⁸⁹ "Ratzinger became keenly aware, following the tragedy of World War II, that political might, or whatever form of power that humanity employs, is not a guarantee of the veracity of these ideas. Truth is a reality that stands above the subjective calculations and utilitarian ego of political ideologies. If Germany fell to Hitler, it was because Germany allowed a false truth to take on the attractiveness of power, wrongly understood as political wilfulness. The German nation allowed politics to take on a totalizing hope that became totalitarian, barbarously vicious and destructive." Maurice Ashley Agbaw-Ebai, "Joseph Ratzinger: The Word Became Love and Truth in the Church" (STL diss., Boston University, 2015), 19.

⁹⁰ Regarding natural law, Ratzinger laments "The philosophical doctrine about the State, in antiquity and in the Middle Ages and even in the debates of the modern era, has appealed to the natural law, which recta ratio [right reason] can recognize.... Now, it seems, there is only partisan reasoning, instead of reason that is common to all men, at least in major, fundamental value judgments." Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 46.

entirely neutral, objective rationality, but in the form of the *Logos* also a moral rationality.⁹¹

A personal, moral rationality authorises "the idea of the natural law [which] presupposes a concept of nature in which nature and reason overlap, since nature is itself rational."⁹² Nature is intelligible because "everything that is, is reasonable in terms of its origin, for it comes from Creative Reason"⁹³ which is itself good.

Even though reason has its grounds in creation, and, more basically, God as creator, it needs "purification." Ratzinger declares "if reason is to be exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification, since it can never be completely free of the danger of a certain ethical blindness caused by the dazzling effect of power and special interests."⁹⁴ Additionally, it requires purification in order to demarcate its limitations and to highlight and strengthen its analytical, theoretical, and moral capabilities. Such purification, he argues, occurs through formation: in the appropriation of faith, the experience of love, and through participation in the church—which has "an indirect duty, in that she is called to contribute to the purification of reason and to the reawakening of those moral forces without which just structures are neither established nor prove effective in the long run."⁹⁵

Faith possesses a unique and unequivocal role in the purification of reason. For:

faith by its specific nature is an encounter with the living God—an encounter opening up new horizons extending beyond the sphere of reason. But it is also a purifying force for reason itself. From God's standpoint, faith liberates reason from its blind spots and therefore helps it to be ever more fully itself. Faith enables reason to do its work more effectively and to see its proper object more clearly. Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what is just.⁹⁶

Faith draws out reason's potential, invites it to address metaphysical questions, points it to its proper ends, and aids it in the exercise of practical reason and the formulation of prudential judgements.⁹⁷ With regard to social responsibility the possibility for wise action

⁹¹ Joseph Ratzinger and Peter Seewald, *God and the World: Believing and Living in Our Time: A Conversation with Peter Seewald*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 33.

⁹² Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 76.

⁹³ Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 111.

⁹⁴ Pope Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005), n.28.

⁹⁵ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.29.

⁹⁶ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.28.

⁹⁷ For "practical reason too, on which genuinely ethical knowledge is based, is truly reason and not merely the expression of subjective feelings without any value as evidence." Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe*?, 41.

"is linked to a double mediation: the mediation through reason that opens itself, that makes itself accessible to God and thus becomes able to discern justice and injustice; and... the mediation through will that puts into action what has been recognized."⁹⁸ Prudential judgements and their application are best affected by the converted mind and will.

Put simply, Ratzinger urges: "We need men whose intellect is enlightened by the light of God, men whose hearts are opened by God, so that their intellect can speak to the intellect of others and their hearts can open the hearts of others."⁹⁹ In terms of formation, apologetics, and truth, which becomes the source for moral action, this means that:

[t]he great fundamental decisions of the early councils, which were expressed in the creeds, do not bend the faith into a philosophical theory; rather, they give verbal expression to two essential, unchanging elements of the biblical faith: they assure the realism of the biblical faith and prevent a merely symbolic or mythological interpretation; they assure the rational nature of the biblical faith, which in fact goes beyond reason itself and any possible "experiences" it may have yet nonetheless appeals to the reason and comes forward with the claim to be telling the truth—to be opening up access for man to the very heart of reality.¹⁰⁰

The gift and reception of faith and its articles have a formative effect on reason and consequently on moral reasoning and ethical action. Faith purifies reason and positively changes people's moral horizons.¹⁰¹

In addition to focusing on the appropriation of faith and the effects it has on reason, Ratzinger emphasises the purifying power of love upon reason. He notes that the "demands of love do not contradict those of reason"¹⁰² and the "orientation of religion

⁹⁸ Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe*?, 80. And: "… reason is not absolute in the moral sphere; or rather, that reason which is absolute, since it manifests the reason of God, must be distinguished from apparent reason, the defective rational endeavours of each age." Aidan Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (London: Burns & Oates, 2005), 169.

⁹⁹ Benedict XVI, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, 52.

¹⁰⁰ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 92.

¹⁰¹ Note, too that "The one outside the Church who acts *veluti si Deus daretur* becomes more responsible in moral terms." Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, 18–19. Further, and at the same time, Ratzinger will claim: "Only in truth does charity shine forth, only in truth can charity be authentically lived.' Put another way, 'charity does not exclude knowledge, but rather requires, promotes, and animates it from within.' Moreover, knowledge of the truth 'is never purely the work of the intellect,' a product of only 'calculation and experiment.' If knowledge 'aspires to be wisdom capable of directing man in the light of his first beginnings and his final ends, [then] it must be 'seasoned' with the 'salt' of charity."⁹⁶ John M. Breen, "Love, Truth, and the Economy: A Reflection on Benedict's Caritas in Veritate," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 33, no. 3 (2010): 1002.

¹⁰² Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.30.

toward a rational view of reality as a whole, ethics as a part of this vision, and its concrete application under the primacy of love became closely associated."¹⁰³ Love generates a context for moral reasoning and the backdrop for reason's general ability to grapple with intelligibility. It is also inspirational and provocative:

We have to pose the question, 'Are you really he?' not only out of intellectual honesty and because of reason's responsibility, but also in accordance with the interior law of love, which wants to know more and more him to whom it has given its Yes, so as to be able to love him more.¹⁰⁴

Love brings its own intellectual clarity to the workings of reason. In relation to faith and love, and their relation to reason and prudential judgements, Ratzinger has much in common with Lonergan, but as I hope to illustrate the latter takes more time and goes to greater lengths to explain how these relations are to be understood.

Ratzinger continues his exposition of reason arguing that it is not only purified by faith and love, but also through formation in the church. The church plays an active role in preparing people to make sound prudential judgements in social and political spheres: she "is duty-bound to offer, through the purification of reason and through ethical formation, her own specific contribution towards understanding the requirements of justice and achieving them politically."¹⁰⁵ The church and her people are also sanctified and empowered by the Holy Spirit. This renewal converts hearts and minds and leads to a sense of responsibility. In relation to politically and socially ordered lives, Ratzinger opines:

it would be a significant achievement if the days of Pentecost would turn us from the thoughtless use of our leisure time to a sense of our responsibility; if they would lead us—beyond the merely rational, beyond that knowledge that can be stored up and used in planning—to a rediscovery of "spirit", of the responsibility inseparable from truth, and of the values of conscience and love.¹⁰⁶

Faith, love and the Spirited body of Christ, according to Ratzinger, peculiarly form lives, preparing them for *recta ratio* and in consequence discernment, moral intelligence, and action.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 183.

¹⁰⁴ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 80.

¹⁰⁵ Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, n.28.

¹⁰⁶ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 153.

¹⁰⁷ So, consider: "It seems to me characteristic of Newman that he emphasized truth's priority over goodness in the order of virtues. Or, to put it in a way which is more understandable for us, he emphasized truth's

As reason is purified by faith and sharpened by a metaphysical focus, and as moral reasoning operates in accord with divine and natural law, and as a person is inducted into the distinctive charism that accompanies Christian conversion, so discernment and prudential judgements become vitally probing and beneficial.¹⁰⁸ They expose binding myths, ideologies, and political commitments.¹⁰⁹ At this juncture human formation offers powerful retroductive warrant. The embodied experience of a faith-filled, love-sublated, church and Spirit formed human creature places her in a position to analyse critically and expose political ideologies that are oppressive, revolutionary or utopian, especially with reference to those heroic and mythical narratives that speak of progress, prosperity and human evolution in absolute terms with little consideration of the effects such idealism has on ordinary people and wider society.¹¹⁰ Ratzinger requires that "we bear in ourselves the reason for our hope in such a way that this *logos* can become *apologia*: the word of hope

priority over consensus, over the accommodation of groups. I would say, when we are speaking of a man of conscience, we mean one who looks at things this way. A man of conscience is one who never acquires tolerance, well-being, success, public standing, and approval on the part of prevailing opinion, at the expense of truth. In this regard, Newman is related to Britain's other great witness of conscience, Thomas More." Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth," 531.

¹⁰⁸ "Conversion becomes the key issue here: a theologian is a Christian open to conversion, one who is willing to embrace another path, letting go of the security of one's own ego and individualistic self-serving preferences. Ratzinger further comments:

[&]quot;(...) Conversion in the Pauline sense is something much more radical than, say, the revision of a few opinions and attitudes. It is a death-event." Agbaw-Ebai, "The Word Become Love," 28. And note, Ratzinger's "emphases on closeness to the Scriptures and attentiveness to the Reformed critique of human nature were joined to other Reformation-congenial emphases also, which more or less naturally followed on from the two already mentioned. Foremost among these was the centrality of conversion in Christian life." Corkery, "Reflection on the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)," 22.

¹⁰⁹ Ratzinger "is not, therefore, a fideist; he does want people to use their intellectual faculty to make judgements about the merits of different social practices. This theme was reiterated in *Deus Caritas Est* at n.28: From God's standpoint, faith liberates reason from its blind spots and therefore helps it to be ever more fully itself. Faith enables reason to do its work more effectively and to see its proper object more clearly. This is where Catholic social doctrine has its place: it has no intention of giving the Church power over the State. Even less is it an attempt to impose on those who do not share the faith ways of thinking and modes of conduct proper to faith. Its aim is simply to purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what is just." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 119.

¹¹⁰ And Lieven Boeve: "Political salvation then [for Ratzinger] depends on the human ethos, on the formation of conscience, and on the simultaneous rational and moral relation to reality, with its source in empirical and moral reason." L. Boeve and Gerard Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey* (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), loc. 1973 of 4799, Kindle. And see, James Corkery, *Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate Hopes* (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 64–68.

wishes to become the answer to the question of the man who seeks to discover where hope is and who wishes to understand the reason why one is permitted to hope."¹¹¹ Hope as it is personally exegeted on an everyday, prudential basis is genuine because as a response to reality as it is, it is reasonable and responsible; it corresponds with reality. Likewise, practical reason is to have political consequence, searching out the means for peace, justice, and righteousness, as well as revealing injurious ideologies. As he states:

[The] task is to see to it that reason is fully functional, not just in the realm of technology and material progress in the world, but also and especially as a faculty of truth, promoting its capacity to recognize what is good, which is a necessary condition for law and therefore also a prerequisite for peace in the world.¹¹²

And:

[t]his means that moral reasoning about, or more precisely, rational discernment of what fosters justice and peace (and therefore is moral) must be constantly carried on and defended against all that could obscure and diminish reason's capacity for discernment.¹¹³

When moral reasoning is effective and undiminished it enriches the body politic, warding

off dehumanising and bogus forms of idealism. Just so, Ratzinger insists:

Politics is the sphere of reason; more precisely, not a purely technical, calculating reason, but moral reasoning, since the end of the State, and thus the ultimate purpose of all politics, is by its very nature moral, namely, peace and justice.¹¹⁴

Politics does not absent reason; it is that part of human concourse which requires the

clearest lines of moral reasoning for just and irenic ends, and for perspicacity with political

theory. With urgency, Ratzinger states:

I would say that nowadays three values are predominant in the general consciousness, yet their mythical oversimplification at the same time poses a threat to moral reasoning today. These three values that are constantly, mythically oversimplified are: progress, science [scientism], and freedom [without obligation].¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe?*, 68. Furthermore, "we must again reflect on the fundamental insight we reached earlier: practical (or moral) reason is reason in the highest sense, because it penetrates the real mystery of reality more deeply than does experimental reason." Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe?*, 42.

¹¹² Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 96–97.

¹¹³ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 60–61.

¹¹⁴ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 60.

¹¹⁵ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 61.

And further, that:

the two foundational political ideas—revolution and utopia—are, in connection with evolution and the dialectic, an absolutely anti-rational myth: it is urgently necessary to demythologize them, so that politics can carry on its work in a truly reasonable way.¹¹⁶

And finally, and especially pertinent to democracies and the politics of identity:

We must once again unmask a myth that confronts us with the ultimate and decisive question for a politics of reason: the myth that a majority decision in many or, perhaps, in most cases is the "most reasonable" way to arrive at a solution for everyone. Here, too, we are dealing ultimately with the defense of reason: reason, moral reasoning, is superior to the majority.¹¹⁷

For Ratzinger, the formed individual is one who is present to the church, sanctified by the Spirit, and revivified by love. She is someone who is able to reason responsibly, discard false ideologies and uphold the welfare of those who are distained, ignored, and neglected as untouchables. The formed individual eschews ideology, makes sense of her environment, critiques its failures, and offers an original and powerful explanatory framework for reading the past and wresting the future. Faith, love, and catechesis create the conditions for authoritative retroductive warrants. For Ratzinger it is not simply experience which generates a true retroductive capacity, it is also catechesis—the right type of formation.

2.2 Summary

This section indicates that Ratzinger does not consistently adhere to one particular methodological approach but uses those methodologies that he perceives will enable him to explore or comment on most effectively the subject he is addressing. Here, Ratzinger implicitly acknowledges the utility of retroduction and the place of experience and setting in its operations. He makes, however, a critical distinction when he insists that it is not any experience which is critical to formation and the analysis and judgements that flow from it, rather it is through ecclesial *habitus* and catechesis that reason is responsible.¹¹⁸ It is the

¹¹⁶ Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 46. Even so: "The idol of the future devours the present; the idol of revolution is the adversary of reasonable political action aimed at making concrete improvements to the world." Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 54.

¹¹⁷ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 64.

¹¹⁸ Ratzinger encounters a similar tension in hermeneutics when he sees the explanatory power of higher criticism vying with traditional ecclesial approaches to reading Scripture, for instance, *Lectio Divina* or a spiritual and systematically theological study—hence, Method C. Pope Benedict XVI, *God's Word: Scripture—Tradition—Office*, trans. Henry Taylor, ed. Peter Hünermann and Thomas Söding (San Francisco:

converted life and intellect which lead to wise judgements. It is the converted life that offers moral vision and stands out against cultural elites which offer diminished and manipulative accounts of true reason. Lonergan will agree with Ratzinger on this, but as I shall try to show, following Aquinas, he is more positive concerning natural human ability and the advances it can make within what he calls the creative vector, even while acknowledging it is in need, figuratively speaking, of baptism. I now turn to a third theological method that Ratzinger employs in his analysis of reason.

3. Joseph Ratzinger: ecclesio-traditio theological method

Aidan Nichols states that for Ratzinger "as a matter of principle, philosophy and theology are vital to each other. Philosophical thought cannot be set in motion without some a priori concepts. It must be fed; it cannot gyrate in a void, as reflection on reflection on reflection."¹¹⁹ To avoid such a perpetual gyration, reason is fed by tradition specifically Christian tradition with its concepts and analogies present in the symbolum, its theological stances, the lives of the saints, and practices of the church. This is the case because Ratzinger sees reason as contingent, injured, and insufficient in its ability to address metaphysical questions and the spiritual needs of humans. Reason requires healing and direction; and it acquires its purpose when it submits to revelation and Catholic tradition. While Ratzinger engages a method of correlation that enables him to process and evaluate contiguity between faith and reason, faith and science, cultural effects and the true, beautiful and good as they are divinely and Christologically exegeted; and while he will modify a method of retroduction to illustrate the good in terms of an authentic Christian responsibility, he is more instinctively at home in what I call an ecclesio-traditio methodology which enables him to analyse, distinguish and gauge the cultural and moral horizons encompassing him. It also provides him with a doughty vehicle for navigating the roads of reason. Vivid internal debate¹²⁰ and dissent might characterise the life of the church over the centuries, but its worked-out, carrying forward of testimony and revelation

Ignatius Press, 2008), 91–126; Michael Maria Waldstein, "The Self-Critique of the Historical-Critical Method: Cardinal Ratzinger's Erasmus Lecture," *Modern Theology* 28, no. 4 (2012).

¹¹⁹ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 199.

¹²⁰ Instanced in "The Sources of Revelation" debate at Vatican Council II. Joseph Ratzinger, *Milestones: Memoirs*, *1927–1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 123–26.

make it the place to stand.¹²¹ Despite its historical machinations the church with its liturgy and traditions remains the timeless repository for life and understanding.¹²² Reason is properly conceived and rendered when its agents accept this.

3.1 Reason as contingent

Ratzinger insists that reason is contingent in that it is created and part of the natural order of things. It is not self-originating or self-authenticating. Running the gauntlet of contradiction, he also holds it springs from the *Logos*,¹²³ the second person of the

This latter perspective seems to better capture what Joseph Ratzinger stood for at Vatican II. His views are best set out in his contributions to the *Commentary on the documents of Vatican II* on the decree on revelation. Ratzinger wrote that "tradition must not be understood as something given once and for all but must be understood in terms of the categories of growth, progress, and knowledge of the faith." …He said he entirely agreed with the great Protestant theologian Karl Barth's formulation of the method of Vatican II as "moving forward from footsteps of those councils." John L. Allen, *Pope Benedict XVI: A Biography of Joseph Ratzinger* (London: Continuum, 2005), 69–70. See, also: "As Ratzinger writes in the first chapter of *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 'the seat of all faith is … the *memoria Ecclesia*… there can be a waxing or waning, a forgetting or remembering, but no recasting of truth in time." Rowland, "Ratzinger on the Timelessness of Truth," 245.

¹²¹ Christopher Collins argues it is a chief characteristic of Ratzinger's methodology: "This Revelation that is given, constructs the whole of reality for the Christian. Reliance on Revelation and its historical-symbolic nature, as opposed to the abstract character of other modes of contemporary theology, has been an essential characteristic of Ratzinger's manner of doing theology." Christopher Collins, "Joseph Ratzinger's Theology of the Word: The Dialogical Structure of his Thought" (Doctor of Philosophy diss., Boston College, 2012), 33. Furthermore, that God's self-disclosure in history and through Scripture underpins Christian tradition: "The method derived for understanding tradition, then, does not start with a speculative or philosophical framework, but rather it begins with the narrative of Scripture and salvation history and only then attempts to discover patterns of meaning and intelligibility." Collins, *Word Made Love*, 57. And Rowland: "Alfred Läpple also claims that Ratzinger was influenced by a view of Revelation according to which Revelation is first and foremost the historical action of God, in the progress of the history of salvation, rather than the communication of some truths to reason through concepts, as claimed in the Neo-Scholastic view." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 7.

¹²² Ratzinger is alert to the difficulty of grappling with "tradition": "If tradition is a once and for all matter, if the practical consequences and verbal expressions of doctrines arrived at hundreds of years ago are themselves sacred, then theological work would be limited to finding new and better arguments for those formulae and consequences. This is essentially the position taken by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani at Vatican II; his episcopal motto was *Semper Idem*, or "always the same." If, on the other hand, doctrines are a human attempt to express the content of divine revelation, then the words and mental categories with which they are expressed are in principle open to improvement and amendment. Moreover, the practical consequences drawn from those documents, reflecting the assumptions and circumstances of a given historical period, are also open to change.

¹²³ And in a slightly different sense: "Creation is born of the Logos and indelibly bears the mark of the creative Reason which orders and directs it." Pope Benedict XVI, *Verbum Domini* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2010), n.8.

Godhead, while simultaneously being an attribute of the Trinity. Reason in its contingency, however, needs, "purification": it is limited, weakened, self-referential and in the final analysis directionless. It requires faith; faith heals and informs it.¹²⁴

Counterfeit reason that wants nothing of revelation and only operates with reference to an immanent frame is a particularly dangerous risk. It:

... no longer recognizes the prerequisite for its own existence and exaggerates its own absolute character beyond the previously assumed absoluteness of the truth, [and] it reverts by an inner logic to a justification of the irrational and makes reason itself out to be an irrational accident.¹²⁵

Which means:

[a]s a form of materialism, it necessarily rejects the primacy of the *Logos*—in the beginning was not reason, but rather the unreasonable; reason, being a product of the development of the irrational, is itself ultimately something irrational.¹²⁶

Reason without a referent, or reason which operates independently and apart from ecclesial tradition, for Ratzinger is incoherent. It is self-contradictory, denying its constitutive origins and rationale.¹²⁷ At base, Ratzinger is neither antagonistic to reason nor philosophy

¹²⁴ Moreover: "The act of faith is rather a process that frees both the reason and the existence of the individual from the bonds that restrict them; it is the introduction of the isolated and fragmented reason of the individual into the realm of him who is the logos, the reason and the rational ground of all things and of all persons." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 99.

¹²⁵ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 149.

¹²⁶ Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 152. Note, too: "Materialism, as we have seen, assumes that in the beginning was, not reason, but irrational matter" and "Whenever the Big Bang is seen as the primordial beginning of the universe, the measure and foundation of reality is no longer reason but the irrational; then reason, too, is only a by-product of the irrational that has come about through "chance and necessity", indeed, by mistake, and to that extent is itself ultimately something irrational." Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 154, 49.

¹²⁷ Rowland observes: "Ratzinger suggests that the question is whether reason, or rationality, stands at the beginning of all things and is grounded in the basis of all things or not? In response to this question, he believes that the answer is Yes, the Christian faith does represent a choice in favour of the priority of reason and of rationality. He also argues that this ultimate question cannot be decided by arguments from natural science, and 'even philosophical thought reaches its limits here.' In a statement which would upset some Neo-Scholastic sensitivities he says, 'in that sense [the sense of scientific rationality], there is no ultimate [empirical] demonstration that the basic choice involved in Christianity is correct'. None the less, he also rhetorically asks whether reason can really renounce the claim that the logos is at the ultimate origin of things, without abolishing itself." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 63.

nor science: his concern is that these are informed at the very minimum by faith, church tradition and revelation.¹²⁸

A counterfeit reason with pretentions to autonomy highlights the fact that "reason is an organ and not an oracle."¹²⁹ The limitations of reason in its functioning as an "organ" point to its contingency and dependency, while not lessening its partial but genuine utility.¹³⁰ Its dependency is evident in the rich effect religions bring to reason's operations;¹³¹ in the results of embodied reasoning with all its histories and insights; and through the experience of academy and corporate interlocution. Reason's limitations necessitate others:

No one can pull himself up out of the bog of uncertainty, of not being able to live, by his own exertions; nor can we pull ourselves up, as Descartes still thought we could, by a *cogito ergo sum*, by a series of intellectual deductions.¹³²

Rather, reason is not stand-alone, it entails physical and communal relations. This "is the way in which intellectual communication takes place, the form in which the mind is, as it were, human—that is, corporeal and social."¹³³ Indeed, a form of reason that repeatedly denies its limitations and seeks independence from tradition and religious insight becomes socially degenerative.¹³⁴ Ratzinger is:

¹²⁸ Ratzinger, however, does signal risks with scientific theologies. Joseph Ratzinger, "The Church and Scientific Theology," *Communio* 7, no. 4 (1980). Furthermore, Ratzinger [writes] "The truth of revelation does not superimpose the truth achieved by reason; rather, it purifies and exalts reason [in its own order], thereby enabling it to broaden its horizons to enter into a field of research as unfathomably expansive as mystery itself."⁷ Eduardo Echeverria, "Ten Years Later: Lessons from the Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger Debate," (2015): 2. https://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources-folder/papers-presentations.

¹²⁹ Ratzinger, On Conscience, 68.

¹³⁰ Ratzinger further contends "... man is neither reason alone nor feeling alone; he is the unity of both these dimensions." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 387.

¹³¹ "...there is no great philosophy which does not draw life from listening to and accepting religious tradition. Wherever this relation is cut off, philosophical thought withers and becomes a mere conceptual game." Joseph Ratzinger, "Truth and Freedom," *Communio.* 23, no. 1 (1996): 31.

¹³² Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 73.

¹³³ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 93.

¹³⁴ And: "Using a metaphor that may resonate with many in New Labour Britain he says that the structure of the general intellectual situation has been fundamentally altered: 'techne (technical reason) is no longer banished to the "House of Commons" of learning, or, to be more accurate, there, too, the "House of Commons" has become the decisive element in the constitution; in comparison with which the "House of Lords" now seems only a collection of aristocratic pensioners'. Techne has become the real potential and obligation of man. *Traditio* has been demoted. What was previously at the bottom is now on top." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 54.

...convinced, in fact, that the crisis we are experiencing in the Church and in humanity is closely allied to the exclusion of God as a topic with which reason can properly be concerned—an exclusion that has led to the degeneration of theology first into historicism, then into sociology and, at the same time, to the impoverishment of philosophy.¹³⁵

Reason is contingent: it requires something more than itself for orientation.¹³⁶

It is Christian faith with its traditions that heals, informs, and actualises reason.¹³⁷ Reason is wounded by sin, which explains its regular decoupling from the true and the good. "Original sin darkens man's reason, which can be enlightened again and restored to its dignity only through the faith."¹³⁸ When reason remembers and recovers its

¹³⁸ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 16. And, Corkery: "Bonaventure pulls back from ascribing excellence to the human and prefers to emphasise instead human dependence, indebtedness and nothingness. The interesting thing is – these same emphases are found also in Ratzinger (as they were in Augustine): we are beggars, receivers, capable of very little. Avery Dulles pointed to Ratzinger's Augustinianism when writing about the Extraordinary Synod of 1985, which Pope John Paul II had convened to assess the achievement of the Second Vatican Council on the twentieth anniversary of its ending. Of two schools of thought present at the Synod, Dulles said, the first, "supernaturalistic" in viewpoint, tended "to depict the church as an island of grace in a world given over to sin;" he called this outlook "neo-Augustinian" (Dulles 1988:191). Dulles spoke of those who had this supernaturalistic outlook as considering that the world had fallen under the power of the Evil One, that collaboration with it was less to be recommended than taking a stance against it and that the Church had become contaminated by the world in the years following the Council (Dulles 1988:191). It is not difficult to recognize these sentiments in Ratzinger, who responded as follows to a question about "restoration" that was put to him in the year that the Extraordinary Synod took place: "If by 'restoration' is meant a turning back, no restoration of such kind is possible...But if by restoration we understand the search for a new balance after all the exaggerations of an indiscriminate opening to the world, after the overly positive interpretations of an agnostic and atheistic world, well, then a restoration understood in this sense....is altogether desirable and, for that matter, is already in operation in the Church (Ratzinger 1985:37–38)." This is a typical Ratzinger response. The world contaminates. Purification, about-turn, de-contamination are needed. Today he says that Europe needs this because what

¹³⁵ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 316. Earlier Ratzinger has lamented that "something wholly new is happening to man and to the world in a culture in which scientific and technical self-determination is becoming ever more total (and is the reason for the crisis that is occurring in a tradition that has no compunction about explaining itself, if need be, in terms of the scientifically proven behavioural patterns of higher animals but can discover no binding force in human history as such and, in consequence, raises afresh the whole question of validity even with respect to tradition-bound institutions like the Catholic Church which seem to be unequivocally characterized by clearly defined norms)." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 16.

¹³⁶ Or perhaps a little more positively: "[Reason] cannot develop its full potential in the realm of the merely intellectual, for where Eros is not directed to what is eternal, it cannot produce the knowledge that is proper to it." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 360.

¹³⁷ For Collins this is underwritten by intelligibility not only present to creation but also human history, which in themselves are illustrative of the Logos in dialogue: "The intelligibility of human history as the place wherein the Logos can be heard and appropriated is in turn the basis of creation itself—the expression of the Eternal Logos." Collins, "Ratzinger's theology of the word," 198.

metaphysical mission through acts of humility which acknowledge limitations and needs, then it becomes receptive and operatively validated:

Europe's greatness is based on a reasonableness in which, despite all that it learns and all that it can do, reason does not forget its highest calling: namely, to be the perception of what is eternal, an organ receptive to God.¹³⁹

Additionally, for reason to be an "organ receptive to God" it must recognise firstly that faith is prior but not alien to it, and secondly that it is informed-formed by faith. Writing in *Faith and the Future*, Ratzinger notes: "Faith, in reality, is sheer contradiction, that which we cannot explain, because it explains us and precedes us; it is the antecedent of all our intellection."¹⁴⁰ But not only is faith antecedent to intellection, it is also essential for its formation and the workings of reason: "for reason comes to light through the Christian faith; reason presupposes faith as its living space."¹⁴¹ Critically, "[r]eason needs faith if it is to be completely itself."¹⁴² If reason is to avoid the self-imposed limitations of maximal hubris, thus cutting its lifeline and sabotaging its value, it must be receptive to faith. For:

as reason sets out on her search [for understanding], faith commissions her to recognize in the faith the prerequisite that makes her own operation possible, and not to pursue her claim to comprehensiveness to the point of abolishing her own foundation, for that would mean that she was mistaking herself for divine reason and thereby abandoning communication with the divine reason on which her life depends.¹⁴³

Europe is experiencing is ultimately a crisis of faith." Corkery, "Reflection on the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)," 26.

¹³⁹ Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe?*, 148. Boeve adds: "The Church's social teaching should also be regarded within this framework. Ratzinger defines this as the making operable of the faith. This involves the ethos of faith challenging scientific and political reason to develop models of action 'which do not produce redemption but can open up the conditions for a redeemed existence.'" Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, loc. 2011 of 4799, Kindle.

¹⁴⁰ Benedict XVI, Faith and the Future, 68.

¹⁴¹ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.3.

¹⁴² Pope Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 2007), n.23.

¹⁴³ Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 149. Note, too: "… we have also seen in the course of our reflections that there are also pathologies of reason, although mankind in general is not as conscious of this fact today. There is a hubris of reason that is no less dangerous. This is why reason, too, must be warned to keep within its proper limits, and it must learn a willingness to listen…. If it cuts itself completely adrift and rejects this willingness to learn, this relatedness, reason becomes destructive." Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 80.

Faith not only heals and informs reason—it is its *Grundlage*.¹⁴⁴ While Lonergan is in sympathy with Ratzinger's stance on faith and reason, where religious conversion, being in love, and the experience of "being grasped by an ultimate concern"¹⁴⁵ are in some senses prior to and informative of reason, he will distinguish between faith and belief—the latter expressing the content of faith—and contend for reason's real value apart from religious experience.

For Ratzinger (and Lonergan, too) faith's relation to reason, however, is not all one way. There is an existential threat from established and developing religions and "faiths" that are unreasonable. In response to this risk, Ratzinger affirms that "the Christian faith is not opposed to reason."¹⁴⁶ Rather, reason properly located tests the rationality of a faith. Paradoxically, it even underpins its intellectual activities. Indeed, "[f]aith needs the intellect if it is to be understood and practiced."¹⁴⁷ Thus the intellect gathers datum and sifts it for ideations which carry forward understandings that exhibit theological integrity, moral rectitude and practical utility.¹⁴⁸ Ratzinger insists on the "…necessary relatedness between reason and faith and between reason and religion, which are called to purify and help one another."¹⁴⁹ Without such a relatedness and "with the detachment of religion from

¹⁴⁴ Rowland contends: "It would also be wrong to regard Ratzinger as fundamentally hostile to either philosophy or science (though he may be hostile to many projects which market themselves as a scientific theology). His basic principle is that reason needs to be informed by faith." And further: "As James V. Schall wrote in his commentary on this message, Pope Benedict believes that the 'depths of reason are discovered more under the stimulus of revelation than by science or human reflection, however legitimate and valuable these are." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 13–14.

¹⁴⁵ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), 240.

¹⁴⁶ Joseph Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. Brendan McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006),42.

¹⁴⁷ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 329.

¹⁴⁸ Rowland with reference to Benedict's Regensburg address highlights commentary on the similarities of Islam and Modernity and their resistance to the truth-testing power of reason: "In his Regensburg address he was clearly trying to encourage the development of Islamic thought in the direction of a consideration of Greek ideas about reason. In his commentary on the address, James V. Schall made the point that, at their philosophic roots, the two cultures—modern secularism and Islam—are not that much different. He suggests that this is what Benedict implies in his citation from Ibn Hazn concerning voluntarism. Islam and modern secularism share the same voluntarist tendency. They both eschew the possibility that there is an obligatory order of reason." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 121.

¹⁴⁹ Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 81. And earlier: "Faith is convinced that reason is capable of embracing truth, and that, therefore, faith does not have to erect its edifice apart from the tradition of reason, but finds its language in communication with the reason of the nations through a process of reception and dialectic." Joseph Ratzinger, Heinz Schürmann, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 71. And slightly later: "We said that

its responsibility to reason, pathological forms of religion constantly increase."¹⁵⁰ Lonergan would concur.

3.2 Summary

Ratzinger approaches the task of theology, political arrangements and decision making, and the moral life through deliberate but varied means. He is not uniformly methodologically disciplined. While the breadth of his work is loosely characterised by a method of correlation, he employs retroduction, too. Perhaps most instinctively, however, he proceeds from an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology which is conservative, deeply considered, communal, embodied, and dialogical. In wrestling with reason, its origins, power and purposes, Ratzinger points to reason's contingency and limitations. He also highlights its deformation in consequence of original sin and the wilful folly of individual choices. While, however, Ratzinger argues for reason's insufficiency, vulnerability, and fallibility, he also speaks of its primacy, relating it to an attribute of God—or the Logos Himself as the second person of the Godhead. Discussion of sin aside, this suggests a tension remains in Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of reason that both wishes to acknowledge the power and value of the created, natural order while also denying it. This tension, I will argue is something that Lonergan's work can address. The point is that Ratzinger exhibits an unwillingness to grant the natural realm finalities—ends proper to themselves—in their own right. Reason will always require faith to blossom: "This is the very essence of wisdom—of the faith that is wisdom—namely, that it bursts open the narrowness of mere reason and reactivates the broader vision to which man is called."¹⁵¹ With reference not only to Christian tradition but also the role the ecclesial community

faith demands and opens up reason, sees itself as the living space of reason, so that the faith is not right unless it leads to an at least rudimentarily reasonable insight; we also pointed out that reason deprives itself of its footing if it abolishes faith." Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics*, 153. Rowland thus observes that for Ratzinger: "Faith without reason ends in fideism, but reason without faith ends in nihilism." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 4.

¹⁵⁰ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*.

¹⁵¹ Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, 75. And: "Ratzinger identified himself with those critics of *Gaudium et Spes* who agreed that the document brought into question the very purpose of revelation. 'The text as it stood itself prompted the question why exactly the reasonable and perfectly free human being described in the first articles was suddenly burdened with the story of Christ,' he wrote." Allen, *Pope Benedict XVI: A Biography of Joseph Ratzinger*, 80.

plays in providing the grounds for reason, its proper ends, and for the social and political effects these have on the individual, Ratzinger concludes:

Reason finds inspiration and direction in Christian revelation, according to which the human community does not absorb the individual, annihilating his autonomy, as happens in the various forms of totalitarianism, but rather values him all the more because the relation between individual and community is a relation between one totality and another.¹⁵²

Thus reason, despite its propensity for Babel-like presumption regarding its own abilities, when viewed and moderated through the lens of an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology becomes an organ which tests the integrity of Christian faith, while also uncovering the true and the good.¹⁵³ Producing some of the same effects as a Christotelic methodology, an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology decentres the self and attenuates individualism, while simultaneously questioning aspects of the liberal tenet of progress. And it is to Ratzinger's Christotelic methodology that I now turn.

4. Joseph Ratzinger: Christotelic theological method

Ratzinger maintains throughout his writings that reason has its origins in God. It is indivisible with God; and God's creation carries an intelligibility reflective of it.¹⁵⁴ If people "listen to the reason of creation" then they "will find an echo of the reason of the creator."¹⁵⁵ It is the *Logos*, the second person of the Godhead, who is responsible for this truth—a truth revealed in Scripture and attested to by tradition. Reason is thus possibly best understood by framing it Christotelically—this means not simply centring reason in

¹⁵² Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.53.

¹⁵³ Just so, "Two things coexist in all ages, that is, the 'appearance' of reason and the manifestation of truth through reason.... [and] the Church is involved in the process of assimilating what is genuinely rational and rejecting what is only superficially reasonable." Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, 72.

¹⁵⁴ "The world comes from reason, and this reason is a Person, is Love—this is what our biblical faith tells us about God." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 26.

¹⁵⁵ Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe?*, 162. And "For all that may be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes; indeed, God himself has disclosed it to them. His invisible attributes, that is to say his everlasting power and deity, have been visible, ever since the world began, to the eye of reason, in the things he has made." *The New English Bible* (New York: Cambridge University Press; Oxford University Press, 1970), Rom 1:19.

Christ but relating it also to the purposes of Christ.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the second person of the Trinity is, and yet becomes, for humanity the basis for rationality and *recta ratio* with moral consequence. He gives an account of the human condition, its needs and ends.¹⁵⁷ This exposition is revealed; and it is logical but not immediately evident to reasoning which seems to respond *post-facto* to such revelation. Christ gathers up in himself the eschatological significance and potential of human rationality at once actualising and ennobling it, while also delimiting it. Lonergan will differ on this point; preferring an account of human reason *qua* reason as a creaturely phenomenon that is demarcated and valid in its own right. Ratzinger does not use the term Christotelic, but his kaleidoscopic focus on Christology,¹⁵⁸ the *Logos* and eschatology offer reasonable grounds for its usage.

4.1 Reason as divine

Ratzinger insists reason is God-given and that it precedes us. It is "God's great gift to man, and the victory of reason over unreason is also a goal of the Christian life";¹⁵⁹ and urgently, "reason that precedes us, alone can keep our reason in balance and can keep us

¹⁵⁶ Christotelic approaches also have hermeneutical application, particularly when reading the Old Testament. Richard Hays and Ellen Davis, *The Art of Reading Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 216–38.

¹⁵⁷ Note, too: We come closer to what Jesus meant with another of Saint Thomas' teachings: "Truth is in God's intellect properly and firstly (*proprie et primo*); in human intellect it is present properly and derivatively (*proprie quidem et secundario*)" (De Verit., q. 1, a. 4c). God is the reality that gives being and intelligibility." Pope Benedict XVI, *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 192. Yet, Ratzinger notes the role Scripture plays in relation to reasoning and faith: "All those who believe shall derive the proofs of their faith not from reason but from Scripture." Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, 159.

¹⁵⁸ Rowland observes positively that "there is a strong Christocentrism in Ratzinger's theological structure." Rowland, "Ratzinger on the Timelessness of Truth," 254. In contrast, George O'Brian and others argue that Ratzinger's Christology is distorted by an ecclesiology which frames Christ in a particular system rather than allowing his words and actions historically to speak for themselves: see, Peter McGregor, "Heart to Heart: The Spiritual Theology of Joseph Ratzinger" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian Catholic University, 2013), 29.

¹⁵⁹ Benedict XVI, *Spe Salvi*, n.23. Thomas O'Brien notes this is a consistent theme in Ratzinger's work, stating: "Truth is an order of being that exists independent of human understanding as something we discover, rather than something we create. 'Truth is the light that gives meaning and value to charity. That light is both the light of reason and the light of faith... It grasps its meaning as gift, acceptance and communion.'This definition of the truth is the relatively sophisticated traditional, and metaphysical understanding of the term that is familiar to the magisterium and theologians but is less accessible to the casual reader." Thomas O'Brien, "A Thematic Analysis of 'Love' and 'Truth' in Caritas in Veritate," *Political Theology* 14, no. 5 (2013): 582–83.

from falling into external unreason."¹⁶⁰ Such reason stems and flows from God.¹⁶¹ The human experience of reason is "preceded by a Word which, though logical and rational, does not originate from reason itself but has been granted it as a gift and, as such, always transcends it."¹⁶² It transcends it because it is divine, personal and creative. It is also encompassing. Early in his work and without any later retractions, Ratzinger argues that it is:

God who is *Logos* who guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the intelligibility of our existence, the aptitude of reason to know God [*die Gottgemässheit der Vernunft*] and the reasonableness of God [*die Vernunftgemässheit Gottes*], even though his understanding infinitely surpasses ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness.¹⁶³

Reason with the ability to be attentive, intelligent, synthetic, and morally discerning is feasible because creation expresses something of its creator. It carries certain givens.

In addition to exegeting its creator, creation, in the light of the incarnation, is able to relate to its creator as intended. Humans, too, are equipped to reason responsibly. It is through the traditions of the church and especially its reading of Scripture that this is discovered. Nichols observes that:

Ratzinger is unusual in the claim that this task of enlarging the field of play of reason is already achieved by the Bible itself. Scripture has opened reason to the truth and love of God, and in this way, it is and continues to be the true 'enlightenment', which has given the world over to reason and not to exploitation by human beings.¹⁶⁴

Scripture does this "since it put[s] human reason firmly on the primordial basis of God's creating Reason, in order to establish it in truth and in love."¹⁶⁵ More specifically Scripture

¹⁶⁰ Ratzinger, Credo for Today, 67.

¹⁶¹ And further: "That God is indeed means that there is a truth of man in which the goals of his intellectual inquiry find their limits and their measure." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 99.

¹⁶² Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 104.

¹⁶³ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 26. In other places, Ratzinger attributes the work of creation more directly to the Spirit—for instance: "The Spirit is the creative origin of all things, and therefore they all bear reason in themselves; this reason does not come from them but infinitely transcends them, yet it forms the law of their being.... The creative reason that creates the objective reasonableness of things, their hidden mathematics, and their inner order, is at the same time moral reason, and it is love.... The fundamental alternative before which the course of the modern period sets us consists in the question: Does the irrational stand at the beginning of all things, is the irrational the real origin of the world, or does it come from creative reason." Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe?*, 112.

¹⁶⁴ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 219.

¹⁶⁵ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 201.

reveals that "in this the final age God has spoken to us in the Son, whom he has made heir to the whole universe, and through whom he created all orders of existence—the Son who is the effulgence of God's splendour and the stamp of God's very being, and who sustains the universe by his word of power."¹⁶⁶ For Ratzinger this means "the *Logos* is seen to be, not merely a mathematical reason at the basis of all things, but a creative love taken to the point of becoming sympathy, suffering with the creature"¹⁶⁷ The *Logos* becomes flesh and lives with us.¹⁶⁸

Reason then is not abstract, arbitrary and disembodied; and "knowledge is never purely the work of the intellect."¹⁶⁹ To use Lonergan's term, it is "sublated"¹⁷⁰ by a reason which is divine, loving and personal; and therefore, it can be known.¹⁷¹ Ratzinger insists that "the same *Logos*, the creative rationality from which the world has sprung, is personally present in this man Jesus."¹⁷² Reason with other indivisible attributes of God is thus uniquely instantiated in the person, decisions and acts of Jesus Christ. Jesus' reasoning and actions are on display in the gospels; more than this Jesus Christ as the "effulgence" ($\dot{\alpha}\pi\alpha\dot{\nu}\gamma\alpha\sigma\mu\alpha$) of God has alone made him known ($\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\tilde{\nu}\nu\varsigma\varsigma$ $\dot{\epsilon}\xi\eta\gamma\eta\sigma\alpha\tau\sigma$).¹⁷³ The

¹⁶⁹ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.30.

¹⁷⁰ Meaning "retaining, preserving, going beyond, and completing." Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Subject," in *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 80. I will write in more depth on sublation in Chapter Four.

¹⁷¹ And note: "Creative love is neither blind will nor pure feeling but love as meaning and meaning as love, because it is the creative reason of all reality, it cannot be reciprocated without logic, without thought and word." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 26.

¹⁷² Benedict XVI, *God's Word*, 206. And this carries the implication as "we have already said that Christian faith, on the basis of its essence as described in the Bible, is not irrationalism but is the most decisive declaration that reason is the ground and goal of all things." Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe*?, 115. And therefore: "St John's declaration that Jesus of Nazareth is self-identical with the divine Logos may be taken as expressing the Church's fundamental conviction that in faith what is manifested is the rational. The foundation of being is Reason: the world is not, therefore, a 'casual side-product' thrown up from the 'ocean of the irrational'." Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 181.

¹⁷³ John 1:18. *The Greek New Testament*, Fourth Revised ed., ed. Kurt Aland Barbara Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo Martini, Bruce Metzger (Stuttgart, Germany: Biblia Druck, 1998), 314.

¹⁶⁶ Heb 1:2–3, New English Bible.

¹⁶⁷ Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 183.

¹⁶⁸ Yet note: "For Ratzinger, also, it is within the living faith of the Church that the Scripture becomes accessible. *Sola scriptura* cannot be a meaningful option, for 'resorting to the Bible in isolation, as a mere historical document does not sufficiently communicate to us an insight into what is essential.' It is within the living context of the Church, wherein the Scriptures are understood and lived, that one can gain an accessible and meaningful understanding of the Scriptures. His approach to Scripture is therefore *ecclesio-centric*, with the Church as hermeneutical locus of Scripture." Agbaw-Ebai, "The Word Become Love," 32.

origin and ends of reason are revealed and "exegeted" in Christ, the Son of God. They are Christotelic.

In closing this section, it is important to highlight the observation that central to Ratzinger's theology and whole theological task is his conviction that God is love—indeed it is a distinctive feature of reason as it is perceived biblically and ecclesially that it is not only divine in origin, creative, coinhering, comprehensive and communicative, but it is also bounded by love. Reason as the following chapter illustrates, for Ratzinger, is sublated, dignified, and rightly oriented by love. More formally, love resolves the tension between theology and philosophy. As Boeve argues:

Ratzinger sees the need for establishing a new relationship between theology and philosophy, because both suffer from the modern antithesis between the two. It is his work on Bonaventure that offers the inspiration to establish a way out: apart from the problem of death and the question of God, it is especially love, and in particular the love for truth, at the heart of Christian faith, which makes room for an intimate relationship between philosophy and theology.¹⁷⁴

4.2 Summary

In terms of moral reasoning and the good life, a Christotelic methodology licences Ratzinger to critique the turn to the self and utopian narratives of human perfectibility. Moreover, it recognises reason as a natural phenomenon but one that is not selforiginating: rather reason is seen as divine, pre-existent, Christological, and teleological, with its teleology purposed and fulfilled for human society in Christ and history. As such reason has genuine and not irrational grounds and it has an iridescent future. This section shows that a Christotelic methodology dramatically relocates and raises reason's profile. It also provides a divine-human basis for dialogue, conversion, and righteous living. Lonergan diverges from Ratzinger at this juncture, paying fuller attention to the Trinity, created participations and their relation to creation, while also maintaining reason in the natural order has a contingent but valid finality. I shall expand on these features of Lonergan's thought shortly (Chapter 4, 2.3-4).

5. Summary: Joseph Ratzinger's theological methods in relation to reason

Ratzinger employs a range of methodologies to explicate his theology. Each acts to make distinctions in his developing understanding of reason; but his wide-ranging commentary on the subject does not fit precisely into a methodological schematic. It is

¹⁷⁴ Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, loc. 626 of 4799, Kindle.

often voiced in a non-academic setting, and at times it is aphoristic, or meditative. Ratzinger extensively employs a method of correlation. He also favours an ecclesio*traditio* methodology, which in the latter part of his life has become increasingly eucharistic and dialogical. It is also love-centric-the subject of the next chapter which considers the interrelation between love and reason. A method of correlation enables Ratzinger to analyse and evaluate reason in relation to a culture and a people's best convictions against a Christian backdrop. Retroduction allows him to enter into the ethical and moral terrain of responsible reasoning in the world as it is today-particularly with reference to South America and modern Europe. And an ecclesio-traditio model, whilst miming many of the qualities of correlation in its comparative and contrastive procedures, permits Ratzinger to probe reason's absolutist claims by decentring the self, moderating individualism and casting doubt on uncritical narrative of progress—while pointing to the true and the good in the $\kappa \eta \rho \nu \gamma \mu \alpha$, of which the church, as an enduring community, bears witness. Ratzinger's *ecclesio-traditio* methodology is distinct from correlation because it locates its critical commentator within a believing community and tradition. It is closer to retroduction, which with organic fluidity also conducts its analysis from within the particular society it is evaluating. In contrast, the method of correlation places one value from tradition in conversation with another from situation, while standing outside both. Its wont is to be objective. While an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology can be caught in the same snares as correlation regarding actual demarcations in what is in effect an eschatological continuum between tradition and situation, it tries to avoid these traps by speaking from a "great cloud of witnesses" (Heb 12:1). It is not a bystander. Ratzinger's Christotelicism resolves the tension between then and now, tradition and situation even more comprehensively than by his use of retroduction and an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology. It assumes the accidentals of history into divine purposes—a project in which Lonergan is also deeply invested. It is like an inner core to an *ecclesio-traditio* model; and it is unsurprising, given Ratzinger's late-life revisions with their focus on Jesus of Nazareth and eschatology, that it emerges most comprehensively at this time. Theologically and philosophically, it offers a strong basis for reason and for its ends-though Lonergan differs on how this is understood. It moves from the declarative statements of belief of an ecclesio-traditio methodology to the subject of belief as its authenticating referent. That same subject is he who generates the converted life; and as Ratzinger has sensed through the method of retroduction this remains the acid test of reason's claims to moral worth and practical utility.¹⁷⁵ For Ratzinger, it is personal love that holds the best claims on reason;¹⁷⁶ and this is because "the last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it."¹⁷⁷

6. Joseph Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of reason

This chapter advances a central claim in my thesis that reason is of critical interest to Ratzinger. In it I have outlined Ratzinger's understanding and evaluation of reason. I have drawn evidence from forty-three of his books, and a number of his journal articles and more informal publications. I have argued that in the main Ratzinger has a high view of reason. He holds that it has a divine ontology and tends to true, good and beautiful ends. Yet reason can be counterfeited with catastrophic and still unfolding consequences.

At base, Ratzinger finds reason to be a universal phenomenon. It is creational as something peculiar to creation. It is divine in origin, and at the very least analogous with a reason that is true of the divinity. Not only does it have divine origins and characteristics, but it is also communicated, presented, incarnated, and received in creation which already, but not yet, models it. While reason is pre-existent it is also immanent. Distinctively for creation it is Christo-logical. It is also Christotelic: it is now realised in Christ whilst awaiting its fullest exposition in redeemed creation and humanity. Reason is divinely coinherent; divine in origin; divinely prescribed and divinely facing.

While Ratzinger contends that reason has the richest foundations possible, he also maintains that it is contingent. Reason is not self-originating or self-authenticating. It is secondary. As an organ and not an oracle, it needs a referent to tune its operations to right ends. Moreover, natural reason wounded by original and repeated sin tends to disorder, and curves to perverse findings. The economic Trinity's self-disclosure and acts in history

¹⁷⁵ For "The purpose of this dialogue between God and the human person is not so much the transmission of information but rather the transformation of the person in the life of the Trinity. For Ratzinger this is not a matter of removing the intellectual component of faith but understanding it as a component in a wider whole. He believes that 'the act of faith is an event that expands the limits of individual reason' and 'brings the isolated and fragmented individual intellect into the realm of Him who is the logos, the reason, and the reasonable ground of all being, all things, and all mankind." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 51.

¹⁷⁶ Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, loc. 211 of 4799, Kindle.

¹⁷⁷ Blaise Pascal, *Thoughts*, ed. Charles Eliot, Harvard Classics, (New York: P.F.Collier & Son, 1914), § 4. Of the Means of Belief, 267. Lonergan develops this argument and explains its significance. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Horizons," in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965–1980, Volume 17*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 19–20.

change this. The incarnation and Pentecost, together with conversion, ecclesial participation, and a renewal of the mind reveal reason's dignity and worth. Faith purifies reason and its tendency towards misuse and desuetude. Yet reason also tests the rationality, coherence, and integrity of faith. Reason is not stand-alone, disembodied, abstract and autonomous; on the contrary, it is always its truest when personal and relational. Indeed, for Ratzinger, the triune God reveals Godself as creative-love-reason.

Reason is most deft when it is cognisant of tradition and receptive to the Spirited insights of the Body of Christ. This does not mean it has no utility, or that working empirically it has nothing to offer; rather, it is limited, especially when it ignores questions of ontology and metaphysics and the ways in which these prompt novel questions and unearth perspicacious findings. Grounded reason, scientific method, technical and positive reasoning have instrumental value and carry human benefit. When these forms of reason become hegemonic or totalising epistemic narratives, they disfigure human relations and generate governments, policies and technologies that run the risk of reinforcing a culture of death.

I have also argued that for Ratzinger reason carries intelligibility and attends to intelligibility in creation. Ratzinger underscores that intelligibility inherent to reason links it to a wider creational intelligibility; and that reason operating intelligently and synthetically gathers data, seeking out coherent patterns, before weighing these to determine frameworks with the most compelling explanatory and predictive power. These innate competencies were attested to by pagan culture and early Christianity's synergistic commitment to reason. They carried through the Middle Ages and the Reformation. The pursuit of truth; the need to uncover imbrications in human behaviour and the natural world for the common good; and a reverence for the sacred canopy, with its metaphysical and ontological intuitions, ensured their continuance. More recently, and especially since various European-based Enlightenments, this ecology has been denuded with reason restricting itself self-referentially.

For Ratzinger, the threadbare appearance of reason, intelligibility, and intelligent and synthetic thought, so typical to the twentieth century, is visible in moral reasoning, too. Reason is geared to being responsible; especially in the converted life. While reason is powerfully instrumental, its utility is best rendered in an *ecclesio-traditio* setting where Christ is all and in all. Yet it has become estranged. Out of relation with its maker, it is at a disjunction with its proper ends. The estrangement of reason from its source is seen in reason's pathologies. Ratzinger picks out and decries counterfeit forms of reason. These are found in scientism, and technical and positivistic reasoning. They are exclusive, rejecting as secondary or false other ways of knowing, such as through tradition, testimony, or revelation, and they are self-referential. Ratzinger finds, too, that utility determines their value. He discovers them to be dangerous and dehumanising. Secular, in the contemporary sense of the term, they unchain the Earth from the sun and wipe Europe's Christian cultural horizon clean. They will not admit or expose themselves to the sublationary power of divine love. Gripped by hubris, it is dead to them.

I should emphasise that Ratzinger's commentary on reason is substantive. It does not represent a momentary interest but a lifelong commitment. While much of his work cautions against reason and its aberrant forms, he consistently advocates for the beauty of reason in its ability to reveal truth and goodness, and, in practical terms, to generate law and policy for social and cultural reformation. Reason is also apologetic and integral to salvation. Ratzinger appears to have trouble reconciling the givenness of reason and intelligibility in creation with reason's origination in God. Arguably a seam of Neo-Platonic thought in Augustine, and Bonaventure's downgrading of reason in the sight of love, produce this orientation. If this is the case, then it does not take sufficient stock of Aquinas' reworking of Augustine's grace-sin dialectic through a grace-nature distinction. It also suggests a slightly clumsy dualism that loosens definition with the doctrines of creation, humanity, and eschatology, echoing the charge of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin that "You are all hypnotised by evil."¹⁷⁸ Additionally, and quite understandably, Ratzinger's experience of the devastation of Germany under National Socialism, the descent of the Iron Curtain, the 1960s with the introduction of the contraceptive pill, nuclear proliferation, student riots, marital decline, and the rise of cultural Marxism makes it more difficult for him to keep his eyes on a world which God made, sustains and loves enough to die for. Dwelling on the transcendent is less painful and slightly easier. More positively, Ratzinger's hesitation with reason might indicate a Pascalian sense of mystery which attests to the ineffability of God and points to the limits of reason's apprehension of God. This might be coupled with a Barthian desire to lock salvation into Christocentric revelation. If so, then reason is punished for something of which it is not guilty; and the

¹⁷⁸ Cited in Dorothy Soelle, *Thinking about God: An Introduction to Theology* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1990), 43.

distinction between natural theology with its claims to what might be known of God (Rom 1:19–20, *New English Bible*), and doctrinal developments, for instance, on the Trinity and soteriology, has not been made. Ratzinger seems to hold a high view of reason, but with difficulty. I will argue that it is personal love, the subject of the next chapter, which will resolve this tension for him.

Chapter Three: Joseph Ratzinger on Love

Introduction

Ratzinger has been characterised as *panzerkardinal*, God's rottweiler—as one who speedily, aggressively, and tenaciously mauls heterodox ideas, bringing them into line or discarding them as anathema. He is portrayed as an Apollonius to John Keats' Lamiasomeone cold, and not readily associated with a capacious interest, even passion for love.¹ This perception is unfortunate and unfair. It does not take sufficiently into account the expectations surrounding Ratzinger's ecclesiastical roles and duties. It also minimises his serious, if sometimes confusing, commitment to the pursuit and preservation of truth; and more to the point, the weighting his writings carry on the subject and sanctity of love. Rowland contends that "while emphasizing that God is the eternal *logos* or reason in creation, throughout his career and in his many addresses to scholarly audiences, Ratzinger has been at least as interested in the theme of God is love."² In this chapter I will show, ceteris paribus, that Ratzinger is actually more interested in love than in reason. Firstly, because his page count with three-hundred and twenty-three discussion points on the matter suggests so;³ and, secondly, because Ratzinger argues, if inconsistently and at times incomprehensibly,⁴ that love is prior to, assimilative of, and even supersedes reason. Love is apparently of more moment than reason.⁵ Furthermore, Ratzinger's interests in ecclesiology, liturgy, Christology, eschatology, and sociology-with its political and economic arrangements—are continually contextualised and refreshed by love. A survey of Ratzinger's life indicates that as a theologian and scriptural scholar he formally learnt that God was love: but as someone rinsed in the charism of Aurelius Augustine, he discovered love to be an overwhelming gift flowing from God that was personal and

¹ A query on any search engine for these terms or ideas in relation to Ratzinger, and especially Benedict XVI, yields hundreds of results from websites, newsfeeds, papers, popular biographies, and bloggers.

² Tracey Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3.

³ From forty-three of his major works, multiple articles, and other writings. Note, too, these discussion points are, by and large, positively oriented towards love, and do not mirror the considerable body of negative commentary Ratzinger develops, for instance, on counterfeited reason.

⁴ For instance: "Absolute thought is a kind of love; it is not unfeeling idea, but creative, because it is love." Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity (Revised Edition)*, trans. J. R. Foster (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 147.

⁵ In contradiction, Ratzinger will also argue that love is indivisible with reason and of equal importance.

transformational;⁶ and as a researcher of Bonaventure, he "saw" that love was Christological, ⁷ eschatological, fraternal, definitive and all-consuming.⁸ Ratzinger's writings across their breadth, and with depth, explore these themes. In this manner, Ratzinger proves over a lifetime to be an ardent "lover." Hardly surprisingly, as pope, his first encyclical closely, even intimately, details love. It is a work of homage and adoration (Latin *ad-oratio*—mouth to mouth; a kiss).⁹ Certainly, Ratzinger will expose and restrict unorthodox teaching, but he is magnanimous on the subject of love.

Ratzinger, then, has much to say about love. Love can be counterfeited, but Ratzinger does not dwell on this.¹⁰ As is the case with reason, a tension arises in his descriptions of love: he appears to affirm the positive creational reality and force of love as

⁶ Rowland comments with reference to the *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*;

[&]quot;Regrettably for Ratzinger, however, the young Karol Wojtyla's personalism did not carry through to n.15– 17 of *Gaudium et Spes*. These expound human spirituality under three aspects: intellect, conscience, and freedom. Neither the concept of the person nor the idea of love was mentioned here. The philosophy of interpersonal love, the whole set of *I–Thou* questions, are practically absent from the treatment of spirituality within this section of the document, and Ratzinger was quite appalled that anyone could attempt to speak of spirituality without thinking that Christian love might have something to do with it." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 41.

⁷ Maturity "consists in the very fact that, in God and with God, I love even the person whom I do not like or even know—*Seeing* with the eyes of Christ, I can give to others much more than their outward necessities; I can give them the look of love which they crave.... No longer is it a question, then, of a "commandment" imposed from without and calling for the impossible, but rather of a freely-bestowed experience of love from within, a love which by its very nature must then be shared with others. Love grows through love." Pope Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005), n.18. Note, however, earlier commentary: "This is the origin, in the latter tradition, of the *ignote cognoscere*, knowing in unknowing, which leads to the concept of *docta ignorantia*; thus, the mysticism of darkness comes about where love alone is able to see. Many texts could be quoted here, for instance, Gregory the Great's '*Amor ipse notitia est*'; Hugh of St. Victor's '*Intrat dilectio et appropinquat, ubi scientia foris est*'; or Richard of St. Victor's beautiful formulation: '*Amor oculus est et amare videre est*' ('love is the eye, and to love is to see')." Joseph Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 55.

⁸ Blanco contends Aquinas' work also informs Ratzinger's understanding of love: "At the same time, he was influenced by Henri de Lubac, and logically also by Gottlieb Söhngen, his *Doktorvater*, with whom he maintains interesting coincidences on the lines of his thought. The latter writer also introduced Ratzinger to 'the three great masters' with whom he maintains a constant dialogue: Augustine, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. From them he learns the contemporaneous nature of love and truth." Pablo Blanco, "The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger: Nuclear Ideas," *Theology Today* 68, no. 2 (2011): 154.

⁹ Pope Benedict XVI, *God's Revolution: World Youth Day and Other Cologne Talks* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 59.

¹⁰ A tendency that suggests sympathy with German Romanticism that is strongly anti-rational while also affirmative of an unbounded imagination and an uncritical love.

an experience common to humanity, while also suggesting that it carries the sublimity of a noble Mind.¹¹ Love is at once an external and transcendental impulse, and an immanent phenomenon. Or it oscillates between the two. The challenge of relating Ratzinger's analysis of love does not lie in unravelling polemic from prosody, rather it rests in the patient adumbration of thought from writing that is often opaque and mystical. A longstanding tradition on the ineffability of love does not help with the task.¹²

Describing Ratzinger's evaluation of love is easier. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, for Ratzinger, its effects are tangible, transformative, and beneficial, even when they are exceptionally demanding. Their value is personal, domestic, communal, and national. They are multifarious in the church but overleap its borders, missionally and by default. They can be measured. They decentre the self, curb individualism and remind humanity in the face of narratives on self-maximisation and progress of its frailty and need. They highlight human dependency. They spring from sacrifice and an assiduous concern for others' wellbeing.

The chapter will mime the shape of the previous chapter. It will explore Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love through his use of correlation, retroduction, and *ecclesio-traditio* and Christotelic methodologies. With its conclusion, I will attempt to summarise Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love, and to describe its interrelation with reason. This chapter aims to advance two further claims in my thesis: that love is of critical interest to Ratzinger, and that he upholds love and reason as inseparable.

1. Joseph Ratzinger: method of correlation

Ratzinger's method of correlation sets conditions for interacting with love in creation, and the means for evaluating cultural convictions on and expressions of love. It affirms the proposition that love is not enclosed by the particular or local as an accident of history, rather it is primary and theological, even as it is experienced universally. This is not to deny that love will express itself or be experienced in diverse ways; rather, it is to claim that in every milieu, genuine love, while caring for the self, always considers others, too. Further, Ratzinger will contend that while natural entities, artefacts and people are

¹¹ Compare, *Poetics* Aristotle, Horace, *Ars Poetica*, and Longinus, *On the Sublime*, *Classical Literary Criticism*, trans. T. S. Dorsch (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 64.

¹² Particularly among poets and Romantics, for instance, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Heinrich Heine, and Rainer Maria Rilke.

reasonable and proper objects for human love, they also speak of something beyond themselves, which is both the inspiration and resting place of love. As with the figure of Beatrice,¹³ beauty-in-love draws people out of themselves and points them towards something beyond itself—something higher. Without denigrating the givenness and given value of creation, or of cultural products, Ratzinger, in certain settings, attests to their allegorical and analogous power, signifying supernatural ends.

As to how love fares with a method of correlation, this chapter will show that Ratzinger believes that the present burden of historical and cultural evidence, despite postmodernity and its preoccupation with rebarbative power, points to an ongoing concern with metaphysical questions on design, origins, purpose, ends, mortality, human goods, the human condition bound by sin, and God. Such a range of questions become a point of connection for a method of correlation: they are an interface where Christian testaments on love listen to, moderate, and engage with a culture's heartfelt and immediate concerns. Love makes sense of them, as arguably it does for the whole theological enterprise. Lonergan, as I shall illustrate, agrees with Ratzinger, here. Secondly, Ratzinger's method of correlation not only speaks to a culture's metaphysical intuitions, but it also addresses ontology. Ratzinger finds the persistent need for grounding human perceptions of the true, the good and the beautiful to be a second point of connection; the need for "being" affords the theologian an opportunity for exploring a culture's understanding of *Being* through the lens of love. Thirdly, Ratzinger recognises that substantial questions, valid arguments, and sound reasoning do not always translate into right action. In the method of correlation, he sees that love provokes engagement. It seeks out truth and goodness, drawing people out of themselves and into a relationship. While correlation rests on the premise of creational good, it cannot secure an individual's salvation; yet this does not mean it has neither utility nor value. On the contrary, correlation is a useful tool in mission, highlighting commonalities and the transformative possibilities of grace. Ratzinger will explore these options further in his ecclesio-traditio and Christotelic methodologies where he shows love to be divine in person and effect, and seemingly standing behind everything. Thus, it is not love *per se* that finally answers all humanity's questions, its quest for permanence and meaning or its loneliness and alienation: it is *divine*, *personal* love.¹⁴

¹³ Charles Williams, *The Figure of Beatrice: A Study in Dante* (Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 1994).

¹⁴ In one sense love is always personal. Here, Ratzinger will argue for love as em-personed, distinguishing it from abstraction or a non-Trinitarian cosmic force.

The following sections explore love as basic to human experience; love as relational; and love as unrestricted (a term preferred by Lonergan). They seek to show how Ratzinger correlates these with Christian revelation. They form a provisional framework for discussing Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love.

1.1 Love as basic

Ratzinger finds love to be basic to human experience, and as a Christian theologian he has no quibble with this. Across time and throughout societies, love is seen to be humanising, powerful, and characterised by dependency and reciprocity, while also offering insight and meaning. Additionally, it has a multiplying effect, is generative and to a degree sustaining.

Firstly, love is basic to human experience and it is humanising. In agreement with literature from anthropology, psychology, arts and philosophy, Ratzinger concludes that "if we stop speaking about love, we stop speaking about men."¹⁵ Love is not simply something that is commonplace, it is also pivotal for the human sense of self. It is in some way essential to humanness—

to shake [it] off in order not to be exposed to its uncertainty—is, so to speak, an operation that is paid for with the life of the patient; it would be to amputate precisely that which makes man man.¹⁶

In addition to giving definition to human creatures, love humanizes them, bringing a type of anatomy to an otherwise inchoate moral and relational form. Love not only "becomes the eye by which man sees,"¹⁷ but also, through imitation and handing on, the means by which moral lives are shaped. Here Ratzinger and Lonergan are aligned, although the latter, as I will show, brings more detail as to how this is affected.

Moreover, love is powerful. It has tremendous effect, for instance, as it is politically rendered, especially because genuine love is indivisible from truth. Making law and practising justice are not simply positivistic: quickened by love, they can have divine legitimacy and substance. Ratzinger holds consistently and unequivocally that human love

¹⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *Co-Workers of the Truth: Meditations for Every Day of the Year*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy and Lothar Krauth, ed. Irene Grassl (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), February 10.

¹⁶ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 79.

¹⁷ Joseph Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 326.

"is a force that has its origin in God, Eternal Love and Absolute Truth"¹⁸ and as such, even if unbeknown, it is a commonly, experienced power "which leads people to opt for courageous and generous engagement in the field of justice and peace."¹⁹

A third and further phenomenon of love revolves around gift and reception. Ratzinger states that "love knows no 'why'; it is a free gift to which one responds with the gift of self."²⁰ Furthermore, love surpasses, properly orders and reframes every other virtue: love even "goes beyond justice—because to love is to give."²¹ Even if love is thoroughly human, and giving is concomitant with love, Ratzinger holds that it is premised on divine love. This does not mean he will denigrate love's creational expression; quite the contrary, he recognises its incarnational value:

This is why Christmas has become the feast when we give presents, when we imitate the God who has given his own self and has thereby given us once again that life which truly becomes a gift only when the "milk" of our existence is sweetened by the "honey" of being loved.²²

For Ratzinger, then, it is a sine qua non that love gives.

The gift of love also brings focus. It is not amorphous or without purpose, or purely experienced as sentiment or emotion;²³ rather, "men live by their encounter with the love that gives meaning to their lives—[this] is true of every relationship; no reform, no revolution, can make this gift superfluous."²⁴ Love at this juncture takes on a moral urgency, for in addition to surprising those being loved with an overwhelming sense of their value, people discover that "if [they] are able by [their] love to give meaning to another person, to just one other person, [their] live[s] will have been infinitely worthwhile."²⁵

²⁴ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 290.

¹⁸ Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n.1.

¹⁹ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.1.

²⁰ Benedict XVI, *God's Revolution*, 46. And: "loved is never something 'merited', but always a gift." Pope Benedict XVI, *Spe Salvi* (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 2007), n.35.

²¹ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.6.

²² Joseph Ratzinger, *The Blessing of Christmas*, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005),
31. Moreover: "Universal love can be realized only in the concrete form of brotherly love." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 54.

²³ Thus "in a culture without truth, this is the fatal risk facing love. It falls prey to contingent subjective emotions and opinions, the word "love" is abused and distorted, to the point where it comes to mean the opposite." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.3.

²⁵ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 290. Ratzinger traversed this theme earlier: "For in fact man does not live on the bread of practicability alone; he lives as man and, precisely in the intrinsically human part of his

While love is given, it is also received, with an emphasis on the latter; and this is a persistent line of argument.²⁶ It runs through all of Ratzinger's methodological approaches on the subject. In the natural realm of correlation, it pertains; and it does so in, for instance, a Christotelic setting. Love is operative in reception. There are many things through dint of effort people gain for themselves:

But Love—that is, that of which we are most in need—is not something we can provide for ourselves; we must await its coming and will most assuredly not acquire it so long as we try to procure it for ourselves.²⁷

Not only do people depend upon reception for love, but they also depend on love for fulfilment. By engaging in reciprocal relations love enables them to mature as individuals: "Love can only be received as a gift... And one cannot become wholly man in any other way than by being loved, by letting oneself be loved."²⁸ In the reception of love people are reoriented. They are relocated into a more spacious context; the moribund habit of turning to the self, turns outward—*ex se*—discovering what it is to be related not just to others, but to history, society, culture, and creation. People learn that "to be truly human means to be related in love, to be from and for."²⁹ Ratzinger finds this reorientation to be the general and reported experience of love and it correlates accurately with Christian teaching. Love locates human identity, and it is affirmative: "One who loves discovers in the other person the goodness of being and is happy that that person exists; one says Yes to this existence and affirms it"³⁰—so, too, for the biblical scholar and the theologian.

Love that is received can be a puzzle; but it is one that yields meaning, ultimately providing satisfactory answers to metaphysical and ontological questions. Love is basic to creation and to human experience. It is also divine—and Ratzinger, at different times, strongly endorses both claims. Instinctively, he veers to and weights positively the latter

being, on the word, on love, on meaning.... Without the word, without meaning, without love he falls into the situation of no longer being able to live, even when earthly comfort is present in abundance." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 73.

²⁶ James Corkery, *Joseph Ratzinger's Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate Hopes* (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 29.

²⁷ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 218.

²⁸ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 267. And: "To be truly human means to be related in love, to be from and for." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.52. Yet note: "But this process is always open-ended; love is never "finished" and complete; throughout life, it changes and matures, and thus remains faithful to itself." Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.17.

²⁹ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 220.

³⁰ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 146.

position, but as a friend to the highly cultured von Balthasar and as someone in his own right who is steeped in Baroque music,³¹ and classical and Romantic literature, he is vividly aware of the protean, daily, and ordinary riches of a love that is grounded in the everyday experience of life. Secular testimony abounds to it. Indeed, "… love is all, it reaches beyond times and places."³² Yet simultaneously love seems more basic than that known to human relations; it underpins moral reasoning, ethical behavior, and substance itself. It, therefore, "remains true that everything [Christians] encounter in dogma is, ultimately, just interpretation: interpretation of the one truly sufficient and decisive fundamental reality of the love between God and men."³³ And more definitely:

Faith in the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, and in his suffering and death for mankind, is the supreme expression of a conviction that the heart of all morality, the heart of being itself and its deepest principle, is love.³⁴

People experience love as a basic good in variant forms, but, for Ratzinger, such love is also analogous. It opens humanity to the deepest of loves—something Lonergan appreciates, too. In terms of correlation, this addresses one of its most repeated and pressing needs. It provides answers to humanity's most profound questions on the nature of being and the purpose of relationships.

While affirming the knowledge of love as a significant human constant, Ratzinger also argues that it has a "more than" factor to it. In human experience love has the odd quality of being greater than the sum of its parts. It appears to make something from nothing, too. As a general observation about people, Ratzinger states: "The very fulfillment of love, of finding one another, causes man to experience the gift of what he

³¹ Joseph Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy*, trans. Peter T. O'Brien (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981); Joseph Ratzinger, Pope Benedict XVI, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, trans. John Saward (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 137; Joseph Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty. Message of His Eminence Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger to the Communion and Liberation" (Rimini, 24–30 August, 2002). Ratzinger has a deep affinity for Mozart, too. Peter Seewald comments: "This is the sensitive schoolboy who composes Greek hexameters and loves Mozart, … who broods for hours over books by Augustine, Kierkegaard and Newman." Pope Benedict XVI and Peter Seewald, *Last Testament: In His Own Words*, trans. Jacob Philips (New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2016), loc. 266 of 4018, Kindle.

³² Pope Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 121.

³³ Joseph Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 76.

 ³⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow: Addressing the Fundamental Issues*, trans. Michael J.
 Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 97.

could neither call up nor create and makes him recognize that in it he receives more than either of the two could contribute.³⁵ Moreover, with no naivety regarding the scale of human suffering or the problem of evil, Ratzinger is still prepared to claim that:

here, too, we experience the liberal graciousness of existence, which grants us the festive wonder of a love we cannot force but that comes to us of its own accord, takes us by surprise and overwhelms us, transforms our life, gives us a new inner center, and even, in moments of ecstatic bliss, confers on us a foretaste of a life that is brighter and fuller than our everyday life.³⁶

Love is prolific. It surprises people, producing in them more than they anticipated.³⁷

Finally, love is both generative and sustaining. It seasons people and does not tolerate their absence.³⁸ With poignant reference, Ratzinger finds love to be primordial and desirous, refusing to believe that the connections it makes are transient, recognising them to be fundamentally enduring because they appear to carry so much value and life.

Gabriel Marcel once said human love is turned from a promise into the fulfilment of reality only when it is wrapped in a love that can truly impart eternity. Marcel said that to say to a person "I love you" meant: I refuse to accept your death; I protest against death. Thus, we see that human love, in and for itself, represents an unredeemable promise.³⁹

Ratzinger is pressing: "It is the way of love to will the other's existence and, at the same time, to bring that existence forth again."⁴⁰ More specifically, "immortality always proceeds from love, never out of the autarchy of that which is sufficient to itself: love is

³⁵ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 276.

³⁶ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 284.

³⁷ This is perhaps especially true in an ecclesial setting. Ratzinger muses that "in every encounter with the love of the 'saints', who truly believed and truly loved, I always encounter more than just certain particular individuals." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 282.

³⁸ Yet "the value of human love does not cease when those who love are separated from one another." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 81.

³⁹ Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*. Further: "This makes dying not natural but illogical, an expulsion from the realm of love, the destruction of a communication that of its essence tends toward permanence." Joseph Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. Brendan McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 83. Ratzinger also states: "We can say, then, that the root of man's wretchedness is loneliness, is the absence of love—is the fact that my existence is not embraced by a love that makes it necessary, that is strong enough to justify it despite all the pain and limitations it imposes." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 52.

⁴⁰ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 88. In the context of politics, he also notes: "This idea [flowing from Karl Marx] of freedom understands love as servitude; in other words, it presupposes the destruction of love. This makes it an attack on the truth of human existence since this draws its life from love." Ratzinger, *The Blessing of Christmas*, 56.

the foundation of immortality, and immortality proceeds from love alone."⁴¹ Yet in spite of this vocation, and of love's affirmative and generative capabilities, and for all its intuitions and yearnings, ordinary human love is impotent in the face of declension and death. Its "willing" and "bringing" only goes so far. Hence the sorrow which accompanies it. Thence the need to reconceive the general experience of human love in the experience of theological hope: for "Love wants eternity, and God's love not only wants it but effects it and is it."⁴² Thus the gospel: "The Christian message is basically nothing else than the transmission of the testimony that love has managed to break through death here and thus has transformed fundamentally the situation of all of us."⁴³ Love, both divine and human, cannot stand for an end to people. It will not have it.⁴⁴

In summary, Ratzinger consistently argues that while love is basic to creation and creational experience, it is divine in origin and character. It is gift. One of the strongest characteristics of love is that this same gift is received. It surprises people. Furthermore, love draws men and women out of themselves, filling them out as people—humanising them: without it their sense of self diminishes; through it, they experience a powerful transformation that turns them aside from a demeaning self-attention, and enables them, in turn, to bring meaning, purpose and value to others. Lonergan as I shall show sympathises with and elaborates on this phenomenon. Ratzinger will maintain that suffering for love is a further and incomparable aspect of humanisation, but he readily acknowledges that love without suffering is gainful and compelling. Love is greater than the sum of its parts. It is also a common human experience—and as such it stirs up and responds to metaphysical questions on meaning, purpose, ends, death, and immortality. Love intuits that there is more than just a span to human life. It confronts death with longing and gives it the lie. While love is all too human, it characterises, even if analogously, the divine. Divine love is

⁴¹ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 306. And compare with earlier claims: "We can now say that love always establishes some kind of immortality; even in its pre-human stage, it points, in the form of preservation of the species, in this direction." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 305.

⁴² Joseph Ratzinger, *Credo for Today: What Christians Believe*, trans. Michael J. Miller et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 97. Ratzinger goes on to claim: "That is why the message of the Resurrection is not only a hymn to God but a hymn to the power of his love and hence a hymn to man, to the earth, and to matter." Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 105.

⁴³ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 314.

⁴⁴ Even though divine love with its indelible and actuating memory uplifts human love, a love which is between people acts to establish them individually. Ratzinger acknowledges that "our I becomes acceptable to us only if it has first become acceptable to another I. We can love ourselves only if we have first been loved by someone else." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 79.

given out to creation, and its reception overcomes the isolating, blank cipher of death. In Ratzinger's analysis, love proves to be graciously, but relentlessly life-giving and human society's greatest hope. Love, as humans know it, is gift, reception, and fulfilment. It is relational.

1.2 Love as relational

Ratzinger can be scathing of counterfeited forms of reasoning—of positivistic, scientific, and technical reasoning. He finds them closed, self-referential and at times arrogating too great an authority to their claims to knowledge. He holds them to be often counterfeit to true intelligence, reasoning, and ethical discussion. They are generally resistant to classical metaphysics, tradition, testimony, and religious insight. They tend in Ratzinger's view to be godless, autonomous, and consequently of limited or no value.

In a similar manner to reason, this section argues that for Ratzinger, love can be counterfeited, too. Such negative love is self-serving; it is suspicious, guarded, mean, selfpreserving at all costs, and gripped by cupidity. It is benighted by self-interest and is, when all is said and done, anti-relational.

In contrast to forms of strictly bordered, bound up and self-absorbed forms of antilove, Ratzinger understands genuine love to be vulnerable, sacrificial, and present to suffering. Speaking against a technical reasoning that disturbs human dignity and which has skewed political decision making in Europe, he urges that "…we should not hesitate to oppose the omnipotence of the quantitative and to take up our position on the side of love."⁴⁵ It is not, however, just the rule of the quantifiable that threatens the quality of life, it is also a pushy, loveless, selfism:

We are afraid that the good that is in the world will become completely powerless; that eventually it will no longer be meaningful to seek the good in truth, purity, justice, or love because the law of the sharper elbow is now the only law that prevails in the world, because the tendency of the world is to judge in favour of the violent, the brutal, not the saintly.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe? The Church in the Modern World: Assessment and Forecast*, trans. Brian McNeil, Second Edition ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 180. The "quantitative" threat is not limited to Europe: "The threat posed by the self-limitation of reason, that is reason reduced to measuring what can be quantified (what is useful or can be scientifically verified), includes the threat to Western society itself as well as to the rest of the world." Vincent Twomey, "Pope Benedict XVI: Joseph Ratzinger on Politics," *Logos* 18, no. 4 (2015): 87.

⁴⁶ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 20. The turn to the self coincides with a loss of focus on others to the point they do not factor in decision-making: "The individualized 'I' and 'you' narrows itself more and more

The antidote to this type of counterfeited love is the patient reception of a love that turns aside self-interest and narcissism in favour of another,⁴⁷ but Ratzinger warns that:

The capacity to love, that is, the capacity to wait in patience for what is not under one's own control and to let oneself receive this as a gift, is suffocated by the speedy fulfilments for which I am dependent on no one and from which I am never obliged to emerge from my own self, and thus never find the path into my own self.⁴⁸

For those who persist in such an addiction to immediacy a worse fate awaits; Ratzinger recalling the trauma of twentieth-century violence indicates that a self-serving, non-relational, inward-curving love tends to deadly consequences for the individual and wider society. He pithily notes that the "destruction of the capacity to love gives birth to lethal boredom"⁴⁹ which in turn births lethal results.

The disparity between counterfeited love and genuine love is highlighted by sacrificial living. A sacrificial love is costly; it does not eschew self-abnegation, and Ratzinger quickly sees that it speaks to the core of reality because it is contiguous with one of the ways God loves. As early as 1968 he argues:

Now to the extent that this exodus of love is the *ec-stasy* of man outside himself, in which he is stretched out infinitely beyond himself, torn apart, as it were, far beyond his apparent capacity for being stretched, to the same extent worship (sacrifice) is always at the same time the Cross, the pain of being torn apart, the

until finally, for example in Kant's transcendental philosophy, the 'you' is no longer found." Joseph Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," *Communio* 17, no. 3 (1990): 454.

⁴⁷ Such a position fails to underscore the place of self-love as a right basis for loving another. Good people bring out the good that is stored in their hearts (Mt 12:35), whereas the unloved-self is unloving. Yet Ratzinger consistently identifies love with altruism at the cost of forgetting or abandoning the self. Thus Kaethler: "The inward gaze cannot confirm or affirm my existence, for this can only be given as a gift, a yes given to us by another. Likewise, navel-gazing presupposes autonomy rather than unity, and therefore unity is impossible. Finally, egoism cannot see the goodness of being because it only looks inward. The I is only seen aright through the we. Therefore, self-love is an outward movement. I love myself by loving another. This works in two ways. First, self-love as an outward movement conforms to reality. In loving another we are being true to what it means to be a human person, and consequently we are being true to the self. As Ratzinger poetically mused, "Man finds his centre of gravity, not inside, but outside himself. The place to which he is anchored is not, as it were, within himself but without." Andrew T. J. Kaethler, "I Become a Thousand Men and yet Remain Myself: Self Love in Joseph Ratzinger and Georges Bernanos," *Logos* 19, no. 2 (2016): 7.

⁴⁸ Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 180.

⁴⁹ Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 180.

dying of the grain of wheat that can come to fruition only in death. The fundamental principle of the sacrifice is not destruction but love.⁵⁰

His distinction is critical because it clarifies one of the purposes of suffering: it is on behalf of an other's good.⁵¹ Even so, Ratzinger continues:

In the Bible the Cross does not appear as part of a mechanism of injured right; on the contrary, in the Bible the Cross is quite the reverse: it is the expression of the radical nature of the love that gives itself completely, of the process in which one is what one does and does what one is; it is the expression of a life that is completely being for others.⁵²

Sacrificial living expresses something of a person and the value that person places on another's life and needs.

Counterfeited love that prioritises self-preservation usually avoids sacrifice. It also shies away from suffering. While this seems entirely natural, Ratzinger has little time for such behaviour; suffering is essential for maturation, and in a social context, for political freedom. He notes that "in the battle against lies and violence, truth and love have no other weapon than the witness of suffering."⁵³ Moreover, the:

Christian faith has shown us that truth, justice, and love are not simply ideals, but enormously weighty realities.... To suffer with the other and for others; to suffer for the sake of truth and justice; to suffer out of love and in order to become a person who truly loves—these are fundamental elements of humanity, and to abandon them would destroy man himself.⁵⁴

Suffering is a necessary evil, and perversely, one that bears fruit. To avoid it is to lessen the possibility of realising the Christologically inaugurated realities of justice, freedom, and fraternity, and to deny the humanisation it brings. For Ratzinger, "In the end, the 'yes' to love is a source of suffering, because love always requires expropriations of my 'I,' in which I allow myself to be pruned and wounded."⁵⁵ Furthermore,

⁵⁰ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 289. Note further: "The sublime and liberating message of love, as being the sole and sufficient content of Christianity, can also become something very demanding." Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 72.

⁵¹ Yet at the same time it fails to highlight that suffering is in consequence of or response to humanity's fallen state and its need for redemption. Once again Ratzinger aligns with a Romantic "agony" that is "half in love with easeful death"—John Keats, *John Keats: The Complete Poems* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 346.

⁵² Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 282.

⁵³ Joseph Ratzinger, Pope Benedict XVI, *Jesus of Nazareth: Part II, Holy Week: From the Entrance into Jerusalem to the Resurrection*, trans. Vatican Secretariat of State (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 49.

⁵⁴ Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi, n.39.

⁵⁵ Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi, n.38.

it is when we attempt to avoid suffering by withdrawing from anything that might involve hurt, when we try to spare ourselves the effort and pain of pursuing truth, love, and goodness, that we drift into a life of emptiness, in which there may be almost no pain, but the dark sensation of meaninglessness and abandonment is all the greater.⁵⁶

As well as missing the opportunity for growth and maturity, a self-love that sidesteps sacrifice and suffering poses the risk of existential despair and alone-ness. Lonergan argues slightly differently on these points: self-love in the right context is valuable; and suffering is in consequence of evil—and not something to look for—a distinction I shall draw out further in Chapter Four.

In sum, Ratzinger shows that love is keenly relational. Love is other-focused, patient, sacrificial and willing to suffer for another's good. It is instrumental in enacting justice. Paradoxically, love's service of another educes sanctity in the servant, setting that person on a path to perfection. Ratzinger does not highlight the value of self-love or self-esteem, the lack of which brings misery, but emphasises a counterfeit love that does not prioritise other people. Such negative self-love is self-absorbed, trying to manipulate things to its own ends. It is anti-relational and has an isolating and hopeless *telos*. In terms of correlation, it is not genuine love; it does not satisfactorily answer any metaphysical question or lend itself to right action. Love that is relational, on the other hand, speaks powerfully to purpose, ends and meaning. It is not stultifying. It is unrestricted.

1.3 Love as unrestricted

Partially in response to counterfeited love, and always conscious of his formal credal commitments, Ratzinger is ready to attack any teaching on love which is reductive. Love cannot be reduced to biological explanation or seen to be a mere psychological sop. It can nether be contained nor restricted. Love, for Ratzinger, overflows. It is unquantifiable, superabundant, and superfluous.

Early, in *What It Means to Be a Christian*, Ratzinger lingers on love's unquantifiability. Drawing on Pascal's analysis of mind, he ponders God's *incognito*—his perfections as his own, comprehensively unknowable to any other—and reflects on non-extended spatial substance and its relation to love. Love is extant, and though it can be given and received or expressed through actions, it somehow remains immeasurable:

Pascal expressed this idea in his marvellous doctrine of the three orders. According to him, there is first of all the order of quantities—and that is

⁵⁶ Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi, n.37.

enormous and infinite, the inexhaustible object of natural science. Besides that, the order of mind, the second great realm of reality, appears, on the basis of quantity, as simply nothing, since quantitatively it takes up no space whatever. And nonetheless, a single mind (Pascal mentions the mathematical mind of Archimedes as an example)—a single mind, as we were saying, is greater than the entire order of the quantitative cosmos; because mind, which has neither weight nor length nor breadth, is able to measure the entire cosmos. Yet above that, again, stands the order of love. That, too, is, in the first instance, simply nothing in the order of "mind", of scientific intelligence, as represented by Archimedes, since it cannot be the object of scientific demonstration and itself contributes nothing to any such demonstration. And nonetheless, a single motion of love is infinitely greater than the entire order of "mind", because only that represents what is a truly creative, life-giving, and saving power. God's incognito is intended to lead us onward into this "nothing" of truth and love, which is nevertheless in reality the true, single, and all-embracing absolute.⁵⁷

Despite the opacity of such commentary, Ratzinger repeatedly returns to the risks involved in verifying love and to the folly of trying to objectify it. Humans experience love as basic, but its marque is divine and therefore unquantifiable. Just so, "If two people regard their love merely as a hypothesis that is constantly in need of new verification, they destroy love in that way."⁵⁸ Wider love in its relationality is irreducible, too: "Just as a person becomes certain of another's love without being able to subject it to the methods of scientific experiment, so in the contact between God and man there is a certainty of a quite different kind from the certainty of objectivizing thought."⁵⁹

Secondly, and in addition to being unquantifiable, love is superabundant. Rowland records Ratzinger's Augustinian assent to the binary formulation of two loves—the love of self in opposition to the love of God⁶⁰—but notes that superabundance flows from God into creation and that it is decisively witnessed in self-sacrificial human love.

The Christian God takes the form of absolute love, whereas the alternative gods are violent or selfish or both. What Ratzinger calls the 'evolutionary ethos' of those who would deny that the human person is made in the image and likeness of God is not only wrong but cruel. It has nothing to offer the weak and suffering. Contrary to the ethos of social Darwinism, Ratzinger holds that the

⁵⁷ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 38.

⁵⁸ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 20.

⁵⁹ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 19.

⁶⁰ "Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, "Thou art my glory, and the lifter up of mine head." De Civ. Dei. XIV.28.1. A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series, Volume II: St. Augustine's City of God and Christian Doctrine, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo: Christian Literature Company, 1887), 283.

ethos of Christianity must consist in love and reason converging with one another as the essential foundation pillars of reality: 'In the conception of early Christianity the primacy of the *Logos* and the primacy of love were revealed to be one and the same. The *Logos* was revealed to be not only the mathematical reasoning at the basis of all things, but as creative love to the point of becoming com-passion, co-suffering with creation'. It is precisely here that the third faculty of the soul becomes effective, as it is for the will or, more biblically, the heart to make the choice for self-sacrificial love or against it. This is the Augustinian point about two cities being founded on two loves. The choice of myth is intimately connected to what and how a person loves.⁶¹

A distinctive hue of love is its superabundance; and Ratzinger is insistent, verbatim, across works that its character "can really be understood only on the basis of the foolishness... that discards any notion of calculation and is unafraid of any lavishness."⁶²

Love is lavish in Ratzinger's theology. It is also superfluous—not only because it is superabundant, but also because it is so strange. Reflecting on Ratzinger's remark in *Introduction to Christianity* that "…only the lover can understand the folly of a love to which prodigality is a law and excess alone is sufficient,"⁶³ Nichols points out that:

In contemplating human love, we see that man is a being for whom excess is, paradoxically, a necessity. Ratzinger concludes, in Kierkegaardian vein, that it is because revelation is superfluous that it is necessary and divine: [it is] the love in which the meaning of the world is disclosed.⁶⁴

Strangely, perhaps paradoxically, a love that is superfluous testifies to another, deeper, reality because it is unlike anything else in human experience. It places everything in context and proffers meaning. Truth thus becomes indivisible from love. While Lonergan approaches this conviction differently, his discussion of love, by way of example, between two people from Bonnyrigg, and his analysis of the religious experience of being in love, yields a similar verdict.

Ratzinger links together truth, meaning and love. Love searches out truth; it has at once a passion for it and is jealous for it in each person's life. "Love, the center of Christian reality on which 'depend the law and the prophets,' is at the same time *eros* for

⁶¹ Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 63.

⁶² Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 80; Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 15. Not only is it superabundant but also "in the love that we receive there is always an element that surprises us." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.77.

⁶³ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 262.

⁶⁴ Aidan Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (London: Burns & Oates, 2005), 91.

truth."⁶⁵ Moreover, as a general rule, a "love that gives less or that is unwilling on principle to extend itself to the other's need for truth fails to attain a genuinely human level and is consequently not love in the full sense of the word."⁶⁶ Such love is less than subpar, for genuine love is inseparable from truth and it is responsible. For Ratzinger "love alone is of no avail. Only when truth and love are in harmony can man know joy. Love is truth, and truth is love."⁶⁷

It is in the nexus of truth and love that people experience unity. It is one thing to associate with people, but it is another to enjoy unity. It is not common interests that finally unite people; rather, it is a love that sanctifies them, that originates with the Godhead, and which in turn is presented to creation: "The model of unity or oneness toward which one should strive is consequently not the indivisibility of the atom, the smallest unity, which cannot be divided up any further; the authentic acme of unity is the unity created by love"⁶⁸ —and "the highest unity there is—the unity of God—is not a unity of something inseparable and indistinguishable; rather, it is a unity in the mode of communion—the unity that love creates and love is."⁶⁹ Love is prayerful of unity.⁷⁰

In sum, love, for Ratzinger, spills over. It is superabundant and superfluous. Its nature is so strange that it simultaneously exemplifies and testifies to something which while immanent is also transcendent. Love is also unquantifiable: its effects can be experienced and measured, but in and of itself it remains mysterious. Love is inseparable from the true and the good; that which is true proves good for one. The indivisibility of love and truth effects unity.

1.4 Summary

This section has taken up again the method of correlation. It illustrates how correlation pertains to Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love. It recognises that correlation moves between the polarities of suspicion and endorsement—that theologians

⁶⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates*, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 27.

⁶⁶ Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 337.

⁶⁷ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 81. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Love Alone is Credible* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005).

⁶⁸ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 170.

⁶⁹ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 81.

⁷⁰ Crossway Bibles, *The ESV Study Bible* (Wheaton: Crossway Bibles, 2008), John 17:11.

throughout history have evaluated a culture's intuitions, politics, civil practices, artefacts and understanding of love more severely or more generously depending on their presuppositions. The section shows that by correlation Ratzinger finds love in some of its forms to have been counterfeited. These are distortions associated with the European Enlightenment, Existentialism, and postmodernity, and tend towards self-determination, egocentricity, narcissism, and independence. They are typified by pride, a rejection of revelation, theological knowledge (especially ecclesial), tradition with its notions of the institutions of civil society, and metaphysics, together with an insistence on limiting love to immanent, evolutionary, and psychical frames. Ratzinger determines these forms of love to be dead ends. While neither denying nor ignorant of these distortions, Lonergan's work, as I will illustrate in the following chapters, offers a foil to this critique, nuancing the discussion on self-determination and strengthening an appreciation for the natural order.

Even though love can be counterfeited it remains, positively, basic to creation; recognised or not, it is divine in origin and character, and sustains all things. It is gift-received. Furthermore, love is evocative, filling people out—humanising them and qualifying them for neighbourly acts. Love is greater than the sum of its parts. It is a common human experience—as such it guides and accurately measures people's responses to metaphysical questions on meaning, purpose, ends, death, and immortality. Love intuits that there is more to human life than the span of "eighty years."⁷¹ While love is basic to humanity, it characterises, even if analogously, the divine. Divine love is given out to creation, and its reception overcomes death. Love, as humans know it, is gift, reception, and a promise of fulfilment.

For Ratzinger, love is relational. This is perhaps most vividly attested through suffering and sacrifice, not as ends in themselves but for the good of others. Counterfeited love is anti-relational and does not lend itself to suffering for others or right action. It is self-centred, and not properly self-loving.

Finally, love is characterised by excess. It is unquantifiable and inexorable; its presence even when thoroughly experienced leaves people aching for more. Love is elusive. It is also somehow inextricably linked with truth. Where there is love, there is truth—and also unity. Lonergan's writings will help shed light on why this is the case.

While Ratzinger will correlate cultural, political, and personal understandings and renditions of love with Christian revelation, he does not shy away from using other

⁷¹ Bibles, *The ESV Study Bible*, Psalm 90:10.

methodologies in his analysis and evaluation of love. As previously mentioned, this might be because he senses a serious flaw in the method of correlation: if tradition and situation are not the foundational sources for theology they claim to be, and are a continuum, then they cannot provide criteria for discrimination for acts of correlation. This means the grounds for reasonable engagement and responsible action with contemporaneity are located elsewhere, possibly in the prudential judgements and practicalities of a life converted by love. It is to these and a discussion of retroductive, *ecclesio-traditio* and Christotelic methodologies that I now turn.

2. Joseph Ratzinger: method of retroduction

It is inaccurate to claim Ratzinger's writings are solely governed by a method of correlation. He uses a complex mesh of methodologies which pay careful attention to human formation and how this plays out in the pursuit of personal holiness, communion with other people, and in nurturing the common good. A method of retroduction is one such measure. The previous chapter noted that retroductive warrants give sense-making accounts of the past, but this is more to test an idea or thesis for the purpose of advancing into the future. In anthropological terms, by investigating the formative influences in a person's experience a warrant uncovers the conditions that lead to prudential judgements. To this extent, retroductive warrants lean towards phronesis and the exercise of practical wisdom as a means of intentionally entering into the future. For Ratzinger, the formation of individuals and the effect this has on their capacity for moral reasoning is a serious matter. He argues that true reason in its practical expression is responsible; and that it signifies a converted life. He further argues that reason is in dialogue with love; it is even reframed or remoulded by it—and that love is by definition responsible. Here, he has much in common with Lonergan. Love has ontic strength and is always attentive to the good of others. For Ratzinger, if there is anything that explains the successes of the past and offers a positive way forward into the future, it is the variegated influence and effects of love. This is because "true love is righteous."⁷²

2.1 Love as responsible

Ratzinger holds that love is a very powerful factor, if not the greatest factor in forming personhood. Love produces self-knowledge and it authenticates individuals. It is demanding of the self and ordinarily requires sacrifice. In serving others, love has a

⁷² Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 276.

metamorphic effect. Just as love is responsible so it is persevering. Love not only sanctifies the individual, it also generates peace and community. Love and truth are indivisible in matters of responsibility. Truth renders prudential judgements; love gives substance to these while also reordering human desires and provisioning the will to act.

In terms of formation, it is imperative for Ratzinger that a person is affirmed through speech and act—not in a blind, therapeutic manner, but at a more existential level. Ratzinger notes that "If an individual is to accept himself, someone must say to him: 'It is good that you exist'—must say it, not with words, but with that act of the entire being that we call love."⁷³ Without the experience of love, habitual self-transcendence stalls, reducing the future possibility of responsible action.

Part of a genuine process of self-authentication involves the birth and development of faith in someone other than oneself. Ratzinger states that "in its simplest and innermost form, faith is nothing but reaching that point in love at which we recognize that we, too, need to be given something."⁷⁴ At its core, faith, then, is the acknowledgement that a person needs something or someone for development and fulfilment. In *What It Means to Be a Christian*, Ratzinger states:

Faith is already present in and with true loving; it simply represents that impulse in love which leads to its finding its true self: the openness of someone who does not insist on his own capabilities, but is aware of receiving something as a gift and of standing in need of it.... Through talking about love, we come upon faith.⁷⁵

Faith (here, Christian) is critical for formation, which in turn is relevant to the taking of worthwhile actions.

The best actions, in Ratzinger's opinion, ascend from a life of self-sacrifice. In general terms, "[t]rue love is an event of dying, a stepping aside before the other and on behalf of the other"⁷⁶—or perhaps more succinctly, "the Yes of love for another involves a

⁷³ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 80.

⁷⁴ Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 12. And: "Faith is thus that stage in love which really distinguishes it as love; it consists in overcoming the complacency and self-satisfaction of the person who says, "I have done everything, I don't need any further help." Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 12.

⁷⁵ Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 75. Note, without amendment, the words are reiterated thirty-four years later: Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 12.

⁷⁶ Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, 47.

far-reaching renunciation of self."⁷⁷ Such self-sacrifice is readily seen in ordinary family life and among friends, but its modelling as normative is seen in the life of Jesus. Self-sacrifice might well have divine foundations, but it is bloodily incarnated.

[It] attains its deepest significance in the Passover of Jesus Christ: in the $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\dot{\alpha}\pi\eta$ $\epsilon i\zeta \tau \epsilon \lambda o\zeta$, in the radical love that became a total exodus from himself, a goingout-from-himself toward the other even to the radical delivery of himself to death so that it can be explained in the words: "I am going away and shall return" (Jn 14:28)—by going, I come.⁷⁸

Love is highly self-sacrificial for proper ends; and once more, Ratzinger is adamant that truth is necessary for the discovery of those ends.⁷⁹ Love might have divine origins, but in its everyday setting it is characterised by sacrifice which more often than not is to someone or society's benefit.

The interrelation between love and truth is evocative.⁸⁰ Love calls out truth. Sometimes this is costly, at other times it is not; but it is rapturous, bringing out the best in a person: "A lover does not make use of the fact that the other person's love is

⁷⁷ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 33. Yet: "Only if one risks this giving of oneself to the other, only if existence is, as it were, first given away can a great love ensue." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 33.

⁷⁸ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 189. Ratzinger had written earlier: "In the New Testament writings—particularly in Paul and John—the commandment of love (over and above its eschatological thrust) acquires its motivation, and hence its distinctiveness, its self-transcending radicality and even perhaps a specific content from the self-emptying (Paul) or self-abasing (John) attitude of the Son (the Son of Man), especially as this love that enters into human existence and death represents and illustrates the love of God." Joseph Ratzinger, Heinz Schürmann, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 21. Note, too, the relationship between self-sacrifice and the principle of superabundance: "God himself lives and works according to the rule of superabundance, of that love which can give nothing less than itself." Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 17.

⁷⁹ So, for instance, "Love alone is of no avail. Only when truth and love are in harmony can man know joy. Love is truth, and truth is love." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 81. In an evangelistic context Ratzinger observes: "This adds a new aspect to the missionary element: real love of neighbour also desires to give him the deepest thing man needs, namely, knowledge and truth." Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, 27. Additionally, and "in the last analysis, the crucial element in the unfathomable expression 'co-workers of the truth' is the relationship between truth and love." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, Preface, 6.

⁸⁰ Compare with "All people feel the *interior impulse* to love authentically: love and truth never abandon them completely...." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.1. Emphasis added. Furthermore, "true love, in contrast with the brief infatuation of the moment, has to do with truth and thus relates to the truth of the other person, a truth that may well be undeveloped, concealed, or disfigured." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 393.

inextinguishable, but feels called upon by that very fact to do his best, for his own part, to become worthy of such love."⁸¹ Love brings both the beloved and lover to life.

Love, then, has a propensity for self-sacrifice and for occasioning the good, but it is also demanding in surprising ways. It is non-discriminatory: it is not a respecter of persons.⁸² This means:

Not just loving someone we like, who pleases us, who suits us, and certainly not just someone who has something to offer us or from whom we are hoping to gain some advantage. ... It means that we are good to someone who needs our kindness, even if we do not like him.⁸³

For Ratzinger genuine love has the astonishing quality of being other-oriented.⁸⁴ "To love someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps to secure it."⁸⁵ When this intending mixes with right reasoning, a reasoning which in itself has already been affected by love, it advances the common good⁸⁶ more persistently, expansively and

⁸⁵ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.7. And: "[there] is an inner urgency to love, with its compulsion to share, to give of oneself to the other ..." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 394. Much earlier, and in a Christian context, Ratzinger had claimed: "Being a Christian means having love; it means achieving the Copernican revolution in our existence, by which we cease to make ourselves the centre of the universe, with everyone else revolving around us." Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 73.

⁸⁶ So, also, according to Rachel A. Amiri and Mary M. Keys, love as a "theological virtue" advances the common good as a general human experience. It does not discriminate, apparently, with regard to faith or standing: "It is integrally bound up with and depends on the truth about humanity and God—hence, *caritas in veritate. Caritas* opens out into truth seeking dialogue 'and hence communication and communion' with others; it 'give[s] direction to moral responsibility'; and it 'reflects the personal yet public dimension of faith in the God of the Bible, who is both Agápe and Lógos' (CiV 2–4). This charity—the original item, so to speak—is in the Christian tradition called a 'theological virtue' for being a gratuitous gift of God it perfects the human being both in him or herself as a child and friend of God and in his or her relations with other human beings who are all God's images and his children. [Love] thus has God for its final goal as well as its source. [It] is God's gift of his own love that makes possible its free return on the part of the creature who receives it: it is thus 'love received and given,' 'grace (*cháris*) … creative love, through which we have our being; redemptive love, through which we are recreated' (CiV 5) …. Yet it is important to note at the outset that Benedict sees these Christian 'theological virtues' as also active in the lives of men and women of other faiths and even in non-believers. He writes that '[b]ecause it is a gift received by everyone, charity in truth is

⁸¹ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 61.

⁸² "Love relates to the other person as he or she really is, weaknesses included." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 393.

⁸³ Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 70. Ratzinger adds: 'For love, as it is here portrayed as the content of being a Christian, demands that we try to live as God lives." Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 71.

⁸⁴ With more mystical notes, Ratzinger states: "Love is the very process of passing over, of transformation, of stepping outside the limitations of fallen humanity—in which we are all separated from one another and ultimately impenetrable to one another—into an infinite otherness." Ratzinger, *Holy Week*, 54.

effectively than any other human impulse or calculation.⁸⁷ Thus "love—caritas—will always prove necessary, even in the most just society. There is no ordering of the State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of love."⁸⁸ Ratzinger's basic position, here, is that "[d]eeds without knowledge are blind, and knowledge without love is sterile."⁸⁹ Love visibly leads to reasonable and responsible action. It is retroductively formative.

A love that experiences a Copernican revolution, centring on others rather than resting on itself, even if it is well thought out when it comes to ethical action still has its limits. It requires fortitude and the capacity for ongoing sacrificial decision making and not just one-off self-sacrifice. Ratzinger observes that love that is responsible is enduring: it is a "love which goes to the very end and which is endless,"⁹⁰ and "is the expression of a life that is completely being for others."⁹¹

In addition to exhibiting fortitude, a love that has retroductive strength is politically and socially rendered. It will build community. It will inform responsible policy-making and the execution of civic projects.⁹² If a love which springs from faith is absent from

a force that builds community [and] brings all people together without imposing barriers or limits' (CiV 34)." Rachel A. Amiri and Mary M. Keys, "Benedict XVI on Liberal Modernity's Need for the 'Theological Virtues' of Faith, Hope, and Love," Essay, 41 (2012): 12.

⁸⁷ In fact, love "alone makes it possible to do the things of this world in a spirit of responsibility, yet at the same time in an uncramped, cheerful, [and] free way...." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 268.

⁸⁸ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.28. Regarding intention and more explicitly theologically, Ratzinger writes: "Love is the soul of all theo-logically/eschato-logically oriented exhortations and imperatives that structures everything in an 'incarnational' manner, seeing God in one's neighbour and one's neighbour in God." Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, 33.

⁸⁹ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.30.

⁹⁰ Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 105. Stated differently: "'Love to the end' is what brings about the seemingly impossible *metábasis*: stepping outside the limits of one's closed individuality, which is what $agáp\bar{e}$ is—breaking through into the divine." Ratzinger, *Holy Week*, 55.

⁹¹ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 282.

⁹² "In *Caritas in Veritate*, Benedict speaks of the practice of charity along 'the institutional path . . . the political path . . . of charity, no less excellent and effective than the kind of charity which encounters our neighbour directly.' The pope clearly affirms the Church's social mission as dealing with structural change, describing the common good as dealing with 'that complex of institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and socially, making it the *pólis*, or 'city'.' He goes on to explain that work for the common good 'paves the way for eternity through temporal action'; and he concludes: 'Man's earthly activity, when inspired and sustained by charity, contributes to building of the universal city of God, which is the goal of the history of the human family.' With such formulations, he not only sets himself in the line of the social teaching of Paul VI, but embraces as well the optimistic, immanent, Teilhardian eschatology of Vatican II." Drew Christiansen, "Metaphysics and Society: A Commentary on Caritas in Veritate," *Theological Studies* 71, no. 1 (2010): 4.

these, then they suffer: "In fact, social service totally disintegrates when it loses the inspiration of the love that comes from faith."⁹³ Such is the case on a general level, too. Ratzinger is convinced that "it takes love which is stronger than all our own initiatives to build fruitful and dependable community and to equip it with the dynamism of a fruitful vocation."⁹⁴ Love is an invariable, even a prerequisite for building and enjoying textured and fruitful lives.

2.2 Summary

A method of retroduction draws from a panoply of inferences. In the social sciences, the study of history, politics, and international relations it tries to ascertain the conditions and personal qualities which are apparently necessary for prudential judgments, justice and maintaining peace. Philosophy, traditionally, with its attention to the good life, and theology do something similar. Retroduction reflects on the past, so seeking to be predictive of the future. It recognises the presence of complex variables, especially in law-making and policy decisions.

This section argues that for Ratzinger love is one such *invariable* that directs and fosters the good. A counterfactual environment of an absent love, where, for instance, leaders and communities are inured by corruption, racial hatred, and violence, experiences a paucity of justice and peace, allowing Ratzinger to infer that love is a critical predicator for each. Moral turpitude harms the good. Love, in contrast, nurtures it. For Ratzinger, love is divine in origin, but incarnated. It is mostly clearly seen in the person and life of Jesus, but importantly it is universal and nascent to creation, too. The common experience of human love is not redemptive in an eschatological sense, but it has great natural force for the good of humanity. Lonergan agrees, and like Ratzinger will look for religious conversion and content to extend and enrich the common but by no means ordinary experience of human love. For Ratzinger, this common experience is also analogous, pointing to the love of God. Love as it is ordinarily known is not inwardly focused. Neither is it torpid. On the contrary it is outward looking, active, and considerate of others. It is affirmative. It wills the best for others and it is evocative-drawing the best out of them. It is also self-sacrificial and persevering. While loving is innate, for Ratzinger, it is also embryonic. Ultimately, it is the converted life that brings intellectual clarity, moral

⁹³ In an ecclesial context this has much more significance. Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 99.

⁹⁴ Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 99.

acumen, and compassionate drive to human love. Ratzinger's retroductive analysis of love is explanatory and predictive of the good; it, finds love at work throughout history and across every racial, social, and financial stratum. Operative love, in the human sense, is not predicated on race, class or income, nor is it limited by these. For Ratzinger, an analysis of love comes close to the heart of things when it comes to uncovering factors that are germane to reasoning and the pursuit of the common good. An *ecclesio-traditio* methodology allows him to come much closer.

3. Joseph Ratzinger: ecclesio-traditio theological method

Using a method of correlation, despite its choreographed flaws, enables Ratzinger to make claims about the contiguity of creational, Christian, and divine love, and distinctions between profane and sacred love in a given culture and period of history. Employing a method of retroduction allows Ratzinger to test love for its integrity in personal, social, and political settings. With reference to correlation, Ratzinger finds that love can be counterfeited, especially if it becomes egotistical and narcissistic. With retroduction, love carries powerful explanatory warrant, but this does not guarantee its generic adoption by a society. A method of retroduction remains descriptive and speaks of possibility. In contrast, adopting an ecclesio-traditio methodology, empowers Ratzinger, firstly, to delineate human depravity, showing how sin distorts creaturely love; secondly, to contend that attention to justice, and especially to those who are oppressed, has its aetiology in the prophetic tradition of Judaism, running through Christianity and into the church; and thirdly, that the church represents the community where contingent, wounded love is healed and perfected by the economic activity of the Godhead, and congruently worked out in the lives of its people. Eucharistic habitus is all important for Ratzinger; it draws together in a living manner every tendon of theology—and the church is the place to dwell and from which to serve, sacrificially.

3.1 Love as contingent

Ratzinger is on one hand sanguine on the subject of love, and on the other hand ambivalent. Love is perhaps the most powerful factor in the development and structuring of human goods; but it is also subject to perversity—a bent too often witnessed in political, familial, and technical developments, which are shot through with legerdemain. Post-fall and in its contingency, creaturely love is vulnerable to corruption. In a more Augustinian moment, Ratzinger claims: "There is only one, indivisible history, and it is characterized by the weakness and wretchedness of man, and as a whole it stands beneath the merciful love of God, who constantly surrounds and supports this history."⁹⁵ Yet love also enters into history; and it inaugurates not only a kingdom but also a church. It is thus to the Body of Christ that Ratzinger turns in an attempt to comprehensively understand love, its significance, and workings.⁹⁶ The church, with her wise, confessing traditions and practices, and eucharistic life becomes the community of sinners which reforms and interprets love. Aidan Nichols observes that:

The interplay of God's faithfulness and man's infidelity, the typical pattern of the Church's life, is "grace in dramatic form". In this "unholy holiness" of the Church is revealed God's true holiness which is love: not a reserved aristocratic love but one which "mixes with the dirt of the world so as to overcome it."⁹⁷

Just as the Lord's divinity is not diminished by his humanity, so love's holiness is not abased by being missional.

In adopting an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology, Ratzinger is able to illustrate how comprehensively love is refined and reconstituted in Christian teaching and practice. Affections and passion are not enough: love is not circumscribed by emotion and sexual concourse. It is profoundly intelligent. Put differently, love requires intelligence in preparation for reasoning and acting responsibly; it necessitates intelligence for civil engagement. Love's bounty is hardly exhausted by physicality or emotion, but it is positively tested by intelligence. In fact, love and intelligence prove to be indispensable and indivisible. Just so, Ratzinger observes: "The Old Testament names heart, soul, and strength as the bearers of God's love in man. Jesus adds mind as a fourth dimension in

⁹⁵ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 35.

⁹⁶ Mannion adds: "It is Ratzinger's reaction to the perceived ills of first the modern, then postmodern world that feeds his writings on liturgy, catechesis and evangelization. Ratzinger posits faith in general, but the liturgy in particular, as an antidote to the ills of the world, thereby necessitating evangelization and catechesis." L. Boeve and Gerard Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey* (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), loc. 3360 of 4799, Kindle. Agbaw-Ebai notes that: "Ratzinger observes: 'Charity is the unity of the Church, and more; it is the real, sober, working love of the Christian heart.' And that means that every act of genuine Christian love, every work of mercy is in a real and authentic sense sacrifice, a celebration of the one and only *sacrificium christianorum*. In effect, the moral life of the Christian is shaped and lived from and for the Eucharistic fellowship." Maurice Ashley Agbaw-Ebai, "Joseph Ratzinger: The Word Became Love and Truth in the Church" (STL diss., Boston University, 2015), 46.

⁹⁷ Nichols, The Thought of Benedict XVI, 92.

order to make it clear that intellect has a place in our relationship with God and in our love of God."⁹⁸

Love is attendant to human beings. It is natural and it is supernatural, too. It is a recurrent phenomenon; and it is bound to knowledge, right reasoning, and ethical behaviour. For Ratzinger, epistemic activity and the outworking of love have their basis in what might be nominated as a Trinitarian dance:

This act of knowing, in which God knows himself, is God's giving of himself as Father and God's receiving of himself and giving back of himself as Son, the exchange of eternal love, both the eternal gift and the eternal return of this gift.⁹⁹

The converted life participates in this reception and return. It is finessed by the Spirit and by Christian tradition with its concepts and analogies (present in the *symbolum*),¹⁰⁰ its liturgy,¹⁰¹ theological stances, the inspiration of the saints, and practices of the church. In such a context, intellectual and moral conversion become mutually reinforcing, leading to a realigning of values, where "as Richard of St. Victor says, 'Love [becomes] the faculty for seeing'."¹⁰² For Ratzinger meeting the personal needs of others or acting politically depend on intelligent, and not blind love: "All real progress has its origin in the eye of love and in its faculty of beholding."¹⁰³

Using an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology enables Ratzinger to distinguish between a love that is self-oriented and unreformed, and a love that is living-in-relation, redemptive, eucharistic and positively consequential.¹⁰⁴ It exchanges the abstracted theoretical

⁹⁸ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 226.

⁹⁹ Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, 91.

¹⁰⁰ Joseph Ratzinger, "Sources and Transmission of the Faith," Communio 10, no. 1 (1983): 29.

¹⁰¹ Mannion argues liturgy is a central concern of Ratzinger's: "With particular regard to the liturgy, he has written extensively on the topic throughout his long career. Indeed, when the first volume of the ongoing publication of an edition of Ratzinger's complete works was published in 2008, the subject of that very first volume was the theology of liturgy. This was a deliberate choice, and one made, as Ratzinger himself explained in the preface, because he wanted to 'allow God to come first', a further consistent theme throughout much of his theology." Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, loc. 3371 of 4799, Kindle.

¹⁰² Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 27.

¹⁰³ Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 287.

¹⁰⁴ Thus: "... faith is not then just encounter with God and the Christ, but it is also this contact which opens a contact with those to whom God has communicated himself. This communion, we should add, is the gift of the spirit, who throws down a bridge for us towards the Father and the Son. Faith in is not only an 'I' and a 'Thou,' it is also a 'we'. In this 'we' lives the memorial which makes us rediscover what we had forgotten: God and the One he is sent. To put it another way, there is no faith without church. Henry de Lubac has shown that the 'I' of the Christian confession of faith is not the isolated 'I' of the individual but the collective 'I' of the church. When I say 'I believe' it means that I go beyond the frontiers of my subjectivity in order to

evaluations more typical of a method of correlation for an analysis wrought from within a working religious community. For Ratzinger, by "[f]aithfully pursuing the path of our Redeemer from the poverty of the Crib to his abandonment on the Cross, we can better understand the mystery of his love which redeems humanity."¹⁰⁵ It is a love that is downright self-sacrificial for others. It is a prodigal love: "True love is death, an obliteration of oneself before and for the other."¹⁰⁶ Distinctively, it is also eucharistic and evocative:

Yet in this mystery of the Holy Eucharist, in which [Jesus] is still constantly the One who is truly and entirely there for us, he challenges us to enter day by day into this law ourselves, which, in the final analysis, is merely the expression of the essence of true loving.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 58. Blanco adds: "according to Ratzinger, the Eucharist is not only a sacred banquet of the community, but it contains the death and resurrection of Christ: it makes present the whole of the paschal mystery of our Lord. The sacrificial dimension and the concept of the memorial of the Passover of our Lord form an essential part of the conception of the Eucharist. That is why it is a supper, a feast and a sacrifice at the same time. So, Ratzinger proposes a new 'liturgical movement' through which Christ and the celebration of the paschal mystery truly occupy the centre of the life of the Church. To achieve this, he goes deeper into the cosmic dimension of the liturgy—and not only its historical aspect—touching on the Christological and trinitarian essence." Pablo Blanco, "Logos and Dia-logos: Faith, Reason, (and Love) According to Joseph Ratzinger," Anglican Theological Review 92, no. 3 (2010): 156. And: "In 1978 Ratzinger published four sermons under the title Eucharistie—Mitte der Kirche. Of particular relevance is a sermon entitled 'The Wellspring of Life from the Side of the Lord, opened in Loving Sacrifice'. Here Ratzinger focuses upon the pierced side of Jesus as the source of both the Church and the sacraments which build it up. He notes that the word which John uses for the side of Jesus is the same as that used for Adam's rib, making it clear that Jesus is the New Adam, from whose side, in the sleep of death, issues a new humanity. From the self-sacrifice of Jesus issues the blood and water which symbolise the Eucharist and Baptism, the source of the Church. Ratzinger links this outpouring both with Jesus' offering of his Body and Blood at the Last Supper and with his Resurrection. For Ratzinger, the Last Supper alone was not sufficient for the institution of the Eucharist. The words spoken then by Jesus were an anticipation of his death. They transformed his death into an event of love. Furthermore: 'They did not remain mere words but were given content by his actual death. . . [and] the death would remain empty of meaning, and would also render the words meaningless, if the Resurrection had not come about. ... [Thus] only the three together [Last Supper, Crucifixion and Resurrection] make up a whole, only these three together constitute a veritable reality, and this single mystery of Easter is the source and origin of the Eucharist." Peter McGregor, "Heart to Heart: The Spiritual Theology of Joseph Ratzinger" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian Catholic University, 2013), 99. A question remains, however, as to whether suffering unto death for another, or for the sake of Christian witness in the face or evil, means that suffering is essential to divinity and human experience; broader tradition suggests that it is not and rather it is in response to a fallen world—despite

integrate myself with the 'I' of the church which at the same time means integrating myself with its knowledge which goes beyond the limits of time." Ratzinger, "Sources and Transmission of the Faith," 26.

¹⁰⁵ Benedict XVI, God's Revolution, 22–23.

¹⁰⁶ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 15.

Or stated more explicitly and concretely, love:

is not just a feeling entailing no obligations, still less a form of social organization, but is in the final analysis a eucharistic concept, which is as such connected to the theology of the Cross, since the Eucharist is based on the Cross; the Cross is the most extreme expression of God's love for us in Jesus Christ.¹⁰⁸

Love is visible in the saints' lives poured out for others, but it is brokered by the cross and grounded in gift and divinity. The church reveals that "on one hand, Christianity can be entirely defined on the basis of belief, [while] on the other hand, it can equally be determined completely on the basis of love."¹⁰⁹ As such, "love is therefore the service that the Church carries out in order to attend constantly to man's sufferings and his needs, including material needs."¹¹⁰

This service is an exposition of eucharistic love. Indeed, Mannion observes that for Ratzinger it reveals:

the inmost core of the concept 'Church' and the deepest meaning of the designation 'sacrament of unity'. The Church is *communio*; she is God's communing with men in Christ and hence the communing of men with one another—and, in consequence, sacrament, sign, instrument of salvation. The Church is the celebration of the Eucharist; the Eucharist is the Church: they do

¹⁰⁹ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 263. Yet Ratzinger is not naïve or idealistic about sin and sanctification, hence his elevation of saints: "In Ratzinger's view, it seems, the Church as a whole is never statically perfect, but rather perfect only in the context of the historical dynamism that is fulfilled in an on-going dialogue with the Living God. Those within the Church are often drawn away from this dialogical relationship with the Lord and turn in on themselves in sin. But in every age, there are those who heroically and dramatically manifest the fullness of this dialogical relationship with the Lord. Maximilian Heim explains that in Ratzinger's thought these historical figures who carry out such a task are the saints and they play an indispensable role in Ratzinger's narrative, historically unfolding and dialogical ecclesiology." Christopher Collins, "Joseph Ratzinger's Theology of the Word: The Dialogical Structure of his Thought," 150.

¹¹⁰ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.19. Additionally, "The Church, being at God's service, is at the service of the world in terms of love and truth." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, 11. Mannion, however, warns: "And yet, if the church is to really be in a position to teach the wider postmodern world, the human family, something of value, then the intra-ecclesial implications of the gospel's call to love must be addressed with equal fervour. For anyone beyond the confines of the church might otherwise look to numerous episodes not simply in the history of the church but also in its recent and present day life where Christians seem to be incapable of even treating their fellow Christians, those with whom they live and work and worship, with anything remotely approximating to the love of which Benedict so eloquently speaks." Gerard Mannion, "Charity Begins at Home … an Ecclesiological Assessment of Pope Benedict's First Encyclical," *New Blackfriars* 88, no. 1018 (2007): 7.

Ratzinger's leanings and contra theologians such as Jürgen Moltmann. See, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ As the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology* (London: SCM, 1973).

¹⁰⁸ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 233.

not simply stand side by side; they are one and the same. The Eucharist is the *sacromentum Christi* and, because the Church is *Eucharistia*, she is therefore also *sacromentum*—the sacrament to which all other sacraments are ordered.¹¹¹

With its woven interconnections sacramental love acts for others, signalling something of the character of God in creation. On an everyday level, it pursues righteousness and justice, which are so central to biblical and prophetic tradition. The church understands its mission in the wake of the incarnation, the ascension of Christ, Pentecost, its own calling-forth and subsequent theological reflection. Its liturgy attests to redemptive and eucharistic love, but its witness becomes apposite when it is visibly and selflessly charitable. When its members pursue justice and seek to free men, women, and children from the oppression of poverty, violence, slavery and loneliness, they are about the business of peace-making.¹¹² For Ratzinger, responsible life is the mark of the church, and it is the imprimatur of eucharistic love:

All this comes together in the Church's most interior and yet also most human task: the task of making, not just talking about, peace, in deeds of love.... The Church does less, not more, for peace if she abandons her own sphere of faith,

¹¹¹ Boeve and Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader*, loc. 3392 of 4799, Kindle. And Collins observes, "The receiving of the Word made flesh ultimately becomes concretized in the most dramatic way in the context of the liturgy. In this encounter, the Church is made. This is the foundational element of Ratzinger's 'communio ecclesiology' which he explains is 'in its inmost nature a Eucharistic ecclesiology.' He describes how in the encounter of the liturgy the corporate personality of the Church is fulfilled only as she goes beyond herself in the sacramental union with Christ. In this sense, the celebration of the Eucharist expresses a nuptial union in which the 'I' of the Church truly becomes herself only when letting down the barriers of her former 'I' and 'losing' herself in the 'Thou' of Christ who fulfills his own identity by virtue of his perfect self-donation." Collins, "Ratzinger's theology of the word," 185. Furthermore, McGregor notes: "In the person of Jesus Christ, divine and human nature interpenetrate. God enters into communion with human beings by taking flesh in human nature. Thus, for Ratzinger, the source of communio is in Christology. '[The] incarnate Son is the "communion" between God and men. Being Christian is in reality nothing other than sharing in the mystery of the Incarnation.... Once this has been grasped, it is clear that there can be no separation of Church and Eucharist, sacramental communion and community fellowship.' In the Eucharist we have $\kappa o i \omega \omega i \alpha$ in the body and blood of Christ. We are one body because we all partake of the one bread (cf. 1 Cor 10:16–17). Ratzinger sees these words as the core of St. Augustine's theological thought. By eating the one bread we become what we eat. The Eucharistic food is stronger than we. It reverses the whole normal process of eating. Rather than it becoming assimilated to us, we become assimilated by it. We become the bread that we eat." McGregor, "Heart to Heart," 134. Or more succinctly and in summary: "One takes one's identity from one's sacramental incorporation into the sacred Body of Christ." Tracey Rowland, "Ratzinger on the Timelessness of Truth," Communio: International Catholic Review 44, no. 17 (2017): 250-51.

¹¹² Thus "the second major theme running through all Ratzinger's writings on political life is justice as the goal of politics. 'The Church's first task in this area is to keep alive in fidelity to her holy tradition, the basic criterion of justice and to detach it from the arbitrariness of power.' By this he means the primacy of ethics (the virtue of justice) over politics and so the primacy of moral responsibility, conscience and integrity." Twomey, "Pope Benedict XVI: Joseph Ratzinger on Politics," 84.

education, witness, counsel, prayer, and serving love and changes into an organization for direct political action.¹¹³

3.2 Summary

For Ratzinger, creaturely love is contingent in that it is created and dependent on something else for its existence. It is also dependent on something other than itself for a description of its natural and supernatural ends. These are Christotelically and ecclesially revealed. Love is thus explicated in an ecclesial context, and an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology shows how divine love eucharistically sanctifies human love, and how love which is being sanctified acts in a social and political context. Eucharistic love renews the mind and affirms the relational indivisibility of truth and love; it also indicates that emotional impulses directed at the good are well served by a moral reasoning that is intelligent and well-formed. Lonergan's writings interleave with Ratzinger's thought at this point; but in Chapter Four, I will argue that his analyses of horizons, a scale of values, and conversion, add clarity as to how such moral reasoning is achieved, and further elucidate love's relation with reason.

4. Joseph Ratzinger: Christotelic method

Ratzinger maintains throughout his writings that love has its origins in God. It is indivisible with God; and God's creation carries an intelligibility and underlying ethic expressive of it.¹¹⁴ It is the *Logos*, the second person of the Godhead, who is responsible for these phenomena—truths that are revealed in Scripture and attested to by tradition. Love is thus best understood Christotelically—which means not simply centring love in Christ but relating it also to his purposes. Jesus Christ, lovingly, gives an account of the human condition, its needs and ends. He gathers up in himself the eschatological significance and potential of human love at once actualising and ennobling it, while also demonstrating it. Divine love redeems and shows itself to be the forum for reasoning, moral reflection, and ethical action.

¹¹³ Ratzinger, *A Turning Point for Europe?*, 63–65. Later, Ratzinger argues: "God himself is the place beyond all places. If you look into the world, you do not see heaven but traces of God everywhere. In the structure of matter, in all the rationality of reality. Even when you see human beings, you find traces of God. You see vices, but you also see goodness, love." Benedict XVI and Seewald, *Last Testament*, loc. 3734 of 4018, Kindle.

¹¹⁴ "The world comes from reason, and this reason is a Person, is Love—this is what our biblical faith tells us about God." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 26.

In the following sections I outline Ratzinger's descriptions of love as divine, eschatological and Christotelic. I argue that these bring theological depth to Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love, but I will also argue in the following chapters that in contrast, Lonergan's precision of analysis with the grace–nature distinction allows for true value in natural love without immediately theologizing it into a Christological or Christotelic vein.¹¹⁵

4.1 Love as divine

First and foremost, for Ratzinger divine love is indivisible. As such it is creative and mysterious. Furthermore, it is truthful and responsible. It is also foundational and prior. Divine love is not compromised or diminished by matter.

Divine love is indivisible. Theologians choose to delineate God's attributes in various ways, describing them, for instance, as: communicable and non-communicable;¹¹⁶ immanent or intransitive and emanant and transitive;¹¹⁷ absolute and relative; or goodness and greatness,¹¹⁸ but by and large they hold to God's simplicity.¹¹⁹ On this, Herman Bavinck writes:

In God all his attributes are identical with his being. God is light through and through; he is all mind, all wisdom, all spirit, all goodness and so forth. In God to be is the same as to be wise, which is the same as to be good, which is the same as to be powerful. One and the same thing is stated whether it be said that God is eternal or immortal or good or just. Whatever God is, he is that completely and simultaneously.¹²⁰

For Ratzinger, God is simple;¹²¹ but it is not an overstatement to claim that at times he seems to privilege love over other attributes of God—even seemingly making it prior to them. Love appears paramount. It is divine. It is also mysterious and transcendent; and

¹¹⁵ Similar tendencies and tensions are present in Ratzinger's approach to the Jesus of history. Thomas P. Rausch, *Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to His Theological Vision* (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 99–100.

¹¹⁶ Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: The Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 55.

¹¹⁷ Augustus Strong, Systematic Theology (Westwood, NJ: Revell, 1907), 247–49.

¹¹⁸ Millard J. Erickson, *Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1996), 263–99.

¹¹⁹ ST. 1.3. Yet recent exceptions include Richard Gale and Richard Swinburne. James E. Dolezal, *God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God's Absoluteness* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 10–30.

¹²⁰ Herman Bavinck, John Bolt, and John Vriend, *Reformed Dogmatics, Volume II: God and Creation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 69.

¹²¹ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 179.

then it is sovereign and irresistible. It is pre-existent, foundational, life-giving, and indivisible from truth. It is as if God's simplicity is not the point for Ratzinger; it is love which is indivisible. Or perhaps, better stated: love is the fundamental reality of God.

Ratzinger consistently claims that the genius of Christian faith lies in its teaching that God is love. He contends this insight gave rise to profound cultural shifts, and social and political change, which in turn produced European civilisation, with subsequent spill over effects spanning the earth. Writing on the early patristic period, Ratzinger states: "The actual advance registered by the Christian idea of God over that of the ancient world lies in its recognition that God is love."¹²² The idea that God is love is compelling and effects existential change.

This divine love is not distant or passive, it is active and multifaceted. It "is a creative love, through which we have our being; it is also redemptive love, through which we are recreated."¹²³ It is a love which beckons:

The more deeply we penetrate the splendour of divine love, the greater will be our discoveries and the more beautiful it will be to travel on and to know that our seeking has no end and, hence, finding has no end, and therefore eternity is at the same time the joy of seeking and finding love.¹²⁴

Divine love draws people to itself but remains mysterious; it "is always *mysterium*—more than one can reckon or grasp by subsequent reckoning."¹²⁵ Love defies definition, but while it cannot be captured conceptually, it is captivating. Even so, Ratzinger rather confusingly declares that "[i]t is precisely when we understand the word 'love' in the full significance of its original meaning that the question of its exact denotation becomes almost unanswerable."¹²⁶ In a similarly opaque fashion, he argues that in the realm of mystery divine love links with the intellect, reasoning and truth, and it is in this "that we find, in fact, the original and precise point of origin for the concept of a love which creates knowledge in the darkness of the intellect."¹²⁷ Love, it seems, is

¹²² Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 58.

¹²³ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.5.

¹²⁴ Benedict XVI, God's Revolution, 95.

¹²⁵ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 162.

¹²⁶ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 146.

¹²⁷ Joseph Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989), 91. Ratzinger adds: "Indeed, even the notion that love precedes knowledge was traced back to Augustine." Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, 91. Nichols argues, "for Ratzinger, love is always *mysterium*—more than one can reckon or grasp by subsequent reckoning. Love

illuminating. Moreover, truth and love together possess the sovereign strength typical of divinity: "Truth, like love, is neither planned nor willed, but somehow imposes itself upon human beings."¹²⁸ This does not involve the forceful annulment of creaturely will. It is more a self-evident imposition. Truth and love speak for themselves; their value is compelling. Indeed, "truth and love are identical."¹²⁹ Lonergan would not agree with this claim with regard to finite subjects, but as I will show in the next chapter, he does delineate a relation between both.

Love, then, for Ratzinger, is divine and compelling. It is also foundational. Love is prior and priceless. It provides the firmest foundations for reassurance and action. Someone who "knows that the foundation of the world is love [can], even in a situation where no man is able or willing to help him, still continue walking in confidence toward the One who loves him."¹³⁰ More basically:

According to Galatians 5:6, in the end neither being circumcised nor being uncircumcised will help, but only faith at work in love; here Paul is only briefly repeating what he said in dramatic fashion in 1 Corinthians 13:1–3: Without love, everything else, faith and works, is nothing, simply of no account.¹³¹

Love is not only foundational, but also of definitive worth. A person who is enormously productive, even in a charitable context, who knows nothing of love knows nothing of God. Such a life is papier-mâché.

Divine love, furthermore, cannot be separated from belief, trust, reason, reasoning which is responsible, truth, personhood, and most importantly for Ratzinger the Lord Jesus Christ. Indeed, all the attributes of love, or of God, are manifest in the second person of the Godhead made man.

itself — the uncreated, eternal God — must therefore be in the highest degree a mystery, *the mysterium* itself." Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 80.

¹²⁸ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.34.

¹²⁹ Joseph Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 231. Moreover: "Reason must be open to its own basis: to the logos that is also person and love, and that makes sense of all things. As a consequence, they are intimately united, logos and agape, reason and relationship, truth and love in Christ, the Logos that is incarnate in love, that establishes all truth and all rational capacity." Blanco, "Logos and Dia-logos," 161.

¹³⁰ Joseph Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 94.

¹³¹ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 50–51.

As a general comment, Ratzinger observes that "in the last analysis believing, trusting, and loving are one,"¹³² but he immediately associates these with reason. Speaking of the constituents of a valid religion, he insists that "At the most profound level its content will necessarily consist in love and reason coming together as the two pillars of reality: the true reason is love, and love is the true reason."¹³³ In *Europe Today and Tomorrow: Addressing the Fundamental Issues*, he is more explicit, claiming: "The Christian faith in God tells us that God—eternal reason—is love."¹³⁴ Love is reason and reason is love; but love is moreover responsible—it is moral reason, interpreted in action, experienced personally and known in the unfolding relationship between God and humanity. Moses:

...encountered the burning bush experience, as opposed to a God sinking back completely into the realm of mathematics, and realized that the God who is the eternal geometry of the universe can only be this because he is creative love, because he is the burning bush from which a name issues forth, through which he enters the world of man.¹³⁵

By the same token, the divine geometer who is the "creative reason that creates the objective reasonableness of things, their hidden mathematics and their inner order, is at the same time moral reason, and... love."¹³⁶ The implications arising from this claim take on eschatological substance, for love "comes from the truth and leads to the truth: the love that is the goal of faith is, in a very real sense, the hope and redemption of the human race."¹³⁷ All this takes shape in human form, but Ratzinger is persuaded that because it is divine, it has distinct characteristics, and that it is only from this premise that "one can correctly understand the mystery of Christ, in which reason can then be seen to be the same as love."¹³⁸

In sum, love appears to be synonymous with a number of the attributes of God. Indeed, if (as stipulated) God is entirely simple, then all the attributes of God are really

¹³² Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 80.

¹³³ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 183.

¹³⁴ Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 97. Although at the outset of his writings, Ratzinger argues:

[&]quot;Logos-the Word in the beginning is creative reason and love." Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 28.

¹³⁵ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 144.

¹³⁶ Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 111.

¹³⁷ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, Preface, 6. Note, however: "The fact that God is love and that Benedict wishes to highlight this dimension of the tradition should not therefore be construed as evidence that he is a universal salvationist." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 80.

¹³⁸ Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 111.

identical to love. There remain, however, conceptual or notional distinctions, since our concept of love is not our concept of wisdom even if we know these are really identical realities in God; we have to think them differently and one at a time, so to speak. Thus, in Ratzinger's analysis, love is mysterious and beckoning. It is foundational, redemptive and reassuring. It is indivisible with truth; and it is reasonable, morally pellucid and morally firm. Further, love and truth have an eschatological draw. They visit humanity with judgement and mercy.

4.2 Love as eschatological and Christotelic

Ratzinger shows love to be divine yet incarnated. The Lord Jesus Christ is exemplary, mediatory, missional, and directional. With the Holy Spirit, he inaugurates and realises God's purposes for creation. He renews the human mind and recreates the human heart. The love of God and neighbour ushers in righteousness and justice. Christotelic love glorifies God and human creatures, and it is triumphant.

Love has its origins in God, it is also present to creation and Incarnate. In the Godhead it is personal and triune, and it is foundational for all that is: "God is One and Three: he is not an eternal solitude; rather, he is an eternal love that is based on the reciprocity of the Persons, a love that is the first cause, the origin, and the foundation of all being and of every form of life."¹³⁹ While God is love and the foundational source of all being, he is also one who loves truly and loves truth; the Word become flesh is light, and "light is life—for the element by which men live most profoundly is truth, which is likewise love."¹⁴⁰ Ratzinger, therefore, maintains, and has no intention of resolving, the tension that emerges when holding to the claim that life, love, reason and truth are of God,¹⁴¹ while at the same time Christologically exegeted. He contends that "in the long run, after all, 'truth' and 'love' cannot subsist in a vacuum. They themselves *are* 'love,' that is, a person";¹⁴² and moreover,

¹³⁹ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 106.

¹⁴⁰ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 183.

¹⁴¹ Indeed, "Precisely because he is sovereign, because he is the Creator, because he embraces everything, he is Relation and he is Love." Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 97.

¹⁴² Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 153. Even so, "If Christian belief in God is first of all an option in favour of the primacy of the logos, faith in the pre-existing, world-supporting reality of the creative meaning, it is at the same time, as belief in the personal nature of that meaning, the belief that the original thought, whose being-thought is represented by the world, is not an anonymous, neutral consciousness but rather freedom, creative love, a person." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 159.

the philosophical dimension to be noted in this biblical vision, and its importance from the standpoint of the history of religions, lies in the fact that on the one hand we find ourselves before a strictly metaphysical image of God: God is the absolute and ultimate source of all being; but this universal principle of creation—the Logos, primordial reason—is at the same time a lover with all the passion of a true love.¹⁴³

The lover, the man Jesus, not only gives himself to humanity, but also purposes his life and actions for it, glorifying the Father. In doing so, he repossesses and refurnishes human love. His "conduct is ultimately shown as a ministering and self-surrendering love 'for us', as a 'pro-existent' love which gets involved, making God's 'pro-existence' ('for us') visible in an eschatological manner."¹⁴⁴ Just so, "whoever looks upon the Crucified One sees what love is." ¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, "from the Cross the word love recovers its uniqueness."¹⁴⁶ Nichols summarises, saving for Ratzinger:

God, at any rate, has "become world", has taken flesh. In his Son, Jesus Christ he has stepped out of the circle of the Trinitarian love so that we should learn everlastingly what that ancient adage means which holds that *Bonum diffusivum sui*, "The Good spreads itself". However, the action of Christ as God's "selfopening" and "becoming worldly" does not simply leave the world as it is. God does not just become the world's companion. Theology, taking its cue from Scripture, describes the opening of God in Christ to the world as mission, and that means the penetration of the world by God's Word and its consequent transformation by a union of love with God himself.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.10.

¹⁴⁴ Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, 20. The theological gravity of God's pro existence and love for us-another is described in another Ratzinger article, where he links the relativity of the Godhead to Christology and then into Cristian anthropology, via an analysis of *prosopon*, *persona* and self-donation through Justin, Tertullian and church councils. Reflecting on Johannine theology, he writes: "John picks up the theology of mission found in the synoptics and in the Judaism of antiquity in which the idea is already formulated that the emissary, in as much as he is an emissary, is not important in himself, but stands for the sender and is one with the sender. John extends this Jewish idea of mission, which is at first a merely functional idea, by depicting Christ as the mystery who is in his entire nature 'the one sent'. The Jewish principle, 'the emissary of a person is like that person' now takes on a completely new and deepened significance, because Jesus has absolutely nothing besides being the emissary, but is in his nature 'the one sent.' He is like the one who sent him precisely because he stands in complete relativity of existence towards the one who sent him. The content of the Johannine concept 'the one sent' could be described as the absorption of being in 'being from someone and towards someone.'' Ratzinger, "Concerning The Notion Of Person In Theology," 446.

¹⁴⁵ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 49. Further, and of significance: "Christianity is this remembrance of the look of love that the Lord directs to man, this look that preserves the fullness of his truth and the ultimate guarantee of his dignity." Pope Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 71.

¹⁴⁶ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 55.

¹⁴⁷ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 106.

The mission of God induces life-giving and beneficial change.¹⁴⁸

It is at this point that Ratzinger is most explicit on how Christology accords with eschatology in relation to love. Methodologically, Ratzinger frames incarnate love as a controlling dynamic for understanding Scripture, the mission of the church, redemption and not just the partial fulfilment, but complete fulfilment of promises for the future made by God.¹⁴⁹ Ratzinger lays his groundwork by noting "history is interpreted as a love story involving God and man."¹⁵⁰ It is history, however, with a focal point that is personal, and which inaugurates the Kingdom of God. In Christ, expectations for the end of history break into "present" history. Thus, "the loving assimilation of Jesus' life and death, of service on the part of his disciples must also be seen as the breakthrough of the eschaton."¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 134.

¹⁵¹ Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, 21. Just so: "Authentic hope in every age is to be discovered and cultivated from within history and not outside of it. True hope is not characterized as a kind of escape from difficult historical reality. This embodiment of hope from within history is what characterizes the life and mission of the Church that gets its life and purpose from Christ, its center. Christ is both the center and the fulfilment of history, for Bonaventure. Ratzinger consistently embraces this same Christo-centric view of all of human history that is fundamentally a 'movement of *egressus* from God; and *regressus* to him through Jesus Christ.' The inner-principle of this movement of history is love that flows from God and flows back to God. In this sense, a further interpretive mechanism for

¹⁴⁸ And note: "Thus, for Ratzinger, the grace of God had to be, first and foremost, healing because our concrete humanity was, first and foremost, sinful. This has always been his emphasis. Hence, for him, grace does not so much build on nature created 'good' (*pace* Aquinas and an optimistic tradition of 'elevating grace') as reverse it (following a more sin-aware tradition rooted in Augustine). The discontinuities between nature and grace and the fact that the latter is much more a healing than an elevating divine gift are obvious, given our condition (Corkery 2009:44). And, again taking guidance from his mentor, Gottlieb Söhngen, whose approach to the relations between grace and nature stays close not to the Thomistic side of the medieval Scholastic tradition but rather to the Bonaventurian (and Augustinian), Ratzinger's theological anthropology follows broadly in the same line (Fiorenza 2005:61).... These emphases in Ratzinger's theology of grace cause him to be decidedly Christocentric." James Corkery, "Reflection on the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)," *Acta theol.* 32, no. 2 (2013): 23, https://doi.org/10.4314/actat.v32i2.2.

¹⁴⁹ So Collins observes, if anecdotally, that "it is striking and indeed unprecedented that a pope approaching an 80th birthday—while serving as universal pastor for a church of well over a billion members, and in addition to the countless commitments that come with that office, including duties of internal ecclesial governance, international diplomacy, as well as a steady flow of other venues calling for written speeches, homilies and various teachings in every aspect of Christian concern—the same man took time and made the effort to initiate a three volume series on the figure of Jesus of Nazareth. It is also worthy of note that he made this offering to the world, not in a magisterial mode, but in a very personal way, the fruit of his lifelong 'search for the Face of the Lord.' With such an effort, Benedict made it unmistakably clear that the figure of Jesus Christ is at the center of his whole project." Collins, "Ratzinger's theology of the word," 87.

Ratzinger is elated by the Lord's inbreaking life and work, and especially about what it signifies regarding the future; but he slips occasionally when it comes to the articulation of detail. Writing on Vatican Council II's position on teleology, he states:

"Thus the Council agreed with Augustine in saying that the goal of history is that mankind become love: it is thus adoration, a living worship, 'the city of God'."¹⁵² It takes effort and imagination to understand what "mankind become love" might mean. In contrast, Ratzinger's prose is easier to follow when it rests specifically on the "Christ event" and its immediate eschatological significance:

We have seen that the frontier of *bios*, in other words, death, was crossed and a new continuum was opened up: the biological has been overtaken by the spirit, by love, which is stronger than death. ... We have tried to understand this as love's being stronger than death and thus as the decisive "mutation" of man and cosmos, in which the frontier of *bios* is broken down and a new field of existence created. If this is all correct, then it means the beginning of "eschatology", of the end of the world. With the crossing of the frontier of death, the future dimension of mankind is opened up and its future has in fact already begun.¹⁵³

Love, in the person of Christ, has overcome the greatest barrier to human and divinehuman relations, death—and in this way proves that it "not only longs for eternity but also guarantees it."¹⁵⁴ Lonergan does not deny this, but, as I have already suggested, and in line with Aquinas, he offers an account of how grace perfects nature which is more broadly trinitarian and which sees, Christology apart, both love and reason validly operative in nature.

For Ratzinger, the coming of Christ in love also has an amplifying effect. It "deepens man's guilty No,"¹⁵⁵ but it simultaneously makes possible the recovery of the

salvation history comes to the fore, namely love as that which 'moves' history toward its gradual fulfilment.' Collins, "Ratzinger's theology of the word," 53.

¹⁵² Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 166.

¹⁵³ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 336.

¹⁵⁴ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 80. Further: "The decisive act of love, indeed, transforms even death into love and thus overcomes it from within, making the Resurrection present in it." Benedict XVI, *God's Revolution*, 10. And compare: "The human person—as image and likeness of Christ and the Trinity—has a face: he is not merely a number and he is firmly situated in love and in truth. This Christian idea of God unites unity and multiplicity, so in the human person both instances are combined. At the same time, in Christ we find the incarnation of truth and of love, of reason and of relation: for the Logos that is made *dialogos*, and is incarnate, dies and resurrects through love." Blanco, "Logos and Dia-logos," 159.

¹⁵⁵ Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, Principles of Christian Morality, 87.

imago Dei and provides human creatures with the means for living out their vocations.¹⁵⁶ It illustrates that in "the abyss of human failure is revealed the still more inexhaustible abyss of divine love."¹⁵⁷ Initially, and in relation to belief in Christ, Ratzinger states that "what faith basically means is just that this shortfall that we all have in our love is made up by the surplus of Jesus Christ's love, acting on our behalf."¹⁵⁸ A little later on, he expands on this, adding that the presence of the Lord Jesus Christ "tells us that God himself has poured out among us a superabundance of his love and has thus made good in advance all our deficiency."¹⁵⁹ An aspect of this recovery revolves around creativity and recreation. It involves a recognition that "love is creative—that God's love is the power that created being out of nothing, that is the true 'ground' on which all reality rests,"¹⁶⁰ and that it "is our task to further creation, to be co-creators in the Yes of love by bestowing existence upon the other in a new way—by letting the gift of being become at last a true gift."¹⁶¹ Here, Lonergan's analysis of intellectual and moral horizons, conversion, a scale of values, and the interrelation between love and reason will helpfully complement Ratzinger's understanding of "our task" as "co-creators in the Yes of love."

For Ratzinger, being a co-creator, admittedly, is not an easy road. While Christians receive new lives and are empowered by the Holy Spirit as a guarantee and deposit of things to come, they struggle with personal sin and temptation. "There will remain in [us]

¹⁵⁶ For Ratzinger (Benedict XVI), "the basis of the dignity of the human person is the belief that the human being is created in the image of God, *imago Dei*. To be created in the image of God says something about what the human person is, what the human person is capable of, and what the human person's purpose is, the end or telos for which the human person is created and to which the human person should direct his or her actions." David G. Kirchhoffer, "Benedict XVI, Human Dignity, and Absolute Moral Norms," *New Blackfriars* 91, no. 1035 (2010): 589.

¹⁵⁷ Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 293. And to the extent that it "seeks out sinners." Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, 19.

¹⁵⁸ Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 74. Note the ontic strength this carries: "His love is the foundation of our eternity. One whom God loves never passes away." And moreover: "This, then, is God's kingship—a love that is impregnable." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 376-77.

¹⁵⁹ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 74.

¹⁶⁰ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 195. Ratzinger stated earlier: "love is the true counterforce to chaos: it is the creative power which continually establishes the world afresh." Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 105. More fundamentally, "Man owes his origin to God's creative love." Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, 28. *In nuce*, divine love is creative: "For man would not exist were he not created by God's love and constantly preserved by it; and he cannot live fully according to truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and devotes himself to his Creator." *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents. Gaudium et Spes*, ed. Austin Flannery (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014), n.19.

¹⁶¹ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 195.

the conflict of two opposing forces of gravity: the gravitational pull of interest, of egoism, and the gravitational pull of truth, of love."¹⁶² Ratzinger acknowledges that the overwhelming propensity to sin has been broken, but its lure is still real and not to be underestimated. Once again though, the expansive effects of Christ's life, death and resurrection will prove positively and irresistibly transformative.¹⁶³ Divine love will be Christotelically triumphant;¹⁶⁴ and accordingly, creation and humanity will reach their intended ends even while wrestling with or groaning under the weight of sin.

The transformational love released at Pentecost, seized on by belief, perseveres. Divine love does not give up. It "demands our participation as instruments of mercy and loving-kindness"¹⁶⁵ and "shows itself by being enduring."¹⁶⁶ It also contextualises and reforms the way individual's reason and relate to others. Transformative, pentecostal love refines human reasoning, emotion, and love, but it does not erase individual identity or singularity:

The dynamic circle of trinitarian love not only unites subject and object but even brings individual subjects together without depriving them of their individuality.... What is so striking here is, of course, the fact that this whole ground of being is, at the same time, a relationship; not less than I, who know, think, feel and love, but rather more than I, so that I can know only because I am known, love only because I am already loved.¹⁶⁷

Thus, economic, trinitarian love actively substantiates human understanding and love. Moreover, it gives faith definition by sharpening the focus of intelligence and reasoning. Ratzinger writes:

¹⁶² Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 63.

¹⁶³ Ratzinger speaking of God's prodigal fidelity notes: "We should live no less from this great certainty, this great joy: that God loves me, this particular person; that he loves each one who has a human face, however disturbed and however distorted that human face might be." Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 60.

¹⁶⁴ For: "Love overcomes evil with good." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.9.

¹⁶⁵ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 62.

¹⁶⁶ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 45. Ratzinger develops this thought further in terms of "abiding": "One further important detail emerges directly from the analysis of the text from 1 John itself: the basic criterion of love, its 'proper work', so to speak—and, thereby, the 'proper work' of the Holy Spirit—is this, that it achieves abiding." Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 45.

¹⁶⁷ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 26, 74. Love is preservative, avoiding wastage: "[it] does not destroy what is distinctive." Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 91. Furthermore: "Just as self-love is not the primordial form of love but at the most a derivative of it, just as one has only arrived at the specific nature of love when one has grasped it as a relation, that is, something coming from another, so, too, human knowledge is only reality when it is being known, being brought to knowledge, and thus again "from another." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 246.

Faith can wish to understand because it is moved by love for the One upon whom it has bestowed its consent.... Love is the desire for intimate knowledge, so *that the quest for intelligence can even be an inner requirement of love*. Love seeks understanding.¹⁶⁸

Intelligence and a reasoning that leads to insight or righteous acts are creational goods; Christian faith allows for the repristination and enrichment of these gifts. Even so, "creative love is neither blind will, nor pure feeling, but love as meaning and meaning as love, [and] because it is the creative reason of all reality, it cannot be reciprocated without logic, without thought and word."¹⁶⁹ Further, "[t]he demands of love do not contradict those of reason"¹⁷⁰ for "the love of God is not founded on a discipline imposed on us from outside, but is constitutively established in us as the capacity and necessity of our rational nature."¹⁷¹ Ratzinger still has yet more to say on the subject; the proper ends of love need to be discovered and embodied reasoning itself needs to pursue them. These are revealed Christotelically by the work, words, and directions of Christ; and pneumatically. They are also dialogical.¹⁷² As the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so he is attentive to the Lord Jesus Christ and operative for his church. Ratzinger writes: "To make things clear, ... Romans 5:5 says: 'God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.¹¹⁷³ Additionally, "The Spirit, in fact, is that interior power which harmonizes [our] hearts with Christ's heart and moves [us] to love [our] brethren as Christ loved them, when he bent down to wash the feet of the disciples."¹⁷⁴ This movement becomes:

¹⁶⁸ Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, 27. Note, too: "[Love] wishes to know ever better the one whom it loves." Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, 27. In a similar manner, loves stands over faith and hope: "Our reflections finally lead of their own accord to the words in which Paul named the main supporting pillars of Christianity: "So faith, hope, love abide, these three; but the greatest of these is love" (1 Cor 13:13)." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 270. Emphasis added.

¹⁶⁹ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 26.

¹⁷⁰ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.30.

¹⁷¹ Joseph Ratzinger, *On Conscience: Two Essays* (San Francisco: The National Catholic Bioethics Center; Ignatius Press, 2007), 31.

¹⁷² Miming a quality of God's interiority: "The one, transcendent God of the Old Testament unveils his innermost life and shows that, in himself, he is a dialogue of eternal love." Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 86.

¹⁷³ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 44. Ratzinger claims earlier: "Analysing biblical pneumatology leads Augustine to formulate the thesis that besides the term 'Holy Spirit', the terms 'love' (*caritas*) and 'gift' (*donum*) are also, in strict terms, names for the Holy Spirit." Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 43.

¹⁷⁴ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.19.

ethics-in-dialogue, because the moral activity of man unfolds from his encounter with God, which means that no longer is it just one's own self-sufficient and autonomous action, mere human accomplishment, but rather a response to the gift of love and so an involvement in the dynamic of love—God's own Self, a dynamic that makes man truly free and brings him to the true height of his dignity.¹⁷⁵

The transformational, dialogical, persevering gift of Pentecost is realised in human reception.¹⁷⁶

Sighting love Christotelically and pneumatologically grounds Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love as it affects human relations.¹⁷⁷ Divine love ceases to be abstract. It acts with compassionate, intelligent intention; reconstitutes, seeks after, and delivers justice;¹⁷⁸ and occasions personal sanctity. It also shows love to be finally triumphant, not in a gloating sense, but as determinative of God's purposes in creation. The fact remains for Christians that "Christ ha[s] become... the discovery of creative love; the rational

¹⁷⁵ Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, 160. Ratzinger warns, however that "Love is ready to understand but not to approve and not to declare as inconsequential what cannot be approved or considered inconsequential." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 398.

¹⁷⁶ By locating dialogue theologically, Ratzinger arrests O'Brien's anxieties ("Dialogue tends to be openended and inconclusive. In dialogue, the partners agree upon a truth that is negotiated at some level. Dialogical truth is achieved through compromise and the development of creative alternatives." Thomas O'Brien, "A Thematic Analysis of 'Love' and 'Truth' in Caritas in Veritate," *Political Theology* 14, no. 5 (2013): 584.). Note, too: "In an *Introduction to Christianity* a deliberate contrast is made between the descent of Jesus into Hell and his ascension into Heaven. According to Ratzinger, these two states form the two poles of the total range of possible human existence. These two poles are existential rather than cosmic. It is possible for any human person to move to the 'hellish' pole through the definite rejection of 'being for' the other. At the opposite pole, the Ascension opens up the possibility for human persons of communion with others through communion with divine love. As Hell can only be self-inflicted, Heaven by nature can only be received as a gift." McGregor, "Heart to Heart," 284.

¹⁷⁷ In relation to faith, Ratzinger argues that "Christian faith does indeed involve a praxis on the part of faith; orthodoxy without orthopraxy fails to reach the core of the Christian reality, namely, love proceeding from grace." Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, 70.

¹⁷⁸ Thus, for Ratzinger "Love (or charity) … encompasses and does not contradict justice, which is traditionally among the foremost of political virtues.... Political, economic, and social life must be informed by gratuitousness and other gifts of love if it is going to flourish. Economic development, for instance, requires more than the logic of exchange and contracts that characterize the market but also the gratuitousness that generates the trust and solidarity on which exchanges depend for their success. Even justice itself depends on the love that exceeds justice.... Christian love is crucial for sustaining political and social life." Daniel Philpott, *Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 162.

principle of the universe ha[s] revealed itself as love—as that greater reason which accepts into itself even darkness and irrationality and heals them."¹⁷⁹

Such love takes on a strong hue when people "realize that God's love is not only spiritual"¹⁸⁰ but also embodied, and that it holds a material and social ecology. Ratzinger states that "the love which addresses us in the Gospel, the Acts and the Apocalypse expresses not merely divine love but also the tangible form of human love," and moreover that "God's Word did not assume an imaginary and inconsequential body."¹⁸¹ On the contrary, when the second person of the Trinity assumed human creatureliness, he affirmed the value of matter and importance of human creatures.¹⁸² Furthermore, Jesus displays in his devotion to the Father, and in his life, death, resurrection and assumption, the qualities and characteristics of humanness in its maximal bearing.¹⁸³ Neighbourly love in action is central to this, reflexively, for "someone who does not love God with all his

¹⁸³ He can be seen as the "Royal Man." Karl Barth, Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance, *Church Dogmatics, Volume IV: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part 2* (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2004), § 64.3.154. See, also: "For Ratzinger, the first step in 'hominisation' was that from animal to logos. But this step is only completed when logos is merged with Logos. Full 'hominisation' only occurs when God becomes man. Ratzinger states that 'only by this event is the Rubicon dividing 'animal' from the 'logical' finally crossed forever and the highest possible development accorded to the process that began when a creature of dust and earth looked out beyond itself and was able to address God as 'You'. ... [Man] is most fully man, indeed the true man, when he not only has contact with the infinite—the Infinite Being! —but is one with him: Jesus Christ.' The goal of hominisation is deification, and in Jesus the Christ it has been reached." McGregor, "Heart to Heart," 57–58. Additionally: "This is the meaning of Christology from its origin: what is disclosed in truth is what the riddle of the human person really intends. Scripture expresses this point by calling Christ the last Adam or 'the second Adam.' It thereby characterizes him as the true fulfilment of the idea of the human person, in which the direction of meaning of this being comes fully to light for the first time." Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," 450.

¹⁷⁹ Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 156.

¹⁸⁰ Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 55.

¹⁸¹ Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 55.

¹⁸² Rowland observes: "Von Balthasar makes the further point, which is strongly taken up by Benedict XVI in *Deus Caritas Est*, that 'the divine figure at the centre of Revelation is to be deciphered not simply as a word, but as absolute love' and that such love is the 'form of the virtues' and the 'form of Revelation'." Rowland, *Ratzinger's Faith*, 50. On a separate note, Ratzinger raises the question as to whether great works of art and architecture could have arisen from people who did not possess a keen appreciation for the material world—for the goodness and beauty which is true of it: "One can of course question whether it would have been possible to build such cathedrals and compose such music if there had not been a deep love for the creation, for matter, and for the body." Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, 43.

heart does not love man, either."¹⁸⁴ Here, Ratzinger's Christotelic methodology is distinctly informative: Jesus' preparedness to die for others discloses and highlights the centrality of love to the immanent Godhead and to its economy—an economy which includes both God's saving activity and his purposes and concerns for human ends in the eschaton.¹⁸⁵ It shows that divine love "is the soul of all theo-logically/eschato-logically oriented exhortations and imperatives, [and] that [it] structures everything in an 'incarnational' manner, seeing God in one's neighbour and one's neighbour in God."¹⁸⁶

Such ends are partially addressed through human solidarity. Suffering seems inescapable to this but is neither meaningless nor fruitless.¹⁸⁷ It teaches compassion, reveals the lengths to which love will go, and speaks plainly on truth. With the Crucified One as his touchstone, Ratzinger writes:

So it is not merely the external beauty of the Redeemer's appearance that is praised: rather, the beauty of truth appears in him, the beauty of God himself, who powerfully draws us and inflicts on us the wound of Love, as it were, a holy *Eros* that enables us to go forth, with and in the Church, his Bride, to meet the Love who calls us.... Whoever believes in God, in the God who revealed himself precisely in the distorted figure of Christ crucified as Love "to the end" (Jn 13:1), knows that beauty is truth and truth beauty; but in the suffering Christ he also learns that the beauty of truth also involves wounds, pain, and even the obscure mystery of death and that this can only be found in accepting pain, not in ignoring it.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, 104. And vice versa, cf. Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity* (London: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982). Yet note: "There is an inseparable link 'between the love of God and the love of thy neighbour. One requires the other in such a close manner that the statement about God's love becomes a lie if one becomes closed to one's neighbour or even gets to hate him.' This means that a fundamental good that man must constantly develop is love. Without multiplying love, every other gift is meaningless. For this reason, only active love introduces man into God's perspective." Robert Necek, "Charity as an Expression of Creative Love," *E-Theologos* 4, no. 1 (2013): 91.

¹⁸⁵ Thus: "He Himself revealed to us that 'God is love' (1 John 4:8) and at the same time taught us that the new command of love was the basic law of human perfection and hence of the worlds transformation." *Gaudium et Spes*, n.38.

¹⁸⁶ Ratzinger, Schürmann, and von Balthasar, Principles of Christian Morality, 33.

¹⁸⁷ "Love is not threatened by any death, any infidelity, or any meaninglessness." Ratzinger, *The Blessing of Christmas*, 31.

¹⁸⁸ Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, 33–34. Additionally, "God is a sufferer because he is a lover; the entire theme of the suffering God flows from that of the loving God and always points back to it." Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 58. Furthermore, and in relation to leadership, prudential judgement, and justice: "Without truth, without trust and love for what is true, there is no social conscience and responsibility, and social action ends up serving private interests and the logic of power, resulting in social fragmentation, especially in a globalized society at difficult times like the present." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.5. So: "It is in the disfigured Face of the Suffering Servant that one finds the ultimate beauty, the beauty of love

From trauma and anguish, however, hope¹⁸⁹ with a distinct accent on justice, arises. Love, here, does not obscure justice, or make it redundant, it endorses it: "True love is excess of justice, excess that goes farther than justice, but never to the destruction of justice, which must be and must remain the basic form of love."¹⁹⁰ In the same way, redemptive love liberates individuals; it frees them from oppressive self-love, enabling them to rise above self-interest in consideration of others.¹⁹¹ Nichols observes that for Ratzinger a form of non-erasure is concomitant with God:

The Father and the Son are not unified to the point of dissolving one in the other. They remain counterposed, since love is founded on such counter-position of a kind that cannot be eliminated. If each remains himself, and does not suppress himself in the other, his being does not for all that remain enclosed in itself. Rather does it express itself in a fecund way, where one gives himself to the other while remaining what he is. Both are one single thing because their love is fecund and transformative. They are themselves, and they are one single reality in the Third, in which they give themselves, in the Gift.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Hope here is distinguished from secular narratives of progress and revolutionary freedom: "[*Deus Caritas Est*] admirably shows how much our Christian life and faith are rooted in hope, in looking and planning for the future, something essential to our life of love, and vice versa. It is a hope therefore that is radically different form an individualistic hope.... But then again [Benedict] shifts attention to an exposition and critique of the degeneracy of Christian hope into Western Enlightenment and revolutionary 'reason' and freedom ideologies. And Benedict concludes correctly (no.26) that it is not science that redeems man; man is redeemed by love." Francis Woehrling, "Caritas in Veritate: Love Shaping the Real World through Rational Understanding," *Catholic Social Science Review* 16 (2011): 15.

¹⁹⁰ Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 118. Earlier, Ratzinger argued that "The upheaval occasioned in God's Heart by the divine love has the effect of quashing his judicial sentence against Israel; God's merciful love conquers his untouchable righteousness (which, in spite of everything, remains untouchable)." Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 64. Later he claims: "God, indeed, does not compete with earthly forms of power, but instead he contrasts the noisy and ostentatious power of this world with the defenceless power of love, which succumbs to death on the Cross and dies ever anew throughout history; yet it is this same love which constitutes the new divine intervention that opposes injustice...." Benedict XVI, *God's Revolution*, 9–10.

¹⁹¹ Also: "To believe is to communicate with Jesus, freeing oneself thereby from the repression that is contrary to the truth, freeing my own 'I', which is shut up in its own self, and making my 'I' a response to the Father: a response to the Yes of love, the Yes pronounced over our existence, that Yes which is our redemption and which overcomes the 'world'." Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, 113. Note, too, "the Christian exodus principle: 'He who loves his life loses it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life' (Jn 12:25; cf. Mk 8:35 par.)." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 254. And finally, "… there can be no love without the purification that comes from suffering, without its patience and humility." Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 11.

¹⁹² Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 139.

that goes to the very end, proving mightier than falsehood and violence. If Ratzinger is concerned about theological aesthetics, it is because he sees the truly beautiful as the encounter with Christ who loves and suffers, and by so doing, saves the world. In this sense, beauty saves the world." Agbaw-Ebai, "The Word Become Love," 36.

Likewise, love does not suppress or dispense with human abilities and intuitions. It validates them. Ratzinger states that:

Divine love is not the denial or the destruction of human love but its deepening, its radical change into a new dimension.... When Jesus speaks of selfabnegation, of losing one's own life, and so forth, he is pointing out the way of genuine self-affirmation ("self-love"), which always requires us to open ourselves, to transcend ourselves.¹⁹³

The pneumatic and Christian experience of love is personally affirming while also selfliberating.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, the renewal of the mind, strengthening of the will and compassionate focus it brings to others promulgate true justice and peace. A Christotelic methodology allows Ratzinger to see that "The triumph of love will be the last word on world history."¹⁹⁵

In sum, an eschatological and Christotelic methodology further aids an understanding of love. It shows love to be both divine and yet human, not simply as a fact of creation, but as its inspiration. In Christ, love reveals itself to be potentiating. The dead body is given life. Human rationality and moral intuitions are given focus; with the Holy Spirit, God renews creaturely minds and hearts. Christotelic love shows itself to be dialogical and deeply concerned with its neighbours. Consequently, it generates righteous, just, and peaceful living.

5. Summary: Ratzinger's theological methods as they pertain to love Ratzinger employs a range of methodologies to explicate his theology. Each acts to make distinctions in his developing understanding of love; but his wide-ranging commentary on the subject does not fit precisely into a methodological schematic—such schemata are developed by scholars to aid interpretation. Ratzinger often voices his

¹⁹³ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 292; 161.

¹⁹⁴ Ratzinger affirms the unique value of every individual elsewhere: "… we should not fall into the opposite error of talking as though the individual were only a small cog in the great cosmic machine. Although it is true that God wants, not just individuals, but all of us in our relations with and for one another, it nonetheless remains true that he knows and loves every single one of us, for ourselves. Jesus Christ, the Son of God and Son of man, in whom there took place the decisive breakthrough of universal history toward the union of the creature with God, was an individual, born of a human mother. He lived a unique life, had his own personal face, and died his own death." Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 59. He also states in his "last testament": "To be loved and to love another are things I have increasingly recognised as fundamental, so that one can live; so that one can say yes to another." Benedict XVI and Seewald, *Last Testament*, loc. 3700 of 4018, Kindle.

¹⁹⁵ Ratzinger, Holy Week, 287.

thoughts on love in a non-academic setting, and at times in gnomic fashion. Ratzinger extensively employs a method of correlation. He also favours an ecclesio-traditio methodology, which in his latter life has become increasingly eucharistic and dialogical. A method of correlation enables Ratzinger to analyse and evaluate love in relation to a people's best cultural formulations; retroduction allows him to probe the conditions that are important for moral formation and ethical response; and an ecclesio-traditio model, whilst miming many of the qualities of correlation in its comparative and contrastive procedures, lets Ratzinger query counterfeited forms of love and cast doubt on secular narratives of human perfectibility—while pointing to the true and the good in the $\kappa \eta \rho \nu \gamma \mu \alpha$, of which the church, as an enduring, eucharistic community, bears witness. Ratzinger's ecclesio-traditio methodology is distinct from correlation because it locates its critical commentator within a believing community. It is closer to retroduction, which with practical wisdom also conducts its analysis from within the particular society it is evaluating. In contrast, the method of correlation places one value from tradition in conversation with another from situation, while seeking to stand outside both. While an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology can fall into the same traps as correlation regarding actual demarcations in what is in effect an eschatological continuum between tradition and situation, it tries to avoid these by speaking from a "great cloud of witnesses."¹⁹⁶ It is not a bystander. Ratzinger's Christotelic methodology resolves the tension between then and now, tradition and situation even more comprehensively than by the use of retroduction and an ecclesio-traditio methodology. It assumes the accidentals of history into divine purposes. It is like an inner core to an *ecclesio-traditio* model; and it is unsurprising, given Ratzinger's late- focus on Jesus of Nazareth and eschatology. While an ecclesio-traditio methodology is Catholic in its emphasis on the eucharist, liturgy and tradition, a Christotelic methodology carries Lutheran tones with its accent on solus Christus. Theologically and philosophically, it offers the strongest possible grounds for love. It moves from the declarative statements of belief of an ecclesio-traditio methodology to the subject of belief as its authenticating referent. That same subject is he who generates and sustains the converted life; and as Ratzinger has sensed through the method of retroduction this remains the acid test of love's claims on moral worth, human significance, and practical utility.

¹⁹⁶ Heb 12:1, New International Version.

6. Joseph Ratzinger's analysis and evaluation of love

This chapter has outlined Ratzinger's understanding and evaluation of love in order to advance my thesis on the importance of love, reason, and their interrelation. It has interacted with forty-three of his books, three encyclicals and several of his journal articles and more informal publications. Ratzinger has a high view of love. No other subject seems to preoccupy him so greatly.

In nuce, Ratzinger finds love to be divine. In consequence, it is also basic to creation. Creational love is contingent. Divine love is characterised by gift and reception, reiterated. Love gives as if it cannot help itself. Yet creation seems so structured by love that it receives; and furthermore, it acts reciprocally, giving back as it can, and in ways which are unique. Love, in general, is creative, and generative. It can bring something from nothing and seems often to produce more good than that anticipated, making the sum of an enterprise greater than its parts. Love is commonly known to be affirming and sustaining.

In the natural domain, love is also relational. Relationality seems to be a defining quality of love. Love by definition loves. Love is dynamic and so outward looking, considerate, persistent, and self-sacrificial for others. It wills the best in others and draws it out of them. Love is formative; it draws a moral horizon and affects moral reasoning. It is responsible, it cannot be otherwise as it always seeks out what will be beneficial for those who are drawn to it. Love is truthful; it highlights evil and honours reasoning and actions that work towards good ends. Most interestingly, the experience of love is also that it is unrestricted; people find it unquantifiable, ineffable, and superabundant—they intuit it as limitless. In this manner, Ratzinger finds a principle of superfluity that corresponds with, and points to something more than the natural.

In the light of the ecclesia, and its conceptions of God's self-disclosure in history, love is known to be divine. It is holy, powerful, sacrificial, and healing. It enables people to endure heartbreak and adversity. It grieves with those who grieve but seeks to create the conditions for righteousness and justice to prosper, honouring God and his purposes for humanity. In Ratzinger's eyes, love is eucharistically expressed through the continual ecstasy of gift and reception.

In Christ, love is exegeted. He makes sense of things. The love that becomes incarnate is the same intelligent, creative love that imbues creation with intelligibility. It is also the love that freely determines to act on behalf of creation when it loses its way. Love proves so strong that it overturns the hopeless alienation of a destitute set of relations, even facing off death. Love as a second paraclete¹⁹⁷ works to sanctify individuals in community. It invites them into richer, but not necessarily trouble free, life; and promises divine fellowship. It recreates human affections and renews the human mind. It takes hold of, sublates, and tends to human reasoning and moral imagining. Love requires intelligent, expansive, and generous moral agency among those it has made; and with its inbreaking and continuing work in creation, it guarantees this comes to pass. For Ratzinger, love has purpose: this is because in the Godhead he believes, and in Christ he sees, "love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love."¹⁹⁸ In God, love is indivisible with intelligence, reason, truth, and person(s); love is not abstract, it is em-personed; it is an inseparable constituent of a living, divine, person-it is something that cannot stand or exist alone. Love's value is superlative as it appears to bind relations together and to be the inspirational force that moves them to act. It is a "Yes" that is outward looking and creative. Just as love is em-personed, for Ratzinger, so it seems is intelligence. Intelligence and love are inseparable and harmoniously work together. Love is not chaotic; it is properly ordered, consistent, clear-sighted, and intentional. Without love things come to a moral standstill and then degenerate. For Ratzinger, any discussion of hope is only meaningful and possible if it focuses on the divine love of the three persons of the Trinity and human participation in it. In the following chapter, I will show how Lonergan's work on contingent predication, created participations and conversion, precisely sharpens a reader's understanding of this same hope as it relates to reason and love.

¹⁹⁷ "He will send another paraclete...." Jn 14:16, New International Version.

¹⁹⁸ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, n.30.

Chapter Four: Bernard Lonergan on Reason and Love

Introduction

It seems contradictory and fruitless to speak of Joseph Ratzinger and Bernard Lonergan at one and the same time. The perception is the two do not go together. Their background, education, formation, spirituality, charisms, roles within the Catholic church, writing interests, writing styles and target audiences differ. It is an adage that Ratzinger's work is not adversative to Platonic thought and is Augustinian in temper. Lonergan, in contrast, is penned into an Aristotelian mould, and nominated as a "transcendental Thomist" after the Angelic Doctor. Moreover, Ratzinger is seen as a traditionalist and conservative, who is suspicious of modernity; whereas Lonergan, too closely allied to modern philosophy and the "turn to the self," is accused of flirting with idealism—the predictable consequence of embracing a methodology that begins with the subject.¹ In terms of priorities and how they go about their work, the two men are held to diverge.

Structure

Over the next two chapters, I will argue that despite perception, Ratzinger and Lonergan have more in common than in difference. Both loom large in the twentieth century as leading Catholic intellectuals; both share a strong commitment to the Catholic church; both wrestle with the times—with modernity, totalitarianism, war, social and political justice, scientific advances, and birth control; and both are acutely aware of the emergence of historical consciousness, the problem of relativism, and of the long and extensive shadows cast by Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist, and existential thought. More importantly to this dissertation, they are keenly interested in reason and rationality, and how these factor ethically; and within the same context, they show, arguably, an even stronger concern for love.

In this chapter, I focus on Lonergan's analysis and evaluation of reason, love, and their interrelation. I do so to advance a central claim in my thesis that Lonergan's articulation of reason, love, and their interrelation acts as an informative and constructive interlocution to Ratzinger's assertion that love and reason are inseparable and must be considered together.

¹ With the Leuven Thomists in mind. Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Octagon Books, 1983).

In Chapter Five, I will go on to show that while the above noted characterisations of Ratzinger and Lonergan have some truth to them, both men are far closer to each other in their interests, understandings, and commitments than they first appear. I will move beyond what Lonergan calls "taking a look" and show that reason and love are of critical importance to both authors—and that for each of them love has a transformational relation with reason, and in consequence the individual and wider community. For Lonergan, this becomes a matter of "religious conversion," of being loved, and of being in love.

In Chapter Five, I will also show that Lonergan's cognitional structure and his first three levels of intentional consciousness allow for a critical realism that addresses Ratzinger's concerns over technical, positivistic, and scientific knowledge. This reading, with an analysis of a "fourth level of consciousness," moral conversion, and other Lonergan elements that refine the grace–nature distinction, helps to integrate Ratzinger's understanding of the interrelation between reason and love. It also confirms that Ratzinger has highlighted a valuable link between love and reason which offers a rich apologetic to contemporary society, while simultaneously exposing the limitations of competitor epistemologies and their immiserated ethical systems.

Methodological considerations

To assist in an analysis of Ratzinger's understanding of reason and love, I introduced, in chapters two and three of this dissertation, four methodological categories: correlation, retroduction, an *ecclesio-traditio*, and a Christotelic methodology. These provided reasonable means for distinguishing aspects of Ratzinger's thought, for showing his concerns, and for delineating his *a priori* and *a posteriori* commitments. It is possible to use these same fields for Lonergan. One could argue, for instance, Lonergan's claim that "[a]ny present is powerful in the measure that past achievement lives on in it"² underwrites an *ecclesio-traditio* methodology; or that his "transcendental Thomism," reflecting Pope Leo XIII's maxim *vetera novis augere et perficere* (increase and perfect the old by means of the new), speaks to a method of correlation that takes serious but not imprudent note of Kant's epistemic work, and wider scientific methodological advances. Likewise, Lonergan's exploration of "natural knowledge," of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness—his development of a Generalised Empirical Method (GEM)—and his

² Cited in Johannes Kristiansen and Svein Rise, eds., *Key Theological Thinkers: From Modern to Postmodern* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 239.

discussion of value judgements and a scale of values are not alien to a method of retroduction with its emphasis on *what is*, and *what works*. Neither does Lonergan downplay Christology or teleology. It is quite possible to discuss features of his work through a Christotelic methodological lens, too; but to do so, bends his intentions out of shape—more so, than when using the other three methodological categories.

This raises an important consideration. The categories I have used to analyse Ratzinger's thought on reason and love are reflective of the methodological tools he uses at any given time to further particular ends. They are various, effective, and instrumental. In contrast, to this many-sided approach, Lonergan's entire theological project is singularly attentive to method. He employs method in an attempt to neutralise the threat of relativism, and find continuity, certainty, and stability. Even when it is under development, there is direction, contiguity, consistency, and coherence in Lonergan's methodology. To put it another way, and in Lonergan's terms, the first three levels of intentional consciousness finessed in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957) carry over into Method in Theology (1972) and his later writings without alteration. While terms are backgrounded or jettisoned, there is a singular if progressive direction to his methodology. For this reason, I will try to explain Lonergan's thought on reason and love on his own terms. To reiterate, it is possible to use the same categories I used to hold up Ratzinger's thought in chapters two and three of this dissertation, but where they fall quite naturally with Ratzinger, they appear more forced and tenuous with Lonergan. His deliberate attention to method cautions I do not do so. Therefore, in this chapter, I will try to analyse and evaluate Lonergan's thought on reason and love according to his own methodological intentionality.

1. Bernard Lonergan: transcendental method

To explore Lonergan's understanding of reason is to pry open his transcendental method, which developed over time. It is also to ask what he was trying to do, and why—questions with answers that coincide with Ratzinger's primary interests, especially as Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Faith, and Pope.

Lonergan was trying to effect four things: the renewal of Catholic theology; the integration of old with new, on a range of fronts; objectivity; and credibility, in terms of

apologetics³—showing that Christian belief was meaningful, relevant and important, and that it could bear scrutiny and interact with philosophical stances that would seem to undermine it. The last three objectives flow from the first: the recognition of the need and desire for a renewal of Catholic theology.

The push for renewal of Catholic theology has a complex genealogy. On the one hand, it marks a relation with philosophy that throughout church history witnessed theologians at work either with or as philosophers (for instance, Quadratus, Aristides, Athenagoras, Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Anslem of Bec). On the other hand, it reflected an urgent need. At the close of the nineteenth century, two encyclicals *Aeterni Patris* (1879) and *Rerum Novarum* (1891) addressed, in different ways, perceived intellectual decay and its potentially grave consequences. Accordingly, the work of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and René Descartes (with his turn to the self),⁴ had unintendedly widened a breach in the relationship between philosophy and faith:

For it pleased the struggling innovators of the sixteenth century to philosophize without any respect for faith, the power of inventing in accordance with his own pleasure and bent being asked and given in turn by each one. Hence, it was natural that systems of philosophy multiplied beyond measure, and conclusions differing and clashing one with another arose about those matters even which are the most important in human knowledge. From a mass of conclusions men often come to wavering and doubt; and who knows not how easily the mind slips from doubt to error? But, as men are apt to follow the lead given them, this new pursuit seems to have caught the souls of certain Catholic philosophers, who, throwing aside the patrimony of ancient wisdom, chose rather to build up a new edifice than to strengthen and complete the old by aid of the new-ill-advisedly, in sooth, and not without detriment to the sciences.⁵

The existential threat to the church and peaceable society was that theologians and lawmakers would discard valid insights and traditions for new-fangled ways; that either socialism or unbridled capitalism would carry off the unthinking, and that the political and social equilibrium which accommodated the dignity of work and the rights of labourers, with the right to private property would be disturbed. For Leo XIII, European Enlightenment, in its various guises, not only undermined ecclesial authority, biblical revelation, and objective truth, but also endangered the social fabric—an indictment

³ Kristiansen and Rise, Key Theological Thinkers, 239.

⁴ Yet, "Lonergan's program does not originate with any doubt about the veracity of sense. It originates with a question about the structure of inquiry and learning." Jeremy Wilkins, *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 175.

⁵ AP n.24.

echoed by Benedict XVI. In response to a farrago of half-truths and intellectual promiscuity, he called for a Thomistic revival—that

While, therefore, We hold that every word of wisdom, every useful thing by whomsoever discovered or planned, ought to be received with a willing and grateful mind, We exhort you, venerable brethren, in all earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the sciences.⁶

The difficulty thereafter was determining what constituted "the golden wisdom" of Thomas; how to transpose it into a contemporary context, and how to differentiate those features of Thomas' work, or his methodology, from its content. At least three approaches to these challenges developed: neo-Thomism, historical Thomism, and transcendental Thomism.

Neo-Thomists, such as, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and Henri Grenier, much in the manner of later literary scholars I. A. Richards and John Crowe Ransom and the school of *New Criticism*, focused on meaning in a text and on the elimination of contradiction. The text, not the reader, was where authority lay. Their underlying assumptions—that language was stable, meaning static, and that authors were unaffected by the age they lived in with its ways of understanding and concomitant values—allowed for the hermeneutical position that texts speak timelessly and "equally to every age."⁷ The drive became to determine what Aquinas had delivered in his work, and put it as "manuals" in front of present-day readers for consumption.⁸ Arguably, a certain hermeneutical and pedagogical naivety pertained to this endeavour.

In contrast, historical Thomists placed emphasis on an intellectual continuum, with, for instance, Étienne Gilson demarcating Aquinas' relations within the philosophical frame of the Medieval world (European, classical and Arabic).⁹ In showing how Aquinas' subject matter related to a lineage of ideas and the questions these addressed, historical Thomists,

⁶ AP n.31. Cited in Neil Ormerod, *Faith and Reason: The Possibility of a Christian Philosophy* (Minneapois: Fortress Press, 2017), 16.

⁷ Ormerod, *Faith and Reason*, 17.

⁸ Gerard Whelan notes that such "manuals were offered to the young Lonergan, training him in Aristotelian logic and in skills of apologetics to defend Catholic truth. [But] little encouragement was given to speaking of personal experience, to cultivating one's own powers of inquiry, or to investigating questions that had not already been answered by authorities from the past." Gerard Whelan, "The Continuing Significance of Bernard Lonergan," *Thinking Faith* (September 2008): 2.

https://www.thinkingfaith.org/articles/20080923_1.htm.

⁹ Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

such as Jacques Maritain and, especially, Alasdair MacIntyre were able point to a tradition of rationality which then situated Aquinas not in heroic isolation, but among a series of intergenerational scholars engaged in philosophical determinations, for example, on the subject of being. This methodology in turn aided the extension and transposition of Aquinas' thought into a contemporary setting, not limited to Christian circles—dialogue on being, of course, not being the purview of theologians alone.

A third way of bringing "the special bulwark and glory"¹⁰ of Aquinas alive to the present was through what came to be called transcendental Thomism. Here, philosophers, theologians, and psychologists, like Joseph Maréchal placed Aquinas in conversation with the novel approaches to epistemology and metaphysics pioneered by Descartes and Immanuel Kant. Their premise was that the turn to the self (or turn to the subject) "could be brought into alignment with Thomistic cognitional and epistemological theories and lead eventually to a Thomistic metaphysics."¹¹ Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan are those best known for this approach.¹²

The point to note is that neo-Thomism, historical Thomism, and transcendental Thomism represent a response to the call by Leo XIII for a Thomistic recovery. Lonergan, in his work to do for this age what Aquinas did for his, exemplifies the desire to maintain the relation between theology and philosophy without denigrating or degrading either. His transcendental method shows how this relation can be maintained, and for my purposes, more importantly, how Ratzinger's concerns over positivistic or scientific reasoning can be reconsidered and allayed.

Maintaining the relation between theology and philosophy (*pace* Aquinas) falls in with two other of Lonergan's objectives: the integration of the old with the new, and credibility regarding Christian apologetics. Gerard Whelan, remembering a visit in 2006 by Benedict XVI to the Pontifical Gregorian University that he was "privileged to witness," writes "the Holy Father stressed the importance of theological reflection today, and of the immense needs for a creative engagement with [contemporary] culture.... He

¹⁰ Cited in Ormerod, *Faith and Reason*, 16.

¹¹ Ormerod, Faith and Reason, 19.

¹² Ormerod notes transcendental Thomism "has not been without its philosophical critics, perhaps most vocal of all being Gilson. Gilson argued that the turn to the subject present within this approach inevitably ended up with a self-enclosed subject unable to break out to make contact with reality. By conceding the idealist starting point, the inevitable outcome was idealism, not the realism inherent in Thomism." Ormerod, *Faith and Reason*, 20.

added that theology must avoid being a mere 'sterile repetition' of achievements of the past but something that is vital and attractive to thinking people today."¹³ Whelan continues by arguing this is precisely what Lonergan did during his life. He notes two linchpin moments in Lonergan's development: "From Newman and Augustine, Lonergan first acquired the insight that he would develop throughout his life: that philosophy should not begin with metaphysics but with an account of concrete, lived experience." And secondly that:

instead of being a dry and dogmatic logician as the manualist authors portrayed him, Aquinas was in fact a genius who was a model of the kind of searching enquiry that Lonergan had also found in works of John Henry Newman and St. Augustine. In Aquinas, Lonergan found a yet more profound account of the working of the human mind than he had found in these other authors. Lonergan was of course aware that Aquinas was working within the limits of the Latin language and a medieval worldview.... Nevertheless, he became convinced that, ... the thought of Aquinas could be brought into dialogue with that of Descartes and Kant and so brought to help solve a number of modern philosophical problems.¹⁴

Lonergan came to see, not just via Newman and Augustine, but also in his study of Aquinas, firstly, that epistemic method should start with the world as we experience it, and secondly, that by attending to data Aquinas had actually illustrated the workings of the human mind, thus providing a basis for cognitional theory.¹⁵ Lonergan would go on to investigate the internal data of consciousness, developing his Generalised Empirical Method, and integrating the old with the new. Additionally, his interaction over an elevenyear period with authors such as Leopold von Ranke, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Soren Kierkegaard, and his debilitating experience of cancer sharpened his relevance apologetically in relation to the dramas of life and human affections. His awareness of levels of consciousness deepened and culminated with the introduction of a fourth level—a level that dealt with affections and responsible consciousness.

I will comment more fully on Lonergan's account of cognitional structure and his transcendental method in the next subsection (1.1), but as a segue to doing so, I would like to draw attention to two further considerations bearing on the issues of relevance and objectivity. The first relates to Lonergan's awareness of the growing significance of

¹³ Whelan, "The Continuing Significance of Bernard Lonergan," 1.

¹⁴ Whelan, "The Continuing Significance of Bernard Lonergan," 4.

¹⁵ Lonergan spoke of his long years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas—of his "eleven-year apprenticeship to St. Thomas Aquinas." Cited in Whelan, "The Continuing Significance of Bernard Lonergan," 4.

historical consciousness and of the need to enter into dialogue with it. The second is Lonergan's commitment to objectivity, and concern with truth. Both are critical concerns for Ratzinger.

Lonergan grasped early on in his studies that history was gathering momentum as a leading explanatory and predictive "science," and that Catholic theology was not taking sufficient notice of the growth in historical consciousness. "Twice during his theology studies he wrote to his Provincial superior in Canada asking that he be allowed to commit his life to developing a philosophy of history 'that [would] leave Hegel and Marx, in spite of the enormity of their achievement, in the shade'."¹⁶ Rather than seeing higher criticism and advances in Protestant scholarship as a threat, Lonergan saw them as an opportunity. Ormerod observes that the:

rise [of historical consciousness] and the critical historical methodologies thus generated had effectively thrown Catholic theology into methodological disarray, shifting the status of the standard sources of theology (e.g. Bible, the Fathers, Church Councils) from being premises for theological arguments to being data for historical investigation. Far from being simply problematic, this shift also offered theology a way forward from the endless disputes over various theological issues by attending more closely to the historical contexts and developments associated with them. As Lonergan notes, "concepts have dates", and are not existing in some sort of eternal immutable noetic realm.¹⁷

A move from treating biblical, patristic, and conciliar sources simply as premises for theological arguments to studies that aimed at understanding the historical consciousness which forged them would enrich theological scholarship, and through comparison with current intellectual and cultural patterns elucidate its intentions and show its relevance. The difficulty historical consciousness posed, however, was its obvious tendency to relativise societies, cultures, and values. Its analytical frame begged questions of relationships between one set of historical understandings and another—of how a people understood their history, themselves, and their counterparts within that history, and how these understandings related to earlier historical narratives, alternative or counter narratives, and future ambitions. Lonergan wanted to recognise advances in historical method while avoiding a historicism that denied normative claims in theology.

In developing his transcendental method, Lonergan found a way to do so. His contention was that in coming to *"thoroughly understand what it is to understand… you*

¹⁶ Whelan, "The Continuing Significance of Bernard Lonergan," 3.

¹⁷ Neil Ormerod, "Method in Theology: All My Work Has Been Introducing History into Catholic theology," *Gregorianum* 101, no. 4 (2020): 887.

*will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.*¹⁸ Intentional consciousness would lead to an authentic subjectivity, which in turn would yield true objectivity, and a method for theology that would guard its integrity while taking account of scholarly and philosophical innovation.

Lonergan stated that "all [his] work ha[d] been introducing history into Catholic theology."¹⁹ This was in response to a reality—the burgeoning of historical consciousness and the impact of historical critical studies—but also an opportunity: to turn Catholic theology's methodological failure to appreciate history's significance and utility into a means for enriching theological understanding and grappling with truth. As I hope to illustrate, Lonergan's concern with history, objectivity, and truth are centripetal to Ratzinger's theological vision, too.²⁰ The two have more in common than commonly thought.

1.1 Intentional consciousness

The starting point for a discussion on cognitional structure and transcendental method is Lonergan's conviction that human consciousness works in dynamic, unchanging, and repeated patterns.²¹ Furthermore, that there are transcendental notions, or impulses, within human consciousness that tend towards self-transcendence (but can be frustrated). *Insight* explores the first three levels of consciousness—the empirical,

¹⁸ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), xxviii. Also note Frederick Lawrence: "Lonergan's close study of Thomas on the relationship between understanding and formulation/judgment in relation to the natural analogy for Trinitarian theology uncovered the factual psychological basis in experience for the metaphysical account of understanding and judgment in Thomas's writings: 'Aquinas attributed the key role in cognitional theory not to inner words, concepts, but to acts of understanding.'" Jeffrey Bloechl, ed., *Christianity and Secular Reason: Classical Themes and Modern Developments* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 241.

¹⁹ Cited in Ormerod, "All My Work Has Been Introducing History," 887.

²⁰ On the relation of history and theology, Ormerod notes: "Joseph Ratzinger concurs in terms of the size of the problem facing theology. He identifies the need to find 'a better synthesis between historical and theological methods, between higher criticism and church doctrine' (Joseph Ratzinger, "Foundations and Approaches of Biblical Exegesis," *Origins*, 17/35 [1988] 596)." Ormerod, "All My Work Has Been Introducing History," 887.

²¹ Kristiansen and Rise, *Key Theological Thinkers*, 241. See also: "Lonergan's starting point, as we will see, is not an idealism, or some putatively immanent subject unrelated to the world. It is 'know thyself' in a distinctive sense. Its precepts are self-attention, self-understanding, self-knowledge, and the fundamental decision he named self-appropriation." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 132.

intellectual, and rational²²—while *Method in Theology* introduces a fourth level of consciousness—taking a position or being responsible. The key characteristic of consciousness is that it is exactly that: conscious. A person not only experiences, understands, ponders, and acts, but also experiences experiencing, understanding, pondering, and acting. Intentional consciousness is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible (four levels of consciousness); and it involves conscious acts that intend an object—relating to something that is an object of enquiry. Done faithfully, it is not only positively transformative for the individual as self-appropriation (as a form of self-knowledge), but also for society as individuals act for the good of others. Conscious intentionality is either done well or badly, but without exception it is a human phenomenon.

The first three levels of consciousness—that Lonergan addresses in *Insight*—take account of discoveries into knowing derived from modern philosophy, science, and psychology. Working synthetically, Lonergan binds together findings from his studies of Aquinas with arguments from Descartes,²³ Kant, Kierkegaard, and later, Jean Piaget.²⁴ The result is a movement away from the explanatory paradigm of faculty psychology (the domestic, conceptual, and linguistic framework of theologians and philosophers for at least a millennium) to "intentionality analysis." Jeremy Wilkins underscores the significance of this shift, noting that:

instead of distinct faculties [common to metaphysical analysis] whose relationships remain to be determined, we have a clear and exact determination of the relationship between levels. Each subsequent level presupposes and complements the prior (later [Lonergan] will call this 'sublation') (*Insight 299*). [Moreover] the basic terms and relations of faculty psychology are attained by

²² Lonergan does not use the language of intentionality analysis in *Insight* but later notes that this is what he was doing there. B.J. F. Lonergan, A Second Collection (cf. nt. 3), 188. Ormerod, "All My Work Has Been Introducing History," 891.

²³ But note, "Where Descartes postulates God to recover the world he has bracketed, Lonergan comes to God through the world of God's good creation, the love of God's self-donation, and the recoil of conscience from sin and evil." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 176.

²⁴ Lonergan, *Insight*, 364–5, 413–14, 27–29, 647; Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Horizons," in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965–1980, Volume 17*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 320. Bloechl, *Christianity and Secular Reason*, 259.

deductive inference [whereas] the basic terms and relations of cognitional theory are attained by grasping and verifying a structure given in consciousness.²⁵

Lonergan puts aside the metaphysical analysis of natural proportion, and the language of the "faculties"—of soul, will, potential, and act—in favour of cognitional intentionality and levels of consciousness.²⁶ Further, cognitional theory turns on verifying the terms and relations that are themselves present, universally, to consciousness, and not in consequence of deducing faculties from objects and acts. Cognitional intentionality operates on three levels: the level of data, of questions for intelligence, and questions for reflection. The first level is attentive to data; the second level generates insights and accompanying formulations; the third level engenders reflection, and judgement. The remarkable feature here is that the terms and relations so described are invulnerable to revision. As Wilkins notes, "the basic terms and relations of cognitional theory are not

If A, then B; but A; therefore B,

scientific theory proceeds by testing implications predicted by theory, according to the form

If A, then B; but B; therefore, probably A,

where A is a hypothesis, and B is some set of testable implications. Such a procedure can never yield certain results because the testable implications B cannot exclude the possibility of some more satisfactory hypothesis A'. Consequently, scientific theory is subject to paradigm shifts in which its basic terms and relations are revised....A paradigm shift does not invalidate the verified concepts of earlier science (though it may eliminate unverified postulates, like the luminiferous aether), but it does displace them as ultimately significant, as basically explanatory, as fruitful for the progress of scientific understanding. Although Lonergan seems not to have quite realized it at the time, in *Insight* he was, in fact, effecting just such a paradigm shift with respect to faculty psychology. The shift is effected by the introduction of a new technique, intentionality analysis, and the discovery and verification of a new set of basic terms and relations, cognitional theory." Jeremy Wilkins, "What 'Will' Won't Do," 478. Note also Lawrence's observation as to Lonergan's *Verbum* study as an instrument for disclosing an apologetic handshake: "The point of the study is all-important, because it establishes an empirically verifiable meaning for the term *reason* as a common ground upon which all people of intelligence—secular or religious—may meet." Bloechl, *Christianity and Secular Reason*, 259.

²⁵ Jeremy Wilkins, "What 'Will' Won't Do: Faculty Psychology, Intentionality Analysis, and the Metaphysics of Interiority," *The Heythrop Journal* 57, no. 3 (May 2016): 477-78, https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12298.

²⁶ Wilkins states, too, that "in *Verbum* [written between 1946 and 1949, eight years earlier than *Insight*], Lonergan remarked that one of the significant limitations of Thomist psychology was that it was generically metaphysical and only specifically psychological. Indeed, he explained that it was a significant barrier to the construction of the *Verbum* study itself. In order to convey Thomas Aquinas's meaning, he found it expedient to reverse this order and begin from the psychological facts, even though this option was severely criticized by some. This remark, and the strategy adopted in *Verbum*, are a first indication of the difference between metaphysical analysis of natural proportion and intentionality analysis of cognitional structure." Wilkins continues: "Whereas the general form of deductive inference is

formulated by moving away from the immediate data, but are themselves given, discovered, and verified in the immediate data of consciousness."²⁷ Thus the terms and relations of cognitional theory provide stable grounds for epistemic enquiry, and offer means for attending to some of the anxieties Ratzinger and others associate with the turn to the self, idealism, and relativism.

In *Insight*, Lonergan draws the conclusion that true knowledge and therefore objectivity come to be known through particular acts of self-transcending which tend toward an authenticity which in itself is characterised by habitual self-transcendence²⁸—a thoroughgoing intentional consciousness working on three levels.²⁹ In *Method*, published fifteen years later, this knowledge becomes more expansive and comprehensive; it incorporates two further elements, moral and religious truth, which in relation to method in turn effects a greater degree of self-transcendence. A person is understood not merely to be rational and intellectual, but also as someone who makes moral determinations, favouring one course of action over another, and affectively responding to values. She is responsible;

²⁷ Wilkins, "What 'Will' Won't Do," 474. And Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 145. And, "Lonergan argues that these first principles of reason express the immanent norms constitutive of the rationality of all traditions of enquiry and, therefore, are not subject to revision...although they are tradition-constituted, they are also trans-traditionally normative." Michael Maxwell, "A Dialectical Encounter Between MacIntyre and Lonergan on the Thomistic Understanding of Rationality," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (December, 1993), https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq199333439.

²⁸ Later, Lonergan introduces self-appropriation—something that is not necessarily the prerequisite for knowledge or objectivity, but for understanding how knowledge is attained and why it is objective. And note that "the practice of self-appropriation is first in relation to an ordering of inquiry rather than an ordering of topics, fields, objects, or scientific subjects in the Aristotelian sense. Its priority is not temporal, but methodological. It is an ordering of activities rather than an ordering of contents.... If the activities of intelligence are the characteristic activity of human beings as human, then self-appropriation also yields a fundamental anthropology." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 179.

²⁹ "In the self-transcendence which one can find as an operative catalyst within the human subject, a given human subject is not content to remain within one level but is always struggling to move beyond a current level of achievement to a higher, richer level of consciousness. A subject in experiencing his or her world wants to move into understanding, and then from understanding into reflection (judging), and from these into moral evaluation and decision (deciding)." Chae Young Kim, "Bernard Lonergan's Approach to Religious Value in a Pluralistic Age," *Gregorianum* 93, no. 1 (2012): 12, https://doi.org/23582036. "The levels of reflection for Lonergan serve only as a means, even if a necessary means, to a practical end: the appropriation of oneself as a knower." James Kanaris, "The "Ins and Outs" of Religious Love: Bernard Lonergan's Pragmatics," *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses* 27, no. 3 (September 1998): 301, https://doi.org/10.1177/000842989802700304.

and she is *to be* responsible (a fourth transcendental precept for a fourth level of consciousness). She is also religious.³⁰

With *Method*, the four levels explored by an intentional consciousness are contiguous. By deliberately addressing a range of questions the conscious mind moves from data to insight and hypothesis (what is it?), to weighing evidence and judgment (is it so?), to taking a position, and to responsible action (is it good?). As a person asks these questions, she travels in an upward movement through the levels of consciousness, which in their totality Lonergan came to call the "creative vector."³¹

Lonergan also came to realise that a "healing vector," associated with religious conversion, as a matter of grace, worked correspondingly from "above" with a downward press to it. The healing vector connected with, strengthened, and "perfected" a person's life and work in the creative vector. The four levels present to intentional consciousness are bounded by four "transcendental precepts": Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. The healing vector transforms the horizon within which they operate (discussed shortly and in detail with the creative vector, and religious, moral, and intellectual conversion in subsection 1.2).

I want to highlight that for Lonergan an intentionality in consciousness does not necessarily terminate in the self-absorption, moral apathy, or idealism that worries Ratzinger. Indeed, the turn to the subject suggests the opposite. It speaks of a good. It entails, in the mode of Augustine's "I had become a question to myself,"³² the subject turning away from herself—standing outside of herself, or perhaps more accurately decentering herself.³³ As she responds to the transcendental precepts, she is drawn out of herself in a movement towards objectivity: the thing itself becomes the focus for enquiry. Consciousness works authentically when it listens to these precepts. When it fails to do so,

³⁰ "The human subject is a dynamic whole, a living trajectory toward religious, moral and intellectual self-transcendence." David Hammond, "Interpreting Faith and Reason: Denys Turner and Bernard Lonergan in Conversation," *Horizons* 35, no. 2 (2008): 202, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0360966900005442.

³¹ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (New York; London: Paulist Press; G Chapman, 1985), 100–09.

³² Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10.33.

³³ "Thus, the central purpose of Lonergan's pedagogy of self-discovery, his turn to the subject, was not to enclose but to decenter the subject by bringing to light the inherent relatedness of subjectivity to the world.

The humility of recognizing our situatedness, horizon, brokenness, and blindness need not involve us in relativism." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 65.

it degenerates into inauthenticity, and the type of subjectivity which Ratzinger rightly inveighs against and warns his readers to avoid.

Note, too, that not only is true objectivity touched on by authentic subjectivity, but so is sanctity. Conscious intentionality, attentiveness to transcendental imperatives (be attentive, be intelligent...), upward motion in the creative vector, downward sublation³⁴ through the healing vector, forgiveness, and reconciliation, each contribute to the emergence of individuals in their being-perfected humanity. Sin, in contrast, and *in nuce*, "is alienation from man's authentic being, which is self-transcendence."³⁵ Robert Egan explains:

To transcend oneself cognitively is to move beyond what one happens to think or believe to that which reflects reality as it truly is; and to transcend oneself morally is to go beyond what one happens to value to that which is truly valuable... Sin is the failure to properly grasp value.³⁶

And to act on that understanding. But if sin is a failure to grasp the truly valuable, then sinfulness marks the absence of love. Sin:

is the privation of total loving; it is a radical dimension of lovelessness. That dimension can be hidden by sustained superficiality, by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world offers to challenge our resourcefulness, to relax our bodies, to distract our minds. But escape may not be permanent and then the absence of fulfilment reveals itself in unrest, the absence of joy in the pursuit of fun, the absence of peace in disgust—a depressive disgust with oneself or a manic, hostile, even violent disgust with mankind.³⁷

Sanctity, in contrast, is characteristic of someone who habitually attends to the transcendental precepts, and who has experienced religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Just so, Lonergan contends that "[h]oliness abounds in truth and moral goodness, but it has a distinct dimension of its own. It is other-worldly fulfilment, joy,

³⁴ "Because intellectual, moral, and religious conversions all have to do with self-transcendence, it is possible, when all three occur within a single consciousness, to conceive their relations in terms of sublation. I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context." Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), 241.

³⁵ Lonergan, *Method*, 364.

³⁶ Robert Egan, "Epistemological Foundations for a Theology of Sin," *The Heythrop Journal* 57, no. 3 (May 2016), https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12318.

³⁷ Lonergan, *Method*, 243.

peace, bliss. In Christian experience these are the fruits of being in love with a mysterious, uncomprehended God."³⁸

Intentional consciousness, therefore, secures authentic subjectivity, which accordingly sustains an accurate understanding of reality, truth, and right action.³⁹ The fourth level of consciousness, with its transcendental precept, be responsible, is pivotal to this. It begs the question who or what does a person love and therefore where does she "fundamentally and ultimately stand?"⁴⁰ Such queries immediately expose the liminal range of a person's horizon and the way she will interact with her social and physical world. They also raise the question and open up the possibility of conversion. The articulation of a fifth transcendental precept—*be in love*⁴¹—potentially reorients her. Even so, Ormerod states that:

Conversion precipitates a different movement within consciousness, a healing movement from 'above, downwards' whereby ...'being in love' ... transforms the responsible, rational, intellectual, and empirical levels of consciousness by opening them to greater levels of receptivity to the realities they encounter.⁴²

Further to this, conversion illuminates a person's values, enabling them to distinguish the truly good from the merely satisfying. The effects of religious conversion flow into her moral and intellectual assessments, reframing and redirecting the upward

³⁸ Lonergan, *Method*, 242.

³⁹ But note, "The subject that comes to light through Lonergan's first philosophy, then, is not an immanent monad struggling to get out. It is the self-transcending subject who is already related to the world not only through its sensorium but, far more importantly, through its questions (and consequently, through the answers that respond to them). Lonergan's cognitional theory is not *Erkenntnistheorie*, epistemology. It is about the performance of knowing, not the justification of knowledge. It is theory, in the precise sense that its terms and relations are explanatory, but it is not theory in the sense of moving away from phenomena, because its terms and relations are uniquely given in consciousness." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 172.

⁴⁰ Neil Ormerod, "The Quest for the Historical Jesus as an Experiment in Theological Method: A Lonerganian Perspective," *Irish Theological Quarterly* (August 2020): 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021140020948378.

⁴¹ With regard to a theologian "[i]t is finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is to be intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, *to love*. Dialectic contributes to that end by pointing out ultimate differences, by offering the example of others that differ radically from oneself, by providing the occasion for a reflection, a self-scrutiny, that can lead to a new understanding of oneself and one's destiny." Lonergan, *Method*, 253. Emphasis added.

⁴² Ormerod, "The Quest for the Historical Jesus," 3. Note, also: "If we are to point to one single concept...that is central both to the theory of consciousness (of which the method in general is an expression) and to method itself in its theological identity—and a concept that is an interesting object of study in its own right—the most obvious candidate is the concept of conversion." Kristiansen and Rise, *Key Theological Thinkers*, 244.

thrust of the three levels of consciousness operative in the creative vector. Lonergan comments:

There is a knowledge born of love. Of it Pascal spoke when he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know, *le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas*. Here *by reason I would understand the compound of the activities of the first three levels of intentional consciousness*, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of factual judging. *By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values*; and I would recall the two aspects of such responses, the absolute aspect, inasmuch as the feeling is a recognition of value, and the relative aspect, inasmuch as feelings express preference of some values over others. Finally, *by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love*.⁴³

The dynamic state of being in love "affords a new window through which we can know in a way that is not reducible to the kind of knowing achieved only through experience, understanding, and judging."⁴⁴ Lonergan identifies three modalities of conversion: the intellectual, moral and religious. The dynamic state of being in love, the sign of religious conversion, leads to the fulfilment of a person's conscious-intentional orientation in her quest for meaning, truth,⁴⁵ and goodness. It directly bears on the intellectual and moral frames of consciousness, too.

1.1.2 Summary

In sum, intentional consciousness operates in dynamic, unchanging, and repeated patterns; self-transcendence occurs with every insight, and every judgment, wherein the subject transcends herself intentionally to attain a cognitional or moral object; self-appropriation is a form of self-knowledge. It is a prerequisite for understanding how knowledge is attained and why it is objective. Authentic subjectivity marks the habitual state of repeated and sustained self-transcendence (which may or may not involve self-appropriation). Conscious intentionality reaches its peak in the experience of conversion, of being in love, which initiates a healing vector. I will now turn to a fuller discussion of conversion. Each of the three areas of conversion—intellectual, moral, and religious—are

⁴³ Lonergan, "Horizons," 19–20. Emphasis added.

⁴⁴ Jeremy Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan's Cognitional-Intentional Anthropology: An Inquiry on the Question of a 'Fifth Level of Consciousness'." (Doctor of Philosophy diss., Marquette University, 2012), 63 (3504188).

⁴⁵ "Truth is the adequation of the mind to reality.... That adequacy is not in itself a theological operation, but the result of the momentous personal transformations Lonergan named religious, moral, and intellectual conversion." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 79.

important because they can speak to Ratzinger's distrust of technical, scientific, and positivistic reasoning, and his fear of epistemic and moral relativism. They can shed light, too, on the interrelation of reason and love.

1.2 Conversion in relation to reason and love

In his parsing of "Dialectic" in *Method*, Lonergan includes sections on "Horizons" and "Conversions and breakdowns." Horizons refers to "the structured resultant of past achievement... the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; [horizons] are the fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they are also the boundaries that limit our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained."⁴⁶ "Conversions and breakdowns" distinguishes between intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, and those features that work against these, eroding the good life, society, and culture. I will turn to an analysis of Lonergan's discussion of love in relation to the categories of conversion in the next section (2.), but first I wish to signal again that for Lonergan religious conversion is linked to the experience of love, which reveals itself to be of the uttermost importance for individual potentiality and society in large.

1.2.1 Religious conversion

If intellectual conversion tends to truth, and moral conversion pertains to values apprehended, affirmed, and realised, "religious conversion is to a total being-in-love as the efficacious grounds of all self-transcendence."⁴⁷

At first glance, religious conversion is an outward movement from the self—a reaching upward, miming the desire to know that characterises questions for intelligence and reflection.⁴⁸ It has content, and it is related to the common phenomenon of religious

⁴⁶ Lonergan, *Method*.

⁴⁷ Lonergan, *Method*, 241.

⁴⁸ And "Religious loving is without conditions, qualifications, reservations; it is with all one's heart and all one's soul and all one's mind and all one's strength. This lack of limitation, though it corresponds to the unrestricted character of human questioning, does not pertain to this world." Lonergan, *Method*, 242. Note, also: "The fact that the human person is capable of transcending himself and reaching out to something that lies outside himself does not mean that this actually happens. Lonergan offers a very simple explanation in *Method in Theology* for why what is possible becomes real: '… our capacity for self-transcendence […] becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love.' To love means not only reaching out beyond oneself, but being out of oneself. It is self-transcendent. In keeping with the fact that there are no limits on the human person's asking—and that this asking, in Lonergan's view, must ultimately be an asking about God, because God is the uttermost and the ultimate—he sees love for God as

experience which directs questions, for example, at existence, the problem of evil, the presence of information, structure and intelligibility in the cosmos, and contingency. Such questions illustrate "how religious experience functions in relation to the normative orientation of consciousness... [and how] it is integral to an ongoing process of conversion, a gradual deepening of fidelity to the inner exigencies for meaning, truth, goodness, beauty, and love."⁴⁹ More particularly, "the question of God reveals that we are beings unrestrictedly in search of meaning, questioning beings, whose desire for meaning, truth, and goodness knows no limit....The question discloses the unrestricted reach of human intending as the total context for all inquiry and activity."⁵⁰ But while religious experience, and religious and metaphysical enquiry seem commonplace, religious conversion remains a gift and its terminus is the beatific vision, and only proximately authentic subjectivity.

Religious experience might have an upward reach to it, but religious conversion holds a downward grip. It is "being grasped by ultimate concern…by an under-tow of existential conscience."⁵¹ Snell and Cone state that for Lonergan "the most significant question of our lives is whether we have been *captured* by God's love. For God's love provides the foundational situation for our living as rational beings. It also grounds the horizon within which we live, both providing for its possibility and orienting us within it to ultimate truth and goodness."⁵² In this sense, "religious conversion is to a total being in love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the realisation of human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goal."⁵³ Religious conversion is a dynamic state. It is being in love; it is

the uttermost and most comprehensive realization of the human person's possibility of self-transcendence." Kristiansen and Rise, *Key Theological Thinkers*, 244. Thus "God can be an object if the term 'object' is taken in the sense that accords with his epistemology: 'an object is what is intended in questioning and becomes known by answering questions." Jeffrey Allen, "Bernard Lonergan's View of Natural Knowledge of God," *The Heythrop Journal* 59, no. 3 (May 2018): 487, https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12605.

⁴⁹ Neil Ormerod and Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology: A New Approach to Catholic Fundamental Theology* (Minneapois: Fortress Press, 2015), 42. Note also: "the question of God within a given culture reflects the symbolic and linguistic resources of the culture." Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 42.

⁵⁰ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 34.

⁵¹ Lonergan, *Method*, 240.

⁵² R. J. Snell and Stephen Cone, *Authentic Cosmopolitanism: Love, Sin and Grace in the Christian University* (Cambridge: James Clarke Company, Limited, 2014), 81.

⁵³ Lonergan, *Method*, 241.

returned love in an unconditional and unrestricted way; and in the Christian tradition it is made possible because "God's love [has flooded] our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us."⁵⁴

More broadly, during conversion people come to embrace new intellectual and moral horizons. Adopting a new horizon generally involves a:

set of judgments and decisions by which we move from one horizon to another. Now there may be a sequence of such vertical exercises of freedom, and in each case the new horizon, though notably deeper and broader and richer, nonetheless is consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities. But it is also possible that the movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing even greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by a conversion.⁵⁵

The movement to a new horizon in conversion, sometimes an "about-face," entails authenticity because a person leaves a horizon that contains incorrect understandings or biases which impede or occlude self-transcendence. I will comment further on horizons (2.2) but key to note is that for Lonergan a flight from authenticity points not only to intellectual and rational failure, but also to irresponsibility. It deracinates the maturing promise of moral self-transcendence—a fourth level of intentional consciousness—and cuts off human fulfilment.

Considered more closely, being-in-love effects a profound change in a person and leads to the liberation of conscious intentionality to a fuller potentiality. The external entrance and experience of love in a person's life changes her, sublating (retaining, preserving, going beyond, and completing)⁵⁶ her horizon with its scale of values, and intellectual and moral frames. Snell and Cone ask:

How, though, does love order intellectual rectitude? The connection with moral transformation seems fairly direct. Love of God, truly having captured one's being, leads one naturally to love what God loves, or to love that which is like God because it bears the imprint of the Creator in its very being. But how does

⁵⁴ Lonergan, *Method*, 241. And, "Because the religious experience of falling in love with God is a matter of conscious awareness, but not at first one of knowledge, it occurs in (what Lonergan came to call) the world of immediacy. "Before it enters the world mediated by meaning, religion is the prior word God speaks to us by flooding our hearts with his love. That prior word pertains, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy, to the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe." Jean-Luc Marion and Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, eds., *The Enigma of Divine Revelation: Between Phenomenology and Comparative Theology* (Cham, NY: Springer, 2020), 221.

⁵⁵ Lonergan, Method, 237.

⁵⁶ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Subject," in *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 80.

love situate intelligence, and why does this transformed horizon ground our ability to know truth in the world? Knowledge, according to Lonergan, has an essentially moral character.... As knowers, we are guided by ethical demands to be attentive to the data we try to understand, inquire, and form possible answers to the questions we have in an intelligent way, and affirm or deny the adequacy of those answers reasonably. While the content of our knowing is something preliminary to making ethical choices, the process of pursuing knowledge is itself a series of ethical choices. Each of the conscious operations involved in knowing can be pursued in a way that is either authentic or unauthentic.⁵⁷

When a person falls in love unrestrictedly, she begins to see the world with eyes of love,⁵⁸ patterned after God's love—something to which Ratzinger is deeply attentive.

Thus, religious conversion constitutes the "basic fulfilment" of a person's conscious intentionality. It gives a sense of ultimate meaning and fulfilment to life.⁵⁹ It is vital to:

the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality, of our questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation. It is a fulfilment that brings a deepset joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbour....Such fulfilment is not the product of our knowledge and choice. It is God's free gift. So far from resulting from our knowing and choosing, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on, and it constructs a new horizon in which the love of God transvalues our values and the eyes of that love transform our knowing.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Snell and Cone, *Authentic Cosmopolitanism*, 83. And: "The love of God, itself the gift of God, places one in a horizon that is quite different from the loss-of-self implied by envelopment in average everydayness. One's identity has changed because of loving in a way that one could not love before. ... the conscious operations of our knowing and choosing have become transformed because of the gift of God's love." Snell and Cone, *Authentic Cosmopolitanism*, 81.

⁵⁸ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 48.

⁵⁹ John Dadosky, "Desire, Bias, and Love: Revisiting Lonergan's Philosophical Anthropology," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 77, no. 3 (July 2012): 246, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021140012443758. Brendan Carmody, "A Note on the Transcultural Nature of Lonergan's Religious Experience," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 49, no. 1 (March 1982): 59, https://doi.org/10.1177/002114008204900105. And arguably, "Supernatural love can ground natural theology simply by the influence that being in love has on one's cognitive and moral life, such that one can, because of the effects of grace, have the moral and intellectual authenticity needed to do the hard work of proving God's existence." Brian Traska, "Lonergan's 'Christian Philosophy' as Believing in Order to Understand," *The Heythrop Journal* 57, no. 3 (May 2016), https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12322.

⁶⁰ Lonergan, "A Lecture Delivered on 10 October 1974 at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, New York," 326–27.

Religious conversion repristinates moral and intellectual conversion. It is pursuit and selfsurrender. It is a dynamic state that is "prior to and principle of subsequent acts."⁶¹

1.2.2 Moral conversion

Whereas intellectual conversion tends to truth, moral conversion pertains to values apprehended, affirmed, and realised by self-transcendence. Moral conversion entails a commitment to that which is truly good. It marks a shift in criteria for making decisions. It is an exercise in "vertical freedom," where a person opts for value over satisfaction.⁶² Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer note that "sometimes such a commitment entails real hardship and suffering, even to the point of death."⁶³ Moral conversion is an orientation to the whole good, of self and others, within the universe of being, and it is signalled by an "uncovering and rooting out"⁶⁴ of bias, and heads towards right action.

Moral conversion is ingredient of self-appropriation. Lonergan asks, "Is moral development just a trap? Is it caught in a vicious circle in which, to acquire what one does not have, one must already have it?" He then comments, "Call it a trap or a vicious circle if you please. But at least note that another interpretation of the human situation is available. One becomes a moral being by transcending oneself."⁶⁵ Thus,

As children or minors we are persuaded, cajoled, ordered, compelled to do what is right. As our knowledge of human reality increases, as our responses to human values are strengthened and refined, our mentors more and more leave us to ourselves so that our freedom may exercise its ever advancing thrust toward authenticity. So we move to the existential moment when we discover for ourselves that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected objects, and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself. Then is the time for the exercise of vertical freedom and then moral conversion consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict.⁶⁶

As a person transcends herself, as she self-appropriates (as an exercise in "vertical liberty"),⁶⁷ she enters a more authentic subjectivity, where moral objectivity is possible,

⁶¹ Ormerod, "All My Work Has Been Introducing History," 899.

⁶² Elizabeth Snedden, *The Eros of the Human Spirit: The Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2017), 57.

⁶³ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 61.

⁶⁴ Lonergan, *Method*, 240.

⁶⁵ Lonergan, "A Lecture Delivered on 10 October 1974," 324.

⁶⁶ Lonergan, *Method*, 240.

⁶⁷ Lonergan, *Method*, 40.

and where she becomes a muse for others. She also attests to a set of values⁶⁸ which become the practical means for personal and social health and fulfilment. In addressing how she achieves this Lonergan states:

There are questions for *intelligence* that promote our being from a world of sense impressions, images, feelings into a world of intelligence, discovery, endless vistas. There are questions for *reflection* that promote our being from a world of sense and intelligence to the rationality of a world in which one discerns clearly and efficiently between fact and fiction, astronomy and astrology, chemistry and alchemy, history and legend, philosophy and myth, science and ideology. There are questions for *deliberation*, and they are of two kinds. There are the self-regarding questions that merely ask what is in it for me or for this or that group of which I am a part. There are the moral questions that ask what is worthwhile, what is truly and not merely apparently good.

Both sets of questions are practical. On them hinges what courses of action will be adopted and followed. Both sets of questions are interpersonal, for on both the lives of other persons are affected for good or ill. Both sets of questions are existential, for on both there is being settled what I am to make of myself, what I am to be.

But along with these common features there also are grave differences. If basically one's questions are of the self-regarding type, then one has not attempted moral self-transcendence. One has merely added oneself to the world's already teeming population of moral drifters.... But when one's basic questions for deliberation regard not satisfactions but values—the *vital values* of health and skill, the *social values* that secure the vital values of the group, the *cultural values* that make worthwhile social goals and the satisfaction of vital needs—then moral self-transcendence has begun. One has ceased to need the carrot of desire and the stick of fear; one has become a self-starter, a principle of benevolence and beneficence, a genuine person whose words and deeds inspire and invite those that know him or her to aspire themselves to moral self-transcendence, to become themselves genuine persons.⁶⁹

In relation to values and action, objectivity is significant; while it does not negate degrees of variance, or plurality, in the practical outworking of a given value (for example, differing national speed limits as the policy expression of a social value), it does address the ambivalence, arbitrariness, and scepticism inherent to relativism. Likewise, "if we accept values as objective, [then] freedom is not about arbitrary choice, but about freely conforming our lives to a set of values not of our own making. Freedom has a normative structure, oriented toward the good."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ "Value is a transcendental notion. It is what is intended in questions for deliberation, just as the intelligible is what is intended in questions for intelligence, and just as truth and being are what are intended in questions for reflection." Lonergan, *Method*, 34.

⁶⁹ Lonergan, "A Lecture Delivered on 10 October 1974," 324. Emphasis added.

⁷⁰ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 62.

Of note is the phrase "a set of values not of our own making." Why? Because such a set articulates the results of moral conversions over generations, becoming a moral tradition.⁷¹ It is expressive, but it also becomes formative. It describes the formulation of values over a span of time (for instance, health-related, social, or cultural), while also acting as a vehicle for the expression of a commitment to that which is truly good. Moral traditions are "cumulative deposit[s] of moral wisdom that emerge from moral conversion present and operative over many generations."⁷² They are a living expression of conscious intentionality, a living organ, too. Note that Ratzinger is keenly aware of this. While he does not use the language of moral conversion or speak of sets of values, his understanding of the worth and impact of, for instance, *ecclesial* tradition with its highly developed scale of values aligns him with Lonergan's more developed analysis.

Lonergan also highlights that a moral tradition deems some values of greater worth than others. Health and prosperity, for example, might be valued over liberty or religious freedom; or duty over family.⁷³ Historical exigencies affect these judgements, but over time and in different settings, a hierarchical and normative scale of values emerges. Hierarchical in the sense that some values are held to be more important than others; normative in that a responsible decision-making process will seek to adhere to a particular scale.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Patrick Byrne observes: "Moral conversion places one's own decisions and other acts in a much larger whole universe of values, replete with its true rankings of value priorities. The questions that set ethical ('real') self-transcendence in motion are questions about true rather than apparent values. Morally converted persons have more and different questions about every potential course of action. Such persons do not ask merely whether this course of action will yield pleasure or even physical well-being. They go on to ask about and consider seriously how it would contribute to the improvement, preservation, or corruption of their society, their culture, their personhood, or the sanctification of the world. Such persons ask not merely how a course of action will affect them individually, or even how it will affect their immediate family and friends. They ask with seriousness about the implications for nature and for human beings distant on the globe and distant in the future. Morally converted ethical questioning challenges satisfaction and complacency and moves us onwards towards judgments about true values. It therefore sometimes brings us to difficult judgments about our own selves, about the ways we have been living, about how our feelings have prioritized values, and about the need for profound and difficult changes." Patrick H. Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment: Lonergan's Foundations for Ethics* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2016), 8.3.3.

⁷² Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 63.

⁷³ Themes explored in great literature, for example, Sophocles' *Antigone*, William Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*, and Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. See also, Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 8.3.6, 9.2.5.

⁷⁴ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 63.

Lonergan readily acknowledges that it is not always easy to be responsible in decision making⁷⁵ or to adhere to a value in the pursuit a particular good. It is in this context, that he expands on the scale of values that are "uniquely his":⁷⁶

In general, response to value both carries us towards self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or of which we transcend ourselves. In contrast, response to the agreeable or disagreeable is ambiguous. What is agreeable may very well be what also is a true good. But it also happens that what is a true good may be disagreeable. Most good men have to accept unpleasant work, privations, pain, and their virtue is a matter of doing so without excessive self-centered lamentation.

Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world....⁷⁷

With moral conversion a person correlates her horizon of feeling to an objective scale of values. It is not only felt values that are significant, however, it is also their felt degree of value. The latter expresses itself through a scale of preference.

⁷⁵ "Most who have made the initial decision for moral conversion find that complete attainment of that goal is difficult. As Lonergan observes, 'moral knowledge is the proper possession only of morally good' people. Most of us remain short of this attainment, and as long as that is the case, our moral knowledge will be imperfect. Ultimately, then, objectivity in judgments of value in general and of ethical value in particular is something attained by people only to the extent that they have completed the difficult maturation process that is begun by their decisions for moral conversion and continued through sustained discernment. 'Objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity,' as Lonergan puts it." And more seriously: "Vices are habitual deviations from such judgments [of value]. Lonergan even argues that in our world, where the "social surd" of unintelligibility, irrationality, and evil abounds, it is highly likely that every person will eventually adopt habits of choosing that corrupt her or his effective freedom." Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 8.3.4, 9.3.2.

⁷⁶ Neil Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction and the Construction of a Systematic Theology," *Theological Studies* 75, no. 3 (August 2014): 529, https://doi.org/10.1177/0040563914538718. Despite Lonergan's advertence to Dietrich von Hildebrand and Max Scheler. Lonergan, *Method*, 31. And Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 9.3. 9.4.

⁷⁷ Lonergan, *Method*, 31. Emphasis added.

In summary, moral conversion is a decision for better moral living. It signifies a shift in criteria for making decisions. It involves feelings as intentional responses to values, judgments of value, choices, and actions which correlate with an objective scale of preference. Moral conversion entails a commitment to that which is truly good. It is an exercise in "vertical freedom" in the creative vector where a person opts for value over satisfaction, and gains ground in the quest for moral authenticity.

1.2.3 Intellectual conversion

For Lonergan, intellectual conversion involves a radical clarification of the human relation to knowledge, truth, and reality, arising from intentionality analysis. It critiques a form of knowing, which proves to be not knowing at all—the naïve conviction that a person understands something by "taking a look"—and engages with the complexity of trying to understand something in a world that mediates meaning through cultural, linguistic, artistic, traditional forms and evolved sets of values. It also meets the challenges of postmodernism's rejection of truth and objectivity, and the difficulties posed by Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, arguably modern relativism's point of origin.⁷⁸

Lonergan's position on intellectual conversion builds on the work of Augustine and Kant.⁷⁹ Each author distinguishes between a superficial and a true knowledge of something. Augustine, having become a question to himself, tempestuously pursues the problem of self-knowledge. He concludes that to know oneself, one must first know God, for to know God is to know reality and hence truth. The problem thus becomes how to know God. Augustine "thought [previously] that anything from which space was abstracted was non-existent, indeed absolutely nothing not even a vacuum."⁸⁰ But in consciously reflecting upon thought, and in relation to Exodus 3:14, he came to understand that God, like thought, and as Being, exists as a non-extended spatial substance, not subject to motion, change or decay. Augustine had been looking for something in a world

⁷⁸ Snell and Cone, Authentic Cosmopolitanism, 67.

⁷⁹ "Lonergan also contends that philosophers in the period between Scotus and Hegel [were] 'devoted to working out in a variety of manners the possibilities of the assumption that knowing consists in taking a look.' For Lonergan, this assumption is a fundamental obstacle to philosophical development. He writes, 'A first step towards transcendence . . . is to reject the mistaken supposition that knowing consists in taking a look.'" Jeffrey Allen, "Bernard Lonergan's Critique of Knowing as Taking a Look," *The Heythrop Journal* 57, no. 3 (April 2016): 455, https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12147.

⁸⁰ Augustine, *Confessions*, 7.1.

of physical objects but understanding came to him conceptually—meaning was mediated in answers to a series of questions. Snell and Cone observe that:

[t]o know a truth means to know a meaning, and the reality of the thing known is mediated to us through that meaning. Truth and meaning are not limited (or even describable) in spatial terms, as bodies are. They can mediate spatial reality to us, but themselves are neither intrinsically "in here" nor "out there." What Augustine discovered is that with respect to the reality he was trying to know (the highest reality, that of God), he would be successful not by finding God somewhere out there, but by contemplating the meanings that mediated God's being to him. In this way, the criterion for knowing reality is not the directness of our encounter with it but the correctness of the meanings that mediate being to us.⁸¹

The point is that when someone assumes that reality is something she encounters, and that knowing this reality means having an unimpeded encounter with it, she is at risk of engaging the myth that knowing is about taking a look. She misses the significance of what it is to be in awe of and wonder at something, and the opportunity then arising for insight afforded by salient questions.⁸²

Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* had already put the naivety of equating taking a look with knowledge to the sword. He had shown that perceiving a thing was not an act distinct from the person doing the perceiving, but rather a creative act in itself. Therefore, to speak accurately of an encounter with reality, was not to speak of the reality that was encountered, but of a person's experience of it. What a person had direct access to was her perceptions, and not the thing itself.⁸³ Kant's *Critique* maintained that it was not possible to know a thing in itself or attain an objective knowledge of reality.

Lonergan in his discussion and analysis of intellectual conversion disagrees. Snell and Cone comment that he recognises "a deep similarity exists between [the] notion of knowledge, which Kant both espouses and problematizes, and the notion of God as a body, which Augustine struggled to overcome. In both cases, reality is something 'already out there now.' Augustine's breakthrough came when he realized that the presence and reality of God has *more the character of a truth that is known* than the character of a body that is encountered."⁸⁴ It is a myth to claim someone truly knows reality by looking, or through

⁸¹ Snell and Cone, Authentic Cosmopolitanism, 70.

⁸² So Kant's emphasis on the role of wonder in relation to gaining understanding. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, ed. Lewis White Beck, 3rd ed., The library of liberal arts, (New York: Macmillan, Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993), (5:162), 33.

⁸³ Snell and Cone, Authentic Cosmopolitanism, 69.

⁸⁴ Snell and Cone, Authentic Cosmopolitanism, 69. Emphasis added.

one or a combination of the other senses. A thin form of knowledge, more along the lines of recognition can be gained, but it is sensitive and animalistic, pertaining more often than not to whether an object represents a threat, a mate or something that can be eaten.⁸⁵ Lonergan writes:

The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what there is to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at. Now this myth overlooks the distinction between the world of immediacy, say the world of the infant and, on the other hand, the world mediated by meaning. The world of immediacy is the sum of what is seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelt, felt. It conforms well enough to the myth's view of reality, objectivity, knowledge. But it is but a tiny fragment of the world mediated by meaning. For the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense experience of any individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural community.... The criteria of objectivity and not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the compound criteria of experiencing, understanding, of judging, and of believing. The reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organised and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgement and belief.⁸⁶

The real world as people discuss it each day is one that is mediated by partially and fully constituted sets of meanings. These might be ecclesiastical, familial, historical, mathematical, artistic, medical, or architectural.⁸⁷ But crucially meaning and an understanding that derives from it are mediated. Meaning is grasped within a conceptual

⁸⁵ "An object is real to the extent that it satiates one's biological needs. Such an object is a 'body,' an 'already out there now real.' By contrast, [for Lonergan] the intellectual pattern of experience, unique to human beings, opposes restrictions on its interests. In this pattern, 'the real is being; it is whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably.'" Allen, "Lonergan's Critique of Taking a Look," 455.

⁸⁷ "Memory and tradition and belief put at our disposal the tales of travellers, the stories of clans or nations, the exploits of heroes, the treasures of literature, the discoveries of science, the reflections of philosophers, and the meditations of holy men. Each of us has his own world of immediacy, but all such worlds are just minute strips within a far larger world, a world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning...." Lonergan, "A Lecture Delivered on 10 October 1974," 317. In relation to ecclesiastical and theological orbits, Ormerod on the origins of Christian realism, writes: "Tertullian was a naive realist, Origen a neo-Platonic idealist, while Athanasius, and the definition of Nicea, demand at least a dogmatic realism, to be able to properly affirm the homoousios. This realism is based on accepting the assertion that reality corresponds to true meaning, mediated by propositions, as summarised in the Athanasian rule for the homoousios: 'all that is said of the Father also is to be said of the Son, except that the Son is Son and not the Father.' Such a formulation operates within a world mediated by meaning but is problematic within the world of immediacy... for Lonergan the teachings of Nicea and Constantinople elicit an intellectual conversion as the depths of that revelation are uncovered through the ongoing reflection of the Christian community." Neil Ormerod, "Gilson and Lonergan and the Possibility of a Christian Philosophy," *The Heythrop Journal* 57, no. 3 (May 2016): 538, https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12235.

and linguistic tradition. Experience is valid as a point of entry; however, it is that moment of wonder that piggybacks awe, which firmly roots epistemic advances ending with insight and judgement. It sets a series of questions (how is this possible and why is it so? etc.,) in motion, which "supervene upon biological drives,"⁸⁸ and that tend towards the finality of knowledge and objectivity.

By following the lead of wonder—attentively, intelligently, reasonably—we can come to correct understandings of the experiences that we have. And in coming to correct understandings, we come to knowledge of the world. For the real world is mediated to us not by encounter alone but by the meanings through which we explain the reality that we encounter. Lonergan calls the transition from more animalistic ways of knowing to fully human knowing, which Augustine made with respect to knowledge of God, 'intellectual conversion' or 'intellectual self-transcendence.'⁸⁹

For Lonergan, "correspondence [with reality] is not between in here and out there, but between a judgment and what is."⁹⁰

This claim speaks to Lonergan's critical realism.⁹¹ It neither negates the work of the senses, nor permits a position that holds mediated meaning purely as an enclosed subjective intuition and an ideation of the mind alone: crucially, and *contra* to Ratzinger's strawman, it validates a turn to the self, but avoids a subjectivity that ends in idealism and relativism; it confirms the existence of an objective reality, but contends it is mediated through meanings⁹² that represent subjective, and often intergenerational and corporate, insight. Thus:

The naive realist knows the world mediated by meaning but thinks he knows it by looking. The empiricist restricts objective knowledge to sense experience; for him, understanding and conceiving, judging, and believing are merely subjective activities. The idealist insists that human knowing always includes understanding as well as sense; but he retains the empiricist's notion of reality, and so he thinks of the world mediated by meaning as not real but ideal. Only the critical realist can acknowledge the facts of human knowing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world; and he can do so only

⁸⁸ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 95.

⁸⁹ Lonergan, Method, 74.

⁹⁰ Allen, "Lonergan's Critique of Taking a Look," 456.

⁹¹ Walker observes: "Lonergan developed a distinctive approach to epistemology and ontology which can be placed squarely within the critical realist camp." Timothy Walker, "Approaches to Critical Realism: Bhaskar and Lonergan," *Journal of Critical Realism* 16, no. 2 (2017): 111, https://doi.org/0.1080/14767430.2017.1288062.

⁹² Earlier Lonergan writes: "we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning." Lonergan, *Method*, 31.

inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing, understanding, and judging is a process of self-transcendence.⁹³

Intellectual conversion, where a person comes to terms with, and appropriates, their own cognitional structure of experience, understanding and judgment, combined with the radical shift of criterion for what is real—from the "already out there now real" of immediate sensory input to a reality mediated by the structure of cognition, as intelligible and reasonable⁹⁴—generates the conditions for speaking about an objective reality that can be built on, while at the same time defeating arguments regarding idealism and relativism. It operates with a critical realism. Lonergan recognises it is difficult to achieve,⁹⁵ but avows its value:

for philosophic issues are universal in scope, and some form of naive realism seems to appear utterly unquestionable to very many. As soon as they begin to speak of knowing, of objectivity, of reality, there crops up the assumption that all knowing must be something like looking. To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments.⁹⁶

Intellectual conversion constitutes a rejection of the enduring myth that the real is out there and that knowing is taking a look, in preference for new criteria for reality, being and truth, as the intentional goals of one's understanding and reason.

In brief, intellectual conversion is a modality of self-transcendence and it is to *truth* attained by cognitional self-transcendence.⁹⁷ It leverages the insight that meaning is mediated and is not the result of unimpeded contact with an object. With intellectual conversion, a person identifies her criteria for knowledge of reality with her performance of knowing the real—not by taking a look, but by satisfying questions for intelligence (e.g., what is it?) and reflection (is it so?).⁹⁸ Intellectual conversion aligns the structures of

⁹³ Lonergan, *Method*, 238.

⁹⁴ Ormerod, "Gilson and Lonergan," 537.

⁹⁵ "Only too easily people can drift from infancy through childhood and a long educational process only to practice adult cognitional procedures with no clear notion of what they are doing." Lonergan, "A Lecture Delivered on 10 October 1974," 321.

⁹⁶ Lonergan, *Method*, 239.

⁹⁷ Lonergan, *Method*, 241.

⁹⁸ Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*, 90.

human knowing with those of reality; and the reality that is proportionate to human knowing will be known through experiencing, understanding, and judging. Intellectual conversion is concerned with verified hypotheses which are probably true; and holds that what probably is true refers to what in reality is probably so.⁹⁹ It is tentative, bearing the hallmarks of humility, but it is not without substance.

1.2.4 Summary

Lonergan articulates three forms of conversion: religious, moral, and intellectual. Each relates to self-transcendence, which in turn reaches for the common good. Intellectual conversion reflects "the orientation of inquiring intelligence...a pure, detached, disinterested desire simply to know... an eros of the mind."¹⁰⁰ It takes care in understanding—moving from the superficial view that knowing is "taking a look" to a critical realist stance, which acknowledges that intelligibility and meaning are mediated through cultural and intellectual frameworks that have taken time to develop. Moral conversion changes a person's decision-making process away from personal satisfaction to accommodate a normative and hierarchical set of values in the consideration of others. It entails the disclosure and rejection of biases, and a commitment to that which is truly good. Religious conversion carries the experience of being in love and being loved by an "other-worldly" love. It sustains transcendental performance. It further recalibrates a person's values and is the basis for self-transcendence in its maturation. The pursuit of the true and the good in this instance are then realised in a cosmic and divinely intending context, making sense of the first conscious inklings that call a person towards authentic subjectivity, and which finally satisfy the human hunger for meaning, value and beatific life.

2. Furthering an account of love

As stated earlier, for Lonergan, religious conversion is to a total being-in-love that makes possible an authentic subjectivity. It signifies a high point in Lonergan's bid to (1) integrate old understandings with new scientific, psychological, and methodological insights; (2) seek out grounds for objectivity; and (3) secure apologetic credibility.

⁹⁹ Lonergan, *Method*, 239.

¹⁰⁰ Lonergan, *Insight*, 74.

Here, Lonergan understands reason to be "the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging."¹⁰¹ Thus reason is active as it addresses cognitional questions (what am I doing when I know?), epistemic questions (why is doing that knowing?), and metaphysical questions (what do I know when I do it?).

Reason is also functioning at a fourth level of consciousness, the level of responsibility. In the instance of religious conversion and in response to love ("heart reasons"),¹⁰² a process of sublation occurs, healing and influencing conscious intentionality in its totality.

Cognitional and conscious intentionality are bounded by reasoning, which to use a term favoured by Ratzinger is "purified" through religious conversion and through the healing vector. Reasoning, then, is not without love; and in a manner not dissimilar to Ratzinger's own intellectual and theological journey, love becomes an increasingly central concern and means for Lonergan and his method. Although Ratzinger appears to have neither the methodological focus of Lonergan nor his precision with terms and distinctions, as I hope to illustrate in the following sections and chapter (Five), he anticipates an interrelation between love and reason, which Lonergan can further illuminate. In this subsection, with reference to Lonergan, I will show how this initially comes to pass.

Lonergan's article "Finality, Love, Marriage" first appeared in 1943, "during the ferment of ideas created by the work of Prof. Doms of Breslau."¹⁰³ It introduces three lines of argument regarding love that he will develop over his lifetime. Love betters the self. It ends downward, destructive personal and social spirals. It betters society. His works "Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace" (1951–1952),¹⁰⁴ *Insight* (1957), and "Topics in Education" (1959),¹⁰⁵ among others, mark a first phase in discussion of these outcomes.

¹⁰⁵ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Collected works of Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education, Volume 10*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993).

¹⁰¹ Lonergan, "Horizons," 20.

¹⁰² Lonergan, "Horizons," 19–20.

¹⁰³ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Finality, Love and Marriage," in *Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1967).

¹⁰⁴ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace," in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Early Latin Theology, Volume 19*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011).

"Horizons" (1968),¹⁰⁶ *Method* (1971), and other spoken comments and writings develop, reconceive, finesse, and enlarge on these three themes in a second phase.

2.1 Phase I: an account of love

The first phase, beginning with "Finality, Love, Marriage," provides early clues as to Lonergan's understanding of love and its effects. Human loving is an "upward step"¹⁰⁷ that makes first individuals and then society better; it acts to curb and recover personal and social declivity. Blackwood states that:

the initial focus was given in a 1943 article in *Theological Studies*, "Finality, Love, Marriage," which linked individual subjectivity to the social sphere and drew on the upward tendency of love in individual consciousness. That upward tendency, Lonergan argued, gave marriage a finality that allowed it to be the first step in a series of unions, culminating in the mystical body of Christ, that would provide the solution to an otherwise inevitable downward spiral of social decay.¹⁰⁸

Key here, is Lonergan's move to link individual subjectivity to the social sphere;¹⁰⁹ as a person is bettered in herself and in relation to another (nominally, in the context of marriage), so a wider set of stale or deteriorating relations are rectified. Marriage encourages a "vertical finality"—an orientation of a created thing to an end beyond the proportion of its nature.¹¹⁰ Even so:

The orientation of married persons toward spiritual development is such a vertical orientation, for proper imitation of Christ is beyond the proportion of human nature. In fact for Lonergan, marriage is specially united to such a vertical end, for "all Christians are called to the imitation of Christ, to the summit of Christian perfection; but from marriage there is a dispositive upward tendency giving a new modality to that high pursuit, for husband and wife are called not only to advance but to advance together." Marriage...was even more

¹¹⁰ Lonergan distinguished three kinds of finality: *absolute finality*, the orientation of all created being to God; *horizontal finality*, the orientation of all created things to the ends proportionate to their nature; and *vertical finality*. Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 18. Just so, "human development is a personal function of an objective movement in the space-time solidarity of man, and married life a series of steps upward through love of one's neighbour to the love of God." Lonergan, "Finality, Love and Marriage," 45.

¹⁰⁶ Lonergan, "Horizons."

¹⁰⁷ Lonergan, "Finality, Love and Marriage," 45.

¹⁰⁸ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 13.

¹⁰⁹ "Lonergan later unveils transcendent loving as the deeper cosmic reality that cradles intellect and science. The human-as-knower turns out to be even more fundamentally a human-as-lover. Indeed, later Lonergan suggested that in the absence of dynamic impulses of love, our whole capacity for cognitive and moral self-transcendence stays only latent. Self-transcendence is actuated in contexts of familial, sexual, civil–political or religious (or, presumably, other) love." Nathaniel Warne and Douglas Davies, eds., *Emotions and Religious Dynamics* (London: Routledge, 2013), 100.

dispositive toward the advancement that heals the larger social situation than was a single individual, precisely because marriage is already a social situation.¹¹¹

Later, Lonergan will add to notions of imitation the direct intervention of God (religious conversion) upon the human heart. The horizontal and vertical finalities of human experience will meet with the transformative, downward incarnational, and pneumatic mediation of Jesus and the Holy Spirit (detailed further in 2.4.1).

In the context of social reformation, "Finality, Love, Marriage" raises one other point I wish to highlight. Marriage is not simply in its own way a social setting; it is also related to the body of Christ. Love within marriage in this sense, and in its socially reformative capacity, is Christological, of the church, and of a Christian tradition.¹¹² Lonergan argues:

Just as there is a human solidarity in sin with a dialectical descent deforming knowledge and perverting will, so also there is a divine solidarity in grace which is the mystical body of Christ; as evil performance confirms us in evil, so good edifies us in our building unto eternal life; and as private rationalization finds support in fact, in common teaching, in public approval, so also the ascent of the soul towards God is not a merely private affair but rather a personal function of an objective common movement in that body of Christ which takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life.¹¹³

The upward tendency of human hope situated in marriage is closely personal and private, yet simultaneously integrated and in common with body of Christ.

While "Marriage, Love, Finality' anticipates three of the major themes that Lonergan develops regarding love, his works "Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace" and *Insight* introduce two further lines of argument: divine love precedes and makes possible human finalities; and secondly, understanding and pursuit of the good require a fourth level of conscious intentionality (mentioned previously), which is realised

¹¹¹ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 18.

¹¹² "Thus, united together, such subjects and their unions form 'the matrix of conditions that supplies an upward tendency to advance in human and supernatural perfection.' That perfection, in its own turn, is the mystical body of Christ, in which "we are all 'severally members one of another' (Romans 12.5), parts of a larger unit in which we are to love our neighbours as ourselves (Matthew 22.39)." This mystical body supplies the solution to the error-upon-error cycle by supporting good instead of evil, right instead of error, and repentance instead of rationalization, in a social format that, again, 'takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life.' Fundamentally, 'human development is a personal function of an objective movement in the space-time solidarity of man, and married life a series of steps upward' through love of one's neighbour to the love of God." Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 2.

¹¹³ Lonergan, "Finality, Love and Marriage," 26.

through interpersonal relations that, in turn, are shaped by love. These lines of argument will be developed in *Method* and other writings.

"Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace" tenders the proposition that it is God's initiative that ultimately reorients and enables people to live and act responsibly. Being loved by God "makes us friends of God, and draws us up into the economy of the whole divinely ordered creation."¹¹⁴ For:

to those whom God the Father loves (1) as he loves Jesus, his only-begotten Son, (2) he gives the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so that (3) into a new life they may be (4) born again and (5) become living members of Christ; therefore as (6) just, (7) friends of God, (8) adopted children of God, and (9) heirs in hope of eternal life, (10) they enter into a sharing in the divine nature.¹¹⁵

And as a person enters into a sharing of the divine nature, she is leavened.

The leavening process has already been underway through conscious intentionality on at least three levels, but now it is also met by divine love. The leavening process requires of a person a new level of conscious intentionality. Commenting on developments in *Insight*, Blackwood writes:

Lonergan was already beginning to realize that the good required a further, higher, level of consciousness ...that the realm of the good is to be known by understanding the "extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will,"[and] that the realm of doing was beyond the realm of knowing, and that he envisioned a "fuller invariant structure that adds reasonable choice and action to intelligent and reasonable knowing."¹¹⁶

Lonergan sees that an understanding of the good and of creaturely responsibility might best be achieved through an intentionality analysis. His *Halifax Lectures* carry this further, exploring the notion of "quasi identification," both on the interpersonal and divine–human level. The concept is instrumental to his deepening interest and explication of love.

Love involves a quasi identification. When two people are in love their thoughts are about us—what are we going to do, what do we need? It is all spontaneously so. There is a quasi identification involved. And in the fact that God became man as our saviour, there is that same manifestation of love, and it is that aspect of love, of God's love for mankind in the full sense of loving—a self-giving to which we respond with a self-giving—that there is in charity something way beyond any ethical structure that can be based upon the pure desire to know. It

¹¹⁴ Lonergan, "Supplementary Notes," 617.

¹¹⁵ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 22.

¹¹⁶ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 28. Blackwood also notes the "Halifax lectures on *Insight* confirmed and elaborated on some of the points made above. These lectures lend support to the suggestion that in Insight he hinted at, but did not fully develop, the notion that the realm of the good and the moral was a distinct fourth level." And further that "… willing, if it is what it ought to be, actually draws one into line with the objective reality of the ordered good of the universe." Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 31.

presupposes an advance made by God as a lover, in the full sense of loving, and it means our response, and it means our response in which we love one another because we love God.¹¹⁷

In language more common to Ratzinger, Lonergan describes God as a lover. Additionally, love as divine self-giving is made known not only through the incarnation, but also through the Holy Spirit; and these constitute the church, which acts as a living tradition that is dynamic and transformational for its constituents:

While grace both heals moral impotence and corrects the disruptions that have entered the social order, it is also the introduction of 'something like quasi identification—the love of God in that sense of self-donation, like entering into the married state, living together, sharing one's life with another.' ... The divine self-gift in the incarnation is the first expression of God's love to us, followed by the divine self-gift of the Holy Spirit in justification. This divine self-gift, Lonergan tells us, sets up a further good of order in this world, which is the mystical body of Christ and his church... [which] is a further, higher integration of human living. It is the transition from the *civitas terrena* that can be constituted by a pure desire to know, to the *civitas Dei* that is founded on the love of God and the self-revelation of God.¹¹⁸

What is striking in all this is that Lonergan grasps that just as being is prior to

knowing, loving is, too. He writes, "it is one thing to be in love, and another to discover that what has happened to you is that you have fallen in love. Being oneself is prior to

knowing oneself."¹¹⁹ This conclusion is important because:

when this being in love is being in love with God, it sets up not only an orientation to God, but also a participation in God. Our conscious desire already orients us to God, but 'in Christ Jesus' we are not only referred to God, as to some omega point, but we are on our way to God. The fount of our living is not *eros* but *agape*, not desire of an end that uses means but love of an end that overflows.¹²⁰

Similar to Ratzinger's Christotelic sensitivities, Lonergan understands that it is not just the desire for a particular end that drives a person to deliberation and action, but a

¹¹⁷ Cited in Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 33.

¹¹⁸ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 35.

¹¹⁹ Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento," 229.

¹²⁰ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 44. And note that "The priority ceases to be the propositions, the affirmations, the deductions, even the formation of the self, and it becomes instead the love of God experienced in the subject's own subjectivity. Propositions, affirmations, deductions, and formation, which still have a role to play, are placed within the higher horizon of a changed being-in. Not only had Lonergan, at this point, much more fully elaborated on the conscious-intentional ramifications of love, but he had also reached the point of placing the love of God in Christ and human love together in the conversation." Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 46.

participatory love that draws them towards it. ¹²¹ Love in this manner is prior to "knowing"—even if it ends in true knowledge. It is "unitive by reason of its act inasmuch as the love in the lover is in a way the beloved in the lover."¹²²

At this point in his work, Lonergan has outlined the effects of love on the individual and on society. Love reorients individuals positively, and consequently, through their relations with others, either curtails or ends social decay. A second phase of writing, which explains and expands on these arguments, comes to the fore with his "Dimensions of Meaning" (1965), and especially "Horizons" (1968). This phase carries patterns not too dissimilar to those outlined in my discussion of Ratzinger's analysis of love, and reason. There is a Christological and teleological presence to Lonergan's thought. There is also a strong consciousness of the church and tradition; of the need for correlation between new understandings unfolding in science, psychology, and sociology; and of the practical force of retroduction. However, these concerns are integrated into Lonergan's transcendental method of conscious intentionality, and therefore rather than trying to place them as categories over his work, I prefer to highlight them as they unfold.

The second phase of Lonergan's analysis and evaluation of love carries eight features. It sees the language of metaphysics backgrounded in favour of (1) interiority analysis and (2) authentic subjectivity. It sees the same with the growing use of the terms and concepts of (3) sublation, and (4) horizons. It develops the notion of (5) religious conversion, the (6) dynamic state of being in love, and a (7) healing vector. Furthermore, it details the (8) prevenient work of the economic Godhead in aligning the human creature with good and cosmic ends. Love is operative in each of these.

"Dimensions of Meaning" and "The Subject" (1968) contain the earliest references to (1) interiority and (2) authentic subjectivity. The significance of these terms is that they move away from the language of metaphysics and provide a framework for asking how love works in relation to cognitional and conscious intentionality, and especially to an


¹²¹ Detailed further in my discussion of created participations in section 2.4 below. Note also Blackwood's further comments on "Existenz and Aggiornamento": "At this point, Lonergan inserts a distinction that illuminates the struggle to shift from the metaphysical horizon to the horizon of intentionality analysis: the distinction between a being-in Christ Jesus as merely a substance or as (more fully) a subject...quietly, imperceptibly, there goes forward the transformation operated by the *Kurios*, but the delicacy, the gentleness, the deftness, of his continual operation in us hides the operation from us."

¹²² Lonergan adds: "this is partly like and partly different from the way in which what is known is in the knower." Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, the Triune God, Systematics, Volume 12*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 675.

understanding of the good and to responsibility.¹²³ Instead of potency and actualisation, authentic personhood (here subjectivity) is placed in the context of relationships, and of note, it is fulfilled interpersonally and lovingly.

"The Subject" also contains the first reference to (3) sublation, which "retains, preserves, goes beyond, completes" that which is sublated.¹²⁴ Thus the intelligent subject sublates the experiential, and the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject, and rational consciousness in the rational subject is sublated by rational self-consciousness as a person deliberates, evaluates, decides, and acts. The language of sublation softens a possible sense of inflexibility, non-integration, or limitation, which the language of levels carries; it makes porous its floors and ceilings.¹²⁵ Further, the term

¹²⁵ With reference to another work, "Faith and Belief," Blackwood argues, "Lonergan affirmed repeatedly in this text that the fulfilment of transcendental intending, which is the gift of God's love, resides at the fourth level of deliberation and choice, but his position on transcending, transforming, and broadening makes such an affirmation problematic. He had come to recognize the limitations of 'the spatial metaphor of speaking of levels of consciousness.' Strikingly, and contrary to the continued language of most contemporary Lonergan scholarship, Lonergan wished to 'remove this metaphor' and replace it with 'the notion of sublation, not exactly in Hegel's sense, but rather in a sense used by Karl Rahner'.... The fulfilment of consciousness by God's gift of love meets nearly all of these characteristics of a sublating operation: it introduces a new basis and ground, preserves the original set of operations, vastly extends their relevance, and perfects their performance." Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 84. Wilkins offers the complex but useful diagram below in relation to love working down from a healing vector, sublating the creative vector of conscious levels of intentionality as they arise out of wonder. Jeremy Wilkins, "Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and the Problematic of Habitual Grace," *Theological Studies* 72, no. 4 (2011): 487, https://doi.org/10.1177/004056391107200402.



¹²³ Note also that Lonergan speaks of metaphysics as a derived and not basic science; derived from cognitional theory and an intentionality analysis. This is his main point of difference with the neo-Thomists in terms of method. Lonergan, *Method*, 343.

¹²⁴ Lonergan, "The Subject," 80. And with reference to love: "It goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context." Lonergan, *Method*, 241.

sublation affords Lonergan a figure for explaining how love affects all areas of conscious operations pertaining to authentic subjectivity.

The fluidity introduced by the term sublation is complemented by the term (4) horizon. A person develops frameworks for comprehension and for valuing things intellectual and moral horizons—over time. But horizons shift. Encountering new and different horizons is to open the possibility for change and growth. This is especially the case with moral and religious conversion.¹²⁶

Still, this was not yet moral conversion. Even though he had an intellectual realization about the wholeness of values, and even though he actually did love God, existentially Augustine was still prideful, choosing the value of his own self-authoring at the pinnacle of the scale of values. Only when he fully chose to accept where his personal value actually stood in the scale of values, and especially in relation to God, could he make the decisive commitment that was his moral conversion.

A second illustration can be found in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*. Early in the story, Rodion Raskolnikov murders two women, and most of the novel probes the inner workings of his conscience in the wake of his crime. Although he could have offered many excuses and motives for his deed, in full honesty he confesses to Sonia, the woman who loves him, that in fact he just did it as a pure act of will, to show that he, like Napoleon, would stop at nothing to do whatever it took to be a great man. He had elevated his own personal value – his own value as an originator of values – over social and cultural values, even over the values of the vitality of life and the natural world. He has no real feelings for any other values than his own power of will.

Raskolnikov's path to moral conversion is long and tortuous. In the end it is Sonia's love for him that opens up his feelings to the values. But unconditional love working through Sonia has not finished its work. Rosemary Haughton writes that "Real knowledge of oneself is something that people can only dare to accept when love has broken through." Haughton means especially that clear and unflinching knowledge of one's own evils – and the good that one *truly* is in spite of them – is only possible when a person knows himself or herself to be loved unconditionally. Dostoevsky traces how Sonia's love for Raskolnikov irresistibly wears down his final layers of self-deception and self-alienation.

After many years, Raskolnikov finally makes his converting decision, which is to love Sonia in turn, and all that she herself loves. Life now was not only sweet but abundant to the full. "Life had stepped into the place of theory and something quite different would work itself out in his mind." Much earlier in her life Sonia had decisively committed to the whole realm of value with its objective scale of value hierarchy through her love of God. By his decision to love her, Raskolnikov has in fact chosen to love God and the whole order of value as God values it, just as Sonia had done earlier. His love of Sonia is simultaneously his religious and his moral conversion. Raskolnikov and Sonia recognize, though not with complete clarity, that

¹²⁶ Patrick Byrne helpfully provides the following illustration:

A number of examples of moral conversion can be found in literature. Perhaps the most famous is that narrated by Augustine in his *Confessions*. There he explains how his encounter with Platonic writings led him to profound realizations about good and evil. Much of what he had counted as evil in the world was not evil after all: "Evil, the origin of which I was trying to find, is not a substance, because if it were a substance it would be good." He now realized that *whatever is*, is good, which opened before him the realm of the wholeness of value and being, replete with its objective scale of value: "Because [God] did not make them all equal, each single thing is good and collectively they are very good, for our God made his whole creation *very good* ... the sum of all creation is better than the higher things alone."

I noted earlier that (5) religious conversion has a personal, outward-seeking dimension to it. In addition to questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation, "there is the religious question [that notes]: we are suffering from an unconditioned, unrestricted love; with whom, then, are we in love?"¹²⁷ Religious conversion is in response to this question and the experience of yearning. It is like a door to a:

new, higher, way of knowing [that] is opened by the dynamic state of being in love.... 'It is a state reached through the exercise of vertical liberty, the liberty that chooses, not among objects within a horizon but between different horizons, different mentalities, different outlooks. It is a state that, once reached, is distinct from, prior to, and principle of subsequent judgments of value and acts of loving. It is the fulfillment of man's capacity for self-transcendence, and as fulfillment it brings a deep-set joy and a profound peace. It radiates through the whole of one's living and acting, opening one's horizon to the full, purifying one's intentional responses to values, rectifying one's scale of preference, underpinning one's judgments of value, simplifying issues by moving them to a deeper level, and strengthening one to achieve the good in the face of evil.'¹²⁸

As an exercise in vertical liberty and in response to the question *with whom are we in love?* religious conversion as a new, higher way of knowing positively radiates through a person's life.

2.2 Phase II: an account of love

A secondary but for Lonergan prior factor working in religious conversion is the intervention of God. This is not a case of a person reaching up in an effort to achieve authentic subjectivity; on the contrary, it involves the humiliation (*kenosis*) of Christ and an outpouring of the Spirit. It is something God does for others, and it warrants an encounter with a radically new horizon—"fundamentally, the horizon is Romans 5:5, through the Holy Spirit given to us, God's love that has flooded our hearts."¹²⁹ This new horizon sublates a person's fourth level of intentionality, realigning her values to those that accent the truly good, removing disvalues, and healing her. Thus, being in love with God, she comes to love responsibly—which is tantamount to achieving authentic subjectivity. Using an older theological lexicon, operative grace brings her to a point where she is able

much remains to "work itself out" as moral and religious conversion become his new principles of life. Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 8.3.5.

¹²⁷ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty 'Systematics'," in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965–1980, Volume 17*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 218.

¹²⁸ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 64.

¹²⁹ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 75; Lonergan, *Method*, 105, 278, 82, 327, 40.

to cooperatively work with grace to perfect her life.¹³⁰ For Lonergan, religious conversion is epitomised by (6) a love of God that brings to fruition conscious intentionality:

As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth.¹³¹

For Lonergan, being in love with God consummates conscious intentionality. A downward (7) healing vector embraces the creative vector; and in its maturity, conscious intentionality not only fulfils a person, but also (8) works redemptively for social restoration. Divine love, here, sublates the way a person evaluates a problem and addresses it. To this extent being in love with God effects four further changes. Firstly, in the manner of sanctifying grace, it has the effect of removing the ceiling on natural ability—on the creative vector with its horizontal and vertical finalities.

The central form makes a lion a lion and not a tiger. It makes a man a man and not a lion. And sanctifying grace radicated in the form of a man makes that man a Christian, a good citizen in the City of God. Augustine's On the City of God, *De Civitate Dei*, is the distinction between the *Civitas Terrana*, the earthly city, and the *Civitas Coelestis*, the heavenly city. Both are on this earth. But the Christians belong to one, and the others to the rest.¹³²

The Christian is "re-formed." To use slightly different terms, her image and likeness is restored, and a new Christ-likeness and Christ-like community becomes available to her. The healing vector transforms the horizon within which the creative vector operates. Healing prunes, reaffiliates, liberates and perfects, but does not undermine the native intentionality of the creative vector.

¹³⁰ Re religious conversion and being grasped by ultimate concern, Lonergan states: "For Christians it is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It is the gift of grace, and since the days of Augustine, a distinction has been drawn between operative and cooperative grace. Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom. Operative grace is religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions." Lonergan, *Method*, 241. And see, Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sanctifying Grace in a "Methodical Theology"," *Theological Studies* 68, no. 1 (February 2007), https://doi.org/10.1177/004056390706800103.

¹³¹ Lonergan, *Method*, 105. And Wilkins, succinctly: "Love is at once the basis for a decision and the demand for free and full commitment." Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 69.

¹³² Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 158.

The healing movement (from above downwards) begins with falling in love, which reveals values, undoes bias, and works through faith and hope to thwart the determinisms of psychology and society. Such a movement works together with an authentic creative movement (from below upwards), and neither the healing movement without the creative, nor the creative movement without the healing, is healthy or authentic.¹³³

And, in discussion:

the same issue was dealt with again the following night (June 20) in the context of a question about the effect that Lonergan's reorientation of the phrase "*nil amatum nisi prius cognitum*" would have on his work in *Insight*. He replied that although *Insight* focused on and in fact progressed from below upwards, fundamentally development from above downwards comes first... love provides the sublating horizon within which authentic deliberative, judgmental, intellectual, and experiential development takes place.¹³⁴

The adage "nothing is known that is first not loved" in Lonergan's analysis becomes *nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum*,¹³⁵ and no one achieves an authentic subjectivity who is first not loved.¹³⁶

The second change love effects is social. The personal experience of Romans 5:5 extends missionally and redemptively into society. As one person is graced by change, so too are others, and a new community (the church) is formed¹³⁷ where the surds of egotism, oppression, hatred, and violence are excised.

¹³⁷ As a matter of emergent probability. Thus: "the limitations of subjectivity are symbolized by the 'heart of stone' that God removes and replaces with a 'heart of flesh'. This gift brings subjectivity to fulfilment by resituating it within a disproportionate larger horizon characterized, in part, by new interpersonal relations. God's gift of love is linked to interpersonal relations through Lonergan's understanding of emergent probability: a plurality of instances of a lower level becomes systematized at a higher level, and a plurality of instances of individual subjects who, through the gift of God's love to them, have become authentic subjects transcending their own limitations provides the lower manifold out of which the higher, graced, interpersonal situation is constituted. This is precisely why the ontological change effected by grace can be identified in terms of the community to which the graced individual belongs: one does not receive the gift of God's love without the corresponding elevation to a higher system constituted by a change in interpersonal relations. Love is the systematization of graced, self-transcending individuals by their incorporation into new, higher, interpersonal relations, a systematization that fulfills the innermost cries of individual subjectivity, which, though originally identified in terms of potency, came to be understood as an openness of limited individual subjectivity to a healing movement working through interpersonal relations." Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 170.

¹³³ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 138.

¹³⁴ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 138.

¹³⁵ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York; London: Paulist Press; G. Chapman, 1985), 77.

¹³⁶ Tad Dunne, "Being in Love," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 10, https://doi.org/10.5840/method19951324.

[R]edemption lies not in what is possible to nature but in what is effected by the grace of Christ. The concrete situation of human lives in history points to the inability of reason as such to remove the surds that have become objectively instantiated in our history, but the mission of the Son makes visible, and the mission of the Spirit makes effective, the new order that would replace this absurd order. These missions are sustained through history by the sending of the disciples, which extends through tradition and community down to the present day.¹³⁸

Lonergan theorises that in consequence of changes in an individual, divine love's sublating influence ineffably, if indirectly, removes the intergenerational surds that are ingrained in history.¹³⁹

Thirdly, love allies personal, social, and ecclesial commitments to the good with divine intention. Those who have known religious conversion, who have the light of faith, and who been integrated into the church, address personal sanctity and social need. As they do so, the church harmonises with a universal and divine order, witnessing to responsible living and human potentiality.

Without faith the originating value is man, and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So, the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good. Where before an account of the human good related men to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man's world to God and to God's world. Men meet not only to be together and to settle human affairs but also to worship. Human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in holiness. The power of God's love brings forth a new energy and efficacy in all goodness, and the limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave.¹⁴⁰

Love changes and aligns human understanding and performances of the good to those divinely intended.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 133.

¹³⁹ "Th[e] transfiguring 'conversion to love', Lonergan held, confirms in its wake also intellectual conversion to reality and moral conversion to the good. By it, Lonergan held, a person's cognitive interiority is empowered to overcome the cognitive distortions that are disseminated through her culture and sedimented within her own personal formation. Also, she is empowered to counter her own tendencies to an evil willing that prefers easier but morally and practically worse courses of action." Warne and Davies, *Emotions and Religious Dynamics*, 100.

¹⁴⁰ Lonergan, *Method*, 116.

¹⁴¹ Note, however, "One's self-love is the originating personal value from which one's own acts of valuing and loving arise; in the more traditional language of grace, this self-love pertains to habitual grace, the grace that makes us pleasing to God." Neil Ormerod and Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sacred Heart, Beatific Mind: Exploring the Consciousness of Jesus," *Theological Studies* 79, no. 4 (November 2018): 744, https://doi.org/10.1177/0040563918801184.

A fourth, final and subtle outcome, and relating to Lonergan's commitment to history, is the materialisation of a theologically and philosophically grounded account of history in consequence of Christ's death on the cross and Romans 5:5. History with its pain and greatness is addressed. Not in the sense that drawing meaning out of meaninglessness renders it meaningful; nor in the sense that by drawing good out of evil renders evil intelligible. But rather, history's arbitrariness dissipates in the light of the cross, the resurrection, and Pentecost. Christologically and pneumatically inspired, authentic subjectivity lends itself to healed and fruitful relations. Thus, "self-transcendent and self-sacrificing love is the key to the notion of redemption in Lonergan's theological theory of history, especially as it implies a changed notion of interpersonal relation."¹⁴²

one of the clearest examples of this emphasis on concrete historical manifestation was Lonergan's illustration of the man and woman who loved one another but did not avow that love. Without an entry into concrete historical meaning, that love would not be full, real love. The outward, historical word of love is not incidental; it is constitutive of the very reality of that love. Thus, what we might call 'love' is not really love unless and until it enters the historical and concrete realm. In part, this is because the existential loving of the lover constitutes the presence of the beloved to that lover, but it is also because love is not simply an idea, but is instead about a changed state of being, a changed way of life. In the case of the love of God, God's avowal of love for us is historically manifested in "Christ crucified."¹⁴³

The death of Christ on the cross, his resurrection and the outpouring of the Spirit reveal full, tangible love in the historical and concrete realm. For Lonergan, the historical events provide meaning, moral direction, and hope in the truest sense. The next section subsection (2.4) will explain how this is the case by examining Lonergan's "so-called"¹⁴⁴ four-point

¹⁴² Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 140.

¹⁴³ Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 176. And: "The example he repeated from his ministries at Bonnyrigg, Scotland, showed the necessity of an examination of historical process for the discernment of a concrete manifestation of love in history. He had to tell the story in order for the manifestation of love to be seen in the young girl's life. This was not simply a case of description supplanting explanation. Instead, narrative was explanatory (though, by definition, not theoretic) precisely because the object of the explanation was a change in the world of human meaning displayed historically in the existential commitments and decisions of a human subject. This is why he could (and, in fact, must) have met what was intended as a technical theoretic question with a narrative response: the ontological change effected by sanctifying grace, religious conversion, is to be found in the concrete, historical, existential community to which the graced or converted person belongs, and the intelligibility of a particular concrete, historical, existential community is revealed more by narrative than by theoretic expression." Blackwood, "Love and Lonergan," 177.

¹⁴⁴ Neil Ormerod, "A (Non-Communio) Trinitarian Ecclesiology: Grounded in Grace, Lived in Faith, Hope, and Charity," *Theological Studies* 76, no. 3 (2015): 449, https://doi.org/10.1177/0040563915593470.

hypothesis and his development of contingent predication. Suffice it to say, at this point, the incarnation and Pentecost recalibrate human love giving the lie to the argument that everything is vanity. Ratzinger, wary of existentialism, nihilism, and the posturing of new atheism, develops his own account of the same historical events. Lonergan's analysis and evaluation of love in relation to conscious intentionality and authentic subjectivity enriches these.

2.3 Summary

Lonergan's interest and attitude towards love changes and increases over time. Early on, he grasps the fact that love betters the self, ends, or at the very least, curtails destructive personal behaviours and social practices, and creates the conditions for positively building society and bettering life. In the second phase of his appraisal of love, Lonergan develops the notion of religious conversion, being in love with God, and a healing vector which complete conscious intentionality in the creative vector. They precipitate a sublation of a person's scale of values and reorient her moral and intellectual horizons. This realignment works against apathy, antipathy, and evil in general, becoming a triumph of grace in perfecting nature. Graced lives actuate God's purposes for creation. They do so in consequence of love and through the initiative of the economic Trinity, manifest in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, the work of the Spirit, practices of the church militant.

3. Bernard Lonergan: the grace–nature distinction

In this subsection on Lonergan's thought on reason and love, I take up the discussion of the "grace–nature" distinction. I will return to ideas that I have already written on in this chapter and show how they coalesce in Lonergan's revision of the distinction. These include: a scale of values; the creative and healing vectors; and sublation. In addition, I will introduce a hypothesis¹⁴⁵—Lonergan's "four-point hypothesis"—and an argument for "contingent predication." The discussion of these subjects is relevant because it offers a means for assessing the *communio* ecclesiology which Ratzinger embraces and carries into his analysis of reason and love. Moreover, it

¹⁴⁵ Significantly developed by Doran and Ormerod. Robert M. Doran, *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions. Volume 1, Missions and Processions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Robert M. Doran, *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions. Volume 2, Missions, Relations, and Persons* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019); Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, *Foundational Theology*.

has the potential to relax the tension I think is present in Ratzinger's work in relation to human reasoning and reason as divine, with human reasoning as suspect and frangible. Furthermore, a sharing of divine life grounded in the created participations of the Godhead, enlivening the theological virtues, shows itself to be a remedy to evil with strong explanatory power. As Ratzinger turns to social and political reform, acknowledging its import in the face of European and Western civilization's dissolution, there remains a tendency to press every solution into God's court without a properly graced, if human, iteration. Reason in relation to love and ethical behaviour can be thoroughly human, and by way of contingent predication thoroughly effective. Lonergan's analysis here, acts as a constructive interlocution to Ratzinger's assertion of the interrelation between reason and love.

Ormerod writes on the ongoing significance of the grace-nature distinction. He observes, "much current Catholic theology is less than convinced of the importance of the distinction, stressing the impact of divine grace to such an extent that the construct of an underlying human nature, or at least its usefulness, is called into question."¹⁴⁶ He continues, noting, "the distinction, which first achieved a more precise elucidation in the writings of Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1160–1236), has served Catholic theology well for close to a millennium."¹⁴⁷ His concern is that the lineage of thought, springing from Augustine, running through to Aquinas, and onto twentieth century theologians, with its delicate distinctions, has been neglected, or worse dropped. Rahner and differently, Lonergan, proving exceptions. Furthermore, *communio* ecclesiologies have only exacerbated this tendency by focusing on mutual indwelling and relationality within the Godhead and transposing these into an egalitarian-essentialist mix that becomes the basis for understanding humans made in the image and likeness of God. God is relational, humans imaging God, at their best are, too. While this is a powerful and comforting redux, it does not reflect adequately on the incarnation, the deposition of the Holy Spirit, and the return on these gifts. The work of the economic Trinity and its effects are not clearly elucidated.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, on the natural plane, an emphasis on relationality lends itself to the smothering over of differences, and the added risk of not addressing moral failure.

¹⁴⁶ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 516.

¹⁴⁷ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 516.

¹⁴⁸ Thus: "The first issue to note about many communio ecclesiologies is the relatively thin account they give of the Trinity itself. The focus is almost entirely on the question of three Persons, one God, and perichoresis or mutual indwelling of the Persons in the Trinity. The standard position is that persons are 'persons-in-

Communio ecclesiology bears a structural resemblance to a functionalist account of society. Functionalism stresses values of harmony and integration, while tending to disvalue or ignore evidence of tensions or conflict. The standard critique of functionalism raised by more conflictualist approaches is that functionalism tends to reinforce the *status quo*, and fails to give adequate accounts of power and social change. In the same way, *communio* ecclesiologies tend to paper over tensions and conflicts.... Attempts to stress equality in the church, or the non-hierarchical nature of communion, can effectively mask the real power relations that exist within the church. Overall I would argue that the symbol of *communio* as applied to the church is inherently conservative, resistant to change, and masks power relations operating within the church.¹⁴⁹

If this is the case, then how much more serious is this failure for wider society (viz., the church's mission as salt and light)? And if Ratzinger is as concerned with reason and love, and their hard transposition into social and political health, as his works suggest, then a re-evaluation of the grace–nature distinction might well be of advantage.

The difficulty with the grace–nature distinction lies in its delineation. To what extent is there a natural "space"? Should it be termed plane, sphere, realm, world, level, or something else? Is it autonomous? Is it hell-bent or heaven tending? Is the realm of grace a wholly separate realm, occasionally making salvific raids into the alien territory of nature? Is the sphere of nature better described as the sphere of sin; and hence the depiction of reality as a grace-sin dialectic more apt?

Lonergan's writings attend to these questions. Spheres, planes and realms, terms commonly used by theologians are not particularly helpful and at times, problematic. Orders, favoured by Aquinas, and dimensions are better. Levels used by Lonergan himself have value, but creative and healing vectors are better still. Why? Because as I note previously, Lonergan becomes increasingly conscious of the fact that the language of

relationship,' and that from this we can conclude to the importance of relationship for human beings; while from the equality of the Persons (*homoousios*) we can draw a conclusion about the non-hierarchical nature of such relationships. While this position is unexceptional in itself and can tend to the banal (e.g., unity in diversity and diversity in unity), it prescinds almost entirely from the specificity of classical trinitarian doctrine. The Creed of Nicaea/Constantinople speaks not just of one God and three Persons, but quite specifically about the relationships between the Persons (God from God, begotten, not made; proceeds from the Father [and the Son]). The creed, at least in its Western form, does not talk about relationship in general, but about the specific relationships of Father to Son and of Father and Son to the Holy Spirit. These relationships are generally spoken of as processions, of the Son from the Father, and the Spirit from the Father and the Son. The two processions are then linked in the Creed to two missions, so that 'for the sake of us and our salvation' the Son 'came down from heaven,' while the Spirit 'spoke through the prophets.' But procession and mission are rarely mentioned in communio ecclesiologies." Ormerod, "A (Non-Communio) Trinitarian Ecclesiology," 454.

¹⁴⁹ Ormerod, "A (Non-Communio) Trinitarian Ecclesiology," 455–56.

spheres (plains, realms), and even levels, connote rigid borders and a compartmentalism.¹⁵⁰ They create separation when reality is actually characterised by an intentional fluidity that allows for an interpenetration and sublation of "levels" that harbour change.

Remembering my earlier contention, Lonergan is committed to Pope Leo XIII's maxim *vetera novis augere et perficere*, it is notable that the introduction of a creative and healing vector, and particularly a scale of values, does not undermine the advances Aquinas made on Augustine's exposition of the human condition and of the priority of grace¹⁵¹—rather, the scale of values he introduces "can best be understood as an unpacking of the traditional grace–nature distinction, on the 'nature' side of the distinction."¹⁵² Lonergan's account of nature thus, fills it out psychologically, socially, and culturally.

Traditional accounts of human nature have revolved around concepts of "bodysoul" or "spirit–matter" dualism versus dualities. Aristotle defined the human being as, for example, a rational animal. Animality corresponds to our bodiliness or materiality, while rationality corresponds to our soul or spiritual dimension. In terms of the scale of values, animality and rationality correlate in some sense with vital and personal values. But a consideration of these two aspects alone tends to bracket out or mask the social, cultural, and historical dimensions of human existence. Lonergan's injection of social and cultural values into his account of human existence expands the more metaphysical consideration of that existence. The latter tended to dehistoricize and individualize human nature, whereas Lonergan's injection gives scope for a human existence that is fully historically (socially and culturally) constituted.¹⁵³

An account that also raises the question as to the effects of conscious intentionality, and the importance of questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation.

The key point here is that questions pertaining to a scale of values can deliver answers that either reflect the operations of grace working down from the healing vector into the creative vector or they can articulate the closed delimiting decisions that express the biases and distortions within a class of values—be they social, cultural, or personal. The horizontal and vertical finalities of the creative vector have genuine value and positive effect—they are what they are—but they are raised to and synchronised with greater ends by a healing vector. Nature in this arrangement is not static and closed but open to a higher

¹⁵⁰ Just so: "conceptualism separated the grace–nature distinction into distinct realms or "spheres" rather than into distinct orders or "dimensions…" Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 530.

¹⁵¹ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 519.

¹⁵² Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 530.

¹⁵³ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 530.

level of integration and fulfilment.¹⁵⁴ Religious conversion shifts the moral scale of values, which in turn enlivens social and cultural values in the creative vector. Even so, values as accumulations of insight over many generations are formative for cultures, but they are not comprehensive—and in the face of such religious conversion, they are changeable. This suggests that grace is not an extrinsic addendum to human nature; and moreover, that grace is not in contrast or competition with nature—rather it perfects it.

[T]he notion of the healing vector expresses the ways the operation of vertical finality transforms the lower levels thus incorporated. This too is evident throughout the natural order. As I have argued previously, the fact that a neutron is incorporated into an atomic nucleus modifies the reality of the neutron. Outside the nucleus a neutron has a half-life of about eleven minutes. Within the nucleus this is no longer the case; its reality has been modified by its incorporation into the atomic nucleus. Analogously, human existence is modified (elevated) through its incorporation into the life of God through religious values. Religious values thus transform moral performance, and through this transformation cultures can be shifted, and distortions of the social order healed, leading to a just, equitable, and sustainable social order for the good of all. Grace is then not an extrinsic addition to human nature considered as a closed system, but a higher-level integration of human existence that itself modifies (elevates) that system. Grace thus completes, perfects, and elevates human nature. For Lonergan the root problem of extrinsicism is found in its conceptualist and essentialist understanding of natures as pure and closed, which is overcome by recognizing the openness of all structures to higher-level integrations (vertical finality).¹⁵⁵

Like Augustine, Lonergan explores the givenness of the human situation and the physical world that sustains it in preference to conceptualist and essentialist understandings of nature. He finds grace does not rarefy historical actualities; it retextures them through a set of heuristic structures that dynamically operate in a series of dialectics within social, cultural, and personal levels of value: these also mark the intelligibility of human history.¹⁵⁶ Arguably, Lonergan's work on a scale of values, sublation, and a creative and healing vector, is not only an advance on Aristotelian metaphysics, but also repristinates

¹⁵⁴ But note, Lonergan would agree with Aquinas that human nature in a limited manner recognises goodness and is capable of it without grace, *contra* to more pessimistic anthropologies relating to human depravity. (John McDermott, "Faith, Reason, and Freedom," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1 December, 2002): 208, https://doi.org/10.1177/002114000206700401.) Thus Aquinas: "In the state of corrupt nature he [man] falls short of what nature makes possible, so that he cannot by his own power fulfil the whole good that pertains to his nature. Human nature is not so entirely corrupted by sin, however, as to be deprived of natural good altogether. Consequently, even in the state of corrupt nature a man can do some particular good by the power of his own nature, such as build houses. . . . But he cannot achieve the whole good natural to him, as if he lacked nothing." Cited in Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 521.

¹⁵⁵ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 532.

¹⁵⁶ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 533.

and augments an understanding of the analogy of proportion between the orders of nature and grace. Moreover, it offers readers of Ratzinger a means for reflecting on his analysis of reason and love, and their interrelation, especially in nature.

Before summarising Lonergan's position on reason and love, I would like to address one further area for discussion: his four-point hypothesis and contingent predication. The subject itself is in development with Ormerod, Doran, and more recently Jacobs-Vandegeer, Ryliškytė, and Wilkins exploring its application and utility. For the purposes of this dissertation, it can bring more precision to the grace–nature distinction, and greater clarity to the interrelation of love and reason, via religious, moral, and intellectual conversion with their accompanying reappraisals of a scale of values.

4. Bernard Lonergan: four-point hypothesis and contingent predication Lonergan's four-point hypothesis is in answer to a simple question that has troubled Christians for millennia. It runs parallel to the question of how grace interacts with nature, asking how persons of the Trinity relate to creation. Ormerod argues Augustine "pushes the matter" noting in reference to the Holy Spirit—that he:

leaves open the possibility of the Spirit being given at some point in time as a 'donation,' introducing a distinction between being a Gift and being actually donated...In other words, a contingent reality is being predicated of the Spirit as a donation, which arises from his personal identity as Gift, but which is distinct from it, precisely as contingent.¹⁵⁷

And further:

Augustine has introduced the distinction between the Spirit as gift and the Spirit as donation; he has explored the notion of contingent predication to conclude that any contingent predication of God to the created order is said 'by way of relationship.' The next step would be for him to suggest an analogy: just as a creature exists as a contingent relation to God as creator, so the donation of the Holy Spirit stands in a contingent relation to God as Father and Son. This contingent relation imitates in some sense the inner-Trinitarian relation of the Spirit to Father and Son. This allows us to then say the Spirit is truly given as gift to believers.¹⁵⁸

It is Aquinas who takes that "next step," but it is Lonergan, arguably, who then most creatively elaborates on it.

¹⁵⁷ Neil Ormerod, "A Trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas and Lonergan: Contingent Predication and the Trinity," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (July 2017): 212–13, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021140017709423.

¹⁵⁸ Ormerod, "A Trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas," 213.

Aquinas examines what can be said about persons in relation to the divine missions of the Son and Spirit in *Summa Theologiae* (*STh* I q43 a1). He argues that "the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus, the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature." Here, "a new way of existing in another" is a contingent reality; yet it is in relation to the "procession of origin from the sender." Aquinas is contending that mission and procession are related through a contingent reality.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, mission carries a temporal term:

Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal, and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal.¹⁶⁰

Building on Augustine, Aquinas adopts the same lines of reasoning in his discussion of the Holy Spirit. In *STh* I q43 a3, he writes: "the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent." Ormerod states that:

Though it is not explicit in this text, the Spirit proceeds by active spiration, so for the Spirit to be given and sent there needs to be a created term in the graced person which in some sense 'imitates' the uncreated term of active spiration, that is, the Holy Spirit. This extends the ways in which the creature imitates God as the exemplary cause of all creation, through their 'natural' act of being, into the supernatural order whereby the temporal term in the supernaturally elevated subject imitates the term of the intra-divine relation of active spiration. Just as God is not changed in the relation of creator to creature, neither is the Spirit changed though the creation of this new relation. But the creature is radically changed through the presence of the Spirit 'existing in a new way' within us.¹⁶¹

Aquinas, also, brings the argument for contingent reality to his discussion of the incarnation. Later, in *STh* III q17 a2, he asks if there is only one being in Christ (rather than two). His answer is "that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the

¹⁵⁹ Ormerod, "A Trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas," 214.

¹⁶⁰ STh I q43 a2 ad 3. Cited in Ormerod, "A Trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas," 214.

¹⁶¹ Ormerod, "A Trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas," 214.

human nature."¹⁶² In the incarnation "a new relation" occurs whereby "the Person" subsists "not merely in the divine, but also in human nature."

Lonergan takes the arguments of contingent predication, the relation between procession and mission, and of the created and temporal terms of the processions (double term) and reworks them. He expands Aquinas' analysis of the processions and missions of the Son and the Spirit (where missions and processions are now related through a contingent reality): he introduces *four* trinitarian *relations* (in advance of the two processions);¹⁶³ and he revises Aquinas' notion of the missions of the Son and Spirit (with their "temporal term"—the Son as incarnate; the Spirit as indwelling people) in favour of four "created participations"—incarnation, sanctifying grace, habit of charity, and light of glory.

Lonergan writes:

1. From the real procession of the Word, there follows a real relation of the word to the principle that speaks the word; and since this procession is generation in the proper sense, this real relation of the Word to its principle is *filiation*.

2. From the real procession of love, there follows a real relation of love to the principle that spirates love; and since this procession is not generation in the proper sense, this real relation is not filiation, and can fittingly be termed *passive spiration*.

3. The intellectually conscious procession of the word is from the grasp of the intelligibility of whatever is to be uttered; moreover, from this grasp of intelligibility there emerges in the intellect that grasps it an intellectual necessity to speak the word. Since this necessity to speak the word really exists in the intellect, it is a real relation to the word to be spoken, and, once this word is uttered, a real relation to the words spoken. Finally, since in God to speak the

¹⁶² Cited in Ormerod, "A Trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas," 215.

¹⁶³ Ormerod observes: "What Lonergan effectively does is generalize the classical construction from a consideration of the two processions to take into account the four trinitarian relations. These four relations are the relation of Father to Son (paternity); of Son to Father (filiation); of Father and Son to the Spirit (active spiration); and Spirit to Father and Son (passive spiration). Two of these relations reflect the two processions (paternity and active spiration), while the other two are their reverse relation. Thus two processions logically provide us with four relations. Lonergan essentially uses the logic of Aquinas (i.e., the processions/missions involve "not . . . a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal"), applies it to the four trinitarian relations to postulate four created participations in the divine nature, and then correlates these relations with "four absolutely supernatural realities": paternity with the secondary act of existence in the Incarnation; filiation with the light of glory; active spiration with sanctifying grace; and passive spiration with the habit of charity" Ormerod, "A (Non-Communio) Trinitarian Ecclesiology," 459–60.

word is to generate Son, the real relation of the eternally spoken Word, the eternally generated Son, is the real relation of *paternity*.

4. The intellectually conscious procession of love is from the grasp and affirmation of the goodness of whatever is to be loved; moreover from this grasp and affirmation of goodness there emerges in the one who grasps and affirms it an intellectual or moral necessity to spirate love; since this necessity really exists in the one who has grasped and affirmed goodness, it is a real relation to the love that is to be spirated and, once this love has arisen, a real relation to the love spirated; finally, this real relation of the spirator to what is spirated is fittingly termed *active spiration*.

5. Once these matters are grasped, we conclude from the real divine processions that there are four real relations in God, namely, paternity filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration.¹⁶⁴

Further, just as:

there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. [so], there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a *created participation* of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.¹⁶⁵

Here, Lonergan articulates two additional trinitarian created participations in the divine nature—the habit of charity and the light of glory—to those commonly stated (the incarnation and sanctifying grace).

The cornerstone to Lonergan's argument is the analogy between four created participations in the divine nature and "contingent predication"—where contingent realities are predicated of a divine nature, without denoting a change in that nature. More precisely, "to predicate [a] created reality to God designates a real relation in the created reality, but only a logical relation in God, so that God is not really changed in Godself."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Lonergan, *Collected works of Bernard Lonergan 12*, 235–37. Emphasis added.

¹⁶⁵ Lonergan, Collected works of Bernard Lonergan 12, 471–73. Emphasis added.

¹⁶⁶ Neil Ormerod, "Doran's *Trinity in History*: The Girardian Connection," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 4.1 (2013): 49. And, "For example, to call God creator designates a reality in the created order but not a new reality in God, who remains the same whether God creates or does not create." Ormerod, "Doran's *Trinity in History*: The Girardian Connection," 49.

Or once again, and in Augustinian terms, a contingent reality is predicated, for instance, of the Spirit as Gift and donation. Thus:

[t]he Creator–creature relation may be contingently predicated of God, establishing the reality of the creature, but not adding to the divine perfection. In the four-point hypothesis a created participation in the divine nature can be realized by an analogous participation in one of the four divine relations. These participations do not constitute a change in the divine relations themselves, but do create a real, albeit created, participation in the divine nature.¹⁶⁷

A person's experience of sanctifying grace or the habit of charity is the experience of a real albeit created relation with the triune God.

The importance and relevance of this discussion is that to adopt the conceptual framework and language of created participations in place of divine missions, is to site a fully integrated and thickly explanatory Trinitarian account of the creaturely experience of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity and the beatific vision.¹⁶⁸ Created participations perfect nature; they neither pare it down nor revile it. For readers of Ratzinger, such a framework helps validate and make sense of human reasoning and love, their relation to each other, and to their creator. Lonergan's tentative development of contingent predication in relation to his four-point hypothesis provides a cogent phenomenology of the graced life¹⁶⁹—a phenomenon not equated with or transparent in

¹⁶⁷ Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction," 534–35.

¹⁶⁸ See also, Neil Ormerod, "Two Points or Four?—Rahner and Lonergan on Trinity, Incarnation, Grace, and Beatific Vision," *Theological Studies* 68, no. 3 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1177/004056390706800309. With reference to the incarnation Ormerod adds: "Lonergan's four-point hypothesis provides a framework for developing a new perspective on Christology, taking as its starting motif the claim of the author of Colossians, "For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily" (Col 2:9, see also Col 1:19)." Neil Ormerod, "For in Him the Whole Fullness of Deity Dwell: The Trinitarian Depths of the Incarnation," *Theological Studies* 77, no. 4 (2016): 804, https://doi.org/10.1177/0040563916666822. "And note: "Doran's extension of Lonergan's position locates the theological reality of sanctifying grace and the virtues of faith, hope, and charity as created participations in the trinitarian relations. The relations between these realities of the Christian life reflect the relations between the trinitarian relations, linking grace with charity, and faith with hope. Inasmuch as a Christian is grounded in sanctifying grace and lives a life of faith, hope, and charity, she is imitating the divine trinitarian relations and is truly, then, an icon of the Trinity." Ormerod, "A (Non-Communio) Trinitarian Ecclesiology," 461.

¹⁶⁹ And note: "One's self-love is the originating personal value from which one's own acts of valuing and loving arise; in the more traditional language of grace, this self-love pertains to habitual grace, the grace that makes us pleasing to God. And this remains true not only in our case but in the case of Jesus.... Jesus' love for the world that emerges from this originating personal value is then identified not with the term of active spiration (the Spirit) but with the term of passive Spiration (Father and Son) and so is the common work of both. As Ormerod states it, 'Just as partaking in the relation of active spiration is to have one's heart flooded by the Holy Spirit, partaking in the relation of passive spiration is to engage in the common work of the Father and Son, which has traditionally been identified as the habit of charity, the habitual orientation to

Ratzinger's own work. Furthermore, "sharing in the trinitarian life through created participations in the divine life, leading to a life grounded in grace and informed by the theological virtues, becomes a constitutive element of the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil"¹⁷⁰—something, in contrast to my previous observation, that Ratzinger, with his commitments to rectitudinous culture and government, would find beautifully fitting.

5. Summary: Bernard Lonergan's analysis and evaluation of reason and love, and their interrelation

In this chapter, I have underscored Lonergan's commitment to reason and love, and their interrelation. Moreover, I have prepared the stage for the next chapter, highlighting areas in Lonergan's method and theology that can act as informative and constructive interlocutions to Ratzinger. While doing so, I have argued that Lonergan's work is in answer to conditions that arose, particularly in the nineteenth century. The success of scientific method, the emergence of historical consciousness as an explanatory and predictive phenomenon, the growing emphasis on subjectivity, and arguments for relativism each required a response. Lonergan's achievement, here, is methodological. Through his Generalised Empirical Method (GEM), and his account of intentional consciousness and transcendental method, he makes room for the aforementioned advances without giving ground on truth and objectivity. With his work on meaning as mediated, he forwards a critical realism that complements the transcendental performance of the subject without dropping into relativism. Additionally, Lonergan brings light to the category of conversion, particularly intellectual conversion—something that is difficult to achieve, but that is of seminal importance. Like Ratzinger, Lonergan finds love to be of critical value. The experience of unconditional love, especially in religious conversion, tends towards human authenticity, characterised by habitual self-transcendence with the moral integrity and just actions associated with it. I have also argued that Lonergan's deliberations on the grace-nature distinction, contingent predication and created participations provide a lucid account of the graced life, where nature is not equated with

enacting God's love in the world. Today we might equally call it 'working for the Kingdom of God.' ' " Ormerod and Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sacred Heart, Beatific Mind," 744.

¹⁷⁰ Ormerod, "A (Non-Communio) Trinitarian Ecclesiology," 461.

sin, but is something that is perfected without detriment or loss to the triune God. In the following chapter I hope to illustrate how each of these insights enriches a reading of Ratzinger's work with respect to love, reason, and their interrelation, and together support his assertion that love and reason must be considered together—that "Intelligence and love are not in separate compartments: love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love."¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n. 30.

Chapter Five: Joseph Ratzinger and Bernard Lonergan on Reason and Love

Introduction

In the course of this dissertation, I have presented Ratzinger's understanding of love, reason, and their interrelation. I have also done the same with Lonergan. This chapter returns to these findings, placing them in dialogue. It also streamlines them in an effort to make the key arguments manageable and clear. It draws distinctions, where either theologian's work contrasts informatively and usefully with the other's.

Before beginning, I offer, here, a series of simple observations. Firstly, Ratzinger has an enduring interest in, and a complex and multivalent understanding of reason; so does Lonergan. Secondly, Ratzinger is mostly descriptive in his discussions of reason, staying within a tradition; he is rarely analytical or explanatory, only occasionally offering definitions or drawing distinctions; this is in contrast to Lonergan, who, while in no sense ignoring tradition, is concerned to explore novelty and analyse, explain, and make distinctions regarding the operations and ends of reason. Thirdly, Ratzinger has a high view of some forms of reason and a low view of others; Lonergan is more laudatory and finds opportunity in the very things Ratzinger deems a threat. Fourthly, Ratzinger's latter-year writings demonstrate a more positive re-evaluation of reason, especially as it relates to love through Christology. He also links intelligibility in creation to reason. Lonergan closely parallels Ratzinger here, but has much more to say on the grace–nature distinction; his focus is less on the relation of reason with Christology, and more on the phenomenon of reason as a created good with limited but true ends. Ratzinger and Lonergan agree on the critical and positive role conversion plays in relation to reason.

With reference to love, Ratzinger is consistent. Despite appearances, and negative personal characterisations suggesting otherwise, love is important, even central to Ratzinger's work. It is a common subject to nearly all his writing from beginning to end. It is an ongoing concern. In contrast, for Lonergan, love grows in importance. Secondly, Ratzinger finds love to be prolific and polyvalent. It is a natural and supernatural phenomenon. It is superabundant. It is everywhere. Lonergan's account of love is slightly more focused than Ratzinger's, but no less appreciative. At times, a pall of idealism and romanticism appears to shade Ratzinger's account of the expression of love, especially with regard to suffering. I think this can cloak it in fideism. In contrast, Lonergan's analyses of the grace–nature distinction, religious conversion, and creative and healing vectors, offer a markedly different and arguably fuller response to the problem of evil and

suffering. Thirdly, both theologians hold that love is pivotal to conversion and sanctification. Romans 5:5 features prominently in their thinking. Lonergan with his fourpoint hypothesis and discussion of created participations, arguably, provides a closer analysis and explanation of how divine love is effective in the natural world. Fourthly, Ratzinger, at times, seems to elevate love over other attributes of God, while simultaneously tipping it into Christology. Lonergan values love, in that it effects what nothing else can, but he is careful (1) to refer to its powerful existential impact in given contexts, such as marriage or love for a neighbour; (2) to distinguish between divine and natural love; and then (3) to place divine love within a wider discussion of the triune God. Finally, despite my comments on Ratzinger's elevation of love, he consistently advances the argument that reason and love are in close if not inseparable relation; that both salt each other; and that one without the other is directionless, particularly in matters of faith (or belief). Ratzinger proposes that love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love. Lonergan's writings complement this thesis by helping readers to understand how this might be so.

Both Ratzinger and Lonergan are committed to the renewal of Catholic theology, the integration of old with new, truth and objectivity, and credibility, in terms of apologetics. Ratzinger's engagement with correlation, retroduction, tradition, the church, and Christology, and Lonergan's own work on method were in response to these exigencies. It is hard to imagine that anything other than their focus on reason and love, two elements critical to life and its welfare, could have been more basic or more important to their projects or to human society moving forward.

1. Love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love

In this section I bring together findings on reason and love from the previous three chapters. I show that Ratzinger's analysis of both love and reason reveals them to be complex, informed by tradition and the church, grounded in God, and explicated and substantiated by the incarnation. I argue that Lonergan is sympathetic with Ratzinger's analysis, but on certain points differs. For Ratzinger being reasonable is being intelligent; intelligence and reason go together. Lonergan in his detailing of cognitional and conscious intentionality shows his readers with great care how this is the case. His evaluation of reason in the natural order is also more positive, or, perhaps, more nuanced than Ratzinger's. It is strengthened by his discussion of horizons, scale of values, and authentic

subjectivity or habitual self-transcendence. Additionally, Lonergan's analysis of conversion introduces a series of distinctions that help clarify the interrelation between reason and love, and vice versa. Finally, his four-point hypothesis and discussion of created participations move the relation between reason and love from being Christologically focused to being triune. This would seem to be an advance on Ratzinger's thinking.

1.1 Reason and love as complex

Hardly surprisingly, given the subject matter, Ratzinger's writings witness to the complexity and value of reason and love, not simply in terms of utility—for what they lead to in physical terms—but also as integral to human fulfilment in a beatific sense. Both reason and love are multifaceted and truly remarkable.

Using a method of correlation, Ratzinger argues that across human cultures and throughout history, reason has raised and addressed metaphysical questions. Additionally, until it became "mutated,"¹ it searched out "being," asking ontological questions, too.

Reason is not singularly human. It marks intelligibility in creation. For Ratzinger, this suggests a divine relation; or "to put it more precisely: in the old Pythagorean saying about the God who practices geometry, there is expressed that insight...which learns to understand being ... as intellectually structured—the perception that even matter is not simply non-sense that eludes understanding, that it too bears in itself truth and comprehensibility that make intellectual comprehension possible." ² Even so, human intelligence with its aptitude for perceiving, handling and organising data is grounded in its participation in that same creation—which is made intelligible by "the Logos, the ultimate origin of things."³ Reason is proportionate, in relation to, and "called by the eternal intellect."⁴

³ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 181.

¹ Joseph Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 158.

² Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity (Revised Edition)*, trans. J. R. Foster (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 153. Ratzinger also notes affirmatively that "Einstein said once that in the laws of nature "an intelligence so superior is revealed that in comparison all the significance of human thinking and human arrangements is a completely worthless reflection." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*.

⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, *Credo for Today: What Christians Believe*, trans. Michael J. Miller et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 28. Note, too, love has its origins in God, it is also present to creation and incarnate: "God is One and Three: he is not an eternal solitude; rather, he is an eternal love that is based on the

This claim theoretically gives reason a natural bent towards metaphysics and ontology: in asking questions on the nature of reality and of being, it is partially addressing its raison d'être. I say, theoretically, because Ratzinger persistently argues that reason is blighted and has become dysfunctional, especially in the wake of European enlightenments. Positivistic reason-reasoning without reference to church tradition and the fathers—scientific reason, and technical reasoning, are self-arrogating and neither actualise reason's true abilities (which include moral reasoning) nor pay homage to its ends. Indeed, "scientific reason... under the pressure of its standards for certainty, abandons question[s] about truth and investigates nothing more than feasibility, [and] in doing so, has fundamentally abdicated as reason."⁵ The result is that "[o]nly quantitative reason, the reason of calculation and experimentation, is considered to be reason at all."⁶ Further, "Europe has developed...a purely functional rationality that has shaken the moral consciousness in a way completely unknown to the cultures that existed previously."⁷ It is possible that the scepticism Ratzinger displays around these so-called forms of reason is aggravated by a degree of Bonaventurian anti-rationalism, German romanticism, a Lutheran and Barthian turn, and a Neo-Platonism which play down creaturely reason in favour of mysticism, imagination and intuition. Additionally, the experience of propaganda, hot and cold war, industrial murder on a grand scale, and "scientific" policies that brought desolation to whole populations, together with a tendency at times to weight a grace-sin dialectic as operative over an against a grace-nature dialectic, likely bring a confirmation bias to his negative assessment. Either way, Ratzinger states "if [reason] does not wish to become deaf, blind, and mute concerning the most essential elements of human

reciprocity of the Persons, a love that is the first cause, the origin, and the foundation of all being and of every form of life." Joseph Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow: Addressing the Fundamental Issues*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 106.

⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 150.

⁶ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 197.

⁷ Pope Benedict XVI, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 30. And note: "There are more and more voices of philosophers such as Singer, Rorty, and Sloterdijk telling us that man now has the right and the duty to construct a new world on a rational basis.... The criterion of rationality is drawn exclusively from experiences of technological production on scientific foundations... in certain cases, if it is in the interest of building the future world of reason, it can be a good thing to kill innocent people." Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 252.

existence," it must recognise its limitations and "listen to the great religious traditions"⁸— specifically the Christian tradition.

Lonergan certainly agrees on the value of listening to the great religious traditions, and he acknowledges the human propensity to ask metaphysical or religious questions.⁹ He also provides a satisfying analysis of meaning as it is mediated over time through such traditions, their communities, and practices.¹⁰ Like Ratzinger, he affirms the value of the Christian tradition; not simply because he stands within it, but also as a matter of authenticity: Christian faith with its knowledge of the uniqueness of Christ speaks truly, and in a way that no other religion can, it ministers to human life and society. Lonergan is also wary of forms of reasoning that are destructive, observing that "A life of pure intellect and pure reason, without the control of deliberation evaluation, responsible choice is something less than the life of a psychopath."¹¹ His analysis of conscious intentionality, however, gives an account of reasoning, showing how it can be scientific, positivistic, technical, and autonomous-in a specific sense-while also being beneficial. Furthermore, basing an argument on probability is advantageous and reasonable, especially in the generation of a theory. Additionally, group discussion and debate, and personal and public reasoning, are not necessarily self-referential or self-centred; in fact, they have an outward tendency that speaks less of a turn to the self, and more to the decentring of the self, characterised by an enquiring attentiveness to others. Moreover, cognitional intentionality, actually offers a means for considering subjectivity and autonomy in an epistemic context without losing sight of either truth or objectivity. It has a natural, but not negative term; which has limitations but is not invalidated by these. In this way, authentic performance becomes a defence against the very relativism Ratzinger fears; it affirms the role of the subject in the knowing process, but shows how, in response to transcendental precepts, she is drawn out of herself in a movement towards objectivity. Human consciousness works authentically and profitably as it listens to these precepts. When it fails to do so, it degenerates into inauthenticity, and the type of subjectivity which Ratzinger rightly inveighs against. For Lonergan, perverse reasoning does not point to an evil innate to

⁸ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 252.

⁹ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), 109; Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York; London: Paulist Press; G. Chapman, 1985), 161–63.

¹⁰ Lonergan, *Method*, 71–76.

¹¹ Lonergan, *Method*, 122.

reason itself, but to a failure in maturity with regard to conscious intentionality and horizontal finality; it also speaks to the embracing of a scale of values, or a prioritisation within a particular class of values, which is flawed. Thus, the social value of utility, for instance, can bias a person's judgements of cultural or vital values, changing the way they reason about labour laws, the aged and even immigration. The individual, group, general, and dramatic biases that Lonergan identifies, offer a precise and satisfying account of how sin affects the finality of knowing by creating blind spots and insensitivity to others; entrenched, delimiting and self-validating narratives; and a chronological snobbery that fixates, to the detriment of everything else, on the value of contemporaneity.¹² The great religious traditions witness to conscious intentionality as a human norm in its quest for meaning and answers; and while reason can draw damaging conclusions, it is not destined to do so. On the contrary, Lonergan shows his readers how subjectivity, scientific method, and technical reasoning, historically and presently, mark advances in human understanding and creativity. Lonergan's approach to reason, here, can helpfully nuance Ratzinger's more depreciatory analysis. To reason is human and reasoning in itself is not necessarily suspect, even when it takes account of the subject or is the practice of science.

In contrast, and despite serious reservations over natural reason, or forms of natural reasoning, Ratzinger speaks more positively on the phenomenon of intelligibility. Ratzinger holds that intelligibility in creation not only reflects the divine mind, but also bears directly on love and how it acts. Thus, "however much we may rebel against proofs for the existence of God, and whatever objections philosophical reflection may justifiably make to individual steps in the arguments, the fact remains that the radiance of the original creative idea and of its power to build does shimmer through the world and its intelligible structure."¹³ And to the extent that intelligibility is a God-purposed and a creaturely phenomenon it carries moral and ethical implications, because "The Logos, the Word in the beginning, understands moral values as responsibility, as a response to the Word, and thus gives them their intelligibility as well as their essential orientation."¹⁴ In consequence, human reason not only naturally seeks out truth, but also the good of others, enabling them to take the focus off themselves, and to enter into a "Ich und Du" relationship—actions in

¹² Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), 244–50; R. J. Snell and Stephen Cone, *Authentic Cosmopolitanism: Love, Sin and Grace in the Christian University* (Cambridge: James Clarke Company, Limited, 2014), 98–102.

¹³ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 256.

¹⁴ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 27.

concert with Lonergan's own analysis of the interrelation between reason and love. For Ratzinger, regardless of season or culture, reason in this context positively leads people to enter into relationships and to make prudential judgements in consideration of others.

As a matter of activity in the creative vector, and of intentionality into the fourth level of consciousness—of being responsible, Lonergan is in agreement with Ratzinger on intelligibility and moral responsibility. His discussion of intellectual and moral conversion with their attentiveness to values and commitments to self-appropriation, self-knowledge, and to self-affirmation as a knower, provides a lucid and helpful analysis as to how an intellectual and moral response to intelligibility in creation unfolds. Further, his studies of religious conversion, of unconditionally being in love, and of the healing vector, describe how a person's values and horizons are sublated, thus bringing about truer moral insights and better moral actions in contexts where natural integrity has not already discovered these. Lonergan's distinction between intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, and the creative and healing vectors, complements Ratzinger's argument on (1) human development through relations and (2) the issuing of prudential judgements and actions. At the same time, it offers rich explanatory detail.

For Ratzinger, while natural reason is present to moral engagement and action, it, too, is enriched by conversion. Reason, to use Lonergan's language, has an upward tendency, which enables it to raise questions for reflection, judgement, and action, while also being receptive to third-party intellectual and moral horizons, especially when that party, cum-person, is divine. Just so, for Ratzinger, responsible action "is linked to a double mediation: the mediation through reason that opens itself, that makes itself accessible to God and thus becomes able to discern justice and injustice; and the mediation through will that puts into action what has been recognized."¹⁵ Lonergan moves away from terms such as the will, and his analysis of the fourth level of conscious intentionality details the discernment of justice and injustice as best affected by a healing vector, conversion and sublation. He also avoids phrasing such as "makes itself accessible" with its Pelagian flavour, but he is aligned with Ratzinger on reason, here, in the sense that he consistently notes that there remains in people an openness to God, which cannot be eliminated. The distinction Lonergan draws is that a person does not simply act as divine receptor, but functions truly intentionally, expressing a matured capacity for apt evaluation

¹⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe? The Church in the Modern World: Assessment and Forecast, trans. Brian McNeil, Second Edition ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 80.

and then decision making. Lonergan and Ratzinger, however, are in agreement on the fact that conversion only adds to the quality of moral engagement and action. Lonergan's contribution to a reading of Ratzinger is to show how this translates into human authenticity.

For Ratzinger, ordinary human love also assists in generating the wider theological context for moral reasoning. It is the backdrop for reason's general ability to grapple with intelligibility. This is due to:

the liberal graciousness of existence, which grants us the festive wonder of a love we cannot force but that comes to us of its own accord, takes us by surprise and overwhelms us, transforms our life, gives us a new inner center, and even, in moments of ecstatic bliss, confers on us a foretaste of a life that is brighter and fuller than our everyday life.¹⁶

In such a state "we have to [ask] the question, 'Are you really he?', not only out of intellectual honesty and because of reason's responsibility, but also in accordance with an interior law of love, which wants to know more and more him to whom it has given its Yes, so as to be able to love him more."¹⁷ This is not dissimilar to Lonergan's account of "being grasped by ultimate concern" and to the "under-tow of existential consciousness."¹⁸ It also hints at religious conversion and to the dynamic state of being in love—as "to a total being in love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence."¹⁹ For both Ratzinger and Lonergan, love brings clarity to the workings of reason with respect to responsible living; and it recursively generates adoration of God.

Love may well be divine in origin; indeed Ratzinger consistently and unequivocally holds that human love "is a force that has its origin in God, Eternal Love and Absolute Truth,"²⁰ but as such, acknowledged or not, it is still a commonly, experienced power "which leads people to opt for courageous and generous engagement in the field of justice and peace."²¹ For Ratzinger, it is personal love that holds the best

¹⁶ Joseph Ratzinger, *Co-Workers of the Truth: Meditations for Every Day of the Year*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy and Lothar Krauth, ed. Irene Grassl (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), September 5.

¹⁷ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 80.

¹⁸ Lonergan, *Method*, 241.

¹⁹ Lonergan, *Method*, 241.

²⁰ Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n.1.

²¹ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.1.

claims on reason;²² and this is because "the last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it."²³ Ratzinger unhesitatingly affirms that love in this sense is basic. Just as reasoning is ineffably human, so too is loving, for "if we stop speaking about love, we stop speaking about [human beings]."²⁴ Love, as it is naturally experienced, is not a scaffolding for obligation, nor is it something to which one can assign a monetary value: "Love knows no 'why'; it is a free gift to which one responds with the gift of self."²⁵ It also has the distinctive trait of superabundance; and Ratzinger is insistent, verbatim, across his writings that love "can really be understood only on the basis of [a] foolishness... that discards any notion of calculation and is unafraid of any lavishness."²⁶ Indeed, "only the lover can understand the folly of a love to which prodigality is a law and excess alone is sufficient."²⁷ The nature of love is so strange that it simultaneously exemplifies and testifies to something which while immanent is also transcendent. Love in the natural realm is unquantifiable: its effects can be experienced and measured, but in and of itself it remains mysterious. Even so: "If two people regard their love merely as a hypothesis that is constantly in need of new verification, they destroy love in that way."²⁸ Furthermore, love is inseparable from the true and the good; that which is true also proves good for one. In this manner, love becomes formative and humanising: love not only "becomes the eye by which man sees,"²⁹ but also through

²² L. Boeve and Gerard Mannion, *The Ratzinger Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey* (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), loc. 211 of 4799, Kindle.

²³ Blaise Pascal, *Thoughts*, ed. Charles Eliot, Harvard Classics, (New York: P.F.Collier & Son, 1914), § 4. Of the Means of Belief, 267. Lonergan develops this argument and explains its significance. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Horizons," in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965–1980, Volume 17*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 19–20.

²⁴ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 55.

²⁵ Pope Benedict XVI, *God's Revolution: World Youth Day and Other Cologne Talks* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 46. And: "loved is never something 'merited', but always a gift." Pope Benedict XVI, *Spe Salvi* (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 2007), n.35.

²⁶ Joseph Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 80; Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 15. Not only is it superabundant but also "... in the love that we receive there is always an element that surprises us." Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.77.

²⁷ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 262.

²⁸ Pope Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 20.

²⁹ Joseph Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 326.

imitation and *paradosis* the traditional and transcultural means by which moral lives are shaped. Moreover, familial love, romantic love, or love among friends is affirmative as it seeks out a person's good: for the "one who loves discovers in the other person the goodness of being, and is happy that that person exists; one says Yes to this existence and affirms it."³⁰ Perhaps most powerfully, however, Ratzinger insists that "Love wants eternity"³¹—and that "the Christian message is basically nothing else than the transmission of the testimony that love has managed to break through death and thus has transformed fundamentally the situation of all of us."³² His rich elaboration on this claim is found in his writings on Christology, the church, and Christian belief.

In the consideration of love as it relates to death, Lonergan can offer Ratzinger very little. Ratzinger is profound on the matter. His expositions of love being stronger than death; of Christ's death for our sakes; and of laying down one's life for another, are compelling. However, Ratzinger does come close at times to suggesting that suffering and dying on behalf of others are virtues in themselves. On this point, Lonergan would differ; not with regard to the atonement, but in the way he views suffering as the result of natural, moral, or spiritual evil: no one is free from suffering, and, pace Ratzinger, in certain circumstances it can be humanising, bringing new depths of empathy and compassion into a person's life; but suffering is not a good in itself, and it is not to be chased after as a romantic ideal. Rather, where possible, suffering is to be curtailed through habitual selftranscendence, and in consequence of conversion, and the adherence to a scale of values which has probity. Failing this, and too often, "feelings sour. Bias creeps into one's outlook, rationalizations into one's morals, ideology into one's thought...[and one] come[s] to hate the truly good, and love the really evil"³³—an outlook which guarantees the suffering of not only swathes of the general public, but also those closest to us. Against this, Lonergan consistently claims that righteous action, stemming from "rounded moral judgement is ever the work of a fully developed self-transcending subject or, as Aristotle

³⁰ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 147.

³¹ Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 97. Ratzinger goes on to claim: "That is why the message of the Resurrection is not only a hymn to God but a hymn to the power of his love and hence a hymn to man, to the earth, and to matter." Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 105.

³² Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 314.

³³ Lonergan, *Method*, 40.

would put it, of a virtuous man."³⁴ In agreement with Ratzinger, however, he also holds that the same virtuous individual, post-conversion, is further schooled by the church.

1.2 Reason and love informed by the church and tradition

Ratzinger states throughout his work that reason and love are basic and powerful influences, common to humanity, which affect and enrich everyday living. All things being equal, people reason and people love. But not always well. And while a method of correlation allows Ratzinger to delineate commonalities, similarities, and differences which have developed over time and across cultures with a Christian analysis of reason and love, he uses an *ecclesio-traditio* lens for a more precise evaluation. As I have already stated, correlation carries assumptions about tradition and situation as foundational sources for theology which seem tenuous as they do not reckon with the active continuum of grace operating constantly in history; and secondly, as a limiting factor, those who adopt a method of correlation are said to stand too far apart from the subject they investigate. True or not, and in contrast, embracing an *ecclesio-traditio* posture allows Ratzinger to analyse and critique reason and love through the eyes of a Catholic community, and from within an ecclesial and theological tradition. To this extent, his analysis issues from the prior commitments of an active participant, rather than those of an observer.

Even so, Ratzinger recognises that reason and love are not without power as daily influences, but when they stand outside of the bounds of tradition, especially ecclesial tradition, they run the risk of structural failure, with the tragic consequences which stem from this. He laments that society at large has accepted "the fundamental idea of the Enlightenment... [that] insight must step in to replace inherited social rules; [and that] the reasonable society will be a society of reasonable persons."³⁵ Reason, here, is vulnerable because in such circumstance it "no longer reflects the spiritual foundation of a living community; its only remaining acting subject in this case is the private reason of the individual, and this means, as we have already explained, that it becomes either positivistic or ideological."³⁶ Worse, reason is functioning ineffectually because "philosophical thought cannot be set in motion without some *a priori* concepts. It must be fed; it cannot

³⁴ Lonergan, *Method*, 41.

³⁵ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177.

³⁶ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 158.

gyrate in a void, as reflection on reflection on reflection"³⁷—and to avoid such a perpetual gyration, reason needs to be fed by tradition—specifically Christian tradition with its *symbolum*, its theological stances, the example of its saints, and the liturgies and practices of the Church. For Ratzinger, reason, like meaning, is mediated. It is not stand-alone, it entails physical and communal relations; this "is the way in which intellectual communication takes place, the form in which the mind is, as it were, human—that is, corporeal and social."³⁸

I have already suggested in the previous subsections that Lonergan presents a different account of Enlightenment reasoning and of "reasonable persons" through his analysis of conscious intentionality. He develops a transcendental methodology that can ameliorate Ratzinger's concerns over the "acting subject" and "private reason," illustrating that self-transcendence has a natural, if limited, horizontal term which is proper to human beings. In regard to meaning as mediated, and the role of tradition and the church in mediating meaning, however, Lonergan is in synchronicity with Ratzinger. His analysis of the mediation of meaning where "the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense experience of any individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural community, and by the continuously checked and rechecked judgments of the community,"³⁹ both complements and thickens Ratzinger's commentary. It also nudges the argument for authentic subjectivity and critical realism, once again, onto centre stage-for the transition from animalistic knowing (from thinking that knowing just comes from taking a look) to ways of knowing which grapple with the world as it is mediated through partially and fully constituted sets of meaning, not only speaks of intellectual conversion, but also of intellectual self-transcendence, and a subjectivity, in its creative and interpretive modes, which corresponds with a reality that is not "in here" or "out there, but between a judgement and what is."40 Both Lonergan and Ratzinger are committed to the church as an institution, and a bearer of tradition; and both, too, understand that the meanings and values the church communicates as a body are formative, playing a vital role

³⁷ Aidan Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (London: Burns & Oates, 2005), 199.

³⁸ Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 93.

³⁹ Lonergan, *Method*, 238.

⁴⁰ Jeffrey Allen, "Bernard Lonergan's Critique of Knowing as Taking a Look," *The Heythrop Journal* 57, no.
3 (April 2016): 456, https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12147.

in the pursuit of truth, justice, and acts of charity. Of particular note is Lonergan's comment on the church in relation to intellectual conversion:

Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion. For the word, spoken and heard, proceeds from and penetrates to all four levels of intentional consciousness. Its content is not just a content of experience but a content of experience and understanding and judging and deciding. The analogy of sight yields the cognitional myth. But fidelity to the word engages the whole man.⁴¹

The genius of the Nicene creed, findings from church councils, encyclicals, and writings and reflections of the church, is that they are formative of the "whole man." Of note, too, is that Lonergan's evaluation of love and reason working with and outwith church tradition deflects some of the criticism levelled at Ratzinger's supposed Eurocentricity or bias towards western civilization. The point is not white, western, and European, but that the institutions which arose in European government, politically and judicially, as well as culturally, arose from a particular tradition that witnessed the synthesis of faith and reason, and of biblical and Greek thought—facts that cannot simply be wished away. Their potency as institutions of civil society lay in this—and inattentiveness to it means that they have become depleted.⁴²

Ratzinger's emphasis on the church as a vehicle for formation is abetted by his conviction that natural reason is wanting. As it is contingent, injured, and finally insufficient in its ability to address metaphysical questions and spiritual needs, it requires healing and direction. This means accepting that:

⁴¹ Lonergan, *Method*, 243.

⁴² Further to this, Lonergan writes: "In the latter case some part of cultural achievement is being destroyed. It will cease being a familiar component in cultural experience. It will recede into a forgotten past for historians, perhaps, to rediscover and reconstruct. Moreover, this elimination of a genuine part of the culture means that a previous whole has been mutilated, that some balance has been upset, that the remainder will become distorted in an effort to compensate. Further, such elimination, mutilation, distortion will, of course, be admired as the forward march of progress, while the evident ills they bring forth are to be remedied, not by a return to a misguided past, but by more elimination, mutilation. Once a process of dissolution has begun, it is screened by self-deception and it is perpetuated by consistency. But that does not mean that it is confined to some single uniform course. Different nations, different classes of society, different age-groups can select different parts of past achievement for elimination, different mutilations to be effected, different distortions to be provoked. Increasing dissolution will then be matched by increasing division, incomprehension, suspicion, distrust, hostility, hatred, violence. The body social is torn apart in many ways, and its cultural soul has been rendered incapable of reasonable convictions and responsible commitments." Lonergan, *Method*, 243–44.

[t]he great fundamental decisions of the early councils, which were expressed in the creeds, do not bend the faith into a philosophical theory; rather, they give verbal expression to two essential, unchanging elements of the biblical faith: they assure the realism of the biblical faith and prevent a merely symbolic or mythological interpretation; they assure the rational nature of the biblical faith, which in fact goes beyond reason itself and any possible "experiences" it may have, yet nonetheless appeals to the reason and comes forward with the claim to be telling the truth—to be opening up access for man to the very heart of reality.⁴³

The gift and reception of faith and its articles not only express reality, but also have a formative effect on moral reasoning and ethical action—on deciding how to love one's neighbour. Additionally, reason in its contingency, requires faith if it is to advance, be "purified" and healed.⁴⁴ "Original sin [has] darkened man's reason, which can be enlightened again and restored to its dignity only through the faith."⁴⁵ Outside of ecclesial tradition and absent of faith, in Ratzinger's view, reason is limited, weakened, self-referential and in the final analysis directionless. Thus, "Reason" is "an organ, not an oracle."⁴⁶

Lonergan takes a different tack, here. While he accepts that in the light of religious conversion reasoning is reformed in relation to a healing vector, which transforms, even effecting an about-face,⁴⁷ a person's scale of values and devotion to a moral and intellectual horizon; while, too, he understands the task of theology, and its impact on the body of Christ; and while he might accept that reason is not oracular, he rejects *in toto* the claim reason is simply an organ. It is much more than this: it is integral to personhood, and as it works transcendentally and intentionally it is able to discern truth and value. It can be directionless, but it is certainly not predicated by this. On the contrary, its tendency is towards questions, reflective judgements, and vertical liberty. Indeed, in terms of performance, one can only reach authenticity by habitual affective, moral, and importantly, cognitive self-transcendence.

⁴³ Ratzinger, *Truth and Tolerance*, 92.

⁴⁴ Moreover: "The act of faith is rather a process that frees both the reason and the existence of the individual from the bonds that restrict them; it is the introduction of the isolated and fragmented reason of the individual into the realm of him who is the logos, the reason and the rational ground of all things and of all persons." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 99.

⁴⁵ Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 16.

⁴⁶ Joseph Ratzinger, *On Conscience: Two Essays* (San Francisco: The National Catholic Bioethics Center; Ignatius Press, 2007), 68.

⁴⁷ Lonergan, *Method*, 237.

Lonergan, however, is much closer to Ratzinger's position on the effects that church and tradition have on its people, their reasoning, and loving. He prefers the word sublation to purify, but it goes without saying that both address change for the better. For Ratzinger, as reason is purified by faith and sharpened by a metaphysical focus, and as moral reasoning operates in accord with divine and natural law, and as a person is inducted into the distinctive charisms that accompanies Christian conversion, so discernment and prudential judgements become probing and beneficial. Thus, purification is to the church—which has "an indirect duty, in that she is called to contribute to the purification of reason and to the reawakening of those moral forces without which just structures are neither established nor prove effective in the long run."⁴⁸ An *ecclesio-traditio* context, then, is the richest possible environment for fostering faith, which:

possesses a unique and unequivocal role in the purification of reason; for faith by its specific nature is an encounter with the living God—an encounter opening up new horizons extending beyond the sphere of reason. But it is also a purifying force for reason itself. From God's standpoint, faith liberates reason from its blind spots and therefore helps it to be ever more fully itself. Faith enables reason to do its work more effectively and to see its proper object more clearly. Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what is just.⁴⁹

And yet, almost paradoxically, for Ratzinger, it "remains true that everything [Christians] encounter in dogma is, ultimately, just interpretation: interpretation of the one truly sufficient and decisive fundamental reality of the love between God and men."⁵⁰ Reason and love are explicated and substantiated by the incarnation. In the "mystery of Christ… reason can then be seen to be the same as love."⁵¹ And the fact remains that "Christ ha[s] become… the discovery of creative love; [and] the rational principle of the universe ha[s] revealed itself as love—as that greater reason which accepts into itself even darkness and irrationality and heals them."⁵²

Lonergan's discussion of the positive, existential impact of life in the church, parallels Ratzinger's in appreciation. His explanation of how reason is affected by faith, however, seems better wrought. I think one key to this success is sublation—a notion that

⁴⁸ Pope Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005), n.29.

⁴⁹ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.28.

⁵⁰ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 76.

⁵¹ Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe?, 111.

⁵² Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 156.

Ratzinger appears to be on the threshold of articulating. Thus, Nichols observes that for Ratzinger non-erasure is characteristic of God:

The Father and the Son are not unified to the point of dissolving one in the other. They remain counterposed, since love is founded on such counter-position of a kind that cannot be eliminated. If each remains himself, and does not suppress himself in the other, his being does not for all that remain enclosed in itself.⁵³

Likewise, divine love does not suppress or dispense with human abilities and intuitions. In the truest sense of the term, it validates them: "Divine love [therefore] is not the denial or the destruction of human love but its deepening, its radical change into a new dimension.... When Jesus speaks of self-abnegation, of losing one's own life, and so forth, he is pointing out the way of genuine self-affirmation ("self-love"), which always requires us to open ourselves, to transcend ourselves."⁵⁴ Ratzinger, Christologically, not only describes the upward sweep and performance of self-transcendence, but he also points to what Lonergan identifies as sublation—the retaining, preserving, going beyond, and completing of that which is sublated. Of note, however, is that Lonergan broadens the scope of these activities to ordinary human experience. What is true to the Godhead is not necessarily limited to it, but is operative, analogously in nature. Lonergan also provides greater detail on how sublation is effected in conscious intentionality, the development of scale of values, the adoption of horizons—and with religious conversion and everything it entails.

In addition to his instructive study of sublation, Lonergan offers refinement and granular definition to Ratzinger's descriptions of creative love and the rational principle of the universe through his theology of created participations. It is not so much that Christ informs intelligibility in creation, nor indeed that there is even a rational principle to it; rather intelligence, reasoning and intelligibility are true of creation as created goods reflecting something of the triune God in its entirety—not just logocentrically or Christologically. Secondly, Lonergan's hypothesis on *four* trinitarian *relations* (in advance of two processions), and four created participations—the incarnation, sanctifying grace, habit of charity, and light of glory—provides a strong account of how the whole Trinity operates in relation to creation, reason, and love, not as a rational principle, but through a dynamic set of sublating relations which perfect human nature. Lonergan is not fighting

⁵³ Nichols, *The Thought of Benedict XVI*, 189.

⁵⁴ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 292; 161.

Ratzinger here; he is giving his readers a pleasing, textured explanation of how divinity interacts with creation to its benefit, especially within and through the church. His work supports Ratzinger's Christological commitments while also broadening them.⁵⁵

Ratzinger's larger interest is on the redeeming Christ; but with Pentecost, he understands that the church and her people are sanctified and empowered by the Holy Spirit as something otherwise they are impotent to do. This renewal not only releases an adoration of God, but also deepens a sense of need in the body of Christ for leading meaningful and responsible lives. In relation to political and social order, Ratzinger states that:

it would be a significant achievement if the days of Pentecost would turn us from the thoughtless use of our leisure time to a sense of our responsibility; if they would lead us—beyond the merely rational, beyond that knowledge that can be stored up and used in planning—to a rediscovery of 'spirit', of the responsibility inseparable from truth, and of the values of conscience and love.⁵⁶

Thinking eucharistically, he even declares that such a renewal can lead to self-sacrifice on behalf of others: "True love is death, an obliteration of oneself before and for the other."⁵⁷ It is therefore from within an ecclesial tradition, in consequence of conversion and the experience of pentecostal life, that love and truth finally come to fruition, for "love alone is of no avail. Only when truth and love are in harmony can man know joy. Love is truth, and truth is love."⁵⁸ Just so, "Love, the center of Christian reality on which 'depend the law and the prophets,' is at the same time *eros* for truth."⁵⁹

I have already suggested that Lonergan's discussion of cognitive intentionality, and of intellectual conversion, takes the edge off Ratzinger's critique of the "merely rational" and of technical knowledge. I have also argued that Lonergan's analysis of the means of addressing moral evil, of bias, and the surds which cause such heartache, immiseration and

⁵⁵ Yet note that economic, trinitarian love actively substantiates human understanding and love. "The dynamic circle of trinitarian love not only unites subject and object but even brings individual subjects together without depriving them of their individuality.... What is so striking here is, of course, the fact that this whole ground of being is, at the same time, a relationship; not less than I, who know, think, feel and love, but rather more than I, so that I can know only because I am known, love only because I am already loved." Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 26.

⁵⁶ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 154.

⁵⁷ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 15.

⁵⁸ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 81. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Love Alone is Credible* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005).

⁵⁹ Joseph Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today's Debates*, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 27.

social decay is cautious with self-sacrifice, focusing instead on authentic subjectivity as remedial to injustice and decline—and that as inspiring as it is, Ratzinger's language around self-sacrifice, death and obliteration needs careful consideration, distinguishing romantic and nihilistic elements from those that speak to the Christian virtue of laying down one's life in specific contexts to mitigate evil. Like Ratzinger, Lonergan does not hesitate to lay great claims to love and truth, but maximally he frames these in the context of religious conversion (precisely defined), sublation, and prudential judgements and acts which are rendered within renewed intellectual and moral horizons. Moreover, while grace perfects nature; natural reason, truth, and love are things of this world, known to it, and have valid terms. Ratzinger's uneasiness with contingency, is not something Lonergan shares. Contingency is not a failing; indeed, it is to creation as something that is created.

A further benefit springing from the relation between love and truth pertains to self-appropriation and self-knowledge. Ratzinger states that if one is to accept oneself, someone must say "'It is good that you exist'—must say it, not with words, but with that act of the entire being that we call love."⁶⁰ Truth-in-love, here has a healing and transformative effect. Interestingly, particularly in consideration of conversion, Ratzinger also states: "Truth, like love, is neither planned nor willed, but somehow imposes itself upon human beings."⁶¹ Lonergan moderates this assertion through the practice of intentionality, but his commitment to intelligibility as a given—as something that should demand everyone's attention—lends sympathy to Ratzinger's claim. He also confirms that the "love of God has been poured into our hearts," with God taking the initiative;⁶² and further that what is fulfilling is not unlimited insight, but unlimited love, where even as one is fully known, one is fully loved.⁶³

In sum, standing within church tradition enables Ratzinger to illustrate how comprehensively love is refined and reconstituted through Christian teaching and practice. For Ratzinger, personal sanctity and becoming truly human, modelling Christ in the world, offering hope in meeting the personal needs of others socially and politically, depend on

⁶⁰ Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 80.

⁶¹ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.34.

⁶² Lonergan, *Method*, 105, 278, 82, 327, 40.

⁶³ *Ipsum intelligere*—where understanding itself appears to be a singularity of insight where one grasps everything about everything, not as intellectualised but as in some sense a direct vision. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York; London: Paulist Press; G. Chapman, 1985), 77.

intelligent, and not blind love. For "all real progress has its origin in the eye of love and in its faculty of beholding."64 In such a context, in Lonergan's terms, intellectual and moral conversion become mutually reinforcing, leading to a realigning of values, where "as Richard of St. Victor says, 'Love [becomes] the faculty for seeing'"⁶⁵ (pace Lonergan's critique of "taking a look" equating to understanding). The church understands its mission in the wake of the incarnation, the ascension of Christ, Pentecost, its own calling-forth, and subsequent theological reflection. Its liturgy attests to redemptive and eucharistic love, but its witness becomes apposite when it is visibly and selflessly charitable. When its members pursue justice, cultivate rather than degrade the natural environment, and seek to free men, women, and children from the oppression of poverty, disease, violence, slavery, and loneliness, they are about the business of peace-making.⁶⁶ For Ratzinger, responsible life is the mark of the church, and it is the imprimatur of eucharistic love. Such love renews the mind and affirms the relational indivisibility of truth and love; it also indicates that emotional impulses directed at the good are better served when moral reasoning is intelligent and informed by the intellectual horizon and values of the church-meaning that "at the most profound level its content will necessarily consist of love and reason coming together as the two pillars of reality: [for] true reason is love, and love is true reason."⁶⁷ While for Ratzinger, God is much more than just an idea, he never lets go of the claim that "the actual advance registered by the Christian idea of God over that of the ancient world lies in its recognition that God is love."⁶⁸ And further, that "The Christian faith in God tells us that God-eternal reason-is love."69 Lonergan's work suggests he would assent to this proposition; his contribution lies in his explanation of how this is so, and how through the habit of charity it translates into personal transformation and social effect.

⁶⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 287.

⁶⁵ Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 27.

⁶⁶ Thus "the second major theme running through all Ratzinger's writings on political life is justice as the goal of politics. 'The Church's first task in this area is to keep alive in fidelity to her holy tradition, the basic criterion of justice and to detach it from the arbitrariness of power.' By this he means the primacy of ethics (the virtue of justice) over politics and so the primacy of moral responsibility, conscience and integrity." Vincent Twomey, "Pope Benedict XVI: Joseph Ratzinger on Politics," *Logos* 18, no. 4 (2015): 84.

⁶⁷ Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 183.

⁶⁸ Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 58.

⁶⁹ Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, 97.

1.3 Conversion—a closer look

While loving and reasoning are innately human, for Ratzinger, they are also embryonic and not fully formed. And they have also been corrupted by sin and are readily counterfeited. Bogus love is pushy and self-serving; it is suspicious, guarded, mean, selfpreserving at all costs, and gripped by cupidity. It is benighted by self-interest and is, when all is said and done, anti-relational—denying the connection between intelligent love and loving intelligence. Counterfeit reason is autonomous, holding in abeyance authority from cultural and religious traditions, and turning to the self. Its mantra is quantification. It works with probability—not certainty—and it eschews claims to absolute truth. It is also loveless. Not surprisingly, therefore, Ratzinger is "afraid that the good that is in the world will become completely powerless," with the heightened risk:

that eventually, it will no longer be meaningful to seek the good in truth, purity, justice, or love because the law of the sharper elbow is now the only law that prevails in the world, because the tendency of the world is to judge in favour of the violent, the brutal, [and] not the saintly.⁷⁰

How does Ratzinger meet this fear, and how does he maintain hope for world? Through conversion and then personal re-formation in the body of Christ. This means that for Ratzinger, a comprehensive analysis of love only comes close to the heart of things when it uncovers factors that are germane to true intelligence, right reasoning, and the pursuit of the common good. These factors, to use Lonergan's language might helpfully be termed religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Ultimately, it is the converted life that brings intellectual clarity, moral acumen, and compassionate drive to human love. On this point, Ratzinger and Lonergan are very close.

Ratzinger approaches the subject of conversion in five ways: (1) Christologically; (2) in answer to a series of questions; (3) through the requirement of humility; (4) through the acceptance of one's own need; and (5) in self-surrender (but not abnegation). Firstly, Christologically: divine love in Christ is "is a creative love, through which we have our being; it is also redemptive love, through which we are recreated."⁷¹ Christ incarnate effects salvation and sets the conditions for conversion as an historical fact. Moreover, as a lover, he works on the human heart operatively, replacing a heart of stone with one of

⁷⁰ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 21. The turn to the self coincides with a loss of focus on others to the point they do not factor in decision-making: "The individualized 'I' and 'you' narrows itself more and more until finally, for example in Kant's transcendental philosophy, the 'you' is no longer found." Joseph Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," *Communio* 17, no. 3 (1990): 454.

⁷¹ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, n.5.

flesh. Secondly, cooperatively with this experience, conversion is in relation to questions for understanding and religious questions. Using language that would resonate with Lonergan, he writes: "Faith can wish to understand because it is moved by love for the One upon whom it has bestowed its consent.... Love is the desire for intimate knowledge, so that the quest for intelligence can even be an inner requirement of love. Love seeks understanding."⁷² Thirdly, for Ratzinger, conversion requires humility; it comes about when people accept their limitations-that there is something that needs to be done for them that they cannot do for themselves. It is "the openness of someone who does not insist on his own capabilities but is aware of receiving something as a gift and of standing in need of it,"⁷³ that is all important. Fourthly, and interestingly, for Ratzinger that deficiency—what a person stands in need of—is love. For many theologians, the need is for the forgiveness of sins; for Ratzinger, while this is true, what a person most needs is love. Thus, what conversion indicates is that "this shortfall that we all have in our love is made up by the surplus of Jesus Christ's love, acting on our behalf."⁷⁴ "To make things clear, ... Romans 5:5 says: 'God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us."⁷⁵ Conversion tells us that in the Lord Jesus Christ, "God himself has poured out among us a superabundance of his love and has thus made good in advance all our deficiency."⁷⁶ Fifthly, and most fittingly in the face of such love, conversion fathers an unconditional giving over of the self. "Love knows-no 'why'; it is a free gift to which one responds with the gift of self."⁷⁷ Conversion is initially a "You had me at hello" moment, but it captures the human heart.

Lonergan in the main does not differ from Ratzinger on these points. He does, however, distinguish religious conversion, from moral and intellectual conversion, and he performs the hard work of linking these to a scale of values and a variety of horizons.

⁷² Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, 27. Emphasis added.

⁷³ Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 75. Note, without amendment, the words are reiterated thirty-four years later: Ratzinger, *Credo for Today*, 12.

⁷⁴ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 74.

⁷⁵ Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 44. Ratzinger claims earlier: "Analysing biblical pneumatology leads Augustine to formulate the thesis that besides the term 'Holy Spirit', the terms 'love' (*caritas*) and 'gift' (*donum*) are also, in strict terms, names for the Holy Spirit." Benedict XVI et al., *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith*, 43.

⁷⁶ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 74.

⁷⁷ Benedict XVI, *God's Revolution*, 46. And: "loved is never something 'merited', but always a gift." Benedict XVI, *Spe Salvi*, n.35.

Moral and intellectual conversion are redirected and enriched by religious conversion, but from their inception already carry positive value and utility—in terms of substantive hope. It is religious conversion, however, which ushers in the changes in people's cognitive and moral performances that have personal, social, cultural, political, and economic impact.

For Ratzinger, it is not only the initial experience of conversion that matters. It is also the more thoroughgoing conversion of a life that occurs through incorporation in the church. As a person is inducted into a way of living through the liturgies, practices, and relational bonds of her local church, so she, working with others, becomes a force for good. The habit of charity has visible effect. While Ratzinger does not use Lonergan's phrasing, his analysis, here, runs parallel with Lonergan's assessment of religious conversion, where changes in a person's moral horizon and sets of relations, in turn bring concrete expression to justice, mercy, and hope. Whether one chooses to adopt Lonergan's language or not, Ratzinger states that conversion rests in the knowledge that "love is creative-that God's love is the power that created being out of nothing, that is the true "ground" on which all reality rests,"⁷⁸ and that it "is our task to further creation, to be cocreators in the Yes of love."⁷⁹ Put more strongly, the love of Christ "demands our participation as instruments of mercy and loving-kindness."⁸⁰ Lonergan might distinguish demand from obligation, and obligation from grateful or graced response, but in relation to responsible action, he is in full agreement with Ratzinger on the role the church plays in moral conversion, and changed horizons and practices.

Finally, then, with this intersection of conversion, church, and personal and societal transformation, Ratzinger fuses truth and love together. Indeed, a love "that is unwilling on principle to extend itself to the other's need for truth fails to attain a genuinely human level and is consequently not love in the full sense of the word."⁸¹ Such love is subpar.

⁷⁸ Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 195. Ratzinger stated earlier: "love is the true counterforce to chaos: it is the creative power which continually establishes the world afresh." Ratzinger, *Behold The Pierced One*, 105. More fundamentally, "Man owes his origin to God's creative love." Joseph Ratzinger, *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. Brendan McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 28. *In nuce*, divine love is creative: "For man would not exist were he not created by God's love and constantly preserved by it; and he cannot live fully according to truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and devotes himself to his Creator." *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents. Gaudium et Spes*, ed. Austin Flannery (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014), n.19.

⁷⁹ Ratzinger, Co-workers of the Truth, 195.

⁸⁰ Ratzinger, What It Means to Be a Christian, 62.

⁸¹ Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 337.

Legitimate love is inseparable from truth, the questions it raises, and the ethical responses it engenders. For Ratzinger, truth obtains wise judgements, and love gives substance to these while also reordering human desires and provisioning the will to act. Thus, genuine love has the quality of being other-oriented and active: for "To love someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps to secure it."⁸² When this intending mixes with right reasoning in the habit of charity, it advances the common good more persistently, expansively, and effectively than any other natural human impulse or calculation.⁸³ Thus Christian "love—*caritas*—will always prove necessary, even in the most just society. [For] there is no ordering of the State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of love."⁸⁴ Conversion, for both Ratzinger and Lonergan, from start to finish, assures this.

1.4 Summary

Over a lifetime, Ratzinger has persistently returned to the subjects of love, reason, and their interrelation. They are central concerns of his work. They are of critical importance for Lonergan, too. Ratzinger and Lonergan have much in common regarding love and reason's origin and ends despite the perception of difference. This said, overall, Lonergan's view of reason is more positive, and arguably more nuanced. His analysis of cognitional intentionality lends expression to this. Being attentive, intelligent, and reasonable, are activities and achievements within the reach of everyone. Furthermore, subjectivity, scientific, and technical reasoning do not necessarily culminate in irresponsibility, or actions and policies that are godless. On the contrary, they are powerful means for attaining the good in themselves. Responsible living is surprisingly commonplace. Lonergan's examination of a scale of values and its relation to moral and

⁸² Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.7. And: "[there] is an inner urgency to love, with its compulsion to share, to give of oneself to the other …" Ratzinger, *Co-workers of the Truth*, 394. Much earlier, and in a Christian context, Ratzinger had claimed: "Being a Christian means having love; it means achieving the Copernican revolution in our existence, by which we cease to make ourselves the centre of the universe, with everyone else revolving around us." Ratzinger, *What It Means to Be a Christian*, 73.

⁸³ In fact, love "alone makes it possible to do the things of this world in a spirit of responsibility, yet at the same time in an uncramped, cheerful, [and] free way...." Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 268.

⁸⁴ Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est*, n.28. Regarding intention and more explicitly theologically, Ratzinger writes: "Love is the soul of all theo-logically/eschato-logically oriented exhortations and imperatives that structures everything in an "incarnational" manner, seeing God in one's neighbour and one's neighbour in God." Joseph Ratzinger, Heinz Schürmann, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Principles of Christian Morality*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 33.

intellectual horizons suggests that the errors Ratzinger imputes to reason do not lie with reason per se, but in the values or in the prioritisation of values informing it. Values of utility, or those that underpin efficiency drives or contemporary forms of Malthusianism, for instance, can easily provoke a misguided evaluation of people of colour, the unborn child, the physically or mentally impaired, and the have-nots, ending in truly dreadful decision-making. Intentional consciousness—and religious, intellectual, and moral conversion with their attention to responsibility-is in answer to this. Nor does Lonergan struggle with contingency. Creation is by definition contingent. Its limitations do not correlate with failure or evil. The experience of suffering is more directly related to human sinfulness and then the accretion of surds that are perpetuated in specific personal, domestic, and local histories. Lonergan's distinction between grace and nature, and his analysis of moral evil, bring substance to Ratzinger's concerns, while simultaneously turning them aside. The dramatic experiences of being loved and being in love are pivotal to both Ratzinger and Lonergan. When they are linked with religious conversion, they become unconditioned, unrestricted, and contextualised. The love of whom, of what to love, and how to love are clarified. Moreover, as love, faith and reason intermingle, they generate belief and thence the symbolum, theological stances and practices of the church, which in turn elicit maturity and responsibility in the believer. Lonergan's description of moral and intellectual conversion, a normative and hierarchical scale of values, and horizons do not add direction to Ratzinger's convictions as to the importance of sound reasoning and responsible action, but they do provide a compelling and coherent account of how these are achieved— of how grace perfects nature. Lonergan's notion of sublation makes a unique contribution to this analysis, too. Finally, although Ratzinger leans towards relating love and reason as inseparable in a Trinitarian setting, his focus more often than not is on how these are cinched Christologically, or for the human creature, Christotelically. Lonergan's four-point hypothesis with his account of contingent predication greatly resource Ratzinger's Trinitarian leanings, and aid his readers to understand how love and reason originate within God and are conditioned by four trinitarian relations and created participations.

Concluding Observations

In this dissertation I have shown that reason, love, and their interrelation are of critical interest to Ratzinger—that he pays considerable longitudinal attention to each. And further: that Ratzinger upholds love and reason as inseparable, and that Lonergan's articulation of the same subject matter acts as an informative and constructive interlocution to Ratzinger's assertion of their interrelation and indivisibility. Love and reason must be considered together. "Intelligence and love are not in separate compartments: love is rich in intelligence is full of love."¹

My analysis of selected works by Ratzinger has been divided into four parts relating to methodologies he adopts. These are correlation, retroduction, *ecclesio-traditio*, and Christotelic. Correlation and retroduction afford Ratzinger the analytical space to consider and interact with reason and love in nature. An *ecclesio-traditio* methodology enables him to analyse them and to explore their inseparability as someone committed to and within a particular tradition. A Christotelic lens refines this evaluation. I streamline these methodologies in Chapter Five.

The dissertation introduces Lonergan as an interlocutor to Ratzinger, arguing that in the context of a discussion on reason and love, and despite appearances, they have much in common. Both share a commitment to the renewal of Catholic theology in response to a failure in political leadership, and to philosophical, scientific, historical, technological, and social pressures. The turn to the self, a growing trend in epistemic scepticism, the scientific revolution, the impact of the French Revolution, ideas associated with Kant, Marx, Darwin, and Nietzsche, the October 1917 revolution, World War I, World War II, the rise of Communism, the Cold War, the technology used in modern warfare, the car, the combined oral contraceptive pill, and the cultural shifts in the 1960s, posed, in their own way, serious threats to the credibility of Catholic belief, Catholic life and human welfare. Ratzinger and Lonergan lived and wrote in response to these pressures.

Both also sought to avoid jettisoning the old simply in favour of the new; Ratzinger by standing within the tradition and by faithfully expositing it; Lonergan by standing in that same tradition, while also working with the innovations that science, psychology, philosophy, and historical consciousness had introduced.

¹ Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n. 30.

Similarly, and important to my thesis, both theologians sought to avoid relativism, looking to find a coherent, plausible, and persuasive way to speak about truth and objectivity. Ratzinger, as I have argued, achieves this by fidelity to tradition, especially with regard to Christian metaphysics, ontology, hamartiology, and the incarnation. He eloquently restates truths on the one hand, while on the other, as part of his method, he highlights failings in contemporary thinking and cultural mores. Lonergan achieves it in a more creative, or at least inclusive manner, by developing a critical realism that acknowledges meaning as mediated, value in subjectivity, and conscious intentionality with its adherence to the transcendental precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, as a way of securing objectivity.

For Ratzinger and Lonergan, love and reason are central to the project of the renewal of Catholic theology and life, a concomitant defence of objectivity and truth, and an apologetic for the Christian faith. A life without either will be characterised by "moral impotence"², and neither be directed, nor an effective witness. For Ratzinger, love needs to be rich in intelligence. And intelligence needs to be full of love—to be informed by, and in relation with love in order to avoid the type of failures in reason he so frequently describes. Love and reason must be considered together. "Intelligence and love are not in separate compartments."³

How can human love be rich in intelligence? For Ratzinger, it is through immersion in church, tradition and eucharistic life. These bring form and understanding to love. How can intelligence be full of love? It is possible because reason, like love, is an attribute of God: but it is Christologically rendered, and pentecostally and ecclesially received. Further, and fundamentally, conversion is vital to the relation of intelligence and love because it not only propels a person into the church's orbit (where they are formed more deeply than otherwise), but also generates the conditions for the reappraisal of her scale of values, and horizons. It facilitates an authenticity that is at once richly intelligent and intelligently loving. How does Lonergan's work aid Ratzinger's readers at this point? As I have illustrated in this dissertation, in four ways: firstly, by highlighting the centrality of not only religious, but also moral conversion in relating love to reason; secondly, by showing how love relates to reason through intentionality; thirdly, by demonstrating that

² Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), 627–30.

³ Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), n. 30.

love's relation with reason is operative in the natural order, even as it is perfected by grace; and fourthly, by an engagement with a theology of contingent predication and created participations which yields a broad and satisfying account of the creaturely experience of love's relation to reason through the incarnation, sanctifying grace, and particularly the habit of charity and the beatific vision.

Ratzinger remains one of the deepest thinkers and most widely read theologians of recent times. His work is prolific, broad, and profound. It responds to the call of the great commission, and it is prophetic—highlighting falsehood, societal evils, and modern forms of idolatry, while simultaneously directing readers to the "pierced one," his cross, and to patient endurance. Ratzinger's continuous and unyielding insistence on the critical importance of love and of reason, and his exploration of their interrelation is timely. Intolerance, hatred, violence, the abuse of power in its various guises, and unreason are casting a growing shadow over families, politics, and nations. Ratzinger knows what this can lead to; he knows, also, how it can be overcome. His lead on the interrelation of reason and love, the value of each, and of their inseparability is one we might follow. More precisely, contemporary discussions on sacred violence, extremism, poverty, environmental degradation, and science-engaged theology might helpfully be framed by intelligibility, conversion, and the interrelation between love and reason. So, too, the field of artificial general intelligence and machine learning.

Lonergan remains one of the most creative and intellectually disciplined theologians of recent times. His work, too, is prolific, but it has a narrower focus than Ratzinger's. His greatness lies in the precision of his thought and writings, with the delineations it makes on human understanding, conversion, and on love. Additionally, his work on the Trinity is like a feast; and it will feed theologians into the future, furnishing them with the basis for a strong apologetic for Christian faith in an intellectually fractured, and likely hostile, environment. His insistence on the importance of love and of reason, and his exploration of their interrelation, makes his writings evergreen. Like Ratzinger, in speaking to these, he is addressing subjects that pertain to God's character, his relation with creation, the nature of reality, intelligibility, human persons, their fulfilment, and to the common good. He is one with Ratzinger as to the importance of reason, love, and their interrelation, and in the urgent need to consider them together.

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