

A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF TERTULLIAN'S
ADVERSUS IUDAEOS

Submitted by

Rev. Fr. Geoffrey D. Dunn, B.A. (Hons.) (U.Q.), M.Litt. (U.N.E.)

A thesis submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy



School of Theology,
Faculty of Arts and Sciences


Australian Catholic University
Office of Research
412 Mt Alexander Road,
ASCOT VALE, Victoria 3032
Australia

29 July, 1999

2000
2001
2002
2003

STATEMENT OF SOURCES

This dissertation is my original work, except where I have acknowledged in the text sources used in its preparation. No material in the dissertation has been extracted in part or in whole from a dissertation by which I have qualified for or been awarded another degree or diploma. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any degree or diploma in any other tertiary institution. No material in this dissertation has been published elsewhere, except as here acknowledged. Appendix A has been published in *Vigiliae Christianae* 52 (1998), pp.119-145. Appendix B is to be published in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, vol. 2, ed. Pauline Allen et al. (Brisbane: Australian Catholic University, Centre for Early Christian Studies, 1999), pp.315-341. Appendix C is to be published in *Journal of Early Christian Studies* (forthcoming). Appendix D is to be published in *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* (forthcoming). Appendix E is to be published in *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* (forthcoming). Appendix F is to be published in *Augustinianum* (forthcoming).



Rev. Geoffrey D. Dunn

July, 1999.

ABSTRACT

In his book, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian*, Robert Sider omitted any analysis of *adversus Iudaeos* because, as he stated elsewhere, the latter part of the treatise was an addition probably by someone other than Tertullian and taken from the third book of *adversus Marcionem*. Rather than accept that position unquestioningly this dissertation, inspired by Sider's methodology, provides an analysis of *adversus Iudaeos* according to the rules of classical rhetoric with regard to its structure (*dispositio*), its argument (*inventio*), and its style (*elocutio*). Particular attention is paid to the differences in rhetorical systems that are found in the writings of Aristotle, the anonymous author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero and Quintilian.

The results of this analysis indicate that whoever wrote the first part of the treatise (chapters 1 to 8) made sufficient comment about the structure of the treatise to indicate that they planned to write on the topics that are found in the second part (chapters 9 to 14). This suggests that the treatise is the responsibility of one author. The argument of Säflund and Tränkle that *adversus Iudaeos* was written prior not subsequent to *adversus Marcionem* are accepted as being valid. Repetition of material from one treatise to another does not imply the activity of some unidentified copyist any more than it does the idea that Tertullian found it convenient to re-use material himself from one work in another. The structure of the treatise as we have it now indicates that it remains in draft form as there are several passages that do seem out of place.

Tertullian's argument rests mainly on making oratorical use of his interpretations of passages from the Hebrew Scriptures. On a number of occasions he displayed knowledge of arguments made by Irenaeus and Justin Martyr from some of those passages, yet on quite a few occasions the arguments and interpretations Tertullian derived from the Scriptures make their first appearance in Patristic literature in this treatise.

The results of this analysis are used in the conclusion of the dissertation to advocate greater attention being paid to this treatise in studies of early Christian anti-Judaic literature. Although many scholars would argue that this treatise provides no information about relationships between Jews and Christians in Carthage at the end of the second century, the position advanced in this dissertation is that how and what one interpreted in the Hebrew Scriptures was the contemporary issue between Jews and Christians still, as it had been since the time of the first followers of Jesus.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of Sources	iii
Abstract	iv
Table of Contents	vi
Abbreviations	xi
Acknowledgements	xxi
Introduction: The <i>Status Quaestionis</i>	1
Chapter One: Classical Oratory in the Second Century A.D.	20
Declamation	20
Second-Century A.D. Oratory	24
African Oratory in the Second Century A.D.	30
Christians and Oratory in the Second Century A.D.	36
Chapter Two: Readership	40
Questions of Readership	40
Imagined Readers of <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	43
Intended Readers of <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	56
Chapter Three: <i>Dispositio</i>	65
Sider's Observations of General Patterns	65
<i>Exordium</i>	68
1. Rhetorical Theory	68
2. <i>Exordium</i> in Tertullian	70
3. <i>Exordium</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	72
<i>Narratio</i>	74
1. Rhetorical Theory	74

2. <i>Narratio</i> in Tertullian	76
3. <i>Narratio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	77
<i>Partitio</i>	79
1. Rhetorical Theory	79
2. <i>Partitio</i> in Tertullian	80
3. <i>Partitio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	82
<i>Refutatio</i>	86
1. Rhetorical Theory	87
2. <i>Refutatio</i> in Tertullian	89
3. <i>Refutatio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	90
<i>Confirmatio</i>	92
1. Rhetorical Theory	92
2. <i>Confirmatio</i> in Tertullian	93
3. <i>Confirmatio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	94
<i>Peroratio</i>	107
1. Rhetorical Theory	107
2. <i>Peroratio</i> in Tertullian	110
3. <i>Peroratio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	110
Summary of Rhetorical Structure	112
Comparison with Other Structural Arrangements of <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	114
Conclusion	130
Chapter Four: <i>Inventio</i>	133
Sider's Observations	133
Rhetorical Theory of <i>Inventio</i>	135
1. Aristotle	135
a) Structure	135

b) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - Deliberative λόγος	142
c) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - Epideictic λόγος	143
d) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - Forensic λόγος	146
e) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - πάθος	148
f) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - ἦθος	151
g) Sources of πίστις: τόποι κοινοί	154
2. <i>ad Herennium</i> and Cicero	156
a) <i>ad Herennium</i>	156
b) Cicero - <i>de Inventione</i>	161
c) Cicero - <i>de Oratore</i>	167
d) Cicero - <i>Orator</i> and <i>de Partitione Oratoria</i>	172
e) Conclusion	174
3. Quintilian	175
a) Introduction	176
b) First-Century A.D. Rhetoric	177
c) Quintilian's Rhetoric	179
d) <i>Inventio</i> - Epideictic	183
e) <i>Inventio</i> - Deliberative	183
f) <i>Inventio</i> - Forensic	184
g) Conclusion	186
<i>Inventio</i> in Tertullian	187
<i>Inventio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	194
1. Introduction	194
2. <i>Exordium</i>	196
3. <i>Narratio</i> and <i>Partitio</i>	201
4. <i>Refutatio</i>	205

5. <i>Confirmatio</i>	212
6. <i>Peroratio</i>	249
Conclusion	250
Chapter Five: <i>Elocutio</i>	253
Sider's Observations on Tertullian's Style	253
Rhetorical Theory of <i>Elocutio</i>	254
1. Aristotle	254
2. <i>ad Herennium</i>	256
3. Cicero	262
a) <i>de Oratore</i>	262
b) <i>Brutus</i>	265
c) <i>de Optimo Genere Oratorum</i>	266
d) <i>Orator</i>	268
e) <i>de Partitione Oratoria</i>	270
4. Quintilian	270
5. Conclusion	274
<i>Elocutio</i> in Tertullian	274
<i>Elocutio</i> in <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	278
1. <i>Exordium</i>	281
2. <i>Narratio</i>	284
3. <i>Partitio</i>	286
4. <i>Refutatio</i>	286
5. <i>Confirmatio</i>	296
6. <i>Peroratio</i>	316
Conclusion	317
Conclusion	321

Appendix A: Tertullian and Rebekah: A Re-Reading of an “Anti-Jewish” Argument in Early Christian Literature	350
Appendix B: <i>Pro temporum condicione</i> : Jews and Christians as God’s People in Tertullian’s <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	378
Appendix C: The Universal Spread of Christianity as a Rhetorical Argument in Tertullian’s <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	406
Appendix D: Tertullian and Daniel 9:24-27 - A Patristic Interpretation of a Prophetic Time-Frame	430
Appendix E: <i>Probabimus venisse eum iam</i> - The Fulfilment of Daniel’s Prophetic Time-Frame in Tertullian’s <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	449
Appendix F: Two Goats, Two Advents and Tertullian’s <i>adversus Iudaeos</i>	472
Bibliography	493

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Anchor Bible
abr.	abridged
ACW	Ancient Christian Writers
<i>AGPh</i>	<i>Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</i>
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AKG	Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte
ANF	Ante-Nicene Fathers
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
<i>AntAfr</i>	<i>Antiquités Africaines</i>
Apul.	Apuleius
<i>Apol.</i>	<i>Apologia</i>
<i>Flor.</i>	<i>Florida</i>
Arist.	Aristotle
<i>Eth. Nic.</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomacea</i>
<i>Poet.</i>	<i>Poetica</i>
<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politica</i>
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Rhetoric</i>
Aristid.	Aristides
<i>Or.</i>	<i>Orationes</i>
<i>ASTI</i>	<i>Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute</i>
<i>AUSS</i>	<i>Andrews University Seminary Studies</i>
<i>BAGB</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé</i>
<i>Barn.</i>	<i>Epistle of Barnabas</i>
<i>BETS</i>	<i>Buletin of the Evangelical Theological Society</i>
<i>Bib</i>	<i>Biblica</i>
<i>BN</i>	<i>Biblische Notizen</i>
<i>BTB</i>	<i>Biblical Theological Bulletin</i>
Calif.	California
CBC	Cambridge Biblical Commentary

CBQ	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
CBQMS	Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CCSL	<i>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</i>
CD-A	Cairo manuscript A of the Damascus Documents
cf.	<i>confer</i>
ch.	chapter
Chron.	Chronicles
Cic.	Cicero
	<i>Brutus</i>
	<i>de Oratore</i>
	<i>de Inventione</i>
	<i>de Officiis</i>
	<i>de Optimo Genere Oratorum.</i>
	<i>Orator</i>
	<i>de Partitione Oratoria</i>
	<i>Topica</i>
CJ	<i>Classical Journal</i>
1 Clem.	<i>1 Clement</i>
Clem.	Clement of Alexandria
	<i>Paidagogos</i>
	<i>Protreptikos</i>
	<i>Stromateis</i>
Cor.	Corinthians
CPh	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CSEL	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i>
Cyp.	Cyprian
	<i>aduirinum vel Testimoniorum Libri</i>
Dan.	Daniel
Del.	Delaware
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
	<i>de Demonsthene</i>
diss.	dissertation
Dt.	Deuteronomy
ed.	editor/edition

e.g.	<i>exempli gratia</i>
Eng.	English
esp.	especially
Eus.	Eusebius of Caesarea
	<i>Demonstratio Evangelica</i>
	<i>Historia Ecclesiastica</i>
Ex.	Exodus
Ez.	Ezekiel
F	Codex Florentinus Magliabechianus, Conv. Sopr. I, VI, 10, saec. XV
Front.	Fronto
	<i>ad Amicos</i>
	<i>ad Antonium Imperatorem</i>
	<i>ad M. Caesarem</i>
	<i>ad Verum Imperatorem</i>
	<i>de Eloquentia</i>
	<i>Epistulae Graecae</i>
	<i>Laudes Fumi et Pulveris</i>
Gal.	Galatians
GCS	Die Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte
Gell.	Aulus Gellius
	<i>Noctes Atticae</i>
Gen.	Genesis
<i>Gen. Rab.</i>	<i>Genesis Rabbah</i>
<i>G & R</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
Hag.	Haggai
<i>H.A. Hadr.</i>	<i>Historia Augusta - Hadrian</i>
Hipp.	Hippolytus
	fragments of <i>Commentarii in Daniele</i>
Hos.	Hosea
<i>HPhQ</i>	<i>History of Philosophy Quarterly</i>
<i>HSCPh</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>HTR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>

HUCA	<i>Hebrew Union College Annual</i>
ibid.	<i>ibidem</i>
ICC	International Critical Commentary
id.	<i>idem</i>
i.e.	<i>id est</i>
Ign.	Ignatius of Antioch
<i>Eph.</i>	<i>Ephesians</i>
<i>Smy.</i>	<i>Smyrnaeans</i>
ILS	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i>
Iren.	Irenaeus
<i>adv. Haer.</i>	<i>adversus Haereses</i>
<i>Dem.</i>	<i>Demonstratio Apostolicae Praedicationis</i>
Is.	Isaiah
Jam.	James
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JBQ	<i>Jewish Biblical Quarterly</i>
JEA	<i>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</i>
JECS	<i>Journal of Early Christian Studies</i>
Jer.	Jeremiah
Jerm.	Jerome
<i>Dan. proph.</i>	<i>Commentariorum in Daniele Prophetam</i>
JES	<i>Journal of Ecumenical Studies</i>
JETS	<i>Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society</i>
JJS	<i>Journal of Jewish Studies</i>
Jn.	John
Jos.	Josephus
<i>Ant.</i>	<i>Antiquitates Iudaicae</i>
<i>JA</i>	<i>Antiquitates Iudaicae</i>
<i>J.W.</i>	<i>Bellum Iudaicum</i>
Josh.	Joshua
JQR	<i>Jewish Quarterly Review</i>
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
JSJ	<i>Journal for the Study of Judaism</i>
JSNT	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</i>
JSOT	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</i>

<i>JTS</i>	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
Jub.	Jubilees
Jus.	Justin Martyr
	<i>1 Apologia</i>
	<i>Dialogus cum Tryphone</i>
Juv.	Juvenal
	<i>Satires</i>
Kgs.	Kings
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
Lev.	Leviticus
Lk.	Luke
LXX	the Septaugint
Mal.	Malachi
Mart.	Martial
	<i>Epigrammaton libri XII</i>
Mass.	Massachusetts
<i>MEFRA</i>	<i>Melanges de l'ecole Fraqncaise de Rome: Antiquite</i>
Mic.	Micah
Mich.	Michigan
Mk.	Mark
MSS	manuscripts
Mt.	Matthew
N	Codex Florentinus Magliabechianus, Conv. Soppr. I, VI, 9, saec. XV
n.	note
Neh.	Nehemiah
n.f.	neue Folge
NICOT	New International Commentary on the Old Testament
NIGTC	New International Greek Text Commentary
N.J.	New Jersey
no.	number
n.s.	new series
<i>NT</i>	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
<i>NTS</i>	<i>New Testament Studies</i>
Num.	Numbers

N.Y.	New York
OECT	Oxford English Classical Texts
OG	Old Greek
op. cit.	<i>opere citato</i>
Orig.	Origen
<i>Cels.</i>	<i>contra Celsum</i>
OTS	<i>Oudtestamentische Studiën</i>
P	Codex Scelestadtensis 439, saec. XI (Paterniacensis)
p.	page
Pet.	Peter
PG	Patrologia Graeco-Latina
<i>Ph & Rh</i>	<i>Philosophy and Rhetoric</i>
Philo	Philo
<i>Cong.</i>	<i>de Congressu Eruditionis Gratia</i>
<i>Leg. Alleg.</i>	<i>Legum Allegoriarum</i>
<i>Mig. Abr.</i>	<i>de Migratione Abrahami</i>
<i>QG</i>	<i>Questiones et solutiones in Genesin et Exodum</i>
<i>Sacr. Abel et Cain</i>	<i>de Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini</i>
Philostr.	Philostratus
<i>VS</i>	<i>Vitae sophisarum</i>
<i>PhQ</i>	<i>Philological Quarterly</i>
<i>PIBA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Irish Biblical Association</i>
PL	Patrologia Latina
Pl.	Plato
<i>Grg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
Plin.	Pliny
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
P.Oxy	Oxyrhynchus Papyrus
<i>PPR</i>	<i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i>
pr.	preface
Ps.	Psalm
q (φ)	codex Parisinus Latinus 13.047, saec. IX-X

Q (Φ)	codex Fuldensis amissus, cuius variae lectiones ex collatione Francisci Modii Aldenburgensis congestae sunt in adpendice editionis Uunianae, Franekerae, 1597
4QD	Qumran manuscripts of the Damascus Document
11QMelch	Melchizedek Document
<i>QJS</i>	<i>Quarterly Journal of Speech</i>
Quint.	Quintilian
<i>Inst.</i>	<i>Institutio Oratoria</i>
R	Consensus harum editorum, Beati Rhenani, 1521-1539
rev.	revised
Rev.	Revelation
<i>RevQ</i>	<i>Revue de Qumran</i>
<i>Rh. Al.</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Alexandrum</i>
<i>Rhet. Her.</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinische Museum für Philologie</i>
Rom.	Romans
<i>RSLR</i>	<i>Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa</i>
<i>RSQ</i>	<i>Rhetoric Society Quarterly</i>
<i>RTL</i>	<i>Revue théologique de Louvain</i>
SC	Sources chrétiennes
Sen.	Seneca (the elder)
<i>Controv.</i>	<i>Controversiae</i>
Sen.	Seneca (the younger)
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
<i>SJT</i>	<i>Scottish Journal of Theology</i>
Suet.	Suetonius
<i>Rhet.</i>	<i>de Rhetoribus</i>
T	Codex Trecensis 523, saec. XII
t.	tome
Tac.	Tacitus
<i>Ann.</i>	<i>Annales</i>
<i>Dial.</i>	<i>Dialogus</i>
<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Historiae</i>
<i>TAPhA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Tert.	Tertullian

<i>ad Nat</i>	<i>ad Nationes</i>
<i>ad Scap.</i>	<i>ad Scapulam</i>
<i>adv. Herm.</i>	<i>adversus Hermogenem</i>
<i>adv. Iud.</i>	<i>adversus Iudaeos</i>
<i>adv. Marc.</i>	<i>adversus Marcionem</i>
<i>adv. Prax.</i>	<i>adversus Praxeas</i>
<i>adv. Val.</i>	<i>adversus Valentinianos</i>
<i>Apol.</i>	<i>Apologeticum</i>
<i>de An.</i>	<i>de Anima</i>
<i>de Bapt.</i>	<i>de Baptismo</i>
<i>de Carn.</i>	<i>de Carne Christi</i>
<i>de Cor.</i>	<i>de Corona</i>
<i>de Cult.</i>	<i>de Cultu Feminarum II</i>
<i>de Fug.</i>	<i>de Fuga in Persecutione</i>
<i>de Idol.</i>	<i>de Idololatria</i>
<i>de Iei.</i>	<i>de Ieiunio</i>
<i>de Mon.</i>	<i>de Monogamia</i>
<i>de Or.</i>	<i>de Oratione</i>
<i>de Pat.</i>	<i>de Patientia</i>
<i>de Praescr.</i>	<i>de Praescriptione Haereticorum</i>
<i>de Pud.</i>	<i>de Pudicitia</i>
<i>de Res.</i>	<i>de Resurrectione Mortuorum</i>
<i>de Spec.</i>	<i>de Spectaculis</i>
<i>de Test. Anim.</i>	<i>de Testimonio Animae</i>
<i>de Virg.</i>	<i>de Virginibus velandis</i>
<i>Scorp.</i>	<i>Scorpiace</i>
θ´	Theodotion
Theo.	Theophilus of Antioch
<i>ad Auto.</i>	<i>ad Autolyicum</i>
Thess.	Thessalonians
T. Levi	Testament of Levi
TPI	Trinity Press International
trans.	translator
TS	<i>Theological Studies</i>

TU	Texte und Untersuchung zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
unpub.	unpublished
<i>USQR</i>	<i>Union Seminary Quarterly Review</i>
<i>VC</i>	<i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
vol.	volume
<i>VT</i>	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
WMANT	Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
<i>WTJ</i>	<i>Westminster Theological Journal</i>
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
X	codex Luxemburgensis 75, seac. XV exeuntis
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
<i>ZAC</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum</i>
<i>ZAW</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</i>
Zech.	Zechariah

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sed in hac ipsa cura est aliquid satis. Nam cum Latina, significantia, ornata, cum apte sunt collocata, quid amplius laboremus? Quibusdam tamen nullus est finis calumniandi se et cum singulis paene syllabis commoriendi, qui etiam, cum optima sunt reperta, quaerunt aliquid quod sit magis antiquum, remotum, inopinatum...

Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 8.pr.31.

I would like to offer my gratitude and appreciation to Assoc. Prof. Pauline Allen, from the Centre for Early Christian Studies, Australian Catholic University, who agreed to be my principal supervisor, and to Rev. Dr. David Rankin, from Trinity Theological College, Brisbane, who agreed to be my associate supervisor. They have offered my support and encouragement, judicious advice, a critical eye, and an unfailing commitment to scholarship of the highest level. If this dissertation is judged to be sound, much of the credit must be laid at their feet. It is thanks to them that I hope I have been spared the pitfalls so eloquently described by Quintilian above.

My thanks also go to Elaine Mortimer, the Inter-Library Loans officer of the McAuley Campus Library of Australian Catholic University. Her tenacity and thoroughness enabled my research to be as broad and comprehensive as it has been.

Finally, I would like to thank the staff, both academic and administrative, and my fellow post-graduate students, of the School of Theology, McAuley Campus, Australian catholic University, for helping to make the past three and a half years not only bearable but rewarding.

INTRODUCTION

THE STATUS QUAESTIONIS

... propterea quod plurimi auctores, quamvis eodem tenderent, diversas tamen vias muniverunt atque in suam quisque induxit sequentes.

Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 3.1.5.

IN the index of references to Tertullian's treatises at the end of his 1971 monograph on the influence of classical rhetoric on the writings of Tertullian, Robert Sider listed all of the thirty-one works generally accepted as genuine with two exceptions: *adversus Iudaeos* being one of those exceptions.¹ Although Tränkle's commentary is contained within his bibliography, there is no reference to *adversus Iudaeos* in Sider's text, not even where one might have expected it, viz., in conjunction with the third book of *adversus Marcionem*.²

Without any statement from Sider himself one is left to hypothesise. Could it be that *adversus Iudaeos* (and *ad Scapulam* for that matter) displays no classical rhetorical influence? Or might a more plausible reason be found in the controversy that has surrounded this work's authenticity and integrity? That this is the case is suggested in another work by Sider when he wrote about *adversus Iudaeos*:

¹ Tert. *ad Scap.* being the other, although Quacquarelli's commentary is listed in the bibliography. Even though I can find no reference to these two works in Sider, Ernest Evans, ed. & trans., *Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem*, vol. 1: *Books 1 to 3*, OECT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.xxiii, states that "every one of Tertullian's works is meticulously examined" in Sider.

² Robert Dick Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.54-55.

Unfortunately, we do not know how much of the debate is represented in this treatise since the latter part (chapters 9-14) is an addition, probably by another hand, with material gathered from Book III of Tertullian's treatise *adversus Marcionem*.³

It is to the *status questionis* that attention must be turned for it would seem that Sider merely has accepted the opinion of others without attempting to discover for himself whether a rhetorical perspective might yield a different conclusion about the matters of authenticity and integrity.

In the standard edition of the works of Tertullian, the *CCSL*, *adversus Iudaeos* is presented as a work of doubtful authenticity.⁴ A couple of reasons for this conclusion are presented briefly. Kroymann, whose 1942 *CSEL* text forms the basis of this edition, with only a few emendations from Borleffs,⁵ accepted only the first eight chapters as Tertullian's own. Of the remaining chapters he wrote:

*... quod uero sequitur inde a cap. IX usque in finem libelli alium calamum patefacit, et quidem minus peritum...*⁶

This is qualified immediately, however:

*... attamen nonnullas sententias haurire uidetur ex schedis plagulisque imperfectis ipsius Tertulliani.*⁷

³ Id., *The Gospel and its Proclamation*, Message of the Fathers of the Church, vol. 10, ed. Thomas Halton (Wilmington [Del.]: Michael Glazier, 1983), p.45.

⁴ Aemilius Kroymann, ed., "[Tertullian]: *adversus Iudaeos*," *Tertulliani Opera*, pars II, *CCSL*, vol. 2 (Turnhout: Typograph Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1954), pp.1337-1396.

⁵ Id., *Tertulliani Opera*, II, 2, *CSEL*, vol. 70 (Vienna, 1942), pp.251ff.

⁶ *CCSL*, vol. 2, p.1338.

⁷ *Ibid.*

In the nineteenth century, Neander, likewise had accepted only the first eight chapters as authentic and considered the rest to have been extracted from the third book of Tertullian's *adversus Marcionem* by someone other than Tertullian.⁸ Åkerman believed that the later chapters were a mere forgery and a "ziemlich miserable Interpolation."⁹ Quispel believed this work to be connected with the apostate brother who stole and published what amounted to the second edition of *adversus Marcionem*.¹⁰ He too believed chapters 9-14 to have been taken from *adversus Marcionem*. Johannes Quasten agreed with Quispel, stating that:

Chapters 9 - 14 continue with the proof that the Messianic oracles were fulfilled in Our Saviour. However, they are certainly spurious, merely an excerpt from Book III of Tertullian's own *Adversus Marcionem*, and represent a clumsy attempt to complete the work. The compiler has been identified by G. Quispel with the *frater* mentioned in *Adv. Marcionem* I, I, who later on apostatized; Tertullian had entrusted the second draught of *Adv. Marcionem* to him but had never gotten it back.¹¹

De Labriolle held the same opinion, that these chapters were borrowed from the later *adversus Marcionem* by someone other than Tertullian, because he identified a clumsiness in the last six chapters not characteristic of Tertullian.¹² David Efroymson accepts this as the majority view among scholars today and, for this reason, ignores this work when commenting on Tertullian's attitudes toward Judaism.¹³

⁸ Augustus Neander, *Antignostikus, Geist des Tertullianus und Einleitung in dessen Schriften* (Berlin, 1849 [2nd ed.]), pp.504ff.

⁹ M. Åkerman, *Über die Echtheit der letzteren Hälfte von Tertullians Adversus Iudaeos* (Lund, 1918), p.11.

¹⁰ Gilles Quispel, *De bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem* (Utrecht: Burgersdijk en Niemanns, 1943), pp.61-79.

¹¹ Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 2: *The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus* (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1953), p.269.

¹² Pierre de Labriolle, *Histoire de la Littérature latine chrétienne* (Paris, 1947 [3ème éd.]), p.121.

¹³ David P. Efroymson, "The Patristic Connection," in *Anti-Semitism and the Foundation of Christianity*, ed. Alan T. Davies (New York: Paulist, 1979), p.116, n.6.

Doubts about the authenticity of the entire work also have existed for a while and continue to persist. Evans seems to have such doubts but, unlike Kroymann, suggests, in a rather ambiguous clause, that the early chapters are the ones of the most doubtful validity.¹⁴ The third edition of *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* lists *adversus Iudaeos* under Tertullian's doubtful works.¹⁵

On the other hand, there are those scholars who support the integrity and authenticity of the work. In the nineteenth century, Noeldechen argued, through a comparison with *adversus Marcionem* in particular, that *adversus Iudaeos* was a draft for the third book of *adversus Marcionem*, the first eight chapters being the more finished part of the draft.¹⁶ Gösta Säflund dated the work early in Tertullian's career and followed Noeldechen in believing, because of stylistic and philological grounds, that it was employed later in the composition of the third book of *adversus Marcionem*.¹⁷ Although he accepted the genuineness of the entire work, Harnack argued that the first eight chapters were written after the first edition of *adversus Marcionem* and that the last chapters were taken from *adversus Marcionem*.¹⁸

Gösta Säflund, after a thorough examination of Tertullian's use of Scriptural texts and a comparison of *adversus Iudaeos* with *adversus Marcionem*, came to the conclusion that the

¹⁴ E. Evans, op. cit., p.xx, believes that the first eight chapters "lack much of the forthright vigour of Tertullian's usual writing," while the later chapters are "copied from Tertullian, unless they are an earlier draft written by himself."

¹⁵ Eligius Dekkers, ed., *Clavis Patrum Latinorum, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina* (Steenbrugge: Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1995 [3rd ed.]), p.9.

¹⁶ E. Noeldechen, *Die Abfassungszeit der Schriften Tertullians*, TU V.2 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1888); id., *Tertullians Schrift gegen die Juden auf Einheit, Echtheit, Entstehung geprüft*, TU XII.2 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1894).

¹⁷ Gösta Säflund, *De pallio und die stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians*, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom, 8, VIII (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1955), pp.128-208.

¹⁸ Adolf von Harnack, *Geichichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, Teil II: *Die Chronologie*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1904), pp.288-292.

former was a single work. He explained the problems that occur with understanding the relationship between the two halves of the treatise, particularly the repetitions, as being the result of the author's change of mind during composition:

Auf Grund unserer Untersuchung über das Verhältnis der zweiten Hälfte von Adv. Iudaeos zu seiner ersten Hälfte kommen wir also zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Schrift in ihrer jetzigen Gestalt eine Einheit ausmacht, wenn deren Disposition auch während des Verfassens verändert worden sein mag, und zwar derart, dass die Darstellung allmählich voller geworden ist als von Anfang an vorgesehen war.¹⁹

In particular, he took exception to the arguments of Åkerman. Although he was not prepared to go to the same extent as had Kroymann, Säflund did accept that, although Tertullian had begun work on chapters 9 to 14, someone else, who was not up to the task, put them together and attached this to the earlier chapters:

Diese Umstände berechtigen aber keineswegs zu der Folgerung, die Kroymann in seiner Edition von *Adversus Iudaeos*...zieht, nämlich dass Tertullian den Entwurf der Kap. 9-14 als vereinzelt hinterlassen hätte, die dann von irgendeinem Stümper zusammengestellt und den "echten" Kapiteln 1-8 angehängt worden seien.²⁰

A number of "problems" in the second half of the treatise, from which Åkerman reached his conclusion that this half was a forgery, were found by Säflund to occur in the earlier parts of the treatise and in some other treatises of Tertullian as well. He considered passages in the second half of the treatise which are without a parallel in *adversus Marcionem* (11.1-10 and 13.1-23) as displaying characteristics of Tertullian's writing.²¹ In those passages in the second half which had a parallel to passages in *adversus Marcionem* Säflund concluded that it made more

¹⁹ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.206.

²⁰ Ibid., p.207.

²¹ Ibid., pp.161-166.

sense to see parts of *adversus Iudaeos* as having been deleted or made more concise for inclusion in the later *adversus Marcionem*.²²

Jean-Claude Fredouille reviewed the state of this question in 1972. Two issues were of particular interest to him: whether this work was by Tertullian and whether this work showed that its author had contact with a contemporary Jewish community. He took a positive stance on both issues:

Pour notre part, nous nous rangeons à l'avis de ceux qui considèrent l'*Adversus Iudaeos* comme une œuvre authentique, reflétant assez bien les contacts réels que Tertullien pouvait avoir avec la communauté juive, vivante et active, de Carthage.²³

Fredouille listed commentators under several headings:²⁴ those, like himself, who believed that the work was authentically Tertullian's and that it reflected a real controversy (Monceaux, Säflund, Braun);²⁵ those who believed that the work, at least the last chapters, was not by Tertullian, although it reflected a real controversy (de Labriolle, Quispel, Quasten, Altaner);²⁶ and those who believed that the work was authentically Tertullian's, although it did not reflect

²² Ibid., pp.166-189.

²³ Jean-Claude Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1972), pp.254-255.

²⁴ Ibid., p.92.

²⁵ P. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, t. 1: *Tertullien et les origines* (Paris, 1901), pp.293ff, believed *adv. Iud.* to be prior to *adv. Marc.* and that it was Tertullian who revised his own earlier work in the later; for G. Säflund see n.16 *supra*; René Braun, *Aux origines de le chrétienté d'Afrique: un homme de combat, Tertullien*, dans *BAGB* 4^e série (1965), p.196.

²⁶ For P. de Labriolle see n.12 *supra*; for G. Quispel see n.10 *supra*; for J. Quasten see n.11 *supra*; B. Altaner, *Patrologie: Leben Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter*, rev. Alfred Stuiber (Freiburg: Herder, 1978 [8th ed.], p.153, in the most recent edition of his work, has had his position modified somewhat: "Auch der 2. Teil (9/14) ist echt und wurde später im 3. Buch *Adversus Marcionem* verwertet."

any real contact with contemporary Judaism (Harnack, Tränkle).²⁷ He did not have a fourth category for those who rejected both the work's authenticity and its reflection of contact with contemporary Judaism. Instead, he had a category for those who accepted the reality of this work as coming from contact with contemporary Judaism but who were not interested in questions of the work's integrity (Williams, Simon, Judant).²⁸

Fredouille argued that Tertullian was dependent upon Justin and Irenaeus and that his urgent concern in this treatise was to demonstrate the novelty of Christ's new law, which was more important than a coherent treatise about the history of salvation.²⁹

Claude Aziza also has turned his attention to Tertullian's relationship with Judaism and to the nature of *adversus Iudaeos*. While a number of his conclusions have been labelled as "unbridled speculation,"³⁰ and criticised because he seems "to have underplayed Tertullian's antagonism towards Judaism and seriously overstated his knowledge of Judaism,"³¹ he raises a number of questions worth considering. Like others who have accepted the integrity of the

²⁷ For A. von Harnack see n.18 *supra*; Hermann Tränkle, *Q.S.F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos: mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964).

²⁸ A. Lukyn Williams, *Adversus Iudaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), p.43: "There was therefore sufficient reason for the *Adversus Iudaeos* to be composed, both as protection to Christians, and as a means of winning Jews."; Marcel Simon, *Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire (AD 135 - 425)* (trans. H. McKeating), The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1996 [2nd. Eng. ed.]), p.139, who, with reference to Tertullian's work, among others, concludes: "Just to look at these few simple facts is sufficient to predispose one to take the anti-Jewish literature more seriously and to accept at face value its ostensible destination."; D. Judant, *Judaïsme et christianisme, Dossier patristique* (Paris, 1969).

²⁹ J.-C. Fredouille, *op. cit.*, p.256: "Mais, dans l'*Adversus Iudaeos*, une préoccupation plus urgente contrariait ce dessein; il lui fallait affirmer, avec force, l'absolue et irréductible nouveauté de la "loi nouvelle" enseignée par le Christ. Dans ce heurt, le réalisme polémique, le sens des responsabilités pastorales et doctrinales l'emportèrent sur le souci de présenter une synthèse cohérente de l' "économie du salut" et de la philosophie."

³⁰ John G. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.296, n.14.

³¹ David P. Efroymson, "Tertullian's Anti-Jewish Rhetoric: Guilt by Association," *USQR* 36 (1980), p.37, n.8.

treatise, Aziza rejects the view that *adversus Iudaeos* was written after, and partly from, *adversus Marcionem*:

Qu'ils aient un lien fort avec le livre III de l'*Adversus Marcionem*, cela va de soi. Qu'ils proviennent directement de ce traité, cela supposerait l'antériorité du livre III de l'*Adversus Marcionem* ce qui ne semble guère probable. Et que l'auteur de cette redite—si redite il y a—ne soit pas forcément Tertullien, c'est encore un troisième problème.³²

He reaches this position because he believes that the entire work displays a coherence and integrity in the development of themes that necessitates chapters 9-14 being part of the intended structure of the work, such that the treatise had to be written prior to A.D. 207-208, the date accepted for *adversus Marcionem*.

De fait si l'on admet—et c'est notre opinion—que l'*Adversus Iudaeos* forme un tout cohérent, on est obligé d'admettre par le même occasion que les chapitres 9-14 ne peuvent pas avoir été empruntés à l'*Adversus Marcionem*. Le contraire serait plus vraisemblable; mais l'admettre nous obligerait à poser le problème de la date du traité qui, dans ce cas, ne peut être qu'antérieur à l'*Adversus Marcionem*.³³

Even though the last chapters may lack rigour, Aziza does not believe that one must conclude that they were taken from *adversus Marcionem*.³⁴ The seemingly ill-fitting nature of the work was part of the deliberate intention of the author. The two themes of the coming of the Christ and the rejection of the Jews are intermingled throughout the work, sometimes one more to the fore than the other:

³² Claude Aziza, *Tertullien et le judaïsme*, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Nice, vol. 16 (Nice, 1977), p.104.

³³ Ibid., p.107.

³⁴ Ibid., p.105.

Quant aux redites qui semblent mal s'accorder avec le plan général de l'oeuvre; elles correspondent à une intention délibérée de l'auteur. Il y a au fond, dans le traité, il faudrait dire dans la symphonie, deux thèmes majeurs: la passion du Christ et la déchéance des Juifs. Il s'agit de montrer que la seconde découle de la première... Faisons aussi la part de la liberté de l'inspiration et ne tombons pas dans l'excès qui consisterait à voir dans chaque paragraphe l'élément qui s'insère à sa juste place. Cependant, il y a une organisation interne à chaque partie, organisation qui relève du dessein apologétique de l'auteur.³⁵

He argued further for real contact between Tertullian and Jews in Carthage, suggesting that Tertullian would have been unlikely to invent the proselyte, whom he mentioned in the opening lines of the treatise, if there had not been one, as his readers would have known this.³⁶

Barnes, relying on both Säflund and Tränkle,³⁷ also believes this to be an early, genuine, though unrevised and later plundered work of Tertullian.³⁸ In the second edition of his biography of Tertullian, he withdrew his earlier bald statement that Tertullian's knowledge of Judaism was derived not from contemporary experience but only from reading the pages of the Hebrew Scriptures, such that "[f]or Tertullian... Judaism was an unchanging, fossilized faith, not to be taken seriously..."³⁹ What he replaced it with was a sense that Tertullian had a detached awareness of contemporary Jews in Carthage.⁴⁰ Indeed, Tränkle put forward the view that

³⁵ Ibid., pp.106-107.

³⁶ Ibid., p.108: "Rien ne s'oppose, ni la vraisemblance, ni le simple bon sens, à voir dans ce traité l'écho d'une réalité carthaginoise. D'ailleurs un dernier argument, d'ordre psychologique celui-là, nous fait pencher définitivement pour la réalité de l'affaire. Eût-il été adroit, si la chose n'avait pas été publique et connue des lecteurs, de commencer un traité contre les Juifs en mettant en scène un prosélyte, manifestation éclatante de l'influence juive et de la permanence de son recrutement prosélytique?"

³⁷ H. Tränkle, op. cit., pp.liii-lxvii.

³⁸ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985 [2nd ed.]), p.53.

³⁹ Ibid., p.92.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.330: "We must imagine Tertullian (I think) as fixing the Jews whom he saw on the streets of Carthage with a gloomy and baleful gaze, but not as engaging them in conversation, still less in seeking their company in social or intellectual gatherings."

Tertullian abandoned this treatise when presented with the opportunity to engage in some real polemic against the popularity of Marcionism.⁴¹

This is also the view of Schreckenberg: that the work is early (prior to *adversus Marcionem*), only written in draft form, and never intended by Tertullian to be published in the state we have it now:

Es scheint, daß dieses Werk... eine ganz frühe Arbeit Tertullians ist, die noch vor dem Apologeticum entstand, aber unvollendeter Entwurf blieb, der gegen den Willen des Autors vervielfältigt und veröffentlicht wurde.⁴²

That material was common to both *adversus Iudaeos* and the later *adversus Marcionem* should not lead one to the conclusion that the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* is spurious nor that it was written after, and from, *adversus Marcionem*.

Man hielt wegen dieser Übereinstimmungen die ganze zweite Hälfte von *Adversus Iudaeos* (Kapitel 9-14) irrtümlich für unecht beziehungsweise aus *Adversus Marcionem* angefügt und ergänzt.⁴³

He describes *adversus Iudaeos* as possessing “die skizzenhafte Unfertigkeit des Frühwerkes” when compared with *adversus Marcionem* and being “theologisch aber nicht so durchdacht und folgerichtig angelegt... wie andere seiner Werke.”⁴⁴ Further, he believes the work to be “eine

⁴¹ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.lxxiv: “So hat er die Schrift gegen die Juden liegen lassen und erst dann wieder zur Hand genommen, als er eine wirkliche Polemik führen mußte, die Auseinandersetzung mit Marcion.”

⁴² Heinz Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Iudaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1.-11. Jh.)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), p.217.

⁴³ Ibid., p.217.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

literarische Fiktion” and “deren Rahmenhandlung keineswegs ein reales Geschehen widerspiegeln muß.”⁴⁵

Tränkle rejected the position of scholars like Neander, Corssen, and Quispel quite explicitly, stating that the evidence Quispel offered was only “spärliche Material,” insufficient to prove his point, with the result that Tränkle believed “sondern erklärt auch keine der bei den früheren Verfechtern der Unechtheit der zweiten Hälfte offen gebliebenen Fragen.”⁴⁶ He agreed with Noeldechen about the genuineness of the work, and argued that the second half of the treatise displays the lecture-like characteristics no less than the first, indicating that the second half had the same formal characteristics as the first.⁴⁷ In fact, Tränkle distinguished between questions of the work’s unity and its authenticity, a point he borrowed from C. Becker.⁴⁸ Even though Tränkle had some questions about the work’s unity in a few places, he had none about its authenticity.⁴⁹ For Tränkle, the style of the first eight chapters matched the style of the second half and that of *adv. Marc.* 3. The most he was prepared to concede was that if the second half were not by Tertullian it was by someone who could imitate him particularly well:

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ H. Tränkle, *op. cit.*, p.xxii.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.xvii.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.xxii: “Damit ist ein sehr wichtiger Schritt getan: Die Frage nach der Echtheit hängt gar nicht mit der Frage nach der Einheit zusammen, wie bisher stets stillschweigend angenommen worden war.”

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.xvi. Even though he agreed with Corssen that ch. 13 seems to follow ch. 8, stating how “wertvoll und, wie mir scheint, richtig diese Behauptung ist”, he criticised him for not having then addressed the questions this would raise about why they were separated in the first place and why 11.1-9 was added where it was, rather than with ch. 13. In the end Tränkle argued that if there were a foreign hand then “Wollte man annehmen, das habe Kompilator getan, so müßte man glauben, er sie ein Verfechter der vollkommenen Unordnung gewesen.” This is something he could not accept. On p.xxii Tränkle indicated that he disagreed with Säflund on the question of the work’s unity because of the repetitions and disjointed structure in several places: “Außerdem glaubte auch SÄFLUND wieder für die ungebrochene Einheit des ganzen Werkes eintreten zu können. Daß das nicht richtig sein kann, geht schon aus unseren kurzen Andeutungen zu dieser Frage hervor...”

Wenn wir an das zurückdenken, was sich über die stilistische Eigenart des ersten, zweifellos echten und in vielem sehr deutlich mit Tertullians Gepflogenheiten übereinstimmenden Teiles hat sagen lassen, so haben wir dort, wenn auch nicht in so zahlreichen Fällen, weil die Möglichkeit des Vergleiches fehlte, die gleiche Neigung zur Wiederholung, das gleiche etwas schleppende Voranschreiten der Gedanken feststellen können wie jetzt in den Partien des zweiten Teiles, die mit Marc. III übereinstimmen. Aus dieser Tatsache erhalten wir, gleichsam "ex abundantia", noch einmal einen Beweis für die Echtheit des zweiten Teiles. Wollte man sie nicht anerkennen, so müßte man annehmen, der Kompilator habe sich in einer Art von prästablierter Harmonie mit der stilistischen Eigenart der Kapitel I - VIII befunden oder sie vorzüglich nachzuahmen verstanden.⁵⁰

Tränkle accepted the priority of *adversus Iudaeos* over *adversus Marcionem* arguing, through a detailed contrast of a number of extracts from both "daß die Formulierungen in Marc. III viel knapper und straffer, in Iud. dagegen schlaffer und umständlicher sind."⁵¹ Not only is the wording more concise and tight in *adversus Marcionem*, but sentence structure too reveals that what takes several sentences in *adversus Iudaeos* and involves much that is long-winded, in *adversus Marcionem* is abbreviated.

Iud. zeigt stets die Neigung, dem Leser möglichst viel an Erklärung zu gewähren, die Behauptungen von allen Seiten zu stützen und keine Voraussetzung unausgesprochen zu lassen. Gerade dies gibt der Schrift an vielen Stellen etwas Träges und Zähes, weil die Überlegung nur nach langem Verweilen auf jeder Stufe vorrücken kann. Dagegen strebt Tertullian in Marc. entschlossen weiter, - wenn es möglich ist, gleich mehrere Stufen auf einmal nehmend.⁵²

In comparison with *adversus Marcionem*, the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* was less organised and less structurally coherent, such that it lacked "Lebendigkeit und Schlagkraft."⁵³ For Tränkle questions about the date of composition of *adversus Iudaeos* must remain unanswered because, given the sketch-like quality of the treatise ("nur als Entwurf erhalten ist"), points like the omission of the Parthians could be explained by any number of factors, although he favoured a

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.lix.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.liii.

⁵² Ibid., p.lvi.

⁵³ Ibid., p.lix.

date early in Tertullian's literary career.⁵⁴ Further, the work, sharing so much in common with other, earlier examples of the anti-Judaic genre of Christian literature, reflects contact not with contemporary Judaism but simply repeats older arguments.⁵⁵ Further still, Tränkle believed that, like Justin *Dialogus*, Tertullian's treatise was not directed to Jews but to pagans and hence each of these works was "Scheinpolemik."⁵⁶ All of this suggests that the more experienced a writer Tertullian became the less need he felt to have to say everything in excruciating detail.

This then is the state of the question with regard to the work's integrity and authenticity. In 1935 Williams, after having surveyed the state of the debate to his own time, accepted that the entire work was by Tertullian but that it displays a great dependence on *testimonia* and that, when he came later to write *adversus Marcionem*, Tertullian relied again on the *testimonia*, or on the extracts he had combined already in *adversus Iudaeos*, which were then interpreted to suit a new purpose or context.⁵⁷ He rejected any notion that the later chapters did not belong, because:

They do in fact continue the argument, though as it seems, in a rougher, more detailed, and less polished form, being, perhaps, taken with little alteration from some *Book of Testimonies*.⁵⁸

He concluded:

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp.lx-lxi.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.lxviii-lxxxviii.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.lxxii.

⁵⁷ A. L. Williams, op. cit., p.45.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.48.

It is not necessary, however, to spend more time over this controversy, for in any case the question of the unity and even the authorship of the tract *In Answer to the Jews* is of little more than academic interest for our purpose.⁵⁹

While that may be acceptable for a sweeping review of the entire genre of anti-Judaic polemic, as Williams' work was, it will not suffice for the purposes of an analysis of this work itself. Indeed, a number of the authors surveyed present their conclusions without much analysis of the text itself, as though content merely to repeat the opinions of earlier authors without investigating the matter for themselves.⁶⁰ Although Sider may have omitted this work from his book because he accepted uncritically the opinion that the work lacked complete unity and integrity, I believe a rhetorical analysis of *adversus Iudaeos*, along the lines Sider himself followed with Tertullian's other works, is an appropriate exercise, if only for the benefit of a fresh approach to the issues that have dogged it. I am convinced, though, that such an analysis will yield other benefits. An appreciation of the extent to which this is a rhetorical work will provide a hermeneutical context. That its author was engaged in debate, seeking to prove a point, to win an argument, and to be persuasive, will, to the extent that they are aware of it, shape the way modern readers approach it. Others besides Sider have argued that rhetoric is an appropriate hermeneutical framework for Tertullian. Efroymsen, for instance, has written that:

Most of his writing is an exercise in rhetoric, in argument, in polemic, and a good deal of the polemic finds at least some room for an anti-Jewish reference.⁶¹

Barnes too has expressed similar ideas:

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.45.

⁶⁰ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xiv, described Neander's opinion about the second half of the work, an opinion that remained largely uncontested for so long, as "die gefährliche Unbestimmtheit."

⁶¹ David P. Efroymsen, "Tertullian's Anti-Jewish Rhetoric," p.25.

Tertullian's general debt to ancient rhetoric has long been acknowledged and partly documented in detail. In particular, Tertullian modelled the form, arrangement and structure of his tracts on accepted canons of rhetorical theory, which often determined the nature and content of his argumentation. However, although rhetorical theory and precept remained remarkably constant through the centuries, practice perceptibly changed and developed.⁶²

With regard to *adversus Iudaeos* in particular, Robert MacLennan has described it as "Christian rhetoric" but then provides only the most rudimentary comments about the structure of the work:

Tertullian's work of "Christian rhetoric" may be divided into two parts: Sections 1-8 try to prove that Israel has turned from God, rejected God's grace and the Old Testament must now be understood and interpreted spiritually. Sections 9-14 continue with an attempt to establish that the Messianic references in the Old Testament were fulfilled in Jesus.⁶³

Although he describes the work as rhetorical, his brief comments on its structure say nothing particular about any rhetorical influence. Averil Cameron has no doubts that Tertullian was "a writer deeply imbued with traditional rhetoric..." who "applied to Christian themes the skill of traditional rhetoric..."⁶⁴

However, I believe that the point made by Barnes, and by Sider when he wrote that one can discern in classical rhetoric "conventional patterns that persisted over the centuries,"⁶⁵ even

⁶² Timothy D. Barnes, "Tertullian the Antiquarian," *Studia Patristica*, vol. 14, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, papers presented to the 6th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1971, part 3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), p.6.

⁶³ Robert S. MacLennan, *Early Christian Texts on Jews and Judaism*, Brown Judaic Studies, vol. 194 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), p.118.

⁶⁴ Averil Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp.85, 115.

⁶⁵ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.12. In his footnote Sider referred to the article by R. Nadeau, "Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes," *GRBS* 2 (1959), pp.53-71, to support the claim that the main outline of rhetoric remained constant for centuries. While this is true, one of points of Nadeau's article was to sketch how Hermagoras' system of *stases* was modified and adapted by subsequent rhetoricians, even though imperfectly.

though fundamentally true,⁶⁶ runs the risk of over-simplification. Even though much of the difference between rhetoricians was the way they arranged the component parts of the theory, the configuration that resulted was itself new, and the relationship between parts and the emphasis each received varied from one rhetorician to another.⁶⁷ In terms of oratory,⁶⁸ the greatest variation can be seen in the style orators chose. *Brutus*, which is a history of Roman oratory, is Cicero's catalogue of the various styles of speaking employed by orators and the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies they used in delivery. Styles went in and out of fashion, trends could be noticed and patterns observed.⁶⁹ Hence, in this dissertation, close attention to the detail of the rhetorical systems of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian (those examined by Sider) will be offered. This will enable much greater detail to be provided in the analysis than would be permitted with the systems only presented with broad brush strokes, and will enable the reader to notice the changes and differences between systems. As well, it provides the reader with an insight into the way I understand what those rhetoricians wrote, for no two modern commentators will interpret those texts and those systems identically. Throughout this dissertation, therefore, I hope to be as explicit as possible about my own reading of the rhetorical sources.

⁶⁶ See Juv. *Sat.* 15.110-112; D. A. Russell, "Rhetoric and Criticism," *G & R* n.s. 14 (1967), p.134; Donald Lemen Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p.66; Elaine Fantham, "Imitation and Evolution: The Discussion of Rhetorical Imitation in Cicero *De Oratore* 2.87-97 and some Related Problems of Ciceronian Theory," *CPh* 73 (1978), p.2; Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," *QJS* 39 (1953), reproduced in *The Province of Rhetoric*, ed. Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), p.7; George A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.6. I shall refer to this work on the whole rather than his more detailed *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) or *The Art of Persuasion in the Roman World, 300 B.C. - 300 A.D.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) because the later work is a significant revision of the earlier two.

⁶⁷ Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 2.3.8 claimed that he was more than an antiquarian cataloguer in that he made his own contribution to theory.

⁶⁸ I accept the traditional distinction between rhetoric as the theory of persuasive speech and oratory as the practice of persuasive speaking. See Ian Worthington, ed., *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: Routledge, 1994), p.viii.

⁶⁹ Cic. *de Or.* 2.22.92.

One of the benefits of highlighting the rhetorical influence on Tertullian is that it complements the research carried out on the other influences that are discernible in his writings. For instance, Eric Osborn has drawn attention to the importance of Stoicism on Tertullian.⁷⁰ In his article he is interested particularly in the philosophy of opposites that operated within Tertullian's theology. While this philosophical influence is important, it is just as important not to forget the educational influence: trained in oratory, Tertullian would naturally have developed the skills of contrasting opposites and of being argumentative. To argue that Tertullian had oratorical training is different from arguing that he was a jurist.⁷¹ A sound grasp of oratory was the sign of a typical Roman education for those who could afford it.

Whether or not *adversus Iudaeos* was composed by Tertullian in whole or in part is an issue of interest to this dissertation and comment will be made with regard to this issue in the course of its presentation, as the results of the rhetorical analysis are established. Yet this issue can be bracketed to some extent. For a significant part of the past eighteen hundred years *adversus Iudaeos* has existed in its present state. Whether by one author or several, whether conceived of as a single literary unit or not, whether a draft left unrevised or a treatise culled from earlier work, whether its final shape was deliberate or accidental, *adversus Iudaeos* has an existence today independent of its author's intentions, whatever they may have been. If not from the stylus of Tertullian himself, someone was responsible for the work existing as it does today and it is quite legitimate to engage *adversus Iudaeos* as it is: as a literary entity in its own right. It can be

⁷⁰ Eric Osborn, "The Conflict of Opposition in the Theology of Tertullian," *Augustinianum* 35 (1995), pp.623-639.

⁷¹ David I. Rankin, "Was Tertullian a Jurist?" in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 31, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, papers presented to the 12th Oxford Patristics Conference, 1995 (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), pp.335-342.

analysed rhetorically no matter whom its author was.⁷² For most of this dissertation, therefore, the author will be referred to as Tertullian, for the sake of convenience, until the issue of authorship is addressed specifically.

Another of the benefits a rhetorical analysis of *adversus Iudaeos* may bring is a contribution to the debate among scholars about the nature and purpose of the anti-Jewish genre of writing and the related question of whether these works reveal any actual contact with, or contemporary knowledge of, Jews. The comments of Fredouille and others reveal this concern. It is a separate concern from the one about the integrity and authenticity of this particular work, for the concern about contact with Judaism is one that relates to the entire genre, whereas questions of integrity and authenticity are limited to considerably fewer works (and here the concern is only with this work). After the rhetorical analysis of *adversus Iudaeos* itself, I shall return to this matter of contact by way of conclusion and, following a survey of the literature, shall offer a contribution, based on my analysis, about the degree of Tertullian's contact. At various earlier points, though, where appropriate, I shall refer to this issue of contact.

So, it is regarding *adversus Iudaeos* as a single and holistic literary unit that I commence this dissertation. As has been noted, the rhetorical analysis may shed some light on the historical question about whether Tertullian could have written it and whether his intention was to leave us the work as we have it today.

⁷² Here I am applying to Patristic literature the principles that literary critics have been applying to Scriptural literature. For example, see Mark Allen Powell, *What is Narrative Criticism?* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), p.7: "Literary criticism does not deny these observations regarding the development of the text, but it does ignore them. Ultimately, it makes no difference from a literary interpretation whether certain portions of the text once existed elsewhere in some other form. The goal of literary criticism is to interpret the current text, in its finished form."

In this dissertation I shall undertake to examine *adversus Iudaeos* according to three of the five divisions of classical rhetoric: *inventio*, *dispositio* and *elocutio*. The other two faculties needed by an orator—*pronuntiatio* and *memoria*—will not be of concern in this analysis of what was always a literary, not oral, product. I shall begin with *dispositio*. A response to a number of detailed points raised by some of the above-mentioned commentators will be provided in the course of this analysis.

The *partitio* of this dissertation is whether or not *adversus Iudaeos* has been written according to the rules of classical rhetoric and the thesis is that it was. What will be argued is that *adversus Iudaeos* is an example of a *controversia*—the juridical, declamatory exercise so common in the time of Tertullian. Before commencing the analysis of the tract it is appropriate to spend some time in comment on rhetoric and oratory in the second century A.D., particularly to see whether Tertullian's African context is of any significant consequence.

CHAPTER ONE

CLASSICAL ORATORY IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.

οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ῥητορικὴ πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς καὶ τὸ πείθειν τῶν ῥητόρων, οὐ κολακεύουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες· οὐ γὰρ διακονοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πείθουσιν· εἰ δ' οἱ ῥήτορες τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐ δημιουργὸς ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθοῦς·

Aristides, Ὑπὲρ Ῥητορικῆς, 202

Declamation

IT is not surprising that it was Quintilian who attempted to provide a balanced assessment of *declamatio*, that most characteristic feature of oratory in the second century A.D.:

*... ideoque ita est celebrata, ut plerisque videretur ad formandam eloquentiam vel sola sufficere. Neque enim virtus ulla perpetuae duntaxat orationis reperiri potest, quae non sit cum hac dicendi meditatione communis. Eo quidem res ista culpa docentium reccidit, ut inter praecipuas quae corrumpent eloquentiam causas licentia atque inscitia declamantium fuerit.*¹

Like its near relation, the *suasoria*, the *controversia* was an oratorical declamatory exercise designed originally to hone the skills of those preparing for or engaged in the political

¹ Quint. *Inst.* 2.10.2-3: "As a result it has acquired such a vogue that many think that it is the sole training necessary to the formation of an orator, since there is no excellence in a formal speech which is not also to be found in this type of rhetorical exercise. On the other hand the actual practice of declamation has degenerated to such an extent owing to the fault of our teachers, that it has come to be one of the chief causes of the corruption of modern oratory; such is the extravagance and ignorance of our declaimers." (Translation from H. E. Butler, trans., *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian* [4 vols.], LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1920-1922])

and judicial world of public speaking but which, in the early years of the Roman empire, had grown to become an art form in itself. Donald Clark has provided a compact definition which will satisfy for purposes here:

The *controversia*, on the other hand, was a school exercise in the judicial oratory of the law courts. The student spoke on fictitious legal cases, prosecuting or defending a fictitious or historical person in a civil or criminal process.²

The evidence of Seneca indicates that a successful practitioner of declamation, in the course of his speech, sought to integrate three elements: *sententiae* (brief, pointed comments or summaries, the effective use of which throughout one's speech was prized highly), *divisiones* (the skeletal outline of the case and the main division tended to be about questions of *ius* and *aequitas*, although not always) and *colores* (usually found in the *argumentatio*, or body of proof, which were arguments designed to throw a different light on the actions, motives and character of plaintiff and defendant).³

A reading of the *controversiae* of the elder Seneca and the *declamationes* of pseudo-Quintilian indicates that, although the topics chosen by the rhetoricians could be based on famous examples drawn from history or mythical legend or even upon actual laws, this need not have been the case. The situation and laws given to the orator for him to develop could be quite fanciful. In investigating the laws involved in the Senecan *controversiae*, though, Stanley Bonner concluded:

² D. L. Clark, *op. cit.*, p.213.

³ *Ibid.*, pp.54-58. See also A. D. Leeman, *Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators Historians and Philosophers*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1963), pp.232-233.

Some of the ‘laws’ used by the Senecan declaimers may well have been obsolete in their day, and revived merely for academic interest and learned dispute; but against this must be set a number of contemporary parallels, and the fact that our knowledge of the legislation of the early Empire is not great...⁴

Our attitude towards *declamatio* is shaped greatly by the comments of ancient rhetoricians and orators. Quintilian thought it a useful practice to the extent that it prepared one for the reality of the law courts:

*Nam si foro non praeparat, aut scenicae ostentationi aut furiosae vociferationi simillimum est. Quid enim attinet iudicem praeparare, qui nullus est; narrare, quod omnes sciant falsum; probationes adhibere causae, de qua nemo sit pronuntiaturus? Et haec quidem otiosa tantum; adfici vero et ira vel luctu permovere, cuius est ludibrii, nisi quibusdam pugnae simulacris ad verum discrimen aciemque iustam consuescimus?*⁵

or to the extent that the topics were credible:

*Sed eo, quod natura bonum est, bene uti licet. Sint ergo et ipsae materiae, quae fingentur, quam simillimae veritatis, et declamatio, in quantum maxime potest, imitetur eas actiones, in quarum exercitationem reperta est.*⁶

Seneca provided Cassius Severus’ own explanation of why he, who was an outstanding orator in the law courts, was such a dismal declaimer:

⁴ Stanley F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire* (Liverpool: University Press, 1949), p.131. A few lines earlier he wrote: “... nor indeed does it make sense that men who were living and debating in the greatest law-giving centre of the world should have needed their imaginations to conjure up imaginary statutes.”

⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 2.10.8: “For if declamation is not a preparation for the actual work of the courts, it can only be compared to the rant of an actor or the raving of a lunatic. For what is the use of attempting to conciliate a non-existent judge, or of stating a case which all know to be false, or of trying to prove a point on which judgment will never be passed? Such waste of effort is, however, a comparative trifle. But what can be more ludicrous than to work oneself into a passion and to attempt to excite the anger or grief of our hearers, unless we are preparing ourselves by such mimic combats for the actual strife and the pitched battles of the law-courts?”

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.10.4: “But it is possible to make a sound use of anything that is naturally sound. The subjects chosen for themes should, therefore, be as true to life as possible, and the actual declamation should, as far as may be, be modelled on the pleadings for which it was devised as a training.”

... *adsuevi non auditorem spectare sed iudicem; adsuevi non mihi respondere sed adversario; non minus devito supervacua dicere quam contraria. In scholastica quid non supervacuum est, cum ipsa supervacua sit?... Deinde res ipsa diversa est: totum aliud est pugnare, aliud ventilare.*⁷

Suetonius mentioned C. Albucius Silus who rarely appeared in law courts because he had experienced the humiliation of once not being able to adapt his declamatory style to the rigours and limitations of forensic practice.⁸ Tacitus' dialogue on the decline of oratory highlights a number of reasons, especially moral ones, for the decay in the standards of public speaking. Among them he included the fact that declamation, so common in his own time, had become mere empty display, with little grounding in the full breadth of human knowledge and the practical employment of forensic method:

... *controversiae robustioribus adsignantur—quales, per fidem, et quam incredibiliter compositae! Sequitur autem ut materiae abhorrenti a veritate declamatio quoque adhibeatur.*⁹

A frequently found conclusion from these criticisms is expressed by William Dominik when he writes:

Declamatory exercises, which required the ability to engage in clever argument, were excellent preparation for the declamation hall. The diminished role of political oratory in the imperial period encouraged the growth of rhetoric as a social pastime where orators practised their skills for

⁷ Sen. *Controv.* 3.pr.12-13: "I am used to keeping my eye on the judge, not the audience. I am used to replying to my opponents, not to myself. I avoid the superfluous as well as what tells against myself. Everything is superfluous in a declamation: declamation is superfluous... Again, the two things are quite different: it is one thing to fight, quite another to shadow-box." (Translation from Michael Winterbottom, trans., *The Elder Seneca: Controversiae and Suasoriae* [2 vols.], LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1974])

⁸ Suet. *Rhet.* 6 (30).

⁹ Tac. *Dial.* 35.4: "... the more mature scholars are asked to deal with the latter [*controversiae*] - but, good heavens! What poor quality is shown in their themes, and how unnaturally they are made up! Then in addition to the subject-matter that is so remote from real life, there is the bombastic style in which it is presented." (Translation from W. Peterson [trans.], rev. Michael Winterbottom, *Tacitus I: Agricola, Germania, Dialogus*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1970 (2nd ed.)]) Earlier (31.1) Tacitus wrote: "... *non ut in rhetorum scholis declamarent, nec ut fictis nec ullo modo ad veritatem accedentibus controversiis linguam modo et vocem exercerent...*"

intellectual fame and enjoyment.¹⁰

In a similar vein are the words of Berry and Heath:

Thus declamation, as well as being an educational tool, was also a hobby, a public entertainment, a competitive sport and a literary genre.¹¹

These comments apply particularly to the situation at the end of the first century A.D. There was another hundred years between Quintilian and Tertullian. What developments were there in rhetorical theory and practice during that time? Was there a distinctive African rhetoric? What happened to rhetoric happened to literature as well during the second century, according to some commentators, and so it is worth considering the larger picture before seeing the extent to which Tertullian was typical of his time.

Second-Century A.D. Oratory

Perry characterised second-century literature as being uninterested in reality, more concerned with escapism, the personal, the less than normal, and the other-worldly.¹² Those engaged in oratory during this century gave to the art its enduringly bad reputation, partly because they shared in those concerns. Saying anything of substance gave way almost completely to saying nothing, though with class and eloquence.

¹⁰ William J. Dominik, "The style is the man: Seneca, Tacitus and Quintilian's canon," in *Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature*, ed. William J. Dominik (London: Routledge, 1997), p.61.

¹¹ D. H. Berry and Malcolm Heath, "Oratory and Declamation," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400*, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p.408.

¹² B. E. Perry, "Literature in the Second Century," *CJ* 50 (1955), p.295.

These men have nothing important, timely or interesting to say in their substance, but are mere rhetoricians. All their brains and learning are sacrificed on the altar of their style, whereby they try to speak in words and phrases, and to a large extent also on topics whose currency and reality were four or five hundred years removed from the realities of their own time.¹³

Form rather than matter was all-important. Orators won renown for their turn of phrase and brilliant expression. This was the age of the romantic novel, of the triumph of prose over poetry, and of the commentator over the innovator.¹⁴ In contrast with earlier centuries, not much literature from this time has survived; what does survive lacks originality.

Van Groningen summarised the characteristics of this age, as far as Greek literature was concerned, as being a deliberate imitation of an archaic Attic language, an imitation of ancient rather than contemporary themes, a mechanical and school-based approach to writing, insincere use of emotion, an inner hollowness of intellectual content, and a fascination with the remarkable, exceptional and trivial.¹⁵

In oratory, this was the age of the Second Sophistic which was a particularly Greek phenomenon. Kennedy sees in the second century the emergence of the permanent divide between Greek East and Latin West.¹⁶

As is well known, the term Second Sophistic owes its origins to Philostratus.¹⁷ For him

¹³ Ibid., p.297.

¹⁴ B. A. van Groningen, "General Literary Tendencies in the Second Century A.D.," *Mnemosyne*, Series 4, 18 (1965), pp.43-45.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp.48-52.

¹⁶ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.201.

¹⁷ Philostr. *V.S.* 481.

the sophists of old had spoken on philosophical topics but, unlike the philosophers, spoke with a confident knowledge, not an unsure searching, and in lengthy speeches, not a series of questions.¹⁸ The new sophists spoke on set themes, often drawn from history and spoke according to well-defined rules. Both could be termed sophist because both spoke with eloquence and won brilliant reputations.¹⁹

Anderson's recent monograph provides an overview of the Second Sophistic. He points out how these sophists had interests far wider than just oratory. With regard to sophistic oratory, their interest tended to be epideictic, with speeches designed for public entertainment, often on ceremonial occasions, and the sophists could be distinguished from the rhetor, whom Anderson believes was limited to the law courts.²⁰ Declamation was their expertise, which continued to be artificial, drawn from a defunct past or an imaginary world, and designed as a school-room exercise in developing a pleasing and popular style. Analysis of oratory was not about what one said but how one said it. The speeches of this age tended deliberately to be archaic imitations of the past. The Second Sophistic involved a focus on Greek culture yet Anderson argues that Latin virtuosi orators were little different from their Greek counterparts.²¹

The Antonine Age, if it be legitimate to see it and the Severan Age as distinct, was the

¹⁸ G. R. Stanton, "Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification," *AJPh* 94 (1973), pp.350-364, has examined why some figures of note have been considered philosophers rather than sophists or vice versa by examining how these individuals considered themselves.

¹⁹ Philostr. *V.S.* 484.

²⁰ Graham Anderson, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London: Routledge, 1993), p.16.

²¹ Id., "The Second Sophistic: Some Problems of Perspective," in D. A. Russell, ed., *Antonine Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.94-96.

generation preceding Tertullian; it was the literary and cultural context that would have had the most direct impact on him. It was the age of Appian, Arrian, Fronto, Herodes Atticus, Aelius Aristides, Aulus Gellius, Lucian, Apuleius, Galen, Ptolemy and Alciphron. For the Christians it was the age of the Apologists, like Justin.

Philostratus tells us little about rhetorical theory but gives us much more information about oratorical practice. Of Favorinus, the Gallic philosopher who died in the middle of the second century, Philostratus informed us that he spoke Greek in Rome and that even those who could not understand him were impressed with his tone, his expressions and his rhythm.²² This is testimony enough to the triumph of form over matter. Extempore speaking was held up as the highest achievement of an orator.²³ Philostratus praised the Attic style of simple, natural and appropriate speech.²⁴ Antiochus of Aegae was characterised as being outstanding in declamation, being too sophistic for forensic oratory and too forensic for sophistic oratory, and being discerning in his use of emotional appeal.²⁵ In quoting the sophists, Philostratus was interested in the wittiness, novelty, eloquence and impact of what was said rather than in its truthfulness, significance or content.²⁶ He often passed over commenting about the topics on which sophists spoke and commented instead on their appearance, the sound of their voices, the flow of words, and their technical abilities.²⁷ The sophist himself sought from his audience not critical appraisal

²² Philostr. *V.S.* 491. The same is said of Hadrian the Phoenician in *V.S.* 589.

²³ *Ibid.*, 583.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 514, 522, 568, 613, etc.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 569. This is said also of Nicetes and Damianus of Ephesus in *V.S.* 511 and 606.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 574, 580, 586-587, 590, 598, etc.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 612.

but admiration and affection.²⁸

Yet, even for sophists, there was still a view that oratory had practical uses. Aristides, in his defence of oratory against Plato's criticisms in *Gorgias*, wrote of orators being used in political missions as ambassadors and of their role as legal advocates.²⁹ He acknowledged that wherever there was law and justice there was oratory and speech.³⁰ Yet he argued also that where oratory existed tyranny did not,³¹ which suggests that he was not focussed on his own age. Indeed, the very topic of responding to Plato, and the examples he used, suggests someone fixated on the past. This can be seen with certainty in the writings of Lucian or Alciphron. They were characteristic of the Second Sophistic: Lucian spoke in praise of towns and cities (*Phalaris, Patriae laudatio*) and insignificant topics (*Muscae laudatio, Convivium*) that read like school topics (*Calumniarum non temere credendum*) and which appealed to a classical Greek past and had little contemporary relevance. Alciphron's letters were pieces of imaginary literature, set in that Greek past.

Perhaps the most significant contribution to Greek rhetorical theory in this age was the work of Hermogenes, yet Philostratus did not give the impression that he was a major contributor to theory. The contribution of Hermogenes was twofold: with regard to *stasis* theory and with regard to style. Although scholarly interest today is on his contribution to determining the issue,³²

²⁸ Ibid., 614.

²⁹ Aristid. *Or.* 2.180-184.

³⁰ Ibid., 2.232.

³¹ Ibid., 2.312.

³² See Malcolm Heath, "The Substructure of *Stasis*-Theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes," *CQ* n.s. 44 (1994), pp.114-129.

his work on style was more popular in his own time. Rather than apply the Ciceronian three styles (grand, plain and middle), he wrote of seven basic ideas, the combination of which gave a piece of writing or an author's speech a certain style. The ideas were clarity (σαφήνεια), grandeur (μέγεθος), beauty (κάλλος), rapidity (γοργότης), character (ἦθος), sincerity (ἀλήθεια), and force (δεινότης). Each of these ideas was then seen to be the result of choices about things like thought, approach, word choice, figures of speech, clauses, and word order.³³

It would have to be concluded, therefore, that even though Hermogenes had a theoretical contribution to make, the Second Sophistic was not a time of advances in theory.³⁴ Thus far the focus has been on Greek rhetorical theory and oratorical practice. As has been noted, there was a parallel phenomenon occurring in Latin literature, though, as Russell notes, by the end of the century, Latin literature had disappeared, with the exception of Christian writers like Tertullian and Cyprian.³⁵ This disappearance he explains partially as the result of the non-translation of Greek literature into Latin (educated readers being familiar with both) and the fact that in oratory one would turn to Greek teaching for theory and Latin teaching for practical use.³⁶ This was an age that believed there was little to add to rhetoric in either Greek or Latin.

Anderson has made the point that, from a Roman, aristocratic point of view, the emergence of empire was the decline of oratory because it was the decline of senatorial power and

³³ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, pp.215-216.

³⁴ James J. Murphy, "The End of the Ancient World: The Second Sophistic and Saint Augustine," in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*, ed. James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula (Davis [Calif.]: Hermagoras Press, 1994 [2nd ed.]), p.207.

³⁵ D. A. Russell, "Introduction: Greek and Latin in Antonine Literature," in *Antonine Literature*, ed. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.3-17.

yet, from a Greek perspective, particularly with reference to the Hellenistic world, this same time, when the struggle to survive no longer needed to be fought, might be regarded as the flowering of oratory's peace-time employment.³⁷ It is all a matter of perspective.

African Oratory in the Second Century A.D.

It is now appropriate to present an outline of rhetoric in the Latin West in the second century A.D. and it is legitimate to focus on Roman North Africa, for two of the significant Latin-writing figures of that century came from there: Fronto and Apuleius.

M. Cornelius Fronto moved to Rome at an early age, becoming involved in life in the capital at the expense of his native land. Tutor to M. Aurelius and Geta, Fronto was consul in A.D. 143. An orator, our knowledge of him derives mainly from his surviving correspondence.³⁸ Given that most of his education took place in Rome, it is hard to determine whether there was a specifically African flavour to his oratory. One could debate Fronto's appreciation of his African heritage. On the one hand, he did refer to himself as an African or a foreigner (*Ep. Grae.* 1.5; 8.1) and he maintained a patronly interest in Cirta (*ad Amic.* 1.3; 2.11). On the other hand, Fronto cultivated Greek friends and, like most of the African provincial elite, according to Champlin, either suppressed his provincialism or justified it aggressively.³⁹ It was characteristic of such a provincial to strive to be more Roman than the Romans.

³⁷ G. Anderson, "The Second Sophistic," p.99.

³⁸ See Edward Champlin, *Fronto and Antonine Rome* (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1980).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.16-17.

Apuleius, born in Madauros a generation after Fronto, studied rhetoric in Carthage before turning to Athens. He became an orator of note, equally at home in Latin or Greek (*Flor.* 9.27-29). Best known as the author of the religious novel *Metamorphoses*, as a person he is known through his *Apologia de Magia*, the record of his speech in a real trial with himself as defendant. It was a typical product of the Second Sophistic: he portrayed himself as well read, highly educated and, in contrast with his accuser, quite capable of delivering a speech which was not only persuasive but entertaining.⁴⁰

Rhetoric was taught in Africa, but the careers of Fronto and Apuleius would indicate that one who wished to excel in this discipline needed to travel for their education. However, it is to be noted that coming from Africa was not an obstacle to their success. Neither gave an indication that he had to unlearn whatever he had learnt in order to be able to participate on the world stage. It may rightly be concluded then that the rhetoric taught in Africa was little different from that taught in any other Latin part of the Empire.

Tertullian himself provides the first extant reference to higher rhetorical learning in Africa (*adv. Val.* 8). Greek was also a part of African education, at least for a certain class, although not embraced wholeheartedly. Fronto knew Greek, several of his letters having been written in Greek, and he took some delight in his ability (*Ep. Grae.* 6), suggesting that it did not come easily to him. Elsewhere he acknowledged his limitations (*ad M. Caes.* 1.8.7). Fronto was one who championed Latin in an age when Greek reigned in the literary world, while Apuleius indicated that he had become thoroughly Hellenised in accepting Greek as the language of learning (*Apol.*

⁴⁰ G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic*, pp.223-227.

4.1-2).

Yet despite this desire to be fully a part of Graeco-Roman culture, Africa never quite succeeded. Greek never reached deeply into all levels of African society and throughout the second century it was losing ground, even as it continued to be known by the literary class.⁴¹ It was unfamiliar to most Christians.⁴² As Rivers has pointed out recently, that someone knew Greek in Africa was a fact worthy of comment.⁴³ Latin remained the language of the new political ruling class, the foreign occupying power, only. Barton has observed that in contrast with Spain and France, where Latin became the parent language for the modern vernacular, in Africa Latin has left next to no trace on modern local languages.⁴⁴ Bouchier has argued that little of Latin literature of the first century A.D. penetrated Africa, leaving the Latin language there more akin to the earlier Republican form.⁴⁵ Perhaps this could explain Fronto's obsession with archaic Latin and why he attempted to do for Latin what the Atticists attempted to do for Greek.⁴⁶

One could paint too negative a picture about Africa. Juvenal, after all, described it as the nursery of orators.⁴⁷ Raven has noted that as provincials began to overtake Italians in the

⁴¹ E. S. Bouchier, *Life and Letters in Roman Africa* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1913), pp.39-40.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.41.

⁴³ J. B. Rivers, *Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.193, commenting on a grave inscription in *ILS* 7761.

⁴⁴ I. M. Barton, *Africa in the Roman Empire* (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1972), pp.59-60.

⁴⁵ E. S. Bouchier, *op. cit.*, pp.57-58.

⁴⁶ D. A. Russell, "Introduction," p.13.

⁴⁷ *Juv. Sat.* 7.148-149.

intellectual life of the Empire, the second century A.D. belonged to the Africans.⁴⁸ In comparison with the previous century, second-century literature may have been a paltry shadow, but to whatever extent literature existed in the second century, the Africans made a significant contribution.

What can be determined about Fronto's oratory from his surviving correspondence? Not as much as if some of his speeches had survived.⁴⁹ Quite apart from what he wrote about rhetoric, one could look to his letters as examples of oratory in print. From his comments we know that the basic elements of rhetoric remained unchanged: the three rhetorical genres of epideictic, deliberative and forensic, the three genres of style (the plain, the middle and the grand) (*ad M. Caes.* 3.16), the parts of a speech (including the *prohoemium* and *narratio*) (*de Eloq.* 3.4), and the two types of figures (*verborum* and *sententiarum*) (*ad Amic.* 1.11). In technical matters Fronto was most concerned with style: the use of the simile (*ad M. Caes.* 3.8), the use of *occultatio* (*ad Ant. Imp.* 1.2), the gathering of arguments and amplification (*de Eloq.* 3.4), and the use of maxims and *loci* (*ad M. Caes.* 5.59).

As well, Fronto showed himself to be completely in touch with the oratorical spirit of his age. Epideictic oratory had become the dominant branch of the art and, in this age where oratory had become a skill demanded for its own sake rather than for its usefulness, the topics of epideictic speeches were increasingly esoteric, even frivolous. Fronto was quite proud of his speech praising dust and smoke. Rhetoric was very much a school activity, particularly for this tutor of future emperors, and Fronto approached it along sophistic lines. Marcus Aurelius was

⁴⁸ Susan Raven, *Rome in Africa* (London: Routledge, 1993 [3rd ed.]), p.122.

⁴⁹ E. Champlin, *op. cit.*, p.2.

set passages and topics to declaim (*ad M. Caes.* 1.4; 1.6), the text on sleep being an epideictic exercise. Declamation was the forum in which an orator performed.⁵⁰ A large part of Marcus' education had to do with reading what had already become the classics: Sallust, Cicero, Cato and Ennius.⁵¹

The sophistic appeal to the past was very central to Fronto. One of his main concerns in educating his imperial charges was that they searched for the right word and that they were to be guided in that through a familiarity with the way those classic writers had used words. Marcus was to learn about maxims from Sallust, for example (*ad M. Caes.* 3.11). Oratory was not about creating new words, but about learning from the past, even though in fresh and exciting, though careful, ways.⁵² Even Cicero was criticised for not being careful enough to search out unexpected words, even though he was always eloquent (*ad M. Caes.* 4.3). Archaism was rife.

Thus, eloquence was the ultimate goal of Fronto's oratory. It was mentioned constantly throughout his correspondence.⁵³ He linked the grand style of speaking with epideictic oratory (*ad M. Caes.* 3.16) and saw the purpose of eloquence as being the creation of pleasure.⁵⁴

All in all one gains the impression that Fronto and his ilk engaged in what may be

⁵⁰ Front. *ad M. Caes.* 2.5; Front. *ad Amic.* 1.7.

⁵¹ For Sallust: Front. *ad M. Caes.* 3.11; Front. *ad Ant. Imp.* 2.6; for Cicero: Front. *ad M. Caes.* 1.8; 3.6, 14; Front. *ad Ant. Imp.* 2.1, 4, 5; Front. *ad Amic.* 1.14; for Cato: Front. *ad M. Caes.* 2.4; for Ennius: Front. *ad M. Caes.* 3.16.

⁵² Front. *de Orat.* 12; Front. *de Eloq.* 3.7-8; Front. *ad M. Caes.* 4.3.

⁵³ E.g., Front. *ad M. Caes.* 1.3, 8; 2.2, 3; 3.1, 12, 15; 3.16; 4.3; Front. *ad Amic.* 1.2; Front. *ad Ant. Imp.* 1.2; 2.2; Front. *de Eloq.*; Front. *ad Ver. Imp.* 2.1.

⁵⁴ Front. *Laud. Fum. et Pul.* 3; Front. *ad M. Caes.* 1.8.

described as salon rhetoric—a skill developed among the leisured for their own amusement and appreciated only by the aficionados and cognoscenti of the art. The power of oratory to please, move, delight, provoke, exhort, clam or influence (*de Eloq.* 3.5) existed mainly for those initiated into its subtleties and already mesmerised by its archaic and arcane pleasures.

*Nihil ego umquam cultius nihil antiquius nihil conditius nihil latinius legi. O te hominem beatum hac eloquentia praeditum! O me hominem beatum huic magistro traditum. O ἐπιχειρήματα! O τᾶξις! O elegantia! O lepos! O venustas! O verba! O nitor! O argutiae! O kharites! O ἄσκησις! O omnia!*⁵⁵

What Fronto revealed through his correspondence is confirmed by the impression of him given by others, particularly Aulus Gellius who knew him in Rome. Gellius could comment on Fronto's encyclopaedic knowledge of Latin etymology and word usage.⁵⁶ He also confirmed that, although Fronto was familiar with Greek, he was always more comfortable in Latin (*N.A.* 2.26.7).

Bouchier considered some of the peculiar influences on African literature in this age and concluded that the Romanisation of Africa did not run deep. Vulgarisms and corruptions, which did not make their appearance until much later in other provinces, appear early in Africa.⁵⁷ Although he presented some analysis of the variations in African syntax, grammar and vocabulary, he noted that all this deviation was less likely to be found in an educated writer like

⁵⁵ Front. *ad M. Caes.* 2.3: "Never have I read anything more refined, more classical, more polished, more Latin. Oh happy you to be gifted with such eloquence! Oh, happy I to be in the hands of such a master! What reasoned thoughts! What orderly arrangement! What elegance! What wit! What beauty! What diction! What brilliance! What subtlety! What charm! What practical skill! What everything!" (Translation from C. R. Haines, trans., *Marcus Cornelius Fronto* [2 vols.], LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1919-1920])

⁵⁶ Gell. *N.A.* 13.29; 19.8, 10, 13.

⁵⁷ H. Bouchier, op. cit., p.120.

Tertullian.⁵⁸

Christians and Oratory in the Second Century A.D.

If these criticisms of declamation and oratory in general apply to the Roman and Hellenistic worlds of the second century A.D.,⁵⁹ they do not apply to Christian orators. Christianity was not in a period of idleness and decline; it was a time when Christians struggled to exist and to justify their existence to themselves, Jews and pagans alike, and a time in which Christianity was growing. Oratory was no mere pastime to while away the hours; it had a very practical and immediate purpose in a life-and-death struggle. It makes sense then to understand Christian pieces of literary declamation as concerned with themes that were very vital, relevant, topical, and practical to their real, everyday existence. The need to be persuasive was a key concern to Christian intellectuals, and, through them, classical rhetoric was given a new lease of life:

... the end of the Roman Republic, he [Tacitus] argued, meant that political oratory carried less influence than previously, and had degenerated into mere verbal displays on topics of little real importance. Christians did not find themselves in the same position: arguing for the most part from a position on the margins of Roman society, they found they had a cause—the gospel of Christ—worthy of the best that classical rhetoric had to offer. In was an opportunity they seized.⁶⁰

If this be true of Christian writers in general, it is also true of Tertullian in particular:

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.119.

⁵⁹ G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic*, pp.45, 196-199.

⁶⁰ Philip E. Satterthwaite, "The Latin Church Fathers," in S. E. Porter, op. cit., p.693. See also Andreas Spira, "The Impact of Christianity on Ancient Rhetoric," in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 18, no. 2, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, papers presented to the 9th Oxford Patristics Conference, 1983 (Kalamazoo [Mich.]: Cistercian Publications, 1989), pp.137-153, even though his focus was on fourth-century Christianity.

Mais, comme écrivain chrétien, Tertullien se trouvait dans une position différent et, de ce point de vue, privilégiée. Il n'était pas soumis aux mêmes contraintes politiques et sociales; il se situait en marge des modes esthétiques; il assignait enfin à la littérature une tâche qui n'était plus la sienne depuis longtemps, celle d'être *utile*, par la transmission et la défense du message chrétien. En même temps qu'elle redonnait une impulsion à des écrivains chrétiens, et Tertullien tout le premier, dans une situation assez comparable à celle des orateurs de la République.⁶¹

Barnes has argued similarly:

His erudition does not always show, because he was intent on effective use in argument rather than on empty display.⁶²

Averil Cameron, however, gives a different interpretation of the relationship between classical and Christian rhetoric in those first centuries of the empire:

But while we must indeed both read Christian writing against its own historical context and be fully aware of the extensive common ground in technical matters between Christian and pagan writers, the view of Christian oratory as revitalizing classical rhetoric is in danger of placing too much premium on the impact of a relatively small number of outstanding Christian writers, and of reading them against too narrow a classical background.⁶³

What she means by “too narrow a classical background” is illustrated in her comments that those who argue for a decline in classical oratory rely too heavily on the comments of Tacitus and Pliny about the lack of opportunity for political oratory and not enough on the flowering of epideictic oratory, which is all too frequently derided, both now and in the past. Hence, Cameron could conclude:

In a more comprehensive view of rhetoric, it can be seen that it was not merely Christian oratory that brought a new vigor into discourse. Neither the orators and writers of the Second Sophistic

⁶¹ J.-C. Fredouille, *op. cit.*, p.172.

⁶² T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*, p.204.

⁶³ A. Cameron, *op. cit.*, p.81.

nor their audiences would have recognized themselves in the modern conviction of their “sterility” and emptiness; far from being marginalized into “mere rhetoric,” their oratory was an integral part of civilized life with a definite and public role to play.⁶⁴

Even though Cameron’s comments are apposite, she does not deny that Christians turned to oratory not for its own sake as a pastime but for its originally intended purpose.

Thus it is not acceptable merely to repeat statements that the second century was an age of sophism when writers created literary fictions for the entertainment of the well educated. That it may be true of many writers of this age does not automatically make it true of all, particularly of Christian writers like Tertullian.

As a rhetorical piece of literature the purpose of Tertullian’s *adversus Iudaeos* was to present an argument and to convince its readers of the veracity of those arguments. It is a piece of work that seeks to persuade, it has a position to defend and alternatives to attack. The reason why I consider *adversus Iudaeos* to be more declamation than pure forensic oratory is provided by Tertullian himself in the opening lines of the work. There is no claim that this work is the record of an encounter (real or supposed). The work was written up after the event as an example of what should have been said. It also involves a twist in the usual forensic practice. Tertullian argues his case that his client, in this case God, was innocent not because God has not done something alleged but because God has done something. We shall return to this point in a later chapter.

Aristotle had noted that for rhetoric to be persuasive one has to attend to the interplay

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.82.

between the rationality of the argument, the character of the speaker and the disposition of the audience, for every speech consisted of speaker, subject of speech, and audience.⁶⁵ A rhetorical analysis of a speech or of a literary composition cannot but be concerned with questions of audience. Knowing one's audience was and is a vital component for rhetorical success. Whether an audience (and here I include readership) was well disposed and receptive or not would influence the arguments one chose to present and the way one chose to present them.

⁶⁵ Arist. *Rh.* 1.3.1 [1358a 37 - 1358b 1].

CHAPTER TWO

READERSHIP

... nec per partes modo scrutanda omnia, sed perlectus liber utique ex integro resumendus, praecipueque oratio, cuius virtutes frequenter ex industria quoque occultantur.

Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 10.1.20.

Questions of Readership

TO whom was *adversus Iudaeos* written? We know from its opening lines (or so the author would have us believe) that the writing of the treatise was preceded and occasioned by a dispute between a Jewish proselyte and a Christian. We are not told whether the author of the treatise was the Christian disputant but one does gain the impression that he might well have been.¹ The author wanted to give the impression that he (accepting Tertullian as the author) was at least privy to the debate, if not a participant. Also present were supporters of each speaker and their partisan interventions seemed to have reduced the exchange to a shouting match.

Was this work written to a Jewish audience, real or imagined, in order to refute their points of view and point out the errors of their way or to convince them of the correctness of the Christian belief? Was it written for a Christian audience, real or imagined, in order to demonstrate where Jewish thinking was astray or to reclaim those who might have been too

¹ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*, p.106, believes that he was.

impressed by the Jewish position? There are a couple of different questions here. One is the question of audience and the other, related though distinct, is of purpose. I shall return to the second question later, although the two are inter-related.

In terms of audience a distinction can be made between real and imagined. The oral *controversia* involved much that was fictitious and make-believe. This extended to the audience. Although delivered before a particular, real audience (those physically gathered to hear the exercise), the speaker could imagine he was addressing almost anybody, another audience altogether (the imagined audience)—a jury in some far-distant land or from some far-distant time, for example. So too with a literary *controversia*. Although it would or could be read by anyone who got their hands on it (real reader), the author would write as though it were meant for any audience he or she could invent (imagined reader). As with the imagined audience in oral *controversia*, the imagined reader of the literary *controversia* could be quite fictitious, a mere creative technique to make the work more interesting, more appealing or more plausible.

I would like to add a third audience, the intended audience, the one to whom a speaker or writer means to communicate. One may speak before a particular audience and one can create an imagined audience (in another time or place) but one's message could be intended for a third group altogether. Thus one may have spoken in a *controversia* before an actual group of fellow students or professional peers in the early empire, while imagining them to be an ancient Greek assembly before whom one was speaking on the evils of the local tyrant, but one could have intended to make a veiled but nonetheless real attack on the evils of contemporary tyranny directed against the emperor himself or for a wider audience than actually was present.² So too

² The comments on *schema* in Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.65-67 are particularly apt in this regard. See Frederick Ahl, "The Art of Safe Criticism," *AJPh* 105 (1984), pp.187-197.

with writing. One may have no control over who actually read something and one may compose it as though addressing one group but really intending to deliver a message to another group.

We could use Aristides' oration in defence of oratory (πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ ῥητορικῆς) as an example. Being written only some fifty years before Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos* makes it useful. What makes it even more useful is the fact that Aristides acknowledged that his setting was entirely imaginary. At times he addressed Plato directly, as though the two of them were locked together in debate:

Φέρε γὰρ σὺ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, ὦ Πλάτων, προὔστης Ἀθηναίων ἢ τινος ἄλλου δήμου τῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις; ... οὐκ ἔχοις ἄν) εἰπεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ προὔστης ὄλως.³

Yet the setting was imaginary and Aristides did not pretend otherwise. He provided his reader with editorial comments inviting them to be aware that what he was doing was creating a literary fiction.⁴ He even gave away more than that: he let his readers know that other authors, such as Plato himself, were not writing real dialogues but imaginary ones, even if they did not acknowledge it.⁵ His remarks were very much for his own time, against those who repeated the arguments of Plato against oratory. It seems entirely in keeping with the age for Aristides to employ a fictitious setting (him debating Plato) rather than attack his contemporary opponents directly and for him, in a display of literary virtuosity, to acknowledge that openly.

³ Aristid. *Or.* 2.331: "Come, Plato, did you ever lead the Athenians or any other people among the Greeks or barbarians toward what is best? ... You could not say so. You were not even a leader at all." (Translation from C. A. Behr, trans., *Aristides I*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1973])

⁴ Ibid., 2.321: "... εἴ πως ἀναστάντες ἢ λαβόντες αἰσθησιν..."

⁵ Ibid., 2.13-14 called Plato's *Gorgias* a "φέρε ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ δείξωμεν ὅπως ἔχει" and described the interaction as being "ἐν σχήματι διαλόγων."

As so often the sophist is in his element in an imaginary court, winning hands down against his long-deceased but remarkably resilient rival.⁶

Yet, we should not be too hasty in drawing the wrong conclusion. Aristides never met Plato, yet this does not detract from the utility of his essay. Even though a debate with Plato is the imagined setting (with its own imagined audience), the intended audience were the disciples of Plato, Aristides' contemporaries. If Aristides could refute Plato himself then, by extension, his disciples were refuted.

At this point in the dissertation I wish to draw my arguments about the readership of *adversus Iudaeos* only from the text itself and leave until the conclusion a comparison between my position and that of others interested in Jewish-Christian relations of the Patristic age. Part of that literature review will involve the argument that a number of modern commentators do not take the distinction between imagined and real audiences or imagined and intended audiences seriously or tend to be dismissive of the value of a treatise if they detect that the imagined readership was not the real or intended one.

Imagined Readers of *adversus Iudaeos*

With *adversus Iudaeos* I am concerned with the imagined and intended readers.⁷ To

⁶ G. Anderson, *The Second Sophist*, p.141.

⁷ There are parallels between the three audiences proposed here and various others contained in modern literary, reader-response and narrative criticisms. Critics in the latter schools employ terms such as "implied reader" and "narrative audience". While there is some overlapping in meaning between the terms I am using and those used in literary criticism, I have not adopted the literary critical terms. These seem to differ in meaning from critic to critic and some of them exclude consideration of authors and their intentions. Rhetorical criticism, on the other hand, seems to accept that a text can be interpreted by readers independently from its author's intended meaning and yet, at the same time, from the text itself, information can be derived about the readers as the author perceived them. For a very basic introduction to literary criticism, particularly as applied to scriptural interpretation, see M. A. Powell, op. cit., esp. pp.11-21.

whom does the work seem to be addressed? For whom was the work actually written? It may have been one and the same group or it may not. The imagined audience for this treatise is not clear immediately, despite its title. In order to make some comment about that readership drawn from the text itself, it would be helpful to scrutinise the first, second and third person references it contains.

It is worth stating, prior to that, that as a piece of literature it would naturally have been intended for a literate audience, or at least one which had access to someone who could read aloud for them. Within the recent work on Christian literacy, some of it sociological, this point is made, viz., that, simply because the overwhelming majority of Christians could not read, this did not mean that literary texts were unavailable to them.⁸ Perhaps the more interesting point made is how few Christians were capable of producing literature and what importance they, including Tertullian, must have held within their communities.⁹ The other initial remark is that the work presumes readers who could read or understand Latin. As Limor and Stroumsa point out in the introduction to the recent collection of essays they have edited, refuters in polemical literature tended to write in their own language, for their own side:

While polemical literature has been written to refute the rival, it has usually been written in the refuter's own language: Jews write in Hebrew and Christians in Latin or Greek, in order to strengthen the domestic audience. While shaped in form of arguments against the rival, polemics usually contribute to shaping the convictions and beliefs of the group itself.¹⁰

⁸ Harry Y. Gamble, *Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp.1-41; Keith Hopkins, "Christian Number and Its Implications," *JECS* 6 (1998), pp.207-213. Hopkins' article was in response to the demographic calculations of Rodney Stark, *The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁹ H. Y. Gamble, *op. cit.*, pp.9-10.

¹⁰ Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa, ed., *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews*, *Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism*, vol. 10 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996), p.vii.

If this be the case, it would suggest a Christian intended readership, but does the fact that this work is a Latin composition exclude necessarily a Jewish readership?

What is known about the familiarity of late second-century Carthaginian Jews with Latin? The evidence from the cemetery epitaphs at Gammarth analysed by LeBohec would seem to be conclusive proof that the Jewish community in Carthage in the second and third centuries was quite at home with Latin.¹¹ Some two-thirds of these epitaphs were written in Latin. Earlier, Caplan had examined other Jewish African inscriptions, some quite possibly from this time, and again they too were almost all written in Latin or Greek.¹² There were very few Hebrew inscriptions.¹³ One could not advance the argument, therefore, that because *adversus Iudaeos* was written in Latin it had to have been written for a Christian rather than a Jewish readership. Gamble has pointed out recently that even though Jews had a higher degree of literacy in the ancient world than other peoples, literacy in one language (Hebrew) does not mean necessarily literacy in other languages.¹⁴ Perhaps one has to wonder at the degree of Jewish familiarity with Hebrew in Carthage and agree with Quispel that Latin would be the one language all uneducated

¹¹ Yann LeBohec, "Inscriptions juives et judaïsantes de l'Afrique romaine," *AntAfr* 17 (1981), pp.165-207, and id., "Juifs et Judaïsants dans l'Afrique romaine: Remarques onomestiques," *AntAfr* 17 (1981), pp.209-229. For comments about separate Christian cemeteries in Carthage see Éric Rebillard, "Les *Areae* Carthaginoises (Tertullien, *Ad Scapulam* 3, 1): Cimetières Communautaires ou Enclos Funéraires de Chrétiens?" *MEFRA* 108 (1996), pp.175-189.

¹² Harry Caplan, "The History of the Jews in the Roman Province of Africa: A Collection of the Sources," (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1921), pp.1-56.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.54. Cf. J. B. Rivers, *op. cit.*, pp.217-218, who suggests that the Jewish community in Carthage was a typical diaspora community, knowing little Hebrew. This would agree with the evidence from Jewish funerary inscriptions from Rome as interpreted by Leonard Victor Rutgers, *The Jews in Late Ancient Rome: Evidence of Cultural Interaction in the Roman Diaspora*, Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, vol. 126 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp.176-209. He notes that Greek predominates until the third century and that Hebrew was generally absent, although why is something about which he can only speculate.

¹⁴ H. Y. Gamble, *op. cit.*, pp.2-7.

people in Carthage spoke.¹⁵ Is the evidence of the cemetery inscriptions enough to posit a belief in their literacy in Latin? Further to this, the debate that occasioned this treatise involved a proselyte—a non-Jew by birth—someone for whom Hebrew or Aramaic would not have been native languages. The most that it seems fair to conclude from this is that the language in which the treatise was written does not exclude a Jewish readership.

Perhaps, further, one may need to consider that the imagined or intended readers were neither Christians nor Jews but those attracted by Judaism (i.e., pagans, but also including perhaps Christians who found their own faith challenged by persuasive Jewish arguments).¹⁶ So we need to turn to other arguments to help resolve this matter.

Although it may seem obvious, one has to raise the question of just whom Tertullian meant when he employed the term “*Judaeos*.” Ever since Kraabel’s article was published in 1982 scholars have had to be aware of and investigate their otherwise unquestioned presumptions. Kraabel argued that the term and its Greek equivalent Ἰουδαῖος ought be rendered as “Judaean” in English, indicative of geographic origin.¹⁷ Kraemer has attempted to modify Kraabel by adding to it the idea that the term may indicate a pagan adherent to Judaism.¹⁸ On the whole, the evidence presented concerns the self-designation of individuals; Kraemer recognises that non-Jewish writers employed the term to refer to those born into Judaism as well as converts. On this basis,

¹⁵ G. Quispel, “African Christianity before Minucius Felix and Tertullian,” in *Actus: Studies in Honour of H. L. W. Nelson*, ed. J. den Boeft and A. H. M. Kessels (Utrecht: Instituut voor Klassieke Talen, 1982), p.260.

¹⁶ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*, p.106, believes the envisaged audience to have been “sympathetic pagans who might be confronted by missionary efforts” from both Christians and Jews. This view is favoured by J. G. Gager, *op. cit.*, p.164.

¹⁷ A. Thomas Kraabel, “The Roman Diaspora: Six Questionable Assumptions,” *JJS* 33 (1982), pp.445-464.

¹⁸ Ross S. Kraemer, “On the Meaning of the Term ‘Jew’ in Greco-Roman Inscriptions,” *HTR* 82 (1989), pp.35-53.

therefore, his point, whatever its validity, does not seem to be of much relevance for the purpose of interpreting this treatise, where the term “Jew” is not used as one of self-designation. Further, that Tertullian was not limiting the term “*Iudaeos*” to pagan converts of Judaism is clear in its opening, for he stated explicitly that the proselyte involved in the original dispute was not ethnically a Jew (1.2 - “*homo ex gentibus nec de prosapia Israëlitum Iudaeus*”). Jews were clearly distinguishable and separate from Christians in Tertullian’s consciousness, they were the people who retained the covenant of Moses without recognising the new covenant established in Jesus.¹⁹ Although there may be much that is common between Christianity and Judaism, it was what made them different that interested Tertullian. Boyarin’s comment, that the relationship between Christianity and Judaism until the fourth century should not be thought of simply in terms of “separations and partings” but “encounters and meetings” as well,²⁰ leads to the presumptive conclusion that perhaps Tertullian felt the need to stress the distinctiveness between the two so much because he experienced the encounters and meetings between them so frequently.

We return to the question of the imagined audience. According to my reading of the treatise, Tertullian provided a possible total of ten first person singular references, if one considers all the variations in the manuscripts. This does not seem to be very many, particularly

¹⁹ Notwithstanding the comments of scholars who point to the fact that in some instances Christians continued with many Jewish practices such that it was difficult to distinguish Jews from Christians for much longer than is often acknowledged. The most recent exponent of this view is Daniel Boyarin, “Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism,” *J ECS* 6 (1998), p.590: “They [the Rabbis] are, we might say, both recognizing and denying at one and the same time that Christians are us, both marking out the virtual identity between themselves and the Christians in their world at the same time that they are very actively seeking to establish difference.” His argument is that the concept of martyrdom was created in the third and fourth centuries in order to create distinctions between communities which had not been distinguishable previously.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.627.

in comparison with some of his other writings.²¹ They are scattered throughout the treatise even though the majority are from the second half.²² I do not think that much can be drawn from this distribution.

Tertullian was not attempting to be more impersonal or removed in this work for there are numerous first person plural references which would seem to rule that out. Some of them are obviously what we may describe as the “literary plural” (the academic equivalent of the royal plural!). They are in clear evidence when Tertullian referred to other passages in his treatise and the references can be only to himself as author.²³ In other instances of his use of the plural he meant what he said—he claimed to speak on behalf of others (Christians)—and a plural subject was involved.²⁴ The remaining instances of the first person plural are less clearly distinguishable. Some seem to be euphemisms for the singular but with the implicit suggestion that he was not

²¹ E.g., Tert. *de Test. Anim.*, a work about one-fifth the size of *adv. Iud.*, has thirteen first person singular references; Tert. *de Idol.*, a work about two-thirds the size of *adv. Iud.* has fifty such references and Tert. *adv. Herm.*, a work only slightly longer than *adv. Iud.*, has at least eighty-nine references to a singular first person.

²² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 2.7 (“*contendo*”); 4.11 (“*putem*”); 6.3 (“*inquam*”) - this is found only in R and is relegated to the critical apparatus in Kroymann's edition; 7.8 (“*dicam*”); 9.3 (“*puto*”) - at Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.12.3 “*puto*” is found also; 9.6 (“*credo*”) - at *adv. Marc.* 3.13.3 “*credo*” is found also; 9.29 (“*fallor*”) - at *adv. Marc.* 3.17.5 “*fallor*” is found also; 10.11 (“*expecto*”) - at *adv. Marc.* 3.19.1 “*expecto*” is found also; 10.15 (“*volo*”) - at *adv. Marc.* 3.19.8 “*volo*” is found also; 14.9 (“*faciam*”) - although this is found in PNFR it is not found in T which has “*faciamus*” and which Kroymann preferred) - at *adv. Marc.* 3.7.7 “*faciam*” is found.

²³ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.7 (“*ut supra memoravimus*”); 2.1 (“*conferamus*”), (“*terminemus*”); 3.11 (“*supra quod ostendimus*”); 4.6 (“*sicuti iam praelocuti sumus*”); 5.1 (“*ostendimus*”); 7.1 (“*conseramus*”); 8.2 (“*quae investigabimus in Danielo*”); 8.2 (“*probabimus*”); 8.15 (“*videamus*”); 9.15 (“*ut diximus*”); 9.26 (“*ut supra memoravimus*”); 10.4 (“*ut et supra de eo praedictum memoravimus*”); 10.14 (“*probabimus*”); 10.16 (“*ut supra ostendimus*”); 11.10 (“*quam supra memoravimus... quam evidenter exidimus*”); 11.11 (“*probavimus*”), (“*ostendimus*”); 13.1 (“*probaverimus*”); 13.8 (“*ostendamus*”); 14.12 (“*sicuti iam praelocuti sumus*”).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.3 (“*habeamus*” following a references to the “*gentes*”), (“*et gentium, id est noster*”); 1.5 (“*noster*” in reference to the “*gentes*”); 3.8 (“*sed Iacob sequentis, id est populi nostri*”); 3.9 (“*id est inter nos, qui ex gentibus sumus vocati*”); 3.10 (“*qui igitur intelleguntur alii quam nos*”); 3.12 (“*quis autem populus... nisi noster*”); 3.13 (“*nos, qui non populus dei retro, facti sumus populus eius*”); 5.1 (“*id est populi nostri*”); 7.1 (“*in quem nos, gentes scilicet*”); 9.22 (“*quod sumus nos nationes*”); 13.24 (“*ex quo gentes nos*”).

alone in holding these opinions.²⁵ Other uses seem to have Tertullian identifying himself with others but without entirely ruling out the possibility that he was only advancing a personal position.²⁶

Those with whom he identified, or appeared to identify, were other Christians, certainly not Jews. Perhaps this ambiguity of number was exploited deliberately by Tertullian in order to give his arguments the appearance of wide support.²⁷ Whomever his imagined readers were Tertullian wanted them to understand that he was not advocating anything novel or radical but rather something traditional and widely shared among Christians.

In itself this use of the first person plural can not tell us whom the imagined readers were, for it would have been quite possible for Tertullian's imagined readers to be Jews and for him still to have referred to "our people" or "us Christians" if he had a sense that he was writing on behalf of his fellow Christians to "hostile" readers. It has to be conceded, though, that so many first person plural references to Christians does give the impression that there was a large contingent of Christians in his imagined audience, the majority, sitting right behind him. Clarity may be

²⁵ Ibid., 3.2 ("consideremus"); 5.3 ("animadvertimus"), ("invenimus"); 5.5 ("legimus"); 6.2 ("praediximus" - which CCSL incorrectly printed as "paediximus"), ("debeamus"); 7.1 ("etiam tempora sunt nobis requirenda"), ("recognoverimus"); 7.2 ("videmus"); 8.7 ("animadvertamus"); 8.9 ("ostendemus"), ("numerabimus"), ("debemus"); 8.10 ("videamus"); 8.11 ("videmus"); 9.1 ("incipiamus"); 9.16 ("nostra interpretatio"); 9.18 ("videamus"); 9.21 ("dicimus"); 9.29 ("dispungamus"); 13.1 ("praescribimus"); 13.9 ("legimus"), ("recognoscimus"); 13.17 ("legimus"); 13.27 ("probamus"), ("inveniamus").

²⁶ Ibid., 2.3 ("recognoscimus"); 2.6 ("cognoscimus"); 2.9 ("intellegimus"), ("adendamus"); 2.10 ("adimamus"); 2.13 ("nobis ostenderet"); 3.6 ("videmus"), ("recognoscimus"); 3.8 ("intellegimus"); 4.2 ("intellegimus"); 4.3 ("dinoscimus"); 4.4 ("intellegimus"); 6.2 ("nobis incumbit"); 7.1 ("credamus"); 7.2 ("scimus"); 8.2 ("credamus"); 9.2 ("existimamus"); 9.8 ("nobis posita"); 11.11 ("proferimus"); 12.2 ("consideramus"); 13.1 ("nos errare"); 13.3 ("animadvertimus"); 13.12 ("sicuti nos"), ("commorabamus"); 13.19 ("nobis scilicet"); 13.24 ("adprobavimus"); 14.1 ("dicimus"); 14.11 ("intellegamus"). One may well argue that some of the references in this note belong in the previous note and *vice versa*. However, the general point that sometimes Tertullian was referring more to himself and sometimes including others, remains.

²⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.46 noted that in declamatory exercises the speaker could choose whether to speak as though they were their assumed character or that character's advocate. At 3.8.51, though, he noted that in most cases one acted the part of the character.

obtained from looking at second and third person references to Christians and Jews.

There are no second person references with regard to Christians. This is not surprising given that Tertullian was a Christian and closely identified himself with other Christians. Never did he aim any of his pleading directly to Christians as though he imagined them to need to be convinced. Just because he did not use the second person for Christians, though, does not mean that he was not addressing them. One gains the impression that in many of his first person references he was making statements that were more than merely indicative ones, that he wanted his imagined Christian readers to think about what was being put forward (“we believe this, don’t we?”). Christians are not referred to in the third person either. Again, the close identification between author and Christians would tend to rule that out. So he does not seem to have imagined a readership that excluded Christians.

One must turn one’s attention to the manner in which reference is made to the Jews. On the whole, the Jews are referred to in the third person.²⁸ It suggests that Tertullian did not include Jews among his imagined readership. This was not designed as a work *to* the Jews but *about* the Jews. This conclusion is, however, not so cut and dried. There are more than enough instances where Tertullian addressed the Jews in the second person to suggest that, even though he addressed the Christian part of his imagined audience for most of his argument, sometimes he did

²⁸ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.3 (“*superbia*”); 1.7 (“*prohiberentur*”); 2.9 (“*et Iudaeis certis temporibus datam*”); 2.10 (“*qui contendit*”); 3.13 (“*fuera*t cognitus”); 4.1 (“*dicunt enim Iudaei*”); 4.6 (“*doceant*”); 4.7 (“*dicturi sunt Iudaei*”); 4.10 (“*eos operatos*”), (“*fecerunt*”), (“*expugnaverunt*”), (“*revocaverunt*”); 5.3 (“*et patribus eorum*”); 6.2 (“*patribus eorum*”); 7.2 (“*Iudaeos non refutare*”); 8.13 (“*exhibeant Iudaei*”); 8.17 (“*Iudaeis postea cessaverunt*”); 9.1 (“*dicunt Iudaei*”); 9.2 (“*dicunt*”); 9.7 (“*dicunt*”); 9.16 (“*convincentur Iudaei*”); 9.20 (“*inquiunt*”); 11.9 (“*in quo Iudaei non essent credituri*”); 11.11 (“*adversus Iudaeos*” - which Kroymann separates from the text), (“*deducantur*”); 13.1 (“*fili* Israel *adfirmant*”), (“*illis*”); 13.5 (“*secundum Iudaeos*”); 13.15 (“*coeperunt*”); 13.16 (“*eos*”); 13.20 (“*non possunt negare*”); 13.24 (“*contendunt Iudaei*”), (“*recognoscant*”), (“*praedicabantur*”), (“*despexerunt et interfecerunt*”), (“*agnoverunt*”); 13.25 (“*apud illos*”); 13.26 (“*ab illis*”); 13.27 (“*perierunt*”), (“*eis*”); 13.28 (“*praedicarentur Iudaei*”), (“*eos*”); 14.10 (“*poterunt*”), (“*decepti sunt*”), (“*negari*”), (“*ignorant*”).

acknowledge a Jewish element.²⁹ The change of person was taken by P. Corssen as an indication of the incompetence of the anonymous compiler of *adversus Iudaeos* who could not be consistent in his usage.³⁰ Säflund argues that changes of person were common in ancient polemical literature.³¹ Both Säflund and Tränkle point out that such changes of person occur in *adversus Marcionem* without the integrity of that work thereby being challenged.³²

Almost all of these second person references occur in the second half of the work. This is significant, for then one must take into account the parallels between *adversus Iudaeos* and the third book of *adversus Marcionem*. Many of the second person references are repeated there,³³ although there are quite a number of second person references in that part of *adversus Marcionem*

²⁹ Ibid., 3.1 (“*inquires*” - although the 1550 edition of Gelenius, based on the no longer extant *Mesnartiana* and *Codex Masburensis*, had “*inquit*”); 8.1 (“*dubites*”), (“*videas*”); 9.2 (“*spectes*”); 9.3 (“*non negabis*”); 9.5 (“*inspicias*”); 9.6 (“*penes vos*”); 9.8 (“*gestitis*”), (“*audetis*”), (“*revincimini*”); 9.10 (“*servate*”); 9.14 (“*archontas vestras et populum vestrum*”); 9.17 (“*legis*”); 9.20 (“*agnosce*”); (“*didicisti*”); 9.21 (“*disce... erroris tui*”), (“*inquis*”); 9.23 (“*ipsi legitis*”); 9.31 (“*vos diffitemini*”), (“*dicebatis*”); 10.1 (“*ambigitis*”); 10.4 (“*per vos*”); 10.11 (“*legistis*”), (“*intellegatis*”), (“*putetis*”); 10.12 (“*essetis dicturi*”); 10.13 (“*quaeris*”), (“*tibi*”); 10.14 (“*ne putetis*”), (“*cordis vestri*”); 10.18 (“*vos*”), (“*interficeretis*”); 10.19 (“*captivitas vobis*”); 11.1 (“*meritis vestris cladem vestram*”), (“*respuistis*”); 12.1 (“*si audes negare*”), (“*tibi*”); 12.2 (“*poteris*” - found only in PNFR, though not in T); 13.4 (“*quod vobis, pro meritis vestris*”), (“*terram vestram*”); 13.11 (“*vobis*”); 13.29 (“*redde*”); 14.1 (“*discite*”), (“*erroris vestri*”); 14.8 (“*poteritis in istam praedicationem*”); 14.12 (“*cernitis*”), (“*non audetis negare*”), (“*si negaretis, statim vobis*”), (“*nec poteritis*”); 14.13 (“*potes*”), (“*vides*”), (“*negas*”). These references are sufficient to make the comment of R. S. MacLennan, op. cit., p.138: “Some scholars have mentioned the fact that Tertullian never speaks about the Jews as ‘you’ but always as ‘them’; so there were never direct comments made about the Jews in his *Answer*.” appear quite false. MacLennan has taken his idea from David P. Efroymson, “Tertullian’s Anti-Judaism and its Role in his Theology,” (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1976), p.63.

³⁰ P. Corssen, *Die altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theopili Christiani* (Jever, 1890), pp.3ff.

³¹ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.160: “Über das reichliche Vorkommen des Personenwechsels in der antiken populären Propaganda brauche ich mich nicht zu verbreiten. In Tertullians lebhaft polemischen Schriften ist er überaus häufig; Adv. Iud. ist in dieser Hinsicht keine Ausnahme.”

³² Ibid., pp.159-160. H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xv, found much to criticise in Corssens’ method.

³³ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 9.2 (=adv. Marc. 3.12.2); 9.3 (=adv. Marc. 3.12.3); 9.5 (=adv. Marc. 9.13.2); 9.10 (=adv. Marc. 3.13.6, although in the singular); 9.20 (=adv. Marc. 3.14.7); 9.21 (=adv. Marc. 3.16.3, although the context—“*cum partiariis erroris tui, Iudaeis*”—makes it very clear that a different audience was being addressed); 9.21 (=adv. Marc. 3.16.4); 10.11 (=adv. Marc. 3.19.1, although all three in the singular); 10.12 (=adv. Marc. 3.19.3, although changed to “*tibi insinuat, de dicturis praedicans Iudaeis*”); 10.13 (=adv. Marc. 3.19.5); 10.14 (=adv. Marc. 3.19.6); 12.1 (=adv. Marc. 3.20.2-3); 13.29 (=adv. Marc. 3.23.7); 14.12 (=adv. Marc. 3.20.2, although in the singular); 14.13 (=adv. Marc. 2.20.10).

which do not appear in *adversus Iudaeos* (or, if they do, appear as third person).³⁴ There are even instances where second person references in *adversus Iudaeos* are in the third person in *adversus Marcionem*, or are otherwise modified.³⁵ How may this be explained? *Adversus Marcionem* was addressed to or about the followers of Marcion and not to the Jews and hence some of the specific references to the Jews in *adversus Iudaeos* needed to be in a different person in *adversus Marcionem*. Given that the Marcionites accepted some version of the Christian gospel, Tertullian had more material from which to draw his arguments against them, as opposed to the material acceptable to the Jews from which he could have drawn arguments, hence the additional second person references in *adversus Marcionem*. There were, as well, quite a number of arguments which Tertullian felt able to direct against them both. This is seen in the large number of instances where a second person reference in one treatise is also a second person reference in the other.

This raises the question of which treatise borrowed from the other. There is no *a priori* reason why the existence of identical material in the two works should necessitate the conclusion that an imitator was at work in one of them rather than the conclusion that Tertullian himself found it convenient to re-edit some old material for a new composition.³⁶ On the basis of the brief presentation of verbs and pronouns alone no conclusion about priority can be determined and one

³⁴ E.g., Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.13.1 (“*duceris*”), (“*accipis*”) and *adv. Iud.* 9.4 (“*inducuntur*”), (“*accipiunt*”); *adv. Marc.* 3.13.6 (“*detraxisti*”); *adv. Marc.* 3.14.1 (“*convinceris*”) and *adv. Iud.* 9.16 (“*convincuntur*”); *adv. Marc.* 3.14.4 (“*habes*”); 3.15.1 (“*vos*”); 3.16.3 (“*inquis*”); 3.16.7 (“*vobis*”), (“*vos probare*”), (“*poteritis*”); 3.19.4 (“*in evangelio quoque vestro*”), (“*intellegas*”).

³⁵ E.g., Tert. *adv. Iud.* 9.6 (“*si penes vos*”) and *adv. Marc.* 3.13.3 (“*si penes*”); *adv. Iud.* 9.8 (“*audetis*”) and *adv. Marc.* 3.13.4 (“*audent*”); *adv. Iud.* 9.8 (“*revincimini*”) and *adv. Marc.* 3.13.5 (“*revincuntur*”); *adv. Iud.* 9.14 (“*archontas vestras et populum vestrum*”) and *adv. Marc.* 3.13.9 (“*archontas Iudaeorum et populum ipsum*”); *adv. Iud.* 10.1 (“*ambigitis*”) and *adv. Marc.* 3.18.1 (“*puto, diversitatem temptatis inducere*”); *adv. Iud.* 10.18-19 and 13.4, 11 do not appear in *adv. Marc.*; *adv. Iud.* 14.1 (“*discite*”), (“*erroris vestri*”) and *adv. Marc.* 3.7.1 (“*discat*”), (“*errorum eius*”).

³⁶ Here I would agree with the opinion of P. Monceaux, *op. cit.*, pp.293ff.

can only speculate about the relationship. Whichever came first, however, it cannot be merely a question of Tertullian copying blindly from one to another, for there are some instances where a second person reference has become a third (this is so both from *adversus Iudaeos* to *adversus Marcionem* and from *adversus Marcionem* to *adversus Iudaeos*). Tränkle put forward the view that *adversus Marcionem* is more concise and tightly worded than *adversus Iudaeos*, less full of explanation and detail. He believed that Tertullian had deleted material to write *adversus Marcionem* rather than added to material to write *adversus Iudaeos*.

Vergleicht man die einander entsprechenden Kapitel in Iud. und Marc. III, so fällt als erstes und wichtigstes auf, daß die Formulierungen in Marc. III viel knapper und straffer, in Iud. dagegen schlaffer und umständlicher sind. So meidet jene Schrift erklärende, aber eigentlich selbstverständliche Zusätze, Wortwiederholungen oder belanglose Füllwörter bis zum Wagnis der Ellipse...

Diese Neigung zur Zusammenfassung geht in Marc. III aber noch viel weiter: Ganze Sätze und Nebensätze, die der Erklärung dienen oder Voraussetzungen von Schlüssen angeben, sind weggelassen, um die eigenen Gedanken des Lesers herauszufordern und seine Anteilnahme zu erzwingen.³⁷

Further, it must be noted that some second person references in *adversus Iudaeos* are in the singular while others are in the plural. The use of the singular suggests that Tertullian's imagined addressee was the Jewish proselyte, while the use of the plural suggests the Jewish section of the debate's audience was being addressed in this written, idealised and imaginary re-run.

Why then are the Jews in *adversus Iudaeos* referred to directly sometimes and indirectly other times? What argument may support the belief that the second person references are the exception to the pattern of referring to the Jews in the third person, rather than the pattern itself?

³⁷ H. Tränkle, op. cit., pp.liii-iv.

The answer may lie in the rhetorical techniques of *exclamatio*,³⁸ *interrogatio*,³⁹ *fictiones personarum* or *conformatio*,⁴⁰ and *communicatio*.⁴¹ There was an amount of overlap and difference of opinion among rhetoricians as to what constituted exactly each *sententia* and differentiated one from another, but addressing an absent third party as though they were present was an established oratorical method. *Ad Herennium* had presented *exclamatio* as a *sententia* to express grief or indignation by addressing a person or place. Quintilian had noted that rhetorical questions were asked not to seek information but to emphasise a point and that *fictiones personarum* could be used to give an insight into the thinking of adversaries.

This is evidenced in Tertullian's employment of these *sententiae*. *Adversus Iudaeos* 3.1; 9.21, 23, 31; 10.11, 14; 13.4 are examples of *conformatio*; 9.8; 10.1, 19; 11.1; 12.1; 13.11; 14.13 seem to be *exclamationes*, wherein Tertullian sought to arouse his readers by the use of verbs with some degree of emotion, like "gestio," "audeo," "reinvincio," "ambigo," "interficio," "respuo," "credo," and "nego." *Adversus Iudaeos* 9.17 is an *interrogatio*.

These second person references, then, are indications of Tertullian's imagined readers rather than his intended readers.

One may draw together some further conclusions about the imagined readership of *adversus Iudaeos*. This treatise was written in the form of a *controversia*, a scholastic form of practice and display in which one set forth arguments and dealt with the imagined arguments of

³⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 4.15.22; *Quint. Inst.* 9.2.27, 38; 9.3.24-26, 97.

³⁹ *Rhet. Her.* 4.15.22; *Cic. de Or.* 3.53.203; *Cic. Orat.* 40.137; *Quint. Inst.* 9.2.7.

⁴⁰ *Rhet. Her.* 4.53.66; *Cic. de Or.* 3.53.205; *Cic. Orat.* 25.85; *Quint. Inst.* 9.2.29-37.

⁴¹ *Cic. de Or.* 3.53.204; *Cic. Orat.* 40.138.

an opponent, even if one did not exist. Tertullian wrote in response to what he claimed to have been a real debate but his literary production was not a record of that encounter but a continuation of it, encapsulating those points which were not presented on the day. To the extent that this piece of writing is what should have been said on the occasion of the debate but was not, it has a degree of fiction about it, but because Tertullian had entered a world where he could recreate an occasion to suit himself, it does not mean, *per se* that there never was the original occasion. It may well be that this debate Tertullian imagined to have taken place before he wrote his treatise was not any one particular debate, but rather was typical of the many debates that may have occurred between Jews and Christians in the Carthage of his time. Unlike Aristides, for example, who set his debate with Plato hundreds of years earlier, Tertullian mentioned that the debate which occasioned his writing was only in the very recent past. It seems as though he wanted the background to his treatise to appear as believable as possible to his readers.

The evidence presented in these past few pages would allow for two views. One view would be that Tertullian wrote imagining that he was speaking to that same gathering who were there for the debate—a mixed group of Christians and Jews (or Jewish sympathisers)—though what he had to say was really for the Christians in that imagined mixed gathering (his intended readers) because, although he sometimes actually addressed the Jews, much of the time, when talking to the Christians, he actually referred to the Jews as though they were not there. In this sense, in this imagined gathering, although Jews may have been present as Tertullian created the setting, he dealt with them as though collectively they were the opposing debater, himself the other debater, and the Christians alone the jury. In the best traditions of debating technique one's opponent was always referred to in the third person, even if they were present, in order to keep the tone more civil and less inflammatory (except when the speaker would lose control and

address them directly). What suggests that Tertullian imagined that his readers were the same group as the audience to the earlier debate comes in the opening sentences. He intended to cover the same points, though more calmly or more thoroughly than the earlier debate (1.1 - “*vel quod... curiosius inspectis lectionibus*”). The argument he wished to pursue in his treatise (1.8) was the same argument as the debate (1.2).⁴² It would seem clear that Tertullian imagined he was having a second attempt to win the same debate before that same mixed audience.

Alternatively, Tertullian wrote imagining an exclusively Christian audience and hence most of the references to the Jews were indirect, although sometimes, to make his style more engaging, he wrote as though dealing directly with the absent party.

Both views are sustainable. In many ways they amount to the same thing. Even though Jews may or may not have been present as Tertullian imagined it, it really made little difference, for the imagined Christians would be the only ones he would allow cast a vote on his own persuasiveness.

Intended Readers of *adversus Iudaeos*

As noted earlier, a distinction between imagined and intended reader is put forward here. Questions about intended audience are speculative and the position taken by commentators perhaps says as much about the agenda of the commentators as it does about Tertullian’s target readership. When we confront the question of intended reader we are confronting the question of the work’s purpose. Was it designed to convert Jews in Carthage to Christianity? Was it

⁴² That we are given the central argument of the debate is obvious through the use of the perfect tense in “*habuit*.”

merely to beat them in argument? Was it designed to help Christians gain a clearer self-identity by sharpening the differences between Christian and Jew? Was its purpose a denigration or vilification of the Jews? Was it, as suggested by Barnes, directed at “sympathetic pagans” confronted by both Christian and Jewish missionaries?

My comments are limited to what is found in the text. The fact that the earlier debate, which served as the occasion for Tertullian writing this work, involved a proselyte may be of some help. There is no *a priori* reason to dismiss the debate as only Tertullian’s literary fiction. Even though I have suggested that in the age of the Second Sophistic, exemplified in Aristides, that such literary fiction was typical, one should only reach this conclusion in the light of proof that the earlier debate did not take place, or that Tertullian was in the habit of inventing his backgrounds. It could well be that a real encounter lay behind Tertullian’s choice of the imagined readers. Simply because Justin’s *Dialogus* and Tertullian’s *de Corona* and *de Fuga in Persecutione* display similar characteristics and because Sophistic orators liked to create fictitious settings, this is not sure proof of a fictitious setting within this work.⁴³ It would seem to be that those commentators who reject the historical reality of this debate (and this will be reviewed in the conclusion to the dissertation) do so because they have a preconceived position they are seeking to defend (usually, that by the late second century A.D. Christians and Jews were in contact no longer). Rather than take this statement at the beginning of *adversus Iudaeos* as a piece of evidence to the contrary, it is dismissed as a piece of artistic creativity or as a literary convention.

⁴³ I agree with H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xxiii, that “Es ist müßig darüber zu streiten, ob ein solches Gespräch wirklich stattgefunden habe. Das kann geschehen sein.” I disagree with him, though, that such a setting was only a *topos*, similar to “die Einkleidung platonischer oder ciceronianischer Dialoge.”

As shall be noted throughout this dissertation, Tertullian was familiar with Justin's *Dialogus*. It is even conceivable that, just as Sophists like Aristides pretended to engage figures from the distant past in debate, Tertullian had the encounter between Justin and Trypho in mind. If that were the case, rather than referring to a dispute only held a few days earlier, Tertullian was referring to one that was held only a few generations earlier. For some, this would be enough to elicit the conclusion that Tertullian merely was re-writing Justin, displaying his superior oratorical skills. I do not reach this conclusion. It may well be, if we find the suggestion that Tertullian had Justin's encounter in mind as the occasion which prompted him writing *adversus Iudaeos*, that Tertullian took that encounter as typical of what he believed to be ongoing encounters between Jews and Christians in local communities throughout the Mediterranean region.

If we choose to accept the possibility (and nothing more than this is being suggested here, for the matter seems to defy resolution) that this debate could have occurred, then the idea put forward by Barnes is well worth considering. It is quite possible that Tertullian intended that his work might be accessible to pagans who were attracted to a monotheistic faith but were undecided between Judaism and Christianity. In that instance, Tertullian's sharp "us and them" contrast would have had something of a "sales pitch" quality about it. Given the arguments he employed, if his message were intended for sympathetic pagans (and I am not convinced entirely that it was, as shall be treated later), Tertullian was addressing those who must have had a high degree of familiarity with, or who were receptive to, the Hebrew Scriptures.

I have suggested, in my comments on imagined readers, that the intended readers were Christians. Thus it seems that Tertullian was more concerned to show his fellow Christians how well he could argue Christian belief or to show interested pagans the overwhelming advantages

of Christianity than to win over Jews. The work does not seem to be interested in their conversion but in pointing out to them where they were wrong (if one accepts that they could have been part of the intended readership) or in pointing out to Christians where the Jews were wrong (if we restrict intended readers to Christians and possibly pagans alone). There is no appeal or address to the Jews in this work, although I do not think that this means that the work was not to be read at all by Jews.

As has been pointed out in other contexts, Tertullian could, to some extent at least, modify his views depending on his intended readership. In works addressed to pagans Tertullian hid or glossed over intramural issues which, in works addressed to an exclusively Christian readership, he would otherwise have explored. As Evans has suggested, we are not to seek to harmonise the various utterances scattered throughout the corpus.⁴⁴ In addressing an audience already hostile it would not have contributed to persuasiveness to be too antagonistic. Thus, in *Apologeticum*, rather than the segregationalist attitude as we find in *ad Martyras*, the rejection of participation in many of the occupations available in the Roman Empire as we find in *de Idololatria*, and the hope for the end of the current political system as we find in *de Oratione*, what we find is Tertullian anxious to reassure political leaders that Christians prayed for the continuation of the Empire (*Apol.* 32.1; 39.2), for the safety of both emperor and empire (*Apol.* 30.4-5), and that Christians participated in all aspects of Roman life, even the army (*Apol.* 5.6; 37.4).⁴⁵ As Evans comments:

⁴⁴ R. F. Evans, "On the Problem of Church and Empire in Tertullian's *Apologeticum*," *Studia Patristica*, vol. 14, ed. Elizabeth A. Lningstone, papers of the 6th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1971, part 3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), p.28.

⁴⁵ See Stephen Gero, "*Miles Gloriosus*: The Christian and Military Service according to Tertullian," *Church History* 39 (1970), pp.285-298.

Tertullian must be allowed to be the resourceful and intelligent advocate that he is. In the *Apologeticum* he employs his knowledge of what he knows to be frequent Christian practice, he appeals to Christian legend, and he records widespread Christian sentiment, all in the interest of making the Church and its faith both intelligible and attractive to his highly placed pagan readers. In speaking on behalf of the Church at large he sees fit to suppress certain rigorist convictions but reveals a rigorist and perfectionist outlook when such an outlook ministers to his apologetic purpose.⁴⁶

Might we notice any difference between *adversus Iudaeos* and book 3 of *adversus Marcionem*? If Tertullian's aim in the former had been to persuade Jews about the truth of Christian claims one could expect him to adopt a more conciliatory tone than in a work for Christians about Jews and Marcion. That Tertullian had a harsh attitude towards Jews and their faith in works addressed to Christian readers has been argued by Efreymson. He notes how Tertullian used the term "Jewish," in contrast to "Christian," as something to describe immorality, impatience, empty ritual, continual defilement, carnal practices, excess, ineffectiveness and idolatrous.⁴⁷ This is what one would expect according to Evans. However, what we notice with Efreymson is how he uses anti-Judaic and anti-Jewish interchangeably. In the conclusion of this dissertation I shall be concerned with differences between these terms, but suffice it here to point out that Efreymson cites passages in which Tertullian highlighted theological differences between two religious faiths or historical incidents and then he infers that Tertullian was making personal (almost racial) attacks on Jews. Efreymson states repeatedly that Tertullian criticised certain things as being Jewish.⁴⁸ Even though he is careful to say that Tertullian never called any Christian a Jew,⁴⁹ the way he writes about "Jewish" and "Jewishness" gives me the impression, most likely quite inadvertently on Efreymson's part, that he believes Tertullian engaged in

⁴⁶ R. F. Evans, op. cit., pp.28-29.

⁴⁷ D. P. Efreymson, "Tertullian's Anti-Jewish Rhetoric," pp.26-35.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.28: "It would, of course, be 'Jewish' to hold that only external actions are wrong and subject to the penitential discipline."; p.29: "But again and again, the potential 'Jewishness' of a contrary position or of an alternate way is identified and sometimes underlined."

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.29.

personal abuse and vilification. If we accept this as being true of many of Tertullian's works, I do not see Tertullian turning from vigorous, theological dispute to invective and name-calling in *adversus Iudaeos*. The reason is not because the work was not written by Tertullian, but perhaps because he had a different readership in mind, one that actually included Jews or allowed for Jews to be readers..

Be that as it may, what does a comparison between *adversus Iudaeos* and *adversus Marcionem* reveal on this matter? We do find something along the lines Efroymsen has suggested in *adv. Marc.* 3.6.2 (“*cum Iudaico errore*”), a passage not paralleled in *adversus Iudaeos*. This reads more harshly, I believe, than “*ex abundantis erroris vestri*” (*adv. Iud.* 14.1) and its parallel “*ex abundantis cum ipso licebat Iudaeo rationem quoque errorum eius*” (*adv. Marc.* 3.7.1). Again, more vitriolic comments may be found in other passages of *adversus Marcionem* which have no parallel in *adversus Iudaeos*.⁵⁰ At one point Tertullian referred to Jesus as “*Iudaismi exorbitatorem et destructorem*” (*adv. Marc.* 3.6.10), but nothing much may be made of this, for this is the crime the Jews alleged Jesus wished to commit. In another passage without parallel in *adversus Iudaeos* Tertullian wrote “*Iudaeis, quibus adempta est sapientia*” (*adv. Marc.* 3.16.1). Perhaps one could expect to find even more acrimony from Tertullian against the Jews in this work, except for the fact that Marcion was the primary objective.

Even though the anti-Jewishness of *adversus Marcionem* may not be strident, it is harsher or more personal than what is found in *adversus Iudaeos*. There is certainly a vigorous disagreement in the latter treatise, but it remains at a theological level and, in comparison with *adversus Marcionem*, does not degenerate into personal abuse or snide comments. All of this

⁵⁰ Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.8.1: “*a Iudaeo, aspis... mutuari venenum*”); 3.6.8: “*Iudaicae ignorantiae*”.

suggests to me that this was a work that was intended not exclusively for Christians.

Even if the earlier debate were merely Tertullian's literary creation, this is a very different matter, though, from saying that there was little contact between Jews and Christians by this time and that Tertullian's treatise merely indicated an antiquarian interest in an academic subject as scholars like Barnes and Tränkle have suggested. Just as Aristides employed fictional settings in order to deliver a very contemporary message to Platonists, to too perhaps with Tertullian. It is well worth asking the question about why Tertullian would address such a matter unless it was an issue at the time. Certainly *controversiae* could, and generally did, address issues that were not current or holding only academic interest. The position advanced here is that Tertullian was not merely addressing a conventional topic in Christian debating exercises but was concerned with an issue that was alive within the Carthage he knew. It would seem probable that there was some opponent or some "false" view between Tertullian's sights. Whether it was some Jew whom he wanted to refute or to convert, or some Christian who was upsetting others with certain opinions about Judaism, or someone trying to convince pagans that Judaism was the better form of monotheism, Tertullian had some opponent in mind. Why did Tertullian want to prove to his fellow Christians that the Jews were wrong? I would suggest it was not simply as some kind of private literary endeavour, or exercise of re-writing Justin or any other earlier Christian writer who had argued their case, but in order to provide those fellow Christians in Carthage with solid information and debating points to use in their ongoing conflict with Jews.⁵¹ That this work deals with the correct interpretation of Scripture is not a sign of Tertullian's pretending to be engaged in a debate that was a real one in New Testament times only, but a sign that the debate between

⁵¹ I agree with what Jack T. Sanders, *Schismatics, Sectarians, Dissidents, Deviants: The First One Hundred Years of Jewish-Christian Relations* (London: SCM Press, 1993), p.52, says about Justin's readers for *Dialogus* and I would apply that to Tertullian's: "In the *Dialogue* Justin certainly shows knowledge of Jewish-Christian debates, but his intended audience is rather Christian, to whom he provides ammunition for arguing with Jews."

Christians and Jews about the correct interpretation of Scripture was one that reoccurred generation after generation. Even though the arguments about the correct interpretation may appear repetitious, they have a certain timeless, universal, always relevant and applicable quality. It remained the contemporary issue between Jews and Christians in Tertullian's time.⁵²

This is the main point to be made in this chapter: even if Tertullian's imagined readers were entirely imaginary (i.e., the earlier debate between the Jewish proselyte and the Christian did not occur), and I argue that this must remain an open question, this does not necessarily mean that Tertullian was not addressing contemporary issues between Christians and Jews in Carthage in the late second century. I am well aware that this opinion has been criticised by Miriam Taylor,⁵³ but here I would support the position taken by James Carleton Paget against Taylor and others who argue the case that much of the anti-Judaic genre of early Christian literature did not reflect contemporary interaction between Christians and Jews but merely presented Christian arguments about the interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures (in other words, simply repeated arguments first found in the New Testament):

That these arguments had scripture as their central focus is again not surprising. An argument between a Christian and a Jew would most naturally have been an argument about scripture because in the eyes of both this was a text of the highest authority, and fundamental to the expression of each other's faith.⁵⁴

⁵² Cf. Lloyd Gaston, "Retrospect," in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. Stephen G. Wilson, Studies in Judaism and Christianity, no. 2 (Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), p.167: "Much of early anti-Judaism arose not out of hostility to Jews but in an attempt to solve this internal problem in the face of Marcion on the one hand and judaizers on the other. Thus the *adversus Judaeos* testimonies use Scripture not to prove Christ to Jews but to convince Christians that Scripture is compatible with faith in Christ."

⁵³ Miriam S. Taylor, *Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity: A Critique of the Scholarly Consensus*, *Studia Post-Biblica*, vol. 46 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), p.94: "The challenge, and it is one the conflict theorists fail to live up to, is to take account of the contemporary quality of the anti-Jewish references, without thereby denying their retrospective character."

⁵⁴ James Carleton Paget, "Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity," *ZAC* 1 (1997), p.218.

The benefits of examining this treatise from a rhetorical perspective is that it enables one to posit the opinion that the one work could fulfil several purposes. Oratorical performances and compositions generally contain both *refutatio* and *confirmatio*. One sought not only to demolish the arguments of one's opponent but also to put forward arguments to support one's own case. Both activities together constituted proof. Beyond proof, one spoke and wrote to persuade and entertain. One's own arguments were put in the best possible light while those of the opponent were put in the worst possible light, but without crossing the line into the territory of patent and obvious lying. One's reason for writing could be a complex amalgam of reasons, only some of which the author may be conscious. To suggest that in *adversus Iudaeos* Tertullian focussed mainly on one activity or attempted to persuade only one type of reader in particular is not to do justice to the oratorical nature of the treatise and the multivalence of oratory.

However, given that in the imagined audience Tertullian's concern was more with the Christians in the mixed group, perhaps this suggests, when we turn to the intended reader, that this was more a work for the Christians about the Jews, though without excluding completely that it could have been for the Jews as well.

So we return to the original question: for whom was Tertullian writing? Was this work directed to those opponents directly or to others about them? I shall return to these questions in the conclusion. In this chapter what I hope has been demonstrated is that a distinction can be made between imagined readers and intended readers and between questions of the intended readers and the authenticity of Tertullian's familiarity or contact with Jews of his own time.

CHAPTER THREE

DISPOSITIO

Cum primis autem difficile est argumenta ita disponere ut sit ordo eorum rite connexus.

Fronto, *Laudes Fumi et Pulveris*, 4.

Sider's Observations of General Patterns

THE first of the divisions of rhetoric considered by Sider with regard to Tertullian's treatises was rhetorical structure. Of Tertullian's adherence to the rules of *dispositio* he wrote:

In Tertullian's use of this characteristic rhetorical structure, we must note three features in particular. First, we shall find that he employs the textbook pattern of structure with a degree of flexibility, omitting, transposing, and combining parts as the demands of rhetorical effectiveness suggested. Second, he brings to some of these parts a few basic features repeated so often as to become almost stereotyped. The *exordium*, for example, is developed with a great regularity on the basis of a central contrast or pejorative association. Third, his vigorous and abundant use of the premunition allows us a special interest in that feature, an interest which is heightened when we observe that occasionally he will set a premunition in balance with an amplification to give his composition something of a symmetrical effect.¹

It is worth stating that such a flexible approach to structure is not the convenient fantasy of the modern commentator, enabling any piece of writing to fit the rhetorical mould. On the contrary, rhetorical theorists such as Cicero and Quintilian, while they listed the parts of a speech, were also at pains to point out that the parts of speech were made for the orator and not the orator

¹ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.22.

for the parts of speech. They advocated flexibility as the mark of the mature speaker, allowing the facts of the matter to shape what was to be said where necessary.²

The second point worth making is that none of these major rhetoricians mentioned *praemunitio* as a separate part of speech. In *de Oratore*, Cicero mentioned *praemunitio* as one of the *sententiae*, where one indicated what one was going to do (Cic. *de Or.* 3.53.204). Later, in *Orator*, Cicero listed it as a figure of thought, again with the idea that the orator would, by employing it, prepare what was to come (Cic. *Orat.* 40.137). Quintilian also mentioned *praemunitio* as a figure of thought, quoting directly from the third book of Cicero's *de Oratore* and from *Orator* (Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.30,43).³ For Quintilian this figure of thought was used to anticipate objections, as Cicero had done at the beginning of *Divinatione in Q. Caecilium* (Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.17). Anticipation (πρόληψις) could be used at any point in a speech but some forms of it were particularly appropriate in the *exordium* (Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.16). As Bonner has pointed out, figures usually were no more than a few words, clauses or sentences,⁴ not a whole section of a speech itself. Sider himself knew this but argued that, in a few of Tertullian's treatises, it was expanded considerably.⁵ Indeed, at one point, Quintilian, using the Greek term πρόληψις rather than *praemunitio*, wrote that, in the course of the *exordium*, it was sometimes appropriate to anticipate the objections of opponents. The same example from Cicero's *Divinatione in Q.*

² *Rhet. Her.* 3.19.17 - 3.10.17; Cic. *de Or.* 2.19.79-81; 2.72.293; 2.76.307 - 2.81.332; Cic. *Orat.* 35.122; Cic. *Part. Or.* 5.15; Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.43,72; 4.2.4-5; 7.1.3; 7.10.5-9.

³ At *Inst.* 9.3.99, Quintilian mentioned πρόληψις as being considered by Rutilius as a figure of speech rather than a figure of thought.

⁴ Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the elder Cato to the younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.305.

⁵ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.34.

Caecilius was cited (Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.49). Perhaps one could argue that the *praemunitio* was a sub-part of *dispositio* rather than an entire part.

As Cicero stated, *dispositio* was the distribution or arrangement of arguments in their proper order.⁶ Often that arrangement could only be determined after the entire detail of the speech had been worked out.⁷ In other words, one needed to have things to say before one started worrying about the order in which to say them.

Bonner has pointed out that in *declamationes* speakers would follow the general rhetorical divisions for oratorical practice, as can be noted in the comments of the elder Seneca.⁸ So the opinion expressed here that *adversus Iudaeos* is a *controversia* need occasion no problems *per se* about the work's rhetorical structure.

Discerning a structure to a work is an important first step in its interpretation. Sider has claimed that Tertullian was most attentive to the possibilities presented by structure:

... we must no longer be satisfied to describe the theology of Tertullian by excerpts from his writings. The real nature of his thought can be perceived only when we discern in the structure of each work as a whole the intricate pattern in which the ideas are related to one another. He offers, that is, not merely theological statements to read, but artistic structures which must be analysed to reveal the delicate relationships of his theological system.⁹

⁶ Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.7.9: "... *dispositio est rerum inventarum in ordinem distributio...*"

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.14.19.

⁸ S. F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation*, p.54. See also A. D. Leeman, *op. cit.*, p.232. Janet Fairweather, *Seneca the Elder*, Cambridge Classical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.155-165, notes that most of Seneca's *controversiae* involved legal or equity matters rather than conjectural ones, which tended to be unpopular in Seneca's time. Whatever the question, *dispositio* was employed (pp.179-189).

⁹ Robert Dick Sider, "On Symmetrical Composition in Tertullian," *JTS* n.s. 24 (1973), p.422.

Sider's article examines the ways in which Tertullian used the classical tendency to symmetrical composition in ways to construct balance between contrasting and parallel ideas not only in the contour of a work but in the arrangement of details. Although I shall argue that chronology determines the main structural thrust of *adversus Iudaeos* rather than symmetry, his point about the importance of structure in interpreting a text remains valid.

With these comments in mind it is now possible to consider the rhetorical structure of *adversus Iudaeos* in order to determine whether or not there is a discernible rhetorical structure and, further, whether the discerned structure can aid in addressing two questions. Those questions are: does this work have integrity as a single composition? Is there consistency with the notion that Tertullian was its author?

Exordium

1. Rhetorical Theory

*Causa principii nulla alia est, quam ut auditorem, quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodatior, praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus inter auctores plurimos constat, si benevolum, attentum, docilem fecerimus...*¹⁰

Rhetorical writers noted that there were different types of cases or *causae* and one would construct differing *exordia* depending on the *causa* one faced as a speaker. The matter could be honourable (*honestum*), where it was perceived generally that it was deserving of defence or prosecution; difficult (*admirabile*) or discreditable (*turpe*), where the speaker had to defend what

¹⁰ Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.5: "The sole purpose of the *exordium* is to prepare our audience in such a way that they will be disposed to lend a ready ear to the rest of our speech. The majority of authors agree that this is best effected in three ways, by making the audience well-disposed, attentive and ready to receive instruction."

was regarded generally as unworthy or had to prosecute what was regarded generally as being honourable; doubtful (*dubium*) or ambiguous (*anceps*), where the issue was unclear or was partly honourable and partly dishonourable; petty or mean (*humile*), where the matter was considered unimportant; and obscure (*obscurum*), where the matter was difficult to grasp or the judge slow to understand.¹¹

The whole point of the *exordium*, as noted above by Quintilian, was to make the audience well-disposed, attentive, and receptive to the arguments that were to follow. Good will came from four quarters: from the speaker (Quintilian made the further distinction between the pleader and client), from the opponent, from the audience (judge or jury), and from the case itself.¹² What the rhetoricians presented were techniques to make the speaker appear more favourable (though not arrogantly so), the opponent appear more unfavourable, to flatter the audience (but not excessively), and to praise one's own case (and downplay one's opponent's). Attention could be gained by promising to speak about something new, relevant or unusual and by listing the points to be made.¹³ Receptivity could be gained by making the audience attentive, or by summarising the case briefly and simply.¹⁴

If the matter were *honestum* one could readily omit an *exordium* or use it to cement the audience's good will further or to outline why the matter was honourable.¹⁵ If *admirabile*, one would need to win that good will through a subtle approach where one attempted to turn the

¹¹ *Rhet. Her.* 1.3.5, listed only the first four; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.15.20; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.40-41.

¹² *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.8 - 1.5.8; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.16.22; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.6-32.

¹³ *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.7; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.16.23; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.33-34.

¹⁴ *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.7; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.16.23; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.34.

¹⁵ *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.6; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.15.21; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.41.

audience's attention away from the deed or the doer (whichever appeared more harmful to one's case), where one agreed with the audience's disdain but argued that it did not apply in this instance, or one linked the case to others that had received favourable decisions.¹⁶ When the matter was *dubium*, because of a lack of clarity about the issue, one would attempt to clarify and if it were *dubium* because it appeared partly dishonourable, one would attempt to secure some good will.¹⁷ With *humile* matters, one sought to make the audience attentive in order to lessen the impression that the matter was of little consequence.¹⁸ Finally, cases that were *obscurum* would be helped by focusing on improving the audience's receptivity.¹⁹

The subtle approach (*insinuatio*) would also be used if one spoke after a convincing presentation by one's opponent or when the audience had wearied.²⁰ Seeming to be overawed by one's opponent yet speaking well could lessen their impact and the promise of brevity or some light aside could alleviate tiredness. Quintilian also added that the *exordium* ought not display any artful skill, the avoidance of which was an art in itself,²¹ and that the *exordium* need to move smoothly on to the *narratio*.²²

2. Exordium in Tertullian

¹⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 1.6.9; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.15.21; 1.17.24; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.42-47.

¹⁷ *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.6; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.15.21; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.41.

¹⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.6; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.15.21; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.41.

¹⁹ *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.16.21; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.41.

²⁰ *Rhet. Her.* 1.6.10; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.17.25; *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.48-50.

²¹ *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.56-60.

²² *Ibid.*, 4.1.76-79.

What are the general characteristics of Tertullian's use of the *exordium* according to Sider? He noted that in several works Tertullian employed the *exordium* in a conventional way to appeal to the reader/judge for a fair hearing. Thus in *Apologeticum*, that forensic speech addressed to the rulers of the empire, there is an appeal to the judges' responsibility to be fair and a contrast between Christian and criminal.²³ In *de Resurrectione Mortuorum*, he linked his opponents with Jews and pagans and clearly stated his position.²⁴ *Adversus Praxean* opens with a denigration of his opponent by associating him with the devil.²⁵ Sider noted Tertullian's ability in other works to be more adaptive and creative, particularly in the interrelationship between the *exordium*, *narratio*, *partitio*, and *propositio*. *De Pudicitia* has a text book *exordium* in which Tertullian sought to arouse the sympathy of his readers, by showing the decline of modesty and, at the same time, he discredited his opponent, by showing the lack of contrast between Church and world on this issue.²⁶ In *de Praescriptione Haereticorum*, Sider identified an *exordium* of fourteen chapters, and this in a work that is only forty-four chapters long. It aims at eliciting *ethos* by identifying the opponents through contrasting them with Christians and associating them with pagan philosophers.²⁷ The *partitio* opens *de Carne Christi* and an *exordium* follows in the first section devoted to Marcion in which this opponent is criticised.²⁸ *De Corona* has no *exordium* but opens immediately with the *narratio*.²⁹ The *exordium* of *adversus Marcionem* is conventional, in that Tertullian sought to win good will for himself and to castigate his opponent,

²³ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.22-23.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.23.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.23-24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.24-25.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.25-26.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.27-28.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.28-29.

by associating him with a barbarous country.³⁰ Finally, Sider argued that *adversus Valentinianos* consists of only an *exordium* and *narratio* and that the *exordium* contains the usual technique of contrast and association.³¹

3. *Exordium in adversus Iudaeos*

This treatise contains a brief *exordium* (*adv. Iud.* 1.1-3a). It contains the history of events that led Tertullian to compose the work—the earlier debate between the Christian and proselyte. In this regard it fulfills the same function as the first part of the *exordium* of *adversus Marcionem* (1.1.1-2) in explaining how the work came to be written.

Although it contains a history it is really the history of the work's evolution rather than the history of the topic under discussion and that is why it is not to be considered a *narratio*. This can be exemplified in a contrast between *adversus Iudaeos* and *de Corona*. Both open with very similar words: “*Proxime accidit*” in the first and “*Proxime factum est*” in the second, which, as has been noted earlier, Sider identified as the opening of the *narratio*. Yet these words in *adversus Iudaeos* do not lead into a consideration of the topic itself but of the origins of the treatise. In the other treatise the opening words do lead into the history of the very incident that becomes the topic for discussion—the refusal of a Christian soldier to wear an awarded military crown.

³⁰ Ibid., pp.29-30.

³¹ Ibid., p.30.

What type of *causa* would Tertullian have envisaged? Given that he was writing mainly for a Christian audience, it would have to be considered *causa honestum*. Tertullian could presume that the reader was already well disposed and receptive towards himself and the topic. Hence there was no need for him to spend time unnecessarily winning their favour. Indeed, he did not refer to himself at all in these opening sentences unless indirectly (if the suggestion is adopted that he was the Christian disputant in the debate).

Yet, one gains the impression that Tertullian needed to capture the reader's attention. He noted in 1.1 that the dispute had been like a tug-of-war ("*alternis vicibus contentioso fune*") and dragged out ("*uterque diem in vesperam traxerunt*"), so much so that rational argument became impossible ("*per concentum disputationis minus plene potuit dilucidari*"). This work was to be the remedy ("*curiosius inspectis lectionibus*"). What Tertullian conveyed without the need for an explicit statement was that through writing he would focus on the issues ("*stilo quaestiones retractatas terminare*") without resorting to the shouting, obvious displays of emotion, and length of the earlier debate. There is, therefore, a sense that Tertullian was sensitive to the exhaustion of his imagined readers (which reinforces the view that the imagined readers were the audience of the dispute) and was seeking to capture their attention by promising them obliquely that his presentation would be rational rather than emotional, and focused rather than rambling.

This desire to capture the reader's attention in such a manner seems entirely traditional and is reinforced by the brevity of the *exordium*. This restraint continued in 1.3 with the brief mention of the now imaginary opponent and Tertullian's quip that he should not become conceited ("*ne Israël adhuc superbiat*") by appealing to outdated pieces of Scripture. Compared

with the ways he characterised his opponent in other treatises, this was a restrained effort indeed from Tertullian.

The *exordium* contains what amounts to the point at issue (1.2). The point in the debate, and the point which Tertullian would take up and continue, was whether Gentiles could share in the grace of God, and the point Tertullian sought to prove was that they could (“*defendendi etiam gentibus ibi divinam gratiam*”).³² This *propositio* is then repeated in 1.3a (“*posse gentes admitti ad dei legem*”) in what becomes a transition from the *exordium* to the *narratio*.

Narratio

1. Rhetorical Theory

The major extant Roman rhetorical writers were in general agreement about the *narratio*. As Cicero stated: “*Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio.*”³³ It became the basis for the proof that was to follow.³⁴ There were three types of *narratio*. In the first, in contentious matters that required a decision, the facts were set forth. In the second, an orator would seek to attack an opponent or amuse the audience through some kind of incidental narrative or

³² I. L. S. Balfour, “Tertullian’s Description of the Heathen,” in *Studia Patristica*, vol.17, no.2, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, Papers of the 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1979 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), pp.788-789, notes that in contrasting Jew and non-Jew, Tertullian used a variety of words, “*natio*” being the most frequent for the non-Jew. In *adv. Iud.*, though, the word “*gens*” was used for the same purpose (and such a meaning for “*gens*” being limited almost exclusively to *adv. Iud.*). In his chart on p.789, Balfour lists *adv. Iud.* as an apologetic work addressed to heathens.

³³ Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.19.27: “The *narrative* is an exposition of events that have occurred or are supposed to have occurred.” (Translation from H. M. Hubbell, trans., *Cicero II: De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1949])

³⁴ Cic. *Part. Or.* 9.31.

entertaining digression.³⁵ Quintilian distinguished between the exposition of the facts of a case themselves and the facts which have a bearing on the case. The third was the practice *narratio* used in school exercises.

Narrationes could be based on facts or on persons. Facts could be legendary (neither true nor probable), historical (true) or realistic (probable). Those based on person dealt with character traits and events.³⁶ Quintilian cautioned against too many subdivisions, like facts, persons and places, in constructing a *narratio*.³⁷ The qualities of the *narratio* were to be brief (*brevis*), clear (*dilucida* or *aperta*) and plausible (*veri similis* or *probabilis*) and this could be achieved if relevant facts only were mentioned, if the facts followed sequentially or chronologically, and if the constructed story appeared true to life with believable motives and consistent characters.³⁸

Quintilian warned orators not to pass too abruptly nor too subtly from *exordium* to *narratio*.³⁹ He also accepted the belief that the *narratio* could be dispensed with when the facts of a case were well known (although it would be foolish to do so where the facts seemed to be against one's position), or where the *stasis* was not *coniecturalis*, and, in forensic matters, sometimes either prosecution or defence could dispense with the *narratio*, although, usually, if one side produced one version of events the other side would need to produce a different story.⁴⁰

³⁵ *Rhet. Her.* 1.8.12; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.19.27; *Quint. Inst.* 4.2.12-16 for the first type and 4.2.17-19 for the second type.

³⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 1.8.13; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.19.27.

³⁷ *Quint. Inst.* 4.2.2.

³⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 1.9.14-16; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.20.28 - 1.21.29; *Quint. Inst.* 4.2.32-60.

³⁹ *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.79.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.2.4-23.

He noted that many pleaders simply followed training practice, where a *narratio* was standard, and did not take the context of their real court situation into account (whether they were speaking first or second, etc.).⁴¹ He also considered the quality needed for the *narratio*, when the facts appeared to be against the speaker, to be one of mitigation.

The *narratio* amounts to a summary presentation of the facts which a speaker would then intend to support with proofs later in the speech (as well as refuting the facts put forward by the other side). Not only was it a moment to instruct the listeners but, within limits, a moment to move them through some emotional appeal.⁴² Quintilian asserted that, early in a speech, the *narratio* came at a point when the listener was most attentive.⁴³

2. *Narratio* in Tertullian

In *Apologeticum*, according to Sider, there is no distinct *narratio* because there is no story to be told, but Tertullian employed one in the third chapter to describe how a good person could end up being accused falsely.⁴⁴ The *narratio* occupies a traditional place in *de Resurrectione Mortuorum*, *adversus Praxean*, and *de Carne Christi*, although, in the first, the *partitio* came before the *narratio* (*de Res.* 2.8-11), and, in the third, the *partitio* came before the *exordium*.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Ibid., 4.2.28-20.

⁴² Ibid., 4.2.111-124.

⁴³ Ibid., 4.2.119.

⁴⁴ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.23.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.23-24, 27.

The *narratio* of *de Pudicitia* (1.6) occurs between two parts of the *exordium*.⁴⁶ According to Sider, there is a *narratio* in *de Praescriptione Haereticorum* in the second half of the work where Tertullian's attention was turned to his prescriptive argument.⁴⁷ It has been noted earlier that *de Corona* opens immediately with the *narratio*. In chapter 2 of the first book of *adversus Marcionem* Tertullian developed a *narratio* by describing, in an historical narrative, how Marcion's heretical beliefs unfolded. Finally, in *adversus Valentinianos* Sider stated that the *narratio* ran from chapter 7 onwards and that Tertullian used the *narratio* as his means of proof, as enunciated at 3.5.⁴⁸

3. *Narratio in adversus Iudaeos*

In *adversus Iudaeos* the *narratio* runs from 1.3b to 1.7. It opens with the promises of God to Abraham. The move from *exordium* to *narratio* is seamless, introduced by "*quamquam*." This concessive conjunction is linked immediately with the preceding statement with the references to Is. 40:15 (and, possibly, Dan. 2:35), and yet, from this point, Tertullian left behind his comments on the debate and turned his attention to the topic at hand. Perhaps such a transition would have been characterised by Quintilian as too subtle or too indirect.

Normally a concessive clause introduces something one has to admit which often has the effect of highlighting the point in the main sentence or making the point appear more impressive (that something could be achieved, for example, even though other conditions prevailed). Such

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.25.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.26.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.30. I am not convinced that the second half of *adv. Val.* is not merely the *confirmatio* of a work that has no *narratio*. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.79 noted how closely related these two parts could be.

a clause often has that somewhat negative quality in that the situation of the main sentence would have been easier or less complicated if what is admitted did not exist. Sometimes “*quamquam*” has the sense of introducing a contrast, better translated as “and yet” rather than as “although.” It was in this second sense that Tertullian employed this conjunction here, for it is the point in the clause he wished to emphasise, not the point in the earlier sentence. The situation is reversed—he cannot deny the validity and authority of a piece of Scripture like Is. 40:15 but it would have made his argument that much easier if such a statement about the Gentiles being merely a drop in the bucket had not been made. Even though that was true (and here the main sentence has become almost concessive), yet there are other passages in Scripture that provided a different message.

The *narratio* centres on the promise God made to Rebekah in Gen. 25:23. Tertullian’s *narratio* reached back to patriarchal (and matriarchal) history and rested on a promise of God recorded in Scripture. It was a strong appeal to the highest authority—the Word of God itself. The statement he made was that not only were the Christians included in God’s promise (1.3 - “*utique Iudaeorum, id est Israëlitum, et gentium, id est noster*”), but that the Christians had displaced the Jews as recipients of God’s grace, as the promise to Rebekah foretold, because of Jewish disobedience and apostasy (1.6-7).

The promise to Rebekah was used by Tertullian as the historical base around which his entire argument was to be constructed. The rest of the treatise was to be an exposition of how that promise had been fulfilled. As it was God’s promise that anchored the argument rather than human reasoning, it would seem that Tertullian was attempting to establish an unassailable position. This promise became the canon against which other passages in Scripture had to be

measured. After discussing the promise, Tertullian summarised the subsequent history by way of a contrast (1.6-7): “... *populus Iudaeorum... derelicto deo idolis deservivit et divinitate abrelicta simulacris fuit deditus...*” and “*Noster vero populus... relictis idolis, quibus ante deserviebat, ad eundem deum conversus est, a quo Israël, ut supra memoravimus, abscesserat*”. There is a brief mention in outline of the history of Israel’s failure, but the details of this history would become the basis of his *refutatio*.

Partitio

1. Rhetorical Theory

The *partitio* or *divisio* was that moment in a speech where an orator indicated the question at issue and the approach he intended to take. According to *ad Herennium*, one attempted to achieve two things (in *de Inventione* Cicero suggested that one attempted either one thing or the other): a discussion of where one agreed with one’s opponent and where one disagreed, on the one hand, and a *distributio*, where one set forth the number of points to be discussed (*enumeratio*) and what they were (*expositio*), on the other.⁴⁹ Such a listing needed to be brief, complete, and concise. After having made such a promise to one’s listeners, it was imperative in the body of the speech to address each one of the points in the *expositio* in turn.⁵⁰

A century later, Quintilian renamed the *partitio* as *propositio*. For him the *partitio* was a characteristic of the structure of any speech rather than any one part of a speech.⁵¹ Although he

⁴⁹ *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.17; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.22.31.

⁵⁰ *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.23.33.

⁵¹ *Quint. Inst.* 3.9.2-3; 4.4.1 - 4.5.28.

considered *propositio* to be part of *confirmatio* and that it was not necessary always to employ it (particularly when the question was obvious), Quintilian acknowledged the role of telling the audience what it was about which a decision needed to be made.⁵² There could be several *propositiones* to be decided or a *propositio* could consist of several parts and it could be framed in a number of ways (unsupported by a reason, supported, and seen from the prosecutor's point of view, the defendant's point of view, or expressed neutrally).⁵³ With regard to what Quintilian defined as *partitio* ("*Partitio est nostrarum aut adversarii propositionum aut utrarumque ordine collocata enumeratio*"),⁵⁴ his following comments reveal that his understanding here was similar to what *ad Herennium* had labelled *distributio*—the mentioning of the points that were to follow in the main body of the speech.⁵⁵ His main recommendation was for it not to be so complicated that it would be forgotten quickly.⁵⁶ He could also see benefit in not informing an audience in advance about what they were to hear, so as to seem to be spontaneous or to be able to spring a surprise on them or to appeal to the emotions.⁵⁷

2. Partitio in Tertullian

⁵² Ibid., 4.4.2-4; 4.5.22-24. *Rhet. Her.* 2.18.28 mentions *propositio* as the first part of the complete argument in which one set forth what one intended to prove. This is the same as *expositio* which the author had already considered as part of *partitio* and which was the usual term employed by the anonymous author.

⁵³ Quint. *Inst.*, 4.4.5-8.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 4.5.1: "*Partition* may be defined as the enumeration in order of our own *propositions*, those of our adversary or both."

⁵⁵ Ibid., 4.5.9 in particular.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 4.5.3

⁵⁷ Ibid., 4.5.4-8.

It would seem that Sider has confused slightly this part of *dispositio*. His understanding of *propositio* is taken from Quintilian and his understanding of *partitio* from Cicero, without realising that these are overlapping, not exclusive, terms.

The *propositio* attempted to set out the main point in dispute, or the essential point, or points, the speaker would make (*Inst.* iv.4.1-9); in the *partitio* the speaker either indicated how far he agreed with his opponent, and what remained in dispute, or set forth briefly the major divisions of his speech (*Inv.* I.22.31).⁵⁸

As Sider saw it, a few pages later, *partitio* is the question and *propositio* is the position taken in relation to that question.⁵⁹ Such a clear-cut distinction is not found in the classical authors (nor, on close inspection, is it found in the passage quoted above from Sider himself a few pages earlier).⁶⁰ As has been stated, Cicero used *partitio* to refer to both the stating of the question and the brief outlining of the points to be made (the latter task having been named *distributio* in *ad Herennium*), and Quintilian used *propositio* to mean the stating of the question and/or the stating of the orator's position and limited *partitio* to the enumeration in order of the points to be made.

Whatever varying terms the ancients and Sider have used to refer to it, there was a segment in one's work where it was appropriate for an orator or writer to state one or more of the following: the point at issue, one's position with regard to that point, and the topics one intended to discuss in relation to the point or one's position. Here the term *partitio* will be used to refer to all three elements.

⁵⁸ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.21.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.23.

⁶⁰ In that passage Sider acknowledged that the *partitio* was more than just the question when he wrote that it could also involve the setting forth of the major divisions of the speech and that the *propositio* was more than one's position in regard to the question because he wrote that the *propositio* could also set out the main point in dispute, which is the question itself. His later statement on p.23 is therefore too simplistic.

Sider made it clear that Tertullian did use these various elements in his treatises. In *Apologeticum*, he stated what the question was (2.5-7) and what his own position would be (2.13-14).⁶¹ This is also present in *adversus Praxean*.⁶² In *de Pudicitia*, a *digressio* was placed between the *narratio* and the stating of the question.⁶³ According to Sider, in *de Praescriptione Haereticorum*, there is a *propositio* in chapter 15 and *partitio* in chapter 19.⁶⁴ Perhaps it would be more helpful and accurate to say that in chapter 15 there is a statement of the point at issue (15.4 - “*dispici debet cui competat possessio scripturarum*”) and of Tertullian's position (15.3 - “*non admittendi eos ad ullam de scripturis disputationem*”) and in chapter 19 there is a statement of the topics he intended to cover in order to prove his position which he restated (19.2 - “*quibus competat fides ipsa, cuius sint scripturae, a quo et per quos et quando et quibus sit tradita disciplina qua fiunt christiani*”). *De Carne Christi*, as has been noted, opens with the statement of the question and the topics with which he proposed to deal.⁶⁵ *Adversus Marcionem* also has a statement of the disputed point and the position to be defended.⁶⁶

It is to be noted that these elements of *partitio* are not always located together or in a particular order in Tertullian's treatises. They were located where he believed they were more appropriate. This is another example of his rhetorical flexibility.

3. *Partitio in adversus Iudaeos*

⁶¹ Ibid., p.21.

⁶² Ibid., p.24.

⁶³ Ibid., p.25.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.26.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.27.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.30.

All three elements of *partitio* are found in *adversus Iudaeos*. However, they are not found together. As this treatise was designed as a response to and continuation of the earlier debate, the point at issue is the same for them both. The position taken by the Christian debater (“*defendendi etiam gentibus ibi divinam gratiam*”) is mentioned in the *exordium* at 1.2, such that the question to which it was the answer is determined easily. It is repeated in the very next sentence (1.3a) and written in such a way as to make it extremely clear what position Tertullian took and what was at the heart of the matter: “... *posse gentes admitti ad dei legem.*”

With the *narratio* having refined the contrast between Jews and Christians in terms of God’s promise, Tertullian had an opportunity to restate the position he took on this question with greater clarity where the *partitio* traditionally would be located. At 1.8 he declared his modified position: the Christians have not been admitted to God’s grace alongside the Jews; in fact they have replaced them:

*Sic namque populus minor, id est posterior, populum maiorem superavit, dum gratiam divinae dignationis consequitur, a qua Israël est repudiatus.*⁶⁷

Interestingly enough, in the usual conjectural forensic speech, the prosecution would argue that the defendant was responsible for some wrongdoing and the defence would seek to establish that the defendant was not responsible. Normally one could not imagine the prosecution arguing someone’s guilt on the basis of their having done nothing (unless it were a charge of negligence). In this case Tertullian asserted that God had done something. One could not argue though that Tertullian was presenting a prosecution case, for he advocated that what God did, in making the promise to Rebekah, was not wrong but admirable, and one would not prosecute someone who

⁶⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.8: “For thus has the ‘less’—that is, posterior—*people* overcome the ‘greater people,’ while it attains the grace of divine favour, from which Israel has been divorced.”

had done something right. This is a further reinforcement for the view that this treatise is more of a *controversia*, a debate on a set topic entered into by opposing sides rather than an actual forensic piece of literature that sought to establish guilt or innocence, because the treatise contains the unusual twist that gives it interest: the defence argued that God had done something while the prosecution argued that God had not. Whereas, by the end of the second century A.D., most *controversiae* were more fantastic or unreal in subject matter, Christian *controversiae* were rooted in the historical, practical, and relevant.⁶⁸ It was not a matter of honing one's skills, impressing one's peers, or filling in idle time. For the Christian, this rhetorical technique served a very useful purpose in helping to define Christian identity through contrast with the Jewish.⁶⁹ Reading this treatise, one has the impression that Tertullian wrote not merely to impress his readers with polished phrases and elegant style as some kind of Second Sophistic literary impresario; rather, for him, rhetoric was, as it had been for Cicero, a vital, utilitarian, and dynamic tool for persuasion.

In 2.1a we find the final part of the *partitio*, the outlining of the points to be brought forward as proof to support the position he had taken with regard to the question at hand. It flows immediately from the second element, the stating of the position, just described. Rather than spell out how many points he was going to make and what they were, Tertullian indicated merely that he was now about to explore the limits of the entire question ("*summam quaestionis ipsius certis lineis terminemus*"). This lack of detail is consistent with Quintilian's position of not having always to be too precise at the start of one's proof. That we have been presented with the main

⁶⁸ Martin Lowther Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome: A Historical Survey*, rev. D. H. Barry (London: Cohen & West, 1996 [3rd ed.]), p.91.

⁶⁹ G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic*, pp.61-64, though, notes that in Aelius Aristides can be found examples of historically plausible or less extreme declamations in pagan society.

point at issue in 1.8 seems beyond doubt given that, in the next sentence, in 2.1, Tertullian referred to it as the “*summam quaestionis*.”

It can be noticed, in the course of the argument that follows, that Tertullian provided the occasional editorial comment linking and summarising sections (4.1; 6.1). As he moved from refutation to confirmation, Tertullian again repeated this element of *partitio* to set out the issue to be discussed (6.2a - “*ostendere et probare debeamus tam illam legem veterem cessasse quam legem novam promissam nunc operari*”). The issue was in relation to the position he had taken (6.2a - “*quoniam praedicatam novam legem a prophetis praediximus [sic!]*”).⁷⁰ Here he was able to divide the issue into two: the first part already handled in the *refutatio* and the second part in the following *confirmatio*. What appears to be another *partitio* follows in the second half of 6.2, but it is actually the first of two questions which would shape the *confirmatio*: whether anyone was expecting a new law-giver (“*Et quidem primum quaerendum...*”). Very cleverly he related this new direction to the refutation he had just completed by framing his sub-question in relation to law, sacrifice, circumcision and Sabbath, the four points of the refutation of 2.1b - 6.1. The second question about whether that law-giver had come was then raised (6.3 - “*Nam etiam... quaerendum*”).

He drew together the two questions, which he had just mentioned, that would shape the *confirmatio* by once again repeating, at the end of the chapter, the *partitio* he had repeated at the beginning of the chapter:

⁷⁰ This should read “*praediximus*.”

*Et in primis definiendum est non potuisse cessare legem antiquam et prophetas, nisi venisset is, qui per eandem legem et per eosdem prophetas venturus adnuntiabatur.*⁷¹

The *refutatio*, by examining the promises of God, had established that the old law would cease, and the *confirmatio* would deal with the question of whether the new law-giver had come. The question that linked these two (whether there was the promise of a new law-giver to replace the old law with the new) was the first question of the *confirmatio*, a question that needed little attention. In case it escaped the reader's notice, the main question at the heart of the *confirmatio* (the second question of 6.2b) was spelt out (7.1 - "*an qui venturus Christus adnuntiabatur iam venerit an venturus adhuc speretur*"). Finally, Tertullian set forth the points he intended to cover ("*Quod ipsum ut probari possit...*"): the time announced by the prophets for the coming of the Christ, whether he has come within that announced time, the prophecies about his coming, and the bringing of the new law (7.1).

It is argued here that what seems to be a new *partitio* really is one part of the already given *partitio*, spelt out in detail. Tertullian was merely providing some direction to this segment of the treatise but this segment was but one element in establishing the overall point that grace now belonged to the Christians. The overall argument demanded Tertullian establish two things: that the Jews had been disinherited and that the Gentiles had been installed because of their adherence to the Christ.

Refutatio

⁷¹ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 6.4: "And, primarily, we must lay it down that the ancient Law and the prophets could not have ceased, unless He were come who was constantly announced, through the same law and through the same prophets, as to come."

1. Rhetorical Theory

Variouly named by the rhetorical writers as *confutatio*, *reprehensio* or *refutatio*, it, together with its opposite—*confirmatio*—lay at the very heart of oratorical practice.

*Nam cum adiumenta nostra exposuerimus contrariaque dissolverimus, absolute nimirum munus oratorium confecerimus.*⁷²

Ad Herennium presented the material for *confirmatio* and *confutatio* conjointly.⁷³ Although its author presumed that *confirmatio* would come before *refutatio* in a speech, he did recognise that, due to particular circumstances, the parts of a speech could be presented in a different order depending on the circumstances that confronted a speaker.⁷⁴ Of *confirmatio* and *confutatio*, the author recommended that one used one's strongest arguments at the beginning and end and one's weaker arguments, bundled together to add to their impressiveness, in the middle.⁷⁵

Cicero noted that the purpose of *reprehensio* was to disprove or weaken the *confirmatio* of one's opponent and that the same method of reasoning for one applied also to the other.⁷⁶ In order to refute an argument one denied its assumptions, denied that the conclusions followed from the assumptions, demonstrated a fallacy in the line of reasoning, or came up with a stronger

⁷² *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.18: "... for when we have submitted our arguments and destroyed those of the opposition, we have, of course, completely fulfilled the speaker's function." (Translation from Harry Caplan, trans., [*Cicero*]: *Ad C. Herennium*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1954])

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 2.1.2; 2.2.2; 3.10.18.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.9.17 - 3.10.18.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.10.18.

⁷⁶ *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.42.78.

argument.⁷⁷ Attacking one argument at a time had the effect of demolishing the whole of one's opponent's arguments.⁷⁸ He also noted that the orator would not be able always to follow the theoretical order for the parts of a speech but would modify it depending on the needs of the audience.⁷⁹

For Quintilian, the entire task of the defence in a forensic speech was *refutatio*, while both defence and prosecution needed to counter the arguments of opponents.⁸⁰ In considering the first, broader responsibility, Quintilian observed that the defence had a more difficult task than the prosecution because there were more options.⁸¹ With regard to refuting one's opponent's arguments, for whatever side, one had to pay attention to the points that had been raised and, if relevant to the case, deny them, justify them, or raise the question of competency, and, if not relevant, to say so or to ignore them.⁸² Like Cicero, Quintilian considered the question of whether to refute an opponent's arguments as a block or individually and stated that generally one refuted arguments in detail, although there could be exceptions.⁸³ Quintilian turned his attention to common practical mistakes made by those who attempted to refute every single word, however needlessly, and by those who refuted as though they were engaged in a declamatory exercise,

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.42.79.

⁷⁸ *Cic. Part. Or.* 12.44.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.15; *Cic. de Or.* 2.19.77-83.

⁸⁰ *Quint. Inst.* 5.13.1.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 5.13.2-3.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 5.13.4-10.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 5.13.11-15.

who, delivering only a prepared speech, thereby completely ignored the points an opponent had made already.⁸⁴

Quintilian did offer a comment about the order of *confirmatio* and *refutatio*. The prosecution would attempt first to prove its case and then to refute the arguments against it, while the defence would begin by refuting.⁸⁵

2. Refutatio in Tertullian

Sider stated:

The structure of the Proof, which composed the main body of the treatise, need not detain us long, since Tertullian did not generally observe any sequence in confirmation and refutation proposed by rhetorical theory. In most of his works the two are inseparable.⁸⁶

In four works he noted that the *refutatio* followed the *confirmatio*—the standard pattern of rhetorical theory. In *de Resurrectione Mortuorum*, he proposed a parallel between the sequential exposition of the Scriptures and of rhetorical structure, in that Tertullian's arguments from the prophets and gospels form the *confirmatio* (29-39), while the arguments from the Pauline epistles form the *refutatio* (40-51).⁸⁷ The same parallel was seen to have operated in *de Monogamia*. Here the distinction can be seen through the use of the passive voice to mark the beginning of the

⁸⁴ Ibid., 5.13.36-52. This included Quintilian's condemnation of answering points before the opponent had even made them, a habit derived from the schools.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 5.13.53.

⁸⁶ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.30-31.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.31.

refutatio (10.1).⁸⁸ A similar sequence of rhetorical structure, though without the Scriptural parallel, is found in *de Baptismo*.⁸⁹ Finally, in *de Carne Christi*, Tertullian began his proof by refuting the three heresies he had mentioned in his introduction (2-16), before presenting his positive arguments for the humanity of Christ (17-21).⁹⁰ This has produced an inversion of the usual pattern.

3. *Refutatio in adversus Iudaeos*

Proof in *adversus Iudaeos* begins with *refutatio* rather than *confirmatio*. Given that Tertullian planned this treatise to be the follow-up to the earlier debate, it is not surprising that the beginning of the body of the work should take the form of a rejoinder. Tertullian wrote as though he were speaking second in the debate, replying to the points that had been made already by the Jewish proselyte. It makes little difference whether that debate was real or a literary concoction, whether Tertullian responded to the arguments of a particular occasion or to the general arguments that occurred time after time in debates of this kind, because the Jewish position, for the sake of this treatise, was a given, as it were, or in the public domain: there for all to know. Declaimers often imagined the arguments of their opponents and spoke as though replying to particular arguments even if no such opposing speech had been delivered on that occasion. With such familiar and well-traversed subjects, the arguments one would have to counter in a declamation, even though perhaps not mentioned at that time, would all have had a

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.32.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp.32-33.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.33.

certain amount of givenness about them.⁹¹ Placing *refutatio* before *confirmatio* seems an entirely appropriate decision in this instance.

The *refutatio* runs from 2.1b to 6.1. In it Tertullian sought to counter the Jewish position that God's grace, call or salvation had been given to them alone. Four Jewish proofs for their position were then examined in order to demonstrate that their conclusions did not follow from the evidence they produced and that there were arguments from Scripture which they ignored. The four proofs were based on the law (2.1b-10), circumcision (2.11 - 3.6), the Sabbath (4.1-11), and sacrifices (5.1-7). In each case Tertullian stated the Jewish position (2.1,10; 3.1 [twice]; 4.1,7; 5.3),⁹² questioned it, and attempted to refute it by pointing out inconsistencies derived from a comparison with other pieces of Scriptural evidence, particularly the Pentateuch and the Prophets. He challenged his Jewish opponents to respond to his refutation (2.10-11; 4.6), confident that they could not. Tertullian attempted to establish that the Jewish argument, that the observances enjoined on them still endured, no longer held because a more thorough reading of the Hebrew Scriptures revealed other promises given by God that would replace the Jewish observances.

There are editorial comments throughout which reveal Tertullian's structural thoughts about his four points. Having just completed his argument that the law existed prior to Moses, at 2.10 he made mention of both the Sabbath and circumcision and proceeded to discuss circumcision and how people had been favoured by God, before and after Abraham, without being circumcised. From 3.7-13 he linked the two proofs already considered (law and

⁹¹ M. L. Clarke, op. cit., p.92.

⁹² In the last of these though it seems, on the basis of Tertullian's use of "*invenimus*," that he himself had to create a Jewish position he could then attack, rather than repeat one he had heard from them.

circumcision) together to consider not the fact that the old law was not as important as the Jews believed, but that a new law and a new circumcision had been promised by God in the Scriptures to a new people. At 4.1, both law and circumcision were mentioned and linked with the Sabbath. Only the discussion in chapter 5 about sacrifice had not been prefigured (unless one counts the mention of Abel, who offered God sacrifices, was uncircumcised, and did not observe the Sabbath, in 2.12 as a prefiguring). At 6.1, Tertullian summarised his argument: with regard to the Sabbath, circumcision, the law, and sacrifices, the Hebrew Scriptures provided evidence that God had promised to replace what had been given to the Jews.

*Igitur cum manifestum sit et sabbatum temporale ostensum et sabbatum aeternum praedictum, circumcisionem quoque carnalem praedictam et circumcisionem spiritalem praeindicatam, legem quoque temporalem et legem aeternalem denuntiatam, sacrificia carnalia et sacrificia spiritalia praeostensa...*⁹³

It can be noticed that Tertullian seems to have attempted to refute the arguments of his Jewish opponent in detail, point by point, as suggested by the rhetoricians.

Confirmatio

1. Rhetorical Theory

Much of what the rhetoricians wrote about *refutatio* they wrote in the context of describing *confirmatio*—the putting forward of one’s own arguments in detail that amounted to proof sufficient to persuade an audience. As Cicero stated:

⁹³ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 6.1: “Therefore, since it is manifest that a sabbath temporal was shown, and a sabbath eternal foretold; a circumcision carnal foretold, and a circumcision spiritual pre-indicated; a law temporal and a law eternal formally declared; sacrifices carnal and sacrifices spiritual foreshown...”

*Confirmatio est per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio.*⁹⁴

Not much therefore need be written here about *confirmatio* in terms of rhetorical structure. *Ad Herennium* described the three *constitutiones* (*coniecturalis*, *legitima*, and *iuridicalis*) under *confirmatio*, as well as motive (which, together with the prosecution's central point, determined the point at issue, except in conjectural issues where there was no motive offered by the defence but a denial of the charge).⁹⁵ Cicero maintained that arguments in the *confirmatio* centred around attributes of persons or actions,⁹⁶ which led to varying degrees of proof and which established their proof through either induction or deduction.⁹⁷ In presenting one's arguments, Cicero believed the prosecutor would follow the order of the facts—a chronological presentation—while the defence had to take into account the mood of the audience and what the prosecution had argued already.⁹⁸ In terms of the arrangement of arguments, Quintilian's advice was not to present them in descending order from strongest to weakest.⁹⁹

2. Confirmatio in Tertullian

The points Sider wished to make about *confirmatio* have already been discussed in the section on *refutatio*.

⁹⁴ Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.24.34: "Confirmation or proof is the part of the oration which by marshalling arguments lends credit, authority and support to our case."

⁹⁵ *Rhet. Her.* 1.11.18 - 1.16.25; 1.16.26 - 1.17.27.

⁹⁶ Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.24.34 - 1.28.43.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.29.44 - 1.30.49; 1.30.50 - 1.42.79.

⁹⁸ Cic. *Part. Or.* 4.14 - 5.15.

⁹⁹ Quint. *Inst.* 5.12.14.

3. *Confirmatio in adversus Iudaeos*

The *confirmatio* of *adversus Iudaeos* commences at 6.2 with the repetition of the work's overall *partitio*—to prove that the old law had ceased (which he had begun to do in the *refutatio*) and that the promised new law had come (which would occupy the *confirmatio*).

*... ostendere et probare debeamus tam illam legem veterem cessasse quam legem novam promissam nunc operari...*¹⁰⁰

As has been noted, this repetition is itself repeated at the end of the chapter:

*Et in primis definiendum est non potuisse cessare legem antiquam et prophetas, nisi venisset is, qui per eandem legem et per eosdem prophetas venturus adnuntiabatur.*¹⁰¹

This sentence at 6.4 mentions the three major points of the treatise that Tertullian advocated: that the old law would come to an end, that there was the promise of a new law-giver, and that the new law-giver had come already. The first point was the *refutatio*, the second point was dealt with in summary fashion (7.2), and the third point was the heart of the *confirmatio*. Osborn seems to recognise that what has been presented thus far was *refutatio* because it dealt with “the deficiency of the Jewish claim” and that what was to come was the positive proof that the Christ had come.¹⁰² Aziza also has recognised the basic twofold structure to the treatise as negative and positive arguments, the very essence of rhetorical *refutatio* and *confirmatio*:

¹⁰⁰ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 6.2: “... to show and prove, on the one hand, that the old law has ceased, and on the other, that the promised new law is now in operation.”

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 6.4: “And, primarily, we must lay it down that the ancient Law and the prophets could not have ceased, unless He were come who was constantly announced, through the same Law and through the same prophets, as to come.”

¹⁰² Eric Osborn, *Tertullian: First Theologian of the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.118.

Tertullien va donc user d'une double argumentation: l'une négative, l'autre positive. Il faut d'abord montrer que les lois de l'Ancien Testament n'ont pas de valeur absolue. Là encore tout un dossier s'est constitué de bonne heure dès le nouveau Testament.¹⁰³

As has been noted in the section on *partitio*, 6.2 - 7.1 forms an introduction to the *confirmatio* and it contains the two questions that would shape the unfolding argument: whether there was a promise for the Christ to come (6.2b - “*et quidem primum quaerendum, an expectetur novae legis lator*”) and whether the Christ had indeed come (6.3 - “*Nam etiam hic novae legis lator... quaerendum, an iam venerit necne*”).

This *confirmatio* was the very heart of Tertullian's treatise, for the *refutatio* was dependent on it. Tertullian acknowledged this directly in 6.4. It would make no sense to argue that the old law had been replaced by the new if the new had not come.

The question at the heart of the *confirmatio* (mentioned in general terms in 6.2a, then as two questions in 6.2b-3, and in general terms again in 6.4) was stated succinctly:

*Igitur in isto gradum conseramus, an qui venturus Christus adnuntiabatur iam venerit an venturus adhuc speretur.*¹⁰⁴

Immediately Tertullian provided an *expositio* of the four topics he would cover to prove that the Christ had come: the times announced by the prophets when the Christ would come, demonstrating that he had come within that time, the prophetic theme of the coming of the Christ, and the connection between the coming of the Christ and the giving of the new law:

¹⁰³ C. Aziza, op. cit., p.94.

¹⁰⁴ Tert. *adv. Iud.*, 7.1: “Therefore upon this issue plant we foot to foot, whether the Christ who was constantly announced as to come be already come, or whether His coming be yet a subject of hope.”

*Quod ipsum ut probari possit, etiam tempora sunt nobis requirenda, quando venturum Christum prophetae adnuntiaverunt, ut, si intra ista tempora recognoverimus venisse eum, sine dubio ipsum esse credamus, quem prophetae venturum canebant,... et cum constiterit venisse, indubitate etiam legem novam ab ipso datam esse credamus et testamentum novum in ipso...*¹⁰⁵

The third topic differs from the first in that, whereas the first was concerned with the issue of time alone, the third would be concerned with more general issues about the coming of the Christ. By linking the third topic to the second by the relative pronoun, it could be suggested that Tertullian was proposing to examine those two topics together, even though actually he would examine the first two topics together. It has to be conceded that this third topic was not as clearly enunciated as a separate topic in the proof as the others were.

These four topics really concern the second question of the *confirmatio*. The first question—whether there was to be a Christ—was disposed of in a couple of sentences as not being an issue. This marks the beginning of the *confirmatio* proper. The Jews would agree with the Christians that the Christ was to come. There was no debate:

*Nec de isto pluribus quaerendum, cum retro omnes prophetae de eo praedicaverunt...*¹⁰⁶

In terms of the structure of the *confirmatio*, Tertullian proceeded to deal with the four topics of the second question. The first argument advanced, though, had not been announced as one of those four topics; it appeared without warning. It has an almost *digressio*-like quality

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.: “For proof of which question itself, the times likewise must be examined by us when the prophets announced that the Christ would come; that, if we succeed in recognising that He has come within the limits of those times, we may without doubt believe Him to be the very one whose future coming was ever the theme of prophetic song... and that, when it shall have been agreed that He is come, we may undoubtedly likewise believe that the new law has by Him been given...”

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 7.2: “Nor need we inquire at more length concerning *that* matter, since in days bygone all the prophets have prophesied of it...”

about it for that reason. Tertullian advocated that the Christ obviously had come because belief in his name had spread throughout the world without limit (7.2b - 8.1a).

The first topic of 7.1 (about the predictions of time) was taken up in 8.1b in terms of three things: the time when the Christ would be born, would suffer, and when Jerusalem would fall:

*Itaque requirenda tempora praedicta et futurae nativitatis Christi et passionis eius et exterminii civitatis Hierusalem, id est vastationis eius.*¹⁰⁷

This was then dealt with in 8.9-10, with regard to the time of the birth of Christ, and 8.15-16, with regard to the time of the passion of Christ and the fall of Jerusalem. The prophecy of Daniel 9:21-27 was presented as the basis of those predictions (8.3-8).

Interestingly, having introduced the first of the four topics of the second question of the *confirmatio* in 8.1b about the prophecies of the time of the Christ, in 8.2 Tertullian restated his outline for the *confirmatio*, the original outline being in 7.1. It does seem a little sloppy that there is so much editorial comment and outlining before the real proof gets under way. This mention is not quite the same as the first, for now, instead of four topics, there are only three:

*Venturi itaque Christi ducis sunt tempora requirenda, quae investigabimus in Danielo; quibus computatis probabimus venisse eum iam et ex temporibus praescriptis et ex signis competentibus et ex operationibus eius, quae probabimus et ex consequentibus, quae post adventum eius futura adnuntiabantur, uti iam adimpleta omnia praecepta credamus.*¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 8.1: "Accordingly the times must be inquired into of the predicted and future nativity of the Christ, and of His passion, and of the extermination of the city of Jerusalem, that is, its devastation."

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 8.2: "And so the times of the coming Christ, the Leader, must be inquired into, which we shall trace in Daniel; and, after computing them, shall prove Him to be come, even on the ground of the times prescribed, and of competent signs and operations of His. Which matters we prove, again, on the ground of the consequences which were ever announced as to follow His advent; in order that we may believe all to have been as well fulfilled as
(continued...)"

The first new topic includes the first two topics of 7.1. The second topic, about other matters, particularly those of action (signs and operations), is equivalent to the third general topic of 7.1. The last topic is no longer the connection between the coming of the Christ and the giving of the new law, but the events which unfolded as a consequence of his coming. They seem also to be expressed in terms more familiar to orators and rhetoricians.

The second topic of 7.1 (about the fulfilment of the prophecies of time) is dealt with in 8.11-14 in terms of the time of the birth of the Christ and 8.17-18 in terms of the time of the passion of Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem.

Thus, in chapter 8, Tertullian dealt with the first two topics of 7.1 (or the first topic of 8.2), about the question of time, in an interweaving pattern: prophecy about the time of the birth of the Christ (8.9-10) and the fulfilment of that prophecy (8.11-14), and then prophecy about the time of the suffering of the Christ and destruction of Jerusalem (8.15-16) and the fulfilment of those prophecies (8.17-18).

The third topic of 7.1, all the other matters prophesied about the coming of the Christ beside that of time, begins in detail at 9.1. As the first two topics had been discussed in relation to three issues—the birth of the Christ, the suffering of the Christ, and the destruction of Jerusalem—so too would the third topic be related to those same three issues: general prophecies about the birth of the Christ (9.1-31), general prophecies about the suffering of the Christ (10.1-19), and general prophecies about the destruction of Jerusalem (11.1-9; 13.3-29).

¹⁰⁸ (...continued)
foreseen.”

There are some problems with such a structure though. The relation between the third topic of 7.1 and what unfolds from chapter 9 onwards would have been clearer if Tertullian had indicated at the beginning of chapter 9 that he was intending to examine all the other matters about the prophecies of the coming of the Christ with the exception of time (with which he had dealt already) and if he had made a more inclusive statement that mentioned not only the birth of the Christ but his passion and the destruction of Jerusalem as well. That he wrote only, “*Incipiamus igitur probare nativitatem Christi a prophetis esse nuntiatam*” seems to contradict his statement in 7.2, that establishing that there were prophecies about the coming of the Christ would not be necessary, unless one understands him to mean in 9.1 not that he intended now to prove that there were such prophecies but that now he intended to examine the content of those prophecies, which is what he went on to do. The use of “*incipiamus igitur*” would give some credence to a belief that there was something of a beginning to a new topic at this point.

Further, as has been noted, 7.1 is not unambiguously explicit that the *confirmatio* would be divided into prophecies about the timing of the Christ and prophecies about other characteristics or qualities of the Christ, which is the way the text now divides, although such an intended structure may be discerned at least in some implicit manner from 7.1.

One could suggest that 10.1 reads as though it ought belong to the *refutatio* (“*De exitu plane passionis eius ambigitis, negantes passionem crucis in Christum praedicatam...*”). However, there is a difference between the arguments in the *refutatio* and the one here. In the *refutatio* Tertullian sought to counter Jewish arguments. Here Tertullian was responding to a Jewish *refutatio* of a Christian argument (that argument being that the Son of God died upon a cross). It belongs to the *confirmatio* because Tertullian had, on the whole, excluded arguments

about the Christ from the *refutatio* (there are the briefest of references to the Christ at 3.8; 4.4 and, although the *refutatio* contains general statements about prophecies that undermined the Jewish position, it was only in the *confirmatio* that prophecies were linked with Jesus as the Christ who was to come).

Another problem of even more concern is the seeming omission of any dealing with the fourth point of 7.1 about the connection between the coming of the Christ and the giving of the new law. One could suggest that the use of “*indubitate*” at 7.1 made the second follow the first as a logical necessity and that Tertullian did not have to concern himself with it any further. Given how much he had written about the old law in the *refutatio* and the mention of the new law at 6.2a, 2b, and 3, one would have expected at least some further reference to this point or some acknowledgement that the circle had been closed. Can 9.18 be such a reference? Here Tertullian argued that the only sword with which Jesus was armed was the sword of the Word of God, a sword with two edges: one the old law and the other the new. A little later Tertullian identified Jesus with Joshua linguistically (9.21) and contrasted Moses, the figure of the old law, with Joshua, the figure of the new law of grace (9.22 - “*idque non per Moysen, id est legis disciplinam, sed per Iesum, id est per novae legis gratiam*”). However, if this be the case, its location, in the middle of the general prophecies about the birth of Christ (the first part of the third point), seems rather strange, hardly the culminating point of the whole treatise. Given that in the reconstituted outline of the *confirmatio* in 8.2 there is no real mention of this fourth *topos*, its non-appearance in the treatise need not raise concern after all.

The major structural problems occur in the last few chapters. The discussion on the general prophecies about the destruction of Jerusalem (11.1-9; 13.3-29) is split and for no

immediately apparent reason. The material in the first half of chapter 11 is largely an extract from Ezekiel and the section is concerned exclusively with prophecies about the destruction. The argument in chapter 13 concerns how, given that Jerusalem had been sacked and the people removed from Judaea, the prophecies about the coming of the Christ could be fulfilled by no one else in the future. Why the material from 11.10 to 12.2 is between these two segments is not clear immediately.

11.10 - 12.2, on first reading, disrupts the structure of the work as outlined thus far. It has to be conceded that even though a suggestion can be made that would incorporate this section into the overall pattern of the *confirmatio*, the disjointed nature of the last chapters remains.

The beginning of this section gives the impression that Tertullian was coming to the end by summarising the argument. This sense of conclusion is provided by the use of “*itaque*” at 11.10 and 11.11, by the use of the perfect tense, and by reference back to earlier parts of the treatise (11.10 - “*quam supra memoravimus... quam evidentem ediximus*”; 11.11 - “*probavimus... ostendimus*”) to where it had been shown that prophecy will be no more because, in his coming and suffering, the Christ has fulfilled all prophecy, and that the old law came to an end because the Christ came within the specified time (the first two topics of the *confirmatio* as described in 7.1). The third topic of 7.1 (the second of 8.2), about the general prophecies or signs and operations of the Christ, does not seem to be mentioned in this summary passage.

At the end of 11.11 Tertullian seems to have begun to develop a new train of thought—to show that what was prophesied to occur after the Christ had come about indeed (“*quae post Christum futura praecanebantur... ut adimpleta cognoscantur*”). In a sense, Tertullian had done

some of this already at 8.16-17 by showing that the destruction of Jerusalem, which ended any possibility of the old covenant continuing, fitted into the time-frame of seventy hebdomads. At that point his interest was in demonstrating only that everything in Daniel's prophecy was reconcilable with his chronology. However, we have seen already in 8.2, in the redraft of the scheme for the *confirmatio*, that the third topic of 7.1 has become one about the events that were to be consequent to the appearance of the Christ. This gave Tertullian scope to develop a wider argument. Further, the general prophecy taken from Ezekiel about the destruction of Jerusalem (11.1-9) was there because it followed the pattern of general prophecies (9.1- 11.9) (the third topic of 7.1) established already in the pattern of the particular prophecies of time (8.1-18) (the first two topics of 7.1): the birth of the Christ, the passion of the Christ, and the destruction of Jerusalem.

Just as in the first two topics of 7.1, where Tertullian investigated the coming of the Christ, his passion, and the destruction of Jerusalem in terms of the time-related prophecies about those events and then the fulfilment of those prophecies, in the third topic Tertullian did not limit himself to the general prophecies but also considered their fulfilment. Thus, while considering the general prophecies about the coming of the Christ (9.1-31), he dealt with the fulfilment of those prophecies (e.g., 9.3 - Jesus as Immanuel; 9.8 - the virgin birth; 9.10 - the visit of the Magi fulfilling the prophecy about the spoils of Damascus). Tertullian did not attempt to prove that these events had occurred; he presumed that they had and then sought to link them to the general prophecies. This is a further suggestion that the intended readers were principally Christians, for they would not need to be convinced that these events had happened as Jewish readers would. While considering the general prophecies about the death of the Christ (10.1-19), he dealt with the fulfilment of those prophecies (e.g., 10.4 - Jesus dying unjustly and on behalf of others; 10.6 -

Jesus dying at the hands of his brethren; 10.11 - Jesus dying on a tree). It would be natural to expect the general prophecies about the destruction of Jerusalem to be handled in a similar manner. This is what is found. 11.1-9 contains the prophecy and 13.1-29 contains the fulfilment of that prophecy.

So why is the summary of 11.10-12 and the material about the calling of the Gentiles in chapter 12, between these two? Here one could argue for the involvement of someone other than Tertullian, for there appears no good reason for this arrangement. Would it be out of the question, though, to suggest a simple oversight on Tertullian's part? Perhaps he had begun to summarise before he had completed his section on the destruction of Jerusalem. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, realising his omission, he ceased summarising and resumed his argument about not only the fulfilment of the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem but other events that took place after the death of the Christ as well.

Therefore, it would seem that at 11.11b, Tertullian, who was beginning to draw together a summary of conclusions, interrupted himself with a new train of thought. The destruction of Jerusalem (11.11 - "*et civitatem exterminatam et sacrificium et unctionem exinde cessare*") reminded him of other events that took place in the years following Jesus' death and resurrection. If Tertullian could demonstrate that those things predicted to occur in the time following the Christ had indeed occurred, it would be further proof that the Christ must have come (11.12). There is a sense that Tertullian had already been doing this but that the explicit understanding of what he was actually doing only struck him when he was halfway through doing it. Even though he had begun to wind things up, this insight gave him a new lease of life. Not only did he go on to reconsider the fact of the desolation of Judaea, particularly Bethlehem (13.2-5a), the end of the

possibility of anointing a new leader (13.5b-7), the destruction of Jerusalem (13.9-10) (all of which for him proved that the Christ had to have come already), and the second coming of the Christ (14.1-10), but also the fact that the fulfilment of prophecies about the Gentiles coming to God had occurred meant that the Christ must have come (12.1-2).

At first glance, the section 13.11-29 does not seem to be connected with the material about the events that had taken place after the coming of the Christ. 13.11-22 seems to be a revisiting of the prophecies about the death of the Christ, particularly the symbolism of the cross, that had been presented already in chapter 10. However, Tertullian only mentioned the cross again in order to demonstrate that, following the death of the Christ, God's original people would desert while the Christians would be the new temples of God's Spirit (13.15). The focus this time is supposedly on what followed his death not the death itself, although this is not clear always. From 13.24 Tertullian drew together the point he was making about the events that had taken place after the coming of the Christ. The Jews were to suffer:

*... recognoscant [the Jews] iam deinde exitum suum, quem post adventum Christi relatari praedicabantur ob impietatem, qua eum et despexerunt et interfecerunt, cuius neque nativitatem neque passionem agnoverunt.*¹⁰⁹

while the Gentiles would inherit redemption:

*... ex quo gentes nos, dilucidatae pectora per Christi veritatem, proiecimus idola, vident Iudaei et quod sequitur expunctum.*¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 13.24: "... let the Jews recognise their own fate, - a fate which they were constantly foretold as destined to incur after the advent of the Christ, on account of the impiety with which they despised and slew Him."

¹¹⁰ Ibid.: "... ever since we Gentiles, with our breast doubly enlightened through Christ's truth, cast forth (let the Jews see it) our idols, - what follows has likewise been fulfilled."

There is, however, a more telling problem with the structure of the last few chapters. 11.11b - 12.1 is repeated almost verbatim in 14.11-12a. It would appear that one of these two sections is an interpolation. There are arguments in favour of each section being the interpolation. As has been noted above, 11.10 - 12.2 interrupts the flow of Tertullian's presentation about the general prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem (11.1-9) and the fulfilment of those prophecies (13.1-29). As will be noted below, 14.11-14 lacks a number of the characteristics of a *peroratio*. Neither passage appears to be entirely convincing in its present location.

I am more inclined to regard 14.11-12a as the interpolation. There are several reasons why I would retain 11.11b - 12.1 despite the difficulties it presents. First, even if one removed 11.11b - 12.1 because it was the interpolation, this would leave 11.10-11a in its present location, still as an interruption between 11.1-9 and 13.1-29. One would have to regard 11.10-11a as part of the 11.11b - 12.1 interpolation (or as another interpolation) in order to remove the interruption, even though 11.10-11a is not paralleled in chapter 14. Second, the argument from 12.1 - 14.10 seems to follow 11.11b-12 quite naturally. Tertullian's statement:

*... quae post Christum futura praecanebantur, quae scripta proferimus, ut ex hoc quoque paria iam in scripturis divinis negari non possint, ut adimpleta cognoscantur.*¹¹¹

seems to be an introduction to what follows in the next few chapters—proof that the events predicted after the Christ have indeed come to pass, hence proving that the Christ had been. Indeed, the coming of the Gentiles to faith seems quite appropriate as one of the consequences of the coming of the Christ, a structural theme announced in 8.2.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 11.11b: "... that the fact also that things which were foretold as destined to happen *after* Christ are being recognised as fulfilled may make it impossible for them to deny (these writings) to be on a par with divine Scriptures."

Leaving the material of chapters 11, 12 and 13 as it seems to provide the most coherent structure, even though 11.10-11a in particular is a clear interruption to the unfolding sequence, and 12.1-2 breaks what would otherwise have been a continuous passage from 11.1-10 and 13.1-29. If one accepts the present structure, then my earlier suggestion that the confusing sequence is best explained by an oversight by Tertullian (who began his *peroratio* before he had really completed his presentation on the destruction of Jerusalem and who, when he realised this, returned not only to complete his argument about the destruction of Jerusalem but other events which had occurred after the death of the Christ as well) appears reasonable, even though highly speculative.

In chapter 14 Tertullian presented arguments about the prophecies of the glorification and second coming of the Christ (14.1 - “*Duos dicimus Christi habitus a prophetis demonstratos, totidem adventus eius praenotatos*”). This is almost the first time a second coming had been mentioned in the treatise. Every other reference to *adventus* prior to this chapter had been in the singular, referring to the first coming of the Christ and without any hint of a second (7.2; 6.3; 8.2,10,12,13 [twice],14,15; 11.10 [thrice]; 13.9,15,24,26). In 13.8, though, we find the brief statement “*et in caelis iam receptum et inde venturum secundum praedicationes prophetarum.*” Even though Tertullian had not alluded previously that he would take up this theme in the *confirmatio*, this was not inconsistent with Quintilian’s advice to surprise an audience occasionally. It fits into a chronological order—birth, passion, destruction of Jerusalem, second coming—and, to that extent, the section from 14.1-10 seems to belong comfortably to the *confirmatio*.

This indeed makes some sense of these chapters even though it does leave the impression that they missed out on editorial revision. Structural consistency or perfection is probably the aim of all essay writers yet those who write and read such pieces are aware that this is not always achieved. The fact that an essay displays a muddled structure cannot, in every instance, be taken as proof that there are interpolations by others; it could simply be that, in the activity of writing, an author has been distracted by an idea which has occurred unexpectedly and that the writing has been affected by this tangential development.

Peroratio

1. Rhetorical Theory

Ad Herennium stated that the *conclusio* consisted of three parts: a summary (*enumeratio*), amplification (*amplificatio*) and emotional appeal for pity (*commiseratio*).¹¹² Cicero named the three parts as *enumeratio*, a rousing of indignation (*indignatio*), and a rousing of sympathy or pity (*conquestio*).¹¹³ Later, he would name only two divisions: *amplificatio* and *enumeratio*.¹¹⁴ Quintilian had a simple division of the *peroratio*: it may deal with the facts of a case or some emotional aspect of a case.¹¹⁵

In terms of *enumeratio*, these major rhetorical treatises all advised the orator to avoid giving the impression that the whole speech had been too carefully constructed according to some

¹¹² *Rhet. Her.* 2.30.47.

¹¹³ *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.52.98.

¹¹⁴ *Cic. Part. Or.* 15.52.

¹¹⁵ *Quint. Inst.* 6.1.1.

predetermined plan, to avoid boring the audience by a mere dry repetition, to try and impress the audience by skill and wit, and to be brief. This could be achieved in a variety of ways: by comparing one's own argument with one's opponent's argument in order to demonstrate how the latter had been refuted, by speaking as oneself or as some imagined character, by wondering what could be said against one's refutation, by drawing on one's opponent's own arguments and pointing out what they were attempting to do or to avoid, or by challenging one's opponent to deal with neglected points.¹¹⁶

Amplificatio or *indignatio* was the rousing of anger or hostility of the audience against the opponent using a technique that could be used on all the topics of a speech but which was appropriate particularly in the *peroratio*. This technique involved the use of some of the *loci communes*: noting the attitude of authority figures to these types of cases, noting those affected by the crime, raising the question of why this culprit should receive any different consideration than others, noting that going easy on one criminal only encourages others, suggesting to the jury that they are the final opportunity to have justice done, establishing that the crime was premeditated, that it is a most serious crime, that it is a unique or unusual crime, that it is worse because of a comparison of personal circumstances, recreating the crime in the mind of the audience, establishing that the person accused of the crime should have been the least likely to have committed it, that no one has ever suffered this type of offence before, that the crime adds insult to injury, inviting the jury to imagine themselves as the victims, and suggesting that one would not treat enemies the way the victim has been.¹¹⁷ All of these would, of course, be most helpful to a prosecutor seeking to establish guilt because these *loci* were intended to arouse the

¹¹⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 2.30.47; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.52.98-100; *Quint. Inst.* 6.1.1-7.

¹¹⁷ *Rhet. Her.* 2.30.48-49; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.53.100 - 1.54.105; *Quint. Inst.* 6.1.12-20.

jury's disdain for the accused. In his later oratorical work, Cicero commented that emotions could be aroused through either the facts of a case or through the words used to describe the facts.¹¹⁸

Quintilian observed that even though the accuser would naturally try to rouse indignation and the defender naturally try to rouse pity, the accuser could also seek pity for the victim and the defender seek indignation for being wrongly accused.¹¹⁹

Rousing the pity of the audience for oneself or one's client could be attempted through such *loci* as comparing past prosperity with present misfortune, suggesting what the consequences of losing the suit would be, entreating the audience for pity or even mercy, highlighting past good deeds or bravery, contrasting expectations with results, commenting on the effects this was having on others, and impersonation.¹²⁰ All three Roman rhetoricians stressed that such appeals ought to be brief and Quintilian noted that actions were as useful as words in moving a jury.¹²¹

While the emotional aspect of the *peroratio* was important, a good orator would be aware that emotional appeal could be used discreetly and appropriately throughout a speech. Even though these points about the *peroratio* were for judicial oratory, with adaptations they could be applied to other types of speech as well.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Cic. *Part. Or.* 15.53.

¹¹⁹ Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.9.

¹²⁰ *Rhet. Her.* 2.31.50; Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.55.106 - 1.56.109; Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.21-29.

¹²¹ Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.30-35.

¹²² Cic. *Part. Or.* 17.59 considered *enumeratio* particularly suited to forensic speeches of the prosecution. Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.51-55.

2. Peroratio in Tertullian

Sider suggested that Tertullian's proof, the main body of a treatise, was often framed by two smaller sections: the *praemunitio*, in which minor issues could be addressed or fundamental objections removed, and the *amplificatio*, which extended the proof by considering remaining objections.¹²³ In some works, like *Apologeticum*, *de Monogamia*, *de Resurrectione Mortuorum* and *adversus Praxean*, Sider contended that a balance and symmetry was achieved through the same or similar themes being explored in both sections.¹²⁴

Reservations have already been expressed about seeing the *praemunitio* as being an identifiable part of *dispositio* in any of the rhetorical text books. As with *amplificatio*, it was not so much a part of the structure of a speech for Roman rhetoricians as it was a quality to be achieved throughout the speech, most often at the end but also wherever it was most appropriate.

With regard to the *conclusio* in particular, Sider noted that Tertullian was more often engaged in emotional climax than summary of argument.¹²⁵ He mentioned *de Resurrectione Mortuorum* and *de Carne Christi* as contrasting examples. Barnes has suggested that in *Scorpiace*, Tertullian presented a *peroratio* that served not only to draw the treatise to a conclusion but to continue the arguments found in earlier chapters.¹²⁶

3. Peroratio in adversus Iudaeos

¹²³ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.34-38.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.37-38.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.38.

¹²⁶ Timothy D. Barnes, "Tertullian's *Scorpiace*," *JTS* n.s. 20 (1969), p.110.

We have already noted how 11.10-11 appears to be a summary of the arguments of the *confirmatio* until Tertullian began to develop a new train of thought about the events that took place (or were to take place) after the coming of the Christ: the conversion of Gentiles, the destruction of Jerusalem, and the second coming of the Christ.

That train of thought comes to an end at 14.11, “*Sufficit hucusque de his interim ordinem Christi decucurrisse...*” There is not so much a summary of the *confirmatio* as a reminder of the topics covered: that Jesus was the one who was announced to come and that the events which were to occur after his coming had occurred. The one argument that received some attention, through being repeated, was the one about Gentiles throughout the world being converted (14.12-14). Although there is a concentration here of second person references and a challenge to the opponents either to deny that the calling of the Gentiles had been foretold or to admit that it had been fulfilled, it would be too much to argue that Tertullian reached any real emotional climax.

As a *peroratio* the section 14.11-14 seems rather disappointing. In terms of summary, only one argument is really mentioned from the *confirmatio*, nothing is said about the *refutatio*, and there is no sense of emotional appeal to the reader. Although the treatise ends focused on the fact that Gentiles were converting to God, there was no reference back to the *partitio* of 1.8 that the lesser people, the Gentiles, had overcome the greater people, the Jews. Where the treatise ends seems rather abrupt and incomplete.

Much of the material of the *confirmatio* also occurs in the third book *adversus Marcionem*. There (*adv. Marc.* 3.20.1-10) this section 14.11-14 occurs in between the section on the birth and death of Jesus (*adv. Marc.* 3.2.1 - 3.19.9) and the section on the events after the

Christ (*adv. Marc.* 3.21.1 - 3.24.13). That a section in *adversus Iudaeos* which stood where the *peroratio* ought to have been, could be used with only minor modifications (*adv. Marc.* 3.20.1-10 being longer than *adv. Iud.* 14.11-14) as a transitional link between two other sections in *adversus Marcionem*, shows how unlike a characteristic *peroratio* the section in *adversus Iudaeos* really is.

In fact, 13.24-29 would work much better as the treatise's *enumeratio*. Reference is made back to the work's *partitio*—the main point about which Tertullian wished to persuade his readers—that God's grace had been transferred from the Jews to the Gentiles.

*Haec igitur cum pati praedicarentur Iudaei propter Christum et passos eos inveniamus et in dispersionem demorari cernamus, manifestum est propter Christum Iudaeis ista accidisse, conspirante sensu scripturarum cum exitu rerum et ordine temporum.*¹²⁷

My suggestion is that 14.11-12a is definitely an interpolation of Tertullian's material by someone else and that 14.12b-14 is probably part of that interpolation as well. 11.10-11a was probably the beginning of Tertullian's *peroratio*, a conclusion he abandoned to include more material. Rather like a long-winded speaker who promises several times to come to an end but never quite does, Tertullian seems to be drawing to another conclusion at 13.28 only to continue with his material about the second coming (14.1-10). A final conclusion, if such a phrase may be employed, was never provided.

Summary of Rhetorical Structure

¹²⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 13.28: "Since, therefore, the Jews were predicted as destined to suffer these calamities *on Christ's account*, and we find that they *have* suffered them, and see them sent into dispersion and abiding in it, manifest it is that it is on Christ's account that these things *have* befallen the Jews, the sense of the Scriptures harmonizing with the issue of events and of the order of the times."

Most of *adversus Iudaeos* can be found to adhere to the general tenets of classical rhetorical theory. The following chart illustrates the structure of the treatise.

<i>Exordium</i>	1.1-3a
<i>Narratio</i>	1.3b-7
<i>Partitio</i>	1.8 - 2.1a
<i>Refutatio</i>	2.1b - 6.1
- law	2.1b-10
- circumcision	2.11 - 3.6
- (promise of new law and new circumcision)	3.7-13
- Sabbath	4.1-11
- sacrifices	5.1-7
- conclusion	6.1
<i>Confirmatio</i>	6.2 - 14.10
- introduction (the 2 questions and the 4 <i>topoi</i> of the 2nd question)	6.2 - 7.1
- 1st question	7.2
- digression	7.3 - 8.1a
- 2nd question	8.1b - 14.10
1st & 2nd <i>topoi</i> of 7.1 announced	8.1b
- (restatement of <i>partitio</i> as 3 <i>topoi</i>)	8.2
* 1st <i>topos</i> of 7.1 - predictions about time (1st <i>topos</i> of 8.2)	
- prophecy in Daniel 9	8.3-6
- comments on time-frame	8.7-8
- coming of the Christ	8.9-10

- passion of the Christ/destruction of Jerusalem	8.15-16
* 2nd <i>topos</i> of 7.1 - fulfilment of predictions about time	
- coming of the Christ	8.11-14
- passion of the Christ/destruction of Jerusalem	8.17-18
* 3rd <i>topos</i> of 7.1- general prophecies (2nd <i>topos</i> of 8.2)	9.1 - 11.9
- coming of the Christ	9.1-31
- <i>topos</i> of name	9.1b-6, 20b-25
- signs associated with prophecy of name	9.7-20a
- <i>topos</i> of family	9.26-27
- <i>topos</i> of character/nature	9.28
- <i>topos</i> of occupation	9.29-31
- passion of the Christ	10.1-19
- death by crucifixion	10.6-14a
- other aspects of his death	10.14b-19
* 3rd <i>topos</i> of 8.2 (subsequent events)	
- destruction of Jerusalem (prophecies)	11.1-9
Beginning of <i>Peroratio</i>	11.10-11a
resumption of 3rd <i>topos</i> of 8.2	11.11b-12
- inclusion of the Gentiles	12.1-2
- destruction of Jerusalem (fulfilment)	13.1-29
- second coming of the Christ	14.1-10
Interpolated <i>Peroratio</i>	14.11-14

Comparison with Other Structural Arrangements of *adversus Iudaeos*

Kroymann's conclusions about the integrity of this work have been reported already. While not interested in determining an overall structure for *adversus Iudaeos*, he did provide further comment about the work's integrity in his notes in the 1954 *CCSL* edition. These comments have a bearing on what structure he would have believed might be found within the treatise. On the whole, he thought chapters 9 to 14 to be a later addition to Tertullian's incomplete or mutilated treatise by someone who had access to material by Tertullian and who composed the second half rather ineptly from that.¹²⁸ Kroymann suggested that 11.10 - 12.2 belong more appropriately straight after 8.18 because it seemed to be an interpolation in its present location.¹²⁹ He also noted that the same material is repeated in two places (11.11b - 12.2 and 14.11-12), as well as in *adversus Marcionem*.¹³⁰ On the basis of "*sicuti iam praelocuti sumus*" in 14.12, Kroymann believed *adversus Marcionem* to be the earlier material from which 14.11-14 was drawn, even though not by Tertullian himself.¹³¹ Of the repetitions in *adversus Iudaeos*, that in chapter 11 is briefer than chapter 14.¹³² The one in chapter 14 seemed to Kroymann to be an even worse imitation of the material in *adversus Marcionem* because of a number of inaccuracies,

¹²⁸ *CCSL*, vol.2, p.1364: "*Ego operi imperfecto vel casu quodam mutilato hanc appendicem affixisse nescio quem putaverim ex relictis aliquot auctoris plagulis errabundas quasdam continentibus epilogi huius libri particulas singulatim et discretim ab auctore conceptas, ut quibus postmodum plenam ac ordinatam demonstrationem superstrueret. Cui negotio prorsus imparem fuisse eum, qui in provinciam auctoris successit, vel inde apparet, quod singulas disputationis partes apta ac dilucida rerum tractatarum ordinatione coniungere supersedet eademque fere utique transgressionis formula usus quasi cohaereant vanam praefert speciem.*"

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.1382-1383: "*Quae abhinc leguntur usque in finem capitis duodecimi et interpolationibus et verborum iactura misere depravata non suo loco in codicibus nostris exhiberi in aperto mihi esse videtur. Artissime enim et aptissime se applicant ad capitis octavi finem, cui si asserveris habebis idoneam partis prioris huius altercationis clausulam...*"

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.1395: "... *eadem eisdemque fere verbis expressa iam supra occurrebant in huius libri capite undecimo exeunte; quae hic accedunt (inde a l.100 [14.13] usque in finem) desumpta scias ex libro tertio Adv. Marcionem...*"

¹³¹ *Ibid.*: "*Utra utris prius scripta sint, satis docent quae hic legis l.92: sicuti iam praelocuti sumus. Neque tamen a Tertulliano ipso huius loci verba composita esse...*"

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.1383: "... *animadvertendum est hunc locum (inde a verbo sufficit usque in huius capitis exitum) redire in fine libelli... eisdem fere verbis compositum, sed hic illic, praecipue sub finem lemmatis, auctum aliquot sententiis. Meo quidem iudicio suo loco hic exstant haec verba.*"

about which he said little.¹³³ His conclusion, though, is clear: these two interpolations were not by Tertullian.¹³⁴

A comparison between the three passages (*adv. Iud.* 11.11 - 12.2; 14.11-12; *adv. Marc.* 3.20.1-4) does reveal a number of mistakes or inaccuracies, particularly in *adv. Iud.* 14. While all three refer to “*quae post Christum futura...*”¹³⁵ *adversus Marcionem* continues:

*Nec <haec> enim dispositio expuncta inveniretur, si non ille venisset, post quem habebat evenire.*¹³⁶

which is similar to *adv. Iud.* 11.12:

*Ne<c haec enim expuncta invenirentur>, nisi ille venisset, post quem habebant expungi quae nuntiabantur.*¹³⁷

In contrast, in chapter 14 of the latter is found:

*... ex dispositione divina credantur expuncta. Nisi enim ille venisset, post quem habebant expungi, nullo modo evenissent quae in adventu eius futura praedicabantur.*¹³⁸

¹³³ Ibid., p.1395: “... *quod qui haec novare ausus est ea quae imitatur verba—multis sane mendis depravata—plus uno loco male intellexit. Cui rei documento est, ut alia taceam (cf. l.86 expuncta reddantur et 87 in adventu), quod verba exemplaris sui, quae leguntur in capite undecimo, perperam de Salomone rege dicta esse arbitratus est.*”

¹³⁴ Ibid.: “*Quae cum ita sint, meo iure haec omnia ut spuria seclusisse me putaverim.*”

¹³⁵ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 11.11 completed the clause with “*praecanebantur*”; 14.11 with “*praedicabantur*”; and Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.20.1 with “*praecinebantur.*”

¹³⁶ Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.20.2: “For the dispensation would not be found complete, if He had not come after whom it had to run on its course.”

¹³⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 11.12: “Else, unless He were come *after* whom the things which were wont to be announced had to be accomplished...”

¹³⁸ Ibid., 14.11: “... may be believed to have been accomplished as the result of a divine arrangement. For unless He come *after* whom they had to be accomplished, by no means would the events the future occurrence whereof was
(continued...)”

Kroymann was correct in his suggestion that Tertullian himself would be most unlikely to have written “*in adventu*” when the whole focus of the passage was *post adventum*.

One of the reasons why Kroymann rejected the authenticity of the two passages from *adversus Iudaeos*, although it really remains in the background, was because of the way the interpolator has misunderstood (this is Kroymann’s argument) the way Tertullian in *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3 had interpreted Ps. 2:7. It would seem in that latter passage that Tertullian offered the would-be interpreter a choice between Jesus and David as the son referred to in the psalm. In *adv. Iud.* 14.12b it is clear that whoever wrote this (according to Kroymann) had a different understanding than Tertullian, for in this passage the choice becomes one between Jesus and Solomon. The issue for us here centres around how *adv. Iud.* 12.2 relates to *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3.

Kroymann’s argument is that an interpolator has misunderstood what is to be found in Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* 3.20.3) and what we have in *adv. Iud.* 12.2 is the result of an inferior effort. This argument only works because of the way in which Kroymann has emended the text at this point. Why Kroymann emended the reading of the codex Trecensis 523 (T) (the most reliable manuscript)—“*Nec poterit alium david filium vindicare quam Christum*”—or the reading found in the codex Scelestadtensis 439 (P), the codex Florentinus Magliabechianus, Conv. soppr. I, VI, 9 (N), the codex Florentinus Magliabechianus, Conv. soppr. I, VI, 10 (F) and the Beati Rhenani editions (R)—“*Nec poteris eum David filium dicere quam Christum*”—in 12.2 to read “*Nec poterit alium deum dei filium vindicare quam Christum*”, is not clear. Certainly, the inclusion of “*deum*” by Kroymann does not seem warranted. Such an emendation suited Kroymann’s

¹³⁸ (...continued)
predictively assigned to His advent, have come to pass.”

purpose: the perfectly clear reference in *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3 (“*Nec poteris magis David filium eius vindicare quam Christum*”), that the son referred to in the psalm must be the Christ rather than David, was obscured by the ineptitude of the anonymous author/editor who turned this, in the later *adversus Iudaeos*, into a clause about no god being son of God other than the Christ. Instead of Kroymann’s emendation, if the reading in T were accepted, what we would notice is substantial agreement between *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3 and *adv. Iud.* 12.2. My conclusion would be that the latter is authentically Tertullian’s and was written first and used later by Tertullian in *adversus Marcionem*. Later again, some unknown person, taking material from *adversus Marcionem*,¹³⁹ has added what amounts to a second interpretation of Ps. 2:7 to *adversus Iudaeos* at 14.12, though this interpretation is clearly different from the other two.

Although I accept Kroymann’s suggestion that the phrase “*sicuti iam praelocuti sumus*” in *adv. Iud.* 14.12 is an indication that this work was dependent on *adversus Marcionem*, it is possible also that the interpolator was attempting to convince readers that he was Tertullian by linking back to the authentic Tertullian of chapter 12, although in such a way as to reveal unintentionally this intended deception. Thus the reference in the last chapter of the treatise need not necessarily be back to a reference in another treatise but to an earlier chapter of the same treatise.

Säflund has noted how 11.11a is an almost verbatim repetition of 8.15. He saw this as a deliberate recapitulation by the author of an earlier point rather than as an interpolation of a repeated section. Thus he disagreed with Åkerman that this was a sign of the second half of the treatise being by another hand.

¹³⁹ I accept Kroymann’s point *supra* (note 128).

Es ist allerdings auffallend, dass ein derart langer Abschnitt in leicht variiertes und in stilistisch entwickelterer Gestalt in so kurzem Abstand wiederholt wird, und es deutet vielleicht darauf hin, dass die zweite Hälfte erst nach einem gewissen Zeitraum nach der ersten Hälfte verfasst worden sein mag: der Verfasser hat dabei ein grösseres Bedürfnis zum Rekapitulieren gehabt als der Leser.¹⁴⁰

He also considered the relationship between 11.11b and chapter 14 (and *adversus Marcionem* 3.20).¹⁴¹ Säflund was prepared to accept that the material in chapter 14 was by Tertullian and that it was a deliberate repetition of the earlier material at the end of chapter 11, just as 11.11a was such a repetition of the material in chapter 8.

Dass die Parallelstelle in Kap. 14 nicht eine interpolierte, mechanische Wiederholung ist, zeigen die Divergenzen im Verhältnis zu Kap. 11: diese Divergenzen sind den Abweichungen völlig analog, welche die Parallelstellen der Kapitel 8 und 11, bzw. die von Adv. Iud. und Adv. Marc. III, aufzeigen.¹⁴²

I do not see a problem with the material in chapter 11 being a repeat of that in chapter 8, particularly if one accepts that 11.10 is the beginning of the *peroratio*. It would be quite natural in one's conclusion to repeat material from earlier in the work. However, I could not accept this section as a deliberate *transitio* inserted to summarise one section of the argument before moving on to the next. Those who may support this idea could suggest that 11.10 onwards is a summary of the first two *topoi* of 8.2 ("*ex temporibus*" and "*ex signis competentibus et ex operationibus*") before the author moved on to the third. Were that the case then 11.10-12 should be located before 11.1 where that third *topos* is commenced. I am yet to be convinced that 11.10-12 is anything but a premature conclusion.

¹⁴⁰ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.191.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp.192-202.

¹⁴² Ibid., p.192.

Säflund suggested something along similar lines, though, in some respects, to what is advanced in this dissertation, viz., that what intervened between chapters 11 and 14 was more information that Tertullian wished to include, which may have escaped him originally when he began to conclude his treatise at the end of chapter 11:

Als Tertullian sich dann veranlasst sah, seine Argumentation durch Anführung und Auslegung neuer Bibelstellen zu ergänzen—d.h. derer, die sich in Kap. 13-14 finden—wiederholte er den ursprünglichen Abschluss mit gewissen Umstilisierungen.¹⁴³

Säflund seems to have suggested that the hasty conclusion in chapter 11 only remains in the treatise today because Tertullian “der endgültigen Abschleifung entbehrt.”¹⁴⁴

Schreckenbergs belief that *adversus Iudaeos* was an early work by Tertullian that never made it past an initial draft and was used as a source for his later *adversus Marcionem* has been mentioned above. In terms of the structure of *adversus Iudaeos* Schreckenberg provides only hints. That the material in *adversus Marcionem* which overlaps with *adversus Iudaeos* is considered to be “klarer und straffer”¹⁴⁵ is a suggestion that the task of discerning a structure in *adversus Iudaeos* would encounter some difficulties because that work has not enjoyed the benefit of revision. He seems to suggest that *adversus Iudaeos* should be replete with all those jumbled, cluttered, half thought-out ideas that leap-frog each other to create that abrupt and disjointed pattern found in the early drafts of most pieces of writing. It seems a reasonable suggestion.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.206.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.207.

¹⁴⁵ H. Schreckenberg, op. cit., p.217.

Part of the evidence for seeing *adversus Iudaeos* as a draft comes from the repetitions in the second half of the work:

... denn Kapitel 13,24 - 14,13 wiederholt beziehungsweise will in besserer Form ersetzen den Abschnitt 10,17 - 12,2. Ähnlich ist die ältere Darstellungsstufe von 13,1-23 durch ausführlichere Darlegungen in Laufe der Kapitel 9-12 ersetzt.¹⁴⁶

Schreckenbergs does not classify any of the material from 13.1 onwards as being an interpolation, merely a repetition or revision in the course of writing. How much of 13.24 - 14.13, though, is a repetition of 10.17 - 12.2 and how much of 13.1-23 is a repetition of chapters 9-12? Certainly, there is no dispute about the fact that 11.11b - 12.2a is repeated almost verbatim in 14.11-12a. One measure of repetition for the remainder is a comparison of the Scriptural arguments Tertullian cited in both sections. In 10.17 - 11.11a he cited Amos 8:9-10 (10.17); Ex. 12:8,11; Num. 9:10 (10.18); Mt. 26:17; Mk. 14:12; Lk. 22:7; Jn. 18:28 (10.18); Ez. 8:12 - 9:6 (11.2-8); and Dt. 28:65-66 (11.9). By comparison, in 13.24 - 14.10, we find Is. 2:20 (13.24); Is. 3:1,3 (13.25); Is. 5:7 (13.25); Mt. 11:13; Lk. 16:16 (13.26); Is. 52:5 (13.26); Is. 1:7,8,4 (13.26); Is. 1:20 (13.27); Ps. 58(59):12 (13.27); Is. 50:11 (13.27); Is. 53:7,2-3 (14.2); Is. 8:14; 28:16 (14.2); Ps. 8:6 (14.2); Ps. 21(22):7 (14.2); Dan. 7:13-14 (14.4); Ps. 44(45):3-4 (14.5); Ps. 8:6 (14.5); Zech. 12:10,12 (14.6); Jer. 17:9 (14.6); Is. 53:8 (14.6); Zech. 3:1-6 (14.7); and Lev. 16:5-29 (14.9). On this basis, it is clear that 13.24 - 14.10 is not a repetition of 10.17 - 11.11a. Could the latter passage be a replacement for the former? 10.17 - 11.11a examines several topics: the suffering of the Christ (10.17-19 - how the death of Jesus fulfilled the prophecy that the sun would grow dark in the middle of the day, a section which fits naturally with the rest of ch.10) and the

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

prophecy from Ezekiel about the destruction of Jerusalem (11.1-10). 13.24 - 14.10 also examines several topics: that those things prophesied to occur after the coming of the Christ had indeed occurred, not only the destruction of Jerusalem but the redemption of the Gentiles as well (13.24-29), and the second coming of the Christ (14.1-10). These are very separate and distinct topics.

The same kind of analysis could be conducted on chapters 9-12 and 13.1-23. Mention has been made above of the fact that 13.11-29 seems simply, at first glance, to be a revisiting of material found in chapter 10. It cannot be denied that there is a certain degree to which this is true, but Tertullian did so in order to reach a different conclusion in each place. It has to be conceded as well that such an extensive revisiting of arguments already mentioned was perhaps a little excessive on Tertullian's part, and does leave the impression that this part of the work was left awaiting revision and re-drafting.

So I agree with Schreckenbergr that the second half of the work seems like a draft, but I do not think that all the evidence to which he makes mention supports that worthwhile conclusion to the same extent that he suggests.

MacLennan provides a very simplistic structure for *adversus Iudaeos*. He accepts Sider's point that classical rhetoric influenced Tertullian's writings and yet does not acknowledge any such influence in his two-part structure for this work. According to MacLennan, the work is to be divided into two: the first eight chapters, attempting to prove that Israel had turned from God, and the last six chapters, attempting to prove that Messianic promises in the Old Testament had been fulfilled in Jesus.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ R. S. MacLennan, op. cit., p.118.

Fredouille, likewise, is not overly interested in the work's structure. He too sees a basic twofold structure, although he, more in keeping with the rhetorical structure described in this dissertation, sees the break occurring between chapters 6 and 7.¹⁴⁸

In contrast, Aziza provides a much more detailed structure for the treatise.¹⁴⁹ At its heart is, he believes, a three-point plan that is derived from a chronological perspective that binds the whole work together: the time before the Christ, of the Christ, and after the Christ.

En fait nous pensons avoir trouvé dans l'*Adversus Iudaeos* trois grands thèmes qui se détachent très nettement (1) le caractère temporaire de la loi, (2) la Christologie, (3) après le Christ. En somme trois parties chronologiquement découpées: avant le Christ, le Christ, après le Christ. La figure centrale reste celle de Jésus qui est effectivement au centre de la querelle. Aussi ne nous étonnerons-nous pas de voir le nombre de chapitres respecter cette importance: 5 pour la première partie (2-6), 4 pour la seconde (7-10), 3 pour la troisième (11-13); restent l'introduction (1) et la conclusion (14).¹⁵⁰

Aziza has not considered the work rhetorically as such. For him, chapter 1 is simply an introduction consisting of several parts: the controversy (1.1-2), the promise of God to Abraham (1.3), Christianity and Judaism (1.4), their relationship (1.5), Jewish idolatry and Christian faithfulness (1.6-7) and the abandonment of Israel (1.8). Merely calling this an introduction does not convey the importance of these opening lines as presenting the central question at issue that we have seen the rhetorical analysis conveys. Further, only the rhetorical approach binds these individual parts of the first chapter together in a coherent and meaningful way.

¹⁴⁸ J.-C. Fredouille, op. cit., p.261, n.116: "La 1^{re} partie de l'*Adversus Iudaeos* (chap. 1-6) est consacrée à l'abrogation de la loi; la 2^e partie (chap. 7-14), à la réalisation des prophéties et à la christologie."

¹⁴⁹ C. Aziza, op. cit., pp.265-271.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.105.

The section of the work here presented as *refutatio* corresponds reasonably closely with Aziza's first main section: "la caractère temporaire de l'ancienne loi" (2-6). Aziza focuses on the Mosaic Law as being the overarching theme of this section, seeing circumcision and the Sabbath as two of the precepts of the law ("les pratiques de la loi") as mentioned in 1.9 and 4.10. Sacrifice was not mentioned at 1.9 as one of the precepts of the law and so its appearance at 5.1 is a little unexpected. Rather than seeing this whole section being about the law in general (chapter 2) and in particular (chapters 3-5), the position argued in this dissertation is that the *refutatio* is made to appear as though dealing with four separate themes. The position is supported by the conclusion at 6.1. Even though circumcision, the Sabbath and sacrifice were parts of the law, by breaking his treatment up as he did, Tertullian was able to give the appearance of it being based not just on a number of different examples but on quite a number of different arguments. Aziza considers all of chapter 6 to be a conclusion to this part rather than, as is advanced here, the introduction to the *confirmatio*.

Aziza entitles chapters 8 to 10 "Christologie." One could not disagree with him that the figure of the Christ is central. However, by describing the second section as "le Christ" and the third as "après le Christ", Aziza ends up with a problem. Throughout the second section Tertullian mentions events that should not have been considered until the third section (8.1, 16-18). Nor does Aziza explain successfully the difference between the two blocks of material about the predictions of the birth of the Christ (8.3-14 and 9.1-31), other than that one centres on prophecies in Daniel and the other on prophecies in Isaiah (in which case 8.15-18 seems to be an unwarranted intrusion). The rhetorical analysis offered above explains and defends the view that these chapters do form a single unit more successfully than does Aziza. Like Aziza, I do not see a break in the continuity of thought between chapters 8 and 9.

There is a rejection by Aziza that there is any ineptitude in chapter 13 because he does not believe that Tertullian went back to discuss the passion in a section on events post-passion.¹⁵¹ The point he makes is that events that were to take place after the death of the Christ were prefigured through the symbolism of the cross:

... après la mort du Christ sur la croix (même procédé que ci-dessus; les deux choses sont liées) annoncée déjà:... et par le symbole du bois de la croix...¹⁵²

This emphasis is accepted in this dissertation as well.

Unlike Aziza, it has been argued here that chapter 14 is not simply a conclusion. 14.1-10, on the second coming of the Christ, makes more sense as another argument in the reconstituted last part of the third topic (subsequent events) rather than as part of a conclusion. It would seem that Aziza regards the whole chapter as a conclusion on the basis of the opening sentence of 14.1. I would see it not as an introduction to the conclusion of the whole work, but as an introduction to the last argument in the last part of the third topic.

Tränkle has noted that abrupt transitions and repetitions make it difficult to determine the structure of this work. Added to that is the fact that the second half appears almost verbatim in the third book of *adversus Marcionem*.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.106: “Mais la pensée, jusqu’alors logique, de l’apologiste ne s’arrête pas là: l’évocation de la crucifixion du Christ déclenche, chez le chrétien, un véritable élan mystique. Les épisodes de la Passion revivent à un rythme accéléré dans deux paragraphes (22 et 23) qu’on comprendrait mal—et qu’on comprend en général mal—à cette place, si justement ils ne correspondaient pas à un mouvement irrationnel de l’écrivain.”

¹⁵² Ibid., p.270.

¹⁵³ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xi.

In considering the structure of the work, Tränkle occasionally pointed out rhetorical features,¹⁵⁴ but did not provide a rhetorical structure for the work or an overall rhetorical interpretation. He recognised that the work has an “eigentliche Streitfrage,” which appears at the beginning of chapter 2, and which is about “die Gültigkeit des jüdischen Gesetzes.”¹⁵⁵ A little later he restated that this was the central idea and stated that it was central to the first half of the work:

Der Gedanke, daß Gott sein Gesetz erweitert, umgestaltet und—so muß er weitergeführt werden—schließlich herrlich zur Vollendung bringt, ist geradezu der Leitgedanke der ersten Hälfte von Iud.¹⁵⁶

I have argued that Tertullian was interested in a broader question than that of the validity of the Jewish law; he was interested in the admission of Gentiles to divine grace or divine law (1.2-3), and admission at the expense of the Jews (1.8). Tränkle believed that the law was the overarching theme and that circumcision, Sabbath and sacrifice are each examples “der einzelnen Gesetzbestimmungen”¹⁵⁷ rather than that Tertullian was treating four themes. Thus Tränkle thought 3.10 was a “plötzliche Zurückwendung” to the theme of the law and finds this “doch verwunderlich.”¹⁵⁸ He saw it only as sudden and surprising, it could be suggested, because he was not reading these chapters as a *refutatio* that find their culmination in 6.1, with the statement that the old law, circumcision, Sabbath and sacrifice were temporary or physical only and that the new would be eternal or spiritual (a clear statement by Tertullian that he wanted his readers to think

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p.xxiii - the suggestion that the setting was a *topos*; the recognition of this work as a *praescriptio*; p.xxiv - that the question at the beginning of chapter 2 was rhetorical.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.xxiv.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.xxvi.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.xxviii.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

that he had considered four themes not just one theme under three headings). Tränkle argued that Tertullian's presentation in these early chapters was so unsystematic and unplanned that the author was creating the structure as he went along, regardless of any inconsistency that may have resulted.¹⁵⁹

I would agree with Tränkle that the end of 3.13 is "etwas planlose Weitergleiten des Gedankengangs"¹⁶⁰ because of the way in which the treatment of law and circumcision had been mingled in 3.7-12. However, it does show that Tertullian regarded law and circumcision as two equal themes and that he kept his *partitio* (showing that the Gentiles had replaced the Jews as recipients of God's favour) very much in mind.

He summed up the structure of the first half, particularly with reference to key summary sentences as follows:

Gliedernde Sätze spielen in der ersten Hälfte von Iud. von Anfang an eine auffallende Rolle. Wir finden sie am Ende des Einleitungskapitels, beim Abschluß der Behandlung von Gottes die Gesetze umgestaltenden Macht 2,9f., auch 3,6f. beim Übergang von der körperlichen Beschneidung des jüdischen Volkes zur geistigen Beschneidung der Christen, vor allem aber an den Übergängen vom 3. zum 4. und vom 4. zum 5. Kapitel, wo jeweils ein Satz den Inhalt des vorausgehenden Abschnitts zusammenfaßt und einer die Gedanken des kommenden ankündigt. Am Anfang des 6. Kapitels werden schließlich in der Weise... noch einmal alle in den vorausgehenden Überlegungen behandelten Gegensatzpaare aufgeführt,—übrigens nicht in der Reihenfolge, in die sie besprochen waren. Damit ist die Behandlung des jüdischen Gesetzes abgeschlossen. Sie hatte darauf gezielt, an einzelnen wichtigen Beispielen seine zeitlich begrenzte Gültigkeit und damit die Notwendigkeit eines neuen Gesetzes zu erweisen.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.xxx: "Die skizzenhafte Unfertigkeit scheint hier fast mit Händen zu greifen und bei näherem Zusehen glaubt man zu erkennen, wie sich die Gedanken des Autors erst allmählich während der Niederschrift formten."

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.xxviii.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pp.xxx-xxxI.

Tränkle noted how 6.2 seemed to announce the rest of the work, but how then the rest of the work did not always match that plan. 7.2 takes up the investigation of a promised new law-giver only in a dismissive way.¹⁶² Chapter 8 begins the proof of the times announced when the Christ would appear, as had been foreshadowed in 7.1, but in such a way as to outline again where the treatise was heading. Tränkle saw the comments of 8.2 determining anew that structure: “*ex temporibus praescriptis, ex signis competentibus, ex operationibus eius,*” and “*ex consequentibus quae post adventum eius futura adnuntiabantur.*” What we have in chapter 8 is only the first part of this fourfold structure. Even though he agreed with Säflund, that what is found in chapter 8 had been announced in chapter 7, Tränkle thought it would be going too far to argue that this proves completely that the work is of a unified design:

Da der Inhalt des 8. Kapitels bereits 7,1 angekündigt ist, sah er darin einen der stärksten Beweise der ungebrochenen Einheit des ganzen Werkes. Indes, diese Behauptung geht viel zu weit; denn die Kapitel IX-XIV bewegen sich zwar auf der Linie der angegebenen Gedanken, decken sich aber, wie ihre genauere Betrachtung zeigen wird, nicht mit der Disposition. So ist sie eher ein Beweis dafür, daß die Schrift, so wie sie uns vorliegt, nicht das Ergebnis eines einheitlichen Entwurfes ist.¹⁶³

Even though the plan may not be unified, this does not mean that the work is not Tertullian’s. *Ad Nationes*, an indisputably authentic work, is one, like *adversus Iudaeos*, that survives in an incomplete form: ideas not integrated, deviations from plan, contradictory arguments, and repetitions. Tränkle suggested that *adversus Iudaeos* be regarded as authentic but incomplete.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Ibid., p.xxxi.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.xxxiii.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p.xxxvi.

It is noted that the theme of the birth of Christ occupies 9.1-27 and that of his life and death 10.1-19, which Tränkle linked back to what was mentioned in chapter 7 and to the theme “*ex signis competentibus et ex operationibus eius*” of 8.2, all of which suggests the authenticity of at least the first part of the second half of the treatise, because chapters 9 and 10 are where they should be. “Dieses Vorgehen ist ganz folgerichtig.”¹⁶⁵

Tränkle noted the way in which 11.11 - 12.2 appeared to be like a summary of chapters 7-10.¹⁶⁶ In this dissertation it has been argued that structurally chapter 12 is not so much a part of that summary as the first part of the section “*ex consequentibus quae post adventum eius futura admuntiabantur*” of 8.2 that dealt with the Gentiles coming to faith, an idea that Tertullian, a little too eagerly, had mentioned already in chapter 7.

Finally, Tränkle was well aware of the correspondence between 11.11 - 12.2 and 14.11-14 and suggested that the latter was designed to replace contradictions found in the ideas Tertullian was putting forward, and that 13.24 - 14.14 was designed to replace 10.17 - 12.2.¹⁶⁷

Thus Tränkle divided *adversus Iudaeos* into two parts, one dealing with the law and the other with the new law-giver.¹⁶⁸ This is roughly similar to my argument about the work being divided rhetorically into a *refutatio* and *confirmatio*. The second part itself consists of two issues according to Tränkle: to show that the Christ had come (which occupied chapters 7 and 8), and to show that the circumstances of his life fulfilled what had been announced by the prophets.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.xliv.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p.li-lij.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p.lii.

Tränkle saw several versions of the treatment of this second issue surviving in *adversus Iudaeos*. For him 13.1-23 was the oldest and most connected with chapter 8. A newer and fuller treatment occurred in chapters 9 to 12, although the intensity of Tertullian's writing declined over these chapters so much that the final part was re-written, which we now have as 13.24 - 14.13.¹⁶⁹ This last section, "eine unfertige Skizze" was not by Tertullian or at least not published with the will and knowledge of Tertullian in his lifetime, Tränkle argued.¹⁷⁰

Conclusion

What has been argued in this chapter is that *adversus Iudaeos* can be analysed structurally from a classical rhetorical perspective. This would suggest, as Sider has done, that Tertullian was quite familiar with, and observant of, the rules of that discipline. This work, according to this investigation, contains the major elements of rhetorical *dispositio*. The structural point of most interest is probably the fact that Tertullian inverted *confirmatio* and *refutatio*.

A rhetorical perspective helps the modern reader appreciate the central purpose of the work, which Tertullian made clear in his *partitio*—that God had replaced the Jews by the Christians as the people of divine favour. A realisation that the work was written by an experienced orator helps one keep in mind that the author was attempting to do what many orators did: speak persuasively and convincingly on an issue. Tertullian was not setting out to present factual information but to win an argument. Facts were useful insofar as they supported the desired position, and facts were presented in such a way as to be at their most convincing, rather

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

than just their most factual. Indeed, as Aristotle had observed long before, facts sometimes were the least convincing thing for certain types of people.¹⁷¹

Discerning a rhetorical structure for the work also helps address the questions of the unity of the work and the related question of the integrity of authorship. On the whole my analysis has established that the work does have an overall unity, at least in general terms. The author provided a number of editorial or summary comments that indicate that he had an overall plan and that he was aware of working within that plan. The second half of the treatise is consistent with the plans announced in the first half. There are places within the treatise where that does not seem to have worked, but these may be explained if we see the author thinking of new matters with which to deal as he wrote and revising or fine-tuning his plan as he composed and then not having gone back and revised his work in the light of those later directions. Only section 14.11-14 really cannot be worked into the rhetorical framework successfully and here we may agree with others who see it as a later addition.

As to the question of authorship, on the basis of the work so far, it has been argued here that, given the work has a structural unity, if we accept that Tertullian composed the first half of *adversus Iudaeos* then there is no reason to reject his hand in the second half. The parallel material in *adversus Marcionem* 3 is accepted without question as being authentically Tertullian's. That it also appears in *adversus Iudaeos* does not mean that it has been copied by someone else. Tränkle's argument that Tertullian used the material in the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* in his later *adversus Marcionem*, after some revision, seems entirely suitable and satisfactory. Having considered *dispositio* it is appropriate now to turn attention to *inventio*. As

¹⁷¹ Arist. *Rh.* 1.1.12 (1355a).

with this chapter, the same questions of unity and authorship may profit from a rhetorical analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR

INVENTIO

Numquam se torsit quomodo diceret, sed quid diceret.

Elder Seneca, *Controversiae*, 7.pr.3.

Sider's Observations

WHEN Sider outlined the theme of his book, he noted, following Quintilian, that there were many variants in the theory of rhetorical methods of argumentation. Despite this, he stated that he would be satisfied with the “conventional patterns which persisted over the centuries.”¹ In considering Tertullian’s method of arguing, Sider focused on Tertullian’s forensic treatises, devoting chapters 4 to 6 to them (while both deliberative and epideictic themes were handled in chapter 7, a brief chapter of only eleven pages), and he divided those treatises into three groups, corresponding to their central issue or *stasis* (the conjectural in chapter 4, the qualitative in chapter 5 and the definitive in chapter 6). At the same time, within those chapters, he examined some of the common *topoi* that could be used in rational argument.

As was proposed in the opening chapter of the dissertation, I intend to be a little more aware of, and attentive to, the variations in the rhetorical theory of *inventio*. While I agree with Sider that the various component parts of *inventio* were more or less shared by the ancient

¹ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.12.

rhetoricians and that what distinguished one theory from another, to a great extent, was the way those parts were put together, I would hold that there is something to be learnt from examining such a construction, rather than just considering each component part in isolation. The order in which rhetoricians used those parts and the relationships they developed to connect those parts may tell us something of the relative merits of the parts of the theory of *inventio*. In other words, a mere presentation of the parts of *inventio* out of the context of how a rhetorician has used those parts in his theory, will tell us less about rhetorical *inventio*.

In reviewing the conjectural method, the way in which an orator offered proof about questions of fact, Sider noted the distinction between inartificial and artificial proofs and how the second could be grouped according to attributes of the person and of the action.² As well, he noted that rhetoricians stressed some particular types of arguments as being of special importance in conjectural matters, viz., “arguments from character, cause and motive, intention or plan, and upon will and ability...”³ Sider claimed further that questions of definition, the second *stasis*, received little attention in rhetorical literature, whereas the third, the qualitative question or issue, was important and was often associated with legal questions like the interpretation of written documents.⁴ When Sider considered the question of definition he associated the formal topics with it.⁵

Before considering how Tertullian handled matters of *inventio* in general terms throughout his writings, I shall review the rhetorical theories of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian in some

² Ibid., p.41.

³ Ibid., p.42.

⁴ Ibid., p.76.

⁵ Ibid., p.101.

detail so as to make explicit my understanding of those theories and to highlight the differences which exist between them.

Rhetorical Theory of *Inventio*

What I would like to do at this stage is to outline each of the major rhetorician's rhetorical theory in order to see the context and the manner in which each has assembled the various component parts of the theory with regard to *inventio*. One thing that may be noted at the outset is that, in a number of rhetorical theories, the material about *inventio* was considered under *dispositio*, such that when one had considered one of the tasks of an orator there was not much left to be said about the other.⁶ In this dissertation an attempt is made to keep the two somewhat separate, to whatever degree that is possible realistically.

Inventio has to do with the discovery of arguments. It has to do with the method employed by orators of gathering and using material from the facts of a case that would have the desired probative and persuasive effect. For an orator, *inventio* was more than merely knowing or finding out the facts; it was the art of turning those facts (and other things besides) into proof.

1. Aristotle

a) Structure

⁶ Wilhelm Wuellner, "Arrangement," in S. E. Porter, *Handbook*, p.67.

Although Aristotle's *Rhetoric* may not have been so influential in Roman oratorical practice,⁷ there is still much in it that is insightful and may be of assistance to the modern reader in appreciating what orators attempted to do when they considered *inventio*.⁸ Providing a schema of Aristotelian rhetoric is not as simple as providing a summary of his treatise, because there seem to be sufficient contradictory statements in the work for commentators to contradict each other about whether the material really is contradictory. There is a dilemma which I think is faced by all who seek to utilise another's works: too general a reading runs the risk of misinterpretation and superficiality, while too detailed a reading runs the risk of sidetracking and cumbersomeness. It is my endeavour to chart an Aristotelian mean between these two extremes by providing a thorough enough presentation of what Aristotle and others wrote, noting some of the difficulties and variations in interpretation along the way, although not attempting to resolve them all.

The contradictions in Aristotle's rhetorical theory come to the fore when one considers the structural unity of his written exposition. This is so particularly when scholars consider the relationship between the first and second chapters of book 1. Kennedy provides a brief statement about the resultant problem in understanding Aristotle faced by many commentators: there seems to be inconsistency between the opening chapters and the rest of the work and inconsistency in the use of some key terms.⁹ In response, some scholars have accepted the inconsistencies and attempted to explain them (Kennedy believes the work was written at different times and only

⁷ M. L. Clarke, *op. cit.*, p.5.

⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 5.1.1: "... *quidem illa partitio ab Aristotele tradita consensum fere omnium meruit...*"

⁹ George A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.55. The words of Jakob Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989), p.9, are no less daunting: "Unfortunately, a consensus is lacking about almost all other points worth mentioning, for the many difficulties presented by it, including inconsistencies real and apparent, have given rise to fundamentally different approaches."

revised partially, and that different parts were written for different audiences),¹⁰ while others have not accepted the inconsistencies.

The question of hermeneutics arises, for each response says as much about the scholar who makes it as it does about Aristotle. Gabin notes that modern commentators are as rhetorical as Aristotle, who was himself an interpreter of what he saw and read.¹¹ To argue that Aristotle's work on rhetoric is unified or not, to argue that there are inconsistencies in it or not, is itself a piece of rhetoric—one seeks for reasons that will persuade the reader to accept as valid one's insights about its cohesiveness and reject the contrary insight of others.

How does *inventio* fit into the scheme of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*? It was a term with which he was obviously not familiar, but it may be used conveniently to describe part of his system. Perhaps the most significant editorial comment of Aristotle that provides an insight into his system, and that part of it we would term *inventio*, occurs at the beginning of book 3:

Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἓν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, ...¹²

According to Lawson-Tancred's introduction to his recent translation for Penguin:

¹⁰ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.55; id., "The Composition and Influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oskenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.416-424.

¹¹ Rosalind J. Gabin, "Aristotle and the New Rhetoric: Grimaldi and Valesio. A Review Essay," *Ph & Rh* 20 (1987), pp.171-172. In a delightful insight that makes the possibility of knowing anything objectively all the more remote, it has to be noted that Gabin's reading of Valesio and Grimaldi is itself rhetorical, as is my reading of Gabin, and the reader's reading of this dissertation.

¹² Arist. *Rh.* 3.1.1 (1403b 1-2): "There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proof; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the speech." (Translation from John Henry Freese, trans., *Aristotle XXII: The 'Art' of Rhetoric*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1926])

The first eight Sections of the work, in the arrangement adopted in this translation [*Rh.* 1.1 (1354a) - 2.26 (1403b)]... are devoted to the study of the various aspects of invention, logical and psychological, and the remaining two are devoted to style and composition. Of those concerned specifically with invention, Sections Three [*Rh.* 1.4-8 (1359a-1366a)], Four [*Rh.* 1.9 (1366a-1368a)], and Five [*Rh.* 1.10-15 (1368b-1377b)] deal with demonstrative invention, the invention of premisses that can support logical arguments, rather than psychological ones, to which Sections Six and Seven [*Rh.* 2.1-17 (1377b-1391b)] are devoted. The Sections on demonstrative invention are devoted each to one genre of rhetoric: Three focuses on deliberative, Four of epideictic and Five on litigious rhetoric.¹³

Kennedy suggests a similar overall structure to the work, with books 1 and 2 treating what would later be known as invention, and book 3 treating delivery, style (3.2-12), and arrangement (3.13-19).¹⁴ Hill divides the work into the same three parts: invention, style and organisation, but considers invention in two sub-sections: invention of arguments in specialised subjects (*Rh.* 1.4 - 2.17) and invention of arguments common to all subjects (*Rh.* 2.18-22).¹⁵ He further divides the first sub-section into specialised *τόποι* for the three kinds of discourses: deliberative, epideictic and forensic (*Rh.* 1.4-15), specialised *τόποι* for establishing the speaker's character (often a reference from *Rh.* 1.1), specialised *τόποι* for leading the audience into certain emotional states (*Rh.* 2.2-11), and a discussion that the choice of *τόποι* depended on factors relevant to the audience (*Rh.* 2.12-17).¹⁶

Grimaldi too believes that the mention of the *τόποι* at *Rh.* 1.2.21-22 (1358a 11-35), with its division into particular and general topics, provides a frame for the work, particularly in the first two books. The three entechnic proofs (reason, ἦθος, πάθος) would be considered as parts

¹³ Hugh Lawson-Tancred, trans., *Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p.18.

¹⁴ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.56. See also id., *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.13-22.

¹⁵ Forbes I. Hill, "Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory. With a Synopsis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*, ed. James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula (Davis [Calif.]: Hermagoras Press, 1995 [2nd ed.]), pp.52-53.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

of particular topics.¹⁷ Like Hill, Garver believes that there is no proper section in *Rhetoric* devoted to character. Garver's brief comments on the structure of the work correspond roughly with Hill's.¹⁸ When Jonathan Barnes considers the structure of *Rhetoric* he has a problem. His reading of Aristotle leads him to the conclusion that, as rhetoric is concerned with persuasion and that persuasion is concerned properly only with enthymemic argumentation, much of Aristotle's work, when devoted to the role of emotion, is off the topic.¹⁹ Barnes could see no common structure unifying these disparate thoughts of Aristotle, other than that they all aimed at persuasion.²⁰ He reaches this conclusion because he reads the work in the light of the opening chapters of book 1, rather than reads those chapters in the light of the rest of the work. Attempting to discern the structure of the work seems achievable more reasonably from considering the editorial comments throughout the whole work rather than just from the opening chapters.²¹

Immediately after his statement at the beginning of book 3 Aristotle's very next statement indicates that what he had written up to this point, viz., the first two books, concerned the first of those three considerations—proof (πίστεις).²²

¹⁷ William M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), p.71.

¹⁸ Eugene Garver, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.14.

¹⁹ Jonathan Barnes, "Rhetoric and poetics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.261-262.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.263.

²¹ William M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), pp.20-21, believes this also. J. Wisse, *op. cit.*, p.19, rejects Grimaldi's interpretation that Aristotle only rejected extraneous emotional appeal, although Wisse does accept that the first chapter of Aristotle was polemical—an overstatement by Aristotle of his own position.

²² Arist. *Rh.* 3.1.1 (1403b): "... περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν εἰσί..."

The three elements of a speech that go to constitute proof are not to be understood as the three genres of oratory (deliberative, epideictic and forensic) but rather as the three types of proof mentioned earlier:

Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἦθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι.²³

Unlike Jonathan Barnes' interpretation that limits proof to the logical, this reading of Aristotle, which may be found in Grimaldi,²⁴ believes that rationality, emotion and character all contribute to proof. This seems obvious when we consider what Aristotle wrote:

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν ὅτι ταύτας ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποιόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίγνεται καὶ πῶς.²⁵

Thus the sources of proof (rational, emotional and ethical) occupy *Rh.* 1.2 - 2.26, style occupies *Rh.* 3.1-12, and structure occupies *Rh.* 3.13-19. The first part, the largest, is further divided into a consideration of the special *τόποι* that supply proof (*Rh.* 1.4 - 2.17)²⁶ and the

²³ Ibid., 1.2.3 (1356a 1-4): "Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove."

²⁴ W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I*, p.40: "... A[ristotle]. gives us three entechnic *πίστεις* which are in every way coequal. Each is constructed through discourse, and each is separately identified. There is ethical *πίστις*, emotional *πίστις*, logical *πίστις*."

²⁵ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.7 (1356a 21-24): "Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions - the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced."

²⁶ Ibid., 1.3.7-9 (1359a) indicates that he intended to consider the special *τόποι* appropriate to each of the three kinds of rhetoric and the common *τόποι* appropriate to them all.

common τόποι that supply proof (*Rh.* 2.18-26).²⁷ The consideration of the special τόποι is divided according to the consideration of the three factors in rhetorical speech: the λόγος of the subject itself found in the speech (*Rh.* 1.4-15), the πάθος aroused in the audience through the speech (*Rh.* 2.1-11), and the ἦθος of the speaker that comes through the speech (*Rh.* 2.2-17). Aristotle noted this division explicitly at the end of his treatment of the special τόποι, before he turned his attention to the common τόποι:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἕτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἀπάντων δ' αὐτῶν εἰλημμένοι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσι καὶ συμβουλευόντες καὶ ἐπιδεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δ' ἐξ ὧν ἠθικοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισταί, λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν²⁸

He then attempted to draw from the different roles played by an audience the different genres of rhetoric: deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν) (where the audience is judge of the future), forensic (δικανικόν) (where the audience is judge of things past), and epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν) (where the audience is spectator and/or judge merely of the ability of the speaker) (*Rh.* 1.3.2-3 [1358b]).²⁹ These three types (εἶδη or γένη) were subdivided further into processes used by the

²⁷ Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJPh* 62 (1941), pp.40-41, noted the way in which Aristotle injected new meaning into τόποι. See William M. A. Grimaldi, "The Aristotelian Topics," *Traditio* 14 (1958), pp.1-16; Jan M. Van Ophuijsen, "Where Have the Topics Gone?" in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 6 (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1994), pp.140-144.

²⁸ Arist. *Rh.* 2.18.2 (1391b 24-29): "Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said, has its own special end, and in regard to all of them we have gathered popular opinions and premises whence men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, and judicial speeches, and, further, we have determined the special rules according to which it is possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric." See William M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric II: A Commentary* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988), pp.225-228.

²⁹ This does not seem to be Aristotle at his best. It seems that he had the genres of rhetoric as a given and was attempting to relate them to how the listener would react. For consistency it would have been appropriate for him to claim that in the epideictic the listener/audience was judge of things present, yet it was obvious that epideictic speeches as they existed were not limited to the present moment (at *Rh.* 1.3.4 [1358b 18]) Aristotle mentioned the present as the most appropriate time-frame for epideictic). However, limiting the epideictic audience's role to that of judging the ability of the speaker seems too constricting—does not the audience likewise judge such an ability in (continued...)

orator: to exhort or to dissuade for deliberative rhetoric, to accuse or to defend for forensic rhetoric, and to praise or to blame for epideictic rhetoric (*Rh.* 1.3.3 [1358b]), in order to achieve a certain end or objective (τέλος): advantage or harm for deliberative rhetoric, justice or injustice for forensic rhetoric, and nobility or disgrace for epideictic rhetoric (*Rh.* 1.3.5-6 [1358b]). Whether or not Aristotle was the first to classify all rhetorical speeches according to this threefold pattern, Quintilian wrote that it was Aristotle's influence that saw later theorists adopt this as standard (Quint. *Inst.* 3.4).³⁰

b) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - Deliberative λόγος

The special τόποι (ἴδια) of deliberative rhetoric occupy chapters 4 - 8 of the first book. He considered the subjects of deliberation, the objective of deliberation, the means to achieve that objective, the resolution of competition among means, and the influence of constitutions.

He began with a recapitulation that deliberation was only about things that were possible, not impossible or necessary, and, of all possible things, only those things which were in one's power to perform (*Rh.* 1.4.1-3 [1359a]).³¹ The end (σκοπός) of all deliberation was named as happiness (εὐδαιμονία) (*Rh.* 1.5.2 [1360b 9-13]).³² He then listed the parts or elements of

²⁹ (...continued)

deliberative and forensic oratory as well? See D. C. Mirhady, "A Note on Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1.3 1358b 5-8," *Ph & Rh* 28 (1995), pp.405-407. I would disagree with Freese's translation of θεωρός as "mere spectator". There is nothing in the text to support this qualifier. The distinction between judge and spectator seems to be something Aristotle inherited as given and then attempted to justify.

³⁰ See D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," *CQ* 30 (1936), pp.171-172. W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric* I, p.79, argues that it probably was Aristotle's division.

³¹ T. H. Irwin, "Ethics in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Ethics*," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., p.145, puts forward the view that Aristotle would include ethical considerations that would make some means unacceptable and therefore impossible.

³² *Ibid.*, pp.150-158.

happiness: the internal advantage of soul and body and the external advantages (*Rh.* 1.5.4-17 [1360b - 1362a]).³³ Aristotle argued that the orator engaged in a process of exhortation or dissuasion (προτροπή or ἀπροτροπή)³⁴ not with regard to the end, which was accepted universally, but with regard to the means of achieving that end—what would be advantageous or expedient (συμφέρον) in bringing about happiness, for people choose the advantageous believing it to be good (*Rh.* 1.6.1-2 [1362a]). Finally, under deliberative oratory, Aristotle considered how the constitution of the state affected exhortation (*Rh.* 1.8 [1365b - 1366a]).

c) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - Epideictic λόγος

Chapter 9 represents Aristotle's brief foray into epideictic rhetoric. It is with this kind of rhetoric that I think one can notice the unease between the existential which confronted him and the theoretical he proposed.³⁵ In epideictic oratory, a speaker engaged in a process of praise or blame (ἔπαινος or ψόγος) about the nobility or virtue (καλόν or ἀρετή) of the subject (*Rh.* 1.9.1 [1366a]).³⁶ Much of the chapter then deals with the nature of the objective—what is noble or virtuous. The common τόπος (τόπος κοινός) of amplification could be employed to great effect in epideictic oratory Aristotle thought (*Rh.* 1.9.38 [1368a]).

³³ W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I*, p.107, notes that the division of these twenty-two parts into a tripartite scheme is also found in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1098b 12-15 and Arist. *Pol.* 1323a 24-27.

³⁴ See Mark D. Jordan, "Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres," *Rhetorica* 4 (1986), pp.309-333, for a discussion about whether protreptic should be considered a distinct genre.

³⁵ This perhaps explains what we find at *Rh.* 1.3.2 (1358b)—the practice of Aristotle's own time seemed to limit the epideictic audience to the role of spectator (they were to be impressed rather than persuaded). Aristotle wanted to see a different role for the audience, more parallel with deliberative and dicanic audiences. I would argue that, on the basis of *Rh.* 1.3.3-5 (1358b), we are to understand the three kinds of rhetoric as parallel. Aristotle was trying to open up possibilities for the epideictic that were not then realised.

³⁶ See T. H. Irwin, *op. cit.*, pp.158-168.

I agree with Oravec's assessment that epideictic oratory was not thought of by Aristotle simply as a means of entertaining an audience or for an orator to display his skill, but thought of as a means of the audience judging the ability of the speaker *as well as* the content of the speech.

She writes:

In the judgmental response, the audience is led to judge not only the orator's stylistic skill, but also his ability to represent objects of praise and blame accurately. To the extent that the speech demonstrates or shows the fact of the deed accomplished, the type of deed, or the quality of the hero himself, the speech evokes a judgment or speculation upon the truth of its representation.³⁷

If I understand her correctly, then what I believe Aristotle was proposing was that epideictic was rhetorical because the orator was attempting to find the best means to persuade an audience to believe that the subject of the speech was worthy of praise because that subject possessed virtuous characteristics.³⁸ Hinks interpreted Aristotle here as rejecting proof as a goal of epideictic; it achieves its purpose if the orator impresses his ideas upon the audience. According to Hinks, there was no question to be proven in epideictic.³⁹ Mirhady rejects an interpretation of *Rh.* 1.3.2 (1358b 6)—“ὁ δὲ περὶ δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρῶς”—as being in reference to the ability of the speaker, and suggests that the spectator was the judge of the “moral capacity of the person being

³⁷ Christine Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory of Epideictic,” *Ph & Rh* 9 (1976), p.168. Also, I agree strongly with her remarks on p.172 about the epideictic time reference. Although the deeds of the subject were likely performed in the past, the audience is deciding whether those deeds are worthy of praise in the present moment: “... epideictic reflects present appreciations, understandings, and judgments...”

³⁸ I take this to be very similar to L. Rosenfield, “The Practical Celebration of Epideictic,” in *Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of Rhetoric*, ed. E. E. White (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1980), p.134, who wrote that epideictic was: “display not of the speaker but of the luminosity of the noble acts and thoughts.” Against this position, it has to be said that when Aristotle, at the beginning of book 2, noted that the objective of rhetoric was judgement (*Rh.* 2.1.2 [1377b]), he mentioned only forensic and deliberative oratory. Against this objection that epideictic oratory was excluded from the function of judging, I would appeal again to the struggle Aristotle faced between the existent and the ideal. At *Rh.* 2.1.2 (1377b) he mentioned simply the traditional understanding rather than advocated his newer interpretation.

³⁹ D. A. G. Hinks, *op. cit.*, p.174.

praised or blamed.”⁴⁰ Further, Oravec opposes the notion that the θεωροί have an exclusively passive role; for her, their role of observation is very similar to the role of understanding, an active role of judging.⁴¹ Why then did Aristotle earlier distinguish between the spectator (θεωρόν) and the judge (κριτήν) if the spectator really is a judge (*Rh.* 1.3.2 [1358b 2])? Perhaps because of historical actualities, the epideictic judge did not have the public forum of assembly or jury in which to cast their vote; it was more an internal judgement only, perhaps.⁴²

This concern with praise and blame, in addition to the mere display of the orator’s skill, was another Aristotelian contribution to rhetoric.⁴³ That being said, several commentators note the moral ambivalence of Aristotle’s comments about the rhetorical use of virtues.⁴⁴ Duffy concludes that Aristotle was less interested in reality and truth than he was in appearance and persuasion.⁴⁵ He argues that Aristotle’s failure to provide a philosophical analysis for epideictic oratory may be explained by the fact that Aristotle accepted the earlier one provided by Plato,

⁴⁰ D. C. Mirhady, “A Note,” p.406.

⁴¹ C. Oravec, op. cit., pp.164-166.

⁴² Arist. *Rh.* 2.18.1 (1391b 16-17) seems to imply this. In the actualities of fourth-century life, the designation “judge” was a limited one. For Aristotle to have called the epideictic audiences judges would have run the risk of having others criticise him for not knowing how to use the term properly. D. A. G. Hinks, op. cit., p.174, on the basis of this phrase, conceded that the orator “will be found to argue nominally as though his contentions were or might be disputed...”

⁴³ J. Richard Chase, “The Classical Conception of Epideictic,” *QJS* 47 (1961), pp.293-300; L. Pernot, *La Rhétorique de L’Éloge dans le Monde Gréco-Romain*, tome 1: *Histoire et Technique* (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1993), esp. pp.28-30.

⁴⁴ Whitney J. Oates, “Aristotle and the Problem of Value,” in *Aristotle: the Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, ed. K. Erikson (Metuchen [N.J.]: Scarecrow Press, 1974), pp.108-109.

⁴⁵ Bernard K. Duffy, “The Platonic Function of Epideictic Rhetoric,” *Ph & Rh* 16 (1983), pp.80-81. I am not entirely convinced. Further to the example he produced (Arist. *Rh.* 1.9.32 [1367b 29-32 - more accurately 24-25 I think]) that Aristotle argued that even accidents and good luck could be used to argue purpose and virtue in the subject, I think that the next thing that Aristotle wrote: “δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται.” (*Rh.* 1.9.33 [1367b 27-28]) must be understood in the context of other passages like *Rh.* 1.2.6 (1356a 19-20) and 1.1.12 (1355b 35-38). Aristotle was not advocating the telling of lies, but suggesting that all things could be interpreted in a number of ways and that the orator is called upon to see things in the best possible light.

viz., that the epideictic celebrated and reinforced values, as well as employed figurative language to express and educate in truth.⁴⁶ Sullivan calls the approaches found in Oravec and Duffy the educational function of epideictic.⁴⁷ By trying to understand the epideictic genre through its social situations rather than its formal characteristics, Sullivan also points to the conservative function of epideictic (the reinforcement of traditional values), the celebratory function (associated with ceremonial occasions), and the literary function (associated with occasions of display).⁴⁸

On the basis of Aristotle's belief that epideictic had an aim (σκοπός) (*Rh.* 1.9.1 [1366a 24]), I conclude that it was put forward by him, even if as a novel idea, as demonstrative or purposive.

d) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - Forensic λόγος

The remainder of the first book is largely devoted to forensic oratory. Chapter 15 is a presentation of the non-artificial proofs, but it is joined with forensic oratory where it was used most commonly. The section begins with some definitions, turns to those who act unjustly and those wronged by injustice, and ends with the non-artificial proofs.

Aristotle examined the motives for, or causes of, human action and posited seven: of voluntary actions, some were due to habit (ἔθος), and others to desire, which was further divided

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp.83-92. Thus Duffy accords epideictic with the legitimate role of "moving" an audience, as distinct from "moving them to action."

⁴⁷ Dale L. Sullivan, "The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter," *Ph & Rh* 26 (1993), p.115.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.114-116. Michael F. Carter, "The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates' Funeral Oration," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991), pp.209-232, argues that epideictic possessed ritual functions rather than pragmatic functions. While that may be true of epideictic in general, I do not believe that we can apply this to Aristotle as the sum total of his understanding, for he was seeking to create a new field for epideictic.

into rational desire (λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν) and irrational desire, which may be anger (ὀργή) or appetite (ἐπιθυμία) and, of involuntary actions, some were due to chance (τύχης) and some due to necessity, which comprised those brought about by compulsion (βία) or by nature (φύσις) (*Rh.* 1.10.7-8 [1368b 34 - 1369a 7]).⁴⁹ All actions are chosen because the agent believes them to be expedient or pleasant (*Rh.* 1.10.18 [1369b]). The expedient having already been discussed with deliberative oratory, Aristotle considered the nature of pleasure in chapter 11.

In this chapter Aristotle seems to have moved away from considering the ἴδια of motive to a consideration of the nature of pleasure and pain in themselves, a matter he had considered elsewhere (*Arist. Eth. Nic.* 7.11-14; 10.1-5).⁵⁰ Having discussed motive, Aristotle next dealt with the state of mind of the unjust. One acts unjustly when one believes that one can escape detection or punishment or that its benefits outweigh its consequences (*Rh.* 1.12.1-3 [1372a]). The next ἴδια of forensic oratory examined were crime and punishment. The matter of justice and injustice was related to persons (in particular as individuals and in general as communities) or to laws (in particular as written or unwritten laws and in general as unwritten natural law) (*Rh.* 1.13.1-3 [1373b]). Equity distinguished between mistakes, crimes and misfortunes, looked to the intention of the law-giver, and the intention of the wrong-doer (*Rh.* 1.13.15-19 [1374b]). As he had handled previously the question of relative advantage, Aristotle also considered relative justice (*Rh.* 1.14.1-7 [1374b - 1375a]).

⁴⁹ The explanation of these seven causes is found in *Arist. Rh.* 1.10.12-18 (1369a 32 - 1369b 17).

⁵⁰ See W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I*, pp.243-246, for a discussion about the contradictions.

In the last chapter of the first book Aristotle considered the non-artificial proofs, for these properly belonged to forensic oratory, and how an orator was to employ them.⁵¹ There were five proofs: law, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths. He put forward a variety of contingencies, depending upon whether one was accusing or defending and whether the proof was favourable to one's case or not (*Rh.* 1.15.1-33 [1375a - 1377b]).

e) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - πάθος

The second book of *Rhetoric* opens with a discussion of πάθος, or emotion. In its introduction, Aristotle presented the practical realisation that it took more than good arguments to be demonstrative and convincing.

There has been some scholarly debate about whether what Aristotle presented was his own belief or the reporting of mere popular opinion. Fortenbaugh has challenged the view that Aristotle's discussion on the emotions was popular and imprecise, and he argues that Aristotle's audience was not the general public but members of the Academy and his definition of each emotion was not as tentative as it appears.⁵² Cooper arrives at a similar conclusion. He notes that if Aristotle's analysis of emotions is less than fully philosophical it is at least "approximately true."⁵³ Striker holds to a variation of what Cooper postulates. She thinks Aristotle's orator did need to rely upon scientific analysis of the emotions in someone else's work, that what is found

⁵¹ D. Mirhady, "Non-Technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes," *AJPh* 112 (1991), pp.5-28, investigates the similarities and differences between Aristotle and *Rh. Al.* on this point and concludes that they derive from a common source, possibly a forensic handbook by Theodore of Byzantium.

⁵² William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *AGPh* 52 (1970), pp.42-53. On p.49, n.24, he puts forward a distinction between material that becomes the content of an enthymeme and material that is a method of persuading. W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, Rhetoric II, p.2, disagrees with Fortenbaugh.

⁵³ John M. Cooper, "An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.241-242.

in *Rhetoric* are theory-based results, and that the theory Aristotle accepted was from the Platonic Academy.⁵⁴

The emotions he examined were anger, mildness, friendship, hate, fear, confidence, shame, benevolence, pity, indignation, envy, and jealousy. Much of Aristotle's presentation was a psychological analysis of feeling. It seems at times that a consideration of how an orator could make use of this was somewhat incidental to the presentation. Leighton does not believe so. He suggests that Aristotle was redefining the emotions in *Rhetoric*, distinguishing them from desires and other elements of the soul.⁵⁵ Brinton is a little more precise in stating that Aristotle did not analyse the emotions so much as describe how to produce them.⁵⁶ Cooper believes that what is found in *Rhetoric* is only a preliminary sketch of what could have become a more systematic investigation.⁵⁷ Frede rejects the position advanced by both Leighton and Cooper when she attempts to explain inconsistencies in Aristotle's explanations of the emotions found in his various works.⁵⁸ Her explanation involves Aristotle's growing distance from his Platonic heritage, the results of which were later additions to *Rhetoric*.

The general view is that Aristotle provided this discussion about the emotions so that the orator would be able to arouse them in the audience. Cooper expresses this as Aristotle

⁵⁴ Gisela Striker, "Emotions in Context: Aristotle's Treatment of the Passion in the *Rhetoric* and His Moral Psychology," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.287-288.

⁵⁵ Stephen R. Leighton, "Aristotle and the Emotions," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.220-228.

⁵⁶ Alan Brinton, "Pathos and the 'Appeal to Emotion': An Aristotelian Analysis," *HPhQ* 5 (1988), p.208.

⁵⁷ J. M. Cooper, op. cit., pp.239-240, follows the earlier distinction made by Aristotle between ἐπιστήμη and ἔνδοξα (Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.11 [1356b - 1357a]), to suggest that Aristotle's presentation of emotions was based upon reputable opinion rather than scientific exactitude.

⁵⁸ Dorothea Frede, "Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.259-260.

manipulating the emotional state of the audience to influence their judgement.⁵⁹ Conley has warned against the view that the audience is there passively to be manipulated by the orator. Further, he interprets Aristotle's conclusion to the section on emotions as stating that the presentation also provided *τόποι* for an orator to discuss emotional motives or circumstances (in a third party).⁶⁰ Although Frede states that "rhetoricians are not supposed to make the emotions the central topic of successful public speeches,"⁶¹ Conley's point is important because it makes sense of Aristotle's contrast between his own and the Sophists' belief about the role of emotion in oratory—Aristotle considered emotion an appropriate topic with regard to someone else's motives. Even though, when one examines the conclusions to each of the discussions about the particular emotions (the part where Aristotle linked the understanding of the emotion to its rhetorical utility), one finds clear evidence that Aristotle was interested in the orator arousing emotions in the audience,⁶² and, at the same time, given that the presentation of the emotions was by way of contrary pairs,⁶³ it seems implicit that Aristotle recognised that an audience would have to come to an understanding about how emotions could motivate the behaviour of others and

⁵⁹ J. M. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p.241. He also accepts that the Aristotelian orator would use his knowledge of the emotions to help the audience understand other people's motives.

⁶⁰ Thomas M. Conley, "The Greekless Reader and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *QJS* 65 (1979), pp.77-78. He bases this interpretation on an acceptance of a textual variant at *Rh.* 2.11.7 (1388b 29-30).

⁶¹ D. Frede, *op. cit.*, p.260.

⁶² Arist. *Rh.* 2.1.9 (1378a); 2.2.27 (1379b - 1380a); 2.3.17 (1380b); 2.4.32 (1382a); 2.5.15 (1383a); 2.7.4 (1385a); 2.8.16 (1386b); 2.9.16 (1387b); 2.10.11 (1388a); 2.11.7 (1388b). Most of these use *ἐμποιεῖν, κατασκευάζω* or *παρασκευάζω*.

⁶³ The opposites (*ἐναντία*) are anger (2.2) and mildness (2.3); love and hate (2.4); fear and confidence (2.5); shame and shamelessness [only mentioned in passing] (2.6); benevolence and ingratitude [only mentioned in passing] (2.7); pity (2.8) and indignation (2.9); envy and rejoicing [only mentioned in passing] (2.10); emulation and contempt (2.11). G. Striker, *op. cit.*, p.292, argues that we are not presented with clear opposites by Aristotle (not a negative and a positive) but with a negative and a non-negative: "... but it does not seem to be true that preventing or restraining a given emotion will automatically lead one to produce an opposite *emotion*."

that an audience may have started out with a particular emotion about the issue (or even an emotion about the speaker, but this is not clear in Aristotle) that needed to be tempered.⁶⁴

Further to this, Nussbaum has examined Aristotle's chapters on the emotions and she concludes that he did not view them as blind forces but as intelligent aspects of personality, based on beliefs which, if they proved correct, established the emotions as rational.⁶⁵ These beliefs were constituents of emotions. Fortenbaugh holds to a very similar interpretation. The emotions, for Aristotle, were not, as they were for the Sophists, hostile to reasoned argument; they were the result of some act of cognition. The emotions were responses to reasons.⁶⁶ The position of Wisse is a little different, in that he argues that Aristotle did not make emotions intelligent but intelligible.⁶⁷ Grimaldi recognises an intellectual component when he distinguishes feelings from emotions, for the emotion requires some intellectual response to stimulus.⁶⁸ In another paper, Conley has likewise argued that a knowledge of the emotions improves the rationality of one's argument.⁶⁹ These positions would tend to support Grimaldi's refusal to label ἡθος and πάθος as "non-logical" proof.

f) Sources of πίστις: ἴδια - ἡθος

⁶⁴ That at *Rh.* 2.11.7 (1388b 29) Aristotle mentioned διαλύεται as well as ἐγγίγνεται would indicate a pre-existing emotion present in the audience with which the orator would have to deal.

⁶⁵ Martha Craven Nussbaum, "Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.303-309.

⁶⁶ W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," p.62.

⁶⁷ J. Wisse, op. cit., p.72.

⁶⁸ W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, *Rhetoric* II, p.15.

⁶⁹ Thomas Conley, "Πάθη and πίστεις: Aristotle 'Rhet'. II 2-11," *Hermes* 110 (1982), pp.300-315. On p.312 he writes: "In some respects, therefore, Aristotle's discussion of the πάθη in the 'Rhetoric' can be seen not only as a contribution to Rhetorical theory but as an extension of his mature logical thinking as well." A. Brinton, op. cit., p.211, sees the orator both evoking (arousing) the emotion in an audience and invoking the emotion, which is an appeal to the emotion as the basis for action.

Part of the remainder of the second book is devoted to ἦθος, the character of the speaker, the final aspect of πίστις. While Aristotle's interest in the emotions had focused particularly on them as found in the audience, his interest in character was focused on the speaker.⁷⁰

Aristotle had mentioned the ἦθος of the speaker at earlier points in his work (*Rh.* 1.2.4 [1356a] and 2.1.5 [1378a]).⁷¹ An orator persuades by means of his own character when, through his speech, he inspires the audience to believe him worthy of confidence. An orator must possess good sense, virtue, and goodwill (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία). Fortenbaugh notices several points of concern: although good sense and virtue have received attention (at *Rh.* 1.9 [1366a - 1368a]), goodwill, although mentioned at *Rh.* 2.1.5 (1378a), was never actually discussed with friendship as Aristotle promised; why was it necessary for goodwill to be mentioned anyway? and why was character completely missing from the opening chapters of book 1?⁷² His response is to locate Aristotle within a long rhetorical tradition that took an interest in character and goodwill in particular.⁷³ He argues that Aristotle was original where he argued that persuasion through character did not aim at producing an emotional effect in the audience,

⁷⁰ This is not to suggest that society as a whole had no ἦθος nor that Aristotle was unaware or uninterested in it. Eugene E. Ryan, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Ethics* and the Ethos of Society," *GRBS* 13 (1972), pp.291-308, examines Aristotle's interest in this area. On p.302 he writes: "Thus as deliberative and epideictic rhetoric as envisioned by Aristotle are used in a society, the members of the society become habituated to find value in certain types of action and not find value in others, to praise certain kinds of men and their deeds and to censure others... All that I have been describing is precisely the ethos of society..." Christopher Gill, "The *Ēthos/Pathos* Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism," *CQ* n.s. 34 (1984), p.153.

⁷¹ Eckart Schütrumpf, "Non-Logical Means of Persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *De oratore*," in W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady, *Peripatetic Rhetoric*, p.96, notes that Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.4 (1356a 10) mentions that some authors of τέχναι did not regard ἦθος as persuasive, and concludes that other authors must have held the opposite view and held it prior to Aristotle.

⁷² William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Persuasion Through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992), pp.210-211; id., "Persuasion Through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *RhM* n.f. 134 (1991), pp.152-156, argues the position that persuasion through character was a later stage in Aristotle's thinking, especially in a non-emotive presentation of the credibility of the speaker.

⁷³ W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Persuasion," pp.211-225.

rather it provided a reason for the audience to accept what the orator said.⁷⁴ Wisse writes succinctly that here was a rational understanding of ἦθος, for the audience needed to make a decision, a rational decision, about the reliability of the speaker.⁷⁵

Aristotle believed that character consisted of four elements: emotions (πάθη), habits (ἔξεις), age (ἡλικία), and fortunes (τύχαι) (*Rh.* 2.12.1 [1388b]). The first two had already been considered, so this section dealt with the last two.

Garver argues that Aristotle failed to devote a separate section to the consideration of ἦθος. He rejects seeing *Rh.* 2.12-17 as being that section because it is devoted to the character of the audience not the speaker.⁷⁶ Instead, what he finds in Aristotle is the argument that through an appropriately logical argument the character of the speaker emerges. If one were too logical, such that the character or trustworthiness of the speaker did not shine through, one could well fail to be persuasive.⁷⁷

Wisse has raised the point that *Rh.* 2.12-17 (1388b - 1391b) seems to be more about the character of the audience rather than the character of the speaker, which I have noted already.⁷⁸ He suggests that discussion of character as a means of persuasion had occurred briefly at *Rh.* 2.1

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.226-228. At the end of this section he writes: “The character of the speaker becomes ground for a reasonable decision and not the cause of an emotion that bends the decision-making capacity of the auditor.”

⁷⁵ J. Wisse, *op. cit.*, p.33. On pp.60-61, Wisse distinguishes two meanings of ἦθος: as character and as a means of persuasion. He alleges that a failure to appreciate this distinction in Aristotle can be seen in post-Aristotelian rhetoricians.

⁷⁶ E. Garver, *op. cit.*, p.285, n.1.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.177-181.

⁷⁸ J. Wisse, *op. cit.*, p.37. On p.38 he interprets *Rh.* 2.13.16 (1390a 24-28) as not really a focus on the speaker but on the audience. I do not think he takes the alternative interpretation he mentions (that the speaker understands the audience in order to be more persuasive) seriously enough. See notes 16 and 19 *supra*.

(1378a) and that *Rh.* 2.12-17 (1388b - 1391b) was an appendix to the material on ἡθος and πάθος. Grimaldi, alternatively, suggests that *Rh.* 2.1 (1378a) was an introduction to both πάθος and ἡθος and that, when Aristotle dealt with ἡθος, he included that of the audience as well as that of the speaker.⁷⁹

g) Sources of πίστις: τόποι κοινοί

Having finished the ἴδια, in the last section of book 2, Aristotle considered the τόποι κοινοί (common topics). The very arrangement of material would tend to support Grimaldi's interpretation that not only the ἴδια of the logical (as divided into deliberative, epideictic and forensic) but also the ἴδια of the emotional and ethical provide premisses for enthymemic demonstration (*Rh.* 2.18.2-3 [1391b]).

Solmsen has argued that Aristotle's understanding of the τόπος was original, such that rather than being a commonplace—a saying about a particular subject memorised and ready for insertion at some point in a speech—it was for Aristotle a form or structure that could be applied to any subject.⁸⁰ However, one does gain the impression from reading this section of the work that its internal structure is somewhat confusing.

⁷⁹ W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, Rhetoric II, pp.5-6, 183-189. On p.186 he writes: "So it is that the actual purpose of chaps. 12-17 with its study of the major character types is to show the speaker how his ἡθος must attend and adjust to the ἡθος of varied types of auditor if he is to address them successfully." C. Gill, *op. cit.*, p.153, n.25, admits that *Rh.* 2.12-17 dealt with the audience, but insofar as the speaker could assimilate his attitude to theirs.

⁸⁰ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," pp.40-41. W. M.A. Grimaldi, "The Aristotelian Topics," p.2, believes it was both formal and material. Further, on p.7, he suggests that the distinction between special and common topics was pre-Aristotelian and, on p.12, that the common topic was a formal topic.

It would seem to me that Aristotle began not with consideration of the particular *τόποι κοινοί*, but with the nature, function and place of them in rhetoric. If we accept that rhetoric was concerned with persuasion and that persuasion dealt with probabilities, then one's common method of proof had to deal with probability, which included whether something did or could take place, as well as whether something would be better or not. So the question of possibility and magnitude characterised all *τόποι κοινοί* (*Rh.* 2.19 [1392a - 1393a]).⁸¹

The *τόποι κοινοί*, like the *ἴδια*, were used as parts of examples or enthymemes. Aristotle returned to an examination of these matters. There were three types of example: the historical (events that had occurred), the comparative (events that were believable, probable or likely), and the fable (events that had not occurred) (*Rh.* 2.20.1-6 [1393a-b]). As examples dealt with particulars Aristotle suggested that an orator used examples after enthymemes so that they appeared more like evidence (*Rh.* 2.20.9 [1394a]). Before turning to the enthymeme Aristotle next focused on the maxim (*γνώμη*), a premiss or conclusion of an enthymeme used without the rest of the syllogism (*Rh.* 2.21.2 [1394a]). With reference to the enthymeme, Aristotle noted again that, because of the nature of the rhetorical audience, the more one attempted to prove something absolutely the less likely one would be in being persuasive (*Rh.* 2.22.3 [1396a]).

Aristotle described some twenty-eight particular *τόποι κοινοί* (*Rh.* 2.23 [1397a - 1400b]). What distinguishes this form of *τόπος* was that it does not increase understanding about a particular subject (*Rh.* 1.2.21 [1358a]) and that the types of propositions derived from *τόποι κοινοί* could apply to a number of disciplines. Many of them were methods for dealing with alternatives and relationships: opposites, similarities, contraries, contradictions, degree, cause

⁸¹ We find many of the particular common topics of *Rh.* 2.24 investigated here in relation to the matter of possibility.

and effect, division, etc. Huseman suggests that this list is not exhaustive and that *τόποι κοινοί* were formal rather than material in nature.⁸²

With a few further remarks Aristotle concluded book 2. His work to this point had focused on the material for proving one's argument rhetorically. In the third book attention was given to matters of style, arrangement and delivery.

2. *ad Herennium* and Cicero

a) *ad Herennium*

Ad Herennium commences with the author's stated intention of writing *de ratione dicendi* (*Rhet. Her.* 1.1.1). Following the Aristotelian tradition, it is stated that there are *tria genera causarum* that concern a public speaker: epideictic (*demonstrativum*), deliberative (*deliberativum*), and judicial or forensic (*iudiciale*). These three kinds of causes maintained their Aristotelian processes: praise or censure (*laudem vel vituperationem*), persuasion or dissuasion (*suasionem et dissuasionem*), and prosecution and defence (*accusationem... cum defensione*) (*Rhet. Her.* 1.2.2). Unlike Aristotle, *ad Herennium* did not locate these three causes as together constituting the *λόγος* of a speech (one of the three sources of proof, the others being the *πάθος* of the audience and the *ἦθος* of the orator). Aristotle's consideration of emotional and ethical issues as contributing to the proof of an argument is missing.⁸³

⁸² Richard C. Huseman, "Aristotle's System of Topics," *Southern Speech Journal* 30 (1965), pp.243-252.

⁸³ Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing Upon the Feelings," *CPh* 33 (1938), p.396: "We... may... conclude that the Hellenistic rhetoricians did little or nothing to keep up the Aristotelian tradition in this particular sphere. This inference is confirmed by what we find in Cicero's *De Inventione*, the *Auctor ad Herennium*, and some Greek rhetoricians..."

As Barwick has noted, post-Aristotelian handbooks of rhetoric either arranged their material according to the parts of a speech (the old method employed by the technographers) or according to the functions of the orator (as had Aristotle).⁸⁴ *Ad Herennium* followed the Aristotelian division, yet, as Solmsen noted:

We must add at once, however, that scarcely any *ars* presents the Peripatetic system in its true and uncontaminated form. Compromises with the alternative system are a regular and normal feature. Cicero in his *De inventione* and the *Auctor ad Herennium* in his (closely corresponding) section on *inventio* so far from reproducing an Aristotelian or Peripatetic theory on the πίστεις actually deal with the “parts of the speech”...⁸⁵

Caplan commented similarly that in this work the parts of speech have been relocated from *dispositio* to *inventio*.⁸⁶ Wisse is equally as strong in insisting that these two works (and possibly many others besides) were a contamination of the Aristotelian scheme.⁸⁷ As James Murphy notes, the contribution of rhetoricians in the centuries after Aristotle, which is found, for example, in *ad Herennium*, was one of codification.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Karl Barwick, “Die Gliederung der Rhetorischen ΤΕΧΝΗ und die Horazische Epistula ad Pisonem,” *Hermes* 57 (1922), pp.1-5.

⁸⁵ F. Solmsen, “The Aristotelian Tradition,” p.48.

⁸⁶ H. Caplan, op. cit., p.xviii. E. Schütrumpf, op. cit., p.104, argues that *Rhet. Her.*, in placing the parts of a speech in *inventio*, is in the Aristotelian spirit. He does this because on p.103 he argues that Aristotle considered style and structure as well as proof to be ἔντεχνον. While it may be true that style is something that is the creation of the speaker (and at *Rh.* 3.1.7 [1494a 15] Aristotle wrote: “... περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον.”), on the whole ἔντεχνον was limited to the three πίστεις as at *Rh.* 1.2.2 (1355b). I think Schütrumpf is relying too heavily on the reference in the third book.

⁸⁷ J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.80-87. F. Solmsen, “The Aristotelian Tradition,” describes Cicero’s *de Or.* as the only major work to escape such contamination. I am sure that Carole Blair, “Contested Histories of Rhetoric: The Politics of Preservation, Progress, and Change,” *QJS* 78 (1992), pp.403-428, would consider the word “contamination” as evidence that a commentator was operating from an influence studies approach. Indeed, I am sure she would consider *Quellenforschung* (in this case, the reconstruction of the original handbook based on extant handbooks) as the epitome of influence studies. If her critique of this approach is true it could go some of the way towards explaining why *Rhet. Her.* and *Inv. Rhet.* have been “looked down at” traditionally because of their “deviation” from the Aristotelian source.

⁸⁸ James J. Murphy, “The Codification of Roman Rhetoric. With a Synopsis of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,” in J. Murphy and R. A. Katula, *A Synoptic History*, p.111.

Ad Herennium moved immediately to consider the faculties (*res*) the orator ought to possess: invention (*inventio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memory (*memoria*) and delivery (*pronuntiatio*) (*Rhet. Her.* 1.2.3).⁸⁹ These faculties could be acquired by the orator through theory (*ars*), imitation (*imitatio*) and practice (*exercitatio*) (*Rhet. Her.* 1.2.3).

Confirmatio and *confutatio* comprise the largest section in *ad Herennium*'s consideration of *inventio*. Assembling one's arguments depends upon the type of issue (*constitutio*) involved. The author set forth three: conjectural (*coniecturalis*), legal (*legitima*) and juridical (*iuridicalis*) (*Rhet. Her.* 1.11.18).⁹⁰ The issue is determined by the charge of the prosecution meeting the primary plea of the defence. *Coniecturalis* deals with questions of fact (*Rhet. Her.* 1.11.18). *Legitima* deals with questions of textual interpretation under six sub-headings: letter and spirit (*scriptum et sententia*—questions of the intention of the law as opposed to its expression), conflicting laws (*contrariae*—where one law permits and another forbids), ambiguity (*ambiguum*—where there is more than one meaning in a text), definition (*definitio*—where the naming of an action is disputed), transference (*translatio*—the changing of court or judge), and reasoning from analogy (*ratiocinatio*—where no specific law covers a matter but where appeal can be made to similar laws) (*Rhet. Her.* 1.11.19 - 1.13.23). *Iuridicale* deals with matters of moral purpose or intent under two headings: absolute (*absoluta*—where the act is claimed to be right) or assumptive (*adsumptiva*—where the act is accepted but extraneous matters are introduced). There are four assumptive types: acknowledgement (*concessio*—a plea for pardon because the act was committed through ignorance, accident or necessity), rejection of responsibility (*remotio*

⁸⁹ At *Rhet. Her.* 2.1.1 these faculties were called functions (*officia*). F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," p.47, identified Aristotle's πίστεις with *inventio*, saw Aristotle alluding to the question of ὑπόκρισις (*pronuntiatio*), and asked the question who was the first rhetorician to add *memoria*, for by the time of *Rhet. Her.* it was firmly established as part of the scheme.

⁹⁰ R. Nadeau, op. cit., p.54, notes that although all Latin systems of rhetoric utilised the Hermagoran *stasis* system, *Rhet. Her.* varied the most widely because of its reduction of the number of *stases* to three.

criminis—by transferring it to another person or attributing it to a particular circumstance), shifting the question of guilt (*translatio criminis*—by diverting the issue of guilt to the crime of another), and comparison with alternative courses (*comparatio*—choosing the lesser of two evils) (*Rhet. Her.* 1.14.24 - 1.15.25).

As well as the question of issue there is also the question of motive (*ratio*), which is important for the defence. In response to that, the prosecution would put forward the central point of the accusation (*firmamentum*). From these two comes the point for judgement (*iudicationem*). In the conjectural issue the *iudicationem* is determined always by the denial of the act (*Rhet. Her.* 1.16.26 - 1.17.27).

In the second book the author continued to present the analysis of *confirmatio* and *confutatio*, here turning attention to how each *constitutio* shaped an orator's speech. With *coniecturali* one would attempt to magnify or diminish suspicion through six topics: probability (*probabile*—which included motive [*causa*] and lifestyle [*vita*]), comparison (*conlatio*—to show who else may or may not have benefitted and whether or not anyone else had the means to commit a crime), signs (*signa*—what place? what time? and was there enough time? was the occasion suitable? what hope of success? what hope of escaping detection?), presumptive proof (*argumentum*—where the defendant was before, during and after the event and anything that may link a person to the crime), subsequent behaviour (*consecutio*—the signs that accompany guilt or innocence), and confirmatory proof (*approbatio*—concerning the common topics of witnesses, torture, presumptive proof and rumour) (*Rhet. Her.* 2.2.3 - 2.18.12).

With *legitima*'s six sub-types the prosecution and defence would seek to find arguments that support their position. On the question of *scriptum et sententia* the prosecution would normally highlight the letter of the law while the defence would normally point to the fact that a written law could not cover every situation of matters of equity. On the question of *contrariae* each side would focus on the law that was most favourable to their position. With *ambiguum* again each side would seek to argue that their interpretation was in keeping with custom. *Definitio* is presented by each side in such a manner as to support their argument and castigate the opposing interpretation. The matter of competency is addressed by either side in matters of *translatio*. When a prosecutor or defender employs *ratio cinatio* they do so when they are able to find other texts of decisions that were favourable to them and they would reject the findings of their opponents as not being parallel (*Rhet. Her.* 2.9.13 - 2.12.18).

With regard to *absoluta iuridicale* both sides would argue about the lawfulness of the action in terms of natural law, statute law, legal custom, precedence, equity, and agreement between parties. In *comparatio* the prosecution and defence would argue about which of two courses really would have been the more beneficial or harmful. In *translatio criminis* both sides would argue about the comparative guilt of the other crime. In *concessio* the questions of necessity, accident, and ignorance would be exploited by both sides as would the merits of punishment and pardon. In *remotio* both sides would put forward arguments about how much another person or circumstance influenced the defendant (*Rhet. Her.* 2.13.19 - 2.17.26).

After dealing with forensic invention at some length, deliberative and epideictic invention received much briefer attention at the beginning of the third book. As with Aristotle, deliberative oratory considered choices between options that were intended to maximise advantage (*utilia*).

There were two topics under *utilia*: security (*tuta*) and honour (*honestum*). *Tuta* was provided by might (*vis*) or craft (*dolus*). *Honestum* was provided by what was right (*rectum*)—wisdom (*prudentia*), justice (*iustitia*), courage (*fortitudo*), and temperance (*modestia*)—and praiseworthy (*laudabile*), even though one ought to pursue the right even without praise (*Rhet. Her.* 3.2.3 - 3.4.7).

The topics for epideictic oratory were listed as external circumstances (*externus*), physical attributes (*corpus*), and qualities of character (*animus*). Even though in the initial mention of the three *genera* (*Rhet. Her.* 1.2.2), the author had mentioned the purpose of epideictic speech as praise or censure, Chase believes that there is evidence in the work that its author considered epideictic oratory to be for display or entertainment rather than actual proof.⁹¹

b) Cicero - *de Inventione*

Cicero's *de Inventione* opens with a tribute to eloquence, in which he defined rhetoric. He wrote that its function was to speak in such a way as to persuade and its end was to persuade by speech (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.5.6). He named Aristotle as being responsible for the threefold division of the material of rhetoric into epideictic, deliberative and judicial, a division he adopted (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.5.7).⁹² He rejected Hermagoras' division into special cases (*causae*) and general questions (*quaestiones*) (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.6.8). As for the *partes* (which *ad Herennium* called *res*), Cicero

⁹¹ J. R. Chase, op. cit., p.297, turning to *Rhet. Her.* 4.23.32 in particular.

⁹² William W. Fortenbaugh, "Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus," in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and Peter Steinmetz, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 4 (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1989), p.42.

accepted the fivefold division into *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria* and *pronuntiatio* (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.7.9) and only the material on *inventio* was written (or survived).

Next, Cicero introduced his Hermagoran *stasis* material. However, unlike *ad Herennium*, Cicero presented all four *constitutiones* or *states*: disputes about facts (*coniecturalis*), disputes about definitions (*definitiva*), disputes about the quality of an act (*generalis*), and disputes about correct procedures (*translativa*) (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.8.10).⁹³ The fact that Cicero introduced the *states* at this point (at the beginning of *inventio*), rather than as divisions of *confirmatio*, as did *ad Herennium*, is evidence to Wisse that Cicero's work was less contaminated than the anonymous handbook with post-Aristotelian alterations.⁹⁴ The *constitutio generalis* concerned questions of the importance of an act or what kind of an act it was. Cicero criticised Hermagoras for then making deliberative and epideictic species of this genus (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.9.12 - 1.10.14). The only two species Cicero would accept were equity (*iuridicialis*) and legal (*negotialis*), the first dealing with matters of justice, right and punishment, and the second dealing with legal custom (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.10.14 - 1.11.15).

⁹³ M. Heath, op. cit., p.116, notes with regard to *constitutio coniecturalis*, the simple model, that Cicero put forward three propositions as to where the issue actually lay. At *Inv. Rhet.* 1.10.13 he said that the issue was the initial response of the defence, and that this was Hermagoras' position: "*Placet autem ipsi constitutionem intentionis esse depulsionem...*"; at *Inv. Rhet.* 1.8.10 and 2.4.15 he said that the issue was the question which arises from the initial propositions of prosecution and defence: "*Constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta...*" but then gives as an example not the question which arose from the conflict of propositions, but only the propositions themselves. Heath believes that *Rhet. Her.* 1.11.18 is the same as Cicero's third position: "*Constitutio est prima deprecatio defensoris cum accusatoris insimulatione coniuncta.*" Heath suggests that Hermagoras was modified to appear less one-sided. From p.117 Heath provides the variants in Cicero's presentation of the other *constitutiones*. Antoine Braet, "The Classical Doctrine of *status* and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation," *Ph & Rh* 20 (1987), pp.81-85, has already noted these three positions (incorrectly on p.81 attributed to the second book of *Inv. Rhet.*) but was more interested in the question of from whose point of view (defendant, prosecutor, judge) the *statis* was determined, and answers that the defendant bore this responsibility.

⁹⁴ J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.86-87.

Cicero made a distinction between *constitutiones* that involved general reasoning and those that involved the interpretation of documents. He considered there to be five matters with regard to the second: variance between words and intent, conflicting laws, ambiguous meaning, reasoning by analogy, and definition (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.13.17). These are the same as is found limited to the *constitutio legitima* in *ad Herennium*. From the *constitutio* the question to be resolved (*quaestio*), the reason or excuse (*ratio*), the narrower focus of the point for the judge's decision (*iudicatio*), and the foundation argument (*firmamentum*) emerged (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.13.18-19).

The remainder of the first book was devoted to a consideration of the *partes* of a speech and, as with *ad Herennium*, Cicero had six: *exordium*, *narratio*, *partitio*, *confirmatio*, *reprehensio*, and *conclusio*. Much of the material in the two works is similar, in parts nearly identical.

In the second book of *de Inventione*, Cicero undertook to deal with particular topics for *confirmatio* and *reprehensio* (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.3.11). The particular topics were with regard to the three genres which, beyond a brief mention early on, had not been a feature of the first book. Even though all speeches involved one or more of the four general issues, there were also rules particular to each type (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.4.12). He began by considering forensic speeches (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.4.14 - 2.51.154). Much of book 2 consists of repetitions or summaries of material from the previous book and then a detailed comment on how different types of orators would make use of the material.

The *constitutio coniecturalis* was the first issue examined for its use in forensic speeches (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.4.14 - 2.16.51) and is divided into three: cause, person and the nature of the act (*Inv.*

Rhet. 2.5.16). Under cause or motive, Cicero listed impulse (*impulsio*) and premeditation (*ratiocinatio*), and considered arguments that a prosecutor could make (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.5.19 - 2.7.24) and a defender could make (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.8.25-28). Under character or person (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.9.28-31), Cicero mentioned again the attributes he had listed earlier (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.24.34 - 1.25.36) and went on to consider how a prosecutor (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.10.32-34) and a defender (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.11.35-37) could employ them. Under action Cicero again turned to his earlier statements (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.26.37 - 1.28.43) and summarised them (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.12.38 - 2.13.44), but this time did not consider it necessary or a simple matter to outline how the prosecution and defence could draw arguments from this (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.13.44-45). This section on issues of fact finished with some comments that although some topics would only apply to particular cases, some would be common topics (*loci communes*), applicable to most forensic speeches and available to both prosecutor and defender: the advantage or disadvantage of suspicions, rumours, tortures, the defendant's past life, and motive. Some were particular to the prosecutor: to highlight the atrocity of a crime and to demand no pity; some were particular to the defender: to highlight the malice of the prosecution and to appeal for pity (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.15.48 - 2.16.51).

The second issue, *constitutio definitiva*, was treated in a similar fashion (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.17.52 - 2.18.56). Both prosecutor and defender would attempt to define a charge such as to include or exclude the matter under consideration and to convince a jury to reject the opposing side's definition. Common topics (*loci communes*) also were involved, such as comparison, magnification or reduction of advantage, and indignation.

The *constitutio translativa* was the next issue handled (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.19.57 - 2.20.61) and again Cicero presented some common topics that would be employed: charges need to be made correctly, and one who wants a change of charge must be afraid of the outcome.

The last issue was *constitutio generalis* (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.21.62 - 2.39.115) with its two subdivisions: *negotialis* and *iuridicalis*. Under the first, Cicero placed consideration of the source of law—nature, custom and statute—and the rules that applied to each of them as well as the common topics involved (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.22.65-68). Here Cicero noted only very general points. Under the second, Cicero listed absolute and assumptive. The absolute dealt with clear questions of right and wrong and could be used in arguments found in *negotialis* (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.23.69-71). The assumptive dealt with extraneous matters that affected the quality of an action: comparison (*comparatio*), retort of the accusation (*relatio criminis*), shifting the charge (*remotio criminis*), and confession and avoidance (*concessio*). With each of these Cicero outlined their meaning, gave an example, looked at the particular topics that would provide arguments⁹⁵ and the common topics.⁹⁶ Finally some thoughts about reward and punishment were added (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.37.110 - 2.39.115).

As well as the four *stases*, Cicero presented arguments concerning the interpretation of texts, which he had mentioned already. For each of the five subdivisions he presented particular objectives and rules for prosecutor and defender.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 2.24.74 - 2.26.76; 2.27.79 - 2.28.85; 2.29.87 - 2.30.90; 2.32.99 - 2.33.101; and 2.35.106 - 2.36.109.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.26.77-78; 2.28.85-86; 2.30.91-94; 2.33.101-103; and 2.36.109.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.40.116 - 2.41.121; 2.41.122 - 2.38.143; 2.39.144-147; 2.50.148-153; and 2.51.153-154.

After this lengthy presentation of forensic speeches, attention was turned to deliberative and epideictic speeches. Solmsen, in noting that these two *genera* were not presented under the *partes*, suggested that they suffered less alteration to their original Aristotelian form.⁹⁸ Much of what Cicero had written already could be applied to these kinds of oratory but, because of the differing aims of each type of oratory, there would be different topics involved (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.51.155). Cicero added to Aristotle's advantage (*utilia*), honour (*honestum*) as another end of deliberative oratory. The points that Cicero made about deliberative oratory (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.52.157 - 2.58.176) and epideictic oratory (*Inv. Rhet.* 2.59.177) were not concerned with particular rules but were concerned with helping the orator understand the goal of a kind of speech so that his words might help link a proposed course of action with a desired end.

Finally, and very briefly, Cicero considered epideictic speech. He referred to his previous discussion of the attributes of a person, which was part of his exposition of the *confirmatio* of a speech. As a further classification he proposed dividing the topics into three: the mind (*anima*—considering the intellectual virtues already mentioned), the body (*corpus*—considering health [*corporis valetudo*], beauty [*dignitas*], strength [*vis*], and speed [*velocitas*]), and external circumstances (*extraneas res*—such as public office [*extraneus honos*], money [*pecunia*], connections [*affinitas*], birth [*genus*], etc.).

These two works, *ad Herennium* and Cicero's *de Inventione*, are of some importance in the history of classical rhetoric because they represent the general rhetorical theory (with its variants) as it would have been known by most who received rhetorical education in the first-century B.C. Even though Cicero went on later in life to present his own refinements, these were

⁹⁸ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," pp.48-49.

the insights of one man which may never have been known to many practising orators. The two works here presented, however, are certainly a window into the commonly and widely held beliefs about rhetoric.

c) Cicero - *de Oratore*

After a lifetime of experience being both politician and advocate (as well as amateur philosopher), Cicero returned to putting his thoughts about rhetoric on paper. Drawing on his own practice, Cicero contemplated the art of oratory, in particular the person of the orator. Cicero's interest had changed from what can be found in *de Inventione*; no longer was it theoretical as much as practical knowledge.⁹⁹ Cicero's *de Oratore* has long been considered his most important rhetorical work,¹⁰⁰ particularly in comparison with *de Inventione*, because of his rejection of this earlier work (*de Or.* 1.2.5). Written in a dialogue form,¹⁰¹ and set at Crassus' villa at Tusculum in 91 B.C.,¹⁰² it was composed by Cicero in 55 B.C. and dealt with the qualities an orator needed.

⁹⁹ Alan Edward Douglas, "The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorica: A Study in Method," *ANRW* 1.3 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973), p.98.

¹⁰⁰ A. D. Leeman, *op. cit.*, p.92; G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, pp.140-141. Cf. Paul Prill, "Cicero in Theory and Practice: The Securing of Good Will in the *Exordia* of Five Forensic Speeches," *Rhetorica* 4 (1986), p.109.

¹⁰¹ Philip Levine, "Cicero and the Literary Dialogue," *CJ* 53 (1957/8), pp.146-151, puts forward the view that Cicero wrote in dialogue form so as to present unpalatable Greek thought in an acceptable Roman setting with acceptable Roman figures saying acceptable Roman things.

¹⁰² W. Görler, "From Athens to Tusculum: Gleaning the Background of Cicero's *De oratore*," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.215-235, points out that the setting was in reality a description of Cicero's own villa, and, given its Platonic background, that Crassus was presented not only as Cicero's own mouthpiece but as a Sokratic martyr as well.

Crassus began the dialogue setting forth the purpose and importance of oratory: to win the good will of the audience and to persuade them (*de Or.* 1.8.30).¹⁰³ In response to the criticism of Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 117 B.C.), Crassus' father-in-law, that oratory was limited to the law courts, the Senate and assemblies, and to pleasing the intelligent with eloquence (*de Or.* 1.10.44), Crassus, taking issue with Plato's *Gorgias*, argued that, even if an orator had limited venue, he needed a broad knowledge.¹⁰⁴ Cicero had Crassus take up a position similar to Gorgias, that the orator would speak better on a particular topic than an expert in the field.¹⁰⁵ Rhetoric or eloquence was considered by Crassus not to be an *ars* if that meant an exact science in which something is known completely and thoroughly, but it was an *ars* only according to a less rigorous definition (*de Or.* 1.23.109).¹⁰⁶

Crassus summarised the school rhetoric—that the orator's task was to persuade,¹⁰⁷ that oratory concerned either general or particular questions,¹⁰⁸ that the point at issue had to be determined (and the three *stases* were mentioned - *de Or.* 1.31.139),¹⁰⁹ that there were three kinds

¹⁰³ In the *expositio* that follows Cicero also noted another function of oratory—to speak well: “*Aut tam iucundum cognitu atque auditu, quam sapientibus sententiis gravibusque verbis ornata oratio et polita?*” (*de Or.* 1.8.31)

¹⁰⁴ Cic. *de Or.* 1.11.48: “*Dicendi enim virtus, nisi ei, qui dicit, ea, de quibus dicit, percepta sint, exstare non potest.*” At 1.12.53 Crassus is made to include an understanding of human emotions and character as part of that broad knowledge.

¹⁰⁵ Pl. *Grg.* 456b-c; Cic. *de Or.* 1.15.65-67—although Cicero did qualify this by adding “*cum cognoveri ab eis*” and “*cum acceperit.*”

¹⁰⁶ At 2.7.30 Antonius was made to express a similar opinion—that oratory was not an art since it dealt with opinion not knowledge.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.31.138: “... *primum oratoris officium esse, dicere ad persuadendum accommodate.*”

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 2.31.133 - 2.34.145 where Antonius argued that all particular cases could be put in general terms, employing *stases* when one considered the act rather than the actors.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.25.105 - 2.26.113 mentioned these three *stases* again. The fourth, *translativa*, had been omitted.

of oratory,¹¹⁰ that the orator had five tasks, that the arrangement of a speech was important,¹¹¹ and style was important.

Antonius' criticisms of the theoretical rhetoric found in handbooks leads to the very heart of Cicero's personal insights in the middle years of his career. Theory was insufficient.¹¹² Not only must there be theory or instruction,¹¹³ but the ingredients for a good orator also included natural ability¹¹⁴ and practice or experience.¹¹⁵ This interplay is really the major theme that runs through this work.¹¹⁶ A little less stylistically and in reference particularly to *inventio*, Antonius again made mention of these three things as being essential for the properly functioning orator (*de Or.* 2.35.147).

Even though Antonius argued that handbook rhetoric was insufficient, he agreed with Crassus about the purpose of oratory, that it was to speak well and convincingly (*de Or.* 1.49.213),¹¹⁷ even though he believed other tasks could be performed by the orator.¹¹⁸ One can

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 1.31.141. Epideictic was not named but described as "*quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur.*" At 2.10.43 - 2.11.48, the epideictic only just managed to remain included. Antonius expressed the opinion that this branch did not need rules. M. L. Clarke, op. cit., pp.52-53, notes that even after saying this, we find Antonius detailing a conventional list of *loci* for epideictic as would be found in any handbook.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 1.31.143, where the securing of the audience's goodwill was allocated to the beginning of a speech.

¹¹² Ibid., 2.18.75: "*Nec mihi opus est Graeco aliquo doctore, qui mihi pervulgata praecepta decantet, cum ipse nunquam forum, nunquam ullum iudicium aspexerit...*"

¹¹³ Ibid., 1.25.115; 2.8.32; 2.9.38; 2.16.70; 2.20.85; 2.34.146; 2.39.162; 3.20.77.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 1.25.114; 2.9.38; 2.20.85-87; 2.23.98; 2.39.162; 3.20.77.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 1.27.123; 1.33.149 - 1.34.159; 2.8.32; 2.16.70; 2.17.72; 2.20.85; 2.22.90-92; 2.27.119; 2.30.131; 2.34.146; 2.39.162; 2.41.175; 3.20.77.

¹¹⁶ Friedrich Solmsen, "Cicero's First Speeches: A Rhetorical Analysis," *TAPhA* 69 (1938), pp.555-556.

¹¹⁷ Harold Gotoff, "Oratory: The Art of Illusion," *HSCP* 95 (1993), pp.219-313, argues that Cicero's speeches often cannot be used by the historian to discover the truth about events because these speeches reflect Cicero's main purpose, which was to be effective on the day it was delivered. He sums up his approach to Cicero on p.313: "For
(continued...)"

note here Cicero's intuitive insight into rhetoric's ultimate failure: its divorce from practical application through an over-emphasis on declamation for its own sake, its theoretical rigidity and the intimidation of orators that confined them to theory and did not allow them to experiment or trust their own instincts.

For the rest of *de Oratore*, with these comments in mind, Cicero considered each of the five *officia* of the orator.¹¹⁹ *Inventio* was the first considered and here, in a thoroughly Aristotelian spirit, can be found discussion of rational argument, character and emotions (*de Or.* 2.24.99 - 2.75.306).¹²⁰

*Ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa: ut probemus vera esse, quae defendimus; ut conciliemus eos nobis, qui audiunt; ut animos eorum, ad quemcumque causa postulabit motum, vocemus.*¹²¹

¹¹⁷ (...continued)

when a man gets up to speak, his intention is clear and simple: to persuade. And in order to persuade he will say, do, become whatever is necessary to accomplish his aim. Versimilitude is more important than truth; and the critic would be well advised never to trust the absolute sincerity of the man's words or the *persona* he presents." Aristotle, as philosopher, not to mention Plato, would have been shocked indeed! A little less harsh are the words of Prentice A. Meador, "Rhetoric and Humanism in Cicero," *Ph & Rh* 3 (1970), p.8, who, in noting similarities between Cic. *de Or.* and Cic. *Off.*, wrote: "... due to the nature of man and society, probable truth is valid for practical life. Cicero prefers that man act of absolute, pure, moral obligation... So man, in the Ciceronian system admits propositions as true upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade him to receive them *as true*, but without certain knowledge that they are so."

¹¹⁸ Cic. *de Or.* 2.15.64: "*In eodem silentio multa alia oratorum officia iacuerunt, cohortationes, consolationes, praecepta, admonita; quae tractanda sunt omnia disertissime; sed locum suum in his artibus, quae traditae sunt, habent nullum.*"

¹¹⁹ I am in general agreement with the structural outline proposed by F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," p.48 and J. Wisse, *op. cit.*, p.191.

¹²⁰ John T. Kirby, "Ciceronian rhetoric: theory and practice," in W. J. Dominik, *Roman Eloquence*, p.16: "As for the content, it is above all in the *De Oratore* that Cicero shows the influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: we now find, in book 2, a fundamental shift from the (originally sophistic) approach to invention based on the *moria logou*, or parts of the oration, to the tripartite Aristotelian scheme of *ethos/pathos/logos*..."

¹²¹ Cic. *de Or.* 2.27.115: "Thus for the purposes of persuasion the art of speaking relies wholly upon three things: the proof of our allegations, the winning of our hearers' favour, and the rousing of their feelings to whatever impulse our cause may require." (Translation from E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, trans., *Cicero III: De Oratore, Books I-II*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1942]) This is repeated at 2.28.121; 2.29.128-129 (where Cicero identified *ethos* with a gentle style, rational argument with a sharp style and *pathos* with an energetic style: "... tres sunt rationes, ut ante dixi: una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum, tertia concitandorum. Harum (continued...)

The Aristotelian distinction between artificial and inartificial proof was retained (*de Or.* 2.27.116-117). The rational arguments, including the *states* (*constitutiones* in *Inv. Rhet.*) and *loci communes* were presented in the light of Cicero's observations about ability, study and practice (*de Or.* 2.24.99 - 2.26.113; 2.27.116 - 2.41.177).¹²² The use of commonplaces or common topics (*loci communes*) would be more successful when used properly, i.e., by an orator of experience and practice (*de Or.* 2.30.130-131). The character of both orator and client was considered vital to securing the goodwill of the audience, though Cicero's treatment of his subject was brief (*de Or.* 2.43.182-184).¹²³ The treatment of pathos was a little more expansive (*de Or.* 2.44.185 - 2.52.211) and Cicero, through Antonius, made the statement that it was important for the orator to feel the emotion he attempted to arouse in the audience. Unlike Aristotle, there was no analysis

¹²¹ (...continued)

trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia vim desiderat."); 2.42.178; 2.77.310; and 3.27.104. I take it that G. M. A. Grube, "Educational, Rhetorical, and Literary Theory in Cicero," *Phoenix* 16 (1962), p.246, n.34, is victim to a typesetting error and the reference should be 2.129, not 2.199. It is on the basis of these passages that commentators derive the three elements of Ciceronian persuasion: *docere, conciliare* and *movere*. L. Calboli Montefusco, "Aristotle and Cicero on the *officia oratoris*," in W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady, *Peripatetic Rhetoric*, pp.68-69, surveys some of the scholarly opinions about whether Cicero's use of *delectare* instead of *conciliare* in *Brut.*, *Or.* and *Opt. Gen.* made any real difference. Like J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.212, 235, Calboli Montefusco criticises the opinion of Elaine Fantham, "Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos," *Phoenix* 27 (1973), pp.266-268, that Cicero used the terms in a technical sense. I would agree because, and no other commentator seems to mention this, Cicero's choice of verbs changes in these five passages in *de Or.* itself, hardly the fact one would expect for a specialised or technical term. While *conciliare* is always used, sometimes *docere* is used while *probare* and *explanare* also appear, and for the third we find *vocare, movere, concitare* and *permovere*.

¹²² At *de Or.* 2.42.181 Cicero wrote: "*Sed cum tria sint a me proposita, de uno dictum, cum de duobus reliquis dixerio, tum erit denique de disponenda tota oratione quaerendum.*" Sutton and Rackham, in their Loeb translation, render the first part of this as, "But since I have assumed three elements in discovery..." and refer to a threefold list at 2.35.147 (pp.326-327). They understand the threefold list to be about ability, theory, and practice. However, the context of *de Or.* 2.42.181 would suggest otherwise. The one thing thus far discussed was rational argument and Cicero was about to move to pathos and ethos. Thus the reference at 2.42.181 is back to 2.27.115, not 2.35.147.

¹²³ C. Gill, op. cit., pp.156-157, notes that because of the differences between the Athenian and Roman legal systems, Cicero, unlike Aristotle, had to consider the character of both advocate and client and how one influenced the other. See George A. Kennedy, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy in Greece and Rome," *AJPh* 89 (1968), pp.428-435 and James M. May, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy and Patron-Client Identification: Variation on a Theme," *AJPh* 102 (1981), pp.308-315. E. Fantham, "Ciceronian Conciliare," p.266, notes that there is confusion about to whose character Cicero was referring and suggests the confusion has arisen because of the way in which he grafted Aristotle's thoughts onto his own. On p.271 she writes: "The Ciceronian emphasis on the act of *conciliare*, of winning benevolence, has converted the unstressed motive of Aristotle's proof into its actual method. At the same time, the Aristotelian discussion of content has been largely displaced by Cicero's emphasis on style and manner of delivery." J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.222-249, critiques Fantham's position, which he describes as a misreading.

of particular emotions, mainly reflections about how ability and experience could alter an orator's handling of what the handbooks suggested.¹²⁴ What is also of interest is the discussion about the relationship between ethos and pathos (*de Or.* 2.52.211 - 2.53.216).¹²⁵

d) Cicero - *Orator* and *de Partitione Oratoria*

Cicero's later works are less concerned with *inventio* as they are with *elocutio*, and much of what is to be found in these works with regard to the former is not startling. As he himself wrote:

*Ac duo [inventio and dispositio] breviter prima; sunt enim non tam insignia ad maximam laudem quam necessaria et tamen cum multis paene communia.*¹²⁶

In *Orator* there is a clear reference to the three *orationum genera*, although the epideictic was dismissed as "*laudationum et descriptionum*," an opportunity to engage in a very polished

¹²⁴ F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero," pp.396-401; J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.250-300. Cf. E. Schütrumpf, "Non-Logical Means of Persuasion," pp.106-100, who discounts any Aristotelian influence.

¹²⁵ C. Gill, op. cit., p.157. E. Fantham, "Ciceronian Conciliare," p.267, on the basis of 2.53.216, believes Cicero reduced presenting a good character to being a sub-set of emotion. Most commentators hold a similar opinion. See F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," p.179; C. Gill, op. cit., p.157; L. Calboli Montefusco, op. cit., pp.74-75. William W. Fortenbaugh, "*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*: Some remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178-216," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.259-262, follows on from Fantham. He believes there is a distinction between Aristotle's position, that the orator displays goodwill towards the audience (*Rh.* 2.1.5-7 [1378a 9,19]), and Cicero's position, that the orator wins the goodwill of the audience (or, the audience shows goodwill to the orator) (*de Or.* 2.43.182). I do not think Fortenbaugh takes into account a passage like *Rh.* 2.1.2 (1377b 22-24) that points to the orator's display of his own character. While I agree with his comments on Aristotle about goodwill, I think closer attention to the difference between character and goodwill (which I believe can be seen in *de Or.* 2.43.182) would improve the analysis: one leads to the other. Fortenbaugh reaches the conclusion, on p.265, that Cicero's connection between persuasion through character and goodwill derived from Hellenistic handbooks rather than Aristotle. J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.234-237, makes the comment that he believes the difference between Aristotle and Cicero to be that the former examined ethos in connection with the trustworthiness or truthfulness of the orator, while the latter attempted to prove a gentle emotion of sympathy and that, in Cicero, there could be no overlap between *conciliare* and *movere*.

¹²⁶ Cic. *Orat.* 14.44: "The first two topics I shall treat briefly, for they are not specially marked out for the highest praise, but are rather fundamental, and apart from that are shared in common with many other pursuits." (Translation from H. M. Hubbell, trans., in *Cicero V: Brutus, Orator*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1962 (rev. ed.)])

style (*Orat.* 11.37 - 13.42). Epideictic's demise as a practical branch (in terms of seeking to persuade) seems complete.¹²⁷ The fivefold division of rhetoric is mentioned, but only so that Cicero could concentrate on expression. *Inventio*, the content of one's speech (*Orat.* 14.44 - 15.49), was concerned with the three *constitutiones*—the conjectural, defining, and qualitative. The procedural issue had disappeared (*Orat.* 14.45). The orator would use the appropriate *loci communes* to construct a generally applicable speech.

The last of Cicero's works to be considered here is *de Partitione Oratoria*, a catechism of rhetoric. Grube has noted that Cicero never dismissed the technicalities of rhetoric completely, because he returned to them at the end of his life.¹²⁸

Cicero divided rhetorical theory into three parts, one dealing with the orator, the second with the speech, and the third with the question (*Part. Or.* 1.3). In this there seems to be the juxtaposition of the Peripatetic concern with the functions of the orator (*Orat.* 2.5 - 7.26) with the technographic concern with the parts of a speech (*Orat.* 8.27 - 17.60) and the Hermagorean *stasis* material (*Orat.* 18.61 - 39.138), rather than a blending of the different schools.

Inventio was the first function of the orator (*Part. Or.* 2.5 - 3.8), the creating of arguments in order to persuade and arouse the emotions of an audience. Arguments from topics derived from the case itself or from outside were mentioned but consideration of emotions was delayed until the next function. *Collocatio* rather than *dispositio* was Cicero's term for arrangement in this late work (*Part. Or.* 3.9 - 5.16).

¹²⁷ At Cic. *Orat.* 19.65, the other two branches appear to retain their persuasive function in distinction to sophistic *delectare*.

¹²⁸ G. M. A. Grube, *op. cit.*, p.237.

With regard to the question itself, Cicero again accepted the division between the general (*propositum*) and the particular (*causa*). General questions could either be theoretical (*cognitio*) or practical (*actio*). The theoretical, which provide knowledge, involved the three *stases* or *constitutiones*, while the practical centred on matters of obtaining or avoiding something, and advantage or utility (*Orat.* 18.61 - 19.67). Here Cicero divided rhetoric into its three *genera*: epideictic (*demonstrativum*) (*Orat.* 21.70 - 23.82), deliberative (*Orat.* 24.83 - 27.97) and juridical (*iudiciale*) (*Orat.* 28.98 - 39.138). With the latter, in particular, each of the three *constitutiones* suggested different lines of *inventio* both for prosecution and defence. The whole work concludes with some comments on the interpretation of written documents (*Orat.* 38.132-135).

e) Conclusion

Cicero inherited a flourishing and detailed rhetorical heritage but was individual enough to realise that successful and appropriate oratory could not always be achieved by adherence to the rules; particular situations and individual flair also had their part to play. Yet Clarke has criticised him for being neither fully conforming nor fully free.¹²⁹

In examining the rhetorical theories found in *ad Herennium* and the works of Cicero, it has been possible to notice the various ways in which later theories of rhetoric attempted to assimilate competing earlier theories (in particular, the *partes* of the handbooks, the *tria genera causarum* of Aristotle, and the *stases* of Hermagoras).

¹²⁹ M. L. Clarke, op. cit., p.51.

Those who have examined the correspondence between rhetorical theory and oratorical practice in Cicero have sounded a warning for those who attempt a rhetorical analysis of a piece of literature. Prill, who has examined five forensic speeches from throughout Cicero's career to determine the extent to which he followed the rules about how to secure goodwill in the *exordium*, concludes that Cicero certainly knew the rules of rhetoric and could apply them effectively, but that he was not rigid in applying them.¹³⁰ Solmsen has suggested that, with the rousing of the emotions in all parts of a speech, not just at the beginning or end (something not found in Hellenistic oratory after Aristotle), Cicero would have been relying on Roman traditional practice.¹³¹ Clarke has questioned the extent to which, in his practice, Cicero followed his own theoretical additions, innovations and refinements. The conclusion is that he followed his own theory to a great extent, particularly with regard to prose rhythm.¹³²

An analysis of a piece of literature must therefore start with the work itself and what it presents. It is not good enough simply to consider the ways in which a work conforms or not to a preconceived theory. One must deal with the realities of the work itself, which a much broader concern. An analysis of a work may reveal the individual adaptations of its author or it may reveal the precepts of a school of rhetoric about which little is known; it is hard to determine. Further, as with Cicero, an author's approach to writing and commitment to particular points of theory may change over time. All of this adds complexity to the task of interpretation.

3. Quintilian

¹³⁰ P. Prill, *op. cit.*, p.108.

¹³¹ F. Solmsen, "Cicero's First Speeches," p.551.

¹³² M. L. Clarke, *op. cit.*, p.83.

a) Introduction

Quintilian is the last of the three major rhetoricians mentioned by Sider. His *Institutio Oratoria*, written during the reign of Domitian, is a large work devoted to the topic of the education of the orator. In many ways it mirrors much of what is found in Cicero and this may be part of the reason why it has been neglected in recent centuries.¹³³ It begins with an explanation about why Quintilian agreed to write his treatise. The difficulties his friends faced is the central point of this chapter: rhetoric in the ancient world was not a monolithic entity (*Inst.* 1.pr.2). Kennedy sees in Quintilian an admission that there was nothing left in rhetoric to develop, he had only to select.¹³⁴

Oratory had changed since the time of Cicero, indeed Cicero himself had become the touchstone in rhetorical orthodoxy.¹³⁵ That he was regarded generally as out of date and verbose is an indication that Quintilian, who advocated an imitation of Cicero, was a reactionary (*Inst.* 10.1.112). Ciceronian oratory was no longer in fashion because the context in which his oratory had operated had changed. As Winterbottom has noted, in the first century of the empire, the opportunity and hence need for deliberative and forensic oratory declined. Panegyric was the only avenue remaining.¹³⁶ That Quintilian continued to advocate educating a speaker for all the purposes of rhetoric and complained that the topics set for declamation were not helpful for

¹³³ J. F. Leddy, "Tradition and Change in Quintilian," *Phoenix* 7 (1953), p.48: "The reason for this is not far to seek, at least in the English-speaking world, for his treatise is devoted to rhetoric which has fallen into disrepute with us and has acquired the sense of empty and bombastic oratory, insincere and artificial."

¹³⁴ George A. Kennedy, "An Estimate of Quintilian," *AJPh* 83 (1962), p.132. On p.137 he ties this lack of originality to a general decline in Roman political and cultural life.

¹³⁵ Plin. *Ep.* 1.5.11; Tac. *Dial.*

¹³⁶ Michael Winterbottom, "Quintilian and Rhetoric," in *Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin II*, ed. T. A. Dorey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p.81.

training legal minds for realistic situations (*Inst.* 2.10.5) shows just how much he ignored the realities of his own time.¹³⁷

This becomes an important point for the interpretation of Quintilian. One obtains an understanding of contemporary rhetoric not so much through what Quintilian promoted as through what he challenged. This certainly is the current received wisdom about rhetoric in the first century of the empire. One must remember that Quintilian was an educator first and foremost. Rhetoric was but one part of his overall interest.

b) First-Century A.D. Rhetoric

The changes to rhetoric with the advent of the empire are well attested. Whereas one had practised in order to become practical, by the early years of the Principate oratory had practically become practice alone. Leeman calls this the New Style, no longer focusing on forum or law-court but on the school-room.¹³⁸ The history of the development of the *suasoria* (a deliberative exercise usually concerning an historical character) and the *controversia* (a forensic exercise of a hypothetical nature) and how, in comparison with the exercises recommended by Cicero which usually were parallel to and preparatory for similar real-life situations, these examples of declamations gradually concerned themselves with topics that were increasingly remote, bizarre, unreal and fantastic, need not be re-told.¹³⁹ The elder Seneca, who himself made a major contribution to this development, lamented the fact (*Sen. Ep.* 106.12).

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.81-82.

¹³⁸ A. D. Leeman, *op. cit.*, p.224.

¹³⁹ S. F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation.*, esp. pp.1-50; *id.*, *Education in Ancient Rome*, pp.277-327; D. L. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp.213-261; M. L. Clarke, *op. cit.*, pp.85-108; G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, pp.166-172.

Declamation became an opportunity for a display of virtuosity. So esoteric did it become that a good declaimer was not necessarily a good legal advocate, as the elder Seneca asserted.¹⁴⁰ The change is that the political climate altered the nature of rhetoric. In a school speech one could talk on any topic, express any view, create any facts, and not fear the consequences.¹⁴¹

Quintilian himself was very much aware of this trend in rhetoric. Like Messala in Tacitus' *Dialogus*,¹⁴² Quintilian could be quite critical of the way declamation had developed. Indeed, at one point, in comparing declamation to forensic oratory, Quintilian used the simile that declamation was like a castrated slave (*Inst.* 5.12.17), pleasing by its "*resupina voluptate*" (*Inst.* 5.12.20). Declaimers were trained not to be persuasive but pleasing¹⁴³ and in so doing employed a style that was quite baroque (*Inst.* 8.3.23,76; 8.5.22-25; 9.2.42,98) and "*procul a veritate seiuncta*."¹⁴⁴ The student who memorised his own compositions for declamation was not being exposed to the literary greats from whom much could be learned through imitation (*Inst.* 2.7).¹⁴⁵

That these problems could be overcome, declamation served a useful purpose. Provided that they resembled reality, declamatory speeches were a helpful form of practice (*Inst.* 10.5.14).

¹⁴⁰ Sen. *Controv.* 3.pr.18; 9.pr.1-2,5.

¹⁴¹ S. F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation*, p.43.

¹⁴² Tac. *Dial.* 28-35.

¹⁴³ Quint. *Inst.* 5.12.17: "... declamationes, quibus ad pugnam forensem velut praepilatis exerceri solebamus, olim iam ab illa vera imagine orandi recesserunt atque ad solam compositae voluptatem nervis carent, non alio mediis fidius vitio dicentium,..."

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.3.24: "... so far removed from reality..." Cf. *ibid.*, 2.20.4.

¹⁴⁵ C. O. Brink, "Quintilian's *De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae* and Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus*," *CQ* 39 n.s. (1989), pp.472-503, investigates the now lost work of Quintilian which investigated the detrimental effect of declamation.

Indeed, often there was a close correlation between the themes of declamation and actual forensic speeches (*Inst.* 2.10.3-4; 4.1.43; 7.4.11; 7.6.1; 9.2.67).

Winterbottom has put forward the view that declamation may not have been as remote from reality as some writers, ancient and modern alike, would have us believe.¹⁴⁶ His evidence is the Minor Declamations attributed to Quintilian. What he says is that it would have been more important to the student orator to learn about real techniques of argument than real historical arguments. Elsewhere he has made the point that declamation was harmful when taught by the untrained but, when used in conjunction with other elements of rhetorical education, it was a very handy tool.¹⁴⁷

Quintilian himself was just as much a product of the changed political climate. Winterbottom has noted the absence of any direct criticism of the *delatores* in Quintilian.¹⁴⁸ There is a sense in which Quintilian seems trapped in some time-warp, calling for the orator to be the master of the full range of oratorical skills in order to be a leading public figure (*Inst.* 12.1.26), at a time when this was no longer a reality open to them.¹⁴⁹

c) Quintilian's Rhetoric

¹⁴⁶ Michael Winterbottom, "Schoolroom and Courtroom," *Rhetoric Revalued: Papers from the International Society for the History of Rhetoric*, ed. Brian Vickers, Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, vol. 19 (Binghamton [N.Y.]: Center for Medieval & Renaissance Studies, 1982), p.63.

¹⁴⁷ Id., "Quintilian and Rhetoric," p.86.

¹⁴⁸ Id., "Quintilian and the *Vir Bonus*," *JRS* 54 (1964), pp.90-97.

¹⁴⁹ Plin. *Ep.* 3.20.12; Tac. *Dial.* 41.4. See M. Winterbottom, "Quintilian and the *Vir Bonus*," p.97.

What distinguishes Quintilian from other rhetoricians was not just his concern for the orator more than for oratory, for Cicero had shared that concern, but his concern for all aspects of the orator's education.¹⁵⁰ Like Cicero, Quintilian believed that good oratory came not from a rigid adherence to rules but from a flexible and discerning intelligence that paid attention to particular cases and circumstances. Adaptability and expediency were the key (*Inst.* 2.13.2,7). Similarly, Quintilian also believed that a good orator combined study, practice and a natural ability.¹⁵¹

As Cicero had divided *de Partitione Oratoria* into three, so too did Quintilian divide his work into three parts, although a different three. In fact, as Dixon notes, although Quintilian followed in Cicero's steps, he could take an independent line at times.¹⁵² Quintilian divided his work according to the art, the artist and the work (*Inst.* 2.14.5). As Kennedy points out, this is only in partial evidence in the rest of the work, the vast bulk being devoted to the *ars* itself.¹⁵³

Quintilian defined oratory as "*bene dicendi scientiam*" (*Inst.* 2.15.34). It must be argued that Quintilian, who linked speaking well with being good, as Cato had done, had a sense of the orator speaking truthfully not just elegantly. This is reinforced by his quoting Kleantes approvingly that oratory was "*sceintia recte dicendi*" (*Inst.* 2.15.35). The orator, in this view, was freed from the responsibility of ensuring results; the orator's task was to speak the truth or what was probably the truth (*Inst.* 2.17.36-39). Whether or not an orator was persuasive was the

¹⁵⁰ M. Winterbottom, "Quintilian and Rhetoric," p.84.

¹⁵¹ Quint. *Inst.* 2.13.15: "*Multo labore, assiduo studio, varia exercitatione, plurimis experimentis, altissima prudentia, praesentissimo consilio constat ars dicendi.*" See also 3.5.1.

¹⁵² Peter Dixon, *Rhetoric* (London,: Methuen, 1971), p.18.

¹⁵³ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.183.

audience's responsibility not his (*Inst.* 2.17.23). The simple translation of “*bene*” as “well” does not capture this moral dimension found at the beginning of the fifteenth chapter and repeated in the next (*Inst.* 2.16.11). Not only did the orator have to speak well, he had to be good at the same time. Whereas Aristotle had located the ἠθος of the speaker in the speech itself, Quintilian considered it as needing to belong to the speaker even apart from the speech, though the speech would be a reflection of the orator's good character.¹⁵⁴ By freeing the orator from the responsibility of being persuasive, Quintilian believed he had eliminated the need for the orator to deal with untruth.

However, the persuasive dimension was not far removed. Quintilian's work concentrates on forensic oratory, the usefulness of which depended on its persuasiveness. Indeed, in discussing *narratio*, he stated that its purpose was to persuade more than merely instruct (*Inst.* 4.2.21). Emotional appeal was to be used if it were the only means left for securing victory (*Inst.* 6.1.7). Good use of *ornatus* was likely to help an audience believe what an orator had said (*Inst.* 8.3.5). Further, Quintilian even asked what the point was of being master of *ornatus* if one failed to direct it to persuading the judges of a case (*Inst.* 11.1.1-3). Persuasion remained an important part of oratory.¹⁵⁵

When Quintilian commenced his presentation of the art of rhetoric (*Inst.* 3.3.1), he stated that oratory was divided into five parts by the best authorities: *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*,

¹⁵⁴ G. A. Kennedy, “An Estimate,” p.136, argues that Quintilian stressed the need for the orator to be of high moral character because of his strong antipathy towards philosophers.

¹⁵⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.11: “*Nam hoc certe nemo dubitabit, omnem orationem id agere, ut iudici, quae proposita fuerint, vera et honesta videantur.*”

memoria and *pronuntio*.¹⁵⁶ *Inventio* and *elocutio* were the largest sections. He accepted that there were three kinds (*genera*) of oratory, or three kinds of causes (*genera causarum*) (*Inst.* 3.3.15), although with non-forensic oratory he divided it into praise or denunciation of the past and deliberation about the future (*Inst.* 3.4.7).¹⁵⁷ He believed that each *genus* concerned the matter at hand and display, although he seemed to prefer encomiastic or laudatory to epideictic as the title for the kind of oratory concerned with praise and blame (*Inst.* 3.4.12-14). He rejected limiting laudatory to questions of honour, deliberative to questions of expedience and forensic to questions of justice, for each type of oratory could deal with any of those questions (*Inst.* 3.5.16).

Like the later Cicero, Quintilian believed that the orator attempted three things: *docere*, *movere*, and *delectare* (*Inst.* 3.5.2). Rhetoric dealt with either general or indefinite questions (*theses* or *proposita*) or special or definite questions (*hypotheses* or *causae*), but behind every special question lay the more universal question. Every *causa* had a basis (*status* or *constitutio* or *quaestio*) and it was the question which arose from the first conflict between the parties of the *causa* (*Inst.* 3.6.1). Then follows a lengthy discussion about the various understandings and divisions of the *causae* (*coniectura*, *finitio*, and *qualitas*) and the one legal *quaestio* (dealing with the interpretation of the written law) (*Inst.* 3.6.66-68). In this he was guided by Cicero (*Inst.* 3.6.80).

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.3.11-14. He considered the rather esoteric question of whether these five parts were parts of the art or duties of the artist and concluded that they were the former.

¹⁵⁷ This contrasts with the interpretation of Aristotle on epideictic as presented by C. Oravec, *op. cit.* At *Inst.* 3.5.3, he seemed to suggest that the epideictic did not involve the proof of something; the qualifiers "*quae constet esse honesta*" with regard to *laudare* and "*quae ex confesso sint turpia*" with regard to *vituperare* suggest that the orator sought not to prove something or someone as praiseworthy or blameworthy, but rather, accepting that something or someone is praiseworthy or blameworthy as a given, to engage merely in praising or blaming. Further, in contrast with Aristotle, Quintilian seemed here to exclude deliberative oratory from being responded to by a judge (in the general sense in which Aristotle had employed the term).

d) *Inventio* - Epideictic

Institutio presents the *tria genera causarum* in more detail. First came epideictic. Hinks has noticed the difficulty that those who came after Aristotle had when they limited the subject matter of epideictic speech to praise and blame but allowed its character to become display of virtuosity.¹⁵⁸ He followed the common misinterpretation that believed that Aristotle had denied any practical value to epideictic. What Quintilian did not realise was that, just as he attempted to inject it with some semblance of practicality over and beyond its display of virtuosity value (*Inst.* 3.7.4), Aristotle had rejected epideictic as mere display as well. Even in a speech designed merely to please and impress an audience, the orator needed to speak with some semblance of proof, attempting to convince the audience that the subject of the speech really did have the virtues or vices attributes to that subject by the speaker (*Inst.* 3.7.23).

e) *Inventio* - Deliberative

Such a view of the orator (as well as a consideration of the deficiencies of the audience) led Quintilian to assert that the aim of deliberative oratory was the honourable (*honestus*) rather than what was expedient (*utilis*) (*Inst.* 3.8.1-2), that it advised about future action as well as enquired into the past (*Inst.* 3.8.6), that in structure a deliberative speech did not always require an *exordium* or occasionally a *narratio*, and that appeals to the emotions were quite proper (*Inst.* 3.8.10-13). Not limiting its subject solely to politics, Quintilian treated deliberative oratory in terms of the subject (*Inst.* 3.8.16-35), the audience (*Inst.* 3.8.36-47), and the speaker (*Inst.* 3.8.48-53).

¹⁵⁸ D. A. G. Hinks, op. cit., pp.174-175.

f) *Inventio* - Forensic

Quintilian began his discussion about forensic oratory by noting the five parts of speech (*Inst.* 3.9.1).¹⁵⁹ The first task of the forensic orator was to determine the *status* (*Inst.* 3.10.5) and its related *quaestio* and then the line of defence or prosecution. Books 4 to 6 were devoted to the parts of a forensic speech.

In book 5 Quintilian turned to *probatio* (*confirmatio*) and, in his preface, condemned the unnamed Aristotle for having rejected appeals to emotion. No matter how much modern commentators find that this was not the case with Aristotle, the ancients themselves, Quintilian at least, believed his statement in chapter 1 of the first book that appeals to emotion had no place in rhetoric. However, he followed the Aristotelian model of treating forensic oratory more closely than had Cicero, by considering *inartificiales* and *artificiales* proof (*Inst.* 5.1.1-2). The *inartificiales* occupied the first part of book 5: decisions of previous courts (*praeiudiciorum*) (*Inst.* 5.2), rumour (*rumor*) (*Inst.* 5.3), torture (*tormentum*) (*Inst.* 5.4), documents (*tabulae*) (*Inst.* 5.5), oaths (*iusiuranda*) (*Inst.* 5.6), and witnesses including both oral and written testimony (*testimonia*) (*Inst.* 5.7). Although they were given, an orator required art to make the most of them.

When considering the *artificiales* Quintilian was more Ciceronian than Aristotelian, adopting the distinction between thing and person (*res* and *persona*) rather than special and common topic (*Inst.* 5.8.4). All proofs must be either necessary, probable, or possible (*Inst.* 5.8.6). Proof could be obtained through signs, arguments, or examples (*Inst.* 5.9.1). Necessary

¹⁵⁹ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," p.49, noted that Quintilian, like *Rhet. Her.* and *Cic. Inv. Rhet.*, included the *partes* of a speech as part of *inventio*, a customary departure from the Peripatetic scheme.

proofs were not a part of the art of oratory because there was nothing about them that could be debated (*Inst.* 5.9.3-4), some signs could either be necessary or probable, and the latter only were of rhetorical significance, to be used in conjunction with other proofs (*Inst.* 5.9.9-10).

Arguments were the result of a reasoned process that started from something that needed no proof in order that proof of something else be obtained (*Inst.* 5.10.11). Credible arguments were to be based on what usually happens, what is highly probable, and when there is no evidence contrary to an assumption (*Inst.* 5.10.16). Arguments could employ *loci*, and Quintilian provided the usual list of them associated with people (*Inst.* 5.10.23-31) and things (*Inst.* 5.10.32-52). Here the *causae* or *quaestiones* could be applied to the *loci*. Arguments could be derived from a comparison between subsequences, similarities, dissimilarities, consequences, contradictions or results (*Inst.* 5.10.71-86) and from a comparison between the greater and the lesser (*Inst.* 5.10.86-94). Examples were different from arguments. An example amounted to a comparison between particular instances to establish similarity (*Inst.* 5.11.6).

The place of emotional appeal occupies the second chapter of book 6. Quintilian went as far as to argue that emotional appeal was more powerful than proof, for the stirring of the emotions created personal interest and interrupted rational thinking (*Inst.* 6.2.4-6). He considered *πάθος* (*adfectus*) and *ἦθος* (*mores*) to be species of emotion, one stronger, the other calmer. The Aristotelian distinction had been lost. The closest Quintilian came to it was when he stated that when these pleasant emotions were aroused it was in such a way that the character of the speaker

was revealed (*Inst.* 6.2.13) and that a person of ἦθος was a person of good character (*Inst.* 6.2.18). He related ἦθος with comedy and πάθος with tragedy (*Inst.* 6.2.20).¹⁶⁰

To stir the emotions most effectively, Quintilian suggested that the orator needed to feel the emotion himself (*Inst.* 6.2.26), particularly the stronger emotions like anger and grief. Producing more comic emotions often involved lies and exaggeration (*Inst.* 6.3.6). One could be successful at raising laughter or employing wit depending upon nature and opportunity. In forensic pleading there was a limited role for wit (*Inst.* 6.3.22-42).

g) Conclusion

Leddy has contrasted Cicero and Quintilian and noted that Quintilian was possessed of a common sense, candour and simplicity that was often lacking in Cicero.¹⁶¹ Yet, he concludes, Quintilian's thoughts had little practical effect; rhetoric headed off in another direction. His sense of practical style had but little impact and represented the memorial to a dying age rather than the instrument of its renewal.¹⁶² As the champion of Cicero, Quintilian must have appeared somewhat out-dated to his own contemporaries. In championing Cicero, Quintilian established a standard of stylistic practice.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," p.179, wrote that Quintilian's attempt to reinvigorate the emotions lacked material to make it effective. C. Gill, op. cit., p.159, argues that Quintilian was not as disorganised as may appear.

¹⁶¹ J. F. Leddy, op. cit., p.50.

¹⁶² Ibid., p.56.

¹⁶³ G. A. Kennedy, "An Estimate of Quintilian," p.140.

Ultimately Quintilian was interested in the practical dimension of the ideal orator rather than the theoretical and yet, because he failed to address the change of circumstances for orators in the years since Cicero, his practical view of the orator fell far short of the ideal.¹⁶⁴ Even though the vast bulk of Quintilian's work was devoted to the *ars* of rhetoric, his concern for the artist and the orator in books 1 and 12 over-arches the entire treatise. This was his own emphasis.¹⁶⁵

Many commentators have viewed Quintilian as representative of the Silver Age, already one rung below Cicero, an age which itself was about to be replaced by one of an even lower standard. Blair's comments would advise us to speak of a transformation of rhetoric rather than its decline, even though Quintilian himself believed there to have been a decline in the art.¹⁶⁶

***Inventio* in Tertullian**

I have put forward already the suggestion that *adversus Iudaeos* is a forensic piece of writing, in all likelihood a *controversia*, and that the *stasis*, *status* or *constitutio* is conjectural. Further, I have advanced the position that what gives the treatise the impression that it is a *controversia* is the novel twist provided by Tertullian: he argued that God, who was the defendant in this matter, was innocent of the charge of having *not* changed those who could be admitted to divine favour. Rather than the usual line of defence that a person was innocent because they had not done something alleged, Tertullian argued that God was innocent not because God had done nothing! God was innocent because God had indeed done something! In

¹⁶⁴ D. L. Clark, *op. cit.*, p.118, suggests that Tac. *Dial.* does contain this historical consciousness.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.115-116.

¹⁶⁶ Elaine Fantham, "Imitation and Decline: Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the First Century After Christ," *CPh* 73 (1978), pp.112-115, believes that Quintilian believed that oratory had declined because of inadequate imitation.

other words, rather than having done nothing to change the situation, as the Jews asserted, Tertullian argued that God indeed had changed the situation. No other commentator seems to have noted this rhetorical dimension in the treatise. Also, by defending God, by saying the God was innocent of having done nothing (rather than saying that God was guilty of having done something), Tertullian was able to cast his opponent in the role of prosecutor arguing for God's guilt. One could argue that this was an attempt by Tertullian to capture the moral high-ground.

Some may argue that by admitting that his client had done something, the issue presented by Tertullian should be seen as qualitative rather than conjectural. However, as Quintilian noted, there was the rhetorical opinion that the other *status*, such as the qualitative, dealt with matters or facts that were certain (while the conjectural dealt with matters that were uncertain).¹⁶⁷ Thus, in the qualitative *status* it was not the facts that were disputed, but their kind or quality.¹⁶⁸ Both prosecution and defence would accept that something had happened and the defence would seek to justify it on some basis.

This is not the case in *adversus Iudaeos* because the Jews did not accept that God had rejected them and welcomed the Christians. The dispute between Christians and Jews, according to what is revealed in Tertullian's treatise, was one about fact, not its quality. Thus the dispute is conjectural. In the language of classical rhetoric, the usual conjectural *status* could be expressed thus: the Jews—"God has done nothing to change those who may be admitted to

¹⁶⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 3.6.34.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 3.6.80: "*Nam primum oportet subesse aliquid, de quo ambigitur; quod, quid sit et quale sit, certe non potest aestimari, nisi prius esse constiterit, ideoque ea prima quaestio.*"; 7.4.3: "*...factum esse constat, quale sit factum quaeritur.*"

divine favour,” Tertullian—“God has changed who may be admitted,” and the question is—“has God changed those who may be admitted?”

With this in mind my focus shall be on *inventio* in Tertullian’s conjectural forensic treatises rather than his other types of forensic treatises or other types of treatises in general (deliberative or epideictic). With regard to the epideictic treatises, one could refer to Mark LeTourneau’s article for an example of a rhetorical analysis of Tertullian’s use of *inventio* in *de Baptismo*, particularly with regard to his use of *topoi* or *loci*.¹⁶⁹ His conclusion was that Tertullian’s love of antithesis and his intricate structure of logical appeals were derived from his conscious, frequent and skillful exploitation of classical invention.¹⁷⁰

Sider has noted that, when investigating matters of fact, Tertullian employed both artificial and non-artificial proofs. In *de Testimonio Animae*, Tertullian offered the soul as a witness, a non-artificial proof, which was then cross-examined to offer evidence that there is but one God. What Tertullian was concerned to do, as any orator knew, was to establish confidence in the reader of the treatise that his witness was reliable and trustworthy.¹⁷¹ He did this by asserting that this witness would not be false because of its divine origin, something accepted by most pagan philosophers, and its simple nature. In chapters 2 to 4 Tertullian provided the evidence given by the soul, and in chapter 5 he dealt with objections to the trustworthiness of the soul as a witness.

¹⁶⁹ Mark LeTourneau, “General and Special Topics in the *De Baptismo* of Tertullian,” *Rhetorica* 5 (1987), pp.87-105.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.103-104.

¹⁷¹ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.43-44.

Apologeticum offers some examples of pure defence conjecture: the charges brought against the Christians involving Thyestean banquets and incest were false, because there was no non-artificial proof from either signs or witnesses, only rumours (Tert. *Apol.* 7).¹⁷² Artificial proofs, using the *topoi* or *loci* of motive, ability, nature, means, and past action were used to argue that the charges were not only improbable but impossible (Tert. *Apol.* 8).¹⁷³ Such things with which the Christians were charged were hardly part of human nature. These arguments are about the person. In the second half of the chapter are arguments about the action—how can so many people who have no family be committing incest? Chapter 9, in presenting the *locus* of past action, asks how Christians, who protest against abortion, can be in support of the murder of children. The second lot of charges against the Christians, sacrilege and treason, were handled not using the conjectural method but that of quality: the action was admitted but how it was to be understood was debated.

The first book of *adversus Marcionem* was divided by Sider into definitional, conjectural and qualitative parts. In chapters 8 to 21, the conjectural part, the arguments derive from the *loci* of cause and effect, place, past deeds, means, ability, manner, and time.¹⁷⁴ Particularly striking are Tertullian's arguments against the existence of the Marcionite god from the *locus* of cause and effect. There is nothing in creation that points back to such a god and, if there is no effect, it must

¹⁷² Although Sider referred to an unpublished dissertation by Paul Keresztes, he did not mention his earlier published article, "Tertullian's *Apologeticus*: A Historical and Literary Survey," *Latomus* 25 (1966), pp.124-133, where Keresztes put forward the view that *Apologeticum* was not forensic but deliberative, in which Tertullian urged the Roman authorities to end persecution.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp.45-48. See also Louis J. Swift, "Forensic Rhetoric in Tertullian's *Apologeticum*," *Latomus* 27 (1968), pp.864-877.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.49-54.

follow that there is no cause.¹⁷⁵ In the last chapter of this section of the book, Tertullian exploited the contradictions contained in the Marcionite claims. The third book uses non-artificial proof derived from signs.¹⁷⁶ This is the book that parallels closely, at least in chapters 7 and 13 to 20, *adversus Iudaeos*. Sider mentioned chapter 13 (which corresponds to the first part of *adv. Iud.* 9) where Tertullian made use of the rhetorical point of offering support to the probative nature of a sign by demonstrating its uniqueness (Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.13.5). As will be noted, this argument also appears in *adv. Iud.* 9.7.

De Carne Christi is another example of a conjectural treatise. Here Tertullian's opponents deny that Christ had human flesh. Tertullian examined God's motive and will from the point of view of the deliberative *loci* of advantage, honour, and necessity in both *refutatio* and *confirmatio*.¹⁷⁷ Sider saw artificial proof from the *loci* of desire, ability, and cause in *de Resurrectione Mortuorum*.¹⁷⁸ Van der Nat has argued that *de Spectaculis* is not so much a theological treatise as a dispute or debate in which Tertullian sought to win an argument.¹⁷⁹

Sider has suggested that rhetorical theory "provided Tertullian with two particularly useful sets of rules" when it came to the use of Scripture in argument.¹⁸⁰ One set of rules concerned the legal questions or non-artificial proofs of interpreting a written document and the other set were

¹⁷⁵ See Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.25.

¹⁷⁶ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.54-55.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.55-63.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.63.

¹⁷⁹ P. G. van der Nat, "Tertullianae II," *VC* 18 (1964), pp.129-143. Cf. Robert D. Sider, "Tertullian, *On the Shows: An Analysis*," *JTS* n.s. 29 (1978), pp.339-365.

¹⁸⁰ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.63.

the artificial proofs of the conjectural method. In a sense, Sider touched upon an issue that seems unresolved in classical rhetoric: the relationship between artificial and non-artificial proof. Although the traditional distinction is that non-artificial proof comes from outside the case and exists already and artificial proof is constructed by the orator from within the case,¹⁸¹ Quintilian stated implicitly that there could be no artificial proof without non-artificial proof.¹⁸² Indeed, in defining what an argument was, Quintilian noted that an argument was a process of confirming uncertain facts as certain by reference to other certain facts (which we may understand as evidence or non-artificial proof).¹⁸³ Perhaps one could suggest that the distinction lay between evidence (non-artificial proof) and what one made with the evidence (artificial proof). Arguments about evidence, then (e.g., the interpretation of written documents or witnesses) in the rhetorical theory were not arguments about how to make use of evidence (which was the responsibility of artificial proof) but were arguments about whether or not to accept the evidence in the first place. Arguments about evidence are what Quintilian, following Hermagoras, called legal questions (*legitimi questiones*) (*Inst.* 3.6.66-67), which involved the letter and spirit of the law, contradictory laws, syllogism, and ambiguity.

The conjectural use of Scripture was particularly apt when both sides of the argument appealed to the Scriptures as a source of evidence.¹⁸⁴ What Sider noted was that, starting with the Scriptures as the raw material, Tertullian used that information to construct rhetorical arguments.

¹⁸¹ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.2; Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.1.

¹⁸² Quint. *Inst.* 5.8.2: “*Atqui cetera, quae continuo magis orationis tractu decurrunt, in auxilium atque ornamentum argumentorum comparantur, nervisque illis, quibus causa continetur, adiciunt inducti super corporis speciem...*”

¹⁸³ Ibid., 5.10.11-12: “*Ergo, cum sit argumentum ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat, necesse est esse aliquid in causa, quod probatione non egeat. Alioqui nihil erit quo probemus, nisi fuerit quod aut sit verum aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat.*”

¹⁸⁴ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.64.

Reference was made to *de Carne Christi* and the fourth book of *adversus Marcionem*. Sider has noted the presence, in chapters 7 to 10 of the latter, of arguments from the *loci* of opportunity, place, occasion, probable sign, motive, name, manner, aptness, nature, means, and past deeds, all of which were designed to refute the Marcionites and to prove that the Christ was the fulfilment of the Creator's design, not its enemy.¹⁸⁵ Tertullian could take parts of the Scriptures still accepted by the Marcionites and turn them against them. They accepted that Jesus was operative in Galilee even though they denied his Jewishness. Tertullian could argue from the *locus* of place that it could hardly have been likely for Jesus to have lived and preached in Galilee unless he were himself Jewish.

Briefly, Sider indicated the presence of qualitative arguments, such as admitting the act but arguing that it was committed for honourable purposes or for advantage or because of extenuating circumstances, in *Apologeticum*, in chapters 22 to 27 of the first book of *adversus Marcionem*, and in the second book as well.¹⁸⁶ In *Apologeticum*, when Tertullian dealt with the charges of sacrilege (Tert. *Apol.* 10-28) and treason (Tert. *Apol.* 29-45), Sider noted the presence of *comparatio*, one of the assumptive subdivisions of the equitable issue in qualitative causes (Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 2.24.71 - 2.26.78), where one can distinguish two events that appear the same because one has a motive or goal different from the other. What Tertullian did was to admit that the Christians did not offer the gods sacrifice but that it was for a good reason, which was that they did not exist (Tert. *Apol.* 10). With regard to the charge of treason, Tertullian sought to use qualitative arguments to show that by not offering sacrifice to the emperor the Christians were

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., pp.64-72.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., pp.76-84.

respecting the God who protected the emperor. *De Idololatria* was offered as an example of a treatise where the use of definition was crucial.¹⁸⁷

Tertullian was also well able to use what Quintilian described as legal questions when using the Scriptures, such as resolving ambiguity in a text or resolving conflict between the letter and spirit of a written document. Sider referred also to book 4 of *adversus Marcionem*, *de Resurrectione Mortuorum*, *de Pudicitia*, *de Monogamia*, and *de Praescriptione Haereticorum* for other instances of Tertullian's use of Scripture.¹⁸⁸

With these general comments in mind attention may now be turned to Tertullian's use of *inventio* in *adversus Iudaeos*.

Inventio in adversus Iudaeos

1. Introduction

By way of general introduction, it needs to be stated with regard to the treatise as a whole that the facts of this case, from which Tertullian derived and constructed his arguments, come from the Hebrew Scriptures (the Old Testament), rather than any other source. This is not surprising given that the point at issue, the *partitio*, the question of whether or not the Gentiles were admissible to God's grace or law (or whether or not the Gentiles had replaced the Jews as God's people), and the position that Tertullian took with regard to that question (that they were

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp.101-103.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp.88-100.

admissible and they had replaced the Jews - 1.3a, 8), involved the correct interpretation of those Scriptures. Thus there was little need to look elsewhere for source material from which to produce arguments.

It is not a surprise, therefore, in a treatise that purportedly was part of a debate (or, more precisely, what the Christian part of the debate ought to have been like had it not disintegrated) between Jews and Christians to find few references or allusions to the New Testament. It would be a foolish orator who, in seeking to persuade, employed as evidence the testimony from documents, the very legitimacy and admissibility of which would be debated and rejected by his opponents. For Tertullian to have argued that Gentiles were now at least a part of God's people on the basis of the pages of the New Testament would have taken the debate in an entirely different direction. It would have become an argument *about* the inspiration of the New Testament rather than an argument *from* the Scriptures to prove a point. Tertullian would have had to make use of non-artificial proofs rather than artificial ones. To win, Tertullian needed to use evidence his opponents would not rule out of court and then he had to use it against them.

This is entirely consistent with the suggestion that Tertullian composed this work for an imagined readership of both Jews and Christians. It is also consistent with the suggestion that the intended readers were Christians who were having doubts or feeling under pressure about being able to explain their position to pagans or Jews.¹⁸⁹ However, if the intended readers were pagans who, because of an interest in monotheism, were deciding between Judaism and Christianity, one would have expected Tertullian to have made more use of the New Testament for, with such intended readers, merely to demonstrate the supposed inaccuracies or limitations of the Jewish

¹⁸⁹ Anthony J. Guerra, "Polemical Christianity: Tertullian's Search for Certitude," *The Second Century* 8 (1991), p.116.

position would only be half the argument; it would be like a *refutatio* without a *confirmatio*. One would expect Tertullian to have highlighted some of the positive features of Christianity a little more. A treatise that focused on proving that Jesus was the fulfilment of Jewish expectation and that, because of that, Gentiles were now part of God's people, would seem to be a limited tactic in winning pagan adherents to Christianity, unless they were very open-minded Jewish sympathisers already. Indeed, to base one's arguments on the Hebrew Scriptures would be what one would expect Jews to have demanded of Christians.¹⁹⁰

Given that in this treatise Tertullian used as evidence what was accepted by both sides of the debate, much of the time he made use of that evidence to construct conjectural arguments. Sometimes he did argue, from the perspective of the rhetorical legal questions, about the intention of the Scriptural authors or ambiguous meanings in the text. This, as we have noticed earlier, is what Sider meant when he wrote that Tertullian had two methods at his disposal for using the Scriptures.

2. *Exordium*

We have noted already how, in the *exordium* (1.1-3a), Tertullian sought to win his readers' interest by presenting himself as being a character of calm and rational argument rather than by heated and emotional abuse of his opponents. The promise made implicitly in the opening sentences was that the treatise itself would focus on the issues rather than the

¹⁹⁰ M. F. Wiles, "The Old Testament in Controversy with the Jews," *SJT* 8 (1955), pp.115-116. On the latter page he wrote: "Thus Christians never object to being expected to produce evidence not merely for a suffering Messiah, but specifically for a crucified one. Nor do the Jews ever appear to retort that prophecies adduced by Christians are of so general a character that they could be applied just as plausibly to thousands of others as to Jesus... A thorough-going Christological interpretation of the Old Testament is thus not so much a result of such discussions as a presupposition of their taking place at all."

personalities, a ploy readers in this age are used to hearing from politicians at election time. The question is about how much Tertullian remained true to his promise. I suggest that, on the whole, the treatise does remain focused on the issues involved and does not descend to polemic if, by this term, we mean personal invective.¹⁹¹

As the Roman rhetoricians had observed: securing goodwill in the *exordium* could come from the facts of the case or from the persons involved. This *exordium*, by looking at the events that occasioned the writing of this treatise, focuses on the persons involved, particularly the opponent. Tertullian's claim that he wished to avoid the emotionalism that disrupted the debate and wanted to present the arguments more fully and carefully through the calm art of writing (1.1) has the effect of suggesting to the reader that Tertullian was an eminently reasonable person with a balanced and tranquil disposition, who was following up the debate with the written treatise, not because he was a fanatical zealot committed to winning but because he was a rational seeker after the truth. In this he reinforced and augmented the positive aspect of his own character and trustworthiness, in a refined and subtle manner. This was recommended by the rhetoricians:

*Quare in primis existimetur venisse ad agendum ductus officio vel cognationis vel amicitiae maximeque, si fieri poterit, reipublicae aut alicuius certe non mediocris exempli. Quod sine dubio multo magis ipsis litigatoribus faciendum est ut ad agendum magna atque honesta ratione aut etiam necessitate accessisse videantur.*¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Much depends on how one defines "polemic." E.g., Luke T. Johnson, "The New Testament's Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic," *JBL* 108 (1989), pp.419-441, understands slander to be a part of polemic not just in the New Testament but in ancient societies as a whole. David Rokeah, "Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity," *Immanuel* 16 (1983), p.62, recognises a difference between mutual rivalry and polemic being bitter or not. A. J. Guerra, op. cit., p.109, simply uses polemic in its more general sense of "controverting the positions of adversaries," in which case *adversus Iudaeos* is polemical.

¹⁹² Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.7: "It is therefore pre-eminently desirable that he should be believed to have undertaken the case out of a sense of duty to a friend or relative, or even better, if the point can be made, by a sense of patriotism or at any rate serious moral consideration. No doubt it is even more necessary for the parties themselves to create the impression that they have been forced to take legal action by some weighty and honourable reason or even by necessity."

Conversely, the character of the opponent in the debate was tarnished somewhat, Tertullian hoped, by dwelling on the fact that he (the opponent) was not a Jew by birth (1.2). This served not only to weaken the impact of the proselyte's arguments by casting suspicion on his credibility, but also could serve as an example (Tertullian called it "*praerogativam*"),¹⁹³ proving Tertullian's own point that the Gentiles could be admitted as members of God's people or recipients of God's grace or law (1.2-3). It is to be noted, though, that Tertullian immediately and permanently took his attention away from the character of the proselyte.¹⁹⁴ Not only does this support the claim that issues rather than personalities were to be the focus,¹⁹⁵ it perhaps suggests also that this point could not be taken too far, for proselytes and God-fearers would only be a part of God's people to a limited extent in Jewish eyes; to qualify completely would require becoming a Jew (and *ipso facto* no longer being a Gentile). Tertullian was certainly not advancing the argument that Christians had become part of God's people by first becoming Jews.

There is a certain cleverness in Tertullian's method. His restraint in dealing with his opponent here seems quite effective. The only negative quality assigned to him is pride (1.3 - *superbiat*).¹⁹⁶ The merest hint that the proselyte is over-confident is more damning than if Tertullian had launched into a lengthier and more scathing attack. The briefest mention of his non-Jewish origin seems enough to cast more doubt on the proselyte's ability to argue the Jewish position than if Tertullian had laboured the point. Of course, this depends on understanding the

¹⁹³ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xxiii, made the point that this seemed to be a reference equivalent to the non-artificial proof found in the decisions of previous courts (*praeiudicia*) (Quint. *Inst.* 5.1.2) or matters of competence (*praescriptiones*) (Quint. *Inst.* 3.6.72): "Die formale Bedeutung dieses Gedankens ist klar: Es handelt sich um ein *praeiudicium*, eine *praestructio* oder *praescriptio*—hier heißt es 1,2 *hinc habuit praerogativam*—..."

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., merely noted that the proselyte did not remain in focus for long: "Tertullian setzt ihn zunächst sehr schnell beiseite und geht zu einem weiteren vorbereitenden Hinweis über..."

¹⁹⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.11, wrote that only rarely would an advocate abuse an opposing advocate.

¹⁹⁶ This is mentioned specifically by Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.10 as an impression to be avoided.

reference in 1.3a (“*ne Israël adhuc superbiat*”) as being to the proselyte of the previous sentence (1.2). Some may object that the use of the term “Israel” seems to have excluded him. On the other hand, perhaps, now that Tertullian was beginning his critique, proselytes and Jews alike could all be lumped together. For some, this may not seem to be Tertullian at his devastating best,¹⁹⁷ but what we find here is no less skillful and no less appropriate for his oratorical intention.

Ultimately, as Tränkle has observed, we cannot reach certainty about the historical veracity of what occasioned this treatise:

Es ist müßig darüber zu streiten, ab ein solches Gespräch wirklich stattgefunden habe. Das kann geschehen sein.¹⁹⁸

While I would like to maintain the possibility that such an encounter was possible, from a rhetorical perspective, it would have to be admitted that in the age of imitation which was the Second Sophistic, the similarity of setting when compared with Justin Martyr’s *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, and the lack of individuating detail about the proselyte do suggest that this earlier incident could be Tertullian’s literary fiction. Even if that must be conceded, it does not mean that his arguments are any less valid or that they were less relevant to his contemporary age than would otherwise be the case which, as will be seen in the conclusion to this dissertation, some have argued. Indeed, against the argument of Tränkle that what we find in the opening of the treatise is only a literary *topos*,¹⁹⁹ it has to be stated that Tertullian makes no claim that the work

¹⁹⁷ Henry Chadwick, *The Early Church*, Pelican History of the Church, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p.91: “... Tertullian himself: brilliant, exasperating, sarcastic, and intolerant, yet intensely vigorous and incisive in argument, delighting in logical tricks and with an advocate’s love of a clever sophistry if it will make the adversary look foolish, but a powerful writer of splendid, torrential prose.”

¹⁹⁸ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xxiii.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.xxiii.

was itself a dialogue. While Justin's *Dialogus cum Tryphone* is purportedly the record of conversation, to some degree at least, no such assertion was made by the author of *adversus Iudaeos* to any degree. Tertullian was not using a literary *topos* as found in the dialogues of Plato or Cicero or Justin; his work is a treatise and makes no pretence at being a dialogue. That he did not make much fuss about the encounter that occasioned the writing of his treatise may lend some support to the belief that such an encounter did take place, for if he intended merely to be literary why did he not follow precedent and create a dialogue setting? Thus, I believe Schreckenberg's point that the work is more a monologue than a dialogue to be an irrelevant one because Tertullian nowhere claimed that this treatise ever was a dialogue.²⁰⁰ Ultimately, whether Tertullian himself had had a recent encounter with a Jewish proselyte or whether he had in mind encounters others had had in the past is of little importance, for it was only the springboard from which he could launch his theological treatise.

From the fact that Gentiles could become Jews, Tertullian was able to offer a contrary position or a clarification of Is. 40:15, which stated that the nations (*gentes*) were only a drop in the bucket or dust on the scales (1.3a). One certainly gets the impression here that, if there really had been an earlier debate, this piece of Scripture had been used by the proselyte as part of his argument. Not only does that existential fact of Gentiles being able to become Jews put the citation from Isaiah into perspective but other pieces of Scripture do the same thing as well. Tertullian seemed to place one extract of Scripture up against another as an orator would do with

²⁰⁰ H. Schreckenberg, op. cit., p.217: "Tertullians Auseinandersetzung mit der jüdischen Seite ist jedenfalls fast monologisch, und nur sporadisch erscheinen Andeutungen oder Rudimente eines Dialoges." George Foot Moore, "Christian Writers on Judaism," *HTR* 14 (1921), pp.198-199, in his statement—"The occasion of the work, the author tells us was a protracted discussion between a Christian and a convert to Judaism; but the argument is not conducted in the form of disputation."—believed that the treatise was claimed to be a record of that discussion.

conflicting laws.²⁰¹ He seemed more interested in associating his new Scriptural evidence (Gen. 22:18 - “*omnes nationes terrae*”)²⁰² with God who made the promise to Abraham, thereby somehow implying that it had greater authority than the Isaian extract quoted by the proselyte.²⁰³

Although Tertullian did not make such a claim explicitly, it certainly seems to be there implicitly. This has the appearance of an oratorical slight of hand or a convenient oversight. If one were to debate Tertullian one could retort: “Is not Is. 40:15 equally God’s word as is Gen. 22:18? Why does the promise in the latter passage cancel the statement in the former?”

3. *Narratio* and *Partitio*

Ignoring that potential objection, with the mention of the promise to Abraham, Tertullian commenced his *narratio*. In this he set forth God’s promise to Rebekah, the fulfilment of which would be proof against the Jewish position (1.3b-7). In making use of this piece of Scripture (Gen. 25:23) though, Tertullian had first to clear up any ambiguity of reference in the text. In this Tertullian was approaching the Scripture as a written document, to which he could apply the points raised by the legal *quaestio* rather than the conjectural *causa*. The rhetoricians advised the orator to indicate that there was no ambiguity in the text under consideration because its meaning was clear, or to resolve any ambiguity which did exist by examining the disputed text in a wider context.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ *Rhet. Her.* 2.10.15; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 2.49.144-147; *Quint. Inst.* 7.7.1-10.

²⁰² Cf. Gal. 3:16.

²⁰³ *Tert. adv. Iud.* 1.3a: “*Quamquam habeamus ipsum deum idoneum pollicitatorem et fidelem sponsorem...*”

²⁰⁴ *Rhet. Her.* 2.11.16; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 2.40.116 - 2.41.121; *Quint. Inst.* 7.9.1-15.

I have examined the *narratio* of *adversus Iudaeos* elsewhere with regard to the originality of Tertullian's interpretation of the Rebekah prophecy.²⁰⁵ The argument raised in that article is that the interpretation of the passage which identified the elder twin, Esau, with the Jews and the younger twin, Jacob, with the Christians, offered in this treatise by Tertullian, first appears in extant literature with Irenaeus.²⁰⁶ Earlier Christian uses of this prophecy to Rebekah or of the figure of Rebekah or her twins, such as in *Barnabas* and Justin's *Dialogus*, do not make this point explicitly or clearly enough. Here I would have to disagree with Tränkle, who suggested that Tertullian's typology was dependent upon a common tradition going back to Rom. 9:12.²⁰⁷ I have made the point as well that, because Tertullian employed this piece of Scripture in his *narratio* leading up to the refined version of the *partitio* in 1.8 - 2.1a, it is not just one argument among many but is indeed the very central one of the treatise.²⁰⁸ Further to the arguments I have advanced to suggest that, from Tertullian's treatment of the Rebekah prophecy, one could date *adversus Iudaeos* prior to *de Pudicitia*,²⁰⁹ the same suggestion could be made when one considers the relationship between *adversus Iudaeos* and *adversus Marcionem*. The fact, that at *adv. Marc.* 3.24.8-9, Tertullian did not need to prove the connection between Jacob and the Christians ("qui [Jacob] *quidem posterioris et praelatoris populi figura est, id est nostri*") and Esau and the Jews, as he did in *adversus Iudaeos*, may suggest that *adversus Marcionem* was the later work.

²⁰⁵ Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah: A Re-Reading of an 'Anti-Jewish' Argument in Early Christian Literature," *VC* 52 (1998), pp.119-145. See Appendix A.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.140-141.

²⁰⁷ H. Tränkle, *op. cit.*, p.lxxv: "... ein Gedanke... geht letztlich auf Röm. 9,12f. zurück und wird nicht selten ausgeführt, so Barn. 13,1ff.; Iren. Haer. 4,21,2..."

²⁰⁸ G. D. Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah," p.143.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.121-122. See also Eric Osborn, "The Subtlety of Tertullian," *VC* 52 (1998), pp. 362-363.

Although Tertullian was rejecting the usual typological interpretation that identified Esau with the Edomites or foreigners in general and Jacob with the Jews,²¹⁰ by suggesting instead that Esau, the elder twin, was to be identified with the Jews because the Jews were older than the Christians as a people and greater because they had been given access to divine favour first (1.5), nowhere in the *narratio* do we find Tertullian admitting to the fact that Gen. 25:23 could be interpreted in various ways and that what he was doing was resolving that conflict through a definitive and authoritative interpretation of his own. One gains the impression that, by not even hinting that there was a long tradition of alternative interpretation, Tertullian was offering a *narratio* that would not only be unassailable but unchallenged as well. Resolving ambiguity in a text's interpretation while not even hinting at the fact that any ambiguity exists seems something of an oratorical technique that makes Tertullian's position seem more convincing than might otherwise be the case. What helps resolve ambiguity is to find which meaning of a text was more natural²¹¹ and Tertullian wanted nothing to cast a shadow of doubt over what he offered as the natural explanation of the prophecy to Rebekah: the greater referred to the Jews and the lesser referred to the Christians because they had existed as a people for a shorter time. That being the natural interpretation, then the prophecy that the greater would serve the lesser obviously referred to the Christians replacing the Jews as the people of God's favour, the position Tertullian took with regard to the question to be resolved (1.8).

That the Jewish people would lose divine favour was something Tertullian believed should not come as much of a surprise, for they had abandoned their position as being people of God's favour ever since the time of Moses. Here Tertullian could cite as his evidence Ex. 32:1,

²¹⁰ G. D. Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah," pp.122-125.

²¹¹ Quint. *Inst.* 7.9.15.

where the people of the exodus asked Aaron to fashion them a god and he provided the golden head of a calf (“*bubulum caput*”) for which they abandoned the God who had brought them out of Egypt, claiming this artifact to be the gods who had saved them (Ex. 32:4).²¹² This piece of evidence would have been a very familiar one to Tertullian’s imagined readers, Christians and Jews alike. That probably made it all the more effective in supporting his proposition.

The citing of Ex. 32:1,4 does not appear in any earlier extant Christian literature except Acts 7:40-41.²¹³ There are references, though, to the wider context: the rejection of God by the people at Sinai. *Barnabas* 4.7-8 and 14.2-3 refers to this setting and cites Ex. 32:7. The author was using this story of how Moses smashed the tablets of the covenant even before the people had received them to show not that the new covenant had replaced the old, but how the “old” covenant had never come into effect in the first place. The argument found in *Barnabas*, that the people of the “old covenant” were never really God’s people at all, is an extreme one in early Christian literature that was not taken up in the next century by later writers.²¹⁴ *1 Clement* 53 focuses not so much on the making of idols and the people’s abandonment of God but on God sending Moses back down Sinai (Ex. 32:7-8) and on Moses interceding with God on the people’s behalf (Ex. 32:9-10,32). Justin’s *Dialogus* cites Ex. 32:6 (*Dial.* 20.1), as did Irenaeus (*adv. Haer.* 4.27.3).²¹⁵

²¹² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.6.

²¹³ Thus we cannot tell the origin of Tertullian’s reference to a calf’s head rather than a complete calf.

²¹⁴ G. D. Dunn, “Tertullian and Rebekah,” pp.128-129.

²¹⁵ The citing of Ex. 32:6 is found first in 1 Cor. 10:7.

If that one example were not enough, Tertullian used another: that of Jeroboam, king of Israel, who set up more golden calves, and indeed the whole history of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, which was one of idolatry (1Kgs. 12:25-33; 2 Kgs. 17:7-17).²¹⁶

By contrast, those people who had been pagans, and therefore worshippers of idols, had now become worshippers of the God whom Israel had abandoned (1.7b). The contrast will be considered further in the next chapter on *elocutio*.

Already, in this *narratio*, we have an indication that the arguments Tertullian was going to advance to support his position that God had indeed divorced Israel from the divine favour and admitted the Christians in their place (1.8) were to be arguments about the action God had taken rather than arguments about God, or, as Quintilian phrased it, arguments about things rather than persons,²¹⁷ and, of the arguments about things, arguments about actions being the most important ones.²¹⁸ What Tertullian presented briefly here were some pieces of testimony that could serve to construct an argument about the motive for the action;²¹⁹ God removed the Jews from divine favour and replaced them with Christians because the former had turned away from God while the latter had turned to God. Jewish unfaithfulness and Christian fidelity would return in other contexts as arguments throughout the treatise.

4. *Refutatio*

²¹⁶ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.7a.

²¹⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 5.10.32.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 5.10.33-36.

Tränkle suggested that the ideas mentioned in *adversus Iudaeos* 1.3b-8, about Jews being prior to Christians, were ignored in the following section and that Tertullian resumed a discussion about the Law, which had been suspended at 1.3a:

Dieser breit ausgeführte und emphatisch hervorgehobene Gedanke bleibt im unmittelbar folgenden Abschnitt unbeachtet—dort geht Tert. wieder von dem ersten Hinweis aus—, entfaltet sich aber während des 3. Kap. im Zusammenhang mit der Lehre von dem neuen Gesetz der Christen, um später fast völlig zurückzutreten.²²⁰

He seemed to imply a disjointed or incoherent structure in this part of the treatise. Reference has been made in the previous chapter to the fact that Tränkle considered that these chapters were concerned mainly with the law and that discussion about circumcision, the Sabbath and sacrifice were merely examples.²²¹ It has been suggested already that seeing a transition from *narratio* and *partitio* to *refutatio* makes clearer and better sense of the treatise and that Tertullian wanted his readers to believe that he was giving four separate arguments about the temporal nature of the Jewish relationship with God rather than one argument with several examples.

Elsewhere I have advanced my ideas in some detail about the *refutatio* of Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*.²²² Here I wish to present a summary of the rhetorical influences at work in the construction of these chapters.

²²⁰ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xxiv.

²²¹ Ibid., p.xxvi: "Trotz dieser Wiederholung erzielt der Gedanke einen Fortschritt; denn es wird nun nicht mehr bloß vom Gesetz allgemein gesprochen, sondern als Beispiele werden zwei besonders wichtige Bestimmungen herausgegriffen, das Sabbatgebote und die Beschneidung, und das sich mit leichter Veränderung mehrmals wiederholende *neque circumcisum neque sabbatizantem* gibt diesen Sätzen ihre Wirksamkeit."

²²² Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Pro temporum condicione: Jews and Christians as God's People in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*," in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, vol. 2, ed. Pauline Allen et al. (forthcoming). See Appendix B.

The Jewish position, as understood by Tertullian, clearly was that the covenant between God and Israel endured and that all who wished to be considered as God's people had to observe the requirements of the covenant. The fundamental notion proposed by Tertullian to counter that position was that God was free to reform that covenant depending on prevailing circumstances (2.10 - "*Nec adimamus hanc dei potestatem pro temporum condicione legis praecepta reformantem in hominis salutem.*"). He sought to defend that notion by examining the law, circumcision, the Sabbath, and sacrifices in the light of what could be construed as proof from both the Hebrew Scriptures and the events of more recent history, in order to demonstrate that God not only was free to reform the covenant but that God had promised indeed to reform the covenant by making it more universal and inclusive.

In 2.1b-10 Tertullian employed three rhetorical arguments concerning the law. The first was an invalid induction that because proselytes had been admitted to God's people all others must have been admitted (2.2). The second was based on the *topos* of degree—a God who is good would seek to offer the covenant to a greater number of people rather than a lesser number (2.2). Finally, and here Tertullian turned to the Hebrew Scriptures, evidence could be offered to show that, in the past, God had indeed already given the law on a universal basis (understanding Adam typologically) and that for this earlier, natural, unwritten law to be fulfilled, the later, written law had to come to an end (2.2-9). This is something that, Tertullian stated, through the prophets, God had promised to do. Just as God had once changed the unwritten law into the written one, God was free to change the written one in order to embrace the Gentiles (2.9-10), for, as it was possible for God to instigate the law, it was possible also for God to terminate or extend it (2.7). As I have noted elsewhere, although in 6.1 Tertullian contended that he had shown that it was foretold that the temporary law would be replaced by an eternal one, just because he might

have been able to prove the old law to be temporary did not mean, as a matter of logical necessity, that the new law had to be eternal. One can notice some oratorical sleight-of-hand at work here.

In 2.4b-5, just when Tertullian was reaching the highpoint of his brief contrast between the primordial law given to Adam and the written law given to Moses (“*deinque*”), in which contrast Tertullian wanted to support the former against the latter (2.6-7), he digressed and described how Adam and Eve had failed to obey that primordial law. This adds nothing to Tertullian’s argument, in fact it detracts from it. Highlighting the failure of those two to keep the primordial law could be taken by a skillful orator as an argument in favour of the necessity (and superiority) of the law given to Moses.

In 2.11 - 3.6, where circumcision was Tertullian’s topic, similar rhetorical techniques were utilised. Once again the Scriptures were scrutinised to supply evidence that God’s real intention was revealed earlier than when the Jewish practice of circumcision was instigated. One can sense a combination of arguments: from possibility (if God has changed things once—from non-circumcision to circumcision—then God has every right to change things again), and from priority (Adam, not Moses, is the typological figure in whom God’s intention for all humanity was revealed). In this section we can detect Tertullian arguing first for one thing and then for its exact opposite. In 2.11-12, the uncircumcised Adam is held out as a figure of enduring relevance, yet in 3.2 Tertullian argued that one person, in this case Moses’ son, cannot be used as universal precedent.

In the second half of chapter 3 (3.7-13) we find Tertullian’s attention turned to some passages from the Scriptures which could be employed as proof that God had promised to replace

the old and temporary law with a new (and eternal) law and physical circumcision with a spiritual one (3.7) and to be more inclusive about who would be included within that new law and new circumcision (3.8-13).²²³ In *adversus Marcionem* 4.1.3-7 we find Tertullian citing Is. 2:3-4; 51:4; Ps. 18(19)8; Is. 10:23; 43:18-19; Jer. 4:3-4; 31:31-32; and Is. 45:3 in reference to God's promise of a new law. The point Tertullian was making there was that Marcion's contention that the old and new laws were so different that they had to have been given by different gods was wrong because the one God who had given the old law had promised also to give the new.

As well as these two Scriptural arguments with regard to circumcision (that God's enduring intention was revealed in Adam's lack of circumcision and that God had promised and invited people, through the prophets, to a spiritual understanding of circumcision), Tertullian employed historical evidence. Circumcision had become the sign by which the Romans could keep the Jews out of Jerusalem (3.4,6). It had become a sign of Jewish rebellion against God (3.5).

The material on the Sabbath (4.1-11) appears to be more integrated. The contrast between the Jewish understanding of this weekly day of rest and what Tertullian believed was the way God wanted the Sabbath to be observed appears from the opening sentences. It was the Christians who fulfilled God's intention (an argument which really belongs to the *confirmatio*). Evidence is once again provided by the Hebrew Scriptures to help achieve two goals. One is to define—the activity of defining being common in conjectural arguments—what a Sabbath really ought to be (and how the Jewish Sabbath failed to qualify) (4.1-5). The other is to show, as in previous sections, that God's intentions were not hard and fast, and that God's requirements “*ad tempus*

²²³ Jer. 4:3-4; 31:31-32; Is. 2:2-4; and Ps. 17(18):44-45.

et praesentis causae necessitatem huiusmodi praecepta convaluisse” (4.11).²²⁴ Even after the Sabbath was instituted under Moses there were exceptions to it (4.7-10). Further, as in the previous sections, the argument against the eternal validity of the Jewish observance rests on the fact that their observance was not so from the beginning. What prevailed before the institution of the Sabbath negated its eternal validity (4.6)

These arguments, even though more integrated than before, do not necessarily support one another. The statements that Adam to Abraham failed to observe the Sabbath and that Joshua taking Jericho necessitated a relaxation of its requirements, while they might highlight the transitory nature of the current Jewish practice, do not help advance the position that the Christian understanding is the correct and eternal one rather than just another temporary one.

The fourth and final part of the *refutatio* deals with sacrifices (5.1-7). Here we may notice that Tertullian has taken the same interpretation he had in the *narratio* (about the younger of Rebekah’s twins being a figure for the Christians) and applied it to the sacrifices of Cain and Abel. The treatise’s *partitio* (that the younger has overcome the elder) is used here to convince the readers that Cain’s sacrifice, which was rejected, symbolises Jewish sacrifice, while the younger brother’s sacrifice symbolises Christian sacrifice (5.1-2). What is worth noting, though, is that Tertullian did not interpret this piece of Scripture to mean that God never accepted Jewish sacrifice, which would seem to be the most natural way to apply the typology, but rather that Jewish sacrifice was physical and Christian sacrifice spiritual. This seems an unlikely conclusion to draw, except that he went on to contrast the physical sacrifices of the Jews, which the Hebrew Scriptures themselves state were rejected by God, with the spiritual sacrifices which were to be

²²⁴ Here I am following PNF and Tränkle against Kroymann.

offered by people of every nation (i.e., Christians) and which were pleasing to God (5.4-7). This is an argument about the type of sacrifice or the acceptable manner in which sacrifice was to be offered. One gets the sense that Tertullian has juxtaposed material found in his sources that really do not sit entirely well together.

This sense is reinforced when we consider 5.3. This argument, about the place physical sacrifice could be offered, would lead most naturally to the fact that Jews were now banned from sacrifice in Jerusalem and from there to a conclusion that involved the contrast not between physical and spiritual sacrifices but between temporary and eternal ones. This is not done. This comment that is in the text therefore seems out of place, except that it may be connected with the section on the Scriptural claim that there will be spiritual sacrifice and that it will happen in every place (5.4).

I would refer readers of these pages to my chapter in the second volume of *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church* for all the details of the rhetorical arguments used, the passages chosen from the Scriptures, and a comparison with earlier Christian literature. There one may find my conclusion that, while he shared much material in common with the *Epistle of Barnabas* and Justin's *Dialogus cum Tryphone* (particularly the latter where, in a number of instances, direct dependence could be suggested), Tertullian sometimes used shared material in ways that were unique, and sometimes used material which we have no evidence to suggest had been used by previous Christian writers against the Jewish faith.

Even though Guerra suggests that Tertullian's argument in this part of his treatise, particularly his argument about the Mosaic law being in embryonic form in the command given

to Adam and Eve, even though circuitous, is barbed,²²⁵ one still finds a lack of personal invective in Tertullian's writing. Perhaps the suggestion that Tertullian was walking a fine line between demonstrating that the Jews had too limited a view of God's activity and were too unfaithful in keeping God's commands, on the one hand, and, on the other, rejecting any value at all in the Hebrew Scriptures as had Marcion, helps explain why Tertullian was not nearly as vehement with the Jews in this treatise as one must expect.²²⁶ Tertullian certainly believed in the superiority of Christianity over Judaism and was not reluctant to point out Jewish error and lack of understanding but to me his comments here have more the tones of academic difference of opinion rather than "all-out brawling."

5. *Confirmatio*

As was noted in the previous chapter, 6.2 is an important passage in determining the rhetorical nature of this treatise. Tertullian was aware that, in the *refutatio*, he had managed to establish only that there was a promise that the old covenant would come to an end. It had not been his task there to establish that such a promise had been fulfilled; this was left to the *confirmatio*. In a sense, therefore, he had a twofold task to accomplish in the *confirmatio*: to prove that the old covenant had indeed come to an end and to prove that the new covenant had been established. He did not need to prove these two things separately, for to prove the second would, of logical necessity, prove the first. Indeed, if the new were in operation then the old must

²²⁵ A. J. Guerra, op. cit., p.116.

²²⁶ See D. P. Efroymsen, "The Patristic Connection," pp.101-110, explains how, in books 2 to 4 of *adv. Marc.*, Tertullian was able to salvage the God of the Hebrew Scriptures from the attacks of the Marcionites by showing that even though the old law was abrogated it did not downgrade the position of God since that old law was relegated by Jesus not because of the inferiority of the God of the Hebrew Scriptures but because of the inferiority of the Jewish people. Efroymsen, on p.105, goes further than I in suggesting that Tertullian did show invective against the Jews in the treatise.

have ceased. So one of the aims of the *confirmatio* was to demonstrate that the new covenant was in operation. Tertullian did not even allude to the possibility of the two being in operation concurrently, i.e., the old covenant enduring. This was a point which a critic of Tertullian may have raised with regard to his logic. If Tertullian himself were ever aware of this possibility, it would seem that he hoped that his readers would not be awake to it. To have to deal with this, as well as everything else at this point, would be too distracting.

Another aim of the *confirmatio* was to demonstrate that the one who would bring that new covenant had materialised, for, by association, to be able to show that this person had come would also mean that one was able to show that the new covenant had also come. Thus, even as he announced that the *confirmatio* would be concerned with proving that the new covenant (or new law) was in operation (6.2), the focus shifted immediately to the question of whether the new law-giver had come. In Tertullian's thinking, proof that the new law-giver had come would also prove that the new law had come and that the old law had ceased:

*Nam etiam hic novae legis lator, sabbati spiritalis cultor, sacrificiorum aeternorum antistes, regni aeterni aeternus dominator quaerendum, an iam venerit necne, ut, si iam venit, serviendum sit illi, si necdum venit, sustinendus sit, dummodo manifestum sit adventu eius comprimi legis veteris praecepta et oriri debere novae legis exordia.*²²⁷

This was sound oratorical practice. In commenting on what he defined as *partitio* (the enumeration of the *propositiones* to be treated), Quintilian noted that it was unnecessary to divide

²²⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 6.3: "Inquire, I say, we must, whether this giver of the new law, observer of the spiritual sabbath, priest of the eternal sacrifices, eternal ruler of the eternal kingdom, be come or no: that, if he is already come, service may have to be rendered to him; if he is not yet come, he may have to be awaited, until by his advent it be manifest that the old Law's precepts are suppressed, and that the beginnings of the new law ought to arise." The necessary connection between the coming of the new law-giver and the establishment of the new law is seen further in 7.1 ("... *et cum constiterit venisse indubitate etiam legem novam ab ipso datam esse credamus et testamentum novum in ipso et per ipsum nobis dispositum non diffiteamur.*").

an argument into parts if, in proving one part, all the others were also proven as a matter of necessity.²²⁸

Unlike other second-century theologians, like Justin and Irenaeus, Tertullian was no longer quite so interested in talking about the Christ who brought God's law to completion or fulfilment, when he moved from *refutatio* to *confirmatio*. Certainly he saw Jesus as the one to fulfil prophetic hope (and would discuss this in much detail in the *confirmatio*), but Tertullian did not use the idea of recapitulation in terms of Jesus and the Mosaic law.²²⁹ Instead, we do find the more strident and polemic assertions that "*legem veterem cessasse*," "*legem veterem compescat... ceremonias antiquas reprimat et circumcisionem veterem cum suo sabbato compescat*" (6.2), "*comprimi legis veteris*" (6.3) and "*non potuisse cessare legem antiquam... nisi*"(6.4). Perhaps this may be taken as an indication of the dating of *adversus Iudaeos* prior to *adversus Marcionem* if we accept that, in the latter, Tertullian argued that the Christ perfected the old law rather than replaced it.²³⁰

Even though, in the *refutatio*, Tertullian had cited some passages of the Hebrew Scriptures that indicated that there was the promise of a new law, spiritual circumcision, eternal Sabbath, and spiritual sacrifice, he had not raised the question there of the promise of the one who would establish such a new law. So before being able to illustrate that the new law-giver had come, there was the need to show that one had been promised (6.2b). As has been noted in the previous

²²⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 4.5.9-10: "... omnia, quae ante id quod ultimum est exsequeris, inania videri necesse est. Festinat enim iudex ad id quod potentissimum est..."; 4.5.11: "... quia, si probari posset, quod est tertium, nihil necesse fuerit dicere priora."

²²⁹ Eric Osborn, *The Emergence of Christian Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.101-105, 146-171, 299-306.

²³⁰ E. Osborn, *Tertullian*, p.104.

chapter, this first question about whether such a new law-giver was even expected was dealt with swiftly (7.2). One has the impression, within the overall rhetorical structure of the treatise, that Tertullian's claim that the Jews would not disagree that a new law-giver was promised, belongs to the *partitio*, where one set out the extent to which there was agreement or disagreement with one's opponent.²³¹ By delaying it until this point Tertullian seems to have achieved a couple of things. First, it reinforces the impression he was attempting to instil in his readers that he was a reasonable person. After having spent several chapters pointing out where he considered the Jews misunderstood God's intentions and promises, by turning his attention to where they agreed with each other (or, at least, where he claimed they agreed with each other),²³² he helped reinforce this impression of reasonableness and balance in his argument. It also legitimised the entire *refutatio*. In a very subtle way, by claiming that the Jews expected a new law-giver and by him linking the coming of the new law-giver with the establishment of a new law, Tertullian hinted at the ultimate argument for his *refutatio*—since the Jews themselves expected a new law, they themselves provided the best proof against their own position that their “old” law was God's ultimate and final intention.

Is. 45:1 was cited as an example of such Jewish expectation in the coming of the new law-giver. I have noted elsewhere how this piece of Scripture could only function as an example of the expectation of a new law-giver because of the textual transformation of κύρω into κυρίω, something Tertullian inherited in his Scriptural source.²³³

²³¹ *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.17; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.22.31.

²³² Here one is reminded of a characteristically rhetorical insight of Quintilian: “*Interim vero etiam fallendus est iudex et variis artibus subeundus, ut aliud agi quam quod petimus putet.*” (*Inst.* 4.5.5).

²³³ Geoffrey D. Dunn, “The Universal Spread of Christianity as a Rhetorical Argument in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*,” *J ECS* (forthcoming). See Appendix C.

The use of the extract from Isaiah seems to have diverted Tertullian's attention somewhat, for its reference to the nations hearing the Christ in the version Tertullian knew, became the occasion for a *digressio* on the universal spread of Christianity (7.2b - 8.1a). Despite the fact that discussion about the universal spread of Christianity does not appear well connected to the first question, about whether anyone expected the coming of a new law-giver or to the first topic of the second question (the time when the expected new law-giver was promised to come), I have argued that this *digressio*, even though it would be better placed together with chapter 12 (and perhaps both would make more sense if placed chronologically in the treatise after chapter 13), does fulfil an important rhetorical function. I shall summarise my arguments briefly here.

In conjectural matters, arguments could be about things or persons, and one of the *topoi* about things was subsequent time.²³⁴ The spread of Christianity was a subsequent action which must demonstrate that the Christ had come. In developing this *topos* (7.2-5) Tertullian cited Ps. 19:5 as the proof that such a thing was expected to occur and Acts 2:9-10, 5 as the historical evidence that such an expectation had been fulfilled. It is interesting to note that in 7.4, with the addition of the Gaetulians and Moors to the list of nations found in Acts 2, Tertullian has added an African perspective to this passage of the New Testament. I have commented on what makes the interpretation of Acts 2 unusual. The last part of the argument involving the universal spread of Christianity (7.6 - 8.1a) involved the general *topos* of contrast, comparison or dissimilarity. Unlike any other figure of power from the past, the name of Christ reigned over the whole world and beyond. The implication is that he must be the promised new law-giver, for only that individual could reign over the whole world. Osborn seems to suggest that this is the major proof

²³⁴ Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.45: "... *praeter id, quod omnia facile argumenta aut ex iis, quae ante rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei aut insequentibus ducuntur.*"

Tertullian offered.²³⁵ Richard Hanson has drawn attention to 7.6 where Tertullian made comment about his interpretive approach to the Scriptures, acknowledging that Is. 45:1 could be understood in a spiritual (“*spiritaliter*”) and more literal sense (“*attamen etiam propria specie sunt adimpleta*”).²³⁶ This accords with Tertullian’s general approach, which tended to downplay the allegorical. What we have noticed in this dissertation is Tertullian’s preference for typology over allegory, and this would accord with Hanson’s position, particularly if we accept Boniface Ramsey’s distinction that typology did not deny the literal, historical or contextual dimensions of a Scriptural text.²³⁷

As has been noted already, the body of the *confirmatio* concerned the four topics related to the question of whether the Christ had come (7.1), rephrased at 8.2 as three topics. In the first version, the first two topics concerned time (the prophecies about the time of the birth and death of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem, and the fulfilment of those prophecies), which, in the second version, was the first topic. In rhetoric, time was an important issue. The author of *ad Herennium* saw it as a sign, which was one of the six conjectural topics.²³⁸ In his early notebook, Cicero observed that time was one of the topics concerned with the nature of the act, one of the three divisions he listed for the conjectural issue.²³⁹

²³⁵ E. Osborn, *Tertullian*, p.118.

²³⁶ R. P. C. Hanson, “Notes on Tertullian’s Interpretation of Scripture,” *JTS* n.s. 12 (1961), p.275. Cf. Karlfried Froelich, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church*, Sources of Early Christian Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), p.10, who talks of typological allegory and allegorical typology as being characteristic of second-century biblical interpretation.

²³⁷ Boniface Ramsey, *Beginning to Read the Fathers* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1986), p.30.

²³⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 2.4.7.

²³⁹ *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 1.26.39; 2.12.40.

Elsewhere I have written at some length analysing chapter 8 of *adversus Iudaeos*,²⁴⁰ a chapter which Säflund described as “recht umständlich.”²⁴¹ The witness Tertullian provided to give evidence about the prophecies of the coming of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem was Dan. 9:1-2a, 20-27 (*adv. Iud.* 8.3-6). Only briefly did he treat Daniel as a written text needing interpretation to remove ambiguity (8.7-8), which was one of the tasks in the juridical or legal issue, but, on the whole, he treated the text as a source of evidence for the conjectural question. In offering his interpretation of the prophetic time-frame in Daniel, Tertullian proposed one that was unique. He drew two periods of time from the prophecy: the first of 62½ weeks and the second of 7½ weeks. The possibility for such an interpretation arose from the fact that the Greek texts of Daniel (Theodotion and the Old Greek) were misinterpretations of the Hebrew original (preserved accurately, I have argued, in the Masoretic Text) and, being misinterpretations, they contained inconsistencies which could be exploited by later interpreters, such as Tertullian, to construct very different interpretations, depending upon which of the inconsistencies one most relied.

Having provided his definitive reading of the text, Tertullian set out a calculation of the time-frame with regard to the prophecies of the birth of the Christ (8.9-10), the death of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem (8.15-16), and interspersed that with historical comment that Jesus was the one whose birth (8.11-14) and death (8.17-18) fitted the prophecy about the time when the Christ would appear, and that the capture of Jerusalem under Vesapsian (8.17) fitted the prophecy about the ruin of the holy place.

²⁴⁰ Geoffrey D. Dunn, “Tertullian and Daniel 9:24-27 - A Patristic Interpretation of a Prophetic Time-Frame.” See Appendix D; id., “*Probabimus venisse eum iam* - The Fulfilment of Daniel’s Prophetic Time-Frame in Tertullian’s *adversus Iudaeos*.” See Appendix E.

²⁴¹ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.191.

Tertullian's arguments, that the Christ was to appear at a particular time and that Jesus appeared at precisely those times, are intricate, the very detail and complexity of which were intended obviously to overwhelm an opponent. It is possible to refute Tertullian's arguments, but it requires some involved textual analysis of Daniel and chronological examination of ancient ruling dynasties. I would refer readers to Appendices D and E for a thorough presentation of just such an analysis of the position Tertullian took (and the weaknesses his arguments contained). The overall aim of Tertullian, though, is clear. He intended to show to Jewish opponents that their continued waiting for the arrival of a messiah was ridiculous because the prophecy in Daniel proved, at least the way Tertullian read it, that the messiah would be born in the reign of Augustus and would die before the destruction of the Temple, which had to be that under Vespasian. Now that that time had elapsed, if Jesus, the one who best fulfilled the time requirements, were not the messiah, then it was too late for there ever to be one, for the opportunity had passed. The same "closed window of opportunity of argument" would re-appear in 13.1-3 in a *topos* on place. That Jesus lived at the right time was the first argument that he was indeed the new law-giver.

In Appendix E I have compared Tertullian's treatment of this passage from Daniel with other early Christian treatments and have noted the ways in which Tertullian's differs, particularly in reversing the main two periods of time. Like Tränkle, I agree that the source upon which Tertullian depended was probably Greek (I have suggested Alexandrian), and that it is regrettable that it has been lost to us.²⁴²

Tränkle referred to 8.14 and the withdrawal of spiritual gifts from the Jews to argue for a Montanist influence visible in this work (as at 13.25), thus disproving the idea that this work

²⁴² H. Tränkle, *op. cit.*, p.lxxv.

would date from early in Tertullian's career.²⁴³ *Adversus Marcionem* 5.8.4-5 is offered for favourable comparison.²⁴⁴ The weakness of this position is that, whereas in *adversus Marcionem* the distribution of spiritual gifts to Christians is mentioned explicitly (making use of 1 Cor. 12:4-11; Eph. 4:8; and Ps. 67[68]:18), such a thing is not found in *adversus Iudaeos*. What we find there is only the fact that, with the coming of the Christ, spiritual gifts among the Jews had ceased. To read more into this, which Tränkle admitted he did,²⁴⁵ is to read too much. I am unable to see *adv. Iud.* 8.14 or 13.25 as evidence of Montanism.²⁴⁶

Time alone was not sufficient to clinch the case. Tertullian needed to look at other characteristics of the new law-giver. Arguments about persons, their attributes and activities were at the heart of conjecture. So, from chapter 9 onwards, Tertullian was engaged in the third topic announced in 7.1—other prophetic themes (or the second topic of 8.2—signs and operations of the new law-giver). I have not examined the *inventio* of chapters 9-11 elsewhere and, because of that, I shall examine them in this dissertation in a little more detail.

Cicero had listed the usual topics to be addressed when an orator considered the attributes of a person:

²⁴³ Ibid., p.lxi.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p.lxii: "Tertullian hätte also auch in montanistischer Zeit so schreiben können, wie er in *Iud.* geschrieben hat. Damit fällt dieses Argument für die Frühentstehung des Werkes fort."

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p.lxi: "Es ist aber durchaus möglich zu sagen... bei den Christen aber lebten sie weiter, nämlich in und durch Christus."

²⁴⁶ Cecil M. Robeck, *Prophecy in Carthage: Perpetua, Tertullian and Cyprian* (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1992), pp.97-100, seems to acknowledge that in *adv. Iud.* 8.14 the most that can be claimed is a "groundwork" for Montanist ideas and that the giving of *charismata* to Christians, particularly those of prophecy, is not dealt with in this text.

*Ac personis has res attributas putamus: nomen, naturam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes.*²⁴⁷

Quintilian listed birth as the first attribute of a person worth exploring.²⁴⁸ Tertullian was interested in proving that in other respects, besides the time of his birth, Jesus was the one who fulfilled the prophecies that were believed to apply to the birth of the new law-giver.

The argument proper, from the *topos* of name, begins in 9.20b. The material in 9.1-20a, while concerned to some degree with the same *topos*, has the characteristics of a *praemunitio*, defence by anticipation,²⁴⁹ a rhetorical technique Sider believed to be typical of Tertullian's writing.²⁵⁰ Thus, while Is. 7:13-15 and 8:4 could and had been used by Christians to develop arguments about why Jesus was the Christ on the basis of his name, previous debates with Jews had revealed a number of weaknesses in the Christian position. Here Tertullian wanted to confront and refute those Jewish counter-arguments head on. According to Tertullian the Jewish counter-arguments were twofold: that Jesus did not bear the name Emmanuel and that Jesus did not perform the signs stated in the prophecy from Isaiah (9.1b). Therefore, in this *praemunitio*, Tertullian set out, using Isaiah, to examine this aspect of the *topos* of name (9.1b-6) and the signs associated with this prophecy about the name (9.7-20a).

The opening sentences of chapter 9 are resplendent with oratorical skill and technique. The chapter begins with some passages cited from the Hebrew Scriptures (Is. 7:13-15; 8:4). Ever

²⁴⁷ Cic. *Inv Rhet.* 1.24.34: "We hold the following to be the attributes of persons: name, nature, manner of life, fortune, habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, speeches made."

²⁴⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.24.

²⁴⁹ Cic. *de Or.* 3.53.204 (Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.30); Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.2,17.

²⁵⁰ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p.22.

since Matthew, the prophecy to Ahaz about the birth of a son had been read Christologically and as proof for the virgin birth (Mt. 1:23). It is therefore not surprising to see this passage from Isaiah 7 quoted on a number of occasions in early Christian literature, including by Tertullian himself in several treatises.²⁵¹ What is interesting is that in a number of these Christian examples Is. 8:4 is added after Is. 7:15.²⁵² Indeed, Skarsaune argues that such a combination, with Is. 8:4 interpolated for Is. 7:16, was constructed by a Christian author and that this was part of a *testimonium* which Justin, unaware of the interpolation, quoted and from which his argument in *Dialogus 77* was derived.²⁵³ What he suggests is that Justin's argument depended on a Jesus-Hezekiah polemic and that Justin's aim was to demonstrate the miraculous nature of the virgin birth of the messiah.²⁵⁴ After announcing his intention of proving that Isaiah did not refer merely to a young woman or the birth of Hezekiah in chapter 43, Justin began his proof of the virgin birth as being a necessary part of the coming of the messiah in chapter 63 and continued it from chapters 66 to 85 (with digressions in chapters 67-70, 72-75, and 79-82). According to Skarsaune, chapter 77 is the highpoint of Justin's argument and he was able to reject Hezekiah as the object of the prophecy on the basis of the interpolated Is. 8:4, which would require superhuman achievement by an infant (which ruled out Hezekiah).²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ Ign. *Eph.* 18 (long version); Jus. *1 Apol.* 33.1; Jus. *Dial.* 43.5-6,8; 66.2; 67.1; 68.6; 71.3; 84.1; Iren. *adv. Haer.* 3.16.4; 3.19.2; 3.21.1; 4.33.11; Tert. *de Carn.* 17.2; 21.2; 23.1,6; Tert. *de Res.* 20.3; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.12.1 (= *adv. Iud.* 9.1); 3.13.4 (= *adv. Iud.* 9.7); 4.10.7.

²⁵² Jus. *Dial.* 43.6; 66.2; Iren. *adv. Haer.* 4.33.11 (with Is. 8:3 rather than 8:4); Tert. *de Res.* 20.3; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.12.1. For Is. 8:4 on its own: Iren. *adv. Haer.* 3.16.4; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.13.1,8; 4.20.4.

²⁵³ Oskar Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile*, Supplement to *Novum Testamentum*, vol. 56 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), pp.32-34.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.200-202.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.201-202.

Skarsaune also considers the relationship between Justin and Tertullian. While, on the surface, it would appear that Tertullian has borrowed from Justin, it is argued that the positions of the two ancient authors are different and that Tertullian's position was a response to a statement of Marcion rather than being taken from Justin.²⁵⁶ Justin reported his Jewish opponents as denying that Is. 7:14 and 8:4 had messianic implications—something confirmed from Jewish sources.²⁵⁷ Tertullian's opponents accepted (or, are made to accept) that the prophecy did refer to the messiah but that Jesus could not be that messiah. On the basis of "*Christo qui iam venit*" in *adv. Iud.* 9.1, Skarsaune goes further and claims that Tertullian's opponent in *adversus Iudaeos* was Marcion.

In *adv. Iud.* the Jews are made to argue that Is. 7:14/8:4 do not fit *Christo qui iam uenit*—the Messiah who has already come. The implication must be that the Messiah spoken of in Isaiah has not yet come. But this is the position of Marcion—not of the Jews.²⁵⁸

But it must be conceded, I think, that neither Jews nor Marcion would have said "*Christo qui iam venit*." Even though put onto the lips of the opponent, it reveals the thinking of Tertullian. In other words, I think that here we see a degree of slackness in Tertullian's writing in that he did not present his opponent's position accurately enough (and, given his rhetorical objective, which was to persuade his readers that he, not his opponents, was right, it is not surprising to see this). One gets the sense that a real opponent, or a more careful and less rhetorical Tertullian, would have written "the so-called Christ" or "the Christ whom you (Christians) believe to have come." To support my position I would refer to the next time Tertullian presented his opponent's position, in 9.2: "*iste, dicunt, qui venit*." Here "*iste*" has that

²⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.239-240.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., pp.380-381. See *Jus. Dial.* 67.1

²⁵⁸ O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, p.239.

sense of “so-called” or “as you claim.” The same care is shown by Tertullian in using “*iste*” in *adv. Marc.* 3.12.1 to represent what Marcion would have said. Thus, contrary to Skarsaune, the argument of the opponents in *adv. Iud.* 9.1-2 and *adv. Marc.* 3.12.1 could be at home equally on the lips of both Jews and Marcion (rather than being an argument of Marcion, transferred by Tertullian to the Jews, provided that we accept that Tertullian himself has represented what the Jews would have said inaccurately in 9.1).²⁵⁹ Even granted that Jews would not have argued that the prophecy in Isaiah actually referred to a messiah, the fact that Tertullian had his opponent agree that it did, does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that Tertullian simply transferred Marcion’s position to the Jews. It might well have been that Tertullian, however inaccurately, actually believed that the Jews and Marcion both held the same views on this matter.²⁶⁰

If we look carefully at the argument in 9.3 what we notice is that Tertullian argued that those who believe Jesus is the Christ believe that he is God-with-us and that therefore he has this name. Among those who believe are Jews who have become Christians (9.3 - “*qui ex Iudaismo credunt in Christum*”).²⁶¹ They are the subject of what remains to be said in 9.3 and equally they appear to be the same subject at the beginning of 9.4 (“*Aequae sono nominis inducuntur*”), yet Tertullian was negatively critical of those people in 9.4 while he was positive about those he mentioned in 9.3. One has to conclude that in 9.4 he has reverted to discussing the opinions of those Jews who do not believe that Jesus is the Christ: the Jews mentioned in 9.1b. Perhaps this

²⁵⁹ Here we may note that Skarsaune (*ibid.*, p.240) tends to support the views expressed by Quispel, Prigent and Nautin that *adv. Marc.* predates *adv. Iud.* He is prepared to accept Tränkle’s reverse position so long as one sees that *adv. Iud.* was merely a preparation for *adv. Marc.* and, presumably, the opponent in *adv. Iud.* was always understood by Tertullian to refer to Marcion.

²⁶⁰ I realise that what I am claiming is that Tertullian, if he read Justin, did not pick up on Justin’s point that the Jews rejected Is. 7:14/8:4 as referring to a messiah in the first place.

²⁶¹ If one accepts that Tertullian was doing more than simply repeating someone else’s earlier arguments, then this clause can be taken as evidence from the late second century of some continuing source of Christian conversion from Judaism.

could be used by some to suggest that this passage has been taken from the earlier section in *adversus Mariconem* (3.12.3) and reused here. I think not because even in that passage we notice some anomaly. There Tertullian began by addressing Marcion who supposedly rejected calling Jesus Emmanuel (*adv. Marc.* 3.12.1), yet was prepared to call him God-with-us (*adv. Marc.* 3.12.2). Even the Jews who have become Christians and the Marcionites accept that he is called Emmanuel (*adv. Marc.* 3.12.3 - “*invenies apud Hebraeos Christianos, immo et Marcionitas, Emmanuhelem nominare*”). It seems odd for Tertullian to criticise Marcion for accepting Jesus as God-with-us but not Emmanuel on the basis that the Marcionites do accept him as Emmanuel. It would seem to me that this contradiction in *adversus Marcionem* can best be explained by accepting that Tertullian has tried to use an earlier source without having ironed out all the difficulties first. The problems that are left in *adversus Iudaeos* with the confusion over the change of subjects from 9.3 to 9.4 have to be accepted as an error in Tertullian’s writing, an error that should have been spotted in a revision of the initial draft.

Even though Tertullian used a couple of the same arguments that Justin did, developed from Is. 7:14 and 8:4, he was not interested to draw out a specific comparison with Hezekiah. For Justin, the argument that proved that Jesus, not Hezekiah, was the one about whom the prophecy referred was the fact that, in fulfilment of Is. 8:4, Jesus had received the spoils of the East, from the Magi, while still an infant and had overcome the evil power (*Dial.* 77-78). The main argument against reading “young woman” instead of “virgin” was that there was not the sign value in a young woman conceiving as there was in a virgin conceiving without sexual intercourse (*Dial.* 84). Tertullian, on the other hand, in engaging in the legal issue of interpreting a text to remove ambiguity, focused on the name Emmanuel (9.2-3 = *adv. Marc.* 3.12.2-3), that the power of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria were not overcome by a warrior but by an infant

(9.4-6 = *adv. Marc.* 3.13.1-3), that there was no sign value in a young woman conceiving (9.7-9 = *adv. Marc.* 3.13.4-6),²⁶² and that the Magi and their gifts represent Damascus and Samaria (9.10-16 = *adv. Marc.* 3.13.6-10). While we can see a number of close parallels with Justin,²⁶³ we simply do not see Tertullian interested in refuting a view that Isaiah could only have referred to Hezekiah. Fredouille notes, in contrast with Justin, that Tertullian's emphasis was on the novelty of the virgin birth, for only something unusual could serve as a sign. Justin had been more interested in connecting it with other prophecies.²⁶⁴

Cette exégèse, qui s'inscrit explicitement dans une perspective polémique, est autrement formulée que celle de Justin, sur laquelle pourtant elle s'appuie: d'une interprétation rationnelle, de type déductif (le *signum* pour être *signum* suppose l'exceptionnel), on est passé à une interprétation fondée sur le paradoxe (l'inconcevable, en l'occurrence la *nouitas monstruosa*, force l'adhésion). On aura reconnu un mode de démonstration cher à Tertullien et sur lequel nous aurons l'occasion de revenir.²⁶⁵

We see here many examples of Tertullian first offering his opponent's view before refuting it (9.1,2,4,7), all very oratorically sound. We may also observe something of his approach to Scripture. O'Malley has noted how, in opposing Marcion, who argued for the discontinuity between the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, Tertullian supported the allegorical use of Scripture to emphasise the continuity, more so there than in other treatises.²⁶⁶ In *adversus*

²⁶² Thus Tertullian wanted the text from Is. 7:14 interpreted literally (given the text he had which used the term "virgin") for that would be a sign and would apply to Jesus, but he did not want the text from Is. 8:4 interpreted literally, for that could not be applied to Jesus. Hence, in 9.9 he dismissed the idea that the literal fulfilment of that prediction could have a sign value in a rather summary fashion.

²⁶³ Even down to the use of Ez. 16:3 as an explanation that sometimes Scripture needed to be interpreted figuratively: *Jus. Dial.* 77.4; *Tert. adv. Iud.* 9.14 (= *adv. Marc.* 3.13.9).

²⁶⁴ J.-C. Fredouille, op. cit., p.265: "L'exégèse de Tertullien est identique [with Justin's] quant au fond: mais l'accent y est mis, une fois de plus, sur la 'nouveau' que constitue la naissance virgine du Christ..."

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.265-266.

²⁶⁶ T. J. O'Malley, *Tertullian and the Bible: Language-Imagery-Exegesis* (Utrecht: Dekker & van de Vegt, 1967), p.38.

Iudaeos, Tertullian favoured an allegorical interpretation when the literal seemed to support the opponents. Thus, while in 9.3-6, he was quite happy with the literal reading of Is. 8:4 referring to an infant not a warrior, in 9.10-16, Damascus, Samaria and Assyria²⁶⁷ were interpreted allegorically or figuratively (9.6 - “*sequitur ut figurate pronuntiatum videatur*”), as was reference to gold, Egypt and Babylon (much of 9.11-15 being a justification for this exegetical practice rather than particularly relevant to the particular topic of the chapter).²⁶⁸

In claiming the name Emmanuel for Jesus, Tertullian was aware that the name was never his literally but that, in a broader context (9.2 - “*cohaerentia quoque huius capituli*”), it had been applied to Christ by those who believed in him (a rather circular argument: Jesus was the fulfilment of the prophecy because those who believed him to be that fulfilment gave him the name by which he would be recognised as the fulfilment). Establishing Scriptural context was an important part of Tertullian’s exegesis.²⁶⁹ On the whole, in chapter 9 of *adversus Iudaeos*, the argument from context seems to be a more important way of interpreting Scripture than the allegorical method.²⁷⁰ Spending time discussing someone’s name was, like their birth, another conjectural *topos* about persons.

²⁶⁷ Tertullian has translated “ἐναντι βασιλέως Ἀσσυρίων” (in the LXX and Justin) as “*adversus regem Assyiorum*,” giving his version of Is. 8:4 a more intense meaning. Whereas in Jus. *Dial.* 77.4 Herod is identified with the king of Assyria and, from the context of ch. 78, “ἐναντι” almost means “under his nose,” in Tertullian the use of the preposition gives the impression that the Magi’s action was in direct opposition to the Assyrian king.

²⁶⁸ J. H. Waszink, “Tertullian’s Principles and Methods of Exegesis,” in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition: In Honorem Robert M. Grant*, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Paris, 1979), pp.27-29, notes that although Tertullian engaged in allegorical interpretation it was only when a literal reading of a text could not be sustained. I am suggesting something a little more than that. Peter Iver Kaufman, “Tertullian on Heresy, History, and the Reappropriation of Revelation,” *Church History* 60 (1991), p.175, states that Tertullian: “... seems to hug the coastline of sacred literature, seldom experimenting with allegory, save for the relatively tame typological readings, which permitted him to strike at Marcion’s disrespect for the Old Testament.” See also M. F. Wiles, op. cit., p.119.

²⁶⁹ T. P. O’Malley, op. cit., p.131.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.139-140 comments on the importance of context for interpreting Scripture in Tertullian.

In 9.6 we see a rare example in this treatise of a more emotive or sarcastic Tertullian who dismissed the understanding of the infant of Is. 8:4 being a warrior as ridiculous, something he retained in *adversus Marcionem* by transferring the reference to Marcion's native Pontus (*adv. Marc.* 3.13.3).

Frequent use of the word *signum* (esp. 9.8-9) recalls the importance of signs in establishing conjectural proof.

Against scholars like Williams, who claimed that Tertullian did not rely upon Justin, Tränkle argued that even though Tertullian offered a somewhat different interpretation of Is. 8:4 than did Justin,²⁷¹ this does not disprove Tertullian's dependence on Justin. This is so, he advocated, because Tertullian always felt free to tinker with source material, and so deviation from a source is not proof of non-dependence.

Diese Abweichungen ließen sich mit einem von beiden verwendeten Zitatenschatz und einer gemeinsamen exegetischen Tradition gut erklären. Doch ist das nur eine Möglichkeit. Wie der Vergleich zwischen Iud. und dem Barnabasbrief gezeigt hat, scheute sich Tertullian auch nicht, die allegorischen Deutungen, die er vorfand, zu verändern, wenn sie dadurch schlagender und eindringlicher wurden.²⁷²

The earlier reference to the fact that the Christ would attain the power of Damascus and spoils of Samaria not as a warrior but as an infant prompted Tertullian to provide what amounted to almost a line by line commentary on Psalm 44 (45) to demonstrate the warlike attributes could only be applied to the Christ figuratively (9.16b-20a = *adv. Marc.* 3.14.1-7, somewhat expanded

²⁷¹ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.lxxx, noted that in Jus. *Dial.* 77.4 the king of Assyria was identified with Herod while in Tert. *adv. Iud.* 9.16 the king was identified with the devil.

²⁷² Ibid.

in 3-4). Justin too had cited this psalm as being of Christological significance, although without offering much comment on it (*Dial.* 38).²⁷³

Tertullian returned to the rhetorical *topos* of name (9.20b-25 = *adv. Marc.* 3.16.3-6). He wished to demonstrate that the Christ was prophesied in the Hebrew Scriptures to bear the name Jesus, for when the Son of God spoke to Joshua, son of Nun and assistant to Moses (for God could not be seen directly), what is recorded is the fact that the Son's name was upon Joshua (Ex. 23:20-21), hence the Son's name must be Jesus (although Tertullian allowed his readers to draw this conclusion for themselves) (9.22-23a). Hence, Joshua "*figuram futuri fuisse*" (9.21). This same argument may be found in Justin (*Dial.* 75). Skarsaune has pointed out the ways in which Justin's interpretation differed from earlier Christian and from Philo's interpretations.²⁷⁴ He suggests that Justin's view that Joshua was the guardian angel may have been prompted by Dt. 31:2-3 (*Dial.* 126.6). It is worth pointing out that, in *adversus Iudaeos*, Tertullian turned to this sentence in Deuteronomy immediately after the Exodus material (9.23b), although he offered the more usual Christian interpretation (Mt. 11:10; Mk. 1:2; and Lk. 7:27) of seeing John the Baptist as the angel/messenger who went before to prepare the way (9.23b-24). The material on John seems somewhat digressive, particularly when the comments turn from John as angel to John as lamp (9.24).

Having examined his name, Tertullian proceeded to investigate Jesus' family (9.26-27 = *adv. Marc.* 3.17.3b-4a). The Scriptural prophecy that there would arise a rod from the root of

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, p.176, believes that Justin employed this psalm to refer to the universal reign of the Christ. Justin cited the entire psalm while Tertullian went only as far as verse 5, omitting most of the universal reference.

Jesse (Is. 11:1-2) was claimed to be fulfilled in Mary, who was from the house of David (9.26 - “*et quoniam ex semine David genus trahere deberet virgo*”). Even when Justin referred to the prophecy of Isaiah 11 (*Dial.* 87.2; and *1 Apol.* 32.12), he did not mention Mary as being of David’s lineage.²⁷⁵ There is only one reference in Justin to Mary’s Davidic ancestry (*Dial.* 45.4). Elsewhere in Tertullian’s own writings, in the context of Is. 11:1-2, we find him claiming that Mary was descended from David (*de Carn.* 21.5,7; 22.2-4; and *adv. Marc.* 3.20.6).²⁷⁶ The rhetorical neatness of these successive personal *topoi* in *adversus Iudaeos* is disturbed in *adversus Marcionem* by the insertion of material more related to either Jesus’ character or his death (3.17.1-3a).

The next personal *topos* considered was that of Jesus’ character or nature (9.28 = *adv. Marc.* 3.17.4b). Tertullian drew from the Scriptures (Is. 53:3,7; and 42:2-3) to show that the Christ would be humble, patient and tranquil.²⁷⁷ The next personal *topos* was that of occupation (9.29-31 = *adv. Marc.* 3.17.5).²⁷⁸ Although he was aware that what was needed was to outline the preaching and healing ministry of Jesus (9.29 - “*actum Christi eius, qui venit*”) up against the prophecies of the Scriptures (9.29 - “*ad scripturarum regulam*”),²⁷⁹ which he exemplified with

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p.446, states that Tert. *adv. Iud.* 9.26 employs Is. 11:1 in a different context than did Justin, though Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.17.4 may depend on Jus. *Dial.* 87.4f. Skarsaune does not allude to the close relationship/dependence between the two passages in Tertullian, and I would support seeing a downplay in the idea of similarity at this point. Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.17.4 contains only the briefest of mentions of the ancestry of Jesus; the focus of the chapter, particularly because of the insertion of 3.17.1-3a, is on the suffering of Jesus.

²⁷⁶ A. Kroymann, *CCSL* 2, p.912, wished to exclude “*ex David*” from the text of Tert. *de Carn.* 21.5.

²⁷⁷ G. Söflund, op. cit., pp.125-128, used Is. 53:3,7 as one of the passages to demonstrate that in the latter half of *adv. Iud.* the Scriptural texts were not taken from a ‘proto-Vulgate.’ That they were was the position of those who wished to prove the latter half to be not by Tertullian because in the first half and in *adv. Marc.* the Scriptural texts seem to depend on the LXX. Söflund was able to show how both this and other instances of this passage from Isaiah (13.21; 14.1) show closer resemblance to the LXX than to the Vulgate.

²⁷⁸ Although Is. 58:1-2 is not referred to in *adv. Marc.* and Is. 35:4-6 appears in *adv. Marc.* 4.24.12.

²⁷⁹ For a discussion on Tertullian’s use of the term *regula* as a technical term (*regula fidei*) see L. Wm. Countryman, “Tertullian the Regula Fidei,” *The Second Century* 2 (1982), pp.208-227.

Is. 58:1-2 and 35:4-6, the only proof Tertullian offered that Jesus did fulfil those prophecies was a brief, compound extract from Jn. 5:18 and 10:33.²⁸⁰ Perhaps a clearer insight into Tertullian's attitude concerning the probative nature of Jesus' works is provided in *adversus Marcionem*, where he cited New Testament passages to show how Jesus himself did not place much emphasis upon them (*adv. Marc.* 3.3.1-2). Given that it parallels what appears in *adversus Marcionem* and that references to humility, patience and tranquility make more sense if found in a section on Jesus' character than in a section of his name, I agree with Tränkle against Kroymann that the sentence beginning "*exploratio etiam*" belongs in 9.27 rather than at the beginning of 9.26.

In chapter 10 Tertullian continued his examination of non-temporal, prophetic themes about the coming of the Christ (7.1), or of the signs and operations performed by the Christ (8.2), and he began by responding to a Jewish argument against the Christian belief that it was prophesied that the Christ would be crucified. The Jews had countered that Christian claim by referring to Dt. 21:23 to support their own belief that, because Jesus was crucified, he could not be the Christ (*adv. Iud.* 10.1).

Justin made use of this text and interpreted it in much the same way as Paul had (Gal. 3:13), viz., that Jesus did indeed become accursed as was predicted and therefore, rather than being an embarrassment for Christians, this text was further confirmation of his being the fulfilment of the Hebrew Scriptures. Justin clarified Paul, stating that the one crucified was not cursed by God but by the people and added some more recent information that the Jews in their

²⁸⁰ Nowhere else in the Tertullianic corpus are these two verses blended together.

synagogues cursed Christians (*Dial.* 96.1-2).²⁸¹ Shotwell calls this predictive allegory of Justin's a "very far-fetched interpretation."²⁸² Irenaeus also cited Dt. 21:23 in the Pauline tradition of Jesus becoming accursed so that people might be freed from the curse of the law imposed by Dt. 27:26 (*adv. Haer.* 3.18.3).

Tertullian's interpretation, like Justin's, depended on the Pauline understanding that Jesus became accursed vicariously. However, whereas Paul, Justin, and Irenaeus had used Dt. 27:26, together with 21:23, to highlight the impossibility of fulfilling the law and therefore the curse under which humanity lived which could only be lifted by someone taking that curse on themselves, Tertullian offered a contextual interpretation of Dt. 21:23, without making use of Dt. 27:26, to come to a similar conclusion (10.2-5a). For Tertullian, the one crucified would be cursed by God if they were being punished for some sin. Jesus was crucified not because of his own sins but on behalf of others, as was predicted in Ps. 34(35):12; 68(69):4; 21(22):16; 68(69):22; and 21(22):18 (not that all these texts referred to the vicarious nature of Jesus' death). Although it is not stated, one would have to believe that Tertullian's conclusion, unlike Justin's,²⁸³ was that Jesus was not really accursed. Yet perhaps, in phrases like "*sed huius maledictionis*" (10.1) and "*non pro meritis suis in id genus mortis expositus est, sed ut ea... implerentur*" (10.4),

²⁸¹ O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, pp.216-219, notes that from *Dial.* 89.2 on, Justin seems to have incorporated the Pauline insight into a tradition which rejected the notion that Jesus could be cursed, giving an overall yes and no balance. Theodore Stylianopolous, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, Dissertation Series, vol. 20 (Missoula: Society of Biblical Literature, 1975), pp.103-108, does not see the combination of two traditions, but only that Justin felt the need to modify the Pauline interpretation. He suggests (p. 105, n. 68) that, unlike Paul, Justin did not apply Dt. 21:23 to Christ, although he qualifies this by acknowledging that Justin saw, in the curse by the Jews, that it did apply.

²⁸² Willis A. Shotwell, *The Biblical Exegesis of Justin Martyr* (London: S.P.C.K., 1965), p.99.

²⁸³ Except, as O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, p.218, points out, when Justin relied upon the non-Pauline tradition, e.g. *Dial.* 90.3 ("δοκούσα κατάραν") and 94.5.

Tertullian accepted that Jesus endured an accursed death (even though undeservedly). The focus is on the accursed yet undeserved death being the fulfilment of prophecy.

Tertullian countered the difficulty raised by Dt. 21:23 by referring to the innocence of Jesus, making use of Is. 53:9. He did not linger on this for long. Suggesting that Jesus' death was unwarranted may not have been accepted by Jews.

Certainly in other passages Tertullian accepted that Jesus did die under the curse of the law and that his interpretation was aligned with that of Paul.²⁸⁴ In *adversus Marcionem* 3²⁸⁵ we have a statement that seems to suggest the priority of *adversus Iudaeos*, if the other passage to which the text refers is not *adv. Marc.* 5.3.9-10. Given the revisions of *adversus Marcionem*,²⁸⁶ this cannot be ruled out.²⁸⁷ Even Tränkle, who supported the authenticity of the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* and its priority over *adversus Marcionem*,²⁸⁸ understood the reference in *adv. Marc.* 3.18.1 to be to *adv. Marc.* 5.3.9-10.²⁸⁹ His main interest in this passage in *adversus Iudaeos*, though, was to disprove Corssen, who believed he could detect the influence of the unknown compiler, by showing that the same hand was responsible for the thoughts of both

²⁸⁴ Tert. *de Pat.* 8.3; Tert. *adv. Prax.* 29.3; and Tert. *de Fug.* 12.2.

²⁸⁵ Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.18.1: “*Sed huius maledictionis sensum differo digne a sola praedicatione crucis, de qua nunc maxime quaeritur, quia et alias antecedit rerum probatio rationem.*”

²⁸⁶ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*, pp.255-256.

²⁸⁷ Taking “*differo*” to refer to a later passage (*adv. Marc.* 5.3.9-10) which had been written earlier, in a previous edition of the work.

²⁸⁸ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.lix: “Daß Tertullian zunächst die Kapitel von der zweifachen Ankunft Christi, von Jesu Geburt und Tod und von der Bestrafung der Juden so gestaltet hätte, wie sie in Marc. III auf uns gekommen sind, und sie dann ihres Schwunges, ihrer Lebendigkeit und Schlagkraft beraubt hätte, ist nicht denkbar. Sinnvoll ist nur die umgekehrte Reihenfolge. Die Annahme, Tertullian habe diese Teile aus Marc. III exzerpiert...”

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p.xli: “In Marc. 3,18,1 ist zwar der Ausgangspunkt der Überlegung der gleiche Einwand, die Antwort wird jedoch auf Marc. 5,3,9f. verschoben, wo diese Frage in Zusammenhang mit Gal. 3,13... ebenfalls behandelt werden muß.”

adversus Iudaeos and *adversus Marcionem* with regard to Dt. 21:23.²⁹⁰ What appears in *adv. Iud.* 10.2 may well be the “*alias antecedit rerum probatio rationem*” of *adv. Marc.* 3.18.1, especially since, in *adv. Iud.* 10.1, Tertullian said of his contextual explanation “*sed huius maledictonis sensum antecedit rerum ratio.*” The explanation offered in *adv. Mar.* 5.3.9-10 is thoroughly Pauline, different from the contextual explanation of Dt. 21:23 offered in *adversus Iudaeos*.²⁹¹

The suggestion here is that this interpretation of the wider context of Dt. 21:23, so typical of Tertullian’s rhetorical use of the Scripture, was by Tertullian and that it suited his argument against Jews who quoted the text against the Christians. Only in *adversus Iudaeos* do we find a focus on the undeserved aspect of Jesus’ vicarious fate (all the other early Christian texts following the Pauline position that focused on the unfulfilability of the law except through the vicarious acceptance of the curse). Later, in response to the Marcionites, who accepted the words of Dt. 21:23 as being from the creator god and that, on that basis, Jesus must belong to another god, Tertullian found the Pauline argument that Jesus was indeed accursed more helpful in establishing his overall point that the creator god was the one God.²⁹²

One can see here that rather than use Dt. 21:23 as a piece of evidence upon which a conjectural argument could be built, Tertullian has treated this as an ambiguous text needing clarifying. This is an example of a qualitative or legal approach. Through this Tertullian has addressed the *topos* of the manner of the death of the Christ. Not only could Tertullian read

²⁹⁰ Ibid., pp.xli-xlii.

²⁹¹ T. Stylianopoulos, op. cit., p.107, n.75, recognised that the interpretations in *adv. Marc.* and *adv. Iud.* differed.

²⁹² In *adv. Marc.* 5.3.10-11, Tertullian’s argument was that it made just as much sense to say that the creator god allowed Jesus to become accursed as it did to say that Marcion’s god allowed this to happen. T. Stylianopoulos, op. cit., p.107, n.75 is ambiguous when he writes: “In the latter reference Tertullian states that Marcion accepts Dt. 21:23 at face value and contended that Christ was indeed cursed by the Creator God.” Who contended? If Stylianopoulos meant that Marcion did, I would think he has misinterpreted Tertullian.

Scripture typologically, seeing in it nothing but Jesus, he could also read it at face value and in its own context.

Having responded to that objection, Tertullian turned to offer texts that predicted the “*sacramentum passionis*” (10.5b) and to figures from the Hebrew Scriptures, like Isaac, Joseph, Jacob, Simeon and Levi, and Moses (10.6-10 = *adv. Marc.* 3.18.2-7), who became typological indicators of the manner in which Jesus died. We may notice how Tertullian claimed the blessing of Dt. 33:17 to have been pronounced by Jacob rather than Moses (10.7 = *adv. Marc.* 3.18.3). Justin, who quoted this text, correctly attributed the blessing to Moses (*Dial.* 91.1-3). The fact that the interpretation of the text about the bull’s horns representing the cross is so similar indicates that there is some connection between the two. Gen. 49:5-7 had not been used in *Barnabas*, Justin, or Irenaeus. Mention of Moses praying with outstretched arms and the erecting of the bronze serpent as being figures for the cross was common in early Christian literature.²⁹³ Tertullian seems reliant upon Justin at this point.²⁹⁴

Other passages from the Hebrew Scriptures served, although non-typologically, to indicate the manner in which the Christ would die: Ps. 95(96):10; Is. 9:5; Jer. 11:19; Ps. 21(22):17, 22; Is. 53:8-10; 57:2; Amos 8:9-10; and Ex. 12:1-1 (*adv. Iud.* 10.11-19 = *adv. Marc.* 3.19.1-9).²⁹⁵ Justin was interested in pointing out that in passages like Jer. 11:19 and Ps. 95(96):10 the Jewish versions of the text had cut out words and phrases that the Christians would employ

²⁹³ Jus. *Dial.* 90.4-5; 91.3; 111.1; 112.2; 131.4-5 (battle against Amalek); 91.4; 94.1-2, 4-5; 112.1-2; 131.4 (the bronze serpent); and *Barn.* 12.2-7. See O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, pp.216-218.

²⁹⁴ James Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background*, WUNT: 2. Reihe 64 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1994), pp.159-160, notes how, in the interpretation of Num. 21:6-9, the author of *Barn.* focused on the life-giving properties of the serpent while Justin focused on the destruction of the power of the serpent.

²⁹⁵ *Adv. Iud.* 10.17-19 is not paralleled in book 3 of *adv. Marc.* In the latter treatise, Amos 8:9-10 is cited in 4.42.5. Indeed, the parallelism between the two treatises does not recommence until *adv. Iud.* 11.11.

Christologically (*Dial.* 72-73).²⁹⁶ Skarsaune suggests that Tertullian derived his selection of texts here from different passages in Justin's *Apologia* and *Dialogus*.²⁹⁷ Fredouille sees, in his use of Is. 9:5, Tertullian's interest in arguing that the novelty or unusualness of something had significance: the birth of a child, in itself, is not particularly significant, but the birth of a child who is son of God is.²⁹⁸

In this entire chapter on the death of Jesus, while he expended much energy in demonstrating from the Hebrew Scriptures that the Christ would die upon the cross, Tertullian did not feel the need to explain or prove the details of the death of Jesus, presuming that his readers were familiar with the fact that Jesus went to his death silently and innocently (10.4,5), that he was persecuted by the Pharisees and held to the cross by nails (10.9), that he was crucified (10.11, 14), that he called his body "bread" (10.12), that he rose from the sepulchre (10.16), that he died in the middle of the day (10.17), and that he died at the time of Passover (10.18).

Having spent much of the chapter arguing that the Scriptures indicated that the Christ would suffer crucifixion (10.6-14a), Tertullian turned his attention to the fact that the Christ was predicted to die, and he left aside the issue of the means by which he would die (10.14b-19). The arguments here seem particularly weak. For one thing, it could be argued against Tertullian that the pieces of Scripture he presented did not refer necessarily to the Christ and that the simple facts concerning time of death, place and burial and resurrection (itself a disputed fact) were insufficient to make him the only one who fulfilled the Scriptures.

²⁹⁶ See O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, pp.35-42.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.p.441-443.

²⁹⁸ J.-C. Fredouille, *op. cit.*, p.266.

All of these things were prophesied to be contemporaneous with the coming of the Christ and that they occurred in the life of Jesus contributed as proof to the fact that he was the promised Christ. Following this, Tertullian turned his attention to the events that were prophesied to be subsequent to the coming of the Christ. He had examined this matter already with regard to the issue of the timing of the subsequent events in chapter 8. Here he would look at the nature of those subsequent events. This can be classified as belonging still to the third topic announced in 7.1, but as moving from the second to the third topic of the revised structure of the *confirmatio* announced in 8.2.

The lengthiest of Tertullian's extracts from the Hebrew Scriptures (Ez. 8:12 - 9:6) occurs in 11.2-8. This was the only occasion when Tertullian used this passage from the prophet, except in *adv. Marc.* 3.22.5 where he cited Ez. 9:4. In *adversus Iudaeos* this passage was able to indicate several things at once: the twofold judgement (in the present age accomplished in the destruction of Jerusalem and the universal judgement in the age to come) and the favourable judgement that would be given to those marked with the sign of the cross. In 11.9 Tertullian added Dt. 28:64-66 as yet another prophecy about the cross.²⁹⁹

I have argued, in the previous chapter, that the appearance of a concluding summary (11.10-11) could be an indication not of an interpolation but of a lack of editorial revision by Tertullian himself; he had begun to draw his treatise to a close before he realised that there was still more to be written about events subsequent to the life and death of Jesus. If it can be believed that Tertullian himself was responsible for this sloppy and untidy structure, it would

²⁹⁹ Tertullian, mistakenly, stated that the passage was from Ex. *Iren. Dem.* 79 is the only other early Christian author who employed part of this prophecy in his writings.

make sense to accept a suggestion like Barnes' that Tertullian lost interest in this work and never revised it.³⁰⁰ Having begun with the prophecy about the "*captivitas vobis et dispersio*" (10.19), it would have made sense to continue with the fulfilment of that prophecy (which Tertullian did in chapter 13) before treating the positive development of the universal spread of Christianity (which occurs in chapter 12).

Elsewhere I have commented on the arguments found in chapter 12 and the relationship of this passage with the material in 7.2 - 8.1a and in *adv. Marc.* 3.20.1-4.³⁰¹ Using Ps. 2:7-8 and Is. 42:6-7, Tertullian applied the rhetorical *topos* of comparison to prove that the reference was to the Christ and not to David, because David never received Gentiles as his inheritance. We have noticed already, in the opening of the *confirmatio*, how Tertullian applied this prophecy to the Christian experience.³⁰²

In 13.1 we find again confirmation that Tertullian had a twofold distinction in mind in his overall argument: the prophecies and the fulfilment of the prophecies with respect to the time of the birth and death of the Christ, and the destruction of Jerusalem, and the prophecies and the fulfilment of the prophecies with respect to other themes about the birth and death of the Christ, and the destruction of Jerusalem.

³⁰⁰ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*, p.107.

³⁰¹ G. D. Dunn, "The Universal Spread," Appendix C.

³⁰² It is to be noted that in *adv. Marc.* 3.20.5 Tertullian utilised yet another piece of Scripture, Is. 55:4-5, to reinforce the idea that the Hebrew Scriptures foretold the universal spread of Christianity because the text referred not to David but to the Christ. The argument about the universal spread of Christianity continued in *adv. Marc.* 3.21 with particular attention to the controversy with the Marcionites.

*Igitur, quoniam filii Israëli adfirmant nos errare recipiendo Christum, qui iam venit, praescribimus illis ex eis<dem> scripturis iam venisse Christum, qui praedicabatur, quamvis ex temporibus Danihelis praedicantis probaverimus iam venisse Christum, qui nuntiabatur.*³⁰³

This would actually be more appropriate placed between 8.18 and 9.1.³⁰⁴

In 13.1b it appears at first as though Tertullian was introducing a rhetorical *topos* of place with regard to the birth of the Christ that would seem to belong to chapter 9, by citing Mic. 5:1 as found in Mt. 2:6. This is what we find in Justin (*Dial.* 78.1; and *1 Apol.* 34.1) and Irenaeus (*Dem.* 63). Tertullian did not develop such an argument. The purpose for which he used Micah, for the first time in Christian literature, was as an argument about events subsequent to the death of Jesus. Here Tertullian was able to take recent historical events, like the expelling of the Jews from Bethlehem, to argue that, as it was now impossible for the Christ to be born in Bethlehem, Jesus, who was born in Bethlehem, must be the Christ (13.1b-3,5). This information and argument are original to Tertullian.

He produced other texts to illustrate that the Scriptures predicted the displacement of the Jews from their land (Is. 1:7; 33:17) which would happen after the coming of the Christ (13.4). We have noticed already that a longer version of the first text (Is. 1:7-8) had been cited by Tertullian in the context of the *refutatio*: that circumcision was the sign by which the Romans could keep the Jews out of Jerusalem (3.4). It was to be used again later in this chapter (13.26 = *adv. Marc.* 3.23.3 [and even intimated at 3.23.7b, which has no parallel with *adversus*

³⁰³ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 13.1a: “Therefore, since the sons of Israel affirm that we err in receiving the Christ, who is already come, let us put in a demurrer against them out of the Scriptures themselves, to the effect that the Christ who was the theme of prediction *is* come; albeit by the time of Daniel’s prediction we *have* proved that the Christ is come already who was the theme of announcement.”

³⁰⁴ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xlv, wrote that it was “die Überraschung groß” to find 13.1 where it is. He suggested also that it belonged more appropriately at the beginning of ch. 9: “Dabei bildet das Zitat Mich. 5,1 in der Fassung, wie es bei Matth. 2,6 erscheint, den Ausgangspunkt, während in Kapitel 9,1 Es 7,13ff. dazu herangezogen war.”

Iudaeos]). As he had in 3.4, Tertullian used Is. 1:7 to prove that the Jews were excluded. Whereas in Tert. *adv. Iud.* 3.4,6; Jus. *I Apol.* 47; Jus. *Dial.* 16.2; and 92.3,³⁰⁵ it was clearly stated that they were excluded from Jerusalem, here the reference is a more general one than just one about the city:

... quod vobis, pro meritis vestris post expugnationem Hierusalem prohibitis ingredi in terram vestram, de longinquo eam oculis tantum videre permissum est...³⁰⁶

Coupled with the fact that the Christ would be born in Bethlehem was that he was to be anointed but, since the destruction of the Temple, anointing was no longer possible (13.5b-7). Reference was made to Dan. 9:26 where Tertullian has “*unctio*,” referring to the end of anointing, rather than “*unctus*,” referring to the anointed one. Here Tertullian was following the Greek text of Theodotion, which read “χρίσμα,” rather than the Greek equivalent of what is found in the Masoretic text (משיח).³⁰⁷ Although this is meant probably to be an argument from the *topos* of place (13.5b - “*unde*”), it is along very similar lines to the argument about the end of anointing from the *topos* of time found in 8.17. Tertullian then stated that he was repeating an earlier argument (13.8 - “*Iterato deinde ostendamus*”) that the Christ had come. He cited Dan. 9:26b (as he had done in chapter 8); Is. 65:2 (the only use of this text in the Tertullianic corpus); Ps. 21(22):17-18; and 68(69):22 (the first part of which had been used already in this treatise at 8.17;

³⁰⁵ See G. D. Dunn, “*Pro temporum condicione*,” Appendix B.

³⁰⁶ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 13.4: “...—which is what you do, being prohibited, in reward of your deserts, since the storming of Jerusalem, to enter into your land; it is permitted you merely to see it with your eyes from afar...”

³⁰⁷ See G. D. Dunn, “Tertullian and Daniel 9:24-27,” Appendix D for some textual comments on Tertullian’s text of Daniel 9. See J. A. Montgomery, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, ICC (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1927), p.382. Among other variations, Tertullian followed both Theodotion (“σὺν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ ἐρχομένῳ”) and the Old Greek (“μετὰ τοῦ χριστοῦ”) in having the Christ or the prince destroyed along *with* the city and sanctuary, rather than the Hebrew, which has the soldiers of the prince destroy city and sanctuary (8.6 - “*cum duce adveniente*”).

and 10.4, 13). This seems a messy presentation (13.8-23), so messy that none of chapter 13 until 13.24 is paralleled in *adversus Marcionem*. In part, it should be included in chapter 8 with the material on the time of the death of the Christ and the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, particularly because we find an unusual comment (contrary to that found in chapter 8 which, it has to be conceded, suggests that Tertullian has forgotten the point he made earlier or that someone else was making this point in chapter 13) that the death of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem occurred at the same time (13.10 - "*quod civitas simul eo tempore exterminari deberet, cum ducatus eius in ea pati haberet*"). In part, it should be included in chapter 10 with the material on the manner of Christ's death. The material about the death of the Christ would belong here in chapter 13, however, if Tertullian used it as a premiss in an argument about how the destruction of Jerusalem meant that the Christ must have suffered already, as predicted. Instead, he does seem to have been so carried away exploring the premiss (13.10b-23) that whatever conclusion he did draw seems to be overwhelmed by the material on the death of the Christ. He did mention some of the events that have followed the death of the Christ, like the fact that the Spirit had deserted the synagogues of the Jews after the coming of the Christ (13.15-16) and that the Jews had sunk into error ("*mersa est in profundo erroris*") while the Christians had been rescued by baptism, even though they now suffered as once the prophets had before them (13.19-20).

Tränkle noted that the author's reference in 13.8 that this argument was being discussed a second time cannot be accurate because nowhere earlier had the ascension and second coming of Jesus been mentioned.³⁰⁸ I would place the emphasis somewhat differently. What Tertullian

³⁰⁸ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xlv: "13,8 geht einen Schritt weiter: Nun soll in wiederholtem Anlauf auch bewiesen werden, daß Christus litt, in den Himmel aufgenommen ward und von dort wiederkommen sollte. Von diesen Themen sind nur die ersten beiden behandelt..."

was doing a second time was investigating the *topos* of subsequent events. The first had to do with the expulsion of Jews from Judaea (including Bethlehem) and the need for the messiah to have been born already. The second had to do with the fact that, as Jerusalem would be destroyed after the death of the messiah, this was another reason why it had to be concluded that the messiah had come already.

The use of Is. 65:2 and Ps. 21(22):17-18 together is also found in Justin (*Dial.* 97; and *I Apol.* 35.2-5). The coupling of Ps. 68(69):22 with Ps. 21(22), though, is not found in Justin. Indeed, Ps. 68(69):22 is not referred to in Justin's writings at all. In Tertullian, this coupling occurs also in *adv. Iud.* 10.4 and *de Res.* 20.5. The difference between those two instances and the one in *adv. Iud.* 13.10 is that in the former there is some indication that he has not blended the two into one, which appears to be the case in the latter instance. Skarsaune notes how Tertullian's interpretation of Ps. 21(22) in *adv. Iud.* 13.10, in referring it not to David but to the Christ, is identical to Justin's (*I Apol.* 35.6) and how *adv. Iud.* 10.14 seems to be a condensing of Justin's own commentary on Ps. 21(22) in *Dial.* 105 and seems to parallel *Dial.* 97.4.³⁰⁹ While I can agree with Skarsaune, that *adv. Iud.* 10.11-14 depends directly upon Justin, I am not convinced that the same thing can be said about *adv. Iud.* 13.10-11 because of the coupling of Ps. 68(69) with Ps. 21(22). Here it would seem that Tertullian has gone back to his *testimonia* source, even though keeping Justin's interpretation in mind (unless it could be argued that Justin derived the interpretation from his source, to which Tertullian had access and that, therefore, in this instance, Tertullian did not rely upon Justin. The other possibility which ought to be mentioned is that this part of chapter 13 was not by Tertullian). This view is reinforced when we consider Iren. *adv. Haer.* 4.33.12, where we find Ps. 68(69):22; Is. 65:2; and Ps. 21(22):19,

³⁰⁹ O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, p.441.

among other pieces of Scripture, cited together. In the midst of all this there is another reference to Ps. 95(96):10, which had appeared in *adv. Iud.* 10.11.

Some of the other texts in chapter 13 do not have a parallel in Justin (Ps. 66[67]:7; Joel 2:22; Jer. 2:10-12;³¹⁰ and Amos 8:9).³¹¹ While Justin had used Jer. 2:13 to refer to circumcision (*Dial.* 19.2; 114), Tertullian used it to refer to the abandonment of Jewish synagogues by the Holy Spirit (13.15),³¹² as he could find prophesied in Is. 65:13-14 (a passage he used in a similar fashion in *adv. Marc.* 4.14.10-11; and 4.15.13).

Tertullian could find more predictions of the cross in 2 Kgs. 6:1-7 (*adv. Iud.* 13.17-20a) and Gen. 22:1-14, which was joined with Is. 53:7-8 and Hos. 6:1-3 (*adv. Iud.* 13.20b-23). All of this, though, is merely preparatory for a conclusion about how the destruction of Jerusalem was to occur after the death of the Christ, but it is a conclusion which, mentioned by way of introduction in 13.8, is easily lost among so much detail on the death of the Christ.

From 13.24 to the end of the chapter the parallel with *adversus Marcionem* (3.23.1-7) is resumed. Tränkle saw this as the beginning of “ein neuer Gedankengang” and that, even though the fate of the Jews would follow on naturally from a discussion of the death of Jesus, 3.24-29 and that finishing at 3.23 “gehören nicht ursprünglich zusammen und wir müssen hier ähnlich wie

³¹⁰ Although Jer. 2:12-13 does appear in *Barn.* 11.2 and Jer. 2:13 in *Jus. Dial.* 114.5, as it does in *Tert. adv. Iud.* 13.14.

³¹¹ Perhaps even an allusion to Is. 16:3, which is noteworthy in that both *Barn.* 11.3 and *Jus. Dial.* 114.5 use Is. 16:1-2 (which Tertullian did not). O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, p.183, notes that in combining Jer. 2:13 and Is. 16:1 with Jer. 3:8, Justin was referring to the Hadrianic ban on Jews entering Jerusalem.

³¹² O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, p.450, argues that *Tert. adv. Iud.* 13.13-14 does not derive from Justin or *Barnabas*.

zwischen den Kap. VIII and IX, XII and XIII einen Trennungsstrich ziehen.”³¹³ He did offer an alternative: “denn ihr Schicksal war im Vorausgehenden stets als bekannt vorausgesetzt worden.”³¹⁴ It is that alternative I wish to adopt. Tränkle argued that the words “*recognoscant... exitum suum*” of 13.24 were “sinnlos” if they had to refer to the section ending in 13.23 because he believed that earlier section only to be about “Christi Geburt, Tod und Auferstehung.”³¹⁵ I have argued that the focus of 13.8-23 is not on the death of the Christ; this is only part of the major premiss of a syllogism (stated most clearly in 13.9 - “*post adventum eius... quod ipsa civitas exterminari haberet*”; and in 13.24 - “*exitum suum, quem post adventum Christi relaturi praedicabantur*”), whose conclusion was that the Christ had come and suffered already (13.1 - “*qui iam venit; iam venisse Christum*”; 13.8 - “*venisse iam Christum*”; 13.24 - “*Christum... venisse*”) and whose minor premiss was that the destruction had taken place (13.9 - “*et ita factum recognoscimus*”). This, indeed, is how the rhetorical *topos* of subsequent events worked: subsequent events proved the earlier one, which was the focus of one’s oratorical endeavours. Only a lack of revision saw Tertullian discuss matters about the death of the Christ without keeping the reader’s attention fixed on the whole major premiss, viz., that the Christ would have suffered before the destruction of Jerusalem.

By way of summary—chapter 13 consists of the argument: the Christ will have come and suffered before the destruction of Jerusalem, Jerusalem has been destroyed, therefore the Christ must have come and suffered already. 13.8-23 saw Tertullian get carried away with some Scriptural interpretation about the suffering-of-the-Christ part of the first premiss. 13.24-29

³¹³ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.xlviii.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

would see him examine some Scriptural passages about the destruction of Jerusalem. These two sections together form the major premiss. Tertullian's words in 13.24 are not meaningless, as Tränkle contended, but they are part of a greater whole.

It has to be mentioned that the minor premiss, other than the brief mention in 13.9, does not receive much attention. The destruction of Jerusalem was an historical fact that did not need to be proven. As Aristotle had noted, in a section of his treatise on rhetoric that continues to provoke disagreement among commentators,³¹⁶ oratory is not logic, and to construct a persuasive argument one need not include all the steps (Arist. *Rh.* 2.20.1-3 [1395b]). Even if Tertullian did not know Aristotle, he knew instinctively what made persuasive argument.

Is. 2:20 and 3:1 were joined together (13.24-25 = *adv. Marc.* 3.23.1-2) to demonstrate that the Jews were taken away from Jerusalem after the Gentiles turned away from idols, which, for Tertullian, meant not simply their conversion but their conversion through Christ who, by implication, must have come before the Jews were taken from Jerusalem. This text does not seem to have been used in Christian literature prior to Tertullian. This taking away of the Jews from Jerusalem was an indication that God had now rejected them (Is. 5:6-7): the blessing of God,

³¹⁶ E.g., W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, Rhetoric I, pp.20-21, 46-47; James L. Kinneavy, "William Grimaldi—Reinterpreting Aristotle," *Ph & Rh* 20 (1987), pp.183-200; James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," *Speech Monographs* 3 (1936), pp.49-74; Jacques Brunschwig, "Aristotle's Rhetoric as a 'Counterpart' to Dialectic," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.34-55; M. F. Burnyeat, "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.88-115; id., "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion," in *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*, ed. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.3-55; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Is There an Ethical Dimension to Aristotelian Rhetoric?" in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.116-141; G. A. Kennedy, *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*, pp.40-42, 297-298; E. Garver, op. cit., pp.162-169; Robin Smith, "Logic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.27-65; Lawrence D. Green, "Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of 'Αντίστροφος,'" *Rhetorica* 8 (1990), pp.5-27; Alessandro Giuliani, "The Aristotelian Theory of Dialectical Definition," *Ph & Rh* 5 (1972), pp.129-142; Carnes Lord, "The Intention of Aristotle's Rhetoric," *Hermes* 109 (1981), pp.326-339 (esp. 333-334); William Lyon Benoit, "Aristotle's Example: The Rhetorical Induction," *QJS* 66 (1980), pp.182-192; id., "On Aristotle's Example," *PH & Rh* 20 (1987), pp.261-267; Thomas M. Conley, "The Enthymeme in Perspective," *QJS* 70 (1984), pp.168-187; Scott Consigny, "Dialectical, Rhetorical, and Aristotelian Rhetoric," *Ph & Rh* 22 (1989), pp.281-287.

seen as rain, stopped because the Jews had brought forth thorns, understood as the suffering of Jesus (13.25-26 = *adv. Marc.* 3.23.2-3). Again, we may notice how one brings about the other, the subsequent proves the earlier's occurrence.

Here we notice how Tertullian remained conscious of the treatise's overall *partitio* expressed in 1.8: the Christian people "*superavit*" the Jews.³¹⁷ This exclusion of the Jews from God's favour is certainly not highlighted in the treatise. When there is discussion about who God's people are, Tertullian was most interested in arguing for Christian inclusion rather than Jewish exclusion.³¹⁸ The underlying argument of the *refutatio*, that the Jewish law had been temporary, certainly led to the conclusion that the Jews no longer belonged. He cited several passages from the Scriptures that indicated that God would turn away from them, but had been content not to comment or to ram home this point.³¹⁹ Here he was just slightly more forthcoming:

*Nam exinde destitit apud illos dei gratia...*³²⁰

*Et ita subtractis charismatum roribus... valetudines apud Israhel curare non desiit...*³²¹

³¹⁷ In one of his rare uses of the New Testament, we find Mt. 11:13; Lk. 16:16 cited by Tertullian in *adv. Iud.* 13.26.

³¹⁸ Perhaps this is an example of the subtlety of Tertullian. See E. Osborn, "Subtlety," pp.361-362.

³¹⁹ G. D. Dunn, "*Pro temporum condicione*," Appendix B.

³²⁰ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 13.25: "For thenceforth God's grace desisted (from working) among them."

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 13.26: "And thus, the former gifts of grace being withdrawn... thereafter it ceased curatively to remove from Israel infirmities of health..." The reference is to the pool of Bethesda (Jn. 5:1-9). This is not in *adv. Marc.* I disagree with Thewall's translation of "*piscina*" as "fishpool." The word occurs in Tert. *de Bapt.* 5.4,5 (the first of which is in connection with baths and the second of which refers to Jn. 5:2); and *de An.* 32.6. There are sufficient classical examples where *piscina* refers to water for human bathing (e.g., Plin. *Ep.* 2.17.11; 5.6.23; Sen. *Ep.* 86.5; Suet. *Nero* 27; and Mart. *Epig.* 3.44.13). Iren. *adv. Haer.* 2.22.3; and 2.23.2 referred to Jn. 5:1-9.

Is. 52:5 and Ez. 36:20,23 served to indicate the blasphemy of God's name among the nations by the Jews (13.26 = *adv. Marc.* 3.23.3), with punishment (Is. 1:7-8) being the result. One last collection of Scriptural passages (Is. 1:20; Ps. 58[59]:12; and Is. 50:11) in 13.27 (= *adv. Marc.* 3.23.4) indicated that the coming of the Christ meant the end of those who were disobedient.³²²

At the end of the chapter we find a repetition of the syllogism that has been at the centre of the argument derived from the *topos* of subsequent events: calamities were predicted to befall the Jews after the coming of the Christ, such calamities have befallen, and therefore the Christ must have come.

*Haec igitur cum pati praedicarentur Iudaei propter Christum et passos eos invenimus et in dispersionem demorari cernamus, manifestum est propter Christum Iudaeis ista accidisse, conspirante sensu scripturarum cum exitu rerum et ordine temporum.*³²³

In what amounts to a rather barbed and condescending piece of wit, Tertullian asked a series of rhetorical questions about where the Jewish cities were that were to be destroyed in some imaginary future if he were wrong about the Christ having come (13.29 = *adv. Marc.* 3.23.6-7).

The last of Tertullian's examples from the *topos* of subsequent events concerns the second coming (14.1-10 = *adv. Marc.* 3.7.1-8). This has received detailed treatment by me elsewhere³²⁴ so it is only necessary to summarise the findings of that research here. The central part of the

³²² Identifying Jesus as the sword of Is. 1:20 derives from a circular argument.

³²³ *Tert. adv. Iud.* 13:28: "Since, therefore, the Jews were predicted as destined to suffer these calamities *on Christ's account*, and we find that they *have* suffered them, and see them sent into dispersion and abiding in it, manifest it is that it is on Christ's account that these things *have* befallen the Jews, the sense of the Scriptures harmonizing with the issue of events and of the order of the times."

³²⁴ Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Two Goats, Two Advents and Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*," *Augustinianum* (forthcoming). See Appendix F.

argument about the second coming is based on a typological interpretation of Lev. 16:5-28. Whereas in *Barn.* 7.6-11 the first goat, offered in sacrifice, represented Jesus offered in sacrifice (and possibly had eucharistic implications) and the second goat, the scapegoat, represented Jesus as one who was rejected and tormented (and who would come again), in Justin and Tertullian the two goats were interpreted with the two comings of Jesus more clearly and explicitly in mind. Unlike *Barnabas*, in Justin and Tertullian, the second goat was identified with the first coming of Jesus because of the treatment it received. They both identified the first goat with the second coming (incongruous as it may appear given that the first goat is sacrificed) because, for Justin, the goat was sacrificed in Jerusalem where the returning Christ would be recognised and, for Tertullian, the goat sacrificed represented the eucharist which would be celebrated until the return of Jesus.

Like Justin's, Tertullian's main purpose in referring to the two comings of the Christ was to counter the Jewish argument that the Christ would come only once, in glory. While these Christian authors accepted that the Christ would come in glory, they stated that this would only be after he had come first in humility. The suffering of Jesus, as predicted in the Scriptural texts cited in 14.1-2, made him the Christ whose first coming was in humility. It has to be admitted that in adopting this argument from his source (whether Justin or a common one), Tertullian has not quite integrated it into his rhetorical argument, for the subsequent event has not taken place. What he wanted to argue was that this subsequent event would only take place given a certain prerequisite event (the first coming in humility). Tertullian did next to nothing in this chapter to prove that, even if the Christ were first to come in humility before coming in glory, that he had, in fact, come the first time. Is 53:2-3, which is cited in 14.1-2, had already been used in 9.28. The argument, that there were to be two comings of the Christ, reads like a *refutatio* of a Jewish

position that there would only be one and not like an argument in this *confirmatio* to convince the reader that the first coming had taken place already. That being said, though, I do not doubt that place of this chapter in the work. It fits into the chronological sequence Tertullian had been following in the *confirmatio* and it is plausible that Tertullian liked the argument he found in his source and wanted to include it in his work even if it did not quite fit the current exposition. This is not an uncommon characteristic of essay writers!

Zell has drawn attention to the thoughts on the priesthood of Jesus found in *adversus Iudaeos* 14 and *adversus Marcionem* 3.7, noting that the references to Jesus as victim (14.8 - “*hostia per omnia*”) was not characteristic of Tertullian’s undisputed works, but that the Levitical imagery, on the whole, was.³²⁵

6. Peroratio

I have indicated already my suspicion that 14.11-14 does not really belong here and that Tertullian never wrote a conclusion to this work. The conclusion that is offered here really only focuses on the argument from the *topos* of subsequent events, the third of the topics announced in 8.2. Then it mentions only one of the examples of the events that, having occurred after the Christ was to have come, were meant to prove that the Christ had indeed come already, viz., the coming of the Gentiles to faith. My belief that this passage is an interpolation is strengthened by the unique interpretation offered here of Ps. 2.7.³²⁶ No mention is made of the other topics of the

³²⁵ R. L. Zell, “The Priesthood of Christ in Tertullian and St. Cyprian,” in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 11, ed. F. L. Cross, papers presented to the 5th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1967, part 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972), pp.284-285.

³²⁶ G. D. Dunn, “The Universal Spread,” Appendix C.

confirmatio—the *topos* of time or the *topos* from person (the birth and death of the Christ)—or of the *refutatio* or of the *partitio* of the work. We find no attempt at the end of the *confirmatio*, or in this pseudo-*peroratio*, to draw the conclusion that had been entertained at the beginning of the *confirmatio*, viz., that proving that the new law-giver had come would be proof that the new law had come which, in turn, would complement and conclude the argument of the *refutatio* that the old law had ceased.

Conclusion

A thorough examination of the arguments to be found in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos* reveals a number of things. First, it demonstrates that he was not only familiar with rhetorical theory in general terms but was quite familiar with it in its detail on *inventio*. He relied mainly upon the Scriptures as a source of evidence, yet was able to incorporate historical events (particularly the chronological time-frame in Daniel 9 which culminated in the capture of Jerusalem) as needed. On the whole he treated the Scripture not as a written text that needed to be interpreted (although, when necessary, he did engage in such rhetorical activity) but as a living witness. There is very little evidence of the invective and sarcasm that characterise some of Tertullian's other works.³²⁷ Here the author was no less convinced of the absolute truth of his own position and of the falsity of his opponent's, but he was, for the most part, a model of restraint in *adversus Iudaeos*. After a heated argument, it would certainly have worked in his favour if he could present his arguments in a dispassionate manner. The real issue—of the role of the Hebrew Scriptures in Christian theology—was never out of his mind and his opposition

³²⁷ Eric Osborn, "Tertullian as Philosopher and Roman," in *Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche: Festschrift für Ulrich Wickert zum siebzigsten Geburtstag*, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, band 85 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), p.231, notes that much of Tertullian's aggression and passion must be seen in the light of his intellectual environment.

to the Marcionites outweighed even his opposition to the Jews. To seem too personally antagonistic would play into the hands of this Christian sect. We see a thorough familiarity with the conjectural *topoi* with arguments about things (time, place, subsequent events) and persons (birth, name, family, character, achievements, death) appearing in an almost text-book sequence.

The arguments of the *confirmatio* hold together to form a sustained whole, undermining the belief of those who reject the second half of the treatise as spurious. As one reads further into the treatise, though, there are signs that the author sometimes includes information and develops a line of debate that is only partially relevant to the main issue. The use of the Cain and Abel story in chapter 5 and the argument about the second coming of the Christ in chapter 14 may be given as examples. The inclusion of the material in chapter 7, about the universal spread of Christianity, is certainly out of place and would have been more effective if joined with similar material in chapter 12. That material itself would have been more effective if it did not divide chapters 11 and 13. The early *peroratio* in 11.10-12 is also out of place. Some of the material in chapter 13, particularly 13.8-23, appears to be off the topic and more appropriate to chapter 10, unless one can remain more focused on the author's objective than one would normally be expected to be. If it were submitted for publication, one would have no doubts that a referee's comments about this work would indicate that there was some interesting material here but that it was in much need of revision before it could be considered for publication. I would consider only 14.11-14 not to be Tertullian's own work.

There is a cleverness in Tertullian's oratory. Sometimes he offers arguments that are flawed, incomplete, circular, or not convincing. It would seem that in stating them boldly or in connection with a series of others, he hoped that his readers and opponents would not notice his

inconsistencies, which they ought to have noticed were they competent orators themselves. One could mention the way Tertullian gave more weight to some pieces of Scripture rather than others (1.2-3) or the fact that, just because he might have been able to prove the Jewish law was temporary, this did not automatically prove that the law given to Christians necessarily was eternal (chapter 2). The same can be said about his argument on the eternal Sabbath in chapter 4. Only the most astute would notice the way Tertullian inverted the time periods in Daniel 9 to suit himself and tinkered with rulers and their reigns to produce the right outcomes (chapter 8).

Finally, I would have to agree with Skarsaune that Tertullian knew Justin's work. When one pays attention to the piece of Scripture they both used and to the number of occasions where their interpretations were very similar, it would seem to suggest something more than that they used the same *testimonia*. Yet Tertullian was doing more than re-editing Justin and translating him into Latin for his Carthaginian readers. Close attention to the treatise itself discloses a number of instances where Tertullian drew a different interpretation than had Justin. At the level of detail Tertullian displayed great originality.

CHAPTER FIVE

ELOCUTIO

Ipsam quin immo curam et diligentis stili anxietatem contrariam experimur...

Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, 39.3.

Sider's Observations on Tertullian's Style

MATTERS of style in Tertullian were not the focus of Sider's monograph. He noted that those who had recognised rhetorical elements in Tertullian's writing generally had limited their observations to matters of style.¹ Sider did not deny that close attention to matters of style could indeed be very helpful to issues such as dating and editions, yet, following the suggestion of Colson in the 1920s, he intended to look deeper and more broadly into the rhetorical influence on Tertullian rather than consider mere stylistic ornamentation.² Thus we find no analysis of Tertullian's oratorical style in Sider.

In keeping with the pattern used throughout this dissertation, I intend to review the rhetorical theory of *elocutio* through a presentation of the thoughts of the three renowned theorists

¹ R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.3-4. He referred to E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909), pp.606-615; H. Hoppe, *Syntax und Stil des Tertullian* (Leipzig: G. B. Teubner, 1903), pp.9-10, 146-193; A. Quacquarelli, *Q. S. F. Tertulliani ad Scapulam* (Rome: Desclée, 1957), pp.31-42; id., *Q. S. F. Tertulliani ad martyras* (Rome: Desclée, 1963), pp.45-59; G. Säflund, op. cit.; and C. Becker, *Tertullians Apologeticum: Werden und Leistung* (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1954).

² R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, pp.2-3. See F. H. Colson, "Two Examples of Literary and Rhetorical Criticism in the Fathers," *JTS* 25 (1924), pp.364-377.

of the ancient world: Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. After that I shall present some comments about Tertullian's *elocutio* in general before considering what may be discovered in *adversus Iudaeos* in particular.

Rhetorical Theory of *Elocutio*

1. Aristotle

Arrangement of material had provided the framework through which teachers of public speaking had organised their presentations (e.g., Pl. *Phdr.* 266d - 267d). Rather than choose the parts of the speech as his framework, Solmsen argued that Aristotle chose the functions of a speech as his, another of his contributions to the field of rhetoric.³

Aristotle began his second section on style (*λέξις*), which concerned not what to say but how to say it, at the beginning of book 3 (*Rh.* 3.1.2 [1403b]).⁴ Style also involved the matter of delivery (*ὑπόκρισις*) which, although as then uninvestigated, consisted of volume (*μέγεθος*), harmony (*ἁρμονία*), and rhythm (*ῥυθμός*) and was an important consideration in tragedy and poetry (*Rh.* 3.1.3-4 [1403b]).⁵ Again Aristotle made the point that what he had written about proof ought to be sufficient yet, given the nature of the rhetorical audience, questions of style played a part in achieving persuasion (*Rh.* 3.1.5 [1404a]).

³ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," pp.37-38.

⁴ E. Schütrumpf, op. cit., p.105, believes that Aristotle's comments on *λέξις* and *τάξις* belong to *ἔντεχνος*.

⁵ William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude Toward Delivery," *Ph & Rh* 19 (1986), pp.242-254, investigates why Aristotle's comments on delivery seem so negative. He believes that there are two introductions to the third book in this first chapter, and that one of them was strongly Platonic.

With regard to effective style, Aristotle stated that three things were necessary: one's language needed to be clear, appropriate and exotic (*Rh.* 3.2.1-2 [1404b]). A balance struck between these was what made an orator's style effective. To make oneself clear one chose proper nouns, to make oneself exotic or ornate, one chose more unusual words, and to make oneself appropriate, one must use exotic words less than one would in poetry (*Rh.* 3.2.2-5 [1404b]).⁶ Thus one used proper nouns, appropriate words and metaphor to achieve this balance (*Rh.* 3.2.6 [1404b]). It is the metaphor that gives a speech its pleasure and exoticism, yet it must be used appropriately. So too with the epithets (ἐπιθέτοι) (*Rh.* 3.2.14 [1405b]). The metaphor had already been discussed in *Poetics* (Arist. *Poet.* 21-22),⁷ but here his concern was with its use in prose. The simile (εἰκῶν) was similar to the metaphor, yet a little more poetic (*Rh.* 3.4.1-2 [1406b]). The opposite of this balance was a frigidity of style (ψυχρά) caused by compound words, strange words, unwieldy epithets, and inappropriate metaphors (*Rh.* 3.3 [1405b - 1406b]).

Aristotle then wrote about other aspects of style. Kennedy considers Aristotle to be muddled hopelessly in his presentation of all this material.⁸ Cope believed that the first four chapters of his book concerned style from the point of view of individual words, while the

⁶ For the difference between rhetoric and poetics see Paul Ricoeur, "Between Rhetoric and Poetics," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., p.327. Scott Consigny, "Transparency and Displacement: Aristotle's Concept of Rhetorical Clarity," *RSQ* 17 (1987), pp.413-418, puts forward the view that by clarity (σοφῆ), Aristotle did not mean clarity of thought so much as clarity of expression, such that one's style was distinctive, while at the same time giving the appearance of clarity of thought. On p.416 he writes: "Achieving clarity means becoming clear of competing styles..." and summarises his argument on p.419: "And his style becomes 'clear' not because it accurately reflects or mirrors or opens a window to reality; rhetorical discourse is clear because it displaces, usurps the sites of antithetical styles."

⁷ Samuel R. Levi, "Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor," *Ph & Rh* 15 (1982), p.34, notes that in *Rh.* Aristotle only dealt with the last of the four types of metaphor he had discussed in *Poet.* Richard Moran, "Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the *Rhetoric*," in A. O. Rorty, op. cit., pp.385-398, asks the question of how the metaphor, as an element of style, exercises persuasion. He suggests that the metaphor works to create an easy learning atmosphere which helps an audience accept the otherwise unacceptable artifice of prepared speech.

⁸ George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, pp.103-114; id., *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*, p.231.

remaining chapters were from the point of view of sentences.⁹ Aristotle made comment on the purity of language (ἐλληνίζειν): natural use of conjunctions, use of specific not general words, avoidance of ambiguity, correct use of gender, and correct use of number (*Rh.* 3.5 [1407a-b]); on stylistic amplitude (expansiveness in expression): use of description rather than names, illustration with metaphor, and description by negation (*Rh.* 3.6 [1407b - 1408a]); rhythm: somewhere between the full metre of poetry and a complete absence, and the paean being most appropriate for oratory (being a mean between extremes) (*Rh.* 3.8 [1408b - 1409a]); and syntax: sentences and clauses manageable for an audience's grasp (neither too long nor too short), clauses being either divided or antithetical, and the repetitions of sounds (*Rh.* 3.9 [1409a - 1410b]).¹⁰ In the midst of all this were some further comments on propriety—making one's comments appropriate to the subject matter and one's character (*Rh.* 3.7 [1408a-b]).

The conclusion to matters of style focused on how some styles were more suited to particular genres: what makes a good written speech is not the same thing as what makes an effective delivered speech. In deliberative oratory, a generalised style was suggested, while for forensic oratory a more precise and finished style was recommended, and the same for epideictic oratory, to an even greater degree.

2. *ad Herennium*

⁹ E. M. Cope, *Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1867), pp.277-282.

¹⁰ For a discussion on the concept of περίοδος see George A. Kennedy, "Aristotle on the Period," *HSCP* 63 (1958), pp.283-288; R. L. Fowler, "Aristotle on the Period (*Rhet.* 3.9)," *CQ* n.s. 32 (1980), pp.89-99; and Tamás Adamik, "Aristotle's Theory of the Period," *Philologus* 128 (1984), pp.184-201. For post-Aristotelian understandings see Doreen C. Innes, "Period and Colon: Theory and Example in Demetrius and Longinus," in W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady, *Peripatetic Rhetoric*, pp., 36-53.

Elocutio occupies the whole of the fourth book of *ad Herennium*, nearly half the whole work, as Thonssen and Baird note.¹¹ The comparison of this length with what Aristotle wrote would suggest that *elocutio* had been growing in importance during the Hellenistic age. Indeed, Clarke has suggested that the source for much of the new material in *elocutio* came from literary criticism.¹²

Ad Herennium divided *elocutio* into two subjects: styles (*genera*) and qualities or virtues (*res*).¹³ Most commentators have attempted to trace the origins of this analysis back to early Peripatetics, particularly Theophrastos. The idea that he was responsible for the three *genera* of style came under close scrutiny by Hendrickson at the start of the twentieth century.¹⁴ He suggested that, like Aristotle, Theophrastos “designated excellence of style as a mean,”¹⁵ and the most he conceded was that Theophrastos was the source of what later developed into a threefold division.¹⁶ Hendrickson argued that Aristotle and Theophrastos could be claimed as the origin

¹¹ Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism - The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), reproduced in *The Province of Rhetoric*, ed. Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), p.138.

¹² M. L. Clarke, *op. cit.*, p.33.

¹³ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.125, notes that Greek and Roman rhetoricians would have used a more technical term than *res*.

¹⁴ G. L. Hendrickson, “The Peripatetic Mean of Style and the Three Stylistic Characters,” *AJPh* 25 (1905), p.126. He criticised the usual interpretation of a passage from *de Demosthene* by Dionysius Halicarnassensis (Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 3) which stated that, on the authority of Theophrastos, Thrasymachos wrote in a mixed style; the usual interpretation is that Theophrastos knew the three styles. “In fact to conclude that Theophrastus conceived of the two other styles as Dionysius does, or named the same representatives of the different characters, or even that he made a classification of style in any sense such as Dionysius understands it, is to transcend the limits of legitimate inference from the data afforded.” Cf., George A. Kennedy, “Theophrastus and Stylistic Distinctions,” *HSCP* 62 (1957), pp.93-104.

¹⁵ G. L. Hendrickson, “The Peripatetic Mean,” p.127.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.125.

of a twofold division of oratorical style.¹⁷ As to who was responsible for a threefold division of style:

By whom the intermediate stage of a middle style was defined it is of course impossible to say. We can only say that its origin as a natural intermediate step between the two characteristic forms is manifest, and that all three styles had been fixed and recognized for a considerable time anterior to this treatise [*ad Her.*].¹⁸

There is no less controversy involved in claiming Theophrastos as the origin of the four *res* of style. Cicero himself claimed this (*Orat.* 24.79). If it be accepted that Cicero has presented the four much as Theophrastos listed them,¹⁹ then the alterations in *ad Herennium* need explanation.

The three *genera* were the grand (*gravis*), middle (*mediocris*), and simple (*attenuatum*), one involving ornate words and impressive thoughts, the next involving not nearly so ornate a language, and the last involving everyday speech (*Rhet. Her.* 4.8.11 - 4.10.15). Each style also had an opposite: swollen (*sufflata*), characterised by turgid and inflated language, slack (*dissolutum*) or drifting (*fluctuans*), characterised by loose construction that does not engage the listener, and meagre (*exile*), characterised by mean and trifling language (*Rhet. Her.* 4.10.15 -

¹⁷ Id., "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style," *AJPh* 26 (1905), pp.254-258, argued that both Aristotle and Theophrastos advocated a style that was both clear and appropriate and that in this way rhetorical language was distinguishable from philosophical and dialectical language (which needed only to be clear). On p.267 he summarised his argument thus far that the original conception of style was twofold rather than threefold: "For we have seen that the plain style is due to the demand, originating with the philosophers, for a more exact and logical system of argument, while the so-called grand style is rhetoric itself in the original conception of it as ψυχαγωγία." I note in passing that on pp.252-253 Hendrickson subscribed to the theory that Aristotle's presentation of ethical and emotional issues lay outside the realm of actual proof, a position this dissertation rejects.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.270.

¹⁹ Cic. *de Or.* 3.10.37: "*Quinam igitur dicendi est modus melior... quam ut Latine, ut plane, ut ornate, ut ad id quodcumque agetur apte congruenterque dicamus?*" M. L. Clarke, op. cit., p.33 and G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.85, believe Cicero had.

4.11.16).²⁰ There is a suggestion in *ad Herennium* that a particular speech would be a mixture of styles.²¹

Ad Herennium presented three *res*: taste (*elegantia*) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.12.17), artistic composition (*conpositio*) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.12.18), and distinction (*dignitas*) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.13.18 - 4.55.69). *Elegantia* consisted of correct language (*Latinitas*) and clarity (*explanatio*), which in the Theophrastean scheme were considered as two separate *res*. *Conpositio* was originally part of *dignitas* and this treatise omitted appropriateness (*decorum*) as a separate *res*. In the section on *conpositio* the author listed faults to be avoided (excessive hiatus—collision of vowels; alliteration—repetition of the same letter; transplacement—repetition of the same word; homoeoptuton—repetition of the same case endings; and hyperbaton—dislocation of words).²²

The bulk of attention was given to *dignitas*, divided into two: figures of diction or speech (*in verborum exornationes*) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.13.19 - 4.34.46) and figures of thought (*in sententiarum exornationes*) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.35.47 - 4.55.69).²³

Among the *in verborum exornationes* were epanaphora (*repetitio*—the starting of successive phrases with the same word), antistrophe (*conversio*—the ending of successive phrases

²⁰ A. D. Leeman, op. cit., pp.29-31, provides examples to illustrate each style.

²¹ *Rhet. Her.* 4.11.16: “*Sed figuram in dicendo commutare oportet...*” G. L. Hendrickson, “The Origins and Meaning,” pp.269-270, identified particular styles with particular *partes* of a speech.

²² G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.125.

²³ M. L. Clarke, op. cit., p.34, believes that the author was not interested in literary criticism but in the oratorical effect of these figures.

with the same word), interlacement (*complexio*—the combination of the previous two), transplacement (*traductio*—the frequent repetition of a word that does not become offensive to the listener, and *antanaklasis*—the repetition of the same word though with different meanings). Antithesis (*contentio*) is a phrase constructed from contraries; apostrophe (*exclamatio*) expresses grief or indignation by addressing some person or object directly; interrogation (*interrogatio*) is the rhetorical question, to be used when one has summed up one's adversary's points of view; and reasoning by question and answer (*rationatio*) takes this one step further, when orators answer their own questions.

Ad Herennium's treatment of maxims (*sententiae*) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.17.24-25) has received some scholarly attention. In an insightful and well-reasoned article, Sinclair has put forward the idea that this treatise gives us a glimpse not only of the aim of the orator to be persuasive but also of the aim of the orator to identify and be identified with his social class. The choice of *sententiae*, those brief sayings drawn from life that seem to have unchallengeable authority because of their common acceptance, could do much to enhance an orator's reputation among his peers.²⁴ The author's advice—to use *sententiae* sparingly (*Rhet. Her.* 4.17.25)—is interpreted by Sinclair to mean that the author was well aware of the anti-philosophical inclination of the Roman elite and wanted to be seen as endorsing that policy.²⁵ Even the *sententiae* themselves, though borrowed from Aristotle, were re-presented by the author to serve a new purpose—not to help

²⁴ Patrick Sinclair, "The *Sententia* in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: A Study in the Sociology of Rhetoric," *AJPh* 114 (1993), p.567.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.564-565. On p. 568, Sinclair defends the author's claim to originality even though many of his examples were borrowed, by noting that the author has, more or less, put them in his own words: "His habit of molding generally acknowledged notions and phrases of others to suit his own purposes and tacitly claiming these re-phrasing as his own is accepted Roman practice."

demonstrate or prove a point but to reinforce an opinion about the author's character.²⁶

Reasoning by contraries (*contraria*) involves using opposite statements to prove each other. The author presented ideas about the colon (*membrum*), the phrase (*articulus*) and period (*continuatio*). Aristotle had discussed them and *ad Herennium* gives evidence of a strong Aristotelian influence.²⁷ Then followed mention of the isocolon (*conpar*—cola of an equal number of syllables), homoeoptoton (*similiter cadens exornatio*—the occurrence of two or more words with the same case ending in the same period), homoeoteleuton (*similiter desinens*—two or more words with similar endings used even though the words are indeclinable), and paronomasia (*adnominatio*—the changing of letters so that similar words mean dissimilar things). The author's advice was to use these last three figures sparingly as they had an artificial or premeditated feel about them (*Rhet. Her.* 4.22.32).

Hypophora (*subiectio*—asking an adversary what they could say in their favour or against oneself and then adding a reply which countered that), climax (*gradatio*—the use of a concluding word in a previous phrase to be the introductory word of the next), definition (*definitio*—the characteristic qualities of a thing), transition (*transitio*—recalling and anticipating), correction (*correctio*—withdrawing a statement and replacing it by another, thus drawing attention to it), paralipsis (*occultatio*—mentioning what you are not going to mention),²⁸ disjunction (*disiunctum*—two clauses ending with special, somehow related, verbs), conjunction

²⁶ Ibid., p.570.

²⁷ H. C. Gotoff, "The Concept of Periodicity in the *ad Herennium*," *HSCPh* 77 (1973), pp.221-222.

²⁸ S. Usher, "Occultatio in Cicero's Speeches," *AJPh* 86 (1965), pp.175-192, has examined how Cicero put this into practice. He notes on pp.176-177, that there is a difference between *occultatio* and what he calls *reticentia* (saying that you are not going to say something and not saying it). Usher described *occultatio* as a figure of thought rather than a figure of speech. He says on p.192 that Cicero used it to beguile the intellect rather than the emotions.

(*coniunctio*—placing the verb between two phrases), adjunction (*adiunctio*—placing the verb at the beginning or end), reduplication (*conduplicatio*—repetition of a word), synonymy (*interpretatio*—not repeating a word but replacing it with a different word which has the same meaning), reciprocal change (*commutatio*—the inverting of a phrase to create a contrary phrase), surrender (*permissio*—a statement that one is leaving a decision up to someone else), indecision (*dubitatio*—when the orator debates which word to use), elimination (*expeditio*—listing possibilities then eliminating all but one), asyndeton (*dissolutum*—separate thoughts expressed without conjunction), aposiopesis (*praecisio*—leaving a conclusion up in the air), and conclusion (*conclusio*—the drawing out of the consequences of what has been said) were more of the figures treated by the author.

The figures of speech ended with ten tropes—words that change meaning (*Rhet. Her.* 4.31.42 - 4.34.46)—including a discussion about metaphor (*translatio*) and allegory (*permutatio*).

Among the *in sententiarum exornationes* were frankness of speech (*licentia*), understatement (*deminutio*), division (*divisio*), refining (*expolitio*), comparison (*similitudo*), simile (*imago*), and emphasis (*significatio*).

The purpose of embellishing style was mentioned at the end of what is a lengthy and involved section as giving a speech impressiveness, distinction, and charm (*Rhet. Her.* 4.56.69).

3. Cicero

a) *de Oratore*

The third book of *de Oratore* was devoted to *elocutio* (*de Or.* 3.5.19 - 3.55.212) and *actio* (*de Or.* 3.56.213 - 3.61.227). After an introduction, where Crassus suggested that matter and form were inter-related (*de Or.* 3.5.19) and that a variety of styles could all achieve excellence (*de Or.* 3.7.25 - 3.9.36), discussion moved to the four qualities of style (*de Or.* 3.10.37). This is commonly taken to be an indication of its Theophrastean source.²⁹ The first two *virtutes dicendi* were all but passed over and the focus was on *ornatus*.³⁰ Here again the *orator perfectus* needed more than rhetorical theory (*de Or.* 3.19.70 - 3.24.90).³¹ *Ornatus* was achieved through the general quality of an overall speech and through the select use of *insignia et lumina* (*de Or.* 3.25.96).³² There are a number of *excursus* in this section as Cicero put forward his views on the relation between oratory and philosophy (*de Or.* 3.14.52 - 3.24.90; 3.27.104 - 3.35.143).³³ When he had Crassus embark on a discussion about *ornatus*, it was divided into two parts, dealing with words singularly and in combination. Individual words could be either proper, metaphorical, or newly created (*de Or.* 3.37.149-152).³⁴ What makes for a good orator is to be able to use rare words and to use such metaphors that make one's meaning clearer or one's description briefer,

²⁹ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition," p.181; cf. W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Cicero's Knowledge," pp.46-54.

³⁰ S. E. Spott, "Cicero's Theory of Prose Style," *PhQ* 34 (1955), pp.2-3, argued that *elocutio* is best translated into English as "expression" and *genus dicendi* as "style" in the sense of a particular kind of speech, and that *ornatus* is best translated as "stylishness" (rather than "style", "ornament" or "embellishment") in the sense of the more abstract quality.

³¹ A. D. Leeman, *op. cit.*, p.124, notes that the general introduction to *ornatus* is so long as to conclude that Cicero was shrinking back from engaging in the technical rhetorical points.

³² Elaine Fantham, "*Varietas and Satietas: De oratore* 3.96-103 and the limits of *ornatus*," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.276-280, investigates Cicero's comments on these sparingly-to-be-used *ornamenta*. While I agree with her contrast between Cicero's use of *varietas* at 3.25.100 (which she describes as "variation"—the equivalent of the orator being able to move between the *genera dicendi*), I would add further that Cicero made the point that an audience tires of *ornamenta* not only because there are too many of them (too much variegation, in Fantham's words), but because people tire of them (and here I note the contrast that seems to have been at the centre of Cicero's example between *picturis novis* and *veteribus*).

³³ *Ibid.*, pp.278-279.

³⁴ Doreen Innes, "Cicero on Tropes," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.307-325, examines these elements.

while providing pleasure or entertainment to the listener because of the cleverness or aptness of the choices (*de Or.* 3.38.152 - 3.43.170). With regard to words in combination (*de Or.* 3.43.171 - 3.51.198), Cicero considered two things: structure (*collocatio*) and rhythm and balance (*modus*), with the first receiving but scant attention. Like Aristotle, Cicero advocated a *modus* for oratory between the strict rhythm of poetry and a complete absence of rhythm. He recommended Aristotle's suggestion that the heroic metre or paean be employed.³⁵ Once again, his own insight came to the fore—no matter what any handbook recommended, practice and ability would make it all seem natural to the speaker (*de Or.* 3.49.191).³⁶

At the end of the segment on *ornatus* comes some comments, still by Crassus, about the *genera dicendi* (*de Or.* 3.52.199)—the full (*genus plenum*), the plain (*genus tenue*), and the middle (*genus mediocritatus*) styles.³⁷ Each style admitted of its own *ornatus*:

Stylishness (*ornatus*) is for Cicero almost the *sine qua non* of a style (*genus dicendi*). He is well known for his orator's contempt of stoic plainness, and even the plain style (*genus tenue*), as he describes it, turns out to allow some *ornatus*.³⁸

Even though the tropes (particularly metaphor) and rhythm were the most important devices for *ornatus*, there were also the *extra verborum sententiarumque floribus* first mentioned at *de Or.* 3.25.96 as "*insignia et lumina*." They were, for him, the high-point of an orator's skill.³⁹ *Ad*

³⁵ W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Cicero's Knowledge," p.47, examines the limited extent to which Cicero's comments reflect accurately what is found in Aristotle.

³⁶ Dirk M. Schenkeveld, "*Iudicia vulgi: Cicero, De Oratore* 3.195ff. and *Brutus* 183ff.," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.291-305, investigates the final section on the defects to be avoided with *modus*.

³⁷ A. E. Douglas, "The Intellectual Background," p.119, believes that references to the three *genera dicendi* prior to *Orat.* were unemphatic and brief.

³⁸ S. E. Sprott, *op. cit.*, p.7.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.11.

Herennium had presented these thoroughly and, in comparison, Cicero merely listed them (*de Or.* 3.52.200 - 3.54.208), keeping them quite separate from the tropes.⁴⁰

The last section of *ornatus*, appropriateness, considered how to relate a speech to audience (*de Or.* 3.55.210-212). Again, all of Cicero's particular concerns found a place.⁴¹

b) *Brutus*

Cicero's later rhetorical writings were shaped, on the whole, by a controversy that raged in Roman oratorical practice between Atticists and Asiatics. They were contributions to this debate, being narrowly focused works with particular objectives rather than more generalised and comprehensive treatises. My interest merely is to highlight how this debate helped sharpen some of Cicero's theoretical beliefs and insights.

Brutus is a history of Roman oratory that culminates in the praise of Hortensius (and Cicero himself) as the finest example of superb Roman speech-making. It is thus a political statement about style. Written in 46 B.C.,⁴² much of it is either traditional rhetoric or consistent with Cicero's own interpretation. Yet Cicero looked to the history of Roman oratory to defend his own stylistic practice.

⁴⁰ A. D. Leeman, op. cit., p.125, notes that *Rhet. Her.* had combined tropes with figures of speech.

⁴¹ Cic. *de Or.* 3.55.212: "... *omnique in re posse quod deceat facere artis et naturae est, scire quid quandoque deceat prudentiae.*"

⁴² Edward A. Robinson, "The Date of Cicero's *Brutus*," *HSCP* 60 (1951), pp.137-146, dated the commencement of the work to the end of 47 B.C.

As far as Cicero was concerned there were three tasks (*officia* at *Brut.* 53.197-198) the orator had to perform:

*Tria sunt enim, ut quidem ego sentio, quae sint efficienda dicendo: ut doceatur is apud quem dicetur, ut delectetur, ut moveatur vehementius.*⁴³

This was the case whether one was employing the simple and concise style, or the elevated and abundant style.⁴⁴ Both were good, even if Cicero gives the impression of favouring the second. This becomes the basis of his criticism of C. Licinius Calvus and the so-called ‘Attic’ style he promoted.⁴⁵

According to Cicero, Calvus understood ‘Attic’ to mean a less ornate, less emotional style, and, to that extent, Cicero agreed that such a style was good (*Brut.* 82.284-285). Perhaps a little cleverly, Cicero professed a more geographic understanding of the term ‘Attic,’ which allowed him then to include a wider variety of styles as ‘Attic’ than Calvus would allow (*Brut.* 82.285 -

⁴³ Cic. *Brut.* 49.185: “Now there are three things in my opinion which the orator should effect: instruct his listener, give him pleasure, stir his emotions.” (Translation from G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell, trans., *Cicero V: Brutus, Orator*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1962 (rev. ed.)]) This statement was in the context of a discussion about the merits of audience and critical appraisal (wherein while the audience judges the effect the orator achieves, the critic can provide an explanation) and that the good orator wins the approval of both (*Brut.* 49.184 - 54.200). J. Wisse, op. cit., pp.212-214 and L. Calboli Montefusco, op. cit., p.68, reject the idea that this is a modified account of *de Or.* 2.27.115, etc. They believe that *de Or.*, like Arist. *Rh.*, was concerned with the three elements in the speech that achieved persuasion, while *Brut.* was concerned with style and with the criteria for being viewed as a successful speaker. On pp.83-86, in expounding her belief that what we witness in the later Cicero is really the expansion of the orator’s task in the *exordium* to the whole speech, and that *delectare* for Cicero came not only from style but also from content, Calboli Montefusco writes: “I believe that, despite Cicero’s new interest in style, it is nevertheless evident that the triad *docere delectare movere* which we find in Cicero’s later works, the task of *delectare* is not a substitution for *conciliare*.” (p.86) That the three *officia* were not limited to style alone is clearer in *Brut.* than in *Orat.*, for there was no link between the *officia* and the *genus dicendi* in the former.

⁴⁴ Cic. *Brut.* 45.201. G. L. Hendrickson, “The Origin and Meaning,” pp.264-265, noted no evidence of a theory of three styles of oratory in *Brut.*, only this older, twofold scheme.

⁴⁵ A. D. Leeman, op. cit., p.139, concludes that Cicero’s attitude towards Calvus may have been too condescending and inaccurate. A. E. Douglas, “The Intellectual Background,” pp.119-131, considers the controversy. On p.122 he suggests that the Atticists may have been responsible for Cicero turning attention to the aesthetic dimension of oratory, away from its practical or functional dimension. Erich S. Gruen, “Cicero and Licinius Calvus,” *HSCP* 71 (1967), pp.215-233, has examined the historical relationship between these two forensic advocates.

84.291).⁴⁶ He rescued the term for his own use by reinterpreting it.⁴⁷ The so-called ‘Atticists’ were criticised for ignoring a Roman orator like Cato (depicted by Cicero as “*acuti sunt, elegantes faceti breves*” (*Brut.* 16.63; and 17.67), even though what they attempted to do was good. Cicero identified himself with Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69 B.C.) (*Brut.* 92.317), a man he described as ‘Asiatic’ (*Brut.* 93.325) (a style that included two types: one characterised by balance and symmetry, the other by rapidity and ornate words), even if he considered such a style to lack substance and appropriateness for the maturer speaker (*Brut.* 95.327).⁴⁸

c) *de Optimo Genere Oratorum*

De Optimo Genere Oratorum remains a neglected work in the Ciceronian corpus, except that, coming between *Brutus* and *Orator*, it may provide some insight into the development of Cicero’s thought,⁴⁹ even though some have questioned its authenticity.⁵⁰ Cicero, while acknowledging the three *genera dicendi*, argued that they told us more about the orator than oratory (*Opt. Gen.* 1.2). Oratory and the perfect orator was of one kind: the one who achieved the three *officia* of oratory:

⁴⁶ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History*, p.154: “A result of Cicero’s tactics is that ‘Attic’ was often used by later writers in a rather general sense to describe any admired, disciplined prose style, while ‘Asian’ often means any style perceived as inflated and faulty.” This is certainly not to be taken to mean that Cicero himself saw one as good and the other as bad. This may have been an unintentioned consequence of his main point that those who described themselves as Atticists defined that term too narrowly. See A. D. Leeman, *op. cit.*, pp.143-144 and G. M. A. Grube, *op. cit.*, p.248.

⁴⁷ Cic. *Brut.* 84.291: “*Ita fiet ut non omnes, qui Attice, idem bene, sed ut omnes, qui bene, idem etiam Attice dicant.*”

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.51; and 91.316, where Cicero acknowledged that, after some time studying in Asia, his style was excessive and lacking in restraint. See G. L. Hendrickson, “Cicero’s Correspondence with Brutus and Calvus on Oratorical Style,” *AJPh* 47 (1926), pp.234-258.

⁴⁹ G. L. Hendrickson, “Cicero *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*,” *AJPh* 47 (1925), p.109, who argued that this is an incomplete work.

⁵⁰ A. Dihle, “Ein Spurious unter den rhetorischen Werken Ciceros,” *Hermes* 83 (1955), pp.303-314. Cf., E. Bickel, “Die Echtheit von Cic. *De opt. gen. or.*,” *RhM* 98 (1955), p.288.

*Optimus est enim orator qui dicendo animos audientium et docet et delectat et permovet.*⁵¹

In *de Oratore* Cicero had distinguished between matter and form, between the content of a speech (the subject of *inventio*) and its expression (*elocutio*).⁵² Expression was achieved through the four *virtutes dicendi*, in the language an orator employed. Not only was good expression achieved through the choice of words or their arrangement (reaching a pinnacle in the *verborum floribus* [*de Or.* 3.25.96]—the figures of speech) (*de Or.* 3.54.206-208), but also in the methods one used to develop the content of the speech itself (reaching its pinnacle in the *sententiarum floribus* [*de Or.* 3.25.96]—the figures of thought) (*de Or.* 3.53.202-205). Much the same point is found in *de Optimo Genere Oratorum*. Eloquence is found in words and in thoughts (*Opt. Gen.* 2.4). One must not take Cicero to be equating *sententia* with the content of one's speech but with the method by which one's content was expressed in language. The figures of thought were a method by which one's idea contributed to one's style by the way in which they were developed, and to achieve a different one of the orator's *officium*, a different type of thought could be used (*Opt. Gen.* 2.5). Cicero used this to reclaim the title 'Attic' for himself and to reject, as mediocre, those orators who could speak in one style only. A variety of styles, to suit different occasions and purposes was desirable (*Opt. Gen.* 3.7 - 4.13), and each legitimately could claim the epithet 'Attic.'

d) Orator

⁵¹ Cic. *Opt. Gen.* 1.3: "The supreme orator, then, is the one whose speech instructs, delights and moves the minds of his audience." (Translation from H. M. Hubbell, trans., *Cicero II: De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum Topica*, LCL [Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1949]) G. M. A. Grube, op. cit., p.244: "This seems to completely confuse the theory of genres (forensic, deliberative, etc.) with the quite different formal of styles which Cicero usually calls *genera dicendi*... The reason is that in the *De Optimo* he is concerned to show that there is only one best way to speak at a particular time on a particular subject in a particular kind of speech or in a particular part of a speech."

⁵² Cic. *de Or.* 3.5.19: "Nam cum omnis ex re atque verbis constet oratio, neque verba sedem habere possunt si rem subtraxeris neque res lumen si verba semoveris."

The same concern motivated Cicero in *Orator*. The vast bulk of the work is devoted to *eloquentia* (*Orat.* 19.61 - 71.236).⁵³ What is new here is a direct linking of the three *genera dicendi* with the three *officia*:

*Erit igitur eloquens... is qui in foro causisque civilibus ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat. Probare necessitatis est, delectare suavitatis, flectere victoriae... Sed quot officia oratoris tot sunt genera dicendi: subtile in probando, modicum in delectando, vehemens in flectendo; in quo uno vis omnis oratoris est.*⁵⁴

Perhaps the last phrase was a rebuke to the Calvus-led ‘Atticists’ who, unlike Cicero, in rejecting the more ornate style, were condemned not to be persuasive.⁵⁵ Hendrickson believed that Cicero’s statement represented the practice of the time.⁵⁶ Douglas believed this linking of the three functions with the three styles was a Ciceronian contribution to rhetorical theory.⁵⁷ This classification was on the basis of what was appropriate before different audiences (*Orat.* 21.70 - 22.74). The plain style was described, again noting how some wished to reserve the appellation ‘Attic’ to this style alone, with its characteristic omission of “*ornamentis alia rerum alia verborum*” (*Orat.* 23.76 - 26.90). The middle style (*Orat.* 26.91 - 27.96) and the grand style (*Orat.* 28.97-99) were also explained. The last style was depicted as the most persuasive. Cicero illustrated these styles with reference to some of his own and others’ speeches (*Orat.* 29.102 -

⁵³ G. M. A. Grube, op. cit., p.238: “The truth seems to be that Cicero the lawyer had patience in plenty to deal with the technicalities of his trade as any good lawyer must have, but that Cicero the orator and stylist had very little patience indeed for technicalities of style.”

⁵⁴ Cic. *Orat.* 21.69: “The man of eloquence whom we seek... will be one who is able to speak in court or in deliberative bodies so as to prove, to please and to sway or persuade. To prove is the first necessity, to please is charm, to sway is victory... For these three functions of the orator there are three styles, the plain style for proof, the middle style for pleasure, the vigorous style for persuasion; and in this last is summed up the entire virtue of the orator.”

⁵⁵ At *Orat.* 29.101 Cicero limited the plain style (the chosen style of the new Atticists) to trivial matters, while the grand style (Cicero’s favourite) was appropriate for weighty matters.

⁵⁶ G. L. Hendrickson, “The Origins and Meaning,” p.267.

⁵⁷ Alan Edward Douglas, “A Ciceronian Contribution to Rhetorical Theory,” *Eranos* 55 (1957), pp.18-26.

31.112).⁵⁸

ἡθος and πάθος were mentioned—one agreeable, the other violent (*Orat.* 37.128 - 38.133), as were figures of speech (*Orat.* 39.135) and figures of thought (*Orat.* 39.136 40.139). There is a lengthy discussion about prose rhythm (*Orat.* 50.168 - 71.236).

e) *de Partitione Oratoria*

This last of Cicero's rhetorical works sees him return to the technicalities of the discipline in this handbook or catechism of rhetoric. He divided rhetorical theory into three parts, one dealing with the orator, the second with the speech, and the third with the question (*Part. Or.* 1.3). Each was considered in turn. *Elocutio* was considered in the first section.

It rested on single words (being natural, invented, and used properly or metaphorically) and words in combination (which involved rhythm and sequence) (*Part. Or.* 5.16 - 7.24), and aimed at achieving lucidity, brevity, acceptability, brilliance, and charm.

4. Quintilian

According to Quintilian, *elocutio* presented the orator with the greatest difficulty, was the most distinguishing feature of an outstanding orator (*Inst.* 8.pr.13-14), and consequently had become the chief concern of rhetoricians. It was in the field of *elocutio* that Quintilian made his original contributions. He advocated the incorporation of the everyday as an arbiter of style. Yet

⁵⁸ Harry M. Hubbell, "Cicero on Styles of Oratory," *YCS* 19 (1960), pp.173-186, for an assessment of the extent to which Cicero's speeches illustrate his theory.

the orator could run the risk of going overboard and, by paying too much attention to details, could end up spoiling any eloquence a speech might otherwise have had (*Inst.* 8.pr.22-23). For him, how one said something could not be separate from what one said about it. His approach to style was not entirely traditional. Consideration was given to single words and groups of words, the former being characterised by correct language (*Latinas*), clarity (*perspicuitas*), elegance (*orantus*), and appropriateness (*accomodatus*), and the latter by correctness (*emendata*), proper placement (*coniunctis*), and adornment (*figurata*) (*Inst.* 8.1.1). This contrasts with Cicero in *de Oratore*, where the consideration of single words and groups of words was a species of *ornatus*, not the other way around. In his treatment of *ornatus*, though, regardless of what he had said in this introduction, Quintilian considered both single and combined words.

Latinas is passed over with barely another mention.⁵⁹ *Perspicuitas* consisted in choosing words neither too common nor too refined, yet proper and usual (*Inst.* 8.2.1-11). Obscurity, ambiguity, and excess were to be avoided. *Ornatus* was a more expansive topic for Quintilian, for an orator to whom it was pleasant to listen was more likely to be convincing. Even here he remained firm in his belief that oratory could be both practical and delightful at the same time (*Inst.* 8.3.11).

Ornatus was achieved through the choice of words, ones that were pleasant on the ear and appropriate to the matter under discussion. Words were proper, invented, or metaphorical, as they had been in Cicero's *de Oratore* (*Inst.* 8.3.24-39). Problems with arranging words were considered (*Inst.* 8.3.41-60). *Ornatus* in sentences consisted in the orator being possessed of a clarity of thought and expression, and of giving it brilliance through embellishment, which

⁵⁹ A. D. Leeman, op. cit., p.299, says that *Latinas* and *perspicuitas* received excellent treatment in Quintilian.

provided an orator's speech with a life-like quality. This could be achieved through describing a setting (which allowed the orator license of creativity), through similes (*similitudines*), and through emphasis (*Inst.* 8.3.62-86). Embellishment could also be given to the force with which words were used and through tropes (words and phrases with altered meanings), such as metaphor, metonymy (*denominatio*—the name of one thing applied to a different though related thing), allegory (the extended metaphor where the meaning is opposite to the words used), periphrasis (*circumlocutio*—saying something in more [or fewer] words than was necessary), hyperbole, litotes (*exadversio*—affirmation of something by denying its opposite), sarcasm, and wit (*Inst.* 8.3.89 - 8.6.76).⁶⁰ As well as tropes there were figures, indeed the two were sometimes indistinguishable.⁶¹ Figures differed from tropes in that in tropes words and phrases themselves had an altered meaning, while in figures a thought is expressed in a particular form to give it an altered meaning (*Inst.* 9.1.1-14).⁶² Quintilian accepted two types of figures: *figurae sententiae* and *figurae verborum*.

Among the figures of thought (*figurae sententiae*) were questions designed to emphasise a point rather than elicit information, to embarrass an opponent or to express wonder, replies that answered questions not asked, anticipation, hesitation, communication, simulation, impersonation, animation, irony, confession, concession, imitation, and hidden meaning (*Inst.*

⁶⁰ Galen O. Rowe, "Style," in S. E. Porter, op. cit., pp.121-157, provides an overview of Quintilian's system on style.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.125, referring to Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.1.

⁶² P. Dixon, op. cit., p.37, provides a useful explanation of the distinction between the two. G. O. Rowe, op. cit., p.129: "Whereas tropes result from changing single words or expressions, the shaping of groups of words belongs to the category of figures, sometimes called schemes. Ancient rhetoricians recognized two categories of figures—figures of words, that is words arranged in certain patterns, and figures of thought, in which the meanings of the word groups have standard intellectual and emotional shapes, such as questions and exclamations."

9.2.6-107).⁶³

The figures of speech were divided into two groups: from the form of language and from the arrangement of words. The former consisted of abnormal or surprising alterations to the rules of grammar (mixing genders, interchanging tenses, idiomatic use of words, unusual word sequences, etc.) (*Inst.* 9.3.6-27). The second group had three subdivisions: the addition of words (doubling, beginning clauses with the same word, ending clauses with the same word, comparisons and contrasts established by repetition, various arrangements and repetitions of clauses, beginning or ending clauses with different words that have similar meaning, etc.) (*Inst.* 9.3.28-56), the omission of words (synecdoche—where the missing word can be supplied from the context, omitting words for the sake of decency, asyndeton—omitting connecting particles, using one verb to complete several clauses, etc.) (*Inst.* 9.3.57-65), and the use of resembling or contrasting words (one word repeated with different meanings, contrasts between words that sound similar, and words repeated in different tenses, moods or cases) (*Inst.* 9.3.66-86). Quintilian was aware that other rhetoricians had included other items as *figurae* which he did not consider warranted and that the effectiveness of *figurae* depended on their judicious employment.⁶⁴

The last element of *ornatus* was *compositio*, the existence of which was the sign of the full flowering of eloquence. This amounted to an examination of order, connection, and rhythm (*Inst.* 9.4.23-111). Quintilian defended the Ciceronian position that oratory should not be devoid

⁶³ F. Ahl, op. cit., pp.187-195, sees in Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.65 a reference to *schema*, which he argues was Quintilian's preferred method of criticising in an age when criticism of political leaders could be dangerous. He suggests that modern commentators who discover such *schema* do not realise that what appears as unintentional really was intended.

⁶⁴ A. D. Leeman, op. cit., p.304, notes that Quintilian limited Cicero's ninety figures in *de Or.* to about thirty-five.

entirely of rhythmical structure but neither should it be bound by the choice of words and their arrangement, but it should not be the only influence. To be effective, *compositio* needed to be decorous, pleasing, and varied (*Inst.* 9.4.146).

After a *digressio*, Quintilian returned to the fourth element of *elocutio*—*accomodatus*. Here mention was made of the *genera dicendi* in the context of particular styles being suited to achieving the purposes of oratory (*Inst.* 11.1.6). He returned to his favourite question: should oratory be persuasive or should it be about speaking well? It was the latter that was more important (*Inst.* 11.1.8-10).⁶⁵ Thus boasting of one's own oratorical ability was unbecoming (*Inst.* 11.1.15-26), as was pre-empting the verdict (*Inst.* 11.1.27-28), and speaking impudently and in a disorderly manner (*Inst.* 11.1.29-30). One also had to take into account one's own character (*Inst.* 11.1.31-38), the character of any introduced person (*Inst.* 11.1.39-42), the character of the audience (*Inst.* 11.1.43-45), and circumstances of time and place, when and where one was speaking (*Inst.* 11.1.46-56).

5. Conclusion

While we see much that is standard in the rhetorical theory of *elocutio* over time, we see by the time of Tertullian that, with the lack of political opportunity, *elocutio* had become the main pursuit of orators. As a consequence, the theory related to *elocutio* had become extremely complex.

Elocutio in Tertullian

⁶⁵ I think it has to be said again that speaking well meant more to Quintilian than speaking eloquently. For him it meant that one spoke truthfully. See *Inst.* 11.1.14 and 12.1.33.

Satterthwaite has drawn attention recently to passages in Tertullian's writings in which he gave us clues about his attitude to matters of rhetorical style:⁶⁶ the orator must convey truth and must do so briefly.⁶⁷ Earlier Fredouille had considered these passages from Tertullian's writings in comments on his rhetorical style and objectives. He saw Tertullian's interest in the truth over matters of eloquence as being firmly in the Platonic tradition:

En fait, notre auteur ne fait, qu'adapter l'antique opposition platonicienne entre une éloquence fondée sur la vraisemblance, qui recourt à l'illusion et à l'artifice pour produire la persuasion, et l'éloquence philosophique, fondée sur la vérité qu'elle a pour mission de transmettre.⁶⁸

He noted as well Tertullian's desire to be brief,⁶⁹ his portrait sketches of opponents as a means of achieving *delectare*,⁷⁰ and his caution in going overboard in *movere*.⁷¹ Fredouille was able to conclude that Tertullian was thoroughly familiar with the rhetorical theory of Cicero with regard to matters of style and yet could, at the same time, be thoroughly contemporary, even original:

Original pour l'époque, ce retour à Cicéron ne pouvait consister en une fidélité totale à l'éloquence classique. Il était possible à Tertullien d'en reprendre les principales théories, il ne lui était pas permis néanmoins d'aller à contre-courant de l'évolution linguistique et des tendances stylistiques de son temps. Sa prose affectée et parfois bizarre, son style passionné et emphatique, ses périodes disloquées, son goût pour un maniérisme baroque et volontiers obscur, ne répondent plus guère

⁶⁶ P. E. Satterthwaite, op. cit., p.688.

⁶⁷ Tert. *Apol.* 46.1; Tert. *adv. Val.* 1.4 (where Tertullian was aware of the Ciceronian distinction between *probare* and *flectere*); Tert. *adv. Marc.* 2.28.3; Tert. *de An.* 2.7; and Tert. *de Virg.* 4.4.

⁶⁸ J.-C. Fredouille, op. cit., p.31. See also pp.67-142. On p.67, citing Cic. *Orat.* 21.69, he wrote: "La première obligation pour tout avocat est de démontrer le bien-fondé de la cause qu'il défend: *probare necessitatis est*. Mais la cause n'étant pas toujours estimable, l'art de la persuasion est souvent un appui efficace. Cependant pour Tertullien, comme pour les théoriciens de l'éloquence philosophique, le but est d'enseigner non la vraisemblance, mais la vérité."

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp.32-34.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp.37-65.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp.143-170.

à la définition cicéronienne des trois styles.⁷²

He examined some of the work by Mohrmann, Norden, and Marache about whether Tertullian's style was Asiatic or whether it had true brevity, simplicity and precision without affectation.⁷³

Quasten also made general comments about Tertullian's style:

Tertullian has a style of his own. It is true that he followed the literary tradition of his age. His works present numerous examples of familiarity with the techniques of rhetoric. He is inspired by the 'Asiatic' manner of Greek orators, which prefers short sentences to long periods and piles up questions followed by pointed answers in staccato fashion. He is fond of antithesis and balance and favours puns. But he shows a marked preference for uncommon forms of expression and he coined words and phrases such as no writer since Tacitus had been able to do. This fact, as well as his love for pregnant terseness, is responsible for a certain obscurity in his works...⁷⁴

Barnes has highlighted Tertullian's importance as one of the few witnesses to Silver Age Latin literature in the centuries of Rome's decline.⁷⁵ Also he has drawn attention to the ways in which his style was influenced by or in reaction to oratory, particularly that of the Second Sophistic: his eloquence with the set theme, his restraint with defamation and slander, his use of *exempla*, his use of satire, ridicule and penetrating insight, his ability to summarise in pithy epigram, his love of apparent paradox, and his ability to transcend the limits of genre.⁷⁶ Anderson agrees with Barnes, with reference to *de Pallio* in particular.⁷⁷ To this we must add Osborn's observation that Tertullian's general style changed depending on the intended readership: in

⁷² Ibid., p.172.

⁷³ Ibid., pp.172-173. See C. Mohrmann, "Observations sur la langue et le style de Tertullien," in *Études sur le latin des chrétiens*, tome 2: *Latin chrétien et médiéval* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1961), pp.235-246; E. Norden, op. cit.; R. Marache, *La critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du goût archaïsant au I^{er} siècle de notre ère* (Rennes, 1952).

⁷⁴ J. Quasten, op. cit., p.249.

⁷⁵ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian*, pp.187-213.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.214-226.

⁷⁷ G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic*, pp.207-208.

adversus Hermogenem, Tertullian met logic with argument, while in *adversus Valentinanos*, he met fable with ridicule.⁷⁸ It is hard to date a work or decide on its authenticity simply on the basis of its overall style. Tertullian was a multi-genre writer, something recommended by Cicero (*Opt. Gen.* 3.7 - 4.13), as we have noted.

Elsewhere Barnes has turned his attention to the comments of Säflund about details of Tertullian's style in order to confirm theories about dating his treatises. He notes that in the later works there is a slight increase in the use of anaphora (*repetitio*—the figure of speech where successive clauses begin with the same word or groups of words), a marked increase in the use of *et* in syndeton, and a degree of asyndeton (*solutum*—the omission of conjunctions).⁷⁹

Such characteristics are all manifestations of a single trend towards a more rhythmical prose with more alliteration and rhyme. It is perhaps ironical that as Tertullian sank deeper into Montanism and thus (one might expect) became more estranged from the values of Roman civilization.⁸⁰

Yet Barnes warns that too much may be made of this.⁸¹ He has also devised a list of criteria for establishing Montanist influences in Tertullian's writings,⁸² but this has more to do with content than with style.

Others have examined particular aspects of Tertullian's style in some detail. One is

⁷⁸ E. Osborn, *Tertullian*, p.183.

⁷⁹ Timothy D. Barnes, "Tertullian's *Scorpiace*," p.121; id., *Tertullian*, p.49. G. Säflund, op. cit., pp.60-74.

⁸⁰ T. D. Barnes, "Tertullian's *Scorpiace*," p.121.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.122.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp., 42-48.

reminded of the painstaking work dedicated to analysing Tertullian's use of clausulae.⁸³ It is, however, within the confines of this dissertation, not possible to undertake such an examination with regard to *adversus Iudaeos*.

Those who translate Tertullian often feel the need to apologise for their results. In his translation of *adversus Hermogenem*, Waszink was aware that his efforts had produced "laborious and, in some cases, immoderately long sentences" because Tertullian's style was "even for his standard—particularly intricate."⁸⁴ Le Saint pointed to the fact that ambiguity of thought and distortions of style rendered translating Tertullian similar to translating St. Paul, for he had a "vigorous and imaginative but highly irregular prose," which the modern reader finds foreign.⁸⁵ He said that Tertullian's style was often incoherent:

His sentences are quite often poorly constructed, a jumble of ideas which pour out in unnatural combinations of words and phrases, strange metaphors, neologisms, cryptic allusions, paradoxes and paralogisms, antithesis, multiple parentheses—a rich but disordered miscellany complicated by asyndeton, ellipsis and the use of every form of brachylogy known to grammarians.⁸⁶

Elocutio in adversus Iudaeos

Rather than analyse the rhetorical style of *adversus Iudaeos* and then compare it with the rest of the Tertullianic corpus, it will suffice, and may be more appropriate, simply to compare the first half with the second. This may reveal something further about the unity, integrity, and

⁸³ J. H. Waszink, "The Technique of Clausula in Tertullian's De Anima," *VC* 4 (1950), pp.212-245; Valerio Ugenti, "Norme Prosodiche nelle Clausole Metriche del *De Idololatria* di Tertulliano," *Augustinianum* 35 (1995), pp.241-258.

⁸⁴ J. H. Waszink, *Tertullian: The Treatise Against Hermogenes*, ACW 24 (New York: Newman Press, 1956), p.25.

⁸⁵ William P. Le Saint, *Tertullian: Treatises on Penance*, ACW 28 (New York: Newman Press, 1959), p.7.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.8.

completeness of the treatise. This was the method employed by Säflund in his examination of this text.⁸⁷

One of the things that an analysis of Tertullian's language and style would contribute to is an understanding of his dependence upon or relationship with early Latin translations of the Scriptures. This is an immense task in itself and one that could easily be the focus of its own detailed treatment. Such an analysis is not undertaken in this dissertation in order that the focus on the rhetorical influences (rather than the Scriptural)—to the extent that they can be separated—on Tertullian's style not be disrupted. Säflund has given some attention to this matter when he took issue with Åkerman's proposal that, in the second half of *adversus Iudaeos*, the biblical extracts followed the wording of the Vulgate closely while in Tertullian on the whole biblical extracts followed the Septuagint. Säflund could point to examples like Ps.44(45):5 in 9.17 and Is. 53:3, 7 in 9.28 (he considered eleven examples in all) where the version found in the corresponding section of *adversus Marcionem* is closer to the Vulgate than the version in *adversus Iudaeos*.⁸⁸ Indeed, often Tertullian obviously engaged in his own loose quoting of Scripture.⁸⁹

With regard to this particular treatise, Fredouille has noted that it has a certain rhythm, that it is full of figures, and has a vigorous and didactic tone, all of which adds to its persuasiveness:

⁸⁷ E.g., G. Säflund, op. cit., p.152: "Ich verweise ferner auf die charakteristische Abundanz in einem "echten" Teil wie Adv. Iud. 8..."

⁸⁸ G. Säflund, op. cit., pp.124-144.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.129, with reference to Is. 11:1 in *adv. Iud.* 9.26, concludes that: "So erlaubt sich Tertullian, die Bibelzitate nach seinem eigenen Stilideal umzuformen, ohne damit jedoch dem Inhalt Gewalt anzutun..."

Mais si par son leitmotiv, par le rythme de ses phrases et les figures mises en œuvre, ce chapitre rend des accents incantatoires, la composition rigoureuse, voire appuyée, et le ton didactique montrent qu'il s'agit moins pour Tertullien d'exprimer sa joie de chrétien que de marquer les différences, et de prouver de manière convaincante l'avènement effectif du Christ.⁹⁰

Interestingly enough, Fredouille divided his monograph into three parts: the first concerned with rhetorical aspects in works of Tertullian (further divided into consideration of the three *genera dicendi: delectare, docere, and movere*), the second with polemic, and the third with spiritual matters.⁹¹ It is in the second that he considers *adversus Iudaeos*, unfortunately creating perhaps the impression that polemic and rhetoric were separate entities.⁹²

Tränkle noted certain stylistic points which he used to compare *adversus Iudaeos* with *adversus Marcionem* in order to determine priority in dating. He noted, with regard to the treatise which is the concern of this dissertation, that its author was at pains to make all possible explanation and to leave nothing unsaid. This means that the work tends to drag and that it is possible to become lost in the detail and lose track of the argument.⁹³ One does not need here to repeat all that evidence, but the conclusion may be drawn from it that, in parts, *adversus Iudaeos*, where it tends to be “Träges und Zähes”⁹⁴ or the sentences “verschlungene,” could be described as *dissolutum* or *fluctuans*. The argument accepted here is that this is not the sign of a foreign and

⁹⁰ J.-C. Fredouille, op. cit., p.262.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 27-178 (37-65, 67-142, 143-170), 179-358, 359-478.

⁹² Ibid., pp.23-24: “Mais la rhétorique ne constitue pas à elle seule toute la culture. Celle-ci véhicule un système de valeurs hiérarchisées, des traditions intellectuelles, morales, religieuses, des instruments conceptuels, bref une ‘mentalité’, que Tertullien devenu chrétien devait, selon les cas, soit conserver, soit adapter, soit rejeter, mais dont il gardait néanmoins l’empreinte. C’est à ce niveau que nous avons tâché de comprendre la polémique de Tertullien contre les païens. Mais ceux-ci ne furent pas ses seuls adversaires: il eut à combattre les juifs, les hérétiques, les ‘psychiques’.”

⁹³ H. Tränkle, op. cit., pp.liii-lvii.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.lvi-lvii.

inferior hand for, as Tränkle has noted, such characteristics are found throughout the whole work,⁹⁵ but of an early draft where the author was more concerned to gather arguments than with how they are expressed.

1. Exordium

“*Proselytus*” is a direct transliteration of προσήλυτος, a common enough term in the Septuagint and Philo. In Tertullian the term is found only in *adv. Iud.* 1.1; 2.2; 4.4 (quoting Is. 54:15?); and *adv. Marc.* 3.21.2-4 (seven times, including the quoting of the same Scriptural passage). Tertullian used the word in its accepted technical sense to refer to a non-Jew by birth who had converted to Judaism. This choice of a proper noun may be regarded as an example of Tertullian’s *perspicuitas*.

While “*disputatio*” may have the sense of argument or disagreement, what we find in the major Roman rhetoricians is that the word is used in a much more neutral sense meaning “discussion.”⁹⁶ In his writings, Tertullian tended to use the word with its fuller flavour, in contexts where it is clear he was referring to adversarial, even conflictual, encounters between opposing groups.⁹⁷

Kroymann’s emendation of the text at 1.1 to “<in>*expertibus*” results in a hapax

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.lix.

⁹⁶ E.g., Cic. *de Or.* 1.2.5; Quint. *Inst.* 3.6.80; and 7.2.14.

⁹⁷ Tert. *de Praescr.* 15.3; Tert. *de Pat.* 5.1; Tert. *de Idol.* 17.2; Tert. *Apol.* 25.1; and Tert. *ad Nat.* 2.12.34; cf., Tert. *de Virg.* 11.1.

legomenon in the Tertullianic corpus.⁹⁸ Whether one accepts “*ex partibus*” as found in T or Q(Φ), as Tränkle and Claesson do,⁹⁹ or “*spectantibus*” as found in PNFR, determines whether one understands the collapse of the *disputatio* as being due to some of the participants themselves or their supporters.

We have noted already Balfour’s study on Tertullian’s use of “*natio*,” “*gens*,” “*ethnicus*” and “*gentilis*.” He concludes that Tertullian never used “*gens*” to refer to a pagan as opposed to a Christian, that when he wanted to contrast Gentile with Jew his preferred term was “*natio*,” that almost never outside of *adversus Iudaeos* did he use “*gens*” as a term to contrast Gentile with Jew, and that “*gens*” was a word Tertullian employed in his early literary career in particular.¹⁰⁰ Balfour believes that on twenty-four occasions in *adversus Iudaeos* “*gens*” referred to heathens (mostly in contrast with Jews) and on twenty occasions it referred to some meaning other than heathen.¹⁰¹ He does not specify what those other meanings are. By heathen are we to understand Balfour as meaning all non-Jews, both pagan and Christian?

It is obvious in the *exordium* that “*gens*” means non-Jew, for the proselyte was described as “*ex gentibus*.” Indeed, in many instances where he used the word, Tertullian was quoting from the Hebrew Scriptures where Gentile is the obviously intended meaning.¹⁰² Only in several

⁹⁸ A. Kroymann, op. cit., p.1339, line 5.

⁹⁹ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.3, line 4; Gösta Claesson, *Index tertullianus, F-P* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975), p.1130.

¹⁰⁰ I. L. S. Balfour, op. cit., pp.786-788.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.789.

¹⁰² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.3 (Is. 40:15); 3.8 (Is. 2:2-3); 3.9 (Is. 2:3-4 - three instances); 5.4 (Mal. 1:10-11; Ps. 95[96]:7); 5.7 (Mal. 1:11); 7.2 (Is. 45:1); 12.1 (Ps. 2:7-8) = 14.2 = *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3; 12.2 (Is. 42:6-7), although cf. *adv. Marc.* 3.20.4 (where “*in lucem gentium*” has become “*in lucem nationeum*”); 13.13 (Jer. 2:10-13); and 13.26 (Is. 52:5), although cf., *adv. Marc.* 3.23.3 (where “*inter gentes*” has become “*in nationibus*”).

instances is it clear and explicit that “*gens*” does not mean Gentile: 1.4 where the reference to “*duae gentes*” includes the Jews; 1.5 “*gens Iudaeorum*;” 3.5 where “*gens peccatrix*” from Is. 1:4 refers to the Jews; 7.4 “*multarum gentium*;” 7.8 “*gentes Maurorum et Getulorum*;” “*istas gentes*;” 7.9 “*ab omnibus gentibus supra enumeratis*;” and 13.29 where “*dispersio gentis*” refers to the Jews. Beyond these few, I would argue, all the other instances of Tertullian’s use of “*gens*” in this treatise may be determined, from the context of the overall argument, to refer to the Gentiles *per se*, whether they be pagans or Christian.

The *exordium* is brief, even containing in 1.2, 3a statements of the treatise’s *partitio* or *propositio* and this provides clarity of style as well as clarity of argument.¹⁰³ Further, the repetition of the treatise’s thesis provided Tertullian with some opportunity for refining (*expolitio*) through restatement in similar words and through the example (*exemplum*) of the proselyte himself. The impression is given that Tertullian was not interested in dwelling too much on why this work came to be written but was eager to enter the fray as quickly as possible. This brevity receives emphasis from the shortness of the opening sentences. O’Malley has pointed out that Tertullian’s language here (“*nubilo quodam veritas obumbrabatur*”) is entirely characteristic.¹⁰⁴

In the *exordium* we notice only the briefest of alliteration or παρόμοιον (1.1 - “*retractatas terminare*”) and assonance (1.3a - “*stillicidium situlae*”); the excessive use of the technique being something against which the author of *ad Herennium* advised.¹⁰⁵ The use of Is.

¹⁰³ Quint. *Inst.* 8.2.22-23.

¹⁰⁴ T. P. O’Malley, *op. cit.*, p.134.

¹⁰⁵ *Rhet. Her.* 4.12.18.

40:15 provided Tertullian with the opportunity to include metaphor (*translatio*) in 1.1 (“*nubilo quodam veritas obumbrabatur*”) and simile (*imago*) with the comparison of the “*gentes*” with “*stillicidium situlae aut pulvis ex area*” in 1.3a.

2. *Narratio*

There are several hapax legomena in the *narratio* of *adversus Iudaeos*. At 1.3b we find the non-classical “*pollicitatorem*,” a word related to the classical term “*pollicitatio*” (although Cicero did not use it), a word which we also find in Tertullian and only the once, which is in this treatise at 6.1. The only reference to Baal in Tertullian’s writings occurs in 1.7. The participle “*abrelicta*” in 1.6 is a hapax legomenon not only in Tertullian but in Latin literature, although, given that it appears a couple of sentences later in 1.6, we should not strictly term it a hapax.

In the *narratio* we can detect quite a number of *figurae verborum* or *in verborum exornationes*. There is homoeoptoton in 1.3b with “*ipsum deum idoneum pollicitatorem et fidelem sponsorem*” and in 1.6 with “*secundum divinarum scripturarum*” (the next word “*memorias*” adds to the alliterative effect). The alliteration a little further along in 1.6 (“*derelicto deo idolis deservivit et divinitate*”) seems quite deliberate. The use of transposition (*transiunctione*), a broader hyperbaton than anastrophe according to Quintilian,¹⁰⁶ in 1.3b (“*quod in semine eius benedicerentur omnes nationes terrae*”) would seem not to be original to Tertullian but to have derived from his Scriptural source for Gen. 22:18.

With Tertullian’s introduction of the Rebekah prophecy from Gen. 25:23 from the end of

¹⁰⁶ Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.62-65.

1.3b onwards, we see further examples of *figurae*. He provided definition of the “*duo populi et duae gentes*” of the prophecy (1.3b - “*utique Iudaeorum, id est Israëlitum, et gentium, id est noster*”). In 1.4 we find the *figura sententiae* of *expolitio* through a repetition of the key element of the prophecy (“*Duos etenim populos et duas gentes processuras ex unius feminae utero*”), and this is before we are presented with the entire Scriptural text at the end of 1.4.

In the interpretation of the text in 1.5 we discover not only antithesis (*contentio*) in the contrast of “*anterior*” with “*in ultimo saeculi,*” and “*maior*” with “*minor,*” but antimetabole or reciprocal change (*commutatio*): “*maior populus, id est Iudaicus, serviat necesse est minori, et minor populus, id est Christianus, superet maiorem.*” Here too we find an example of parenthesis (“*utpote in ultimo saeculi spatio adeptus notitiam divinae miserationis*”), something very common to Tertullian’s style. We may notice it again in 1.6 (“*abrelicto deo*”).

As is to be expected in a work that investigates the relationship between two people’s relationships with God, the *figura* of antithesis appears frequently. It makes a second appearance at the end of the *narratio* in 1.7, with the contrast between the changes in Jewish and Christian attitudes to idols. There is perhaps a sense of irony here with the worshippers of idols becoming God’s people and God’s original people now becoming the worshippers of idols.

The final *figura* to which I would like to draw attention is the synonymy (*interpretatio*) with reference to the bovine idols (“*bubulum*” in 1.6 and “*vaccas*” in 1.7).

The typological interpretation of Gen. 25:23 is entirely characteristic of Tertullian’s *elocutio*: he preferred to interpret Scripture literally and in its original context when his

opponents did the opposite, and to interpret it allegorically or typologically when his opponents offered a literal or historically contextualised understanding.

3. *Partitio*

This statement of the thesis of the treatise is built on the antithesis between the greater and the lesser, the anterior (not mentioned explicitly here at 1.8 but implied on the basis of 1.6) and posterior, and those admitted to divine grace and those divorced from it.

The *partitio* acts as a *transitio* announcing where the treatise is heading, but such a function is normally to be expected from this section of an oratorical product.

4. *Refutatio*

As we have noted, Tertullian's *refutatio* is constructed around four themes which serve as examples of the point he wished to make that God had not limited divine favour to one people alone. Just as the Jewish rabbis developed Midrash, partly in response to the threat of Christianity,¹⁰⁷ Christian authors like Tertullian entered into the debate about the interpretation and meaning of pieces of Scripture to develop arguments. This is very similar in many ways to the classical rhetorical practice of elaborating upon *chreia*. What we find in the chapters of the *refutatio* of *adversus Iudaeos* seems to be a series of theses which Tertullian elaborated, particularly through the use of passages of the Hebrew Scriptures which served to provide examples and authoritative references. Tertullian seems to have all the skills of a good rabbi in

¹⁰⁷ Jacob Neusner, *What is Midrash?* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p.45.

appealing to one passage of Scripture to illumine or contradict another and reveal its hidden meaning. One gets the impression that the theses Tertullian investigated were standard or common in the ongoing interactions between Jews and Christians and in this treatise he was turning his hand to these familiar debating topics, ones that were indeed not only familiar but relevant and not yet antiquated or merely formal.

In chapter 2 the proposition is stated, although in a negative fashion. Such negativity is not surprising in a *refutatio*. The thesis that can be discerned states that God has given the law to all peoples (2.1b). The implied rationale for this is because God's goodness demands that all people be saved (2.2). Tertullian argued for this from the contrary, in an enthymemic syllogism where the premiss (that proselytes are saved) is not mentioned but presumed. That proselytes can be saved was enough to demonstrate that the opposite thesis (that only one people can be saved) cannot be true. The *exemplum* used to illustrate that thesis is the law given to Adam (2.2-5) and the lives of Abraham and Melchizedek (2.6-8). The conclusion is that the law given to Moses was only temporary (2.9).

The proposition with regard to the second theme on circumcision is not mentioned until half way through the elaboration: physical circumcision has been replaced with spiritual circumcision (3.7). Tertullian began the initial proposition that physical circumcision is no longer to be observed (2.10) and the rationale implied is that people can be the friends of God without it (2.10). Again, both proposition and rationale are expressed negatively. *Exempla* to support the proposition are found in Adam, Abel, Noah, Enoch, and Melchizedek (2.11-14). The contrary is then treated with regard to the circumcision of Abraham and Noah's son (3.1-3), with the conclusion that circumcision was given as a sign, not a cause, of salvation. The *exemplum* to

illustrate this is found in the use of circumcision as the sign or means by which the Romans kept Jews out of Jerusalem (3.4). Then there is an appeal to the authority of Scripture to prove that God promised to keep them from the holy city: Is. 1:7-8, 2, 15, and 4 (3.4-5) and a repeat of this preliminary conclusion (3.6). After the statement of the full proposition comes another appeal to authoritative passages of the Scriptures: Jer. 4:3-4 and 31:31-32 (3.7). Having made his point that physical circumcision was to be replaced by a spiritual one, Tertullian cited other passages (Is. 51:2-3 and 2:3-4) to show that this was for the Gentiles (3.8-13). The contrary position to that is addressed (3.10). The argument about the law is used as an analogy for that about circumcision, just as this theme of circumcision itself is really an analogy to that of the law (which may illustrate a flaw in Tertullian's logic, one that he may have hoped would escape detection).

In the next theme, the proposition is that the observation of the Sabbath was only a temporary injunction (4.1). Immediately, the contrary is explored (4.1-2). Is. 1:13 and 66:23 are presented as the statement from authority (4.2-3). Circumcision is presented as an analogous argument (4.5). Adam, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and Melchizedek are presented as *exempla*, although negatively (4.6). The contrary argument, that the Sabbath was to be observed from the time of Moses onwards, is then considered (4.7), and Joshua and the Maccabees are offered as *exempla* to refute that contrary position (4.8-10). The theme finishes with a summary and exhortation (4.11).

The final theme maintains this declamatory pattern. The proposition is given (5.1) and an *exemplum*, that of Cain and Abel, follows (5.1-2). Passages of the Scriptures are produced as authority statements about the offering of sacrifice outside Israel by the nations and the offering

of a spiritual not physical sacrifice (Mal. 1:10-11; Ps. 95[96]:7-8; 50[51]:19; 49[50]:14; Is. 1:11-14; and Mal. 1-10.

The *refutatio* is a series of little declamatory elaborations on set themes or set questions. Like a good orator Tertullian was able to employ the standard means of developing his theme, but instead of using maxims and anecdotes he was able to use the Hebrew Scriptures. Such a pattern in the *refutatio* reveals Tertullian's rhetorical training.

In terms of single words in the *refutatio*, we may notice the occurrence of a few hapax legomena in the writings of Tertullian: "*plasmator*" in 2.1-2 (a word which makes its first appearance with Tertullian); "*Leviticae*" at 2.7; and "*prae-focatus fuisset*" in 3.1. As would be expected in a discussion about the Jewish covenant, proper nouns like "*Sabbatum*," "*circumcisio*" and "*holocaustrum*" appear.¹⁰⁸ There are several words that are best described as late or post-classical, if not ecclesiastical: "*primordialis*" and the use of "*matrix*" in a figurative sense in 2.4; "*eremus*" in 2.9; 3.13; 9.24 (Is. 40:3 and Jn. 1:23) and 13.12;¹⁰⁹ "*paradiso*" in 2.4 and 9;¹¹⁰ "*propheta*" which first appears in 2.9 and then frequently thereafter in the treatise; "*spiritalis*" in 3.7, 11; 5.1, 5 (twice), 6, 7; 6.1 (thrice), 3; 8.14; 9.19, 27; and 14.9; "*praedemonstrabat*" in 3.10 (another hapax in Tertullian's writings); "*sanctifico*" in 4.1 (twice, the second time from Ex. 20:8) and later in 8.14; "*oblationum*" in 5.1; "*praeostendo*" in 4.5 (twice); 5.1, 3; and 6.1 (yet another hapax in Tertullian); "*angelus*" in 5.4; and "*apostolorum*" in 5.4.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ "*Holocaustra*" is used in 5.3, while "*holocaustomata*" is found in 5.6 (quoting Is. 1:11).

¹⁰⁹ "*Eremus*" occurs on only three other occasions in the remainder of Tertullian's writings: *ad Mart.* 2.8; *de Idol.* 5.5; and *adv. Marc.* 5.3.8.

¹¹⁰ Gell. *N.A.* 2.20.4 noted that the common Latin equivalent of παραδείσους was "*vivaria*".

¹¹¹ The only other occurrence of this very frequently used word of Tertullian's in this treatise is at 7.3.

When consideration is given to stylistic patterns of repetition in this section of the treatise it can be noted that there are several examples of alliteration but, in keeping with rhetorical advice (*Rhet. Her.* 4.12.18), only in moderation: “*morte morerentur*” in 2.2; “*praemiserat praeceptum*” in 2.6; “*circumcisio carnalis cessatura*” in 3.11; “*auditu auris obaudivit*” in 3.12 (which we may take also as an example of periphrasis [*circumitio*] involving an element of transplacement [*tractio*]. This *figura* derives from Ps. 17[18]:44-45 which Tertullian had just cited in 3.11); “*circumferrent in circuitu civitatis*” in 4.8; “*dominus deus daturus*” in 5.3; and “*postea per prophetas praedicat*” in 5.4.

There are several examples of homoeoptoton, such as “*quando secundum sua merita in sanctam civitatem ingredi prohiberentur secundum verbum prophetarum dicentium*” in 3.4 and “*Iesum Christum filium*” in 4.4.

There are several examples as well of epanaphora (*repetitio*). The most involved occurs in 2.4b-5. In the previous chapter, in the treatment of the arguments in the *refutatio*, I drew attention to the fact that 2.4b-5 appears as a weakness in the development of Tertullian’s position. He was interested in upholding the validity, priority, and superiority of the law given to Adam, and it did nothing to help his case to remind his readers that Adam and Eve had failed to obey that law. Although the inclusion of this material did not help, Tertullian’s inclusion may be explained in terms of the opportunity it gave him to develop his style.

Through negative reasoning, Tertullian wanted to show that the commandments of the Mosaic law were to be found in the earlier law by demonstrating how Adam and Eve had failed to keep the precepts of what would become later the written law, precepts that did indeed exist

implicitly in the earlier, unwritten law. From the list of the Mosaic commandments in 1.3, presented in no particular order, Tertullian went on to illustrate the failure of Adam and Eve, using that list as a checklist. The order of the list is as follows: love of God, love of neighbour, the prohibition on killing, the prohibition on adultery, the prohibition on stealing, the prohibition on lying, the injunction to honour parents, and the prohibition on coveting. Then, through a succession of conditional statements, Tertullian exemplified how those commandments existed from the time of creation.

The *elocutio* of these examples is heightened, and given force, by the use of epanaphora with the word “*si*,” although it is not to be found in every cola (at the beginning of 2.5, the example of anastrophe with “*a furto quoque abstinuissent*” breaks the parallels), and by the asyndeton between the cola. The first example is the love of God (“*si dominum deum suum dilexissent, contra praeceptum eius non fecissent*”) and the second is the love of neighbour (“*si proximum diligere, id est semetipsos, persuasioni serpentis non credidissent*”). The third example about killing is not expressed as a condition but as a consequence of the second example (“*atque ita in semetipsos homicidium non commisissent, excidendo de immortalitate faciendo contra dei praeceptum*”). There is no mention of adultery. The example about stealing is expressed outside the pattern.¹¹² There is no mention of parental respect. The last example is about coveting (“*si alienum non concupiscentes de fructu illicito non degustassent*”) and follows the pattern.

¹¹² To follow the pattern “*a futuro quoque abstinuissent*,” rather than being the apodosis, would become the protasis and “[*si de fructu arboris non clam degustassent*] *nec a conspectu domini dei sui sub arbore delitescere gestissent, nec falsum adserveranti diabolo mendacii participes efficerentur credendo ei, quod similes dei essent futuri, atque ita nec dominum deum offendissent ut patrem, qui eos de limo terrae quasi ex utero matris figuraverat*” would become the apodosis.

One of three things must be concluded here: either Tertullian did not want to follow the epanaphoric pattern he had established slavishly, or this section needed some revision and polish, or the parallels he thought he could establish between the law given to Moses and the law given to Adam could not be established in practice as he had imagined.

Other examples of epanaphora occur in 2.6 (“*qui ante... qui ante*”) and 2.9 (“*nec... aut... nec... sed*”). In my reading of the *refutatio* I found one example of antistrophe (*conversio*) at 2.2 (“*quando voluit et per quos voluit et sicut voluit*”) but none of interlacement or of epanalepsis (the repetition at the end of a clause of the word used at the beginning),¹¹³ nor of anadiplosis (the repetition of the last word of one clause as the first word of the next), although we may detect the presence of the closely related, sometimes indistinguishable, climax (*gradatio*) in 2.9, where God gives the law to various peoples, climaxing with the giving of the law to the Gentiles. Nor do we find antimetabole (*commutatio*). There is one example though of chiasmus: in 5.3-4 we find “*ut sacrificia nullo alio in loco offerrentur deo quam in terra promissionis... ut in omni loco et in omni terra offerantur sacrificia deo?*” There are also several examples of transplacement (*traductio*): “*certis temporibus... certis temporibus... certo tempore... certo tempore*” in 2.9, the repetition of “*in signum*” in 3.1,3-4,6, and “*secundum*” in 3.4. There appears to be no reduplication (*conduplicatio*) in this part of the work.

In terms of the balance created in the writing, we may notice how ideas are sometimes put in apposition: “*deus universitatis conditor mundi totius gubernator hominis plasmator universarum gentium sator*” (2.1b) where, had not Tertullian been referring to God, one would have accused him of hyperbole. We do find examples of synonymy (*interpretatio*) that create a

¹¹³ Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.51 and Cic. *de Or.* 3.54.206.

sense of balance: “*Quid enim mirum, si is auget disciplinam qui instituit, si is perficit qui coepit?*” in 2.7 (which also results in isolcolon), “*post intervalla<ta> temporum multorum spatia*” in 2.8, “*observata et custodita*” in 2.9, the use of the metonymious expression “*sanctam civitatem*” in 3.4, and, in the repetition of the same idea in 3.6, the replacement of that with the simple “*Hierusalem.*” There is a series of synonyms in 3.10: “*gladiorum et lancearum,*” “*aemulos et hostes,*” “*pristinam ferocitatem gladiorum et lancearum*” and “*belli pristinam in aemulos et hostes executionem,*” “*ad tranquillitatem*” and “*in pacificos actus,*” and “*arandae et colendae*” (based on Is. 2:3-4). This is a particularly eloquent passage in the *refutatio* for we find antithesis between the “*vetus lex*” and the “*nova... lex*”, the use of polysyndeton in both antithetical sections and a sense of *gradatio* in the second section with the use of “*designabat,*” “*convertebat*” and “*reformabat.*” (an example of disjunction [*disiunctum*]). Within this section on the new law there is antithesis between “*ad tranquillitatem*” and “*pristinam ferocitatem*” and between “*belli pristinam*” and “*in pacificos actus.*” There is isocolon with “*et ultione gladii se vindicabat et oculum pro oculo eruebat et vindicatam iniuriam retribuebat*” and “*et pristinam ferocitatem gladiorum et lancearum ad tranquillitatem convertebat et belli pristinam in aemulos et hostes executionem in pacificos actus arandae et colendae terrae reformabat.*” There is also the personification (*conformatio*) of the law taking vengeance. The criss-crossing of synonymy and antithesis, and the rhythm created by polysyndeton, leads one to the conclusion that this was a polished piece of writing and an example of oratory in the grand style. There is more synonymy in 5.3 (“*sacrificia et holocausta*” and “*pro peccatis quam pro animabus*”)¹¹⁴ and 5.4 (“*in omni loco et in omni terra*”).

Antithesis, as a *figura verborum*, features constantly throughout the treatise. This adds

¹¹⁴ A. Kroymann, CCSL 2, p.1350: “*por (sic!) peccatis.*”

to the contrast Tertullian was attempting to achieve throughout the *refutatio*. We see this exemplified in 2.6 where the “*generalis et primordialis dei lex*” is set against the “*lex posterior*” (in 2.9 Tertullian wrote of the law in terms of “*principalis*” and “*subsequenta*”), in 2.7 where the antithesis is between establishing a law and expanding it, in 3.1 where the circumcised Abraham is contrasted with the uncircumcised Melchizedek, in 3.10 where the vengeance of the old law contrasts with the clemency of the new, in 4.3 with the contrast between a human and a divine Sabbath, and in 5.2 where the sacrifices of Abel and Cain are examined. The most outstanding antithesis occurs in the *transitio* at the end of the *refutatio*, which is presented in a series of parallel *isolcola* (6.1): the temporal and the eternal Sabbath (4.5,7,11), the physical and spiritual circumcision (3.7,11; and 4.5), the temporal and eternal law (3.11), and the physical and spiritual sacrifices (5.1,5-6). This *transitio* is achieved through the use of another *figurae*, that of accumulation (*frequentatio*).

Finally, to achieve a sense of balance and rhythm, we may notice further examples of *isocolon* in 2.10: “*sabbatum adhuc observandum quasi salutis medellam et circumcisionem octava die propter mortis comminationem;*” 3.1: “*Acceperat enim circumcisionem, sed quae esset in signum, [temporis illius] non in salutis praerogativam;*” 3.2: “*Atquin, si salutem circumcisio omnimodo adferret, etiam ipse Moyses in filio suo non intermisisset, quominus octava die eum circumcideret;*” and 3.13:

*Nam Israël, qui deo fuerat cognitus quique ab eo in Aegypto exaltatus fuerat et per Erythraeum pelagus transuectus, quique in eremo, mancipatus ei XL annis, ad instar <erat> aeternitatis redactus, nec humanis passionibus contaminatus aut saeculi huius cibis pastus sed angelorum panibus manna cibatus satisque beneficiis deo obligatus...*¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 3.13: “For Israel—who *had* been known to God, and who had by Him been “upbraided” in Egypt, and was transported through the Red Sea, and who in the desert, fed forty years with manna, was wrought to the semblance of eternity, and not contaminated with human passions, or fed on this world’s meats, but fed on “angel’s loaves”—the manna—and sufficiently bound to God by his benefits...”

In this last instance, though, this is present only in a rough form. More examples can be found:

4.3: “*Unde dinoscimus sabbatum temporale esse humanum, et sabbatum aeternum censi divinum;*” and 4.6:

... *aut Adam sabbatizasse, aut Abel hostiam deo sanctam offerentem sabbati religione placuisse, aut Enoch translatum sabbati cultorem fuisse, aut Noë, arcae fabricatorem, propter diluvium immines sabbatum observasse, aut Abraham in observatione sabbati Isaac filium suum obtulisse, aut Melchisedech in suo sacerdotio legem sabbati accepisse.*¹¹⁶

This is an example also of epanaphora which results almost in elimination (*expeditio*). We may continue with examples: 4.10: “*Nec dubium est opus serville eos operatos, cum praedas belli agerent ex dei praecepto;*” and 5.5: “*Sic itaque sacrificia spiritalia laudis designantur, et cor contribulatum acceptabile sacrificium deo demonstratur.*” In many of these examples, as well as in other examples of isocolon mentioned earlier (2.7 with “*instituit*” and “*coepit*,” 3.10 with “*vindicabat*,” “*eruebat*” and “*retribuebat*,” and “*convertebat*” and “*reformabat*”), we see what Säfllund has described as characteristic of Tertullian’s style with isocolon: the use of rhyme (homoeoptoton) within the cola.¹¹⁷

Among the other *figurae* in the *refutatio* we find frequent use of the rhetorical question (2.1b, 7 [five times], 11; 3.10,12; and 5.4) and even hypophora (*subiectio*) in 2.10; 3.1 (twice); 4.1 and 7, though in subtle forms. In 3.5 and 4.2 we find examples of simple *ratio* where Tertullian used the question in order to introduce the answer.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 4.6: “... that Adam observed the sabbath; or that Abel, when offering to God a holy victim, pleased Him by a religious reverence for the sabbath; or that Enoch, when translated, had been a keeper of the sabbath; or that Noah the ark-builder observed, on account of the deluge, an immense sabbath; or that Abraham, in observance of the sabbath, offered Isaac his son; or that Melchizedek in his priesthood received the law of the sabbath.”

¹¹⁷ G. Säfllund, op. cit., pp.165-166.

Tränkle has pointed to the presence of asyndeton in 2.2 with the use of “*certis statutis temporibus.*”¹¹⁸ There is ellipsis in 2.9 with the omission of some verb like “*data est*” with reference to the timing of the law, in 3.7 with the omission of “*circumcisio*” after “*spiritalis,*” in 5.2 with the omission of “*munera*” with reference to Abel, and in 5.5 with “*non terrenis sacrificiis sed spiritualibus.*”

We find metaphor in 2.3: “*omnia praecepta... pullulaverunt*” and the metaphorical application of “*germinaverunt*” to “*omnia praecepta legis*” in 2.6 on the basis of “*in arboris fructu.*” Another example occurs in 2.13, where Enoch is said “*necdum mortem gustavit.*” In 3.8 Christ is described as “*mons.*” There is simile in 2.5 with the expression “*quasi ex utero matris*” applied to God’s creation of Adam and Eve from clay.

In 5.3 “*populorum*” is used as a metonymy for Jews and Christians. At 1.3, 3.4 and 13 “*Israel*” is used for its people, a common enough oratorical technique.

5. Confirmatio

As in the earlier parts of the treatise, we find a number of words in the *confirmatio* that could be classified as post-classical or ecclesiastical and which make their first appearance with Tertullian (who derived them possibly from Old Latin versions of the Scriptures known to him). We also find instances of words that are either hapax legomena or rare in Tertullian, just as we did in the “authentic” first half of the treatise. As Säflund observed, pointing to *de Anima* and *adversus Marcionem* as his examples, many of Tertullian’s works each contain words that appear

¹¹⁸ H. Tränkle, op. cit., p.45.

in no other treatise.¹¹⁹ Given that different works addressed different, one may even say specialised, themes, it is not surprising to find some terms, particularly technical ones, confined to one particular work. Further, there are words which appear in *adversus Iudaeos* and nowhere else in the Tertullianic corpus except in the corresponding section in *adversus Marcionem*. It has to be conceded that one could argue that a lazy copier merely lifted words from *adversus Marcionem* for use in *adversus Iudaeos*, even though they were unfamiliar, in an attempt to imitate the authentic Tertullian.

The following words are hapax legomena in Tertullian or appear only in this treatise, even though on a couple of occasions: “*lator*” (6.2,3);¹²⁰ “*Getuli*” (7.4,8); “*abante*” (7.5); “*valvae*” (7.5); “*Dan*” (7.7); “*India*” (7.7); “*Artaxerxes*” (8.10); “*Ochus*” (8.10); “*Argus*” (8.10); “*Melas*” (8.10); “*Evergetes*” (8.10); “*Philopator*” (8.10); “*Epiphanes*” (8.10); “*baptistam*” (8.14 [from Mt. 11:13]); “*Caius*” (8.16); “*Caligula*” (8.16); “*Otho*” (8.16); “*Rubellius Geminus*” (8.18); “*Fufius Geminus*” (8.18); “*Martio*” (8.18); “*crepitaculo*” (9.5);¹²¹ “*mammis*” (9.5);¹²² “*lanciare*” (9.6);¹²³ “*commoror*” (9.22; 13.12,15); “*peccantia*” (10.10);¹²⁴ “*tenebresceret*” (10.17 [from Amos 8:9-

¹¹⁹ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.145.

¹²⁰ A fragment of the lost *Codex Fuldensis* (3.20) preserves “*latoribus*.” A comparison of this codex with De la Barre’s 1580 Paris edition by François de Maulde in 1584 resulted in a collection of variants which Franciscus Junius incorporated as an appendix to his 1597 Franeker edition (Q[Φ]).

¹²¹ In *adv. Marc.* 3.13.2 we find the diminutive “*crepitacillo*,” another hapax.

¹²² In *adv. Marc.* 3.13.2 we find the diminutive “*mamillis*,” another hapax.

¹²³ In *adv. Marc.* 3.13.3 we find “*lanceare*.”

¹²⁴ “*Peccantia*” is found in P^NF^R (and “*pecantia*” in T). A. Kroymann, op. cit., p.1377, emended the text to read “*petulantia*.” G. Säflund, op. cit., p.145, noted a number of hapax legomena in other treatises of Tertullian in a form similar to “*peccantia*.” He concluded: “Die Form ‘peccantia’ ist in eine symmetrische Satzpartie mit Homoioteleuton eingefügt: ‘a delictorum peccantia/ad crucis istius sacramenta’—eine weitere Stütze für ihre Echtheit.”

10]); “*chrismatis*” (13.6); “*ducator*” (13.10);¹²⁵ “*indulcavit*” (13.12 [a late Latin verb]); “*vepre*” (13.21 [from Gen. 22:13]); “*spinea*” (13.21 [from Mt. 27:29; Mk. 15:17; and Jn. 19:2]); “*abominamenta*” (13.24);¹²⁶ and “*Iosedech*” (14.8).

The following words, in various forms, appear elsewhere in Tertullian but rarely: “*ceremonia*” (6.1,23 and *de Idol.* 14.6 [from Is. 1:14]);¹²⁷ “*diffiteor*” (7.1; 9.31 and *de Res.* 3.4 [a fairly rare word in classical Latin]); “*Beersheba*” (7.7 and *de Iei.* 9.4); “*ebdomas*” (frequently in *adv. Iud.* 8 and 11, but otherwise only in *de Cor.* 3.3); “*bellator*” (9.4,8,16,20 and equivalents in *adv. Marc.* 3.13.1,5 and 3.14.1,7, as well as *adv. Marc.* 3.14.5 [twice] and 4.20.4); “*praegnatus*” (9.8 and *adv. Marc.* 3.13.5, and *de Carn.* 1.4); “*iuvencula*” (9.8 [twice] and equivalent in *adv. Marc.* 3.13.4 [twice], and *de Mon.* 13.1 [from 1 Tim. 5:14]);¹²⁸ “*debellatricis*” (9.15 and *adv. Marc.* 3.13.10, and *Apol.* 25.4); “*armiger*” (9.20 and *adv. Marc.* 3.14.7); “*unicormis*” (10.7,13 and *adv. Marc.* 3.18.3; 3.19.5 [from Dt. 33:17 and Ps. 21(22):22]); “*rhinoceros*” (10.7 and *adv. Marc.* 3.18.3); “*minotaurus*” (10.7 and *adv. Marc.* 3.18.3); “*bicornus*” (10.7 and *adv. Marc.* 3.18.3); “*plasmatus est*” (13.11 and *de Spec.* 23.7); “*protoplastis*” (13.11 and *de Cast.* 2.6); “*dilucido*” (13.24 and *adv. Marc.* 3.22.1. This verb had been used earlier at 1.1); “*podere*” (14.7,8 and *adv. Marc.* 3.7.6. Earlier it had been used in 11.7,8 [from Ez. 9:2,3]); and “*cidarim*” (14.7 and *adv. Marc.* 3.7.6).

¹²⁵ “*Ducator*” is found in PNFR. A. Kroymann, op. cit., p.1386, followed T which has “*ducatus*.” G. Säflund, op. cit., pp.146-147, noted that although the word is not to be found in the rest of Tertullian it is to be found in Old Latin versions of Mt. 2:6 in which the passage from Mic. 5:2 is quoted.

¹²⁶ This is quoted from Is. 2:20. G. Säflund, op. cit., p.148, noted that this word agreed with Old Latin biblical translations.

¹²⁷ Is. 1:14 is also cited in *adv. Iud.* 4.2 and *adv. Marc.* 4.12.4,13, although omitting reference to “*ceremonia*.”

¹²⁸ The word is ecclesiastical and may owe its origin to Tertullian or to an earlier translator responsible for an Old Latin edition of the Scriptures or some other unknown source.

Other words are late Latin or ecclesiastical: “*spiritaliter*” (7.5; 10.9); “*nativitas*” (8.1,11,15,16; 9.1,9; 11.10; 13.22 [from Is. 53:8],24; and 14.6 [from Is. 53:8]); “*signaculum*” (8.12; 11.10); “*recapitulavit*” (8.8); “*prophetia*” (8.12,14,15; 9.10; 10.11,12,19; 11.10; and 13.23); “*baptizato*” (8.14); “*Emmanuel*” (9.1 [from Is. 7:14],2 [twice], and 3 [four times]); “*capituli*” (9.2); “*Iudaismus*” (9.3); “*idololatriae*” (9.12); “*sacramentum*” (9.22,25; 10.5,10; 13.12,17,19,21; and 14.7); “*maledictus*” (10.4); “*obumbrandum*” (10.5); “*benedictionis*” (10.8); and “*evangelii*” (12.2).

In terms of the *genera dicendi*, we may note Säflund’s comments that repetition was characteristic of Tertullian’s *elocutio* and that Åkerman’s observations did not stand up to scrutiny. Åkerman had argued that in the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* (and specifically he referred to 9.1) we find wasteful uses of the demonstrative pronoun, which was more characteristic of late and vulgar Latin rather than of Tertullian. The pleonastic use of pronouns, and even of whole phrases, is something that can be found not only earlier in *adversus Iudaeos* but in *adversus Marcionem* and other treatises.

Dies hängt zum Teil mit einem für Tertullians Stil bezeichnenden Phänomen zusammen, nämlich mit der Vorliebe für emphatische Wiederholung (“*inculcatio*”), wie es u. a. Thörnell betont hat (*Studia Tertulliana*)...¹²⁹

One need not repeat Säflund’s comments about typical Tertullianic words and expressions such as “*praescribere*,” “*unde*,” and “*indubitate*,” which can be found not only in the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* but in the first half, and in other treatises, as well.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.151.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp.163-164.

Throughout the *confirmatio* there appears to be a number of instances of the use of *figurae* based on patterns of repetition. Often such *figurae* would be used to produce emotional impact, so perhaps their moderate occurrence in this treatise is another indication that its author wished to avoid the same kind of emotional uproar that ostensibly had been responsible for the premature ending of the earlier encounter. On the other hand, the scarcity of such *figurae* perhaps indicates a work that still lacked polish.

There are few obvious examples of alliteration: “*figuram futuri fuisse*” (9.21); “*angelum appellat per prophetam spiritus sanctus dicens ex persona patri... nec novum est spiritui sancto angelos appellare eos*” (9.23. This extremely clever alliteration results also in chiasmus); “*itaque inprimis Isaac*” (10.6); “*cuius cornua essent crucis*” (10.7); “*alterius alicuius prophetari passionem*” (10.14); “*unctio, unde unguetur*” (13.7); “*passuros praedicat propheta*” (13.16); “*fuerat ferrum, <et ferrum> statim supernatavit*” (13.18); and “*qui coccinea circumdatus veste et consputatus et omnibus contumeliis adflictus extra civitatem crucifixus est*” (14.9).

Examples of epanaphora occur throughout the *confirmatio*: “*novi testamenti heres et novorum sacrificiorum sacerdos et novae circumcisionis purgator et aeterni sabbati cultor*” (6.2), although the reference to the Sabbath breaks that pattern. Hyperbaton (*transgressio*) was employed here through transposition (*transiectio*) of the noun to give the clause a better rhythm and to achieve the epanaphora. This *figura* of beginning successive clauses with the same word occurs also in 7.7 (“*si Solomon... si vero Babylois et Parthis... si Aegyptus Pharaon... si Nabuccodonosor... si Alexander Macedo*”); 8.2 (“*et ex temporibus praescriptis et ex signis competentibus et ex operationibus eius, quae proba<bi>mus et ex consequentibus*”); 8.12 (“*Quoniam omnes prophetae... quoniam adimpleta est propheta... quoniam ipse esset*

signaculum” - creating a series of three isocola); 9.6 (“*qui ante norint... ante militare... ante virtutem*”); 9.7 (“*Signum autem... signum non videretur*”); 9.15 (“*Sic et Aegyptus.. Sic et Babylon*”); 10.5 (“*quanto incredibile, tanto magis scandalum... quantoque magnificum tanto magis obumbrandum*”); 10.7 (“*Aliis feros, ut iudex, aliis mansuetus, ut salvator*”); and 13.20 (“*alios enim lapidaverunt, alios fugaverunt*”).

It is probably worth pausing at this point to consider 7.9. It seems to be a highly polished and well crafted couple of sentences at the end of what I consider to be a digressive passage at the start of the *confirmatio*.¹³¹ We find here two examples of epanaphora involving the use of the word “*ubique*” and “*omnibus*.” In both instances there is a sense of climax (*gradatio*) involved. In the first instance, the name of Jesus not only extends everywhere and is believed everywhere but it has been given to everyone. In the second, the series begins with Jesus as equal and ends with Jesus as Lord and God. There is also a fine example of antithesis between kings and barbarians, linked with greater favour and lesser joy. Here attention could be drawn to the ellipsis of a verb. This is followed by a clause which acts as an *expolitio* by repeating the same idea in different words. Within this *expolitio* we may notice synonymy (*interpretatio*) with “*dignitatum*” and “*natalium*.” This antithesis and *expolitio* has a touch of irony about it, in that Christianity did not appeal to the ruling elite in time in which Tertullian wrote and that, in reality, the lower classes found more favour than did they.

Christi autem nomen ubique porrigitur, ubique creditur, ab omnibus gentibus supra enumeratis colitur, ubique regnat, ubique adoratur. Omnibus ubique tribuitur aequaliter; non regis apud illum maior gratia, non barbari alicuius inferior laetitia; non dignitatum vel natalium cuiusquam

¹³¹ G. D. Dunn, “The Universal Spread,” Appendix C.

*discreta merita; omnibus aequalis, omnibus rex, omnibus iudex, omnibus dominus et deus est.*¹³²

There are a couple of examples of antistrophe: “*in ipso et per ipsum*” (7.1); “... *suspensus in ligno... suspenderetur in ligno*” (10.3); “*pariter osensum est haec illum propter mortem consecuturum, post mortem, utique per resurrectionem, consecuturum*” (10.16);¹³³ “*iam venisse Christum... iam venisse Christum*” (13.1);¹³⁴ “*in Bethleem?... in Bethleem?*” (13.7); and “*simul cum duce. Quo duce?*” (13.9).

We find one example of interlacement (6.3 - “*si iam venit... si necdum venit*”), but none of epanalepsis, anadiplosis, antimetabole nor of reduplication (*conduplicatio*). While one would not expect to find many such examples in a treatise of this size, their complete absence is a surprise.

I have mentioned already the presence of climax (*gradatio*) in 7.9. There is the same sense of climax with the *exempla* in 7.7-8; they are presented in historical order culminating with the Romans who were to be outdone by the name of the Christ himself. The reference to the Magi in 9.12 also provides the opportunity for the same *figura*:

... ipsos magos, qui cum illum cognovissent et muneribus honorassent et genu posito adorassent qua dominum et regem, sub testimonio indicis et ducis stellae, spolia sunt facti Samariae, id est

¹³² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.9: “But Christ’s Name is extending everywhere, believed everywhere, worshipped by all the above-enumerated nations, reigning everywhere, adored everywhere, conferred equally everywhere upon all. No king, with Him, finds greater favour, no barbarian lesser joy; no dignities or pedigrees enjoy distinctions of merit; to all He is equal, to all King, to all Judge, to all ‘God and Lord.’”

¹³³ Here I would follow TPNFR and *adv. Marc.* 3.19.9 and reject Kroymann’s alteration where “*consecutum*” is found instead of the second “*consecuturum*.” Rhetorical antistrophe is a strong argument in favour of this rejection.

¹³⁴ G. Säflund, *op. cit.*, p.165, noted that Tertullian had preference for “*einprägende Wiederholungen*,” but did not see it in terms of oratorical technique.

There are several examples of transplacement (*tractio*) or of polyptoton, a form of paronomasia,¹³⁶ where we find the repetition of the same word, although in different case endings or person to give the reader variety in style. At 6.2 we find “*praedicatam novam legem a prophetis praediximus.*” At 7.6-7, part of which has been considered already for its epanaphora, there is the frequent use of the verb “*regnare*” in various persons and the noun “*regnum*”:

*Quis enim omnibus gentibus regnare potuisset, nisi Christus, dei filius, qui omnibus regnaturus in aeternum nuntiabatur? Nam si Solomon regnavit, sed in finibus Iudaeae tantum; a Bersabee usque Dan termini regni eius signantur. Si vero Babyloniis et Parthis regnavit Darius, ulterius [ultra fines regni sui] non habuit potestatem [in omnibus gentibus]; si Aegyptiis Pharaon vel quisque ei in hereditario regno successit, illic tantum potitus est regni sui dominium; si Nabuccodonosor, cum suis regulis ab India usque Aethiopiam habuit regni sui terminos,*¹³⁷

Other examples of polyptoton occur in 8.1 where Tertullian cited Dan. 9:26 (“*et civitatem sanctam et sanctum exterminari*”), which is cited again in 8.6 and 8.8 as “*et civitatem et sanctum exterminabit*” and “*exterminari*” without the polyptoton; in 8.9-10 with “*quando hanc vidit visionem Daniel. Videamus igitur...*”; in 8.12 involving both “*propheta*” and “*prophetia*” and “*signaculum*” and “*signo*”; in 8.13 (“*ad adventum eius Christi, qui iam venit*”); and in 8.17:

¹³⁵ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 9.12: “... the magi themselves, who, on recognising Him, and honouring Him with gifts, and adoring Him on bended knee as Lord and King, on the evidence of the guiding star, became “the spoils of Samaria,” that is, of idolatry—by believing, namely, on Christ.”

¹³⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 4.14.20-21 described *tractio* as the frequent reintroduction of the same word and provided examples which seem indistinguishable from polyptoton, the third form of paronomasia, in which the same noun is used repeatedly though with changes of case (4.22.31). Quintilian mentioned polyptoton (*Inst.* 9.3.36-37) separately from paronomasia (*Inst.* 9.3.66-74). Under paronomasia he considered what Cornificius described as *tractio* (9.3.71). Keeping these two *figurae* distinct is not always possible even among classical rhetoricians.

¹³⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.6-7: “For who *could* have reigned over all nations but Christ, God’s Son, who was ever announced as destined to reign over all to eternity? For if Solomon “reigned,” why, it was within the confines of Judea merely: “from Beersheba unto Dan” the boundaries of his kingdom are marked. If, moreover, Darius “reigned” over the Babylonians and Parthians, he had not power over all nations; if Pharaoh, or whoever succeeded him in his hereditary kingdom, over the Egyptians, in that country merely did he possess his kingdom’s dominion; if Nebuchadnezzar with his petty kings, “from India unto Ethiopia” he had his kingdom’s boundaries;...”

*Nam et unctio illic exterminata est post <estorminationem uncti, hoc est post> passionem Christi: erat enim praedictum huius exterminium, [exterminari illic unctionem] sicut in psalmis erat prophetatum: exterminaverunt manus meas et pedes.*¹³⁸

In chapter 9 more examples of polyptoton may be observed: 9.12 with “*cuius tunc ‘virtutem’ Christus accepit, accipiendo insignia eius*”; in 9.24 with “*lucerna lucens*”; in 10.3 with “*ut qui in aliquo delicto iudicium mortis habuisset et moreretur suspensus in ligno*”; the use of “*praedicatio*” and “*praedicare*” in 10.5;¹³⁹ in 10.10 with “*ubi nomen domini Iesu dimicabat, dimicaturi quandoque adversus diabolum*”; in 13.2-3 with “*procedere*”; in 13.6-7 with the five appearances of the noun “*unctio*” and the single instance of the verb “*ungo*”;¹⁴⁰ and in 13.19 with the four appearances of “*lignum*.”

Yet, as mentioned previously in this section, we find no precise examples of antimetabole (*commutatio*), the antithesis created by a chiasmus not of grammatical structure but of exact words. This *figura* requires the most craft and skill and results in the most memorable aphorisms. Rather than say that this is evidence of an inferior composing hand it is just as possible that such *figurae*, which required the highest degree of ability, would be attended to last in composition, after the draft completion of a work. We have found only one example of antimetabole in the whole treatise, in chapter 1, which is that part of the work that would most probably have received whatever revision the work was going to get, prior to any other part. One cannot make a distinction between the “first half” and the “second half” of the treatise on this basis.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 8.17: “... for ‘the unction,’ too, was ‘exterminated’ in the place after the passion of Christ. For it had been predicted that the unction *should* be exterminated in that place; as in the Psalms it is prophesied, ‘They exterminated my hands and feet.’ The reference is to Ps. 21(22):17.

¹³⁹ We may note also the paronomasia in 10.4-5 with the use of “*praedicare*” and “*praedicere*.”

¹⁴⁰ We almost have an example of antistrophe here with “*nec unctio illic est... non illic est unctus...*”. G. Säflund, op. cit., p.165, saw this repetition as characteristic of Tertullian’s writing.

The final *figura* of repetition to consider is chiasmus. Reference has been made to one or two examples in the *confirmatio* already. Another instance occurs in 7.5:

*utpote ante quem omnium civitatum portae sunt apertae et cui nullae sunt clausae, abante quem ferreae serae sunt comminutae et valvae aereae sunt apertae.*¹⁴¹

This chiastic pattern relies upon understanding “*ferrae serae*” as a synecdoche for closed gates. The use of chiasmus here reinforces the antithesis that is created. Further, we make take “*et valvae aereae sunt apertae*” as an *expolitio* of “*sunt comminutae.*” There are two further examples of chiasmus in 9.3: “*credunt in Christum, ex quo in eum credunt*” and “*iam venisse illum, qui praedicabatur Emmanuel, quia quod significat Emmanuel venit*”; and another in 9.20:

*Sic bellipotens et armiger Christus et sic accipiet spolia non solius Samariae verum et omnium gentium. Agnosce et spolia figurata, cuius et arma allegorica didicisti...*¹⁴²

As part of an antithesis involving before and after we find chiasmus in 10.8 with “*a terra in caelum*” and “*de caelo in terram.*” In 10.12 we read: “*panem corpus suum appellans—cuius retro corpus in pane prophetes initiavit.*” Finally, in 10.14 there is a chiastic pattern involving death and the cross:

*ut ex hoc, quod non esset edita qualis mors, intellegatur per crucem evenisse, nec alii deputandam fuisse passionem crucis quam cuius mors praedicabatur.*¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.5: “... as of Him before whom the gates of all cities have been opened, and to whom none are closed, before whom iron bars have been crumbled, and brazen gates opened.”

¹⁴² Ibid., 9.20: “Thus mighty in war and weapon-bearing is Christ; thus will He “receive the spoils,” not of “Samaria” alone, but of all nations as well. Acknowledge that His “spoils” are figurative whose weapons you have learnt to be allegorical.”

¹⁴³ Ibid., 10.14: “... from the fact that the *nature* of the death had not been specified, it may be understood to have been effected by means of the *cross* and that the passion of the *cross* is not to be ascribed to any but Him whose *death* was constantly being predicted.”

Attention may be turned now to that group of *figurae* that produce a sense of balance in one's speech or written work. There is much evidence of parallelism in the treatise. At the beginning of the *confirmatio* we find parallel statements, based on the themes of the *refutatio*, which had been summarised in 6.1, concerning the expectation of the coming of the giver of the new law, the heir of the new covenant, the priest of the new sacrifice, and the purger of the new circumcision (6.2). This is followed by another parallelism, a repetition of the last one, except that this time each of the parallels consists of isocola of antithesis in which there is adjunction (*adiunctio*), which creates rhyme:

*... qui legem veterem compescat et novum testamentum statuat et nova sacrificia offerat et ceremonias antiquas reprimat et circumcisionem veterem cum suo sabbato compescat et novum regnum, quod non corrumpatur, adnuntiet.*¹⁴⁴

The antithesis is created by the comparison of “*nova*” with “*vetera*” or “*antiqua*.” One may also notice that the parallels and antithesis are not presented slavishly. The third parallel involves the second and third themes of the *refutatio* (circumcision and Sabbath) being considered together (and out of sequence when compared with the *refutatio*). The component parts of the antithesis within each parallel is presented with variety (synonymy): “*lex*” and “*testamentum*”; “*sacrificium*” and “*ceremonia*”; “*circumcisio* and *sabbato*” and “*regnum*.” The parallelism is repeated yet again in the next sentence:

*Nam etiam hic novae legis lator, sabbati spiritalis cultor, sacrificiorum aeternorum antistes, regni aeterni aeternus dominator quaerendum, an iam venerit necne...*¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 6.2b: “... to suppress the old law, and institute the new testament, and offer the new sacrifices, and repress the ancient ceremonies, and suppress the old circumcision together with its own sabbath, and announce the new kingdom which is not corruptible.”

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 6.3: “Inquire, I say, we must, whether this giver of the new law, observer of the spiritual sacrifices, eternal ruler of the eternal kingdom...”

We may notice the synonymy between “*sacerdos*” of 6.2 and “*antistes*” of 6.3. Several points may be made here. In 6.1 (and in the *refutatio* itself) the reference was to eternal Sabbaths, not spiritual ones and to spiritual sacrifices, not eternal ones. There is a degree of inaccurate summary here. Further, all reference to circumcision has now been replaced with reference to the kingdom. Each of these parallels has an example of anastrophe (*perversio*), a form of hyperbaton (*circumitio*), one of the tropes, with the noun at the end of the phrase, and the verb placed at the end (*adiunctio*).

In a series of *exempla* we find more parallel statements in 7.4 detailing those peoples who had come to know and believe in the Christ. Tertullian invited his opponents, in an effort for them to prove that the Christ had not come, to show that the kinds of things which would stop when the Christ appeared were still occurring. A brief series of two such events (prophecy and miracles) is presented in 8.13. There is another instance in 10.10, where comment is made about how Moses ought to have prayed during the battle with Amalek: “*et manibus caedentibus pectus et facie humi volutante orationem commendare debuisse*” In 13.14 we find: “*cum terra quoque contremuit et sol in media die tenebricavit et velum templi scissum est et monumenta dirupta sunt?*”¹⁴⁶ The final example of parallelism is at 14.9 in the discussion of the scapegoat: “*unus autem eorum circumdatus coccino, maledictus et consputatus et convulsus et compunctus...*” This is then repeated in reference to the passion of Jesus.

Antithesis is at the very heart of the argument of this treatise; Jews and Christians

¹⁴⁶ G. Säflund, op. cit., pp.165-166, indicated a number of instances in chapter 13 where he detected parallels arising out of rhyming isocola, viz., 13.1 (with “*praedicabatur*” and “*nuntiabatur*”); 13.9 (with “*legimus*” and “*recognoscimus*”); 13.10 (with “*deberet*” and “*haberet*”); 13.11 (with “*exterminantur*” and “*suspenditur*” and with “*irrigata*” and “*fundata*” and “*plasmatus est*” and “*natus est*”); 13.15 (with “*immoratur*” and “*commorabatur*”); 13.17 (with “*sacramentum*” and “*celebratum*”); 13.20 (with “*lapidaverunt*”, “*fugaverunt*”, “*tradiderunt*” and “*possunt*”); and 13.22 (with “*locutus est*” and “*sublatum est*”).

disagreed about the interpretation of how Scriptural prophecy had been fulfilled. This antithesis is characteristic not only of the *inventio* of argument but of the *elocutio* of writing as well. This can be illustrated by a number of examples. Some have been mentioned already in the preceding pages of this dissertation. In 7.6, as part of the larger argument contrasting the universal spread of Christianity with the boundary limitations of human empires, we find a contrast between what happens to the hearts of individuals held in the power of the devil and those in the power of the Christ: “*quod praecordia singulorum variis modis a diabolo obsessa fide Christi sint reserata.*” When discussing and interpreting Dt. 33:17 in 10.7 we find the author making comment on the two characteristics of the Christ: as a fierce judge to some and as a gentle saviour to others. The Christian belief in the death and resurrection of Jesus provided a moment of antithesis between Jesus going into the tomb dead and Jesus coming out of the tomb resurrected (10.16). The idea of the birth of Jesus as a new creation provided antithesis between the “*tunc*” and “*nunc*” of the first and second creations:

... *ex qua homo tunc primum plasmatus est et ex qua nunc Christus secundum carnem ex virgine natus est...*¹⁴⁷

The metaphorical contrast between the thirsting heathens and Christians revived by the baptismal waters of the cross of the Christ (and the fact that this alleviated the pagan “thirst”—their lack of the divine word—is mentioned parenthetically) is presented in 13.12 (with a near example of antistrophe involving the verb *revivesco*). Finally, the two advents of the Christ in chapter 14 provided some opportunity for antithesis: between the first coming in ignobility and the second in sublimity (14.3); between the sordid garments of the first coming and the festal garments of the second coming (14.7); and between the two goats of Leviticus 16 (14.9).

¹⁴⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 13.11: “... out of which man was of yore first formed, out of which now Christ through the flesh has been born of the virgin...”

The next group of *figurae* to consider are those of inversion of words. We have noted already the anastrophe that occurs in 6.2-3. In 7.9 the placement of “*ab omnibus gentibus supra enumeratis colitur*” in the midst of the epanaphora breaks that pattern somewhat, but it also keeps it from being dull and predictable.

There are many examples of parenthesis in the *confirmatio*, particularly with regard to the interpretation and identification of metaphors and allegories in the Scriptures. Säflund has drawn attention to this as being characteristic of both halves of the work.¹⁴⁸ The holy one to be anointed, who had been announced in Dan. 9:24, is identified as the Christ (here meaning Jesus as the Christ) in 8.12. The “power of Damascus,” mentioned in Is. 8:4, is interpreted to mean the gold offered to Jesus by the Magi (9.11) and the “spoils of Samaria” is understood to mean the worship offered by the Magi themselves (9.12). In this section of the treatise, the comments made about Is. 8:4 are long-winded and distracting. First, a distinction had to be made about why the prophecy from Is. 7:14 could be interpreted literally and that from Is. 8:4 could not (9.5-9). Then, in offering the interpretations just mentioned, there were several references to other pieces of Scripture to show that power meant gold and that Samaria meant idolatry (or worship): Zech. 14:14; Ps. 71(72):15, 10; and 1 Kgs. 13:32-34. In making this last point, there is a digression into the metaphorical application of town names to attributes (9.14-16), finishing with the identification of the “king of the Assyrians” in Is. 8:4 as the devil. The metaphorical interpretation of Christ as warrior concludes with the understanding that the sword of the warrior predicted in Ps. 44(45):3-4 is the word of God (9.16b-20). All in all, 9.5-20 is loose in its construction, pedantic in its explanations, repetitious in its examples, torturous in its clarity, and

¹⁴⁸ G. Säflund, op. cit., p.164: “Das wiederholte Abbrechen der Bibelzitate durch eingeschobene Erläuterungen, eingeleitet durch ‘id est’, ‘scilicet’, ‘videlicet’, ‘utique’, ‘indubitate’, ist für Tertullians exegetischen Stil bezeichnend. So finden sich auf einer Seite im ersten Kapitel von Adv. Iud. (Oe. II 702) nicht weniger als sechs ‘id est’, nebst einem ‘utique’. Im Verhältnis zu ‘id est’ hat ‘utique’ bei Tertullian eine deutlich polemische Spitze...”

complex in its arguments. Other than the flash of wit and sarcasm in 9.6, this section is dull and verbose, unlike Tertullian's usual style. Yet it still makes sense to me, as it did to Tränkle, to believe that this provided the basis for a revision which we find in *adversus Marcionem*, rather than the suggestion that someone took a perfectly sensible piece of writing in *adversus Marcionem* and inflated it with tedious repetition and addition.¹⁴⁹

At 9.22 there is a parenthetical reference to the “*nationes*” who were the second people. This had been the subject of the *narratio* and no further explanation was required. The “land flowing with milk and honey” (Ex. 3:8) was seen as the possession of eternal life, which cannot come from the Jewish law for it was Joshua not Moses who led the people into that land (9.22). Joshua is a prefiguring of Jesus. The circumcision that Joshua administered to the people (Josh. 5:2) was understood to represent the new law given by Jesus. The selling of Joseph into slavery by his brothers (Gen. 37:28) was a typological reference to Judas (10.6b). The bull of Gen. 49:6, mentioned as part of Jacob's curse on his sons Simeon and Levi, was understood to be Jesus (10.9). The metaphorical “*ex ore lionis*” of Ps. 21(22):22 was explained as a reference to death, and the reference in verse 17 to the piercing of hands and feet was seen as a typological reference to the crucifixion of Jesus (10.13). The “*adventus*” of the Christ was explained as the nativity of Jesus (11.10). The references in Is. 42:7 to blindness, captivity, and darkness were taken to be metaphors for sin and ignorance, and this was mentioned by way of parenthesis (12.2). Is. 33:17-18 refers to the king who shall be seen from afar and the terror in the people, and, as Tertullian cited this verse (13.4), he interrupted it three times to offer passing interpretations. Likewise with Jer. 2:10-13 (into which Amos 8:9 has been inserted); several times the text is interrupted so that an explanation of how it referred to the death of Jesus could be offered (13.13-15). Christ was

¹⁴⁹ H. Tränkle, op. cit., pp.liii-liv.

considered to be the fount of life on the basis of this piece of Scripture as well. The silence of Jesus when before Pilate (Mt. 27:13-14; Mk. 15:4-5; Lk. 23:9; and Jn. 19:9) was seen as being foretold in Is. 53:7, as was mentioned in passing (13.22). There is a brief note that Hos. 6:2 refers to the resurrection (13.23). The ending of God's favour upon Israel had been announced in Hos. 5:6-7, and in 13.25-26 we find brief typological interpretations of the fulfilment of those predictions in the time of Jesus. In the last chapter, the sordid clothes of Zech. 3:3 were seen as a prefiguring of the first coming of the Christ involving the indignity of suffering in the flesh (14.7) and the two goats of Lev. 16 were typological allegories for the two comings of the Christ (14.9).

There are other examples of metaphor, allegory and typology in the treatise, but these are mentioned here because of the parenthetical manner in which Tertullian explained them. Other metaphors and allegories will be mentioned with the rest of the tropes.

Of the *figurae* designed for omission, we find an example of ellipsis in 7.7 with the omission of "*regnavit*" after it had been used once with Darius. The same thing is to be found in 8.10 with the rulers who followed Darius. In 9.16 Tränkle noted the presence of ellipsis.¹⁵⁰ He has also pointed to asyndeton in 13.11.¹⁵¹

In terms of the other *figurae* which could be employed to create one's own style, we find examples of homoeoptoton throughout the *confirmatio*. Among some of the more obvious examples are: "*quoniam praedicatam novam legem*" (6.2); "*illam legem veterem cessasse quam*

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.82.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.104.

legem novam promissam” (6.2); “*et Sarmatarum et Dacorum et Germanorum et Scytharum et abditarum multarum gentium et provinciarum et insularum*” (7.4); “*ferreae serae sunt comminutae et valvae aereae sunt apertae*” (7.5); “*secundum actum suum*” (9.18); “*verum et omnium gentium*” (9.20); “*lignarium aliquem regem*” (10.11); “*dominum deum creatorem et Christum*” (12.1); “*ecclesiam, dei templum et civitatem sanctam et domum domini*” (13.25); and “*carnis passibilis et mortalis*” (14.7).

Quite a number of rhetorical questions (*ratiocinationes*) appear in the treatise: 7.3, 4 (twice), 5, 6, 8; 8.9, 12; 9.17 (twice); 10.10 (twice), 11, 12, 16; 13.2, 5, 7 (twice), 9, 13, 14, 19, 22, 23, 29; and 14.9. Sometimes an answer is provided and sometimes not.

There are some examples of elimination (*expeditio*), which one would expect to find in a work that it built upon antithesis. In the introduction to the *confirmatio* we find such an example (6.3-4). Tertullian set out the alternatives: either the giver of the new law had come (in which case service is to be given him) or he had not (in which he was to be awaited) but, given that the old law could not cease until the new lawgiver had come, he simply had to demonstrate that the old law had ceased to prove one of the options wrong. There is an unnecessary repeat of this in 7.1. Throughout the last three chapters we find instances where an alternative is offered but, upon examination, it is an impossible one (12.2; 13.3-5, 11, 29; and 14.10)

There are two instances where the author used paralipsis (*occultatio*) in the entire treatise: in 7.2 we find the statement that nothing further need be said about the Jewish expectation of the coming of a messiah and yet the author continued with an extract from Is. 45:1. In 10.6b we find the statement that Joseph, the son of Jacob, could be compared to Christ on a number of points

but the comparison was here going to be limited to one, viz., the persecution at the hands of his brothers. Yet, in 10.7, we find yet a further comparison.

Hypophora occurs in 8.1, where Tertullian invited his Jewish opponents to disagree with him by stating that they would agree with the Christian statement through their own powers of observation; in 8.13, where he asked his opponents to put forward something positive of their own to prove that there still was prophecy after Jesus; in 10.11, where the Jews were invited to offer their understanding of what God reigning from a tree meant; in 12.1-2, with “*si audes negare*” and “*nec poterit... vindicare*”; in 13.5, where the first question is left unanswered indicating that it is more of a invitation for the opponents to find an alternative than a rhetorical question waiting to be answered; in 13.20, with a offer similar to the one in 8.1 of implicitly inviting them to deny something by stating that they cannot deny it; and in 13.29, where the author ironically allowed the Jews to argue their case if they can reverse their military and political oppression.

The use of synonymy (*interpretatio*) seems to be a characteristic of the *elocutio* of the author of this treatise. Mention has been made *supra* to some examples in 6.2-3 with reference to the parallelism that occupies the opening of the *confirmatio*. In this section attention may be drawn to “*ostendere et probare*” as well. A further example occurs in 7.3: “*quem exaudierunt omnes gentes, id est: cui omnes gentes crediderunt.*” At 7.8 we find “*transgredi non sinuntur... inclusae sunt... obsidentur.*” There are several examples in chapter 9: “*superstitionis [et maledictionis]*” (9.15); “*compungentes et transfigentes*” (9.19); and “*bellipotens et armiger*” (9.20). There is the replacement of “*serpens*” with “*colubris*” in 10.10 and of “*inriserit*” with “*respuerit*” in 10.14. The final examples are: “*nondum pluviis rigata nec imbribus fecundata*”

(13.11); “*bibendo... potantes*” (13.12); “*non lapis offensionis nec petra scandalī*” (also involving metaphor) (14.3); and “*comminuet et conteret*” (14.3).

There are only a few examples of paronomasia in the *confirmatio*. In 9.3 we find the expression “*solum sonum*”; in 9.6 there is the sarcastic statement about Jewish infants “*qui ante norint lanciare quam lancianare*”; in 10.3 there is the use of “*delictum*” and “*maledico*”; and in 11.12 the use of “*invenio*” and “*venio*.” As this is an extremely witty form of *elocutio*, one would not expect to see many examples of its use, nor would one want to see too much.

Of the tropes, we find hyperbole in 7.3, with the claim that “*omnes gentes*” had heard and believed in God’s Son. This is continued in 7.5, with the suggestion that no city in the world had been able to keep Christianity out. The statement that “*Britannorum inaccessa Romanis loca*” (7.4) may show Tertullian’s limited knowledge of events away from North Africa. The boast that the name of the Christ is “*ubique adoratur*” is obviously hyperbole. The use of “*constat*” in 9.22 to describe the Jewish position on the belief of the Son of God being the one who addressed Moses in the burning bush seems to be highly exaggerated if not a clear-cut untruth.

Perhaps one could suggest the presence of catechresis (*abusio*) or mixed metaphor in 7.1 where Tertullian stated that Jesus was the one “*quem prophetae venturum canebant*.” There is a touch of irony in the statements that the Germans were shut in by the Romans, and paradox in the observation that the Romans’ fortifications had brought a halt to their expansionist policies (7.8). “*Itaque omnis synagoga filiorum Israel*” in 8.18 and “*filiī Israēl*” in 13.1 have the appearance of metonymy, as does “*orbem*” in 9.15 and 12.2 and “*lanciare*” in 9.6. The only example of periphrasis (*circumitio*) in the *confirmatio* appears to be “*divinae prophetarum*

volumina” in 13.5.

Besides the Scriptural metaphors which we find explained in parenthetical comments, we find a number of others in the *confirmatio*. In 7.1, Tertullian wrote that he was going to plant his foot on the issue of whether the Christ had come yet or was still to be awaited (“*Igitur in isto gradum conseramus*”). The name of Christ is said to reign throughout the world.¹⁵² A little further along Tertullian wrote of the devil blockading the hearts of people, whose hearts were unbarred by the Christ (7.6). In 7.7, Alexander the Great was described as holding Asia (“*tenuit*”). In one of the only real instances of personal invective, polemic or sarcasm in the whole treatise in 9.6 (to which attention has been drawn already earlier in this section), the personal attack is heightened by the use of metaphor: “*dehinc pannis armati et butyro stipendiati.*” This seems like the Tertullian who is so familiar to us from his other adversarial treatises. The Christ was said to be “*ensem sermonis dei praecingi figurate*” (9.19), which perhaps has links with Heb. 4:12 and Rev. 1:16; 2:12. The Gentiles were described as momentarily glowing (“*momentaneum ardorem*”) and the light of the Christ was said to be shining more (9.28 - a reference to Is. 60:1-3). The devil is named as serpent in 10.10. This has an obvious Scriptural base and no further explanation was deemed necessary. So too with the reference to Christ’s body as bread (10.12) and the hardness of hearts (10.14), no elaboration was offered. Human error was referred to as a vortex (12.1). In 13.15 not only is the Christ described as the fount of the water of life but also as the true temple of God. In chapter 14, the Scriptural image of rock as stumbling block and as corner stone is applied to Jesus (14.3).

Among the *figura sententiae* we find accumulation (*frequentatio*) of the ideas of chapter

¹⁵² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.5: “*In quibus omnibus locis Christi nomen, qui iam venit, regnat...*” This is following PNFR.

8 in 8.12. There is a sense of dialogue in 9.1-2 and 9.21. Perhaps one could describe some of the digressive passages of the *confirmatio* as dwelling on the point (*commoratio*) (7.3 - 8.1a; 9.11-16a; 10.8b-10a; and 13.10b-23). Particularly with 9.11-16a, given that the author had already spent some time on the issue of the messiah taking the power of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria (9.4-10), it seems that, rather than seeing this as a particularly strong argument that was worth spending considerable time over, it is more appropriate to see this as tedious, overblown, long-winded, and in need of some serious pruning. There is a brief illustration of understatement (*diminutio*) in 9.29 when the clause “*nisi fallor*” is added. The description of how Moses ought to have been at prayer is a fine example of portrayal (*effictio*) (10.10).¹⁵³

6. *Peroratio*

The unsatisfactory nature of this desultory and desiccated appendage has been mentioned already in previous chapters. There is nothing with regard to its *elocutio* that would redeem it from this judgement. Quintilian had advised that in a *peroratio* one ought to either summarise the facts or appeal to the emotions of the listener (reader). If one chose to summarise then one needed to avoid dry and tiresome repetition of points made already by appropriate insights and a good use of *figurae*.¹⁵⁴

We see a metaphorical description of the Gospel as rays illuminating the world (14.12).

There is a sense of *eliminatio* in 14.14 and we do find the isocola with rhyme that is characteristic of Tertullian (“*Haec aut prophetata nega, cum coram videntur, aut adimpleta, cum*

¹⁵³ Ibid., 10.10: “... *genibus positus et manibus caedentibus pectus et facie humi volutante orationem commendare debuisse...*”

¹⁵⁴ Quint. *Inst.* 6.pr.2.

leguntur”). Yet I remain convinced that this was found in *adversus Marcionem* and attached here as a substitute ending for a treatise whose author never provided it with one of its own.

Conclusion

If we accept the research of scholars like Säflund and Tränkle, that *adversus Iudaeos* was composed prior to *adversus Marcionem*, we may reach a number of conclusions as a result of the analysis of Tertullian’s *elocutio* in *adversus Iudaeos*. It would seem beyond doubt that the author of this treatise was familiar with oratorical technique and rhetorical theory. While any writer or speaker could decide to start successive sentences with the same word because it seemed to heighten the drama and intensity of what they were communicating without ever having studied any rhetoric, through the accident of natural ability as it were, it would seem, given the sheer number and variety of *figurae* in this treatise, that the author of this treatise knew the theory.

There are a number of words which appear in *adversus Iudaeos* which do not appear elsewhere in the corpus of Tertullian’s writings. For several reasons this does not suggest that another person was responsible for this treatise. This phenomenon occurs in both parts of the treatise and so, if one wanted to dismiss the second half of the work as someone else’s composition on this basis one would have to say the same of the first half as well. Further, some of these words may derive from Old Latin versions of the Scriptures, and given that some of those passages were not the subject of consideration anywhere else in Tertullian’s writings it is not surprising to find them used only here. Given that the subject matter of this treatise was not dealt with extensively elsewhere (except for *adversus Marcionem*) it is to be expected that one would find some almost specialised words used here that do not occur elsewhere in Tertullian’s works.

It is interesting to note that, in the second half of the treatise, the greatest occurrence of hapax legomena are in those passages which have no parallel in *adversus Marcionem*.

The most typical characteristic of the *elocutio* of this treatise is with the antithetical presentation of Scriptural interpretation. The exegetical understanding of the Jews was contrasted with that of the Christians in order to show Jewish misunderstanding. In this we find some examples of Tertullian engaging in allegorical interpretation (in the sense of examining a text for a deeper, even hidden, meaning that goes beyond the literal), but even more typically we find him engaging in typological interpretation (in the sense of seeing the future announced in the present).¹⁵⁵ On this basis we may conclude that the interest of Tertullian lay with refuting Jewish interpretation of the Scripture rather than with refuting Jews themselves. Except for the sarcasm in 9.6 this treatise can not be characterised as being vitriolic or vilificatory. The impression created in the opening lines of the treatise, that this would be a work of substance rather than of slander, seems to have been carried to the end. Appeals to the emotions play almost no part in this work. As I have stated earlier, rather than seeing this approach as a sign of the issue of Christians and Jews not being relevant to Christians in Carthage in the late second century, I believe that Tertullian's care in not succumbing to satire (which, as we know from his other treatises, he could do so easily) may be taken as an indication of the importance and intensity of the debate between Jews and Christians. Here may be an example of Tertullian believing that the "facts" could be more effective than personal attack.

Some passages in our treatise seem more finished or more fashioned than others. Attention has been drawn already to passages such as 1.5; 3.10; 6.1-2; 7.6-7, 9; and 9.23 in

¹⁵⁵ See T. P. O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p.148, for comment about such a distinction.

particular. Other passages (9.11-16a and 13.8-23 being the most glaring) seem laboured, long-winded, lethargic, and in need of pruning and polish. Quintilian had warned orators against long sentences that become obscure through too much hyperbaton and parenthesis, and against superfluous words.¹⁵⁶ Tertullian's writing exhibits a curious blend of rambling sentences and terse ideas. This treatise is no exception, at least with regard to his loquacity. This incomplete nature of the tract makes it difficult to assess in which of the three *genera dicendi* one would classify this tract. Perhaps, particularly given Tertullian's opening comments about how, in comparison with the earlier debate, this work would be calm and rational, one could suggest that this was a work intended to be in the plain style.¹⁵⁷ One would have to omit passages like 9.11-16a and 13.8-23 from consideration because they are in such need of revision that drawing conclusions from them about Tertullian's style seems a risky business. Cicero claimed that the plain style ought to have some vigour about it, to have no deliberate rhythm, to be loose but not rambling, not to be too smooth, not to have obvious ornament except some metaphor, and to have clear, simple and everyday language (Cic. *Orat.* 23.75 - 25.86). We have noted the absence or limited use of some of the more elaborate *figurae* and the fact that much of the metaphor exists because Tertullian was explaining and interpreting it as found in the Scriptures.

My conclusion is that there is enough in this treatise that is consistent with Tertullian's *elocutio* to decide that *adversus Iudaeos* is his. Because it is a work written early in his literary career, when, one must presume, the influence of his oratorical training would have been at its most dominant, one must conclude further not that its author lacked experience or ability with

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 8.2.14-17. In this last section we find this insightful comment: "... *dum communem loquendi morem reformidant, ducti specie nitoris circumeunt omnia copiosa loquacitate, eo quod dicere nolunt ipsa...*"

¹⁵⁷ I have Cicero's comments in *Orat.* 28.99 in mind: "*Ille enim summissus, quod acute et veteratorie dicit, sapiens iam, medius suavis, hic autem copiosissimus, si nihil est aliud, vix satis sanus videri solet.*"

regard to *elocutio* but that its author did not spend enough time and effort on drafting. *Adversus Iudaeos* reads like many student essays: desperately in need of major overhaul in order to salvage the few decent insights that seem likely to drown in a sea of indifferent prose.

CONCLUSION

... nihil est enim simul et inventum et perfectum...

Cicero, *Brutus*, 18.71.

THE purpose of this conclusion is twofold. I would like to summarise my findings from the rhetorical analysis of *adversus Iudaeos* and I would like to compare my findings with the insights of other scholars.

This is the first time that this treatise has been examined from a rhetorical perspective. It is the first full-length treatment of the text in English and one of the few in any language that has been undertaken. The evidence that has been extracted from the work supports the arguments advanced by scholars such as Tränkle, Säflund, Aziza, and Fredouille that *adversus Iudaeos* is an authentic work by Tertullian.

Maintaining a rhetorical perspective enables the modern reader to keep in mind that this work has something of the nature of a pamphlet about it. The author was putting forward a point of view and wanted to do so in a persuasive and convincing manner. As with all debate and argument, orators do not try to be objective. They try to win their case. Supposition and conjecture can be given the appearance of fact. Facts that are helpful are included, those that are not are excluded or explained away. Facts are arranged in a particular order to be at their most compelling and are presented in the best possible light. This is true not only of *adversus Iudaeos*

but of scholarly literature in general. Anyone who presents a thesis is engaged in the art of persuasion.

Robert Sider has shown that Tertullian was well versed in this art. It is not surprising that he was. Anyone in this age who had a good education had spent many an hour mastering the discipline. Rhetorical theory and oratorical practice must be considered to be a major influence on the composition of all Christian literature in antiquity written by those who had any formal Graeco-Roman education. An appreciation of rhetoric helps put the phoenix-like quest for objectivity into a more realistic perspective. In reading, one never has access to undiluted facts but only to someone's interpretation, presentation, or even obfuscation of the facts. Rhetoric is a crucial hermeneutical tool for the Patristics scholar. A good grounding in classical rhetoric means that, for example, Cyprian's *de Unitate* or Augustine's *de Trinitate* will not be read as scientific reports or simply as dogmatic statements, but as oratorical arguments.

The oratory of Tertullian's age was predominantly sophistic: concerned with matters of style and entertainment where historical themes and fictitious settings were all the rage. Yet the Christian literature of that century which shows the influence of rhetoric does not have this sense. Christians needed all their skills to exist, not entertain. Even though persecution was sporadic, hostility towards Christians on social and intellectual grounds was always in fashion. There is a certain rawness and immediacy with Christian oratory. Tertullian is a fine example of the way in which oratory was used for very practical reasons by early Christians. I think it unjust to characterise Tertullian's oratory as sophistic.

Whom did Tertullian seek to persuade with this treatise? The first thing to notice is that,

unlike Justin's *Dialogus*, which purports to be the record of a conversation with a Jew, and was therefore designed, ostensibly at least, or directed at or intended for Jews, *adversus Iudaeos* is not a record of a conversation. It claims to be a record of what should have been said during that earlier encounter but which was not, owing to the breakdown in communication that resulted from some heated exchanges. This becomes the first question that may be raised: did this precipitatory exchange actually take place? I am inclined to believe that it may have, although it was something of a standard oratorical technique of declaimers to create a fictitious setting or an imagined audience. The important point is that, whether or not that earlier encounter was a literary fiction, it does not mean that we can conclude that Tertullian never met Jews in debate or that there was no contact between Christians and Jews in Carthage at the end of the second century. Therefore, the question about whether this earlier encounter took place is a different one from the question about whether any encounters at all took place. One does not lead necessarily to the other.

An analysis of the persons addressed in the treatise reveals, I believe, evidence not of an incompetent imitator, who attempted to complete the treatise but could not maintain consistency of person, but evidence instead of the orator in Tertullian coming to the fore. My conclusion is that Tertullian imagined that he was before the gathering he described in the opening sentences of the work and that, instead of its degenerating into a cacophony of verbal abuse, he was able to present all his arguments. That imagined gathering (leaving aside, as I said, the issue of whether it was in any way a real gathering) consisted of Jews (both ethnic and proselyte), Christians, and possibly interested supporters or curious on-lookers. Most of the time the Jews in that audience were addressed in the third person, which leads to the conclusion that Tertullian was imagining himself talking about them to the Christians rather than talking to them, for only

the Christians were being permitted by Tertullian to have a casting vote on his persuasiveness. To preserve an atmosphere of learned disputation rather than personal acrimony, he addressed his opponents in the third person, but sometimes, to heighten the emotional intensity, as speakers do, he addressed them directly.

While this deals with questions of the imagined readership, we still need to ask about the intended readership. I believe that the work was intended for Christians in order to supply them with debating ammunition for their own encounters with Jews in Carthage, for I am convinced that contact between Jews and Christians had continued in Carthage until Tertullian's day. The fact that much of the evidence from the Scriptures used by Tertullian was also used by Irenaeus and Justin (even though there is considerable difference in the arguments constructed from that evidence, if one pays close attention to detail) could well mean that the same issues kept on arising in different localities at different times and that the Christian response needed to be repeated constantly. I believe also that the work could have been aimed at Jews as well as Christians. At its heart the treatise is about offering the correct interpretation of passages from the Hebrew Scriptures and so, either directly or indirectly, Tertullian wanted Jews to realise where they were going wrong in their understanding. As I argued in chapter two, oratory enabled a speaker (or writer) to accomplish several tasks at the same time.

The second question that this analysis sought to answer through its rhetorical investigation concerned the question of authorship. The most solid or most obvious information with regard to this matter came from a consideration of whether this work shows a rhetorical structure. One can discern such a structure in *adversus Iudaeos* and a fairly standard one at that. The work contains an *exordium* (1.1-3a), concerning the history of events that led to the writing of the text,

a *narratio* (1.3b-7), which recorded God's promise to replace the Jews as God's people with the Christians (as Tertullian read it in the prophecy contained in Gen. 25:23), and a *partitio* (1.8 - 2.1a), in which Tertullian stated his position that the Christians indeed had replaced the Jews as God's people and his intention to examine all the relevant matters methodically. The major body of an oratorical presentation followed: *refutatio* (2.1b - 6.1) first and then *confirmatio* (6.2 - 14.10). This inversion of the usual order was not altogether unusual and it enabled Tertullian to present his two main rhetorical elements of structure in a chronological order: the *refutatio* argued that God had made promises to replace the Jews by showing that the position of the Jews (that God had made no such promise) was false, through quoting and interpreting passages from the Hebrew Scriptures, and the *confirmatio* argued that those promises had been fulfilled in Jesus. The *refutatio* was divided into consideration of the law (2.1b-10), circumcision (2.11 - 3.6), the Sabbath (4.1-11), and sacrifices (5.1-7). There is a small passage (3.7-13) on the promises of a new law and new circumcision that would make more sense if they were integrated with their respective sections. At the beginning of the *confirmatio* Tertullian announced that there were two questions to be considered: whether there was any prophecy about the coming of a new law-giver and whether that promised new law-giver had arrived. Only the second question was addressed, because to answer that question in the affirmative meant answering the first one positively as well. In 7.1 we find a statement about what four areas Tertullian intended to cover, which was revised in 8.2 into three areas: the time when the Christ would come (8.3-18), the signs and operations of the Christ (9.1 - 10.19), and subsequent events (11.1 - 14.10). In between 7.1 and 8.2 is a passage about the universal spread of Christianity, which makes more sense when it is repeated as one of the subsequent events. There really is no *peroratio* to the treatise. 14.11-14 is a repetition of 11.10a-11 where Tertullian had begun to draw his arguments to a conclusion before realising that there still were more arguments to present. Not only is 14.11-14 a repetition,

but, on the basis of a misinterpretation of Tertullian's interpretation of Ps.2:7, I would conclude that it is an interpolation by a foreign hand.

Determining a rhetorical structure for the entire treatise leads to several conclusions. The first is that finding a *partitio* enables one to discover the work's focus. The second is that whoever wrote the first half of the treatise (up to the end of chapter 8) intended to write what is found in the second half because of the editorial comments about structure which are found in those early chapters. The third conclusion is that this work remains in an incomplete state. More time spent on it would have seen a number of revisions: the incorporation of 3.7-13 into chapters 2 and 3; the elimination of the *digressio* in 7.2 - 8.1a; the elimination of the premature *peroratio* in 11.10-11a; the relocation of 12.1-2 to before 11.1 (enabling 11.1-9 and 13.1-29 to flow together smoothly); the elimination of some meandering in chapter 13 that obscures the argument; and the addition of a proper *peroratio*.

To the objection of those who point to much of the second half of *adversus Iudaeos* being found in book 3 of *adversus Marcionem* (which, for them, indicates plagiarism) I would respond, as have Tränkle, Säflund, and Barnes, that there is no reason not to consider that, when it came time to writing his work against Marcion, Tertullian himself found it convenient to re-use material he had written earlier.

In terms of rhetorical *inventio*, I have suggested that this treatise should be seen as a *controversia* not because it dealt with a fantastic theme but because of the way Tertullian expressed the *partitio* of the work. God is the defendant, and the argument between Tertullian and his Jewish opponents was over whether God had changed the covenant by abandoning the

Jews and reaching out to the Gentiles. Remembering that prosecutors accused people of wrongdoing, it is clear that Tertullian was not prosecuting God. However, and this is what gives the treatise its novelty and reveals its author's talent, in defending God, Tertullian did not argue that God was innocent because God had done nothing, but that God was "guilty" of doing something, and this is what made God innocent! Such a twist is more characteristic of the approach that could be taken in a *controversia* rather than in a formal forensic setting. In saying that *adversus Iudaeos* has characteristics of a *controversia*, though, I am not saying that, like contemporary declaimers, Tertullian chose a theme that was fictitious or bizarre, but one that was real and relevant to Christians of his time.

In this *controversia* the chief witness to be interrogated was the Hebrew Scriptures. Tertullian argued that a correct understanding of the Scriptures would reveal whether God had promised to do what Tertullian "accused" God of intending and whether God had fulfilled that promise. Throughout the chapter on *inventio* I highlighted those instances when Tertullian offered a literal interpretation of a Scriptural passage, other instances when he offered a typological interpretation, and some when his approach was allegorical. The point to be made is the way in which Tertullian adopted a particular method, depending on what was most helpful for winning his point. He could take an allegorical approach when his opponent offered a literal interpretation and he could always find a piece of Scripture to challenge those offered against him.

Although many of the passages of the Scriptures about which Tertullian proffered comment had been used in earlier generations by the author of *Barnabas*, Irenaeus, or Justin, reinforcing the belief that they all made use of *testimonia*, it is to be noted that the way in which

Tertullian used that piece of evidence to construct an argument was often original. When one pays close attention not just to the fact that a certain piece of Scripture was used frequently in early Christian literature but to the fact that authors did make different arguments from the same pieces of evidence, it indicates that statements that anti-Jewish literature was repetitive are too sweeping and generalised. Attention to detail reveals the originality of Tertullian's work.

I have been able to illustrate how Tertullian made use of the full range of rhetorical *topoi* or *loci communes* in the course of the treatise: degree, priority, opposites, contraries, possibility, time, subsequent events, etc. As well I have drawn attention to weaknesses in his argument, where a competent opponent could have challenged the logic of the conclusions Tertullian was drawing. We can see the full force of oratorical skill involved in drawing attention away from those areas of weakness.

Throughout *adversus Iudaeos* much of the heated and personal abuse that is often associated with polemic is absent. Only at 9.6 and 13.29 do we find Tertullian playing the man, not the ball, as it were.

The arguments develop in such a way that they support the structural comments made in chapters 6 and 8, tending to reinforce the view that one author was responsible for the entire treatise. However, I have drawn attention to sections where Tertullian seems to have got carried away with himself and lost sight of the point at issue. Much of 9.6-16a and 13.8-23 could be offered as illustrations. We can see why Tertullian included these arguments where they are, and they do support his overall position but, by arguing them at great length, the balance and feel for what is essential in the treatise is somewhat lost.

In terms of *elocutio* I have offered a tentative conclusion that this treatise was written in the plain style, a style that disguised its craft under the veil of simplicity. This would be in accord with his stated desire not to write in such a way as to inflame emotions. There is almost the complete absence of wit and satire. Other than his long-winded passages that are too unrefined even for this style, much of the time this treatise avoided excessive use of ornamental *figurae*, and maintained a clear and direct language, even though with proper words that would rarely be used elsewhere. The whole purpose of the treatise was to contrast Jewish and Christian understandings of the Scripture and so it is not at all surprising to find an antithetical style in the presentation of ideas. Much of Tertullian's own style of expression is derived from the passages of the Scriptures upon which he commented. Despite the plainness of style there are enough examples of a subtle and careful use of rhetorical *elocutio* to confirm that the author of *adversus Iudaeos* was thoroughly familiar with its precepts.

The second task to accomplish in this conclusion is to see how my findings compare with what others have said, not only with regard to this treatise in particular but with regard to the broader issue of Jewish-Christian relationships during the first Christian centuries. I believe that placing my findings in the wider context of the genre of Christian anti-Judaic literature will make an important contribution to the question of how long Jews and Christians remained in contact with each other in late antiquity. I believe also that my research challenges some of the methodology and presumptions of those who enter this debate.

I should like to return to my comments in chapter two about the readership and purpose of the treatise. From a rhetorical reading of the text itself I offered the suggestion that the work seems to have a mixed gathering of Jews and Christians (the same gathering which earlier had

attended the debate) as its imagined readership, and that the intended readers were primarily Christians, though Jews were not excluded entirely. If that be the readership then the work's purpose was primarily to convince Christians that they had replaced the Jews as God's people and that the Jewish interpretation of the Scriptures was wrong. I have suggested that Tertullian wrote this treatise because there was a need to rectify false understandings of the relationship of the Jews with God and to refute false understandings of the meanings contained in the Scriptures. To me this suggests that there was ongoing contact between Christians and Jews.

I promised in that earlier chapter to contrast my conclusions about readership and purpose with the insights of other scholars. This concluding chapter, after the rhetorical analysis of the treatise under investigation, is the appropriate place for that evaluation. We may begin with the comments of Williams earlier this century who, although he did not address the issue of readership explicitly, did make some comment about the purpose of the tract. He seemed to have accepted a mixed readership when he made comment on its purpose:

There was therefore sufficient reason for the *Adversus Judaeos* to be composed, both as a protection to Christians, and as a means of winning Jews.¹

Many of those who argue that the work was intended for Jews do so because they accept that Judaism and Christianity were engaged in a lively interaction at the time of Tertullian, while those who argue that the work was intended for Christians not Jews do so because they believe that the two had gone their separate ways by this time. This has been noted most recently by Stroumsa and Carleton Paget. The former writes:

¹ A. L. Williams, *op. cit.*, p.43. On p.52, though, he did admit that Tertullian's personal knowledge of contemporary Jews was inferior to that of Justin.

... I shall present the two main competing scholarly approaches to early Christian anti-Judaism. The first, which has been fashionable in the last generation, insists on the social dimensions of the conflict between Jews and Christians in the towns of the empire, while the second considers anti-Judaism as mainly belonging to the Christian discourse of self-definition.²

The latter expresses the question in similar fashion:

Did the Christian *Adversus Judaeos* tradition, and indeed Christian anti-Judaism in general, reflect genuine disputes between Christians and Jews, so that it could be understood either as a response to a threat posed by the Jewish community to the nascent church, or as an attempt to convert Jews to Christianity? Or, contrary to this thesis, was it literature which should be understood without any reference to an outside Jewish reality, and seen rather as the result of internal tendencies within Christian theology and polemic?³

The insight of Williams that the one work may be capable of accomplishing more than one task seems to have been lost, to a large degree, in the polemics of modern scholarship. What I would like to do is to summarise the arguments of these two schools of thought, as represented by some of their key advocates, before returning to the critical comments offered by Stroumsa and Carleton Paget and offering my own critical comments. The body of literature available on this topic is growing enormously and in a survey such as this I can hope only to touch briefly upon some of it.

Carleton Paget lists Juster, Krauss, Williams, Parkes, Blumenkranz, Simon, Wilken, Blanchetière, Horbury, de Lange, and Wilson as belonging to the first school.

In the writings of these scholars, and others, the vibrant character of the Jewish community in the ancient world has been emphasised, particularly in relation to the cities in which Christians lived (in this respect much has been made of archaeological evidence), and the view has been espoused

² Guy G. Stroumsa, "From Anti-Judaism to Antisemitism in Early Christianity?", in O. Limor and G. G. Stroumsa, op. cit., p.3.

³ J. Carleton Paget, "Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity," p.195.

that it would have been difficult for Christians with their interest in and reliance upon the Jewish scriptures, to avoid contact with Jews.⁴

Samuel Krauss, for example, considered the Jews to have continued to be a significant group in certain parts of the Mediterranean world until well into the fourth century and to have remained in competition with the Christians, even though Christians like Ephraem of Syria, the most passionate and polemical of Patristic writers, had little personal contact with Jews.⁵ The hostility was inflamed by the preferential treatment offered the Jews by the emperor Julian. He argued that there is every reason to believe in the reality of the contact between Justin and Trypho.⁶ In addition, Krauss noted that the disagreement between Jews and Christians centred on the exegesis of Scripture.⁷ No mention is made of Tertullian's treatise in his articles.

We may take Marcel Simon as the primary exponent of this point of view and hence devote more attention to his arguments.⁸ For him, the anti-Judaic literature⁹ only made sense as part of a significant and on-going interaction between Christians and Jews. Simon wanted to

⁴ Ibid., pp.196-197.

⁵ Samuel Krauss, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers, part 2," *JQR* 6 (1894), p.89.

⁶ Id., "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers, part 1," *JQR* 5 (1893), pp.123-125.

⁷ Ibid., p.129.

⁸ Cf. D. P. Efroymsen, "Tertullian's Anti-Jewish Rhetoric," p.25, who puts Simon and Ruether together. See G. N. Stanton, "Aspects of Early Christian-Jewish Polemic and Apologetic," *NTS* 31 (1985), p.377.

⁹ I am aware that throughout this dissertation I have not defined what I mean by the term anti-Judaism and anti-Judaic. It has not been an issue until this point. Like many scholars I see a difference between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, reserving the former term to a theological and religious dimension and the latter to a racial and ethnic dimension. See Craig A. Evans, "Faith and Polemic: The New Testament and First-century Judaism," in *Anti-Semitism and Early Christianity: Issues of Polemic and Faith*, ed. Craig A. Evans and Donald A. Hagner (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), p.1. Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p.3, and Gavin Langmuir, "Anti-Judaism as the Necessary Preparation for Anti-Semitism," *Viator* 2 (1971), pp.383-389, argue that anti-Judaism always finds social expression in anti-Semitism. J. G. Gager, op. cit., would tend to support their assertions.

answer the question about the purpose of anti-Judaic literature being written and to do so not asserting unquestioningly, as he believed Williams had done, that such literature reflected real controversies nor asserting the opposite, as he believed Harnack had done, that the writings “do not contain any real answer to objections actually raised by Jews.”¹⁰ Simon responded by raising a number of pertinent questions which continue to remain relevant to this debate:

How could Christians even conceive the idea of directing these treatises against the Jews if they had not on some occasions had experience of attacks from that quarter? If indeed they had only pagan objectors in mind, why attempt to counter them in this curiously roundabout way?¹¹

Simon drew attention to the fact that the arguments in this genre of literature derived from the Scriptures, that it should not be surprising that the same Scriptural passages and interpretations could be used against Jews, pagans and heretics alike,¹² and that just because parts of Tertullian’s *adversus Iudaeos* were reused without much modification in his *adversus Marcionem* one should not reach the conclusion that the opponent in *adversus Iudaeos* was really pagan. Given the greater use of Scripture in treatises designed ostensibly for Jews than in those explicitly directed to pagans, perhaps one should accept that the Jews were the intended recipients.¹³ Simon responded also to Harnack’s point that in the dialogues the Jew seems to be a conventional and literary character by noting that dialogues represent only a small part of this anti-Judaic genre and that, even if the character is the construct of the author to some degree, real encounters may still

¹⁰ M. Simon, op. cit., p.137.

¹¹ Ibid., p.138.

¹² Ibid., p.145: “If particular methods of argument and proof, particular themes and ideas remain constant throughout the series of writings, this lack of variation may either be a sign of the slavish dependence of each treatise on its forebears, or equally readily be explained by the simple persistence of the same objections and the same methods of attack on the part of the adversary.”

¹³ Ibid., p.139.

underlie the literary trappings.

Even allowing the maximum influence in the writing of these polemical works to convention and artifice, it still has to be explained why anti-Jewish writing of this kind was produced uninterruptedly to the end of the middle ages. Do men rage so persistently against a corpse? Or are they such slaves to habit that they will go on producing a type of literature that has lost, centuries earlier, its justification and purpose?¹⁴

If that says something about Simon's position with regard to the reality of the interaction that lay behind the texts, one has to ask about the purpose of this literature. He noted that Hulen's assessment that this genre could be classified according to which of three purposes a work fulfilled: expository, argumentative, and denunciatory,¹⁵ seemed too rigid and artificial. A work like Justin's *Dialogus* appears to be just as much expository as it is argumentative.¹⁶ I have made the same statement from a rhetorical perspective: an orator's task was to persuade, to convert an audience to the speaker's/writer's point of view, and part of persuasion involved refuting the arguments of one's opponent. Simon offered a modification of Hulen's position, particularly with regard to works where the emphasis appeared primarily to be one of refuting:

When in a particular polemical work the emphasis is placed insistently not simply on a refutation of Jewish criticisms of Christianity but on a refutation of the beliefs of the Jews themselves, we may take it as certain that it is genuinely a work directed against Jews.¹⁷

When the emphasis appeared primarily apologetic Simon agreed with Harnack that such works

¹⁴ Ibid., p.140.

¹⁵ B. Hulen, "The Dialogues With the Jews as Sources for the Early Jewish Argument Against Christianity," *JBL* 51 (1932), pp.58-70. On pp.143-144, Simon noted that, in broad outline, he agreed with Hulen that these three categories have some chronological pattern.

¹⁶ M. Simon, op. cit., pp.140-141.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.143.

may not be polemical at all but addressed to an internal Christian audience. Simon's position is more nuanced though than Harnack's, and more in line with that of Williams:

Such works may have been written with a number of different objectives in view. This does not entitle us to reject the possibility that these writings were originally directed against Jews as if it were totally out of the question.¹⁸

Simon's main point is delivered when he reminded his own readers that the discussion about whether real encounters lay behind each piece of writing or whether these works are addressed actually to Jews is secondary to the issue of whether Judaism posed a real threat to Christianity.

Thus the arguments they offer really are for internal consumption, but not in the sense in which Harnack believed. If these arguments are intended to build up the faith of the believers, they do not do so by combating pagan criticisms, nor by rebutting objections that arise spontaneously in the Christians' own minds. It is the devices of the Jews and the drawing power of the Synagogue that they are designed to meet. Thus, though the people who produced these writings were not aiming directly at the Jews themselves, the title "anti-Jewish literature" is a proper and deserved one, for the Judaizing tendencies that appeared in the Church were a phenomenon that had not arisen spontaneously in Christian circles. They presuppose a stimulus from without.¹⁹

Simon can argue this because he believed that Judaism remained a vital force in antiquity for longer than had been accepted previously.

For if Judaism did continue for some time to play a part, or attempt to play a part, in the ancient world, Christianity must necessarily have come into collision with it.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid. On p. 156 Simon restated his position with regard to the purpose of this genre: "The anti-Jewish writers pursue a double aim, to demonstrate from scripture the truth of Christianity, and by the same means to refute the claims of Judaism." He mentioned Tertullian's treatise as demonstrating this double purpose with a first part (chapters 1-5) and a second part (chapters 6-14).

¹⁹ Ibid., p.145.

²⁰ Ibid., p.xi.

With reference to Tertullian in particular, it has been noted already that Fredouille, Monceaux, Säflund, and Braun believe that Tertullian had contact with Jews and that, on this basis, can conclude that Tertullian intended his work for Jews.²¹ William Frend, surveying Tertullian's corpus and Carthaginian archaeology, would believe that Tertullian was in touch with contemporary Jews.²² Aziza goes one step further and suggests that Tertullian's legalism and agitated personality might have stemmed from the fact that before he became a Christian Tertullian could once have had leanings towards Judaism.²³ Scholer accepts the opinion of scholars like Aziza, Frend and Horbury that Tertullian did have knowledge of contemporary Judaism in Carthage but he rejects the view of Frend that Tertullian provides us with evidence of a Jewish persecution of Christians.²⁴

I have spent considerable time presenting some of the detail of Simon's position because I believe that some of the efforts of more recent scholars who survey this field are too simplistic. Stroumsa rightly highlights the fact that Simon pointed to social factors as being important

²¹ J.-C. Fredouille, op. cit., pp.269-271.

²² W. H. C. Frend, "The Persecutions: some Links between Judaism and the Early Church," *JEH* 9 (1958), pp.156-157; id., "The *Seniores laici* and the Origins of the Church in North Africa," *JTS* n.s. 12 (1961), pp.280-284; id., "A Note on Tertullian and the Jews," *Studia Patristica*, vol. 10, ed. F. L. Cross, papers presented to the 5th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1967, part 1 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1970), pp.293-296; id., "Tertulliano e gli Ebrei," *RSLR* 4 (1968), pp.3-10; id., "A Note on Jews and Christians in Third-Century North Africa," *JTS* n.s. 21 (1970), pp.92-96; id., "Jews and Christians in Third Century Carthage," in *Paganisme, Judaïsme, Christianisme: Influences et affrontements dans le monde antique*, ed. A. Benoit (Paris: de Boccard, 1978), pp.191-193.

²³ C. Aziza, op. cit., p.221: "Sans aller jusqu'à de telles conclusions qui restent, il faut bien l'avouer, subjectives, on peut cependant constater qu'il y a chez Tertullien des traits que possédaient les Juifs de son temps."

²⁴ D. M. Scholer, "Tertullian on Jewish Persecution of Christians," *Studia Patristica*, vol. 17, no. 2, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, papers presented to the 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1979 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), pp.821-828. See William Horbury, "Tertullian on the Jews in the Light of *De Spectaculis* XXX.5-6," *JTS* n.s. 23 (1972), pp.455-459.

because of the latter's belief that Judaism remained a dynamic force far longer than credited previously,²⁵ but he does not make any comment about the purpose of anti-Judaic writings, especially Simon's carefully stated position that some of this literature was written for an internal reason as well as for external ones. I must conclude that Stroumsa's attempt to place Simon squarely into one camp does disservice to the subtlety of Simon's argument. Stroumsa has been influenced greatly by the thesis put forward by Miriam Taylor in a work in which she acknowledges that she is creating typologies and categories.²⁶

Taylor describes the position of Simon and others as the "conflict theory" of Jewish-Christian relations.²⁷ She divides this "competitive anti-Judaism" into two types: "polemical and apologetic" anti-Judaism, which grew out of the literary controversies between Christians and Jews, and "defensive" anti-Judaism, in response to the Judaizing tendencies among some Christians.²⁸ According to Taylor, polemical and apologetic anti-Judaism sought to demonstrate that Jesus was the messiah, that the Christians had therefore replaced the Jews as God's people, and that the nature of the Christian argument revealed the rivalry that actually existed between Christians and Jews. That demonstration was achieved in the debate about the interpretation of Scripture.²⁹ Several criticisms of this model are offered by Taylor. Firstly, it presumes that Jews would have been interested in debating these particular issues with Christians. Secondly, the themes remained repetitive and constant over centuries, which indicates that the debates could

²⁵ G. G. Stroumsa, *op. cit.*, p.11.

²⁶ M. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.21.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.22.

hardly have been genuine, for genuine debates would be attentive to changing circumstances. Thirdly, the Jewish opponent lacks substance and independence, suggesting that such a figure is more a literary construct than a real opponent. Fourthly, this model is based upon presumptions of rivalry and evidence is made to fit this model. Lastly, any weaknesses in the model are explained away as being due to the apologetic and polemical needs of the Christian authors.³⁰ The criticisms that Taylor offers of defensive anti-Judaism are that it presumes that Christian attraction to Jewish practices must be the result of a healthy Judaism and that scholars seem to find their evidence for this Judaising from the fourth century and read it back into earlier centuries.³¹ Without prior notice, Taylor then offers a third typology of competitive anti-Judaism: “embittered” or “disillusioned” anti-Judaism.³² This approach arose from the fact that Christians were disappointed at the failure of their attempts to convert Jews to Christianity and needed to explain away their lack of success. The criticism is offered that it is dangerous to introduce psychology into history and that a reading of the text reveals a theological rather than a psychological position.

So what the Christians hold against the Jews is not so much their persistence in concrete acts of aggression, but, in the most simple of terms, that they are not Christians. True, if there were no Jews, then there would be no cause for continuing condemnation, but this condemnation in no way implies contact with living Jews. The real objection against Judaism, in other words, is an objection against their whole religious position, their stubbornness in clinging to Judaism, their refusal to abandon their old allegiances in order to turn to Christ as Messiah. The objection holds on a theological rather than a practical level, and there is no evidence to suggest that it was rooted in concrete actions that might have produced an emotional reaction.³³

³⁰ Ibid., pp.22-24. Taylor returns to the second point in pp.122-125.

³¹ Ibid., pp.26-40.

³² Ibid., pp.41-45.

³³ Ibid., p.44.

Another typology offered by Taylor is described as “conflictual” anti-Judaism. Whereas competitive anti-Judaism was based on a belief in two equal groups engaged in struggle, this other typology recognises the inequality in the struggle between Christians and Jews and its political and social, as well as religious, dimensions.³⁴ Taylor divides this typology into three kinds: “reactive” anti-Judaism, which derived from a Christian inferiority complex, “strategic” anti-Judaism, in which Christians positioned themselves to usurp the privileges of the Jews, and “recriminatory” anti-Judaism, which contained the Christian response to Jewish antagonism. This typology too comes in for critical evaluation, almost exclusively through a re-examination of Melito of Sardis. There is no evidence, Taylor asserts, to conclude definitively that Jews in the second century were wealthy and secure, that Christians in the same period were poor and oppressed, and that this resulted necessarily in a particular attitude of Christians to Jews.³⁵ Strategic anti-Judaism is dismissed as being without foundation with regard to Melito.³⁶ The idea of Jewish persecution of Christians is likewise dismissed as speculative because it is not found even in the Christian writers where many modern scholars assert it is to be found, as is the idea of a struggle between Judaism and Christianity to win imperial favour in terms of a winner-loser paradigm.³⁷

As an alternative, Taylor offers a “symbolic” anti-Judaism, in which typology she suggests

³⁴ Ibid., p.47.

³⁵ Ibid., pp.52-74.

³⁶ Ibid., pp.75-77.

³⁷ Ibid., pp.78-114. See also Steven T. Katz, “Issues in the Separation of Judaism and Christianity after 70 C.E.: A Reconsideration,” *JBL* 103 (1984), pp.43-76, who argues that much of what has been understood traditionally as being evidence of Jewish antagonism towards Christians is really Jewish antagonism against all heretics not just Jewish Christians in particular, and that, as a result, there is no evidence until at least the Bar Kochba revolt of a sharp separation between Jews and Christians.

that:

... the writings of the fathers make much more sense as expressions of an anti-Judaism rooted in theological ideas than as responses to contemporary Jews in the context of an on-going conflict.³⁸

For Taylor this theological need centred on Christian self-definition, i.e., how to preserve both a continuity with their Jewish heritage and maintain a distinction, even supersession. It is here that Taylor sees the use of Scripture as the basis of this theological anti-Judaism.

We have here a tradition which remains constant over centuries, and forms a coherent body of mutually reinforcing arguments. It functions according to an internal logic in which the invalidation of Judaism emerges as a theoretical necessity in the appropriation of the Jewish God and the Jewish Bible for the church. It is grounded in a hermeneutic of the Holy Scriptures which condemns not the contemporary actions of Jews, but judges them rather in terms of historical crimes with a theological significance. The Jews are judged in particular in terms of their response to Christ as Messiah. The church's portrayal of Judaism is expressed in terms of a dualism opposing Christians and Jews which is built into the very logic and into the very structure of Christian teaching. Recognizing this, scholars have acknowledged, as we have seen, a theological dimension in the formation of the "Adversus Judaeos" tradition, and they have further linked these theological arguments to the formation of Christian identity.³⁹

For Taylor this need for theological self-definition cannot co-exist with Christian interaction with contemporary Judaism for the texts of anti-Judaism do not reveal, Taylor asserts as a hermeneutical principle, Christian identity in all its social dimensions, but only its theological ones.⁴⁰ She takes an "all or nothing" stance and therefore places Simon totally in the opposite

³⁸ M. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.127.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.139.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.140-141: "In other words, then, accepting that the church's writings have a theoretical dimension, which can account for the origins of anti-Jewish ideas, has important implications for our understanding of the references to Judaism in these writings. To the extent that the Judaism portrayed by the church fathers is recognized as a figurative entity which emerges out of Christian theorizing about Christianity, it cannot simultaneously be interpreted as referring to a living Judaism from which useful information can be gleaned about Jewish-Christian interaction. Unfortunately, though, most scholars seem oblivious to the need to make interpretive choices of this kind."

camp, even though he would not place himself there. Taylor finds in the comments and writings of Gaston, Efrogmson, and Ruether a refusal or an inability to rule out the “conflict theory,” even though they both support the idea that the primary purpose of these writings was for internal, theological needs of self-definition.⁴¹ These writings provided the basis for the reaffirmation of the Christian argument against Marcion (“reaffirmative” anti-Judaism)⁴² and provided a source of symbolism that Christians could use for a variety of other purposes, particularly as an exhortation to virtue and as a tool against other opponents (“fortifying” anti-Judaism and “associative” anti-Judaism).⁴³

I have provided an extensive summary of Taylor because her case is well made and forcefully argued. It cannot be dismissed lightly. Stroumsa has responded to her position by stating that if the “conflict theory” position suffers from the weakness of only considering the social at the expense of the theological, Taylor’s suffers from the opposite weakness. He argues for a more dynamic critique, one that recognises change over time and one that recognises a variety of discourses.

Therefore, it is not sufficient to study *both* history and discourse. It is the history of Christian discourse, its transformations throughout the first centuries, which must stand at the core of our research if we are to understand the paradoxical radicalization of anti-Judaism in theological

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.144-151. To this list I am sure that Taylor could add J. Gager who, despite the fact that on p.154 of his book he asserts that these debates and treatises function at a symbolic level for Christian self-definition, believes that public debates were a feature of Jewish-Christian relations for the first three centuries.

⁴² M. Taylor, op. cit., pp.170-177. As an example of the position Taylor criticises one could refer to the opinions of J. Massingberd Ford, “Was Montanism a Jewish-Christian Heresy?”, *JEH* 17 (1966), pp.154-158, where it is suggested that Tertullian’s interest in Judaism may have come from contact with Jewish figures whose advice he sought in preparation of material to use against Marcion. A description of the instances in Tertullian’s writings which demonstrate his acquaintance with Jewish thought is provided as well.

⁴³ Ibid., pp.178-187. In the section on associative anti-Judaism, Taylor relies upon Efrogmson’s analysis of the ways in which Tertullian linked his opponents to Jewish characteristics.

discourse over time.⁴⁴

Judith Lieu too acknowledges a dynamic approach in that she is aware that one cannot make too hasty a generalisation about Jewish-Christian relations. Some texts give evidence of contact and others do not. For her, Tertullian, although aware of the Jews in Carthage, had little to do with them.

On the other hand, other authors also must have been aware of well-established Jewish communities in their midst and yet betray much less direct knowledge. Tertullian's anti-Jewish polemic is particularly virulent but he offers only a few hints of contemporary Jewish communities in Carthage, and these mainly as illustrations of some other point; when he is writing against the Jews they become for him the people of the Old Testament who rejected and persecuted the prophets that spoke of the coming of Jesus, and who eventually rejected both him and the Church.⁴⁵

For Lieu, there is recognition of the rhetorical nature of the anti-Judaic literature in that the reality of the Christian knowledge of Jews helped shape the image of them which the Christians presented, which, in turn, became a part of the reality for a new generation.⁴⁶

Carleton Paget offers a more sustained critique of Taylor. He claims that she has not recognised and dealt with significant primary and secondary literature, that Taylor presumes that all scholars who support the position agree that conflict between Christians and Jews was on the basis of proselytising, and he questions whether Judaism was as uninterested in proselytising as Taylor claims and whether Judaising among Christians did not have any connection with Judaism

⁴⁴ G. G. Stroumsa, *op. cit.*, p.17.

⁴⁵ Judith Lieu, "History and Theology in Christian Views of Judaism," in *The Jews Among Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire*, ed. Judith Lieu, John North and Tessa Rajak (London: Routledge, 1994 [rev. ed.]), pp.86-87.

⁴⁶ Eadem, *Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996), p.12. On p.105 she dates Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos* to early in the next century, which is presumably why it is not dealt with in her book.

and he objects to Taylor's non-acknowledgement of contact between Jews and Christians in terms of biblical exegesis.⁴⁷

The evidence cited above, then, combines to support the contention which, theoretically at least, seems self-evident, that some Christians felt a certain reverence for the Jewish interpretation of scripture. Following on from this they felt the need to consult Jews on certain exegetical matters, and that they correspondingly also felt the need to refute Jewish objections to Christian positions, objections which seem to be evident in a number of writings.⁴⁸

Carleton Paget also raises the question of Jewish anti-Christianity as being insufficiently explored in Taylor's monograph. He also responds to Taylor's assertion that the arguments of this genre of literature remained static, as I have mentioned in chapter two. He notes that much of this literature is polemical, in which it was not important to represent an opponent's point of view accurately. He notes also that the form of the literature varied, as did its tone.⁴⁹

He agrees with Taylor that in assessing the purpose of this writing we are often left only with the texts themselves and that oftentimes the interpretation of texts is based on certain assumptions. Unlike Taylor, Carleton Paget does not seem disturbed by this.⁵⁰ He concludes:

But to dismiss all anti-Jewish sentiment in Christianity as the result of inner Christian tendencies does not do sufficient justice to the evidence, and suffers from a certain unsubtlety which manifests itself in an 'either-or' mentality—either Christian anti-Judaism genuinely reflects concern and interaction with an external reality called Judaism, and if it does, we should expect very specific

⁴⁷ See Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Halakhah in the Church Fathers," in *Essays in Honor of Solomon B. Freehof*, ed. Walter Jacob, Frederick C. Schwartz and Vigdor W. Kavalier (Pittsburgh: Rodef Shalom Congregation, 1964), pp.264-268 for an examination of the Jewish influences in two of Tertullian's treatises.

⁴⁸ J. Carleton Paget, "Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity," p.213. The arguments Carleton Paget presents occupy pp.203-213.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.218-219.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.221.

types of evidence, or it does not.⁵¹

Carleton Paget's observations seem to me to be balanced and quite reasonable and consistent with what I have discovered in the course of my rhetorical analysis of Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*. While Taylor would argue that one cannot have both, this is precisely what I would argue and do so from the text. An orator engaged in both *confirmatio* and *refutatio* and together they constituted persuasive proof. I agree with Taylor, as exemplified in Tertullian, that the Jews had crystallised into symbolic figures that enabled Christian writers to develop their self-understanding, yet I do not see any *a priori* need to eliminate absolutely the possibility that this was done in the context of ongoing relations between Christians and Jews. In any oratorical effort, through the use of common *topoi*, there is invariably some generalising and abstracting about one's opponent. *Adversus Iudaeos* is a theological text, not the record of debate, yet it is a theological text written in response to a particular encounter or as a template designed to enhance Christian victories (at least in front of other Christians) at future possible encounters. It draws upon earlier theological statements, but in such a way that this refinement of theological and symbolic speculation might have practical use. I am not saying that Tertullian's work was ever used thus, but I would like to keep open such a possibility.

I cannot argue, nor would I want to, that all Christian anti-Judaic literature reflects contact between Christians and Jews, was directed to Jews, or was merely the attempt to reach self-understanding on the basis of symbolic constructs. One can only comment with regard to individual works, respecting the fact that situations varied in time and place.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.224.

I agree with Taylor that assumptions (or, more accurately, presumptions) determine what one reads in a text. One can never eliminate all presupposition and prejudice. Pure epistemological objectivity is impossible, for it is always a subject who knows, and a subject is a holistic amalgam of openness as well as of past experience. The most one can do is acknowledge one's presumptions and explore them as fully as possible. I have tried not to presume that Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos* is evidence of contact between Christians and Jews. I have attempted to base my decision on a reading of the text, which is very explicit in its opening sentences that such contact did occur. Although some may wish to dismiss this as literary invention, perhaps they do so on the basis of their own presumptions that by the late second century contact between the two no longer took place. Although Christian writers like Tertullian were very much a product of their times, especially of their literary environments, I have relied upon the argument that in these early Christian centuries they were not like their pagan counterparts who engaged in oratory for its stylistic and literary opportunities. They were concerned with its practical application of persuasion. One should be wary of dismissing too hastily what Tertullian writes as simple sophism. On Taylor's own hermeneutical principle of making statements from the text, one would have to challenge her on this point.

I have suggested that in the *Epistle of Barnabas* we may find suggestions that a clear-cut distinction between Jews and Christians did not come about as early as is commonly accepted. The later we are able to date the widespread disappearance of Christian Jews, the more likely it is that much of the anti-Judaic literature of the second century reflects a real struggle between two groups claiming to be the true people of God.

I have made the point that whether or not a treatise discusses current events or current

Jewish practices is no sure guide to whether or not there was contact between Christians and Jews. I have argued that Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos* reflects what would have been of interest to a debate between Christians and Jews in the late second century A.D. Their interest was not in current events but in the interpretation of the past. The correct interpretation of Scripture was what would give one or other of these religious communities their legitimacy, at least as far as the Christians were concerned. There is nothing to rule out a position that claims that what was of the utmost interest to Carthaginian Jews and Christians in the Severan Age was an age-old debate. It has to be admitted that Tertullian revealed little about contemporary Jews (other than the fact that they were in all probability always interested in arguing with Christians about the correct interpretation of Scripture) but the suggestion is that this is the case, not because he had no contact with any but because they were not in themselves the issue. This was the age of the Second Sophistic: the past was the contemporary issue.

I do not think that we can take the fact that this treatise does not seem interested in converting Jews as evidence of the lack of real contact behind it. Tertullian's purpose was rhetorical: he needed to persuade his readers to believe his arguments. He wanted to win. For a Christian readership all he needed to do was prove the Jewish position wrong and the Christian one right in their eyes. Whether or not Jews were convinced by his arguments was irrelevant. If they did, so much the better, but their refusal to believe the things that God had done in recent times with regard to the promotion of the Christians meant that they were stubborn in their rejection of the truth, and their refusal to convert was proof that they had no regard for the truth. The question of rivalry between Jews and Christians for me is not a question about rivalry for members. I believe scholars make a mistake in limiting the notion of rivalry to proselytising. The rivalry between Christians and Jews was a rivalry for theological legitimacy, again, at least as far

as the Christians were concerned. That there continued to be Jews living in the same environment as Christians meant that the latter needed to justify themselves to themselves and to anyone else who would listen.

If one takes the distinction between real, imagined, and intended readers seriously, then the fact that the imagined readers of the treatise were mainly Christian cannot be taken as evidence that Jews were excluded completely from being among the intended readers. It would make sense to suggest that Tertullian wanted as many Jews as possible to be exposed to his “successful” repudiation of their interpretation of the Scriptures and defence of the Christian interpretation.

In addition, I do not think that the arguments offered by Tertullian were entirely repetitive or conventional. A thorough examination of the pieces of Scripture he chose, of the interpretations he offered of those pieces, and of the way in which he linked individual pieces into a coherent whole displays much originality. I am not denying that Tertullian was strongly influenced by earlier writers like Justin, Irenaeus, and the author of *Barnabas*, but I am saying that he was not straightjacketed by them. As a writer and therefore, by virtue of his education, a leading figure in the Christian community in Carthage, it is quite possible that Tertullian’s purpose in writing *adversus Iudaeos* was to introduce the arguments of someone like Justin, who wrote in Greek, to the non-Greek reading members of his own community for the first time, with the idea that if they had worked before they would probably work again. At least in the second century we should not see repetition of ideas as indicating a high degree of artificiality and stereotyping.

Finally, I do not think that because the Jewish figure in this genre was ineffectual we must reject the notion of contact between Christians and Jews. Earlier this century Moore recognised that, although such “straw” figures might point to the fact that the authors were not attempting to convert Jews but to edify Christians, this did not mean that there were not real controversies between Jews and Christians.⁵² This view has been repeated more recently by McDonald.⁵³ Of course, there is no such figure in Tertullian’s work. This tract is not a verbatim account and has no pretensions to be one. It is a theological pamphlet in which Tertullian is aware of real encounters but is not limited by them. He wrote what he believed would set forth the Christian understanding and confute any Jewish counter-argument. So, like Williams and Simon, I would want to argue that there are enough indications from the text of this treatise itself that it was designed to serve multiple purposes: that it was reflective of ongoing contact and that it was part of a developing Christian theological self-identity.

I would hope that this rhetorical analysis of Tertullian’s *adversus Iudaeos* would help rehabilitate this text as an authentic, unified, though unrevised work of the first Latin theologian. With another perspective added to those already offered by the few scholars who have chosen to investigate this treatise perhaps even more notice will be given to this work in the literature of anti-Judaism and to the rhetorical nature of theological literature. Gaston has indicated that he considers Tertullian to be a significant figure for Christian anti-Judaism:

In many respects Tertullian represents a turning point in the development of Christian doctrine, in which certain tentative second-century developments receive a clear formulation which will

⁵² G. F. Moore, *op. cit.*, p.198.

⁵³ Lee Martin McDonald, “Anti-Judaism in the Early Church Fathers,” in C. A. Evans and D. A. Hagner, *op. cit.*, p.227.

dominate all further doctrine, and that is also the case here. Anti-Judaism, then, can be defined as what Tertullian says about Jews.⁵⁴

Adversus Iudaeos is a significant text. Like this dissertation it sought to be persuasive, and like this dissertation it has its own shortcomings, limitations and narrowness of perspective. As a good orator should, one must end stressing the importance of one's message and apologise for the lack of ability of the messenger.

⁵⁴ L. Gaston, op. cit., p.163. I do disagree with Gaston, though, when he writes on pp.163-164 that: "To judge by the work of Tertullian, it [Christian anti-Judaism] arises out of an inner-Christian theological debate rather than out of rivalry with a living Judaism. It seems not to be the case that Tertullian looked at contemporary Judaism and found something lacking or that he was motivated by personal animosity toward specific Jewish persons." I would modify this by saying that Tertullian's anti-Judaism is expressed as an inner-theological debate that arose out of the ongoing rivalry between Christians and Jews.

APPENDIX A

Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah: A Re-Reading of an "Anti-Jewish" Argument in

Early Christian Literature,"

Vigiliae Christianae 52 (1998)

**TERTULLIAN AND REBEKAH:
A RE-READING OF AN "ANTI-JEWISH" ARGUMENT
IN EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE**

BY

GEOFFREY D. DUNN

I

Rebekah, the wife of Isaac and mother of Esau and Jacob, is mentioned on nine occasions in the writings of Tertullian. Four of those references are to Rebekah veiling herself the first time she saw Isaac (Gen. 24:64-65);¹ one is to Isaac's denial of Rebekah as his wife (Gen. 26:7);² and four are to Rebekah as mother of Esau and Jacob (Gen. 25:22-26).³ This paper is concerned with the last four references and their place in early Christian anti-Jewish polemic. Rosemary Radford Ruether has written with regard to Patristic *Adversus Iudaeos* literature:

But throughout these writings from the second to the sixth century the arguments themselves remain fairly continuous and fixed.⁴

She suggests that one such example of a constant interpretation in early Christianity is with regard to Gen. 25:23: the younger people, who are the Gentile Church, overcome the elder people, the Jews.⁵ The aim of this paper is to investigate the interpretation of Gen. 25:23 in Tertullian in particular and in earlier Christian literature in general. The argument of this paper is that, although these early Christian writers shared common material, they each employed that material in ways that suited their own individual approaches and each contributed their own unique insights and

¹ Tert. *de Cor.* 4.2; Tert. *Or.* 22.10; Tert. *de Virg.* 11.3 (twice).

² Tert. *de Cult.* 2.2.6—found only in the *Codex Parisinus latinus 1622, saec. ix (Agobardinus)*.

³ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.3,4; Tert. *de Pud.* 8.8; Tert. *de An.* 26.2.

⁴ R.R. Ruether, "The *Adversus Iudaeos* Tradition in the Church Fathers: The Exegesis of Christian Anti-Judaism," in P.E. Szarmach (ed.), *Aspects of Jewish Culture in the Middle Ages* (Albany 1979) 29.

⁵ *Ibid.* 35 and 48 n. 14.

perspectives. To ignore these finer points of individuality is to run the risk of over-generalisation or over-simplification.

II

In the *narratio* of his own work, now entitled *adversus Iudaeos*, Tertullian quoted God's promise to Rebekah in Genesis 25:23:

*Duae gentes in utero tuo sunt, et duo populi de utero tuo dividuntur, et populus populum superabit, et maior serviet minori.*⁶

He interpreted this statement typologically: the elder child represented the Jews and the younger represented the Christians. Tertullian provided two reasons for this interpretation: the Jews were earlier in time than the Christians as a people and the Jews had access through the Law to God's grace earlier than did the Christians (*adv. Iud.* 1.5). From this he concluded not only that the Christians *also* had access to divine grace, but that, because of Jewish infidelity, *only* the Christians now had that access (*adv. Iud.* 1.6-7). In other words, the Christians had overcome the Jews and thus the promise made to Rebekah had been fulfilled at last. This becomes the *partitio* (*adv. Iud.* 1.8) which Tertullian developed into the unfolding arguments of the remainder of the work.

The references in *de Pudicitia* and *de Anima* to Rebekah's twins are briefer and occur as proofs for other points Tertullian wished to make.

In *de Anima* the reference to the twins wrestling within Rebekah's womb and to Jacob, while still in the womb (*i.e.*, before he was actually born), grasping the foot of his newly-emerged, elder sibling, Esau, was taken as proof that, even before they were born or had taken breath,⁷ infants had a soul (*de An.* 26.3).

In *de Pudicitia* he was arguing against forgiveness for the Christian who sinned after baptism and he felt the need to counter the interpretation of the Lukan parable of the prodigal son (Lk. 15:11-32) that saw the younger son who received forgiveness as the Christian and, consequently, the elder son as representing the Jews (*de Pud.* 8.3). He countered by attempting to

⁶ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 1.4: "Two nations are in thy womb, and two peoples shall be divided from thy bowels, and people shall overcome people, and the greater shall serve the less." (Eng. trans. from A. Roberts & J. Donaldson [rev. A.C. Cox], *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 3: *Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian* [Grand Rapids, Mich. 1885]).

⁷ A reference to the Stoic and Platonic positions Tertullian was countering that the body and soul only came together at birth.

prove that the elder son of the parable, who was faithful to the father, could not be an allegorical representation of the Jews because of their unfaithfulness, even though they were older by adoption (*de Pud.* 8.4—*Licet enim et filius audiat Iudaeus et maior, quia prior in adoptione . . .*). Instead, the elder son of the parable was a figure for the Christian (*de Pud.* 8.4-8). However, although the elder son was seen by Tertullian as such a figure, this did not mean that the Jews would be the younger son. The younger son could not represent the Jews as that would be contrary to the prophecy made to Rebekah about her twins (*de Pud.* 8.8). Certainly Tertullian would not have liked somebody to point out that, if the Jews did not correspond to the younger son of the Lukan parable because that would be contrary to their place in the Rebekah prophecy, then, logically, the Christians could not be taken as the elder son of the Lukan parable because that would be contrary to *their* place in the Rebekah prophecy. Tertullian was aware of the limitations of allegorical interpretation,⁸ but drew the line to suit himself: the Jews could not be the younger son of Lk. 15 but the Christians could be the elder.

Later, he suggested that the pagans must be the younger son (*de Pud.* 9.14), and all of this was meant to prove that forgiveness was offered but once by God. What is of interest here is that the reference to Rebekah is made merely in passing:

*Multo aptius Christianum maiori et Iudaeum minori filio adaequassent secundum fidei comparationem, si ordo utriusque populi ab utero Rebeccae designatus permetteret demutationem. Nisi quod et clausula refragaretur.*⁹

Obviously Tertullian presumed that whoever read this reference, and the earlier one about the Jews being older by adoption, would understand their meaning without any further explanation. This provides a possible connection with *adversus Iudaeos*. It could well be argued that Tertullian felt no need to amplify his reference to Rebekah and who her twins represented

⁸ Tert. *de Pud.* 8.9: "Ita etsi quaedam facient, sed aliis contra sapientibus interimitur exemplorum peraequatio."

⁹ Tert. *de Pud.* 8.8: "Much more aptly would they have matched the Christian with the elder, and the Jew with the younger son, 'according to the analogy of faith,' if the order of each people as intimated from Rebecca's womb permitted the inversion: only that (in that case) the concluding paragraph would oppose them . . ." (Eng. trans. from A. Roberts & J. Donaldson [rev. A.C. Cox], *The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4: Tertullian, Part Fourth; Minucius Felix; Commodianus; Origen, Parts First and Second* [Grand Rapids, Mich. 1885]).

in *de Pudicitia* because he had done so in his earlier work, *adversus Iudaeos*. Such an interpretation would be a small contribution in support of the chronology established by Timothy Barnes that places *adversus Iudaeos* early in Tertullian's literary career and *de Pudicitia* at its end.¹⁰ Given the controversy about the authenticity and integrity of *adversus Iudaeos*,¹¹ this connection between the two works would amount to a supporting argument in favour of the authenticity of at least the early part of *adversus Iudaeos*. On the basis of the brevity and lack of explanation of the reference to Rebekah in *de Pudicitia*, it would seem fair to presume that Tertullian would have explained it elsewhere. Given that in the rest of his extant works no explanation was forthcoming, except in *adversus Iudaeos*, again it would seem fair to conclude that this explanation in *adversus Iudaeos* was authentically Tertullian's. This suggestion would achieve a degree of certainty if it could be shown that the typological interpretation of the twins, presumed in *de Pudicitia* and explained in *adversus Iudaeos*, was original to Tertullian or not known to Christian theology in Carthage. It is to this question we turn now.

III

The obvious and traditional interpretation of this passage was that Esau, the elder, was the eponym of the Edomites, or foreigners in general, and that Jacob, the younger, was the eponym of the Jews, the people of Israel. Tertullian's identification of the Jews with the elder son was to run counter to this tradition.

The Yahwist message from the narrative in Genesis itself was that the promise made to Rebekah about the younger overcoming the elder (Gen. 25:23) was fulfilled indeed in the life of Jacob himself (considered as an individual rather than as a nation) through his obtaining Esau's birthright (Gen. 25:29-34) and cheating Esau of Isaac's blessing (Gen. 27:1-40). Further,

¹⁰ T.D. Barnes, *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford 1971) 55.

¹¹ See A. Kroymann's notes in *Tertulliani Opera, Pars II, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*, 2 (Turnhout 1954) 1338; G. Quispel, *De bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem* (Utrecht 1943) 61-79; E. Noeldechen, *Die Abfassungszeit der Schriften Tertullians, Texte u. Unters.*, v. 2 (Leipzig 1888); *idem*, *Tertullians Schrift gegen die Juden auf Einheit, Echtheit, Entstehung geprüft, Text u. Unters.*, xii.2 (Leipzig 1894); G. Säflund, *De pallio und die stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians* (Lund 1955) 122 ff.; A.L. Williams, *Adversus Iudaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance* (Cambridge 1935) 43-45; H. Tränkle, *Q.S.F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos: mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar* (Wiesbaden 1964) liii-lxvii; T.D. Barnes, *op. cit.* 53.

that the individuals also represented nations, and that the nations referred to in Gen. 25:23 were accepted by the Yahwist author to be the Edomites, in the person of Esau, and the Israelites, in the person of Jacob, can also clearly be demonstrated from Genesis itself (Gen. 32:29; 35:10; 36:1). Other traditions in Israel, in particular the prophetic tradition, also saw events in the life of Jacob as prefiguring or representing events in the whole nation of Israel (Hos. 12; Jer. 9:3).¹² Jacob was the "typological prototype for *all* Israel," as Fishbane has noted.¹³ He would go as far as to say:

It would appear that for the prophet, in so far as the individual Jacob-Israel is the ancestor of Israel, his behaviour has to some degree *determined* the behaviour of his descendants. Indeed, because of the eponymous link between the person Israel and the nation, the parallelism drawn between the actions is not a mere rhetorical trope, but drives deeper into the very "nature" of Israel. The nation is not just "like" its ancestor, says Hosea, but *is* its ancestor in fact—in name and in deed.¹⁴

Scholars today, both Jewish¹⁵ and Christian,¹⁶ continue to recognise that the authors of Genesis accepted that the nation dependent on the younger twin was Israel.

The *Book of Jubilees* retold the story of the birth of the twins, making Abraham a central figure. He decided that Jacob would be the one to transmit all the blessings he himself had received from God (Jub. 19.23), and it was Abraham who told Rebekah that Jacob would be chosen by God to be God's own people (Jub. 19.18). There is nothing to suggest any

¹² The question of how God could be party to or approve of the underhanded if not immoral actions of Jacob and Rebekah has long been one of primary interest to scholars of the Jacob cycle, Jewish and Christian, ancient and modern. See M. Maher, "The Transfer of a Birthright: Justifying the Ancestors," *Proceedings of the Irish Biblical Association* 8 (1984) 1-24, for a presentation of Rabbinic and Patristic interpretation; R.P. Bulka, "The Selling of the Birthright: Making Sense of a Perplexing Episode," *Jewish Biblical Quarterly* 9 (1990-91) 100-104; L. Teugels, "A Strong Woman, Who Can Find?" A Study of Characterization in Genesis 24, with some Perspectives on the General Presentation of Isaac and Rebekah in the Genesis Narratives," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 63 (1994) 89-104.

¹³ M. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel* (Oxford 1985) 377.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 378. Cf. R.J. Clifford, "Genesis 25:19-34," *Interpretation* 45 (1991) 397-398: "The stories are not allegories with a one-to-one correspondence of individual and nation. The human actors, however, are ancestors who somehow include and prefigure their descendants."

¹⁵ E.g. B. Jacob, *The First Book of the Bible: Genesis* (abr. ed. & trans. by E.I. Jacob & W. Jacob) (New York 1974 [Eng. ed.]) 167.

¹⁶ E.g. R.J. Clifford, *op. cit.* 400.

other interpretation than that Jacob stood for the people of Israel. Josephus also retold the story, but with Abraham dead by the time Rebekah conceived and with Isaac the one who consulted God and received the prophecy (Jos. *J.A.* 1.18.1). Once again, though, there is nothing to contradict the traditional Jewish interpretation. Philo, who saw in the Scriptures both a literal (τὸ ῥητόν) and symbolic (τὸ συμβολικόν) meaning, and admitted to allegorising (ἀλληγοροῦντες), considered part of the Jacob cycle in his *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin*. Although he was not explicit, it is clear that Philo identified the younger son with the people of Israel because he noted that, in God's prophecy to Rebekah, reference was not made to the name of the twins but to the nations that would be their descendants (Philo, *QG* 157).¹⁷

Later rabbinic Midrash on the Jacob cycle presents difficulties for one who wishes to comment on the history of interpretation. *Genesis Rabbah* in its final form dates from the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century A.D., although it most probably contains earlier material.¹⁸ In particular, it addressed problems the Jews faced in the light of Constantine's conversion. The point here is that it is consistent with the Jewish tradition outlined briefly above. *Genesis Rabbah* interpreted the pre-natal story of Esau and Jacob allegorically, with Esau representing Rome, attracted to idolatry, and Jacob representing Israel, attracted to synagogues and study houses (*Gen. Rab.* 63.6-7).¹⁹

In the light of this Jewish tradition that can be seen from the time of the redaction of the Jacob cycle in Genesis onwards, it may be asked what interpretations did the earliest Christians provide about the story of Rebekah's pregnancy? Paul made reference to it in Romans 9:10-13. In the context of the surrounding chapters it is evident that Paul accepted the identification of Jacob, the younger son, with the people of Israel, *i.e.*, his interpretation was entirely consistent with the Jewish tradition. In its immediate context, Paul's reference to Rebekah, as well as his reference to God's promise of Isaac to Abraham (Rom. 9:7-9), was as an example of, or as proof of, God's freedom of election (Rom. 9:18). Paul took up the point that God was not limited by primogeniture but had the freedom to choose the younger twin.

¹⁷ See also Philo, *Sacr. Abel et Cain* 2.4; 4.17; Philo, *Cong.* 23.129.

¹⁸ J. Neusner, *The Midrash: An Introduction* (Northvale, N.J. 1990) 142-148.

¹⁹ *Idem* (trans.), *Genesis Rabbah: The Judaic Commentary to the Book of Genesis—A New American Translation, volume 2: Parashiyot Thirty-Four through Sixty-Seven on Genesis 8:15 to 28:9* (Atlanta 1985), 354. Here Neusner expresses his opinion that Esau represented Rome.

He continued that God's choice of the Gentiles for salvation, prefigured in the prophets (Rom. 9:25-29), was equally free (Rom. 9:24). Israel's disobedience had not nullified God's free election of them (in Abraham and Jacob) (Rom. 11:1-2), for it had given God the opportunity to be merciful to the Gentiles (Rom. 11:11-28). A remnant of Israel had remained faithful (Rom. 11:25). Israel was still loved by God because of the election (Rom. 11:28), and Israel's disobedience was so they too might experience God's mercy as the Gentiles had (Rom. 11:31-32).²⁰ Given that Paul returned on several occasions in these chapters to the election of Israel, the mention of God's free choice of Jacob was still in accord with the traditional interpretation of Jacob with Israel. On a careful reading of Romans itself, Clifford's assertion: "For Paul, the 'younger' Gentiles were now chosen and God was not to be questioned."²¹ and Schreckenberg's: "Diese Stelle und ihre christliche Deutung auf Kirche (Jakob) und Synagoge (Esau), eine Deutung, die sich auf Paulus, Röm 9,12, berufen konnte, kam schon in der Kirchenväterzeit zu allergrößter Bedeutung."²² cannot be maintained without qualification. Paul did not identify Jacob, the "younger," with the Gentiles; the call of the Gentiles was a further call (the grafting of the new branch onto the old olive tree—Rom. 11:17-24) that only happened after chosen Israel disobeyed God; it was not one that originated with the prophecy to Rebekah.

²⁰ See D.G. Johnson, "The Structure and Meaning of Romans 11," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 46 (1984) 91-103; J.A. Fisher, "Dissent Within a Religious Community: Romans 9-11," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 10 (1980) 105-110; C.E.B. Cranfield, "Romans 9:30-10:4," *Interpretation* 34 (1980) 70-74; *idem*, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, vol. 2, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh 1979) esp. 476-479; B. Byrne, *Reckoning with Romans: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Gospel* (Wilmington, Del. 1986) 184-206; J.A. Fitzmyer, "The Letter to the Romans," in R.E. Brown, J.A. Fitzmyer & R.E. Murphy (eds.), *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1990) 856-862; E. Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans* (trans. G.W. Bromiley) (London 1980 [Eng. ed.]) 260-318; W.D. Davies, "Paul and the People of Israel," *New Testament Studies* 24 (1978) 4-39; N. Elliott, *The Rhetoric of Romans*, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series no. 45 (Sheffield 1990) 264-275; J.C. Beker, "The Faithfulness of God and the Priority of Israel in Paul's Letter to the Romans," in G.W.E. Nickelsburg & G.W. MacRae (eds.), *Christians Among Jews and Gentiles: Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl on His Sixty-fifth Birthday* (Philadelphia 1986) 10-16.

²¹ R.J. Clifford, *op. cit.* 401.

²² H. Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1.-11.Jh)* (Frankfurt am Main 1990) 63.

IV

We may now consider the references to Rebekah and her twins in Patristic literature prior to Tertullian. *1 Clement* mentioned Jacob as the father of the twelve tribes of Israel and of having fled from his brother and gone to Laban (*1 Clem.* 31), but there is no mention of the prophecy of their birth nor, therefore, any contribution to the interpretation of this allegorical representation. The letter *ad Diognetum* likewise contains nothing about the prophecy to Rebekah, neither does Polycarp nor Ignatius of Antioch. The Nag Hammadi material too reveals nothing relevant for our purposes here.

In the *Epistle of Barnabas* is found the first extant interpretation of the prophecy to Rebekah where the younger son is not identified as the people of Israel as commonly understood. The epistle cites Gen. 25:23, the prophecy of God to Rebekah (*Barn.* 13.2).²³ The author used this text as part of the answer to the question about whether the covenant belonged to "us" or to "them" (*Barn.* 13.1). Another text is also cited: Gen. 48:18-19 (Jacob's blessing of Joseph's sons Ephraim and Manasseh) as further proof, although the author was selective in how he cited this (*Barn.* 13.4-6).²⁴ The Rebekah passage was presented for allegorical interpretation, for the author invited his readers to identify who Rebekah, Isaac and the people referred to through the two sons were.

As the author did not elucidate, one must examine the context in which these proof-texts were offered to determine whom the two sons represented. The question of the letter's provenance and dating need not detain us, because the opinion of a number of scholars that it originated in Alexandria in the late first (or even early second) century A.D. may be accepted.²⁵

²³ J.C. Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, *Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament: Reihe 2*; 94 (Tübingen 1994) 162-165, notes the ways in which *Barn.* has altered or inherited alterations to the Genesis story.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 162 notes that the combination of these two stories is not found in any other Christian writing and is only found in Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* 3.29.88-3.30.94.

²⁵ L.W. Barnard, "The Date of the Epistle of Barnabas—a Document of Early Egyptian Christianity," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 44 (1958) 101-107; W.H.C. Frend, *The Rise of Christianity* (London 1984) 121; B.A. Pearson, "Earliest Christianity in Egypt: Some Observations," in B.A. Pearson & J.E. Goehring (eds.), *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, vol. 1 of *Studies in Antiquity and Christianity* (Philadelphia 1986) 150-151; R.M. Grant, "Theological Education at Alexandria," in B.A. Pearson & J.E. Goehring, *op. cit.* 181; R.S. MacLennan, *Early Christian Texts on Jews and Judaism*, vol. 194 of *Brown Judaic Studies* (Atlanta 1990) 21; J.C. Paget, *op. cit.* 9-42; cf. A.F.J. Klijn, "Jewish

The question of *Barn.* 13.1, about the identity of the people of the covenant, had first been raised at *Barn.* 4.6, where the author expressed his opposition to those who argued "that the covenant is both theirs and ours" (ὅτι ἡ διαθήκη ἐκείνων καὶ ἡμῶν). The author's opposition to that view was so the readers of the letter might not misinterpret God's intentions, as had been done in the past, not only with regard to the covenant, but with regard to sacrifice (ch. 3), fasting (ch. 4), circumcision (ch. 9),²⁶ food laws (ch. 10), the Sabbath (ch. 15) and the Temple (ch. 16) as well.

The contrast between "us" and "them" is a feature of this letter. Many commentators make the simple identification that "us" refers to Christians and "them" refers to Jews.²⁷ It is partly on the basis of the identification, presumably, that William Frend is able to write: "After circa A.D. 100 there was less of a tendency for Christians to claim to be Israel and more of a tendency to contrast Christianity and Judaism as separate religions. Christianity claimed to be heir to the universalist claims of Judaism."²⁸ However, nowhere in the epistle did the author make such an explicit identification; words like "Jew" and "Christian" were not in the author's vocabulary. A closer attention to the contrast in the epistle reveals that it expressed the view which Frend characterised as belonging to the earlier,

Christianity in Egypt," in B.A. Pearson & J.E. Goehring, *op. cit.* 166; K. Wengst, *Schriften des Urchristentums: Didache, Barnabasbrief, zweiter Klemensbrief, Schriften an Diognet* (Darmstadt 1984) 115; P. Prigent, *Les Testimonia dans le christianisme primitif: l'Épître de Barnabé I-XVI et ses sources* (Paris 1961) 22-24; M.B. Shukster & P. Richardson, "Temple and *Bet Hamidrash* in the Epistle of Barnabas," in S.G. Wilson (ed.), *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, vol. 2: Separation and Polemic* (Ontario 1986) 17-31; J. Alvarez, "Apostolic Writings and the Roots of Anti-Semitism," *Studia Patristica* 13 (1975) 69-76.

²⁶ See J.N.B.C. Paget, "Barnabas 9:4: A Peculiar Verse on Circumcision," *Vigiliae Christianae* 45 (1991) 242-254, who argues that although there was a Jewish tradition of spiritualising circumcision, *Barn.*'s argument here was his own. As will be discussed below, Paget's view that *Barn.* was anti-Jewish needs qualification.

²⁷ S. Lowy, "The Confutation of Judaism in the Epistle of Barnabas," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 11 (1960) 1; W. Horbury, "Jewish-Christian Relations in Barnabas and Justin Martyr," in J.D.G. Dunn (ed.), *Jews and Christians: the Parting of the Ways, A.D. 70 to 135* (Tübingen 1992) 315; R.S. MacLennan, *op. cit.* 24; J.C. Paget, *op. cit.* 52; A.L. Williams, *op. cit.* 14. Perhaps one of the clearest statements of this view is C.M. Williamson, "The 'Adversus Judaeos' Tradition in Christian Theology," *Encounter* 39 (1978) 275: "Here for the first time in post-biblical Christian history we find a Gentile Christian appropriating the prophetic criticism of Jews by Jews on behalf of a Gentile Christianity and using it against Jews." (emphasis added). Also I have to disagree strongly with the view of J. Alvarez, *op. cit.* 73, who argued that the author avoided the term Jew because it was abhorrent to him.

²⁸ W.H.C. Frend, *op. cit.* 124.

first phase (A.D. 65 to 100) of the sub-apostolic period: "All Christianity at this stage was 'Jewish Christianity.' But it was Israel with a difference."²⁹ In other words, the argument here is that the *Epistle of Barnabas* did not so much contrast Jew with Christian or Judaism with Christianity as old people of the covenant with new people of the covenant or one type of Jew with another type. Is there really any difference?

Indeed there is. The old people of the covenant comprised all those who had misunderstood God's intentions from the establishment of the covenant until the present and who therefore had never been the people of God (*Barn.* 4.7-8—ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι οὕτως εἰς τέλος ἀπώλεσαν αὐτὴν λαβόντος ἤδη τοῦ Μωϋσέως . . . καὶ συνετρίβη αὐτῶν ἡ διαθήκη . . .). The new people (*Barn.* 5.7—τὸν λαὸν τὸν καινόν) comprised those who had understood God's intentions after the time when the covenant had been broken *first* until the present. The new people were the only one, true people; the old people never had been.³⁰ For the author of the epistle, it was the people who changed not covenants. The "old" covenant was not replaced by a "new" one at the time of Jesus. The covenant had ended even before Moses descended from Sinai (*Barn.* 4.7-8; 14.2-4) because the people were not worthy to receive it. As Simon has stated with regard to the covenant with Moses: "The entire development of Israel's history from that point onwards is quite meaningless, except as an illustration of what the Sinai apostasy involved. It cannot be for a Christian in any sense sacred history."³¹ But that end was temporary. What had been abolished (*Barn.* 2.6—κατήργησεν) was not an "old" covenant but its old misapplication.³² The covenant of Jesus was the same as that of Moses; it was revived rather than replaced (*Barn.* 4.8; 5.1-2; 14.5-6).³³

Thus, there is a sense in *Barnabas* that no covenant existed in the time between Moses and Jesus: those who thought they had it (but had really lost it) could do no right, for they lived in their misunderstanding (*Barn.* 2.4-5,9; 3.4-5; 4.14), while the prophets prepared for the coming of the Christ by announcing what true understanding would involve (*Barn.* 2.10;

²⁹ *Ibid.* 123.

³⁰ When *Barn.* used the word "Israel" (4.14; 5.2,8; 6.7; 8.1,3; 9.2; 12.2,5; 16.5) he was referring to it in an historical sense. The term was not applied directly to "them."

³¹ M. Simon, *Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire (135-425)* (trans. H. McKeating) (Oxford 1986 [Eng. ed.]) 87.

³² *Barn.* 2.6 mentioned ὁ καινὸς νόμος and in the context of these early chapters it does not mean a new covenant but a new way of living the one covenant.

³³ M. Simon, *op. cit.* 88, notes the telling flaw in *Barn.*'s argument—the omission of Ex. 34:1-4 (the giving of the second tablets to Moses).

3.6; 7.1-12.11). This true understanding was a spiritual, not a literal application of the covenant.³⁴ For *Barnabas* the “new” covenant was not really new but rather the correct application of the “old,” which had never had a chance.³⁵ The author wrote of another pattern (*Barn.* 6.11—ἄλλον τύπον), a second fashioning or refashioning (*Barn.* 6.13—δευτέρων πλάσιν; 6.14—ἀναπεπλάσμεθα) rather than another covenant. It was to prevent the people of the *renewed* covenant from falling into the same pattern of misunderstanding, as had the original people of the covenant, that the author wrote (*Barn.* 2.10; 3.10; 4.1-2).³⁶ The prophecy to Rebekah was seen as the earliest prophecy that the original recipients of the covenant would be replaced by others. What may have made the prophecy (and the one of Jacob to Joseph’s sons) significant was that it was given before the rebelliousness of those first recipients.

The proposal in this paper is that the author of *Barnabas* did not see two distinct religions (Judaism and Christianity) or even two covenants (old and new) but that he saw a struggle between two peoples claiming to be the one, true, legitimate heirs of the one, true covenant (*Barn.* 6.19).³⁷ He did not use the terms “Jews” and “Christians” but “us” and “them.” “Them” referred to the rebellious people of the Exodus and their spiritual descendants. “Us” referred to the authentic Israel, the followers of Jesus who interpreted God’s requirements correctly.³⁸ That the language of “Jews”

³⁴ See particularly *Barn.* 12 for the clearest example: the spiritual interpretation of circumcision. J.G. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* (Oxford 1985) 158, points out that *Barn.* was not the first to have spiritualised the Law. Philo had criticised allegorising Jews who had abandoned literal observance (Philo, *Mig. Abr.* 89-93).

³⁵ This is the point made by S. Lowy, *op. cit.* 1, when he contrasted Justin and *Barn.* on fasting: “By this device [contrasting ‘us’ and ‘them’] he [Barnabas] proves his racial thesis: the Jews misunderstood the law when applying it in its literal sense. Fasting was never intended to be a practical institution, and the verses were meant to bear a ‘spiritual’ interpretation, which alone was originally intended to be the true exegesis of the Law.”

³⁶ Indeed, if the author feared that there was a chance that some in his community would imitate the way of misunderstanding, it suggests that that way was attractive if not familiar to them.

³⁷ J.C. Paget, *op. cit.* 52: “. . . there is only one covenant, that which the Jews lost by worshipping the golden calf, and which the Christians have gained through Christ’s saving work on the cross . . .” I would not use the terms “Jews” and “Christians” here but, as I believe *Barn.* saw it, those who clung to the defunct Mosaic version of the covenant and those who belonged to the authentic covenant as revived by Jesus.

³⁸ W. Horbury, *op. cit.* 325, distinguishes between Jews and Christian Judaizers. The argument of this paper partly is that *both* could be “them” for *Barn.*

and "Christians" was not employed may be an indication that there were still a significant enough number of Christian Jews in the community.³⁹ Certainly the way one interprets "us" and "them" in *Barnabas* will determine the extent to which one believes the Christians and the Jews had gone their separate ways by this time.

Support for this interpretation can be found in the mentioning of the prophecy to Rebekah, where the author of the letter indicated that the prophecy was in reference to who was the legitimate heir to the covenant (in the singular) (*Barn.* 13.1—ἡ διαθήκη), not to a struggle between two covenants. The twins in the womb represent the false heirs and the true heirs rather than non-Jew and Jew or non-Israel and Israel (as Hellenistic Judaism and Jewish Midrash understood it) or even Jew and Christian (as Tertullian saw it). Thus the point that some commentators find so worthy of comment—that *Barnabas* is so anti-Judaic in content yet so Jewish in method⁴⁰—is not so remarkable, for the author was not against Judaism but rather against false Judaism (or, for true or authentic Judaism, which was found in the followers of Jesus). It would seem that *Barnabas* was composed at a time when "Jew" and "follower of Jesus" had not yet become mutually exclusive terms. Jewish people were not excluded from being "us" provided that they were followers of Jesus. Perhaps the scholar who holds the most similar view is Prigent, who described *Barnabas* as being anti-cultic rather than anti-Jewish.⁴¹ The point at issue is how one defines terms like "Jew" and "Judaism."⁴² Thus, the view of Barnard that "the Jewish

³⁹ Such a position would be strengthened by an early dating of *Barn.* (under Vespasian or Nerva) rather than a later (under Hadrian). See P. Richardson & M.B. Shukster, "Barnabas, Nerva, and the Yavnean Rabbis," *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 34 (1983) 31-55.

⁴⁰ W. Horbury, *op. cit.* 318.

⁴¹ P. Prigent, *op. cit.* 29-83. On 83, he concludes: "Ce n'est plus là le spiritualisme des *Testimonia* mais une attitude plus radicale, il ne s'agit plus d'opposer le judaïsme au christianisme, mais l'humanité naturelle à la nouvelle création." The review of this work by R.A. Kraft, *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 13 (1962) 405, notes that Prigent generally has avoided a term that is "conventional and misleading." Cf. J.C. Paget, *op. cit.* 56-57, who rejects this because he sees *Barn.* as being more than anti-cultic. While this can be accepted, it does not mean that *Barn.* was anti-Jewish. More accurately, I am arguing, he was against one type of Judaism.

⁴² Only if the term "Jew" meant that it excluded Christians could then one understand *Barn.* as being anti-Jewish. The crucial question is the extent to which, by the time *Barn.* was written, Judaism and Christianity were mutually exclusive entities, rather than overlapping ones. D. Georgi, "The Early Church: Internal Migration or New

nation was therefore inferior to the Christian Church, as the types indicate,"⁴³ is not sufficiently nuanced.

The argument of Johnson against those who have attempted to explain away the presence of anti-Jewish polemic in the New Testament—"These approaches are theologically motivated and are anachronistic. They isolate 'Christianity' over against 'Judaism' as though each was a well-defined entity when the polemic was written."⁴⁴—can, I believe, be used against those who argue for the presence of anti-Jewish *qua* anti-Jewish polemic in *Barnabas*, if one accepts that this community still had the presence of a significant number of what we may term Christian Jews. The suggestion that the author himself may have been of Jewish origin supports this overall position.⁴⁵

Certainly "us" would have contained most of the Christians whether of Jewish or Gentile origins⁴⁶ (with the exception of Judaizing Christians whether of Gentile or Jewish origin)⁴⁷ and "them" would have contained

Religion," *Harvard Theological Review* 88 (1995) 35-68, focuses on the pluralism of first-century Judaism, of which Christianity was a part.

⁴³ L.W. Barnard, *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background* (Oxford 1966) 126. His point, that *Barn.* does not seem to have drawn directly on *Rom.*, is sound.

⁴⁴ L.T. Johnson, "The New Testament's anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 108 (1989) 422.

⁴⁵ L.W. Barnard, *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background* 47, identifies the author as a converted rabbi. The Jewishness of *Barn.*'s Christian community is not to be downplayed. Cf. H. Schreckenberg, *op. cit.* 174: "Der Verfasser war wohl eher Heidenchrist als Judenchrist. Er versucht, unter radikaler Eliminierung des Judentums das Alte Testament alter Geschichtlichkeit zu entkleiden und ausschließlich für die Kirche zu reklamieren."

⁴⁶ *Barn.* 12.11 (citing Is. 45:1); 13.7 (citing Gen. 17:5) and 14.7-8 (citing Is. 42:6-7; 49:6) refer to the calling of the nations (the Gentiles) and from this it is clear that "us" included a significant number of Christian Gentiles. It would be wrong though simply because of this to conclude that "us" were *exclusively* of a Gentile origin. Thus, R.A. Kraft, *The Apostolic Fathers, vol. 3: Barnabas and the Didache* (New York 1965) 39, goes too far when he concludes that the author and his community were non-Jewish because "the community is expressly identified with uncircumcised Gentiles (13:7; 14:5-8; cf. 3:6; 16:7-9)." The reference to τὰ ἔθνη in *Barn.* 16.2 is to the heathen and was not used in a positive sense at all.

⁴⁷ These would be those at *Barn.* 4.6 who claimed the covenant belong both to "us" and "them," whom K. Wengst, *op. cit.* 112-14, described collectively as *Normalchristentum*. They are normal only from our perspective, not *Barn.*'s. Wengst argues that it was this group, rather than Jews in general, who posed a real problem for *Barn.* Cf. M. Mach, "Justin Martyr's *Dialogus cum Tryphone Iudaeo* and the Development of Christian Anti-Judaism," in O. Limor & G.G. Stroumsa (eds.), *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemic*

most of the Jews (with the exception of the Christian Jews).⁴⁸ That *Barnabas* did not use the terms "Jews" and "Christians" is understood in this paper as an indicator that he found these terms unhelpful or they were not yet available to him in distinguishing who the twins of Rebekah were. In other words, a sizeable number of Christian Jews in the community would mean that *Barnabas* had to explain the struggle between the twins as the struggle between the non-authentic and the authentic people of the covenant. On the other hand, that the author wrote about the real heirs to the covenant

between Christians and Jews (Tübingen 1996) 27, who believes that it is by no means clear that Judaizers were a worry to *Barn.* P. Richardson & M.B. Skukster, *op. cit.* 38-39, identify those referred to in *Barn.* 4.6 as Jewish Christians (in this paper termed Christian Jews—see next note). S.G. Wilson, "Gentile Judaizers," *New Testament Studies* 38 (1992) 611-612, raises the possibility that they were Gentile Judaizers.

⁴⁸ J.C. Paget, *op. cit.* 56, comes close to this position when he wrote: "Up to that date [A.D. 115] Jews constituted a significant force in that area [Alexandria/Egypt], and could not possibly have been ignored by Christians, particularly as many Christians probably hailed from a Jewish background, and the Jewish community was much more numerous than the Christian." (emphasis added). Also, L.W. Barnard, *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background* 52 and 126: "The 'former people' were the Jews who had lost the privileges of the covenant; 'this people' were the Christians (both Jews and Gentiles)." Although on 134 he emphasises the anti-Jewish nature of *Barn.* as he sees it. Surely it would be too much to expect that the Christians of Jewish origin no longer thought of themselves as being in any way Jewish? That Paget has not really considered the point he seems to have made is clear on 58 when he discussed "the possibility of a movement towards Judaism." Might it not be more an issue of how far some Christians had moved away from rather than towards Judaism? B.A. Pearson, *op. cit.* 150, accepts that a split between Jews and Christians was not complete until A.D. 115-117. See B.J. Malina, "Jewish Christianity or Christian Judaism: Toward a Hypothetical Definition," *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 7 (1976) 46-57; A.F.J. Klijn, "The Study of Jewish Christianity," *New Testament Studies* 20 (1974) 419-431 and L. Gaston, "Judaism of the Uncircumcised in Ignatius and Related Writers," in S.G. Wilson (ed.), *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, vol. 2: Separation and Polemic* (Ontario 1986) 34-35; cf. S.K. Riegel, "Jewish Christianity: Definitions and Terminology," *New Testament Studies* 24 (1978) 410-15; R. Murray, "Defining Judaeo-Christianity," *Heythrop Journal* 15 (1974) 303-310; G. Quispel, "The Discussion of Judaic Christianity," *Vigiliae Christianae* 22 (1968) 81-93. Given the disagreement about terms it is important for the reader to be aware of my definitions. "Christian Jew" is used here to denote a Jewish person who becomes a Christian. "Jewish Christian" or, perhaps more helpfully, "Judaising Christian" denotes a Christian, whether of Jewish or Gentile origin, who advocated a closer adherence to Jewish religious law and custom than became the Christian norm. To be consistent one ought to refer to "Christian Gentiles" rather than "Gentile Christians" for those of a pagan origin who became Christian (the latter term being reserved for those, like Paul, who advocated a minimal adherence to Jewish traditions). Only as more Christians were born into Christian families did dropping these adjectives make sense.

rather than, say, the real Israel, may be an indication that a growing number of Christian Gentiles made that identification no longer appropriate. This cannot be proven because of the paucity of evidence but it must remain a possibility.

Paget has put forward the view that *Barnabas* contains a somewhat clumsy attempt at transforming the normal interpretation of the Rebekah prophecy to suit the author's perspective. In *Barn.* 13.1 "them" (εἰς ἐκείνους) refers to the "former people" (ὁ πρῶτος), while "us" (ἡμᾶς) refers to "this people" (οὗτος ὁ λαός), which Paget takes as an indication that the author was quoting his source that the Jews were the first people, yet in *Barn.* 13.6 the author referred to τὸν λαὸν τοῦτον εἶναι πρῶτον (the new interpretation which for Paget asserted that the Christians not the Jews should be first).⁴⁹ This is clumsy only if the reference to πρῶτον in *Barn.* 13.6 was used chronologically rather than in rank order of importance. Paget's point, though, that for *Barnabas*, there was only ever one group who belonged to God, stands.

It is hoped that this new reading of *Barnabas*, particularly the Rebekah passage, addresses the concerns expressed by Lowy: "Scholars have paid very little attention to Barnabas' exclusive usage of the words 'they' and 'we' instead of Jews (including Jewish-Christians) and Gentiles."⁵⁰ If one may interpret *Barnabas*' interpretation of the Rebekah prophecy, it is argued in this paper that the author would have seen Jacob as the father of true believers, or the true people of the covenant, not simply Jews. The choice of a phrase like κληρονόμοι τῆς διαθήκης⁵¹ was deliberate, for *Barnabas* had not yet made a distinction between Christian and Jew as later Christian writers would. Perhaps *Barnabas* was written on the very cusp of a clear and permanent division emerging, rather than some time after.

Although it is recognised generally that he knew and used *Barnabas* as one of his sources,⁵² Justin Martyr, when he came to write his *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, lived in a changed environment. By the middle of the second century A.D., as the number of Christian Jews declined and the vast

⁴⁹ J.C. Paget, *op. cit.* 163-165.

⁵⁰ S. Lowy, *op. cit.* 29.

⁵¹ *Barn.* 6.19; 13.1,6; 14.6.

⁵² M. Mach, *op. cit.* 28; M. Simon, *op. cit.* 151; O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study of Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile* (Leiden 1987) 110-13, concludes that Justin never copied an Old Testament quotation from *Barn.* Cf. M. von Engelhardt, *Das Christentum Justins des Märtyrers. Eine Untersuchung über die Anfänge der katholischen Glaubenslehre* (Erlangen 1978) 375.

majority of Christians were of pagan origins, a clear distinction had emerged between Christians and Jews.⁵³ This is evident in Justin's work with a clarity that is lacking in *Barnabas*.

At many points in the dialogue Justin referred to ἡμᾶς τὰ ἔθνη (*Dial.* 122.5) or otherwise indicated that most Christians were of Gentile origin,⁵⁴ in contrast to the Jews who were for him a distinct nation.⁵⁵ This universal dimension to God's people is much more apparent and received much greater emphasis in Justin than in *Barnabas*. For Justin, God's people mainly comprised Gentiles who believed in Jesus as well as (μετά) the just descendants of Jacob (here understood as Jews).⁵⁶ Yet one senses in Justin that Jews who became Christian were Jews no more.⁵⁷

Although there is a reference in the dialogue to Rebekah (*Dial.* 46.3) it is made only in passing. In the section of the dialogue that is concerned with the call of the Gentiles (*Dial.* 109-111, 115-125, 130) and God's present relationship with the Jews (*Dial.* 112-114, 131-136) is found Justin's mention of Jacob and his brother (*Dial.* 134.5). Mach believes that this ref-

⁵³ S.G. Wilson, "Marcion and the Jews," in S.G. Wilson, *op. cit.* 45-58, highlights the importance of understanding Marcion's attitude towards the Jews in order to understand Justin's position.

⁵⁴ Jus. *Dial.* 10.3; 11.3; 12.1 (citing Is. 55:3-5); 13.2 (citing Is. 52:10); 14.4-7 (citing Is. 55:3-5 again); 16.2; 24.3-5 (citing Is. 45:1-3) (O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 328, notes that "House of Jacob" here meant the Jews); 26.2-3 (citing Is. 42:6-7,10); 28.4; 29.1; 34.3-6 (citing Ps. 72, esp. vv.11,17); 34.8; 43.1; 52.4; 64.1; 92.3; 109 (citing Mic. 4:1-5); 115.1 (citing Zech. 2:14-3:2); 119.3 (citing Zech. 2:15 again); 120.3; 121.1 (citing Ps. 72:17 again); 121.4 (citing Is. 49:6); 122.3 (citing Is. 42:6); 122.4-5; 123.1-2; 130.1-2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Even the "you" of the *Dial.* is Trypho and all other Hebrews of the circumcision; 14.8 (ὁ λαὸς ὑμῶν); 17.1 (contrast between others nations and yours); 30.1; 38.1 (the Jewish regulation to have nothing to do with the Christians); 44.1-2; 52.2-3; 77.4; 108.1; 110.5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 26.1 (though the context makes it clear that Christian Gentiles were definitely in the majority).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 39.1-2. At 47.1-4 Justin seemed to accept that Gentile Christians who kept the Law would be saved provided they did not force other Christian Gentiles to adopt their practices. S.G. Wilson, "Gentile Judaizers" 609-610, on the basis of Jus. *Dial.* 46-7, distinguishes two particular types of Gentile Christians here: those who adopted Jewish customs while remaining Christian and those who abandoned Christianity to join the synagogue (in addition to those Gentile Christians who were not attracted to Jewish ways at all). In *Dial.* 47.4 Justin also referred to the pressure Christian Jews exerted on Christian Gentiles to observe traditional practices. Anyone who exerted pressure to observe the Law (be they Gentile or Jewish in origin) was not looked upon favourably by Justin. See H. Remus, "Justin Martyr's Argument with Judaism," in S.G. Wilson, *op. cit.* 66-74.

erence belonged to the tradition found in *Barnabas* and Tertullian.⁵⁸ Yet there are a number of differences that need to be explored carefully, beginning with the general context. In an earlier passage, Justin saw the prophecy God gave Jacob in Gen. 28:14, about all families of the earth being blessed in Jacob, as being given to him because he was the ancestor of the Christ through whom indeed all the peoples had been called, but not being given to Esau (*Dial.* 120.1).

More immediately one must consider ch. 134 itself. It continues the argument from the previous chapter that the Jews had remained stubborn in their disobedience of God. Even though the Jewish leaders were able to point to Scriptural proof-texts to justify their actions, Justin was determined to demonstrate the inaccuracy of their interpretation. The example concerned was the number of wives a man might have. Jewish leaders looked to the patriarchs as justification for allowing several wives. Justin countered that in Jacob's marriage to the sisters Leah and Rachel (Gen. 29:16-30) the Jews were meant to see the older sister Leah as a representative of Jews and synagogues and Rachel as the Church, and to discern God's message that the Christ was to come to serve and to restore to dignity the children of all the wives (*Dial.* 134.3).⁵⁹ It had nothing to do with how many wives one could have.⁶⁰ This was the main point of the chapter. Mention of Jacob and his brother was secondary.

There was no reference to the Rebekah prophecy but merely to the animosity that existed between Jacob and Esau (Gen. 27:41). Thus Mach's point needs modification. It was on the basis of that animosity that Justin could draw the parallel: as Jacob was hated by his brother, so too Jesus and the Christians were hated by the Jews, even though they were brothers. This provides a reason for identifying Jesus (more so than the Christians) with Jacob. For Justin, the connection was Jacob = Israel = Jesus (*Dial.* 134.5—*Ἰσραὴλ ἐπεκλήθη Ἰακώβ· καὶ Ἰσραὴλ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ἀποδέδεικται, ὁ ὢν καὶ*

⁵⁸ M. Mach, *op. cit.* 41, n. 61, states that Justin presented "Jacob [as] the father of the Church and Esau the father of the Jews."

⁵⁹ B.Z. Bokser, "Justin Martyr and the Jews," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 64 (1973) 114, adds that the poor vision of Leah was used as a statement of Jewish blindness. O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 343, notes: "The introduction of the bondmaiden motif is not called for, and it only blurs the logic of the Leah-Rachel typology."

⁶⁰ S. Krauss, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 5 (1893) 129-130, mentioned that this allegation about Jewish multiple marriages was not found in other Christian writers and that Justin's charge was all too accurate. L.W. Barnard, "The Old Testament and Judaism in the Writings of Justin Martyr," *Vetus Testamentum* 14 (1964) 402, takes this as another example of Justin's familiarity with Judaism.

καλούμενος Ἰησοῦς). To introduce an argument based on the prophecy to Rebekah that identified Esau with the Jews, would simply have obscured Justin's point.

Throughout the dialogue Justin sought other grounds as well upon which to identify Jacob with Jesus. The speckled-herd payment to Jacob was a prefiguring of Jesus redeeming the many human races (*Dial.* 134.4-5). Schreckenberg refers to other connections Justin made:

Jakob ist ein "Typus Christi" (*Dial.* 140,1 zu Gn 30,1ff.); die wunderbare Wirkung von Holzstäben weist vor auf das Kreuzesholz Christi (*Dial.* 86,2 zu Gn 30,37-38), ebenso deutet darauf der Stab Jakobs (*Dial.* 86,2 zu Gn 32,11); das Erlahmen von Jakobs Schenkel ist eine Vorherverkündigung der Kraftverlustes und des Leidens Jesu am Kreuz (*Dial.* 125,2 zu Gn 32,25), und es ist der präexistente Christus, mit dem Jakob ringt (*Dial.* 126,3 zu Gn 32,25.31-32).⁶¹

In quoting Ps. 24, Justin equated Jesus as the king of glory who enters through the opened gates, on the basis of his resurrection and ascension, rather than Solomon.⁶² Therefore, for Justin, the reference in Ps. 24:6 to the God of Jacob was equivalent to saying the God of Jesus,⁶³ establishing his point that the Christ had been called Jacob in the Scriptures.⁶⁴ In chapter 75 Justin again equated Jesus with Jacob through a combination of Scriptural texts.⁶⁵ Justin reminded his readers later that he had proven already that the Christ was called both Jacob and Israel.⁶⁶ Other proof-texts could be employed. Is. 42:1-4 was quoted to prove the connection.⁶⁷ Is. 49:6 was understood to mean that the tribes of Jacob were the Christians and that Jacob was the one who was a light for the Gentiles (*Dial.* 121-122). Is. 43:15, with its reference to Israel the king, had to be, for Justin, a reference to Jesus the king, associated with the suffering servant of Is. 42:1-4 again (*Dial.* 135.1). Just as Jacob was given the name Israel because he had overcome the power against him, so Jesus could be called Israel

⁶¹ H. Schreckenberg, *op. cit.* 189.

⁶² *Jus. Dial.* 36.5. B.Z. Bokser, *op. cit.* 112, knows of no known Jewish interpretation which equated Solomon with the king of glory.

⁶³ *Jus. Dial.* 36.3-4.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 36.2. O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 176, locates this chapter as part of *Jus.*'s discussion on the new law (*Dial.* 11-42) and that here the emphasis was on Christ's universal rule.

⁶⁵ Beginning with Ex. 23:20-21 and Num. 13:16 where Joshua/Jesus is the angel of God. *Jus.* went on to state that Jesus was also called Israel, as was Jacob. This part was repeated at *Dial.* 113.

⁶⁶ *Jus. Dial.* 100.1,4; 114.2; 130.3; 140.1.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 123.8-9.

because he had overcome the power of the devil in the desert.⁶⁸ Indeed, it was Jesus himself who had wrestled with Jacob.⁶⁹ As part of his proof that God's new, universal covenant had been established in Jesus, Justin wanted to demonstrate that Jesus was the Christ by demonstrating that Scriptural prophecies about the Christ had been fulfilled by Jesus. Some prophecies were not exclusively about the Christ, but Justin wanted to show that they also could only have been fulfilled by Jesus who is God. It is here that the connection between Jesus and Jacob was first made.

Jacob was also a figure for the Christians, and for Justin that was based on several arguments, but it has to be admitted that this interpretation probably derived from a separate tradition (perhaps Justin's own conclusion) from the one which identified Jacob with Jesus. That latter identification is the dominant one in Justin, for, if Rachel is a figure for the Church then Jacob as Jesus fits with that, whereas Jacob as a type for Christians does not. Jacob's name (Israel) was to be given to all who fled to the Father through Jesus (ὅτι πάντες οἱ δι' αὐτοῦ [Jesus] τῷ Πατρὶ προσφεύγοντες), but the Jews were only the children of Jacob through the fleshly seed (ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ σαρκικὸν σπέρμα τοῦ Ἰακώβ τέκνα ἔστέ) and that alone was no guarantee of their salvation.⁷⁰

Justin's purpose in this work was to demonstrate that the covenant God established with the Jews ended with the coming of Jesus.⁷¹ Not that Justin said that the Jews were thereby automatically now excluded, but that God had established a new covenant in order that all people, not just one, might be party to it (unlike *Barnabas*, Justin did indeed write of a *new* covenant [*Dial.* 11.4—ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη]). This was the true Israel: all those who are led to God by the crucified Christ.⁷² Rather than see no value in the covenant God established with Moses or the requirements of that

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 125.3-5. Further, just as Jacob was pained in the hip because of that experience, Jesus too suffered. Jacob received from Israel (the Christ) the name Israel! H. Schreckenberg, *op. cit.* 189, links this passage with the earlier one at *Dial.* 86.2.

⁶⁹ *Jus. Dial.* 126.3. H. Schreckenberg, *op. cit.* 189, notes that in this episode Justin sees both "eine Vorhervorkündigung des Kraftverlustes und des Leidens Jesu am Kreuz" (in what happened to Jacob) and "der präexistente Christus" (in the one who wrestled with Jacob).

⁷⁰ *Jus. Dial.* 125.4. B.Z. Bokser, *op. cit.* 115.

⁷¹ *Jus. Dial.* 11.2-4; 82.1. B.Z. Bokser, *op. cit.* 103-106, notes that the Scriptural passages Justin cited (Is. 51:4; Jer. 31:30-32) do not suggest the future abrogation of Judaism.

⁷² *Jus. Dial.* 11.5; 122.2; 123.5-7 (citing Jer. 31:27; Is. 19:24-25; Ez. 36:12); 135.3,5; 136.1. O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 329, notes that seeing Christians as the house of Israel was not self-explanatory for Justin. On 326-353 he discusses two approaches to the concept of the new people of God: an association model and a substitution model.

covenant admitting only of a spiritual interpretation as *Barnabas* had, Justin could see some positive points in that covenant. Yet the people of Israel were so inclined to sin that they needed regulation to give them a chance.⁷³ Those who believe in the Christ had no need of such restraint.⁷⁴

Skarsaune notes that the texts cited in chapters 123 and 135 were the only ones that established that the Christians were Jacob and, moreover, he notes that Origen was the only other early Christian writer to mention them.⁷⁵ In ch. 123 he used Jer. 31:27; Is. 19:24-25 and Ez. 36:12 to support his argument. Indeed, at the end of ch. 123, Justin indicated that he did not know the new interpretation of the Rebekah prophecy, for he continued to associate Jacob with the Jews.⁷⁶ In ch. 135, not only was Jesus explicitly identified again as Israel and Jacob, but the Christians were identified as the true Israel.⁷⁷ Justin could see that the old Israel had been replaced by a new, and Is. 65:9-12 and Is. 2:5-6 were pressed into service. If the Jews were the house of Jacob physically, the Gentile followers of Jesus were the house of Jacob spiritually.⁷⁸

Like *Barnabas*, Justin appealed to Jacob as a figure of some significance for the followers of Jesus. However, he made no use of the prophecy to Rebekah to establish a connection between Jacob and Christians.

The other Christian writer before Tertullian who made reference to Rebekah was Irenaeus of Lyons. Patrological interest in Irenaeus, however, has not been focused on his views about the Jews, largely because his own interest in *adversus Haereses* was the struggle for orthodoxy within Christianity.⁷⁹ Irenaeus did make reference to the prophecy to Rebekah (*adv. Haer.* 4.21.2-3), but Williamson goes too far when he puts forward the view that much

⁷³ Jus. *Dial.* 19-22; 44.2; 45. T. Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law* (Missoula 1975) 51-56, examines the tripartite division of the law found in Jus. *Dial.* 44.2.

⁷⁴ Jus. *Dial.* 26; 46-7 (where believing in the Christ and keeping the Law were not incompatible for everyone).

⁷⁵ O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 350-352.

⁷⁶ Jus. *Dial.* 123.9: "Ὡς οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς Ἰακώβ ἐκείνου τοῦ καὶ Ἰσραὴλ ἐπικληθέντος, τὸ πᾶν γένος ὑμῶν προσηγόρευτο Ἰακώβ καὶ Ἰσραὴλ..." O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 187-188, notes that Justin did not conclude that Christians can be called Israel, but sons of God.

⁷⁷ Jus. *Dial.* 135.3: "Ὡς οὖν Ἰσραὴλ τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ Ἰακώβ οὕτως λέγει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ λατομηθέντες..."

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 135.6: "ὡς δύο οἴκους Ἰακώβ· τὸν μὲν ἐξ αἵματος καὶ σαρκός· τὸν δὲ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ πνεύματος γεγεννημένον."

⁷⁹ M.A. Donovan, "Irenaeus in Recent Scholarship," *The Second Century* 4 (1984) 219-241, for example, has nothing to say about Jews in recent scholarship.

of the fourth book was a discussion of the relationship between Gentiles and Jews and that Irenaeus belonged firmly to the *adversus Iudaeos* genre.⁸⁰ The most one could say, more realistically, was that Irenaeus knew and used some of that tradition, not for its own sake, but in order to advance his argument against the Gnostics that there was but one God. Bacq has presented a structural analysis of the fourth book and divides it into three sections: chs. 1-19 about the one God being the author of both Testaments, chs. 20-35 about the one God being revealed by the prophets, and chs. 36-41 about human free response to God's call.⁸¹ Thus the destruction of Jerusalem was not for Irenaeus a sign of the lesser importance of the God of the Jewish Scriptures, as it was for the Gnostics he opposed, but one that the city had served its purpose in bringing forth the Christ (*adv. Haer.* 4.4.1). Irenaeus could thereby maintain a positive but limited role for Judaism: positive, in that it was the seedbed that God used to bring forth the Christ, but limited, in that its role ended with the coming of that Christ (*adv. Haer.* 4.4.2). The primary objective of the chapter, however, remained that of reaffirming that it was the one God who established both the old law and the new. Throughout these chapters Irenaeus sought to identify the God of the old covenant as the God of the new by demonstrating that the new covenant was prophesied in the old and that therefore it was the one God at work (e.g. *adv. Haer.* 4.7.1-3). That addressed the main concern of Irenaeus: the arguments of the Gnostics.

It does have to be admitted that this approach, which salvaged the Jewish Scriptures for Christianity, did not retain the Jews as God's people any longer, as far as Christians were concerned. By neither seeing nor accepting the Christological dimension to the old covenant, the Jews could not really know God because they did not know the Son.⁸² Irenaeus was quite specific in identifying the Jews: *Propter hoc Judaei excesserunt a Deo, Verbum eius non recipientes, sed putantes per seipsum Patrem sine Verbo, hoc est sine filio, posse cognoscere Deum.*⁸³ What Jesus did was to free people from the yoke or bondage of the Mosaic law (*adv. Haer.* 4.13.2) which had first been imposed because the Jews had abused the liberty God had given them through their disobedience and stubbornness (*adv. Haer.* 4.15.1-2).

For Irenaeus, not only did the old law foretell the coming of the Christ,

⁸⁰ C.L. Williamson, *op. cit.* 283.

⁸¹ P. Bacq, *De l'ancienne nouvelle alliance selon S. Irénée: Unité du livre IV de l'Adversus Hareses* (Paris 1978).

⁸² Mt. 11:27; Lk. 10:22; Jn. 3:35; 13:3.

⁸³ Iren. *adv. Haer.* 4.7.4. See also 4.26.1.

so too did the prophets. They were witnesses to the working of the Word throughout history and foretellers of his coming as human (*adv. Haer.* 4.20.4-5). The theme of there being one God continued into the second section of the book. It is in this context that the Rebekah prophecy must be understood. The Gentiles who believe in Jesus (*ex gentibus credunt in Christum Iesum*) were prefigured in Abraham, who believed God's promise that the nations would be justified through faith (*adv. Haer.* 4.21.1). The inference Irenaeus intended his readers to draw was that it was the same God who achieved this in Jesus who also had announced it to Abraham. Abraham thus had typological significance. It was because it was the one God that Abraham's faith and Christians' faith were one and the same (*eo quod una et eadem illius, et nostra sit fides . . .*).

Isaac, the father of the twins, also had typological significance (*adv. Haer.* 4.21.2—*non sine significatione*). It is worth drawing attention to the fact that Irenaeus mentioned Isaac, for his focus was on Rebekah and her twins, not Isaac. His purpose (as it had been with mentioning Abraham) was to demonstrate that the God who made the prophecy to Rebekah was the same God who brought this to fulfillment in Christ and (as it had been with mentioning Abraham) that God's plan of salvation was based on free choice (*adv. Haer.* 4.21.2). Here Irenaeus quoted Rom. 9:11 (*ut secundum electionem propositum Dei permaneat, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante . . .*). Irenaeus adopted the Pauline interpretation that this prophecy was about God's freedom to choose, demonstrated by his choosing the younger twin rather than the older.

However, Irenaeus went further than Paul by identifying the two nations born to Rebekah (one in bondage, one in freedom) as the Jews and the Christians. The Christians, who have believed in Jesus, are later in time than the Jews (and Irenaeus' quoting of Jn. 19:15 leaves no room for doubt that they were whom he meant) who did not (*adv. Haer.* 4.21.3—*In Christo autem universa benedictio: et propter hoc benedictiones prioris populi a Patre surripuit posterior populus . . .*). Irenaeus spent no time establishing that the Christians were the younger nation. The Christians were Jacob for, as in the case of Jacob and Esau, they had snatched away the blessings of the former people (the Jews). There were other connections between Christians and Jacob that did not rely directly upon the prophecy to Rebekah: just as Jacob was persecuted by Esau for taking the latter's birthright, so too the Church was persecuted by the Synagogue,⁸⁴ just as the tribes of Jacob were born

⁸⁴ Iren. *adv. Haer.* 4.21.3: "Ob quam causam fratris patiebatur insidias et persecutiones frater suus sicut et Ecclesia hoc idem a Judaeis patitur."

in a strange country (Gen. 30:25), Jesus was in a strange country when he generated the twelve foundations of the Church; just as Jacob was promised payment with various coloured sheep (Gen. 30:31-43—Irenaeus did not mention the goats), Jesus gathered various people together; and just as Jacob had children by the two sisters and the two slaves (Gen. 29:31-30:24), Jesus gathered people from the two laws and from slave and free (*adv. Haer.* 4.21.3).⁸⁵ The chapter finishes with a mention of Rachel as a figure of the Church.

Irenaeus used elements from various traditions but combined them in a manner previously unknown. He had an acknowledged debt to the Pauline understanding of the Rebekah passage as being about God's freedom, combined with part of what is found in *Barnabas* that the younger son no longer represents Israel as traditionally understood.⁸⁶ As Irenaeus did not know *Barnabas*,⁸⁷ this is a strong argument for the existence of *testimonia* which served as a common source (unless it were a coincidentally independent idea for both). The mention of the twelve tribes, the coloured sheep, and the wives of Jacob (the last two having some parallel in Justin) could also be derived from such Testimonies, but perhaps directly from Justin himself, because the overlapping typologies there (Leah-Rachel/slave wife-free wife; Jacob-Jesus, Rachel-Church/Jacob-Christians, Rachel-Church) are found also in Irenaeus.

V

Now we return to Tertullian. He made no use of the Pauline emphasis on God's free election of the younger twin (whom Paul regarded still as representing Israel). Perhaps he was aware of Paul's association of Jacob with Israel and did not find that helpful for his purposes, or perhaps the whole argument about election was superfluous to his position. Certainly, although Romans was frequently referred to in Tertullian, Rom. 9:10-13 never received mention anywhere in Tertullian's writings.

When it came to identifying the typological significance of Jacob and Esau, Tertullian was more explicit than *Barnabas*. As has been argued here, *Barnabas* nowhere referred to Jews and Christians because such a clear-cut

⁸⁵ See O. Skarsaune, *op. cit.* 343, for the doubling up and confusing of these images in Jus.

⁸⁶ The younger son for *Barn.* being those Jews and others who believed in Jesus, while for Irenaeus he was the Church, clearly distinguished now from the Jews.

⁸⁷ R.M. Grant, *Irenaeus of Lyons* (London 1997) 1.

distinction had not emerged at the time of the composition of the letter. For *Barnabas*, the covenant God established with the people at Sinai had been abandoned by them immediately but it had been revived through Jesus. The people of the covenant were those who followed Jesus, whether they were of Jewish or Gentile origins. The prophecy to Rebekah was proof in *Barnabas* that this substitution would take place. Tertullian, writing a century later, lived at a time when the division between Jews and Christians had been well cemented into place and thus he had no qualms in identifying Esau with the Jews and Jacob with the Christians (*adv. Iud.* 1.5-6). However, Tertullian did not adopt *Barnabas'* view that there was only one covenant, rather he accepted that there were two—old and new (*adv. Iud.* 2.9-10; 6.1-2). He did not make the point, as had *Barnabas*, that the first people had lost the covenant at Sinai; instead, Tertullian made the point that the Jews, throughout their history, whether under Moses or their kings, had been guilty of idolatry (*adv. Iud.* 1.6-7). Further, Tertullian made no use of Gen. 48:18-19, Jacob's blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh, anywhere in his writings.

It would seem reasonable to conclude that, if he knew *Barnabas*, Tertullian had no direct dependence upon that work's interpretation of the prophecy to Rebekah.

As has been noted above, one of the major interests of Justin in his dialogue was to establish Jacob as a figure for Jesus. The prophecy to Rebekah was never mentioned by Justin. Therefore it did not form any part of his argument; the animosity between Jacob and Esau, the speckled herd of Jacob, the staff of Jacob, the suffering of Jacob, and the marriage of Jacob with Rachel (the Church) did. Even though Justin went on, in one or two places only, to identify the Christians with Jacob, the prophecy to Rebekah played no part.

Irenaeus, on the other hand, did make use of the Rebekah prophecy. Unlike any other early Christian writer before him, he adopted a Pauline interpretation, arguing that this passage from Genesis displayed God's freedom of election. However, unlike Paul, he presented the younger twin as a type of Christians. Here Irenaeus held a similar position to *Barnabas* (though different in the fact that *Barnabas* did not employ the term "Christians"). In Irenaeus, for the first time, is found the association between Jacob and the Christians because as a people the Christians appeared after the Jews. This was to be the main argument produced by Tertullian to support his own interpretation.

To this extent, Irenaeus and Tertullian were closest in outlook. However,

Tertullian had no use for Irenaeus' Pauline position nor for his other supporting arguments (the persecution of Christians by Jews, the speckled herd, or the children of the different wives). Indeed, the idea that the Christians were more recent than the Jews and that the Jews had been unfaithful to God's covenant throughout history were the only arguments Tertullian needed to establish that the younger twin was really a typological representation of the Christians.

Perhaps the most significant adaptation of the Rebekah prophecy by Tertullian was its structural context in *adversus Iudaeos*. Like his other writings, this too displays the influence of classical rhetoric.⁸⁸ After an *exordium* detailing the occasion of the composition of the treatise (*adv. Iud.* 1.1-3a), Tertullian provided a *narratio* that contained the basic outline of the history of God's promise of divine grace (*adv. Iud.* 1.3b-7): God had promised universal salvation through Abraham, God promised to Rebekah that the younger nation would overcome the older, the Jews had forsaken the covenant time and again, and the Gentiles had turned from idolatry to faithfulness. All of this led to the *partitio*, the statement of the question at the heart of the rhetorical exercise and the position Tertullian hoped to persuade his readers to adopt. At *adv. Iud.* 1.2 and 3a, Tertullian stated his position that Gentiles could be admitted to God's law (*posse gentes admitti ad dei legem*). At 1.8 this was refined: Gentiles were not only admitted to God's grace but had replaced the Jews. From this followed the *refutatio* (*adv. Iud.* 2.1b-6.1) proving that the Jewish covenant had gone and a *confirmatio* (*adv. Iud.* 6.2-14.10) proving that the new covenant had come.

The point here is that for Tertullian the Rebekah prophecy was not merely one argument among many. It was at the very heart of the treatise. It was a succinct statement of God's intention to replace the Jews with Christians. All that Tertullian considered about the law, circumcision, the Sabbath, the coming of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem was as proof that this prophecy had been fulfilled.

VI

When one examines the use of a particular Hebrew Scriptural text at the hands of early Christian writers, one is left with three options for a conclusion: either there was a direct dependence of one author upon another (although one also has to allow for some injection of editorial originality

⁸⁸ R.D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford 1971).

by the later into the inherited material), or there was a common source or sources (again, allowing for individual contribution or modification to that source/s), or there were some very like-minded early Christian writers.

It is well accepted that early Christian writers made use of *testimonia*, and modern scholars have long developed their thoughts about whether there was one or several collections of extracts from the Hebrew Scriptures, and whether they were oral or written.⁸⁹ As Williams noted, the fact that several authors referred to the same texts means little; what is important is their interpretation. What we have seen with the Rebekah passage suggests that whatever use the authors considered might have made of *testimonia*, they also had their unique manner of remoulding that inherited material to suit their particular outlooks. Although some trajectory can be traced throughout the century under consideration, each author used the material in remarkably different ways and for remarkably different purposes.

How well known was this *testimonium* about Rebekah in late second-century Carthage? This we do not know. The fact that in *de Pudicitia* Tertullian did not explain what he meant when he referred to Rebekah's twins thus must mean one of at least two possibilities: the reader of that work was presumed to have access to *adversus Iudaeos*, or else this Christian interpretation of Gen. 25:23 was widely and commonly known.

In this paper it has been my intention to demonstrate that careful attention to particular arguments reveals that the *Adversus Iudaeos* literature of early Christianity is not as repetitive as Ruether or Stroumsa suggest.⁹⁰ Rather, we have to endorse the sentiment of Simon when he wrote: "... the monotonous and stereotyped nature of the anti-Jewish literature ought not to be exaggerated."⁹¹ Although the early Christian writers considered in this paper shared much in common in their interpretations of the Rebekah prophecy, they each handled their material, reworked it and added to it in ways that were unique to each of them.

The Rebekah prophecy continued for Christian writers after Tertullian to be a profitable argument against the Jews. In concluding we may note Tertullian's near contemporary, Hippolytus who, as quoted by Jerome, identified Esau with the first people and the devil, and Jacob with the Church or the Christ, and cited the prophecy to Rebekah (Jer. *Ep.* 36).

⁸⁹ E.g., A.L. Williams, *op. cit.* 3-13; L.W. Barnard, *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background* 109-135; M. Simon, *op. cit.* 154-155.

⁹⁰ G.G. Stroumsa, "From Anti-Judaism to Antisemitism in Early Christianity?" in O. Limor & G.G. Stroumsa, *op. cit.* 8.

⁹¹ M. Simon, *op. cit.* 140.

We may note also the north African Christian writers Cyprian (*Test.* 19) and Augustine (*adv. Iud.* 7[9]). One could also mention Commodian and Paulinus of Nola among other Patristic writers who made use of the Rebekah prophecy. Some associated this passage of Genesis with other passages and many added their own insights to the developing Christian interpretation. The final point to make is that they were all selective in their references to Rebekah's twins. None of them mentioned the blessing Isaac finally gave Esau, that eventually he would throw off Jacob's yoke from his neck (Gen. 27:40).

I am grateful for the encouragements and suggestions of Assoc. Prof. Pauline Allen of the Australian Catholic University who read drafts of this article.

Department of Theology, Australian Catholic University
P.O. Box 247 Everton Park, Q, 4053, Australia

APPENDIX B

Geoffrey D. Dunn, "*Pro temporum condicione: Jews and Christians as God's People in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*," in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, vol. 2, ed. Pauline Allen et al., (Brisbane: Australian Catholic University, Centre for Early Christian Studies, 1999), pp.315-341.*

*Pro Temporum Condicione: Jews and Christians as God's People
in Tertullian's Adversus Iudaeos*

I

On the basis of the assertion that Patristic anti-Judaic literature was "rather repetitive in its argumentation",¹ a number of scholars have concluded that, from about the middle of the second century AD, possibly starting with Justin, there was little, if any, real contact between Christians and Jews; that, therefore, the dialogue setting of a number of pieces of this literature was a literary fiction; and that these works dealt not with contemporary issues but only antiquarian ones.² If that is accepted by these scholars as being true of early Christian anti-Judaic polemic in general, it holds for Tertullian in particular.³

¹ G.G. Stroumsa, "From anti-Judaism to antisemitism in early Christianity", in O. Limor and G.G. Stroumsa (eds), *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews*, Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism, vol. 10 (Tübingen 1996), 8.

² A. von Harnack, *Die Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani nebst Untersuchungen über die antijüdische Polemik in der alten Kirche*, TU1/3 (Leipzig 1883); idem, *Judentum und Judenchristentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho*, TU 39 (Leipzig 1913), 47-98; M.S. Taylor, *Anti-Judaism & Early Christian Identity: A Critique of the Scholarly Consensus* (Leiden 1995); D.R.A. Hare, "The relationship between Jewish and Gentile persecution of Christians", *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 4 (1967), 446-456; R.R. Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York 1974), and eadem, "The *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition in the church Fathers: the exegesis of Christian anti-Judaism", in P.E. Szarmach (ed.), *Aspects of Jewish Culture in the Middle Ages* (New York 1979), 27-50 (although M.S. Taylor, *Anti-Judaism*, 149-151, points out inconsistencies in Ruether's position that there was little contact between Jews and Christians in the Patristic age); D. Rokeah, *Jews, Pagans and Christians in Conflict* (Leiden 1982); idem, "Anti-Judaism in early Christianity", *Immanuel* 16 (1983), 50-64; M. Mach, "Justin Martyr's *Dialogus cum Tryphone Iudaeo*", in *Contra Iudaeos*, 30.

³ L. Gaston, "Retrospect", in S.G. Wilson (ed.), *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, Studies in Christianity and Judaism, no. 2 (Waterloo, Ont. 1986), 163-164: "To judge by the work of Tertullian, it arises out of an inner-Christian theological debate rather than out of rivalry with a living Judaism. It seems not to be the case that Tertullian looked at contemporary Judaism and found something lacking or that he was motivated by personal animosity toward specific Jewish persons." (M.S. Taylor, *Anti-Judaism*, 7-8, 145, characterises Gaston as supporting the "conflict theory" of Marcel Simon, even though he claims not to be.) S.G. Wilson, *Related Strangers: Jews and Christians 70-170 C.E.* (Minneapolis 1995), xiv: "Tertullian and others seem to do little more than sum up in rather wooden fashion what has already been fought out and decided." H. Tränkle, *Q.S.F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos: mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar* (Wiesbaden 1964),

This is a position against which I wish to argue. However, in so doing, I do not wish to move to the opposite extreme and argue that early Christian anti-Judaic literature was not repetitive, that there was contact between Christians and Jews, that the dialogue settings were authentic, and that the works dealt with contemporary issues. What I wish to propose is that not all four ideas need be logically or necessarily consequent or dependent upon each other. In other words, one may accept one or more of these ideas without having to accept all four together. Indeed, a number of scholars have done so, even though they have not drawn much attention to the fact.⁴ These are important issues to raise because they are inter-related with other historical, literary and social interpretive questions. They are the questions, as Carleton Paget has stated succinctly, that dominate scholarly work.⁵

lxviii-lxxxviii. On lxvii he writes: "...nachdem die Trennung der Gemeinden einmal vollzogen war, die Kirche mit der Synagoge nichts mehr zu tun hatte..." and concludes from this: "Die bisherigen Erwägungen mahnen auch zur Vorsicht bei der Neigung, Tertullians Schrift gegen die Juden einen aktuellen Anlaß zu geben..." and "Dazu kommt als Wichtigstes, daß eigentlich der gesamte Inhalt von Iud. der schon bezeichneten literarischen Tradition entnommen ist." (lxviii); D.P. Efroymson, "Tertullian's anti-Jewish rhetoric: guilt by association", *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 36 (1980), 25, seems to support the position of Simon that Christianity defined itself in relation to Judaism throughout the Patristic age, yet, in an earlier work (idem, *Tertullian's Anti-Judaism and its Role in his Theology* [unpub. PhD diss., Temple University, 1976], 61-79) he makes it clear that his position is that references to Jews in Tertullian are mainly references to biblical Jews not contemporary ones, that Tertullian had little if any contact with Jews and that much of his work was unoriginal; R.S. MacLennan, *Early Christian Texts on Jews and Judaism*, *Brown Judaic Studies* 194 (Atlanta 1990), 119, 137-138; H. Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1.-11. Jh.)* (Frankfurt/ M. 1982), 217; T.D. Barnes, *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford 1985, 2nd edn), 92 and 330 (where, although he revises his earlier opinion, Barnes seems prepared only to admit observation of Jews rather than contact with them).

⁴ E.g. G.F. Moore, "Christian writers on Judaism", *Harvard Theological Review* 14 (1921), 198, stated that there was an abundance of real controversy between Christians and Jews but that the written works were literary fictions with the Jewish opponents mere straw figures. On 199 he made the point that the arguments in the Christian literature were repetitive and were purely biblical.

J. Carleton Paget, "Anti-Judaism and early Christian identity", *Zeitschrift für Antike und Christentum* 1 (1997), 195: "Did the Christian *Adversus Judaeos* tradition, and indeed Christian anti-Judaism in general, reflect genuine disputes between Christians and Jews, so that it could be understood either as a response to a threat posed by the Jewish community to the ascent church, or as an attempt to convert Jews to Christianity? Or, contrary to this thesis, was it literature which should be understood without any reference to an outside Jewish reality, and seen rather as the result of internal tendencies within Christian theology and poetics?"

It is my intention to demonstrate, through an examination of the early chapters of Tertullian's *Adversus Iudaeos*, that, were one to accept the setting of the treatise (as having been occasioned by an exchange between a Jewish proselyte and a Christian) as a literary fiction, it does not follow, as a matter of necessity, that there was no contact between Christians and Jews in Carthage in Tertullian's time or that the treatise did not deal with issues that were relevant to them at that time.⁶ Further, it is my intention in this paper to explore the arguments of Tertullian's *refutatio* in *Adversus Iudaeos* in order to achieve a clear insight into his understanding of Christian and Jewish identity and relationship (not only with each other but also with God). This should provide a small contribution to an appreciation of Tertullian's sense of Christian spirituality and self-identity, one that was to stand in stark contrast with the Jewish cultic spirituality. This will be achieved within a framework of rhetorical analysis for, although Michael Mack says that an exposition of Tertullian's rhetorical techniques would require a paper of its own,⁷ this is something, at least with regard to *Adversus Iudaeos* (to which Mack was referring), that has not been done. As with my investigation of the *narratio* of the treatise, questions of the work's authorship and integrity will not be addressed here because such controversy is usually only attached to the second half of the treatise.⁸

From a rhetorical perspective, I would argue that Tertullian's treatise *Adversus Iudaeos* was written to persuade its readers to accept one key point. That key point is mentioned explicitly, as one would expect, in what I believe is the work's *partitio*: "Sic namque populus minor, id est posterior, populum maiorem superavit, dum gratiam divinae dignationis consequitur, a qua Israël est repudiatus."⁹ The *partitio* was expressed according to the interpretation Tertullian provided of Genesis 25:23 in his *narratio* (1.3b-7), viz., that Esau, the elder twin,

⁶ I would agree with the statement of T. Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law* (Missoula 1975), 37: "...the fact that, after all, the adversary in such works is sketched as a Jew and not as someone else, imply that Christians were bothered by Jewish questions and that the Jewish community was not totally indifferent to the Jewish-Christian debate as Harnack supposed."

Mack, "Justin Martyr's *Dialogus*", 32, n. 22.

G.D. Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah: a re-reading of an 'anti-Jewish' argument in early Christian literature", *VC* 52 (1998), 122.

Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 1.8; CCSL 2, 1341: "For thus has the 'less'—that is, posterior—*people* overcome the 'greater people', while it attains the grace of divine favour, from which Israel has been divorced". English translation is by S. Thewall in A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (rev. L.C. Cox) (eds), *The Ante-Nicene Fathers 3: Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian* Grand Rapids, Mich. 1885).

was a typological figure for the Jews and that Jacob, the younger twin, was a typological figure for the Christians.¹⁰ Tertullian's point, that Christians had replaced Jews as recipients of God's favour, would have been in contrast to an argument advanced by the (supposed) Jewish proselyte that the Jews remained God's people and they alone.

Having stated his position, Tertullian closed his brief *partitio* with an indication that he was ready to explore the entire question (2.1a). This he did, I am suggesting, by using the standard rhetorical elements of *confirmatio* and *refutatio*. In *Adversus Iudaeos* Tertullian commenced the body of argumentation with the *refutatio* (2.1b-6.1) rather than the *confirmatio*.

One has to ask why Tertullian inverted the standard rhetorical pattern of *confirmatio* and *refutatio*. As Robert Sider has noted on several occasions, Tertullian demonstrated an imaginative flexibility with regard to rhetorical structure, particularly the way in which form and content came together, such that, although often rhetorical structure and theological sequence of arguments coincide, sometimes it was the sequence of theological themes or biblical exposition that shaped the structure (most noticeably in his hortatory and epideictic treatises).¹¹ In this particular treatise, given that it was written in response to a supposed debate (whether that particular debate actually took place is irrelevant), where the arguments of the Jewish proselyte (and, by extension, of Jews in general) were in the public domain as it were, it is not surprising that Tertullian began with a rejoinder or rebuttal. Further, such an inversion of structure also suited his presentation of material. His argument followed a chronological pattern: God's *promise* that the law would be temporary (given throughout Jewish history) and God's *fulfilment* of that promise (by having a new law established through Jesus). The first part corresponds with the *refutatio*, the second with the *confirmatio*.

What makes the *refutatio* a particularly devastating and effective piece of rhetorical argumentation is that Tertullian used the evidence in the Hebrew Scriptures, on which the Jews themselves would have relied, against them. There is barely an allusion to the New Testament in the chapters that constitute the *refutatio*. Indeed, there are few references throughout the entire work. This would lend support to a view that Tertullian was too skilled a rhetorical controversialist

¹⁰ See Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah", 119-145.

¹¹ R.D. Sider, "Structure and design in the 'de Resurrectione Mortuorum' of Tertullian", *VC* 3 (1969), 177-196; idem, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford 1971), 21-40. For a further discussion on Tertullian's rhetoric see J.-C. Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique* (Paris 1972).

to use as argumentation evidence which an opponent would rule immediately as inadmissible. The fact that Tertullian was able to find nearly all of the ammunition he needed from the Hebrew Scriptures is an indication not that he was an antiquarian but that he knew how to achieve the most telling blows, for nothing could be more devastating to the Jews than the criticisms God had against them which were presented in the Scriptures.

Tertullian's purpose in this part of *Adversus Iudaeos* was to refute the argument that God's grace was only for the Jews by demonstrating that God's covenant with them was only temporary because God's plan ultimately was to have a universal covenant with humanity. His point was to illustrate from the Hebrew Scriptures themselves that it was God who had promised change; it was not some novel idea of the Christians. Some parts of the Scriptures were very critical of the way Jews had lived and were living the Mosaic covenant.

What of the structure of the *refutatio*? Tränkle believes that the question of the validity of the Jewish law dominates the first half of the treatise,¹² or at least the question of whether God has taken the option of rearranging or expanding it.¹³ He suggests that these early chapters are rather unsystematic.¹⁴ Aziza understands chapters 2-6 as forming a distinct section of the treatise which he entitles "le caractère temporaire de l'ancienne loi".¹⁵ He notes that 2.9-11 announces a focus on two practices of the Jewish law: circumcision and the Sabbath.¹⁶ From here on, though, Aziza's presentation of structure seems a little disjointed, merely listing the various component parts of chapters 3-6 without much sense of a unifying thread.¹⁷

I would suggest that a clear structure for the *refutatio* is provided at its conclusion (6.1). Tertullian summarised, employing antithesis, a rhetorical figure

² Tränkle, *Kommentar*, xxiv: "Die eigentliche Streitfrage, die Gültigkeit des jüdischen Gesetzes, tritt erst vom Anfang des zweiten Kapitels an in den Mittelpunkt."

³ *Ibid.*, xxvi: "Der Gedanke, daß Gott sein Gesetz erweitert, umgestaltet und—so muß er weitergeführt werden—schließlich herrlich zur Vollendung bringt, ist geradezu der Leitgedanke der ersten Hälfte von Iud."

⁴ *Ibid.*, xxviii: "Wir haben auch hier also das etwas planlose Weitergleiten des Gedankengangs"; xxx: "Die skizzenhafte Unfertigkeit scheint hier fast mit Händen zu greifen und bei näherem Zusehen glaubt man zu erkennen, wie sich die Gedanken des Autors erst allmählich während der Niederschrift formten."

C. Aziza, *Tertullien et le Judaïsme* (Nice 1977), 264.

Ibid., loc. cit.

Ibid., 266-267. Here he lists little sections about circumcision (2.13,14; 3.1, 2-3, 7), the law (8), the theme of two peoples (3.9-13), the Sabbath (4.1-6, 7, 8-11) and sacrifice (5.1-3, 4-6-7), interspersed with partial concluding sections (3.4-6; 4.10) and a final conclusion (6) without providing subheadings to show how they form distinct groupings.

of speech,¹⁸ what he had thus far achieved, namely a demonstration that there had been a temporal and an eternal Sabbath promised, a carnal and a spiritual circumcision promised, a temporal and an eternal law promised, and carnal and spiritual sacrifices promised.¹⁹ Thus we find discussion about the law (2.1b-10), circumcision (2.11-3.6), law and circumcision (3.7-13), Sabbath (4.1-11) and sacrifices (5.1-7), although, it has to be admitted, not in the same order as summarised at the beginning of chapter 6. All in all, Tertullian wished to prove that God never intended the covenant with Israel to be perpetual but rather that God would reform it according to the circumstances of the times ("pro temporum condicione").²⁰ Part of that reform would be a new spiritualised and eternal covenant with all people. We are now in a position to examine the arguments of these chapters in *Adversus Iudaeos* in a little more detail.

II

Tertullian commenced his *refutatio* by attempting to prove that one of the arguments (that God *had* given the law to only one people) in the Jewish position (that God *intended* to give the law to only one people)²¹ was false. In this he was following sound oratorical practice.²² That this argument was part of the Jewish position may be reconstructed from the way Tertullian opened his discussion with a rhetorical question (a fine way to grasp the listener's or reader's attention)²³ about why God would have given the law through Moses to one people and not to all people (2.1). To counter the Jewish position that God only intended to give the Law to the Jews, Tertullian wanted to show that the law, in reality, had not

¹⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 4.15.21; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.3.81. Cf. E. Osborn, "The conflict of opposites in the heology of Tertullian", *Augustinianum* 35 (1995), 623-639, who sees Stoic philosophy as the source of Tertullian's love of antithesis.

¹⁹ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 6.1; CCSL 2, 1352: "Igitur cum manifestum sit et sabbatum temporale ostensum et sabbatum aeternum praedictum, circumcisionem quoque carnalem praedictam et circumcisionem spiritalem praedicatam, legem quoque temporalem et legem aeternalem enuntiatam, sacrificia carnalia et sacrificia spiritalia praeostensa..."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.10; CCSL 2, 1343.

²¹ The (supposed?) Jewish argument presumably ran: the fact that God has given the Law to only one people must be taken as proof that God intended to give the Law to only one people. That Tertullian did not dwell on his opponent's arguments is good oratorical practice for, as Quintilian advised, it is not helpful to repeat an opponent's charge or amplify it (Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.13.27).

²² Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 1.42.79-1.43.81; Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.13.7.19.

²³ *Rhet. Her.* 4.16.23-24; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.6-16.

been given to one people alone. In other words, he wished to demolish the argument that underpinned the Jewish position.

First, in an inductive argument, the validity of which does not hold logically,²⁴ he stated that unless God gave the law to everyone then it would be impossible for proselytes to have access to it (2.1). This is a brief allusion back to the occasion of the treatise, but one that hastily was neglected. Next he presented the *locus communis* or *topos* of degree or possibility.²⁵ The purpose of an argument from the *locus communis* of degree was to advocate something because it was more advantageous: a person seeking to do good is more likely to do more good things than fewer.²⁶ This is precisely what Tertullian argued (2.2). God is both good and equitable (“bonitati dei et aequitati ipsius” [2.2]) and it therefore follows that God would give the law to all nations (“Sed...omnibus gentibus eandem legem dedit” [2.2]). This would serve to give God a motive for giving the law to all, for Tertullian wished to prove God “guilty” of such an action.²⁷ Establishing motive was an important forensic practice. Finally, Tertullian sought to demolish the Jewish assumption by examining God’s “*vita hominis ex ante factis*”, as the anonymous author of the treatise *Ad Herennium* described it, God’s manner of life, in the light of previous conduct (2.2-9).²⁸ In other words, as prosecutor in this conjectural matter, Tertullian wished to show that in the past God had committed “crimes” similar to the one with which Tertullian now “accused” God, viz., giving the law to others besides the Jews. We see here several examples of the oratorical consciousness of Tertullian.

Let us consider the details of this argument from manner of life. Tertullian stated that God had given a law to Adam and Eve about not eating the fruit from the tree in the middle of paradise (2.2; Gen. 2:16-17; 3:2-3). This law was the same as the law given through Moses (2.3), and here Tertullian exemplified that law by citing various Old Testament texts,²⁹ except in embryonic form. The one

²⁴ The most Tertullian should have concluded from the fact that proselytes were admitted as God’s people would be that God had given the law to *some* other people, not that God had given it to *all* other people, which is the conclusion he inferred (2.2: “Nisi enim omnibus eam dedisset...”).

²⁵ For degree see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.7.3-11 (1363b-1364a); Cicero, *Top.* 4.23, 18.68-71; Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.10.86-93; for possibility see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.19.1-15 (1392a-b); Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.10.95-99.

²⁶ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.7.3 (1363b 18-19):...ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων...μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι...

²⁷ *Rhet. Her.* 2.2.3; Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 2.5.19; Quintilian, *Inst.* 7.2.35-44.

²⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 2.3.5; Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 1.25.35; 22.10.32-34; Quintilian, *Inst.* 7.2.33-34.

²⁹ Deut. 6:4-5; Lev. 19:18; Ex. 20:13-16 (Deut. 5:17-20), 12 (Deut. 5:16), 17 (Deut. 5:21).

law about not eating the fruit enclosed the later law that was disclosed through Moses (2.6). Adam and Eve are typological references for all humanity, not just the Jews. Thus, before the law given to Moses, a written law, there was another, God-given law, an unwritten one, a natural one, the source of the later one (2.7). It was the law in its natural state which Noah, Abraham and Melchizedek followed and by which they were found righteous in the time before Moses (2.7). Hence, the law given through Moses was, one may suggest, merely the codification of what existed already (2.6b-7a,9). Thus Tertullian argued that, in the past, God had not given the law only to one people (in the person of Moses) but to all people (in the persons of Adam and Eve). If God had done so in the past, then the Jewish position that God only intended to give the law to one people was seen to be untenable and further, if God had done it once before, there was every likelihood that God would do it again. It was a standard forensic piece of logic,³⁰ even if Anthony Guerra has described it as "somewhat circuitous".³¹

Tertullian's conclusion is worth noting. From his statement that the law of Moses was a subsequent one, indeed a derivative one, ("sed ad subsequentem" [2.9]), he added that God had promised the law to the Gentiles, that God had reformed the law given through Moses as had been promised repeatedly through the prophets, and that that law was but temporary.³² To this point, Tertullian had given no evidence to support a claim that God had made promises to the Gentiles, nor that the law of Moses had been reformed nor that the law was temporary. The first conclusion could be argued from the possibility arising from contraries: if one thing is possible (giving the law to the Jews) then its opposite is possible (giving the law to the Gentiles).³³ The second really belongs to the *confirmatio*. The last conclusion seems to be based upon another *locus communis*, that of possibility: if the beginning of something is possible so too is its end.³⁴ Indeed,

³⁰ E. Osborn, *The Emergence of Christian Theology* (Cambridge 1993), 199, mentions the contrast between the temporary, particular law and the eternal, universal law with regard to Justin, *Dial.* but not with regard to Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* specifically. He does refer to Tertullian's argument from priority.

³¹ A.J. Guerra, "Polemical Christianity: Tertullian's search for certitude", *The Second Century* 8 (1991), 116.

³² Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 2.9; CCSL 2, 1343: "...quam certo tempore deus et gentibus exhibuit repromissam per prophetas et in melius reformavit, ut praemonuit futurum; ut, sicuti certo tempore data est lex per Moysen, ita temporaliter observata et custodia credatur."

³³ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.19.1 (1392a); Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.8.7.

³⁴ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.19.5 (1392a).

he had suggested the same thing a little earlier.³⁵ Tertullian wanted to protect God's sovereign right to change things depending upon circumstance (2.10) and the implicit suggestion was that if God had changed the law once, from being unwritten to written, then God could change it again into something else.³⁶ Indeed, the implicit suggestion Tertullian seems to have been making was that the unwritten law was God's real intention (because it was original and one could argue that what comes first is better than what follows—just as one could argue the opposite, if one needed to) and that the written law had to be only temporary if God's real intention was to be fulfilled.

Is this approach unique to Tertullian? Even though some of the texts from the Hebrew Scriptures had been used by earlier Christian authors none had constructed the kind of position Tertullian had—that the law existed prior to Moses and that God was entitled to (and even expected to) reform it.³⁷ Although Justin, in his *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, while discussing the Christian attitude to the Jewish law, made mention of the fact that the law given on Horeb was for one people and the new law was given for all, that the giving of the new abrogated the old, and that the new covenant was the final one (esp. *Dial.* 11-12),³⁸ he had no argument that the old law was not perpetual because God was free to reform it since God was its author nor that the new law would be universal because that was God's intention revealed through Adam and Eve.³⁹ Only towards the end of Justin's treatment of the new law do we find any mention of the righteousness of those who lived before the law was given to Moses, and an association of those people with those who were followers of Jesus.⁴⁰ Although in chapter 46 Justin

³⁵ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 2.7: "Quid enim mirum, si is auget disciplinam qui instituit, si is perficit qui coepit?"

³⁶ Guerra, "Polemical Christianity", 116, notes the importance of this phrase in understanding Tertullian's attitude towards Judaism.

³⁷ Gen. 2:16-17 (Rom. 6:23; Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 5.18.1, 5.23.1; Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* 2.21); Gen. 3:2-3 (Rom. 6:23; Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 5.23.1); Deut. 6:4-5 (Mk 12:29-30; Matt. 22:37; Ignatius, *Smyrnaeans* 6; Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 4.2.2, 5.22.1; Clement, *Prot.* 8.80.4, 10.108.5; Clement, *Strom.* 3.4, 5.14.115); Lev. 19:18 (Mk 12:31; Matt. 5:43, 19:19, 22:39; Rom. 13:9; Gal. 5:14; Jam. 2:8; Ignatius, *Smyrnaeans* 6; *Didache* 1.2; *Hermas* 3; Clement, *Prot.* 10.108.5).

³⁸ See Stylianopolous, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, 78-90.

³⁹ Justin, *Dial.* 11-12.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.4; PG 6, 572: Ἐπεὶ οἱ τὰ καθόλου καὶ φύσει καὶ αἰώνια καλὰ ἐποιοῦν, εὐάρεστοί εἰσι τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τούτου ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ὁμοίως τοῖς προγενομένοις αὐτῶν δικαίοις, Νῶε καὶ Ἐνῶχ καὶ Ἰακώβ, καὶ εἰ τινες ἄλλοι γεγονάσι, σωθήσονται σὺν τοῖς ἐπιγνοῦσι τὸν Χριστὸν... O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile*,

asked Trypho about whether those who lived before Moses who were considered righteous could be saved, even if they had not observed the precepts of the Mosaic law (and asked in such a way the answer was obvious), Justin did not draw the conclusion from this that God intended a universal law with all people. All that Justin concluded was that one did not need to observe the provisions of the law in order to be saved.⁴¹ Although Justin made many of the same points that Tertullian would he did not draw them together in the same way that Tertullian would. It would seem that Justin was more interested in establishing that some of the Mosaic law was valid but incomplete until its fulfilment in Jesus, while other parts of the law, established because of Jewish hardness of heart, only had temporary validity (*Dial.* 44.3).⁴²

Nor do we find these kinds of arguments in the *Epistle of Barnabas*. What we find there is not the argument that came to predominate in Christian literature, viz., that the old law was replaced by the new. Instead we find the argument that there was only one law, the one established in Jesus, for, according to the author, what was commonly thought of as the old law was in fact no law at all, for Moses smashed the tablets of the covenant before they came into effect.⁴³

Not only is Tertullian's argument not found any earlier, it is not found in any of the passages of his other writings where he employed these scriptural texts, for, even though in some parts of *Adversus Marcionem* he did refer specifically to the replacement of the old by the new law, what he was referring to was the way in which Jesus made the old law superfluous by extending it.⁴⁴ In *Adversus Marcionem* we do find a more positive attitude on Tertullian's part with regard to the Jewish law, but this is not surprising in the context of the treatise

Supplement to *Novum Testamentum* 56 (Leiden 1987), 168, connects ch. 44-47 to the earlier treatment on the new law in ch. 11-43.2.

⁴¹ See Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, 51-68, on Justin's tripartite division of the law.

⁴² Osborn, *The Emergence of Christian Theology*, 201.

⁴³ *Barn.* 4.7-8, 14.1-5. See Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah", 128-129. R. Hvalvik, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant: The Purpose of the Epistle of Barnabas and Jewish-Christian Competition in the Second Century*, *Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament* 2. Reihe 82 (Tübingen 1996), 100: "...we find that Barnabas repeatedly stresses that the Jews worship God in a way which is not in accordance with his will... The same holds true for their circumcision in the flesh (9:4), their literal understanding of the food laws (10:2,9), and their sabbath observance (15:8). In other words: it is the Jews who do not follow God's commandments".

⁴⁴ Tertullian, *De pud.* 5.2; *De spec.* 2.8, 3.2; *De mon.* 7.7; *Scorp.* 2.3; *De cult.* 2.2.5; *De cor.* 11.1; *De an.* 38.3; *Adv. Marc.* 1.23.4, 1.29.4, 2.4.6, 2.17.4, 4.27.4, 4.35.3, 4.36.5, 5.4.11-12, 5.14.11, 5.17.15, 5.18.13.

where Tertullian sought to defend the Hebrew Scriptures from the Marcionite attack. Richard Hanson saw no conflict between Tertullian's attitude towards the Jewish law in *Adversus Marcionem* and the first part of *Adversus Iudaeos*; indeed, it was confirmation for him of Tertullian's authorship of at least the first part of the latter treatise.⁴⁵ Only in *Adversus Iudaeos* is there the argument that the old law was replaced because, as its author, God had that freedom and because, as was shown in Adam and Eve, God had always intended a universal law. This makes this chapter of *Adversus Iudaeos* original in Christian anti-Judaic literature.

III

Circumcision and the observance of the Sabbath are signs of the law and the arguments that hold for the law in general would hold for circumcision and the Sabbath in particular, but this did not deter Tertullian from treating these two matters as though they were separate issues, thereby creating the impression that his *refutatio* was based on a large number of impressive points, a kind of rhetorical *frequentatio* or *consummatio*.⁴⁶

The discussion about circumcision follows the same pattern as that with regard to the law and God's previous conduct. The Jewish position was stated and Tertullian invited his opponent to prove that, in the past, God had counted people righteous only if they had been circumcised.⁴⁷ Knowing that he was moving on to prove the opposite, Tertullian's invitation seems to be a display of rhetorical hypophora, inviting one's adversary to say something in their favour which they cannot.⁴⁸ If circumcision were so vital, why was Adam never circumcised after he had sinned, Tertullian asked (2.11). Again, Adam has typological significance for all humanity ("sobolem eius" [2.12]). If great figures of the past, in the time prior to the time of Moses, were acceptable to God without circumcision (Abel, Noah, Enoch, Melchizedek, and Lot), then it could be argued that God was free to find other people, particularly those living now,

⁴⁵ R.P.C. Hanson, "Notes on Tertullian's interpretation of Scripture", *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 12 (1961), 276.

⁴⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 4.40.52-4.41.53; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.103.

⁴⁷ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 2.10; CCSL 2, 1343: "Denique qui contendit et sabbatum adhuc observandum quasi salutis medellam et circumcisionem octava die propter mortis comminationem, doceat <et> in praeteritum iustos sabbatizasse aut circumcidisse et sic amicos dei effectos."

⁴⁸ *Rhet. Her.* 4.23.33-4.24.34; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.3.98.

equally righteous without circumcision (2.12-14).⁴⁹ The conclusion I have mentioned, though, was left unsaid by Tertullian at this point; the examples were to speak for themselves.

One gains the impression that this exchange had been part of the encounter that sparked the writing of this treatise or of other similar such encounters, for Tertullian was able to make reference to two Jewish counter-arguments. The first was that all this may be true but that Abraham (the father of faith) was circumcised (3.1). Putting dialogue onto the lips of one's opponents was part of rhetorical style, provided that it was in keeping with that character's personality.⁵⁰ Thus we can not determine from this seeming interjection anything conclusively about the occurrence of the earlier debate. Of course Tertullian repeated this position only because he felt confident it could be demolished: Abraham had been pleasing to God before he was circumcised. Thus circumcision was a sign of that relationship, not its prerequisite.⁵¹ The second Jewish counter-argument was about the necessity of the circumcision of Moses' son (Ex. 4:24-26). This seemed to be proof for the validity of the threat attached to the covenant God made with Abraham: any male not circumcised would be cut off from his people (Gen. 17:14). Tertullian responded that had circumcision been necessary for life rather than just as a sign of the covenant, Moses would have circumcised his son when the latter was eight days old, not later, and that what was necessary for one could not be made necessary for everyone (3.2). Indeed it was only necessary for Moses' son because Moses could hardly make circumcision compulsory for everyone if his own son had been excluded (3.3). That Tertullian admitted that circumcision was required of the Jews may seem to be a weakness in his case, one of which he was aware, for he seems to take a new tack and argue that circumcision was the sign that enabled the Jews to be singled out and identified because of their unfaithfulness (here Tertullian cited Is. 1:7-8; 2:15,4) and so that they could be prohibited from entering Jerusalem when it was captured (3.4-6).⁵² The ultimate purpose of physical circumcision was for punishment.

⁴⁹ In these sentences not only did Tertullian refer to circumcision but also to the observance of the Sabbath (and even, with Cain, to the offering of sacrifices [2.12]). Only from 3.1 did he separate the arguments.

⁵⁰ *Rhet. Her.* 4.43.55, 4.52.65; Cicero, *Orat.* 25.85; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.29-37.

⁵¹ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 3.1; CCSL 2, 1344: "Acceperat enim circumcisionem, sed quae esset in signum, [temporis illius] non in salutis praerogativam".

⁵² The same point is made at *Adv. Iud.* 13.3-4, again with reference to Is. 1:7 (and this time Is. 33:17).

The rest of chapter 3 of *Adversus Iudaeos* presents passages from the Jewish Scriptures which indicate the coming of a new covenant and a new circumcision. What is to be found here suggests that Tertullian did not wholly revise these early chapters in the light of his concluding summary of 6.1. Had he done so, one would expect to find the material in 3.7-13 concerned specifically with the law to be integrated into 2.1b-10. The passages employed by Tertullian were Jeremiah 4:3-4 (spiritual circumcision), Jeremiah 31:31-32 (new law), Isaiah 2:2-4 (the call of the Gentiles), and Psalm 17 (18):44-45 (the obedience of the new people). These were to prove not only that there now was a spiritual circumcision and a new law, but that the old, physical circumcision and old law had been obliterated and hence were only temporary. Further, the new law and spiritual circumcision were there for people (particularly Gentiles) who were obedient to God's desires rather than disobedient and difficult. Tertullian had scope to engage in figures of speech involving contraries:⁵³ physical and spiritual, old and new, obedient and disobedient, temporary and eternal (although this last concept is not found specifically in this part of the chapter).⁵⁴ Tertullian's main interest with circumcision was in the contrast between physical and spiritual, yet he did make the point that because the physical had been replaced by the spiritual, the physical had been temporary ("Sic ergo circumcisio carnalis, quae temporalis erat..." [3.7]).

Thus, although in the first half of chapter 3 Tertullian had argued against the practice of circumcision, he was able to argue in favour of circumcision, provided that it was understood in the spiritual, allegorical way that prophets like Jeremiah had.⁵⁵

Again it can be asked whether the interpretation about circumcision was original to Tertullian. In a passage of *Barnabas*, which Carleton Paget argues preserves an idea original to its author,⁵⁶ we find reference to several of the same passages of the Jewish Scriptures to which Tertullian would later refer⁵⁷ as well

⁵³ *Rhet. Her.* 4.18.25-26; Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.10.2, 9.3.99.

⁵⁴ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 3.8; CCSL 2, 1346, refers to Is. 2:2-3 being concerned "in novissimis diebus".

⁵⁵ P.G. van der Nat, "Tertulliana I", *VC* 18 (1964), 22, noted with reference to *De cult.* how Tertullian often attacked someone or something only then to use that position himself to advance his argument.

⁵⁶ J.N.B. Carleton Paget, "Barnabas 9:4: a peculiar verse on circumcision", *VC* 45 (1991), 242-254. Cf. L.W. Barnard, "The 'Epistle of Barnabas'", in *ANRW* 2/27, 184, who sees the author being influenced by the Tannaitic catechism.

⁵⁷ Ps. 17 (18):44; Jer. 4:3-4 (twice); and Is. 1:2.

as others.⁵⁸ As one would expect from *Barnabas*, the argument is that God never had intended circumcision to be understood literally and that those who did had been influenced by an evil angel.⁵⁹

There is some degree of similarity between the use of the Jewish Scriptures in *Barnabas* and in Justin's *Dialogus* with regard to circumcision (and a degree of similarity between Justin and Tertullian therefore). We find Jeremiah 4:4 at *Dialogus* 15.7 and 27.2; Deuteronomy 10:16 (together with verse 17) at *Dialogus* 16.1 and Jeremiah 9:25 at *Dialogus* 28.2.⁶⁰ Carleton Paget's conclusion, like Skarsaune's, though, is that Justin did not rely upon *Barnabas* but that they both had access to the same tradition.⁶¹ The argument used by Tertullian about circumcision being a sign making Jews easily identifiable for the purposes of keeping them out of Jerusalem (*Adv. Iud.* 3.4, 6) is found in Justin (*Dial.* 16.2, 92.3),⁶² both in connection with Isaiah 1:7. Justin, like Tertullian, did not indicate that circumcision was never meant to be taken literally but that a new or second

⁵⁸ Is. 33:13; Jer. 7:2-3; Ps. 34:13; Ex. 15:26; Is. 1:10; 40:3; Deut. 10:16; Jer. 9:25; Gen. 17:23, 27; 14:14. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 72, points out that where Justin used Jer. 9:25 (*I Apol.* 53.11), he, like the author of *Barnabas*, used it from a non-LXX source, possibly a common textual tradition.

⁵⁹ *Barn.* 9.4. I accept the argument of Carleton Paget, "Barnabas 9:4", 242, that *κατήργηται* should be translated as "rejected" rather than "abolished", particularly because it agrees with 4.7-8. Hence, this reference at 9.4 should not be taken as any indication of the abolition of circumcision under Hadrian but of its rejection by God as a literal command. Idem, *The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 64 (Tübingen 1994), 146: "Rather his claim is that the *literal interpretation* of what is a good commandment is evil because the Jews were deceived into interpreting the commandment in such a way by an evil angel. All this seems to indicate that what B. has written here was his own creation". Hvalvik, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant*, 125: "once more the problem is that the Jews are practising a rite in opposition to what God had really ordained..." Hvalvik stresses that the evil angel did not give the command to circumcise but deluded the Jews into misunderstanding God's intention.

⁶⁰ Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 72, notes that in *Dial.* 28.2 Justin used Jer. 4:4 and 9:25 from the LXX.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit., and Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 146-147.

⁶² Justin, *I Apol.* 47, also referred to the prohibition placed on the Jews living in Jerusalem in connection with Is. 1:7, but without mention of circumcision. H.P. Schneider, "Some reflections on the Dialogue of Justin Martyr with Trypho", *Scottish Journal of Theology* 15 (1962), 172, notes that Justin's exegesis here is peculiar to this work. Schneider seems unaware of its presence in Tertullian. Tränkle, *Kommentar*, xxvii: "Hier wirkt also noch einmal jener schon erwähnte Gedankengang Justins herein, nach dem das Gestez erlassen worden war, um die Juden zu bestrafen. Darum, daß sich diese Anschauung schlecht zu der vorher unangefochtenen Lehre von der Allgemeingültigkeit des mosaischen Gesetzes fügte, hat sich Tertullian nicht gekümmert."

circumcision (δευτέρα^ς ἤδη χρεία περιτομῆς [*Dial.* 12.2]) was necessary because of a hardness of heart.⁶³ According to Justin, the Christians had no need of Jewish circumcision (*Dial.* 19.2; 29.1), for they had been circumcised with the stone of the words of the apostles which kept them from evil and not with the iron instrument which kept the Jewish hard-hearted (*Dial.* 24.2; 114.4). Tertullian was content to mention Jeremiah's call to the circumcision of the heart as the proof that the physical circumcision was at an end. Justin mentioned Adam being created uncircumcised, as well as Abel, Enoch, Lot, Noah and Melchizedek (*Dial.* 19.3-6, 92) and one could suggest Tertullian's dependence on Justin or a shared common source at this point.⁶⁴ As well, Tertullian's main interest in circumcision was in order to posit the contrast between physical and spiritual (3.7,11; 6.1) rather than between temporary and eternal (which was the contrast he used with regard to the law). Justin's interest in circumcision was primarily in terms of a contrast between physical and spiritual (*Dial.* 18.1-19.2; 24.1-3; 41.4; 43.2),⁶⁵ particularly the fact that Christians understood properly the demand for spiritual circumcision, as being what made Jewish circumcision no longer binding,⁶⁶ although he also referred to the contrast between temporary and eternal (*Dial.* 23.1-3; 29.1-2; 43.1-2).

On the other hand, Fredouille notes that Tertullian's use of Jeremiah 4:3-4 was different from Justin's.⁶⁷ In *Dialogus* 28.3, Jeremiah 9:25-26 was added to Jeremiah 4:3-4 and Justin argued about the uselessness of circumcision and the lack of time the Jews had in which to recognise this. Tertullian was more interested in showing the fulfilment of Jeremiah's prophecy and the abrogation of the old law.⁶⁸ Although Justin, like Tertullian, referred to Abraham with regard to the issue of circumcision, Justin did not make as much out of this as Tertullian would later. Justin seems to have conceded that the commandment to circumcise

⁶³ Justin, *Dial.* 18.2; 19.5; 43.1; 45.3; 46.5-7; 92.2-4.

⁶⁴ Tränkle, *Kommentar*, lxxx-lxxxi, almost was convinced of this when he noted that both Justin, *Dial.* 33.2, and Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 3.1, mention that Abraham was circumcised when Melchizedek offered him bread and wine which, in the light of Gen. 14:18 and 17:10 was a mistake. Yet Tränkle concluded: "Es liegt doch am nächsten anzunehmen, Tertullian habe beide Male aus derselben Quelle geschöpft."

⁶⁵ Skarsaune, *Proof from Prophecy*, 304, notes the connection between circumcision and baptism in Justin, *Dial.* 41.4.

⁶⁶ D.E. Aune, "Justin Martyr's use of the Old Testament", *Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society* 9 (1966), 194, refers to *proskairos* and *aiionios* as revealing Justin's key approach to the Hebrew Scriptures. See also Stylianopolous, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, 90-102, 133-141.

⁶⁷ Fredouille, *Tertullien*, 263.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 263-264.

obliged from the time of Abraham,⁶⁹ although we do find mention in Justin of Abraham being circumcised as a sign rather than cause of righteousness (*Dial.* 23.4), an argument he supported with reference to the fact that women could be righteous and they did not receive circumcision (*Dial.* 23.5). Tertullian observed, on the contrary, that even after Abraham there were some patriarchs who pleased God without having been circumcised (3.1). Despite this difference, it would seem probable to suggest direct dependence by Tertullian upon Justin, not only in the selection and presentation of the text as Skarsaune observes,⁷⁰ but, in part, in the interpretation drawn from the text.⁷¹ Certainly Tertullian did not follow Justin in accepting that following Abraham, until the hardness of heart set in, circumcision was necessary for salvation. Tertullian's argument about Moses' son, one that we do not find in *Barnabas* or Justin, countered that. Perhaps we see here something of a contrast between these two writers in terms of emphasis, in that Tertullian was not as expansive as Justin had been. Tertullian did not find it necessary to make use of Justin's reference to other nations which practised circumcision (*Dial.* 28).

Even though it would have to be admitted that, on the whole, the arguments employed by Justin and Tertullian were biblical ones, and thus had been used since the time of the prophets themselves, this is not so exclusively.⁷² Both authors, as has been noted, refer to the fact that circumcision was an identifiable mark that was used to prevent Jews from entering Jerusalem. Whereas, in the aftermath of the capture of Jerusalem in AD 70 under Vespasian

⁶⁹ Justin, *Dial.* 23.4; 43.1; 46.4. M. Hirsham, "Polemical literary units in the classical Midrashim and Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*", *Jewish Quarterly Review* 83 (1993), 378-381, examines any connection between Trypho's list of those parts of the Jewish law which remained after the destruction of the Temple (*Dial.* 46.2) and rabbinic interpretations as exemplified in *Mekhilta*, and concludes that the sources of *Mekhilta* may have been inspired by anti-Christian sentiment rather than that Justin was overly familiar with rabbinic Judaism. Schneider, "Some reflections", 170, for example, sees Trypho's understanding of Gen. 17:14 in *Dial.* 10 as parallel to *Haggadah*. See also L.W. Barnard, "The Old Testament and Judaism in the writings of Justin Martyr", *Vetus Testamentum* 14 (1964), 395-406. Cf. P. Sigal, "An inquiry into aspects of Judaism in Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho*", *Abr-Nahrain* 18 (1978-79), 74-100, who argues that "Justin was thoroughly and accurately familiar with the Judaism of the second century" (74).

⁷⁰ Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 450.

⁷¹ J. Nilson, "To whom is Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* addressed?", *Theological Studies* 38 (1977), 545, mentions the scholarly consensus that Justin was a source for Tertullian's *Adv. Iud.* Cf. Barnes, *Tertullian*, 106.

⁷² J.L. Kugel and R.A. Greer, *Early Biblical Interpretation*, Library of Early Christianity 3 (Philadelphia 1986), 143-144.

and Titus, Domitian's administration of the *fiscus Iudaicus*, which enabled the Romans to tax Jews who no longer practised their faith and Gentiles who had converted to Judaism, shows that Roman interest in circumcision to be for financial reasons,⁷³ under Hadrian Jews were banned from entering Jerusalem as a result of the Bar Kokhba revolt.⁷⁴ The evidence of Justin and Tertullian is that because of circumcision the Romans were able to enforce that ban.⁷⁵ Interestingly, neither Justin nor Tertullian refers to Hadrian's ban on circumcision,⁷⁶ something Smallwood believes cannot be used without reservation to date the lifting of the ban on circumcision of Jews to early in Antoninus' reign.⁷⁷ An alternative understanding would be to suggest that it would not help Justin's argument that Jews could be kept out of Jerusalem because of their circumcision or his argument that Jews and Christians were different because one kept a physical circumcision and the other a spiritual circumcision, if he acknowledged that, for a time at least, Jewish circumcision had been banned. What Justin wanted to be able to do was both contrast the physical circumcision of Abraham, which was a sign of his righteousness, with the physical circumcision of the Jews, which was a sign of their hardness of heart,

⁷³ E.M. Smallwood, "Domitian's attitude toward the Jews and Judaism", *Classical Philology* 51 (1956), 2-4.

⁷⁴ As well as Justin, *Dial.* 16.2 and Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 3.4-6, 13.3-4 see: Justin, *I Apol.* 47.6; Eusebius, *HE* 4.6.3-4; Eusebius, *Dem. Ev.* 6.18.10; Dio 59.12.2.

⁷⁵ Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 293, argues that the Scriptural passages Justin had employed were not strictly anti-circumcision passages, rather they had called for a true circumcision without eliminating physical circumcision. Justin's anti-circumcision argument is based on the historical punishment of the Jews (the ban on entering Jerusalem) which was as a result of their killing Jesus, the Just One (*Dial.* 16.4-5).

⁷⁶ *H.A. Hadr.* 14.2 (cf. Dio 59.12.1-2, who did not mention such a ban as a cause of the revolt of Bar Kokhba in AD 132). A. Lindner, *The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation* (Detroit 1987), 99, takes the fact that Justin made no mention of such a ban on circumcision in *Dialogus* as evidence that the rescript of Antoninus Pius (from Modestinus as cited in Justinian's *Digest* 48.8.11) permitting Jews to circumcise their sons was in effect before AD 155 when *Dialogus* was composed. See also E. Schürer (rev. G. Vermes and F. Millar), *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.-A.D. 135)*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh 1973), 537-540; E.M. Smallwood, "The legislation of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius against circumcision", *Latomus* 18 (1959), 334-347; eadem, "The legislation of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius against circumcision: addendum", *Latomus* 20 (1961), 93-96 (which is repeated in her *The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian* [Leiden 1981], 428-473); M.D. Herr, "Persecutions and martyrdom in Hadrian's day", *Scripta Hierosolymitana* 23 (1972), esp. 93-94, 98. Cf. H. Mantel, "The causes of the Bar Kokhba revolt", *Jewish Quarterly Review* 58 (1967/1968), 224-296.

⁷⁷ Smallwood, *The Jews*, 471.

and compare it with the spiritual circumcision of Christians, which was a sign of their righteousness. That Tertullian repeats Justin's mention of the ban on Jews entering Jerusalem is an indication that in *Adversus Iudaeos*, even though it may not be entirely contemporary with late second-century Carthage, his arguments were not restricted solely to biblical ones.

IV

When Tertullian turned his attention from circumcision to Sabbath, his focus shifted from physical and spiritual back to temporary and eternal (4.1.5). Like the previous parts of the *refutatio* this section depended upon rhetorical figures of speech involving contrast: yours and mine, temporary and eternal, human and divine.

He began by mentioning the Jewish belief that the Sabbath originated from the fact that after creation God rested on the seventh day (4.1b).⁷⁸ This became the basis for the Mosaic injunction: "Mementote diem sabbatorum, sanctificare eum; omne opus servile non facietis in eo, praeterquam quod ad animam pertinet."⁷⁹ Then his contrasts begin: the Jews keep the Sabbath once every seven days while the Christians keep the Sabbath "ab omnia opere servili" every day;⁸⁰ the Jewish Sabbath is despised by God (Is. 1:13; Ezek. 22:8) which was taken as an indication that their Sabbath was temporary and human, while the eternal and divine Sabbath announced in Isaiah 66:23 had been established in Jesus (4.2-4). In this brief section Tertullian was engaged in definition ("Ac per hoc quaerendum nobis, quod sabbatum nos deus velit custodire" [4.2])⁸¹ and he

⁷⁸ Gen. 2:2; Ex. 20:11, 31:17.

⁷⁹ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 4.1c; CCSL 2, 1347. The first part of this quotation is from Ex. 20:8, 31:14a; Deut. 5:12. Rather than adding the more detailed instruction about working being permitted for six days and that no one (son, daughter, slave, beast or visitor) may work on the Sabbath (as is added to the verses cited above—Ex. 20:9-10, 31:15; Deut. 5:14) (an important enough addition to be used by itself in a number of places—Ex. 23:12, 34:21, 35:2; Lev. 23:3), Tertullian has added Ex. 12:16b instead.

⁸⁰ Here we may sense another rhetorical *locus* from contrast: that which is harder to do (keep the Sabbath every day rather than just one day in seven) is a greater good—Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.7.32 (1365a).

⁸¹ In rhetoric, definition could be one of the *states* or *constitutiones* of the juridical *causa* (Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 1.8.10, 2.17.52-2.18.56; Quintilian, *Inst.* 7.3) or it could be one of the methods of interpreting written documents (Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 2.51.153-154; *Rhet. Her.* 2.12.17 [where the anonymous author considered the juridical *causa* and the interpretation of written documents to be one and the same thing]), or it could be used as a *locus communis* (Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.10.32-52, esp. 39-40, 44, 52).

followed most of the rhetorical requirements: a definition of the word in question offered (4.1); the connection between this definition and the "accused" (4.3-4); and the invalidating of the opponent's definition (4.2). What Tertullian omitted were the emotional and more personal *loci*.⁸²

Then comes a return of the argument from previous conduct, although not as explicitly as in chapter 2. One could presume that the readers could flesh out the details for themselves. In order to show that God now excused people from the observance of the Jewish Sabbath it would be helpful to show that in times past God had excused other people from the observance of the Sabbath and, further, that what God had done originally was more important for the present than what God had done in the more recent past (which we may term a *locus* of priority—what is older is better). Without going into that detail, Tertullian mentioned simply some of those who had lived without observing the Jewish Sabbath: Adam, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham and Melchizedek (4.6).

While, in the treatment of circumcision, Tertullian, unlike Justin, had looked to events subsequent to the giving of the command to Abraham (*viz.*, the late circumcision of Moses' son) to demonstrate that God intended a spiritual not physical value for circumcision,⁸³ in the treatment of the Sabbath Tertullian turned to events subsequent to the giving of the command to Moses and in these oratorical examples sought to demonstrate that God gave the Jews injunctions about the Sabbath only on a temporary basis.⁸⁴ Joshua and the people marching around Jericho for seven days necessitated their breaking the Sabbath command (4.8-9), as did the Maccabees who fought on the Sabbath (4.10). Although Tertullian concluded the chapter by stating that these examples made it clear that the Sabbath requirements were temporary rather than perpetual, the other point he made was that, even though God had established the requirement to observe the Sabbath, this was not hard and fast; it could be adapted to circumstances.⁸⁵ Here we witness Tertullian harking back to the point he had made in 2.10, which, I maintain, is central to the *refutatio*, *viz.*, that God was free to make changes.

Attention may once again be turned to the earlier anti-Judaic literature. While the possible presence of millenarianism in *Barnabas* 15.3-5 may draw

⁸² Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 2.18.55-56.

⁸³ Whereas Justin, who accepted that circumcision had a physical validity and was obligatory in the time after Abraham, argued mainly that such a validity was temporary.

⁸⁴ Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 4.7; CCSL 2, 1348: "...sed temporale fuisse praeceptum, quod quandoque cessarit".

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.11; CCSL 2, 1349: "Unde manifestum est, ad tempus et praesentis causae necessitatem huiusmodi praecepta non valuisse, non ad perpetui temporis observationem huiusmodi legem eis deum ante dedisse."

comment from scholars, it is the ethical interpretation of the Sabbath (*Barn.* 15. 1-2, 6-7) that is of interest in this paper for its possible connection with Tertullian. The author's reference to the Jewish Scriptures' statements about the Sabbath (*Barn.* 15.1,6 —with reference to Ex. 20:8 and Deut. 5:12) have been seen by scholars to have been influenced by Psalm 23 (24):4.⁸⁶ It is an interpretation that states that the Sabbath is observed not simply by resting from work, but by abstaining from evil and living a pure life. For the author such a thing was not possible in the present but only in the time to come when all things have been made new (*Barn.* 15.6-7).⁸⁷ This idea may be behind the otherwise enigmatic statement of Tertullian that Christians "sabbatizare nos ab omnia opere servili semper debere et non tantum septimo quoque die, sed per omne tempus" (4.2). Servile work was taken to mean not just normal physical labour but anything that defiled one's relationship with God; Tertullian was not suggesting that Christians were perpetually idle.

Skarsaune suggests that Isaiah 1:13 lies behind *Dialogus* 12.3-13.1.⁸⁸ Justin's only mention of the Sabbath with regard to the Christians resting from all (evil) work is a brief mention in *Dialogus* 12.3.⁸⁹ Other than that, Justin did not refer to the same passages from the Pentateuch that Tertullian would later employ (such as the story about Joshua taking Jericho) with regard to the Jewish Sabbath. Justin was emphatic in arguing that the Sabbath was instituted for the Jews as a means of subduing their hardness of heart by turning them from such things as the worship of idols, the sacrificing of children, the social neglect of the needy, etc.⁹⁰ He argued also that nature did not observe a Sabbath (*Dial.* 23.3), that there were circumstances that excused the observance of the Sabbath (such as the offering of sacrifice on the Sabbath or the practice of circumcision on the Sabbath) (*Dial.* 27.5), and that neither did the patriarchs before Moses observe the Sabbath.⁹¹ We can notice that Tertullian, unlike Justin, repeated the list of patriarchs when discussing the Sabbath while Justin was content merely to refer to his earlier list used in connection with circumcision, and that Tertullian used a different example

⁸⁶ Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 168.

⁸⁷ Hvalvik, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant*, 126, points out that the author wanted to show that the Sabbath God meant was a cosmic one at the end of time. It was to be sanctified by a holy life in the present age.

⁸⁸ Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 168-169.

⁸⁹ Justin, *Dial.* 12.3; PG 6, 500: Σαββατίζειν ὑμᾶς ὁ καινὸς νόμος διαπαντὸς ἐθέλει, καὶ ὑμεῖς μίαν ἀργούντες ἡμέραν εὐσεβεῖν δοκεῖτε, μὴ νοοῦντες διὰ τί ὑμῖν προσετάγη.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.2, 19.5-6, 21 (citing Ezek. 20:19-26), 27.2, 43.1, 45.3, 46.5-7, 47.2, 67.4, 10, 92.2-4.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 19.3-4, 23.1, 27.5, 92.2.

to illustrate the point that there were circumstances that over-rode the commands of the law.⁹² Tertullian did not take up Justin's point about the Sabbath being instituted because of a hardness of heart.⁹³

By the time Tertullian came to write *Adversus Marcionem*, given the different context and purpose of the treatise, it is not surprising that, in discussing the Sabbath, the arguments have been modified. The carrying of the ark around Jericho is mentioned, though not this time to show that the Sabbath command was temporary but that there were different kinds of work—sacred, which was permitted on the Sabbath, and human, which was not (*Adv. Marc.* 2.21.1-2).

V

The final part of Tertullian's *refutatio* is concerned with sacrifice. Like circumcision, the contrast employed in this part involved physical (or earthly: "sacrificia terrenarum" [5.1]) and spiritual sacrifices. Over half of chapter 5 consists of extracts from the Hebrew Scriptures. In understanding the rhetorical use Tertullian made here of the Scriptures we must not refer to what the rhetoricians had written about the interpretation of texts or laws but to what they stated with regard to conjecture itself in general.⁹⁴ For Tertullian, the issue here was not the text of the Scriptures or the reliability of the Scriptures but to what use the evidence provided by the Scriptures could be used.

It was in this part of the *refutatio* that Tertullian referred back to and made particular use of the point he had made in the *narratio* (that, of the twins of Rebekah, Esau, the elder, referred to the Jewish people and Jacob, the younger, referred not to the Jewish people, as they themselves believed, but to the Christian people) and which had become the treatise's *partitio* (that the younger

⁹² At the end of *Dial.* 62 Justin refers to Joshua's capture of Jericho but in a different context from Tertullian.

⁹³ Tränkle, *Kommentar*, p.xxix: "Der nach dem vorhergehenden Kapitel naheliegende und in Justins Dialogus 19,6 auch ausgeführte Gedanke, Gott habe den Sabbat eingeführt, um das jüdische Volk vom Götzendienst abzubringen, wird nicht verwendet. Überhaupt hält sich Tertullian bei dieser Frage nicht lange auf, widmet dem *sabbatum aeternum* der Christen noch ein Zitat, deutet es und wendet sich dann dem ausführlichen Nachweis der zeitlich begrenzten Gültigkeit des mosaischen Sabbatgebotes zu."

⁹⁴ *Rhet. Her.* 1.11.19 and 2.19.13-2.12.18 saw this as *legitima*, one of the three *constitutiones* of oratory, which Cicero called *definitiva* (*Inv. rhet.* 1.8.10-11) and which was part of general reasoning (*Inv. rhet.* 2.17.52-2.18.56). For Cicero, the interpretation of a text was a separate matter from the issue of definition (*Inv. rhet.* 2.39.115-2.51.154). This distinction was maintained by Quintilian (*Inst.* 3.6.66).

had overcome the elder).⁹⁵ He took that understanding of the relationship between elder and younger son and applied it to the sacrifices of Cain and Abel as found in Genesis 4:2-14 (5.2). Abel, the younger son, like Jacob, the younger son, was for Tertullian a typological reference to the Christians. From this one may expect Tertullian to have developed an argument, based on the contrast between temporary and eternal, about how the sacrifice of the Christians had replaced that of the Jews, but it is not to be found. Maybe a reason can be found in the fact that the passage from Genesis does not suggest that one type of sacrifice was *replaced* by another later on, but that one type of sacrifice was *preferred* over another (the sacrifice of Cain never having been acceptable to God) and nowhere did Tertullian want to suggest that Jewish sacrifice had always been illegitimate. Given that the sacrifices of both Cain and Abel were physical, it is not surprising that Tertullian made no further use of this passage to develop his contrast between physical and spiritual sacrifices, which was his main point (6.1). This suggests that this passage had been used in earlier arguments about sacrifices and that Tertullian borrowed it, even though it did not quite fit with the argument he was developing.

Whereas, in his argument about circumcision being spiritual, Tertullian did not argue that physical circumcision had no value (it was, after all, the way by which Jews could be kept out of Jerusalem), one does not gain the impression that he could see much value in the physical sacrifices of the Jews. Although he would go on to advocate that spiritual sacrifices were what God intended, he accepted, even if he did not recognise much value in it, that physical sacrifices had occurred.

As a good orator should in constructing a conjectural case, Tertullian examined questions of motive, manner of life, place and occasion.⁹⁶ The first point made dealt with place. Contrasted here were references to Leviticus 17:1-9 and Deuteronomy 12:1-26 about how sacrifice was to be offered only in Jerusalem with other statements of God found in Malachi 1:10-11 and Psalm 95 (96):7-8 about sacrifice being offered in every place by everybody (5.3-4). Had Tertullian been attempting to contrast temporary and eternal sacrifices rather than physical and spiritual ones, one would expect to find some mention of the fact that, with the capture of Jerusalem, Jewish sacrifice had come to an end.⁹⁷ This is

⁹⁵ Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah", 119-145.

⁹⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 2.2.3-2.4.7; Cicero, *Inv. rhet.* 2.5.17-2.12.42; Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.10.23-52.

⁹⁷ K.W. Clark, "Worship in the Jerusalem temple after A.D. 70", *New Testament Studies* 6 (1959-1960), 269-280, argued that the sacrificial cult continued in the ruins of the temple until AD 135. This has not received much support from other scholars like S.J.D. Cohen, "The

not found.⁹⁸ The extract from Psalm 95 (96), with its reference to all nations and to their bringing their gifts, provided Tertullian with the opportunity to shift from the question of place to that of type of sacrifice. To counter the Jewish cultic argument about animal sacrifice, reference had only to be made to the prophetic and wisdom traditions within the Jewish faith, and we find Tertullian using Psalm 50 (51):19; 49 (50):14, Isaiah 1:11-14 and Malachi 1:11 (the last of which reintroduces the idea of universal sacrifice) (5.5-7). The spiritual sacrifice was one of praise and God's motive in demanding such sacrifice was to engender humble and contrite hearts.

The fact that Tertullian concerned himself with Jewish sacrifice, which was certainly just a distant memory by the time he was writing, should not be taken as an indication that he was merely repeating arguments whose relevance had expired 130 years earlier. His point seems to be that, regardless of the fact that Jewish physical sacrifice had now ended, at the time that it mattered the Christians, but not the Jews, understood God's ultimate intention of replacing physical sacrifices with spiritual ones and that they alone complied. It may have taken place in the past, but its relevance, in determining who God's people were, endured.

When we turn to the *Epistle of Barnabas* what we notice is the similarity of texts used: Isaiah 1:11-13; Jeremiah 7:22-23, Zechariah 8:17 and Psalm 50 (51):19.⁹⁹ Just as Carleton Paget argues that the author of *Barnabas* relied upon a testimony source and that other early Christian writers relied upon such a source rather than *Barnabas* itself,¹⁰⁰ the same would be true of Tertullian (the

significance of Yavneh: Pharisees, Rabbis, and the end of Jewish sectarianism", *Hebrew Union College Annual* 55 (1984), 27, n. 1; Smallwood, *The Jews Under Roman Rule*, 345-348; and Wilson, *Related Strangers*, 4, who make specific mention of Clark, and others who take no cognisance of his position, e.g.: M.E. Stone, "Reactions to destructions of the second temple", *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 12 (1981), 195-204; R. Kirschner, "Apocalyptic and Rabbinic responses to the destruction of 70", *Harvard Theological Review* 78 (1985), 27, and B. Isaac, "Judaea after AD 70", *Journal of Jewish Studies* 35 (1984), 49. J.T. Sanders, *Schismatics, Sectarians, Dissidents, Deviants: The First One Hundred Years of Jewish-Christian Relations* (London 1993), 316, n. 53, retains an open mind.

⁹⁸ Stylianopolous, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, 120, notes that, in contrast to Tertullian who did not mention the destruction of the temple itself, Justin did and that his interest was in the temporary nature of Jewish sacrifice.

⁹⁹ *Barn.* 2.5-10. Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 104, notes a number of early Christian writers (Justin, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and ps.-Gregory) who have similar groupings of texts, but he fails to mention Tertullian.

¹⁰⁰ Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 104-105. G. Stanton, "Other early Christian writings: 'Didache', Ignatius, 'Barnabas', Justin Martyr", in J. Barclay and J. Sweet (eds),

more so because unlike *Barn.* 2.10; *Clem., Paed.* 3.90.4; *Clem., Strom.* 2.79.1; and *Iren., Adv. haer.* 4.17.2, in *Adv. Iud.* 5.5 Tertullian did not attach the second part, possibly from the *Apocalypse of Adam*, to Ps. 50 [51]:19). Further, Carleton Paget contrasts the argument found in *Barnabas*, that literal sacrifice was never intended by God, with the argument found in Justin and Irenaeus.¹⁰¹ We could add Tertullian to that list as one who accepted that Jewish sacrifice did once have legitimacy.

Hvalvik raises the question of whether the fact that the epistle deals with a no longer existent sacrificial cult is evidence that the author's material was merely traditional and that he did not know contemporary Judaism. He rejects this conclusion:

When Barnabas describes what God has revealed, it is thus natural to deal with both past and present. Besides, what Barnabas wishes to demonstrate is the error of the Jews which has not changed. They have always gone astray. For that reason Barnabas can deal with historical examples alongside examples from Judaism in his own time.¹⁰²

As has been noted, this idea of sacrificial legitimacy is not strong in Tertullian. It is in Justin. Sacrifice was of value once because it was intended to prevent the Jews from turning to the worship of idols, something it failed to achieve.¹⁰³ Justin cited Amos 5:18-6:7, Jeremiah 7:21-22 and Psalm 49 (50):1-23 (*Dial.* 22.1-11). Further, Jewish sacrifice was understood as a type for the sacrifice of Jesus and thus had derivative value (*Dial.* 40.111). Justin made mention of the fact that the sacrifice of the Passover lamb was permitted only in Jerusalem and that with Jerusalem's capture all sacrifice had ceased (*Dial.* 40.2-3; 46.2). Skarsaune notes that in the context of the discussion about the sacrifice of Christ, Justin included baptismal material.¹⁰⁴ Sacrifice, like circumcision, the Sabbath and other ceremonial festivals, was instituted because of a Jewish

Early Christian Thought in its Jewish Context (Cambridge 1996), 182, notes that the author's appeal to Is. 1:11-13 is straightforward rather than typological or allegorical.

¹⁰¹ Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, 105. Hvalvik, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant*, 123: "And he [God] rejected it [sacrificial practice] because he never demanded such things".

¹⁰² Hvalvik, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant*, 95.

¹⁰³ Justin, *Dial.* 19.5, 22.1, 27.2, 67.8.

¹⁰⁴ Skarsaune, *Proof from Prophecy*, 297-301.

hardness of heart.¹⁰⁵ Justin does not seem to have singled sacrifice out for as much attention as circumcision and the Sabbath for, besides those two, he often referred simply to τὰς ἑορτὰς πάσας (*Dial.* 18.2) or τὰ ἄλλα (*Dial.* 23.1).¹⁰⁶

While Tertullian accepted that Jewish sacrifice once had legitimacy and his main interest was on the contrast between physical and spiritual sacrifice, his use of Malachi 1:10-11 and Isaiah 1:11-14, indicates that he did accept, and thought he could prove, that the Jews were now excluded from God's people because of their failure to grasp God's underlying intentions. We do not find Tertullian drawing much attention to this; he merely quoted the passages from the Scriptures and allowed them to speak for themselves about this fundamental point of his treatise's *partitio*.

VI

Tertullian's *refutatio* is a traditional example of what was expected in oratory. There can be no doubt that oratory influenced the way in which Tertullian constructed his arguments. He intended to argue his position persuasively and in order to win the debate he needed to demolish the arguments of his opponents. The argument was about whether the Jews were the only (or even whether they were still) God's people. The Jewish position, according to the way Tertullian presented their arguments (it was a good oratorical ploy for an orator to have an audience remember his version of the opposition's arguments rather than the opposition's own version), was that God had stipulated certain requirements for those who wished to belong to the covenant, and those stipulations were to be found in the Hebrew Scriptures. From those very same Scriptures Tertullian wanted to show that God had a different ultimate plan, one that involved the first covenant coming to an end ("cessant" [6.1]). The *refutatio* established that, contrary to the Jewish position, there was such a promise made (6.1), at least that is what Tertullian claimed to have established. In the *confirmatio* he intended to demonstrate that that promise had been fulfilled in the person of Jesus.

Like a good orator Tertullian presented the facts in the light most favourable to himself. The one basic piece of evidence about the promise of a new covenant was broken down into its component parts and each part presented as though it were a new argument, creating the impression of many arguments

¹⁰⁵ Justin, *Dial.* 18.2, 43.1, 44.2, 45.3, 46.5-7, 47.2, 67.4, 8, 10. See W.A. Shotwell, *The Biblical Exegesis of Justin Martyr* (London 1965), 9; Stylianopolous, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, 141-153.

¹⁰⁶ See Stylianopolous, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, 65 for further references.

rather than the one argument repeated in different guises. If an argument had a weakness Tertullian used it anyway, not drawing attention to that weakness and hoping that, if he hid it among others, the opposition would overlook it. As an illustration one can even see a weakness in Tertullian's central argument that God was free to change the covenant depending on the circumstances of the time. The weakness is that just as Tertullian used that line of reasoning about the Jewish covenant, there would be nothing to stop a Jewish orator retorting that God must be free to reform, even replace, the Christian covenant if circumstances demanded. Rather than attempt to anticipate that argument, one gets the impression that by avoiding any suggestion of it Tertullian hoped that no one would think to exploit it. The weakness of Tertullian using an argument from contraries (the Jewish covenant is temporary, therefore the Christian covenant is permanent) is that there is no logical necessity for the contrary to be true: even if the nature of the Jewish covenant could be proven to be temporary, that did not mean automatically that the Christian one had to be permanent; it too could have been another temporary one. What Tertullian failed to provide in his *refutatio* were any Scriptural texts that could be used as proof of God promising that any new covenant would be an eternal one, but that did not stop him from making the claim.

We have noticed the close relationship between Tertullian and Justin and the way that both of them have a more moderate position than the *Epistle of Barnabas*. Even so, this paper has drawn attention to the many instances where Tertullian utilised the same source material in different ways, in different contexts and for different purposes. He developed original arguments in his *refutatio* from material he shared in common with earlier Christian writers.

Tertullian did demonstrate, in his section on circumcision and sacrifice at least, that his arguments were more than a string of extracts from the Hebrew Scriptures or dependent solely upon the Pauline corpus. He was well aware of, and prepared to use, more recent historical events (the capture of Jerusalem, the end of sacrifice, the banning of Jews entering Jerusalem) as part of his ammunition.

It has to be conceded though that, by the time Tertullian used them, these historical references were not so recent, and that there are no references to Carthage or events there between Jews and Christians in the *refutatio*. This does not mean that Tertullian was merely rewriting older treatments to hone his skills or prove his ability or was living in the past, interested only in antiquarian rather than contemporary issues. It could well be argued that whether or not the Hebrew Scriptures predicted a new covenant that embraced all peoples and was

established by Jesus remained a contemporary and contentious issue between Christians and Jews in all parts of the Mediterranean world and over a long period of time. For Tertullian, the past was important because it legitimised the present; how to understand that past was the contemporary and on-going issue. Someone was accusing him of not being faithful to what God had revealed to the Jews and commanded them to do. He felt the need to respond to that pressure and to defend Christianity, which he did by using the Hebrew Scriptures to show that Christians alone were now God's people because sometime in the past they alone had truly been faithful to God's real plan.

Ultimately the *refutatio* of Tertullian's much neglected *Adversus Iudaeos* tells us something about his sense of Christian self-identity. Part of that self-identity relied upon making clear distinctions between Christians and Jews. As we have noted throughout this paper, for Tertullian Christians were those who understood the spiritual (and ultimate) dimension of God's covenant rather than only the literal dimension as did the Jews. They were the people who were faithful to God's original and enduring intentions, the heirs of the Jewish prophetic and wisdom traditions. His *partitio* was that the Christians had replaced the Jews as God's people and, even though he did not make constant reference to this position throughout the *refutatio*, allowing the passages he quoted to speak for themselves about this matter, Tertullian certainly had this belief—the old law, physical circumcision, the Sabbath, and sacrifices were temporary and had now been replaced; the Jews had been replaced as God's people by the Christians. An authentic spirituality required a right relationship with God and the orator in Tertullian wanted to argue that only the Christians had this right relationship, for only Christians truly understood what God required.

APPENDIX C

The Universal Spread of Christianity as a Rhetorical Argument in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*

IN much of Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*, one of the early Christian examples of the anti-Judaic genre, the basis of his argumentation was provided by the Hebrew Scriptures. The manner in which he used passages from those Scriptures varied considerably, not only in this work but throughout the corpus of his writing. Three times in *adversus Iudaeos* Tertullian cited passages of the Hebrew Scriptures that introduced the promise of universal salvation or, at least, the coming of the nations to faith in God, and then, from those passages, sought to argue that such promises had been fulfilled through the universal spread of Christianity (7.2b - 8.1a; 12.1-2; 14.12-14). The aim of this paper is to investigate these three instances in the context of the unfolding rhetorical argument in *adversus Iudaeos* in order to gain an insight into the way in which Tertullian's rhetorical objective influenced his approach to and interpretation of the Scriptures. In part, the aim is to make a small contribution towards addressing the concern raised over a decade ago by Mark LeTourneau that, despite the attention given to Tertullian's rhetorical practice, his use of the classical topics remains largely ignored by scholars.¹

Consideration must be given to the place these three instances occupy within the rhetorical structure of the treatise. Sider and Fredouille have argued convincingly that the tenets of classical

¹ M. S. LeTourneau, "General and Special Topics in the *Baptismo* of Tertullian, *Rhetorica* 5 (1987): 87.

rhetoric were employed by Tertullian and shaped not only the presentation of his material but his very manner of thinking.² In fact, George Kennedy goes as far as to state that Tertullian was both an advocate and a teacher of rhetoric in Rome before his conversion.³ Even if that is claiming too much,⁴ the importance of rhetoric to the theological endeavour is clear. Bradford Hinze too, in a recent article in which he argues that an understanding of rhetoric contributes to an appreciation of the diversity, contextual character and cultural heritage of Christian tradition, has recognised the influence of rhetoric on Tertullian and others in shaping their theological thinking.⁵ Elsewhere, I have focussed on the rhetorical influence at work in Tertullian's use of the Hebrew Scriptures in other parts of *adversus Iudaeos*, in particular the first chapter.⁶ Here attention will be turned to some other parts of this treatise, for this work has thus far been neglected in terms of rhetorical analysis by modern scholars. None has looked at the structure of the treatise from a rhetorical perspective, which will be a priority in this article.

Attention must also be paid to some of the details about Tertullian's Scriptural texts and the insights he drew from them in order to appreciate the way in which his oratorical education provided a framework through which he read these texts and how it is possible to reconstruct the structure of the treatise from the arguments he developed from the Scriptures.

² R. D. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); J.-C. Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1972).

³ G. A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 260.

⁴ T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985 [2nd ed.]), 243-5.

⁵ B. E. Hinze, "Reclaiming Rhetoric in the Christian Tradition," *TS* 57 (1996): 487.

⁶ G. D. Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah: A Re-Reading of an 'Anti-Jewish' Argument in Early Christian Literature," *VC* 52 (1998): 119-45.

Determining a rhetorical structure for *adversus Iudaeos* is no cut and dried exercise, for not only did Tertullian employ the oratorical building blocks with a degree of flexibility and originality,⁷ but some understandings of the nature and relationship of the various component parts of rhetorical theory varied from rhetorician to rhetorician, when one examines the details, despite the fact that, from a holistic or general perspective, much of classical rhetoric was standard and uniform across the schools of thought and particular authors. For this reason, I am sure that others may disagree with the rhetorical structure proposed here, the first, to my knowledge, ever offered with regard to this treatise. I believe that a fairly standard structure may be discerned. Without wishing to deny Tertullian's ability to exercise creative freedom, as a rule of thumb, I would suggest that one need not propose the existence of a more complex, creative and custom-built structure that is the exception to the rule than is necessary. I would advocate this particularly if *adversus Iudaeos* is accepted as being written very early in Tertullian's literary career,⁸ at a stage when it would be reasonable to expect him to be less likely to deviate as much from his rhetorical heritage and education than later in his career when his own style had matured and his confidence to express himself less encumbered by the restraints of theory had grown.

Elsewhere I have suggested that 1.1-3a is an *exordium* outlining the reason why this work was written, that 1.3-7 is a *narratio* that contained an outline of the history of God's promise of divine grace, an outline which centred around Tertullian's interpretation of Genesis 25.23, and

⁷ Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, 22.

⁸ G. Säflund, *De pallio und die stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians* (Lund: G. W. K. Glerup, 1953); H. Tränkle, *Q. S. F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos, mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964), lx-lxvii; Barnes, *Tertullian*, 53; H. Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1.-11. Jh)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), 217.

that 1.8-2.1a is the *partitio* where Tertullian set out the point at issue and the position he took with regard to the matter under consideration (and about which he hoped to convince his readers), viz., that the Gentiles had now been admitted to God's favour and the Jews now excluded.⁹ This *partitio* or *propositio* (we find different terms in *ad Herennium*, Cicero and Quintilian, with overlapping—neither identical nor distinct—meanings)¹⁰ was mentioned in 1.2 and 1.3a in a slightly less developed form. The issue of the exclusion of the Jews and the inclusion of the Christians was the “*gradum... et summam quaestionis certis*” (2.1). The heart of any piece of forensic oratory was *confirmatio* and *refutatio* (or *confutatio* or *reprehensio*),¹¹ and I believe that Tertullian, inverting the usual order, which was an acceptable practice,¹² presented a *refutatio* (2.1b - 6.1)¹³ and a *confirmatio* (6.2 - 11.9; 11.11b - 14.10). A *peroratio* was commenced at 11.10-12 before being abandoned as a new train of thought occurred to Tertullian, and which we find repeated and expanded in a rather weak *peroratio* at the end of the treatise (14.11-14), which I believe to be an interpolation (see below).

Lack of space prevents me from presenting the detailed reasoning for all these conclusions

⁹ Dunn, “Tertullian and Rebekah,” 143.

¹⁰ Cf. Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, 21, who uses the terms *propositio* and *partitio* as being mutually exclusive.

¹¹ *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.18; Cic. *part. or.* 9.33.

¹² Cic. *part. or.* 5.15; Cic. *de or.* 2.19.77-83.

¹³ One of the readers for this journal of an earlier draft of this paper suggested that what I see as *refutatio* may be *praemunitio*. To that I would respond that whereas *refutatio* is recognised by the major Latin rhetorical treatises as part of *dispositio*, *praemunitio* is regarded by them as one of the *sententiae* (Cic. *de or.* 3.53.204; Cic. *orat.* 40.137; Quint. *inst.* 9.1.30, 43), to be used in any part of speech (Quint. *inst.* 9.2.17), which, as S. F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the elder Cato to the younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 305, noted were usually no more than a few words or sentences. I see no reason to suggest that what we have is an expanded *praemunitio* in which Tertullian sweeps away obstacles to his argument, when the simple inversion of two standard parts of a speech (*refutatio* and *confirmatio*) would explain what we find just as well, with less need to create an exception to standard oratorical understandings. Further, Tertullian has no need to “anticipate” the arguments of his opponents; he already knows what they are (or so he claimed) because the treatise was designed to be the response to the previous debate, in which the Jewish arguments had been advanced. Tertullian did not need to anticipate the Jewish arguments, he needed to refute them.

(something which is at the heart of my doctoral dissertation), but I would like to offer some with regard to the *confirmatio*, in which two of the three references to the universal spread of Christianity occur. In the remainder of this section of the article I wish to examine the rhetorical structure (and then Tertullian's use of Scripture) surrounding the first of those references to the universal spread of Christianity.

6.2 - 7.2 is an important passage in determining the treatise's overall structure. Following on from the *refutatio* (6.1 is a summary),¹⁴ Tertullian was left with a twofold task as he saw it (6.2): to prove that the old covenant had indeed come to an end and that the new covenant was now operative (in other words, to establish that what had been promised was now fulfilled). This is precisely the point at issue mentioned in 1.8, though expressed in different terms. To prove the second of these tasks would, of logical necessity (so Tertullian wanted his readers to believe), prove the first, so attention was given only to the second task. In order to prove that the new law had come, Tertullian argued that all that was necessary to achieve was to show that the new law-giver had come (6.2b-3). All this is summarised in 6.4. Just as the idea of promise and fulfilment gave shape to Tertullian's presentation of the law (even though, as I have just stated, he would not deal with the issue of the fulfilment of the promise of the giving of a new law), so too the idea of promise and fulfilment gave shape to his thoughts on the law-giver (6.2b-3), though, he argued, the idea of the promise of a new law-giver was one which the Jews would not contest (7.2). Hence, all his attention in the *confirmatio* could be directed at demonstrating that the promise of the new law-giver had been fulfilled (7.1). The point at issue, about the replacement of the Jews by the Christians as God's people (1.8), would come down to proving that the Christ (whom Tertullian accepted without question as the one who would be the new law-giver) had come.

¹⁴ See G. D. Dunn, "Pro temporum condicione: Jews and Christians as God's People in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*," in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, vol. 2, ed. Pauline Allen et al. (forthcoming).

There is then an announcement of the four matters by which proof that the new law-giver had come would be established: an examination of the times predicted in which the Christ would come, an examination of whether those predictions had been fulfilled, an examination of other (non-temporal) aspects of prophetic themes, and an examination of the connection between the coming of the Christ and giving of the new law (7.1). This reads like a small *enumeratio* or *partitio* within the *confirmatio*.¹⁵ Thus 6.2 - 7.2 is preliminary to the *confirmatio* proper, refining the limits within which the discussion would occur.

Like a number of scholars, I believe that this treatise remains in a draft, unrevised form.¹⁶ This may help to explain some of the repetitions and some of the muddle that exists within the structure of the treatise and the details of the arguments. The fact that the *partitio* of 1.8 needs further refinement in 6.2-4, for example, may be taken as an indication of that lack of later revision. Another example is in 8.2, I believe, where the fourfold structure for the *confirmatio*, announced in 7.1 was revised into a threefold structure that is more obviously rhetorical in that it is based on general *topoi* (times, signs and operations, and subsequent events). Säflund has pointed to “die dreifache Darstellung von Christi Weitherrschaft,” which is the very heart of this article, as an indication that, in a work of some “Ökonomie der Komposition,” such repetitions are a sign that the work grew and took shape in the course of its writing, independent of its original plan.¹⁷ It is a work that “der endgültigen Abschleifung entbehrt.”¹⁸

¹⁵ Here understanding *partitio* in the sense in which Quintilian used it (*inst.* 4.5.1), simply as the enumeration of the points to be investigated (which was termed by the author of *ad Herennium* as *distributio* - *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.17).

¹⁶ Barnes, *Tertullian*, 53; Schreckenberg, *Adversus-Judaeos-Texte*, 217; Tränkle, *Kommentar*, lix-lxvii; Säflund, *De pallio*, 206-208.

¹⁷ Säflund, *De pallio*, 206: “... wenn deren Disposition auch während des Verfassens verändert worden sein mag, und zwar derart, dass die Darstellung allmählich voller geworden ist als von Anfang an vorgesehen war.”

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 207.

The revised *enumeratio* for the *confirmatio* gives it its final shape. Indeed, the *topos* of time occupies *adversus Iudaeos* 8, the signs and operations of the predicted Christ (and how they were fulfilled in Jesus) occupies chapters 9-10, and the *topos* of subsequent events (although not the precise timing of those events, which had been dealt with in chapter 8) occupies chapters 11-14.

What then are we to make of 7.3-8, which seems to be an argument about events subsequent to the coming of the Christ (rather than an argument from the *topos* of time) and which would seem to make more sense if it occurred in chapter 12? The whole of the *confirmatio* seems to follow a roughly chronological sequence with the exception of this passage. My conclusion is that this section is out of place, most likely because, following Säfllund's idea, although the work had a plan, Tertullian wrote down some ideas as they occurred to him, even if out of sequence on occasion. Such meanderings would have been relocated, in all probability, in a revision. What we have preserved in this text is an early draft that still shows signs of the author's mind leaping backwards and forwards, in much the same way as readers of an earlier draft of this article saw disjointed, poorly organised ideas desperately in need of revision. I maintain that this is the case primarily because I believe the chronological sequence is the dominant structural frame for the entire *confirmatio* from chapters 8 through to 14 (time of the Christ, time of subsequent events, ways in which the birth of Jesus fulfilled Scriptural prophecies, ways in which the death of Jesus fulfilled Scriptural prophecies, ways in which the coming of the Gentiles to faith fulfilled Scriptural prophecies, ways in which the destruction of Jerusalem fulfilled Scriptural prophecies, and the ways in which the second coming of Jesus would fulfil Scriptural prophecies—the last three being arguments from the *topos* of subsequent events). The

chronological sequence also best fitted with Tertullian's rhetorical sequences of *topoi*: times, signs and actions, and subsequent events. 7.2b - 8.1a is an argument from the *topos* of subsequent events,¹⁹ one which best belongs with the other arguments from the same *topos* in chapters 11 to 14.

Having offered some comment on the structure of the work with regard to chapter 7 in particular, I wish now to examine Tertullian's use of Scripture in this chapter before returning to consider the structure of chapters 12 and 14 and the ways in which Scripture has been used in those chapters with regard to the idea of the universal spread of Christianity.

Earlier I mentioned that Tertullian stated that he need not devote any effort to proving that there was the promise of a new law-giver, for this was something to which not even the Jews would object.²⁰ The only piece of evidence to support this assertion was the example he then cited from Is. 45.1 (7.2b), which he believed was all that needed to be said on the matter.²¹ This is the principal reason why this piece of Scripture appears here, to support a point advanced in the refinement of the *confirmatio*'s thrust. We see this in the first half of the extract from Isaiah 45.1.

Tertullian would cite Isaiah 45.1 in one other treatise (*adv. Prax.* 11.8; 28.11).²² Despite

¹⁹ Quint. *inst.* 5.10.45-47; *rhet. Her.* 2.5.8; Cic. *inv. rhet.* 1.28.43; 2.12.42.

²⁰ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.2a (CCSL 2, 1353): "*Venturum enim Christum et Iudaeos non refutare scimus, utpote qui in adventum eius spem suam porrigant.*"

²¹ Ibid.: "*Nec de isto pluribus quaerendum...*"

²² Ibid. 7.2b: "*Sic dicit dominus deus Christo meo domino*" (A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera*, Pars II, CCSL 2 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1954], 1354, emends *domino* to *domini*); Tert. *adv. Prax.* 11.8: "*Haec dicit Dominus Domino meo Christo*"; ibid. 28.11: "*... haec dicit Dominus Domino meo Christo*".

the substitution of the demonstrative pronoun for the adverb and the omission of *deus* in *adversus Praxean*, all three citations display the same mistake that either Tertullian or his source,²³ made in reading the Greek text of the LXX: κύρω (to Cyrus) has been misread as κυρίω (to [my] lord). Rather than being the words of Yahweh “to Cyrus the anointed” they have become the words “to the Lord the anointed.” Taking τῷ χριστῷ as personal rather than functional completes the transformation of this into a Christological proof-text. For Tertullian this extract from Isaiah was one example of the fact that the Jews expected the coming of a new law-giver because God had promised them one.

Tertullian could have ended his quotation there and moved to 8.1 to begin to examine the fulfilment of the prophecies of the new law-giver seamlessly. Instead he continued the quotation from Isaiah. It contained a reference to universal salvation.²⁴ Such a theme was not the reason Tertullian employed the text. Tertullian’s reason was to demonstrate that the Jews did have an expectation of a messiah, a new law-giver, but, having introduced a secondary theme with the Isaiah extract, Tertullian temporarily abandoned his major theme and turned his attention to this new one (7.3 - 8.1a). To me it seems that Tertullian, prompted by what was in the latter part of his quotation, was either distracted by a random thought or began on an argument which originally he planned to treat later.

Some may argue that this section in *adversus Iudaeos* is in its rightful place. It may be

²³ That Tertullian was not personally responsible for this mistake would seem beyond doubt, given that it appears also in *Barnabas* 12.11 and *Iren. dem.* 49. Here I leave aside the question of whether Tertullian copied directly from one or other or from a *testimonium*.

²⁴ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.2b: “... *exaudiant illum gentes!*” On Tertullian’s use of *gentes* rather than *nationes* in *adv. Iud.* see I. L. S. Balfour, “Tertullian’s Description of the Heathen,” in Elizabeth A. Livingstone (ed.), *Studia Patristica*, vol. 17, no. 2, papers of the 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies 1979 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), 785-89.

suggested that the theme of the spread of Christianity to all nations in 7.2 - 8.1 was the main reason for Tertullian quoting Isaiah 45.1, that at 7.1, as part of the introduction to the *confirmatio*, the idea of nations responding to the Christ was mentioned (“*in quem nos, gentes scilicet, credituri adnuntiabamur*”), perhaps suggesting that the argument of the universal spread of Christianity was Tertullian’s strongest argument which was presented first, and that 7.2 - 8.1 and 12-13, both described as treating presently observable facts, frame the strictly Scriptural arguments of chapters 8-11.

It has to be acknowledged that the coming of the nations to faith is very important to Tertullian. This is why I have suggested that 1.8 is the point at issue for the whole treatise—showing that the Gentiles had replaced the Jews as the recipients of God’s grace. Tränkle sees this section in chapter 7 as “*einem Höhepunkt des Werkes*” and he characterises its style as being “*so sieghaft, überschwenglich und geradezu hymnisch.*”²⁵ I see a number of problems with the above suggestions. The first is, as has been stated, that Tertullian told us explicitly (“*de isto*” referring to the lack of argument from the Jews about the promise of a new law-giver) why he quoted Isaiah 45.1 in 7.2, and it had nothing to do with the universal spread of Christianity. Second, the idea that the universal spread was Tertullian’s strongest argument is weakened somewhat when we take into account his editorial comments about structure. In 7.1, the first thing he said that needed to be explored was the times announced by the prophets for the coming of the Christ (“*etiam tempora sunt nobis requirenda, quando venturum Christum prophetae adnuntiaverunt*”), which he commenced, through explicit acknowledgement, in 8.1b (“*Itaque requirenda tempora praedicta*”). In other words, if 7.2b - 8.1a was his strongest

²⁵ Tränkle, *Kommentar*, xxxii.

argument in pride of place,²⁶ it appears unannounced.²⁷ While Quintilian suggested to orators that sometimes arguments should appear unannounced,²⁸ it appears odd to me that after having made such detailed statements about the direction of the *confirmatio* Tertullian should introduce this idea of the universal spread of Christianity here unannounced and out of place. If this were his strongest argument, it is surprising that it is completely missing in what amounts to a revision of *adversus Iudaeos*, viz., book three of *adversus Marcionem*. Even though there was a different opponent and the need for different arguments, Tertullian was able to reuse *adversus Iudaeos* 12.1-2 in *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.2b-4. Why was 7.2 - 8.1a not deemed recyclable? Third, the idea of the frame of observable events around the non-observable events of the Scriptures has the drawback that it does not take 14.1-10 into account. Finally, I need only mention briefly my belief that the chronological framework is the best way to understand the whole *confirmatio* and that, like Säflund, I do not believe Tertullian intended to refer to the universal spread of Christianity three times. My suggestion remains that Tertullian momentarily lost sight of his tightly conceived plan for the *confirmatio* and, having noticed the references to the Gentiles in the text he was citing for another purpose, was carried away to treat an issue he had planned already to treat in a later place, an issue that was obviously important to him because it sprang to mind so readily.

Although I promised a couple of pages back to turn my attention to the ways in which

²⁶ Cic. *de or.* 2.77.313.

²⁷ I do not think we can see such announcement in the mention of the nations in *adv. Iud.* 7.1, for, as Tertullian stated, this event was dependent upon recognising that the Christ had come within the time-frame prescribed (“*ut, si intra ista tempora recognoverimus venisse eum, sine dubio ipsum esse credamus, quem prophetae venturum canebant...*”). In other words, Tertullian himself seems to have stated clearly enough that the issue of the time-frame needed to come before the issue of the coming of the nations to faith. The time-frame occupies chapter 8, hence the matter of the nations coming to faith ought to follow, not precede, that chapter.

²⁸ Quint. *inst.* 4.5.4: “*Alia sunt magis, propter quae partitione non semper sit utendum: primum, quia pleraque gratiora sunt, si inventa subito nec domo adlata, sed inter dicendum ex re ipsa nata videantur...*”

Tertullian used Scripture in this section of the treatise, after a few comments on Isaiah 45.1 I turned my attention back to issues of the treatise's structure. This is so because Isaiah 45.1 is important in determining the place of this section in that overall structure. Here is a clear example of how Tertullian allowed Scripture to shape the structure of his argument, even though it has resulted in, I believe, an untidy presentation.

Whether or not this section is in its correct place, how does this *topos* of subsequent events help establish the point that the promise of the coming of the new law-giver has been fulfilled? The basis of the *topos*, of course, was to establish that an earlier event had occurred because a subsequent event, which depended upon the existence of the earlier event, had taken place. Isaiah 45.1 is the prophecy: after the coming of the new law-giver, the Christ, all the nations would respond to him. How did Tertullian prove that the prophecy had been fulfilled? He stated that the preachers of the Gospel, in the words of Psalm 18(19).5, had reached the ends of the earth (7.4). This verse was popular, although used for slightly varying purposes, in early Christian literature.²⁹ He stated also that the nations of the world had come to believe in the Christ. To support this, reference was made to Acts 2.9-10,5 (7.4), one of the few and certainly the longest of the extracts from the New Testament in the treatise. Tertullian made no other use of this passage in any of his extant writings and, it would seem, this instance is the earliest surviving record of its use in post-New Testament Christianity. A subtle change has been made to the text. Whereas it could be argued that all the people referred to in verses 9-11 of Acts 2, not merely those from Rome mentioned at the end of verse 10, were not Gentiles but rather foreign-

²⁹ Rom. 10.18; Iren. *dem.* 86; Jus. *dial.* 42.1 (O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987], 94, believes Justin depended directly on Rom. 10.18 here); 64.8; Jus. *1 apol.* 40.1-4; Clem. *paid.* 2.8.61.3; Tert. *de fug.* 6.5; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.22.1; 4.43.9; 5.19.2.

born (or migrant) Jews and converts (or potential converts) to Judaism,³⁰ Tertullian's text makes it clear, by the inclusion of the third *et*, that most of the people referred to in the list were Gentiles, with only those in Jerusalem being Jews: "... *Romani et incolae, tunc et in Hierusalem Iudaei, et cetera gentes...*"³¹ In other words, Tertullian has presented a different version of the story from Acts. For him, the Jews were merely one group among many, rather than as the genus which could be divided into various "species" of Jews, as Acts 2 itself has. Tertullian has achieved this by attaching verse 5, rather than verse 11, to the end of verse 10 and by breaking the apposition that exists in Acts 2.5.³² The reference to Acts 2 was not the only proof for Tertullian's claims that the nations of the world had come to believe in the Christ. He listed other nations and races not mentioned in Acts as having come to accept the name of the Christ who had come already: Gaetulians, Moors, Gauls, Spaniards, Britons, Sarmatians, Dacians, Germans, Scythians and other, remote, unknown people (7.4b-5).

This is a valuable insight into Tertullian's use of Scripture. Through a misreading of the New Testament text (deliberate or otherwise) he was able to point to the fact that peoples of the world had come to believe in the Christ, which was something that would happen after the new

³⁰ It could be argued that Ἰουδαῖοι τοὶ καὶ προσήλυτοι, at the beginning of verse 11, stands in apposition to the entire list of nations in verses 9-11, rather than just to οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες Ῥωμαῖοι. This is suggested on the basis of Ἰουδαῖοι and ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς ἀπο παντὸς ἔθνους standing in apposition in Acts 2.5. It seems clear from the context of the passage that the reader is meant to identify the peoples listed in verses 9-11 with the Ἰουδαῖοι... ἀπο παντὸς ἔθνους of verse 5. See R. J. Dillon, "Acts of the Apostles," in R. E. Brown, J. A. Fitzmyer and R. E. Murphy (eds.), *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs [N.J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), 731; H. Conzelmann, *Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 14; and L. T. Johnson, *The Acts of the Apostles*, *Sacra Pagina* 5 (Collegeville [Minn.]: Liturgical Press, 1992), 44.

³¹ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 7.4 (CCSL 2, 1355): "... Romans and sojourners, yes, and in Jerusalem Jews, and all other nations..." English translation is by S. Thewall in A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (rev. A. C. Cox), *ANF 3: Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian* (Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Eerdmans, 1885). Even if one were to reject the previous note, that the Ἰουδαῖοι in Acts 2.11 referred to all the aforementioned peoples, no one would dispute that it refers to οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες Ῥωμαῖοι. What we see in *adv. Iud.* 7.4 is that Tertullian differentiated between Romans and Jews, clearly a misreading of Acts. On the question of whether Tertullian had a Latin version of Acts available to him see J. H. Petzer, "Tertullian's Text of Acts," *The Second Century* 8 (1991), 201-15.

³² Neither Kroymann, CCSL 2, 1354, nor Tränkle, *Kommentar*, 14, recognised the replacement of Acts 2.11 with 2.5.

law-giver had come, proving that he must therefore have indeed come already. The counter-argument, that all these people were mistaken, is not raised.

The last part of this section (7.6 - 8.1a) involves a different conjectural general *topos* rather than subsequent events, used to demonstrate the same thing. Arguments could be constructed from contrast, comparison or dissimilarities.³³ Here Tertullian acted like a prosecutor, wanting to show that no one else could be the Christ because only Jesus reigns over the whole world. Neither Solomon, Darius, Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander the Macedonian, the Germans, Britons, Moors, Gaetulians, nor even the Romans reigned everywhere. Only the Christ reigns across a world without boundary or limitation:

*Christi autem nomen ubique porrigitur, ubique creditur, ab omnibus gentibus supra enumeratis colitur, ubique regnat, ubique adoratur. Omnibus ubique tribuitur aequaliter...*³⁴

Tertullian ended the section with a direct appeal to supposed Jewish readers: as they see happening what is happening, they cannot deny the Christian position (8.1a).

II

We may turn our attention now to where Tertullian returned to the issue of the universal spread of Christianity for a second time (12.1-2). Here we may consider again questions of the structure of the treatise, especially important in a section of the work where its authenticity is

³³ *Rhet. Her.* 2.4.6; *Cic. inv. rhet.* 2.13.43; *Cic. de or.* 2.40.169-170; *Quint. inst.* 5.10.73.

³⁴ *Tert. adv. Iud.* 7.9 (CCSL 2, 1356): "But Christ's Name is extending everywhere, believed everywhere, worshipped by all the above-enumerated nations, reigning everywhere, adored everywhere, conferred equally everywhere upon all."

disputed,³⁵ and the use Tertullian made of the Hebrew Scriptures in shaping that argument.

The second and third tasks of the *confirmatio* as listed in 8.2 (the third task as set out in 7.1—other issues about the appearance of the Christ, with the exception of the *topos* of time) begin following the chronological framework of the whole *confirmatio*, viz., the birth of the Christ (ch. 9), the death of the Christ (ch. 10), and prophecies about the destruction of Jerusalem (11.1-9). Just where one would expect Tertullian to argue about the fulfilment of those prophecies of destruction, we find instead the beginning of a general conclusion (11.10-12) and the spread of Christianity (12.1-2), before he dealt with that matter of the fulfilment of the prophecies of destruction (ch. 13). Then comes the argument about the second coming of the Christ (14.1-10).

This disruption needs explanation. We also need to keep 14.11-14 in mind, for it parallels this disruptive section and the conclusions one draws about this section will affect one's understanding of the later section.

If one accepts that it was Tertullian himself who added 11.10 after 11.9, rather than some later editor, copyist or party unknown (and, it has to be admitted, this cannot be ruled out

³⁵ Schreckenberg, *Adversus-Judaeos-Texte*, 217, describes *adv. Iud.* as “unvollendeter Entwurf” and notes, with regard to its relationship with *adv. Marc.* that “Man hielt wegen dieser Übereinstimmungen die ganze zweite Hälfte von *Adversus Judaeos* (Kapitel 9-14) irrtümlich für unecht beziehungsweise aus *Adversus Marcionem* angefügt und ergänzt.” Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion*, 254-5, provides a review of some scholarly opinion on the matter. C. Aziza, *Tertullien et le judaïsme*, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Nice 16 (Nice, 1977), 107, concludes: “De fait si l’on admet—et c’est notre opinion—que l’*Adversus Iudaeos* forme un tout cohérent, on est obligé d’admettre par la même occasion que les chapitres 9-14 ne peuvent pas avoir été empruntés à l’*Adversus Marcionem*.”

absolutely),³⁶ then it seems as though he was beginning to draw the treatise to a close. Tränkle was of the same opinion.³⁷ I am suggesting that, in the course of highlighting the points he had made, when he wrote about the destruction of Jerusalem as being foretold in Daniel 9.26 (11.11 - “*et civitatem extirminatam et sacrificium et unctionem exinde cessare*”), Tertullian was reminded that his treatment of the topic of Jerusalem’s destruction, in the earlier part of that chapter, was incomplete. In 8.16 he had dealt with the sole *topos* of the *timing* of the destruction, but in 11.1-10, where attention was turned to other *topoi*, he had mentioned only *prophecies* about it (principally Ezekiel 8.12 - 9.6). He had not dealt with the *fulfilment* of those prophecies.

In what has the appearance of a new lease of life (and to me this seems a plausible alternative to the argument that the second half of the treatise is not only spurious but written by someone incompetent), Tertullian abandoned his process of concluding and turned to consider not only the fulfilment of the prophecy about the destruction of Jerusalem, but prophecies about other events as well which were to occur after the coming of the Christ. In other words, Tertullian got back on track. Had this work been revised, 11.10-12 would simply have been removed. Taking it out we can see the whole flow of the *topos* of subsequent events in a rough chronological sequence: prophecies about the destruction of Jerusalem and exile from the land (11.1-9), the Gentiles coming to God (12.1-2), the desolation of Judaea, particularly Bethlehem (13.2-5a), the end of the possibility of anointing a new leader (13.5b-7), the destruction of Jerusalem (13.9-10), the suffering of the Jews (13.24-29), and the second coming of the Christ

³⁶ Kroymann, CCSL 2, 1382-3: “*Quae abhinc leguntur usque in finem capitis duodecimi et interpolationibus et uerborum iactura misere deprauata non suo loco in codicibus nostris exhiberi in aperto mihi esse uidetur. Artissime enim et aptissime se applicant ad capitis octavi finem, cui si asserueris habebis idoneam partis prioris huius altercationis clausulam.*”

³⁷ Tränkle, *Kommentar*, xlv: “Er ist ein Abschlußteil, eine Zusammenfassung der ganzen bisher von Jesus Christus handelnden Kapitel. Von hinten her soll er die Teile, die den Umständen seiner Geburt, seines Wirkens und seines Todes gewidmet waren, zu Kapitel VII and VIII in Beziehung setzen...”

(14.1-10).³⁸

I think the arguments Tertullian presented in 12.1-2 are weakened by being separated from the other arguments on the same issue which occur in 7.2b - 8.1a. I do not see the issue being given prominence by being mentioned twice.³⁹

If the above are some comments about the rhetorical structure of this section, what may be said about the arguments Tertullian presented within the section? They are Scriptural. This time he added a new Scriptural passage to those he had considered in chapter 7.⁴⁰ Psalm 2.7-8 has the promise of the nations being given to the messiah as his inheritance. These verses were to feature in other parts of Tertullian's writings. Mention may be made of *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.3 in particular (which is part of the parallel with *adversus Iudaeos* 11.11 - 12.2), as well as 4.22.8 and *adversus Praxean* 7.2 and 11.3, all of which used Psalm 2.7, and *adversus Marcionem* 4.16.12; 4.25.9; 4.39.11; and 5.17.6, which used Psalm 2.8.

Although Psalm 2.7 is mentioned in Acts 13.33 and Hebrews 1.5, the idea of the nations being the inheritance of the messiah, as promised in Psalm 2.8, is not used in the New Testament. In early Christian literature it does, however, make an appearance. *I Clement* cites Psalm 2.7-8 (36.5). There is an allusion to Psalm 2.7 in *ad Diognetum* 11.5. Justin Martyr made a couple of references to Psalm 2.7 (*dial.* 88.8; 103.6—more particularly referring to the baptism of Jesus),

³⁸ This sequence is not perfect. The material on the universal spread of Christianity interrupts the material on Jerusalem. Perhaps *adv. Iud.* 12.1-2, in a revision, would be better located before *adv. Iud.* 11.1.

³⁹ This is Tränkle's opinion (*Kommentar*, xlv) when he suggested that the harking back of *adv. Iud.* 12.2 to chapter 7 can be taken as a sign of the work's overall integrity.

⁴⁰ That a new piece of Scripture is used must call into question the statement of A. L. Williams, *Adversus Iudaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), 50, that chapter 12 is only a summary of chapter 7.

and to Psalm 2.7-8 (*dial.* 122.6; *1 apol.* 40.8-19—as part of a more extensive quoting of Psalms 1 and 2) where he was stressing the universal call to salvation being predicted in the Hebrew Scriptures.⁴¹ Irenaeus, in the midst of establishing the typological significance of Jacob for the Christians rather than the Jews,⁴² cited Psalm 2.8 (*adv. haer.* 4.21.3). He was attempting to find parallels between Jacob and Jesus. Just as Jacob had been promised the various coloured sheep (Genesis 30.31-43), so too Jesus, as the Christ, had been promised the various nations (Psalm 2.8). Elsewhere he also cited Psalm 2.7-8 (*dem.* 49).⁴³ Clement of Alexandria (*strom.* 4.22.136.1) cited Psalm 2.8 in the context of a discussion about the true Gnostic asking for knowledge about God for its own sake. Origen would also later use it (*cont. Cels.* 4.8). That Cyprian also quoted these two verses in his collection of *testimonia* (*test.* 2.8) is a clear indication of their importance, although he saw them mainly as verses to establish the necessity for the pre-existent Word to be born in time, rather than in connection with the universal spread of Christianity. This establishes that, even though early Christian writers could turn to a Scriptural passage for any number of reasons, in this instance Tertullian's use is remarkably similar to what is found in Justin and Irenaeus.

To support the idea that the son referred to in Psalm 2.7 could not be David nor the ends of the earth coterminous with Judaea, Tertullian employed Isaiah 42.6-7 (12.2).⁴⁴ The one who was to be both a covenant with the people (the Jews) and a light to the nations (the Gentiles)

⁴¹ Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 103, notes that Justin's reference in *dial.* 122.6 was mainly about verse 8 not verse 7. On 109 he argues that Justin does not display direct knowledge of *1 Clem.*

⁴² Dunn, "Tertullian and Rebekah," 140-1.

⁴³ Interestingly enough, while in the unrevised *adv. Iud.*, Is. 45.1 is cited in 7.2 and Psalm 2.7-8 in 12.1, in *Iren. dem.* both pieces of Scripture occur in 49.

⁴⁴ *Barn.* 14.7; *Jus. dial.* 26.2; 65.4; 122.3 also used Isaiah 42.6. For a comparison of Justin's sources in these instances see Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy*, 62.

would also be the one to open the eyes of the blind, to release the bound from their bondage and to bring light to those in darkness. Without direct reference to Luke 4.14-18, Tertullian was clear that this mission had been fulfilled by Christ and could not be fulfilled by another. Here Tertullian was offering an interpretation of Psalm 2.8 contrary to the one that was held by the Jews, which held that the son referred to in the psalm was David, its supposed author, but Tertullian did not substantiate his own position (nor did Justin—*dial.* 88.8).⁴⁵

Not only is there this *topos* of subsequent events (the coming of the Gentiles to faith) but there is a *topos* of comparison, that no one else could have done the things prophesied in the Scriptures but Jesus (12.2b). What is interesting is that, in this brief section, there is little by way of comment about the fulfilment of the promises of the universal spread of faith to the nations. There is presumption rather than proof that there is fulfilment.⁴⁶ The proof had already been detailed in 7.3 - 8.1a using Acts of the Apostles.

III

The third instance of theme of the universal spread of Christianity occurs in 14.12-14. Once again, when we pay close attention to the way in which the author interprets the evidence he used in his arguments (the Hebrew Scriptures on the whole), we can draw some conclusions about the rhetorical structure of the treatise and, I believe, the authenticity of parts of the treatise. What I wish to do is to compare what we find in chapters 12 and 14, based on the Scriptural

⁴⁵ Cf. Iren. *dem.* 49, who referred to Psalm 109(110).1 as well.

⁴⁶ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 12.1 (CCSL 2, 1384): "... *aspice universas nationes de voragine erroris humani exinde emergentes...*"; 12.2 (CCSL 2, 1384): "... *Christo, qui totum iam orbem evangelii sui fide cepit...*"; "... *per quem expuncta consideramus.*"

interpretations offered, in order to make comments on the rhetorical structure of the treatise.

14.11-12a is an almost verbatim repetition of 11.11b-12.12a. I reject the textual emendation of Kroymann and argue that *adversus Iudaeos* 12.1 and *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.3 state and mean the same thing when they use the phrase “*David filium*,” in contrast with *adversus Iudaeos* 14.12. In terms of the interpretation provided of Psalm 2.7, what is to be noticed is how much more complicated the argument is in 14.12b-14 than it had been in 12.2. As well it can be noticed that there is no reference to Isaiah 42.6-7 in chapter 14.

Whereas in the first interpretation of Psalm 2.7 (in 12.2) the options for who the son was were given as Jesus or David, here in 14.12 the options are listed as Jesus or Solomon. This change of options is significant when one considers the structure of the work as a whole and its relationship with *adversus Marcionem*. I wish to state my conclusion that 14.11-14, rather than 11.10 - 12.2, is an interpolation and to proceed to offer argument in support of it.

Although 11.10 - 12.2 interrupts the smooth flow from 11.1-9 to chapter 13, it would have to be agreed that the argument about the universal spread of Christianity, as an example of the *topos* of subsequent events, fits in very well with the overall rhetorical structure of 11.1 - 14.10 where the *topos* of subsequent events, announced as the three item of the *confirmatio* at 8.2, is presented through a number of examples. 14.11-14, placed where a *peroratio* ought to be, has none of the characteristics of an end of an address. I believe also that 14.11-14 has been taken from *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.1-4, although like Barnes, Säflund and Tränkle, I agree that *adversus Iudaeos* was composed prior to *adversus Marcionem*. Thus, I would argue that Psalm 2.7-8 first was used by Tertullian in *adversus Iudaeos* 12.1 and explained in terms of Isaiah 42.6-

7. It was used again by Tertullian in *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.1-4 (also with Isaiah 42.6-7). Finally, it was used by someone else (without Isaiah 42.6-7) who borrowed the material from *adversus Marcionem* and incorporated it into *adversus Iudaeos* at the end of the treatise,⁴⁷ perhaps unaware that it was already a part of the treatise or intending, for whatever reason, to delete the passage from chapter 12.

In *adversus Iudaeos* 12.2 and *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.3⁴⁸ Tertullian interpreted Psalm 2.7 correctly: it was addressed by God to someone.⁴⁹ The debate was whether that was to David or to Jesus. In *adversus Iudaeos* 14.12b the psalm is interpreted as David speaking to someone, and the debate then is whether this is to Solomon or to Jesus.⁵⁰ The interpretation of the psalm,

⁴⁷ Cf. Kroymann's notes in the CCSL edition. He believed everything from the start of chapter 9 was used by someone else borrowing from *adversus Marcionem* (1364). He believed 11.10 - 12.2 belonged after 8.18 (1382) and that both 11.11b - 12.2 and 14.11-12 were taken from *adv. Marc.* 3.20.1-4 and that neither of the two passages in *adversus Iudaeos* were by Tertullian (1395).

⁴⁸ Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3 (CCSL 1, 535): "*Nec poteris magis David filium eius vindicare quam Christum.*" E. Evans (ed. & trans.), *Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem*, vol. 1: *Books 1 to 3*, OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 233: "You cannot claim that David, rather than Christ, is his son..." and R. Braun (ed. & trans.), *Tertullien, Contre Marcion*, t.3, SC 399 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1994), 175: "Tu ne pourras pas prétendre reconnaître son fils en David plutôt que dans le Christ..." both support such an interpretation. My argument is that "*David filium*" in *adv. Iud.* 12.2 should be translated as it is here in *adv. Marc.*, i.e., as accusative not genitive. Cf. Tränkle, *Kommentar*, 100.

⁴⁹ Interpreting this passage of Scripture, and deriving information about the rhetorical structure of the treatise, is not helped by Kroymann's emendation of the text to read "*nec poterit alium deum dei filium vindicare quam Christum*" ("and he will not be able to prove another god as son of God than Christ" or "and he will not be able to prove another god than Christ, son of God.") Tränkle's text reads "*nec poteris alium dei filium dicere quam Christum*" (omitting *deum*). He replaces *David* with *dei* on the basis of similar abbreviations used in the pre-Carolingian period: "Außerdem konnte *David* leicht aus dem zweiten Glied in das erste eindringen und *dei* ersetzen, zumal es von beiden Wörtern in vorkarolingischer Zeit einander recht ähnliche Kürzungen gab... und mit *alium* eigentlich *David* gemeint war." (101) It would seem Kroymann derived *deum* from *eum* in PNFR: "*nec poteris eum David filium dicere quam Christum.*" T has "*nec poterit alium David filium vindicare quam Christum.*" I can find no justification for removing *David* and replacing it with *dei* nor any justification for turning *alium* or *eum* into *deum*. Kroymann's argument (remembering he dated *adv. Iud.* after *adv. Marc.*) seems to have been that the perfectly clear interpretation by Tertullian of Psalm 2.7 in *adversus Marcionem* referring to Christ rather than Solomon (mistakenly identified by Kroymann instead of David, which is what is in the text in *adversus Marcionem*) has been turned into a completely different argument about no other god being son of God by the incompetent editor/author of the second half of *adversus Iudaeos*. Take away the pre-conceived idea of the priority of *adversus Marcionem* and the need for the text to be emended in the way he has done so disappears.

⁵⁰ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.12b (CCSL 2, 1395): "*nec poteritis in istam praedicationem magis David filium Salomonem vindicare, quam Christum dei filium.*" This clearly has *David* in the possessive case, which we do not find in *adv. Marc.* 3.20.3 or, so I argue, in *adv. Iud.* 12.2.

offered in chapter 12 of *adversus Iudaeos* and in *adversus Marcionem*, here (chapter 14) has been misinterpreted. One would not expect Tertullian himself to have made that mistake.⁵¹

Given that Tränkle has considered this citation of Psalm 2.7 in some detail and reached different conclusions, it is important to consider his position. He rejects the text of *Codex Paterniacensis* 439 (P) at *adversus Iudaeos* 12.2, about which he comments:

Bis zu OEHLER schrieben die Herausgeber mit P (=q) *nec poteris eum David filium dicere quam Christum*, was man wohl nur so übersetzen kann: ‘Du wirst ihn nicht eher als Sohn Davids denn als Christus bezeichnen können.’⁵²

He has translated David as possessive, thereby making the reference to a “son of David” rather than to “David as son” which then, as he points out, clashes with what follows in 12.2 (“*aut terminos terrae David potius promissos*”), which is addressed to David.⁵³ There is no clash, however, if David and Christ are understood as the alternatives for the position as son in this comparative sentence. This occurs if we accept the text in P and translate it as “You will not be able to affirm him (David) to be son as much as Christ.” I agree with Tränkle that this is what we find in *adversus Marcionem* 3.20.3,⁵⁴ and I suggest that *adversus Iudaeos* 12.2 needs to be understood similarly. As a result, I disagree with Tränkle’s opinion that the change from David to Solomon in *adversus Iudaeos* 14.12 is irrelevant.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Jus. *dial.* 88.8 was well aware that these were words of God to David (or Jesus), not words of David.

⁵² Tränkle, *Kommentar*, 100.

⁵³ *Ibid.*: “Außerdem ist im zweiten Kolon (*aut terminos...*) von David die Rede, nicht vom Sohne Davids. Es wäre sehr seltsam, wenn bei der Ausdeutung des Zitats, das an ein Person gerichtet ist, zwei verschiedene Personen als angesprochen gedacht würden.”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, li. Earlier (xiv) he had stated that 11.11 - 12.2. and 14.11ff were “mit wechselnden Abweichungen, aber mit wesentlich gleichem Inhalt verwendet ist...”

This textual analysis may appear overly involved and unnecessary but it is on the basis of the results I believe I have established that I am able to reach my conclusion about the non-authenticity of 14.11-14.

IV

Sider has pointed out that Tertullian turned to Scripture not simply as a written document needing interpretation but as living testimony to be used to construct conjectural arguments.⁵⁶ A number of years ago J. H. Waszink observed that to understand Tertullian's method of exegesis one needed reference to Quintilian.⁵⁷ As Philip Satterthwaite writes, there can be no doubting Tertullian's debt to classical rhetoric in the formulation of his arguments.⁵⁸

This article has attempted to highlight some of the ways in which classical rhetoric influenced the manner in which Tertullian interpreted the Hebrew Scriptures, particularly with regard to the issue of the promise of the universal spread of faith and the fulfilment of that promise in the Gentiles. This issue is used as an conjectural argument from the general *topos* of subsequent events, one of three *topoi* which give overall shape to the *confirmatio* of the treatise. Conclusions about the rhetorical structure of the treatise and of the *confirmatio* in particular can be reached through an examination of the details of passages Tertullian cited to illustrate his point that there existed in the Hebrew Scriptures promises from God about the universal spread

⁵⁶ Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric*, 63-4.

⁵⁷ J. H. Waszink, "Tertullian's Principles and Methods of Exegesis," in W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (eds.), *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Tradition: in Honorem Robert M. Grant* (Paris, 1979), 18. Cf. T. P. O'Malley, *Tertullian and the Bible: Language-Imagery-Exegesis* (Utrecht, 1967), who did not seem interested in or aware of the rhetorical dimension of Tertullian's exegesis.

⁵⁸ P. E. Satterthwaite, "The Latin Church Father," in S. E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. - A.D. 400* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 673.

of faith to the Gentiles. The threefold appearance of this issue suggests that the structure of the treatise is an unrevised draft, with 7.2b - 8.1a out of place in its present location, 12.1-2 in a better though not perfect position, and 14.11-14 a later interpolation by someone else into the treatise. Looking at the details of the Scripture he offered we may notice that some of his choice of Scripture and his interpretation was original, while some was shared with or derived from some source used by other early Christian writers. What has been my concern has been to illustrate how Tertullian's use of Scripture has been influenced by his use of classical rhetorical *topoi* and how insight into the structure of the treatise may be derived from close attention to ways in which he used Scripture.

APPENDIX D

Tertullian and Daniel 9:24-27 -

A Patristic Interpretation of a Prophetic Time-Frame

THE commencement of the third millennium on the 1st January, 2001, is anticipated eagerly by many and with trepidation by some as a date of particular significance. As the change of millennium looms ever larger it is appropriate once again to look back to that event of which this change will be supposedly the two thousandth anniversary, viz., the birth of Jesus. That Dionysius Exiguus miscalculated the date is accepted generally and may lessen the importance of the year 2001 for some, but ought to be a reminder to all about the arbitrariness of dates and the difficulties of calendars.

However, in a brief series of papers, I do not intend to review the wide-ranging debate about the date of the birth of Jesus in its entirety. Rather, I intend to limit my comments to an evaluation of the remarks of one author in particular, Tertullian of Carthage, the late second- and early third-century Christian writer and theologian, and to one of his works in particular, *adversus Iudaeos*, in which he discussed not only the birth and death of Jesus, but many other dates in the Persian, Hellenistic, Ptolemaic, and Roman worlds as well, in the light of Dan 9:24-27. In part, I wish to assess the statement made about Tertullian's efforts by Roger Beckwith that "[h]is figures are sound"¹.

¹ R. T. Beckwith, *Daniel 9 and the Date of Messiah's Coming in Essene, Hellenistic, Pharisaic, Zealot and Early Christian Computation*, *RevQ* 10, 1981, 539; *idem*, *Calendar and Chronology, Jewish and Christian. Biblical, Intertestamental and Patristic Studies*, Leiden 1996, 272.

Whatever problems scholars may have with the authenticity of the later chapters of *adversus Iudaeos*, most are agreed that chapter 8, in which is found the interpretation of Daniel 9, is authentically Tertullian's². Before examining Tertullian's interpretation in some detail, it is important to situate it in context. From a rhetorical perspective, it is suggested here that chapter 8 is part of Tertullian's *confirmatio*, which began at chapter 6 with a repetition of the work's *propositio*:

*Itaque necessitas nobis incumbit ut... ostendere et probare debeamus tam illam legem veterem cessasse quam legem novam promissam nunc operari...*³

For his *confirmatio* Tertullian set himself the fourfold task of investigating: i) the prophecies about the timing of the coming of the Christ, ii) the fulfilment of those prophecies of time, iii) other prophetic themes about the Christ, and iv) the giving of the new law (7,1). In chapter 8 it can be maintained that Tertullian dealt with the first two of those tasks: prophecies about the timing of the Christ and the fulfilment of those prophecies of time. This was done with regard to three events, viz., the time of the birth of the Christ, the death of the Christ, and the

² See the comments by A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera*, Pars II, CChr.SL 2, Turnhout 1954, 1338; A. Neander, *Antignostikus, Geist des Tertullianus*, 2nd ed., Berlin 1849; G. Quispel, *De bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem*, Leiden 1943, 61-79; J. Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 2. *The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus*, Utrecht 1953, 268-9; P. de Labriolle, *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne*, 3rd ed., 1947, 1.121; D. P. Efroymsen, *The Patristic Connection*, in *Anti-Semitism and the Foundations of Christianity*, ed. A. Davis, New York 1979, 116, n.6. For those who accept the entire work's authenticity see C. Aziza, *Tertullian et le judaïsme*, *Publications de la Faculte des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Nice* 16, Nice 1977, 104-7; J.-C. Fredouille, *Tertullian et la conversion de la culture antique*, Paris 1972, 254-5; A. L. Williams, *Adversus Iudaeos. A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance*, Cambridge 1935, 45; G. Säflund, *De pallio und die stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians*, *Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom*, 8, VIII, Lund 1955, 122-208; T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian. A Historical and Literary Study*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1985, 53; H. Tränkle, *Q.S.F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos. mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar*, Wiesbaden 1964, liii-lxvii; and H. Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Iudaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1. - 11. Jh.)*, Frankfurt am Main 1982, 217. Cf., E. Evans (ed. & trans.), *Tertullian. Adversus Marcionem*, Oxford Early Christian Texts, Oxford 1972, 1.xx.

³ Tert., *Iud.* 6,2a (CChr.SL 2, 1352-3, 13-18 Kroymann): "And so there is incumbent on us a necessity... to show and prove, on the one hand, that the old Law has ceased, and on the other, that the promised new law is now in operation." English translation is by S. Thewall in ANF 3. *Latin Christianity. its Founder, Tertullian*, ed. by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, rev. A. C. Coxe, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 1885.

destruction of Jerusalem.

It was presented in an interweaving pattern: introduction to the prophecies about time (8,1), introduction to the fulfilment of the prophecies about time (8,2a)⁴, prophecies about the time of the birth of the Christ, the death of the Christ, and the destruction of Jerusalem (8,3-8), calculation of the time-frame for the prophecies about the time of the birth of the Christ (8,9-10), proof of the fulfilment of the prophecies about the time of the birth of the Christ (8,11-14), calculation of the time-frame for the prophecies about the time of the death of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem (8,15-16), and proof of the fulfilment of the prophecies about the time of the death of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem (8,17-18). Within this structure proposed here, Dan 9:1-2a, 20-27 was cited by Tertullian (8,3-6) as the relevant prophecy for determining the time of those three events. In 8,7-8 Tertullian offered an interpretation of that prophecy. His aim, therefore, was to prove that Jesus (and the Roman capture of Jerusalem in AD 70) fulfilled the prophecy in Daniel which, in turn, would be an argument in support of his position that the old law had been replaced by the new. In forensic cases of a conjectural nature the matter of time was an important *topos*. Time was a species of artificial proof with regard to actions⁵.

In this first paper, I wish to consider matters relating to the text of Dan 9:24-27 cited by Tertullian (8,3-6) and the interpretation or calculation of the time-frame offered by Tertullian

⁴ Ibid., 8,2b seems to be a repetition of that fourfold task of 7,1 in slightly different language, combining the first two into one. Here we find Tertullian wishing to prove that the Christ had come on the basis of i) time, ii) signs and operations, and iii) consequences. "... *quibus computatis probabimus venisse eum iam et ex temporibus praescriptis et ex signis competentibus et ex operationibus eius, quae proba<bi>mus et ex consequentibus, quae post adventum eius futura adnuntiabantur, uti iam adimpleta omnia praecepta credamus.*" (1356-7, 8-13 Kroy.) See H. Tränkle, Kommentar (see note 2), xxxii-xxxiii on 8,2: "Die einzelnen Punkte sind so scharf gegeneinander abgegrenzt, daß dieser Satz wohl nur als regelrechte Gliederung für das folgende verstanden werden kann. Im 8. Kapitel wird nur der erste von ihnen besprochen, die übrigen müßten also den späteren Teilen des Werkes vorbehalten sein..."

⁵ Her. II 4,7; Cic., inv. rhet. I 26,39; II 12,40; Cic., part. or. 11,37; Quint., inst. V 10,42-47.

about Daniel's time-frame (8,7-8). In a subsequent paper I wish to consider Tertullian's use of his time-frame in establishing that the birth and death of Jesus and the destruction of Jerusalem were the events that fulfilled those prophecies found in Daniel (8,9-18).

I. Daniel 9 in Context

In order to be able to comment on the use Tertullian has made of Daniel 9, it is necessary first to appreciate this passage from Daniel briefly in its own context, a passage Montgomery has described as "most vexed"⁶ and of which Chazan says, "the combination of brevity and obscurity is daunting."⁷

Dan 9:20-27 is part of the story of the third of four visions which constitute the apocalyptic half of this work, which runs from Dan 7:1 - 12:13⁸. Unlike the other visions, this is a reinterpretation of a piece of Scripture, viz., Jer 25:11-12; 29:10. In 605 BC (Jer 25:1), Jeremiah prophesied the desolation of the kingdom of Judah under the Babylonians for seventy years before a permanent reversal in fortune⁹. Even though numerous attempts have been made to suggest two events, seventy years apart, that would suit the conditions of Jeremiah's prophecy¹⁰, it would seem, on the basis of Dan 9:2, that the author of Daniel,

⁶ J. A. Montgomery, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, ICC, Edinburgh 1927, 377.

⁷ R. Chazan, *Daniel 9:24-27: Exegesis of Polemics*, in *Contra Iudaeos. Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews*, *Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism* 10, Tübingen 1996, 143.

⁸ On the question of the authenticity and integrity of Daniel's prayer (Dan 9:3-19) as part of the chapter, see J. J. Collins, *Daniel. A Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, Minneapolis 1993, 347-8; idem, *The Jewish Apocalypses*, *Semeia* 14, 1979, 30; B. W. Jones, *The Prayer in Daniel IX*, *VT* 18, 1968, 488-93; M. Gilbert, *La prière de Daniel, Dan 9,4-19*, *RTL* 3, 1972, 284-310; and A. Lacocque, *The Liturgical Prayer in Daniel 9*, *HUCA* 47, 1976, 119-42.

⁹ G. P. Couturier, *Jeremiah*, in *New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, ed. by R. E. Brown, J. A. Fitzmyer and R. E. Murphy, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.) 1990, 267, 285, 287, considers Jer 25:12 a gloss and 29:10 part of the later material incorporated by Baruch.

¹⁰ From the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar (587 BC) to the edict for restoration issued by Cyrus I

unlike other Scriptural authors¹¹, did not accept that the prophecy had been fulfilled in a literal sense and thus sought an alternative, non-literal basis for recognising its fulfilment¹². That basis was the hebdomad or week of years¹³.

In the reinterpretation of Daniel, the desolation of the people of Judah was to last seventy weeks of years or 490 years (each week representing seven years) until the establishment of the new world order of everlasting justice (Dan 9:24). That period of time was divided into three epochs: one of seven weeks (49 years) from the prophetic announcement until the coming of an anointed leader (Dan 9:25a)¹⁴, one of sixty-two weeks

(538 BC) was approximately only 50 years. Yet, for some, this was enough time to fulfil Jeremiah's prophecy (2 Chron 36:17-23; Ezra 1:1-2), which would suggest that Jeremiah's figure was not meant to be taken literally or that the author of 2 Chronicles and Ezra could not calculate accurately. Modern scholars would suggest the first, e.g., G. P. Couturier, Jeremiah (see note 9), 286 (as in Ps 90:10 where seventy years equals a full lifetime) and P. Grelot, *Soixante-dix semaines d'années*, Bib 50, 1969, 173-5. However, others have put forward other events which, perhaps, may make Jeremiah more accurate literally: Zech 1:12 put the fulfilment of the prophecy in the second year of Darius I (520 BC); R. G. Kratz, *Translatio Imperii: Untersuchungen zu den aramäischen Danielerzählungen und ihrem theologiegeschichtlichen Umfeld*, WMANT 63, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1991, 224-5, would begin dating from the battle of Carchemish in 605/4 BC; R. E. Winkle, *Jeremiah's Seventy Weeks for Babylon. A Re-Assessment, Part II. the Historical Data*, AUSS 25, 1987, 289-99, would begin the dating in 609 BC; T. E. McComiskey, *The Seventy Weeks of Daniel against the Background of Ancient Near Eastern Literature*, WTJ 47, 1985, 26, would begin the dating after the first deportation to Babylon in 597 BC, even though he goes on to argue (36-40) that the number seventy had a symbolic rather than literal significance in much ancient Near Eastern literature; R. Hammer, *The Book of Daniel*, CBC, Cambridge 1976, 96, mentions some who would date the fulfilment of the prophecy to the dedication of the new temple in 516 BC.

¹¹ 2 Chron 36:17-23; Ezra 1:1-2; Zech 1:12. B. Z. Wacholder, *Chronomessianism. The Timing of Messianic Movements and the Calendar of Sabbatical Cycles*, HUCA 46, 1975, 202, attributes the invention of sabbatical messianism to the author of Daniel. Cf., M. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, Oxford 1985, 482, who believes that the author of 2 Chronicles, who combined Jeremiah's prophecy with Lev 26:34-35 about the restoration of the lost sabbaths, "seems to have understood the seventy years of Jeremiah's oracle as ten sabbatical cycles."

¹² The author of Daniel's dissatisfaction need not have stemmed solely from time discrepancy. See L. F. Hartman and A. A. Di Lella, *Daniel*, in *New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (see note 9), 417: "But the author of Dan 9 is not satisfied with this fulfilment, which appears to him too incomplete a restoration of Zion." Even though J. Braverman, *Jerome's Commentary on Daniel. A Study of Comparative Jewish and Christian Interpretations of the Hebrew Bible*, CBQMS 7, Washington D.C. 1978, 105-12, discusses Jerome's interpretation of the seventy weeks, earlier (98) he mentioned Daniel himself as though he had a literal interpretation of Jeremiah: "This means that Daniel calculated the seventy-year period beginning with the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple (587 B.C.E.)..." My arguments disagree with Braverman's position.

¹³ B.Z. Wacholder, *Chronomessianism* (see note 11), 202-3, argues that *shavu'a* was understood by ancient Jewish exegetes (Qumranic, rabbinic) as not merely any seven years but a sabbatical cycle, i.e., a seven-year period that had a definite beginning and end because of its place in a fixed pattern of cycles.

¹⁴ In trying to calculate this 49 year period the words of J. J. Collins, *Daniel* (see note 8), 355, are particularly apt: "That Daniel 9 is dated to the first year of the fictional Darius the Mede should dispel any expectation of

(434 years), during which the rebuilt temple would be in operation (Dan 9:25b), and the third of one week (7 years), which would start with the cutting down of an anointed, followed by the destruction of Jerusalem and temple. The end of sacrifice in the second half of that week would finish with the destruction of the desolater (Dan 9:26-27), the anointing of the temple and the beginning of everlasting justice (Dan 9:24).

Although any number of comments could be made about points of interest in this passage, only those related to the time-frame itself will be considered here. In verse 25, the Hebrew of the Masoretic Text (MT) quite clearly separates the seven weeks from the sixty-two weeks by the use of the *atnah* (אֲנִי) ¹⁵ and this is accepted by many modern commentators as the originally intended meaning ¹⁶. On the other hand, the translation attributed to

exactitude in the calculations.” A. Laato, *The Seventy Weeks in the Book of Daniel*, ZAW 102, 1990, 213, reports the scholarly consensus as 587/6 BC. The *terminus a quo* is the going forth of the word to rebuild and restore Jerusalem. Could that be the divine word given through Jeremiah sometime in the decade (597-587/6 BC) between the two deportations (Jer 29:1-32; 51:60?) or could it be the divine word given through Cyrus (2 Chron 36:22) in 538 BC about the rebuilding of the temple and the return of the exiles? (On the basis of the Chronicler’s perspective, I would not accept the rejection by J. J. Collins, *Daniel* (see note 8), 354, of the word being Cyrus’ decree; for the Chronicler, Cyrus’ decree is both a human and divine word.) The *terminus ad quem* is the presence of the anointed ruler. Could that be Cyrus (Isa 45:1), Jeshua the high priest (Hag 1:1,12,14; 2:2,4; Zech 3:1,8; 6:11) or Zerubbabel the governor (Hag 1:1,14; 2:2,21; Zech 4)? R. C. Newman, *Daniel’s Seventy Weeks and the Old Testament Sabbath-Year Cycle*, JETS 16, 1973, 233, based on Neh 2:1-6, wants the date to be 445 BC, during the reign of Artaxerxes II. On the whole this seems a most unsatisfactory article. The chief argument in favour of 445 BC seems to be that it allows a *terminus ad quem* that coincides with the ministry of Jesus. That the argument is apologetic rather than interpretative is confirmed in the conclusion. True scholarship cannot be advanced by Newman’s concluding paragraph on 234: “The Jews were once exiled seventy years for not keeping the sabbatical year. Is it unreasonable that their present exile of about 1900 years should be a punishment for rejecting their promised Messiah?”

¹⁵ שְׁבַעִים שָׁבָעָה וְשִׁבְעִים וְשָׁנִים See J. J. Collins, *Daniel* (see note 8), 355.

¹⁶ J. J. Collins, *Daniel* (see note 8), 355-6; R. Hammer, *Daniel* (see note 10), 98; L. F. Hartman and A. A. Di Lella, *The Book of Daniel*, AB 23, New York 1978, 250; J. A. Montgomery, *Daniel* (see note 6), 379-80; M. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation* (see note 11), 483; T. E. McComiskey, *The Seventy Weeks* (see note 10), 19-25. See M. J. Gruenthaner, *The Seventy Weeks*, CBQ 1, 1939, 44-54, for both arguments. R. Chazan, *Daniel 9:24-27* (see note 7), 147, notes that the Medieval Jewish scholar Soadia Gaon accepted the threefold division. Cf., B. Z. Wacholder, *Chronomessianism* (see note 11), 205, who counts the seven weeks as part of the sixty-two, a view rejected explicitly (and seemingly correctly) by Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation* (see note 11), 482). R. T. Beckwith, *Daniel 9* (see note 1), 521-2 and idem, *Calendar and Chronology* (see note 1), 260, notes a number of messianic interpretations that have the coming of the anointed leader of verse 25 not after seven weeks but after sixty-nine weeks (i.e., seven and sixty-two). A. Laato, *The Seventy Weeks* (see note 14), 220-1, through an attempt to recover the pre-Maccabean core of these verses, identifies the anointed of verses 25 and 26 as one and the same person, and does so through joining the sixty-two weeks to the seven. J. Doukhan, *The Seventy Weeks of Dan. 9. An Exegetical Study*, AUSS 17, 1979, 17, rejects the MT punctuation because he believes the passage

Theodotion (θ')¹⁷ joins them together so that the anointed one (and θ' only allows for one anointed one) only appears after sixty-nine weeks. This seems to raise a problem: either the anointed one appears after sixty-nine weeks (verse 25) and yet was cut off after sixty-two weeks (verse 26), seven weeks before the anointing (even though θ', and the Old Greek [OG] for that matter, refer to χρίσμα rather than χριστός) or else μετὰ τὰς ἑβδομάδας τὰς ἐξήκοντα δύο in verse 26 means “after the sixty-two weeks that follow the seven” (in which case the promised one is both anointed and cut off at the same time - at the sixty-nine week mark)¹⁸. This problem has not been noticed by those, like Beckwith, who have considered the Greek version:

Also, and as a consequence, they [Messianic interpretations] usually identify ‘the anointed one,

refers to only one messiah not two. R. C. Newman, *Daniel’s Seventy Weeks* (see note 14), 232, also rejects the MT interpretation because the punctuation dates from the ninth or tenth centuries. He does not consider the earlier, Patristic evidence for such an interpretation (e.g., Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus). W. Adler, *The Apocalyptic Survey of History Adapted by Christians. Daniel’s Prophecy of 70 Weeks*, in *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity*, ed. J. C. Vanderkam and W. Adler, *Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum*, section III, vol. 4, Minneapolis 1996, 208, notes that in Second Temple literature the periodisation of the 70 weeks did not conform to a 7,62 and 1 week pattern. Further, with regard to early Christian literature, he states on 223-4 that the majority of Christian exegetes ignored the division into 7 and 62. Those like Clement, Hippolytus and Eusebius who did not ignore it, the minority of Christian exegetes, are said to have access “to a partially submerged Jewish tradition of interpretation that survived in a Christianized form well into the third and fourth centuries.”

¹⁷ For the relationship between Theodotion-Daniel, the Greek translation of Daniel preserved in most MSS and which, according to Jerome (PL 25, 514; 28,1357 Migne) replaced the Old Greek translation (probably in the third century AD), and Proto-Theodotion (or *kaige*), the name given by D. Barthélemy to a Greek recension of the first century AD of LXX in light of Hebrew MSS, and Ur-Theodotion, versions of Daniel found in the New Testament identical to the later Theodotion-Daniel see e.g., D. Barthélemy, *Les devanciers d’Aquila*, VTSup 10, Leiden 1963; P. Grelot, *Les versions grecques de Daniel*, Bib 47, 1966, 392; J. Ziegler, *Susanna, Daniel, Bel et Draco, Septuaginta. Vetus Testamentum Graecum* 16/2, Göttingen 1954, 61; A. Schmitt, *Stammt der sogenannte “Θ”-Text bei Daniel wirklich von Theodotion?*, *Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens* 9, Göttingen 1966; L. F. Hartman and A. A. Di Lella, *The Book of Daniel* (see note 16), 76-83; R. E. Brown, D. W. Johnson and K. G. O’Connell, *Texts and Versions*, in *New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (see note 9), 1092-5; J. J. Collins, *Daniel* (see note 8), 3-11; S. P. Jeansonne, *The Old Greek Translation of Daniel 7-12*, CBQMS 19, Washington, D.C. 1988, 11-31.

¹⁸ This seems to have been recognised by the OG translation of verse 26 which reads καὶ μετὰ ἑπτα καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἐξήκοντα δύο. S. P. Jeansonne, *The Old Greek Translation* (see note 17), 128 suggests that ἑβδομήκοντα was a misreading of the Hebrew and should have been ἑβδομάδας and that “In 9:26 of the OG, the translator has inserted ἑπτα to clarify the fact that the anointed one (who will be cut off after 62 weeks, if the terminus a quo is the rebuilding of Jerusalem) will be cut off after 62+7 years with the terminus a quo being the issuance of the word.” W. Adler, *Apocalyptic Survey* (see note 16), 206-7, accepts ἑβδομήκοντα in the OG as 70 years and that ἑπτα and ἐξήκοντα refer not to hebdomads but simply to straight years, making a total of 139 years.

the prince' [verse 25] with 'the anointed one' who is cut off after the 62 weeks in verse 26. This certainly makes *good and consistent sense* of the prophecy, and only requires that the hopeful message of the prophecy should be fulfilled in spite of the death of the Messiah (on Jewish interpretations) or because of His death (on the Christian interpretation).¹⁹

It is because of this problem that it is suggested here that the MT interpretation might have been the original and θ' a corruption. The OG version of verse 25 makes even less sense²⁰.

Daniel was not alone in the periodisation of history; other historical apocalypses roughly contemporary with Daniel were interested in understanding events as part of an unfolding scheme or pattern leading to an eschatological moment, but space prevents anything more than this passing reference²¹.

II. Daniel 9 in Tertullian

Although there are several references to these verses of Daniel in Jewish²² and early

¹⁹ R. T. Beckwith, Daniel 9 (see note 1), 521-2 and idem, Calendar and Chronology (see note 1), 260-1 (emphasis added). He explains the Masoretic punctuation as a non-messianic reaction to early messianic expectations. He sees the Masoretic punctuation as an alteration to an earlier understanding but, as I have attempted to demonstrate *supra*, the context cannot support such an "earlier" interpretation.

²⁰ καὶ μετὰ ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἐξήκοντα... F. F. Bruce, *The Earliest Old Testament Interpretation*, OTS 17, 1972, 44, believes that the OG translation was in fact an interpretation.

²¹ A. Yarbro Collins, *Numerical Symbolism in Jewish and Apocalyptic Literature*, ANRW 21.2, Berlin 1984, esp. 1221-49; J. C. VanderKam and W. Adler, eds., *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity*, vol. 4 of *Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum*, Section III, Mineapolis 1996.

²² See T. Levi 15-16; Jub. 23; Damascus Document (CD-A, I, 5-12 = 4Q266 [4QD^a] I,9-17 = 4Q267 [4QD^b] 2,I,10-16); 11QMelchizedeck (11Q13 [11QMelch] II,7). R. T. Beckwith, Daniel 9 (see note 1), 523-5, notes that these Essene computations are messianic, begin their calculations from the return from exile (which they would date about 490 B.C.) and have the Messiah appearing in the last week following what Beckwith believes to have been the pre-Masoretic, original Hebrew text. For another interpretation, which Beckwith (530) labels "Pharisaic" and sees as a deliberate counter to Essene belief through the development of the Masoretic punctuation, the timing of the last week to coincide with AD 70 or 135, or the timing of the first week with the rebuilding of the temple under Herod in 18 BC, see *Seder Olam Rabbah* 29-30; *Abodah Zarah* 9a-9b. For the Hellenistic interpretation see *Jos.*, ant. X 11,7 §§ 267, 276. J. A. Montgomery, Daniel (see note 6), 396-7; J. J. Collins, Daniel (see note 8), 85, 356; and R. T. Beckwith, Daniel 9 (see note 1), 534-6, accept that Josephus was referring to Dan 9:27 and that the last week ended in AD 70. F. F. Bruce, *Josephus and Daniel*, ASTI 4, 1965, 154, based on *Jos.*, j.w. IV 5,2 §§ 318, 323, identified the anointed who was cut off with the High Priest Ananus, murdered in AD 68. Bruce contrasted (152-3) the interpretation of Daniel which Josephus found in his sources with (153-60) the interpretation Josephus himself provided. R. T. Beckwith, Daniel 9 (see note 1), 536, connects

Christian literature²³, it was not until the late second century AD that Christian writers began to use this part of Daniel to prove that Jesus was the one to fit the chronology²⁴.

When we come to consider Tertullian's use of Daniel 9, which he did only in *adversus Iudaeos*²⁵, we need to consider two things in particular: the text of Dan 9:24-27 he cited (8,5-6) and his interpretation of that text (8,7-8). Determining the text used by Tertullian is no easy matter due to the textual variations that survive in the codices of Tertullian. It could be argued, as a matter of principle, however, that, in choosing between variations, one should favour a reconstruction of his text of Daniel that matches his following interpretations. Hence I shall investigate questions relating to text and interpretation together rather than separately. Again, as with the passage from Daniel itself, any number of comments could be made, but here I restrict them to those with regard to the time-frame.

Providing an interpretation of a written document was a common rhetorical device to rule out, among other things, ambiguity²⁶. Only briefly, at 8,7-8, was Tertullian concerned to deal with removing ambiguity from the written text through his authoritative interpretation. For the rest, the prophecy from Daniel provided Tertullian simply with the facts about when

this reference in Josephus to the cutting off of the anointed and the destruction of the city with Dan 9:26. Cf., A. Laato, *The Seventy Weeks* (see note 14), 216-19, who, in arguing that Josephus was guided by Daniel 9, locates Josephus' end of the sixty-two weeks with the murder of Onias III in 171 BC. For other Jewish interpretations see R. T. Beckwith, *Daniel 9* (see note 1), 536-9 and idem, *Calendar and Chronology* (see note 1), 261-72; W. Adler, *Apocalyptic Survey* (see note 16), 206-17.

²³ See Matt. 24:15; Mark. 13:14 (possibly 2 Thess 2:4); Barn. 16,6; Iren., Haer. V 25,4. See L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks in Daniel in the Early Fathers*, WTJ 7, 1944, 137-9; W. Adler, *Apocalyptic Survey* (see note 16), 217-38.

²⁴ C. Rowland, *Apocalyptic, God and the world. Appearance and reality. Early Christianity's debt to the Jewish apocalyptic tradition*, in *Early Christian thought in its Jewish Context*, ed. by J. Barclay and J. Sweet, Cambridge 1996, 238-49, in investigating, in part, the influence of Daniel on early Christian apocalypticism, does not mention chapter 9.

²⁵ The exception being Tert., *iei.* 10,13, where he quoted from Dan 9:21.

²⁶ Her. II 11,16; Cic., *inv. rhet.* II 40,117; Quint., *inst.* III 6,88; V 7,32-7.

the new law-giver would appear (8,9-10.15-16) so that he could go on to develop an argument, from the conjectural *topos* of time, showing that the Christ had come at the proper time and that therefore the new law had replaced the old (8,11-14.17-18). For the most part, Tertullian treated the text of Daniel not as a document but as a witness giving testimony.

Tertullian began his brief interpretation of the text of the prophecy with the general time-frame of the seventy weeks as a single unit and a reference back to Dan 9:25:

animadvertamus igitur, terminum quomodo²⁷ in vero²⁸ praedicit LXX ebdomadas futuras; in quibus si reciperent eum, aedificabitur in latitudinem²⁹ et longitudinem et innovabuntur tempora.³⁰

Here a difference between Tertullian and Daniel can be noticed. In the MT the rebuilding of square and moat (רחוב וחרוץ) takes place in the sixty-two weeks that follow the initial seven weeks, with the implication that what is rebuilt or restored lasts for the sixty-two weeks³¹. In θ', with the addition of the seven and sixty-two weeks, the return of streets and walls (πλατεία καὶ τεῖχος) will be for sixty-nine weeks³². Both clearly refer to the second temple

²⁷ Following A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera* (see note 2), 1358, and H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 2), 16, who accept codex Parisinus Latinus 13.047 (φ or q), codex Paterniacensis 439 (P), codex Florentinus Magliabechianus conv. suppr. VI,9 (N), codex Florentinus Magliabechianus conv. suppr. VI,10 (F), and codex Luxemburgensis 75 (X), against the highly regarded codex Trecensis 523 (T) (*quomodo terminum*).

²⁸ Following φ (q) and codex Fuldensis, as found in the appendices of Franciscus Junius' 1597 edition (Φ or Q), as does H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 2), 16, 72-3, against *in verbo quod* in F, *in verbo quas* in PN, *inveniamus quando* in T and *in verbo 'quoacus<que>'* in A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera* (see note 2), 1358.

²⁹ Following TPNFX. Although A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera* (see note 2), 1358, accepts *latitudinem* here in Iud. 8,7 as part of Tertullian's repetition of the phrase from the text of Dan 9:25, in Iud. 8,5, however, when Tertullian first cited Dan 9:25, against φ (q) and T (which have *latitudinem*), Φ (Q) (which has *altitudinem*), and PNF (which have *laetitia*), he (Kroymann) emends the text to read *latitia*. If Kroymann was prepared to accept *latitudinem* in Iud. 8,7, consistency should require he accept *latitudinem* in Iud. 8,5 as well.

³⁰ Tert., Iud. 8,7 (1358, 42-6 Kroy.): "Observe we, therefore, the limit, - how, in truth, he predicts that there are to be LXX hebdomads, *within which* if they receive Him, 'it shall be built with height and entrenchment, and the times shall be renewed.' "

³¹ J. A. Montgomery, *Daniel* (see note 6), 372.

³² Tertullian's *in latitudinem et longitudinem* more closely resembles the OG (εἰς πλάτος καὶ μήκος) than θ' (πλατεία καὶ τεῖχος), although Tertullian, like θ' but unlike the OG, places the phrase in Dan. 9:25 rather than

begun after the return from exile. Tertullian's interpretation is different: the rebuilding of the breadth and length is conditional upon the acceptance of the Christ within the seventy weeks (*in quibus si reciperent eum*)³³. This seems to be a reference to a rebuilding in the time post-AD 70 (that year being the *terminus ad quem* of Tertullian's seventy weeks). In other words, in 8,7 Tertullian seems to have referred to the rebuilding not of the second temple but of a third, a possibility which then expired when, at the time of the destruction of the second temple (which was the limit of the seventy week time-frame), the Jews still had not accepted Jesus. Tertullian seems to have suggested that the promise of a new temple after its destruction in AD 70 had been ruled out by the obstinacy of the Jews. This is a point which is not mentioned again in chapter 8 and seems to be unique to Tertullian.

On the basis of the *interpretation* of Dan 9:25 in 8,7 (where the clause *aedificabitur in latitudinem et longitudinem et innovabuntur tempora* is taken to refer to the entire seventy weeks), one would have to accept the inclusion of the disputed phrase *septem et dimidia et ebdomades* as part of Tertullian's *citation* of Dan 9:25 back in 8,5b. This would mean that in the text the clause refers to the seventy weeks as it does in the interpretation, not just the 62½. The problem is that both Kroymann and Tränkle reject the phrase and have Tertullian's text of Dan 9:25 in 8,5 read:

*... a perfectione sermonis integrando et aedificando Hierusalem usque ad Christum ducem ebdomades sexaginta et duae et dimidia...*³⁴

9:27. This makes the question of the translation Tertullian used difficult to determine.

³³ L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 23), 146, noted the conditional nature of Tertullian's interpretation.

³⁴ Tert., *Iud.* 8,5 (1357-8, 30-3 Kroy.): "... from the going forth of a word for restoring and rebuilding Jerusalem unto the Christ, the Leader, hebdomads (seven and a half, and) lxii and an half..." Thelwall has bracketed the contentious phrase, noting that it was missing in early MSS (ANF, 3 [see note 3], 159).

Accepting this inclusion would also make verse 25 a parallel to verse 24 (cited in 8,5a): both mention seventy weeks until eschatological fulfilment. The inclusion would also parallel θ' more closely which, as has been noted, joined these two blocks of weeks together. The parallel is not exact though, for θ' only accounts for sixty-nine weeks at this point (ἀπὸ ἐξόδου λόγου τοῦ ἀποκριθῆναι, καὶ οἰκοδομησαί' ιερουσαλήμ, ἕως Χριστοῦ ἡγουμένου ἑβδομάδες ἑπτα, καὶ ἑβδομάδες ἑξηκονταδύο·) while Tertullian, if we include the phrase, accounts for all seventy (*ebdomades septem et dimidia et ebdomades sexaginta et duae et dimidia*).

However, the inclusion of *septem et dimidia et ebdomodes* in 8,5b is not problem-free: the reference in Daniel is to a particular part of the seventy weeks - from the going forth of the word about the rebuilding of Jerusalem until the Messiah - a clause which Tertullian keeps (*Iud. 8,5b - a profectioe sermonis in integrando et aedificando Hierusalem usque ad Christum ducem*). The problem is that Tertullian would then have associated this clause with the entire seventy weeks if the phrase *septem et dimidia et ebdomades* is retained, yet then his time-frame would extend beyond *ad Christum ducem*, up to the destruction of the temple in fact. If one were to accept this terminal point in the text of Daniel as cited by Tertullian (*ad Christum ducem*) then the phrase about the 7½ weeks cannot be included in 8,5b as part of Tertullian's text of Daniel. In his interpretation, Tertullian accepted that the time until the Christ was limited to 62½ weeks (8,8a - ... *et recapitulavit et dixit intra LX et II et dimidiam ebdomadas nasci illum et ungui sanctum sanctorum...*)³⁵, also suggesting the exclusion of the phrase from the cited text. Further to that, and perhaps the most telling argument against inclusion, there is no evidence of this phrase *septem et dimidia et ebdomades* in any of the

³⁵ Ibid., 8,8a (1358, 48-50 Kroy.): "... both ecapitulated, and said, that in lx and ii and an half of an hebdomad He is born, and an holy one of holy ones in anointed..."

codices of Tertullian; its first mention is in the edition of Jacob Pamelius in 1579³⁶.

Yet another point may be made against the inclusion of the phrase as part of Tertullian's text of Dan 9:25. In the immediate continuation of the prophecy (Dan 9:26a), which Tertullian quoted there is reference to the 62½ weeks (*et post ebdomadas has LX et II semis...*)³⁷. The use here of the demonstrative pronoun would seem to rule out the reference in 8,5b of Dan 9:25b being to the whole seventy weeks, and hence rule out the inclusion of the phrase about the 7½ weeks.

It would seem that there can be no definite solution to the question of whether or not to include mention of the 7½ weeks together with the 62½ as part of Tertullian's quoting of Dan 9:25 in 8,5b. It is indeterminate because two differing interpretations were drawn from the text, whatever it might have been, by Tertullian. At 8,7 he mentioned that the Jews had seventy weeks within which to recognise the Christ in order for the rebuilding of the temple. This is clearly a harking back to the text of Dan 9:25 that is found in 8,5b (which would then need the inclusion of the reference to the 7½ weeks) and, in addition, the inclusion of such a phrase about the 7½ weeks would match θ' more closely, though not perfectly. On the other hand, Dan 9:25 talks of the coming of the Christ. This was not at the end of the seventy weeks but at some point earlier. Hence the mention of the 7½ weeks at 8,5b would be inappropriate and inaccurate. That there is doubt about whether Tertullian used this phrase is easily explicable: Tertullian's translation depended in some manner upon θ' which, as has been noted, was a misinterpretation of the text of Daniel itself. The inconsistency existed in θ'

³⁶ H. Tränkle, Kommentar (see note 2), 72: "Vergleicht man diese Interpretation mit den zugrunde liegenden Worten des Daniel, so fehlen 1.7 die 7½ Wochen, wie schon PAM. erkannt hat. Dazu kommt, daß es bei Theodotion an dieser Stelle heißt: ἑβδομάδες ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομάδες ἐξήκοντα δύο. Der Ausfall ist, wenn man die von mir vorgeschlagene Ergänzung wählt, durch die Wiederholung von *ebdomades* leicht denkbar."

³⁷ Tert., Iud. 8,6a (1358, 35 Kroy.).

already³⁸. Tränkle notes that those who make an argument from the fact that in *adversus Iudaeos* 8 Tertullian cited Daniel from θ' rather than the LXX (here meaning the OG) do not pay close enough attention to the possible influence of the LXX here. His conclusion is that Tertullian's text of Daniel was probably already an amalgamation:

... im zweiten Fall entspricht Dan. 9,26 *exterminabitur unctio et non erit* sicher der Formulierung der Septuaginta ἀποσταθήσεται χρίσμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται und nicht Theodotians ἐξολεθρευθήσεται χρίσμα καὶ κρίμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ. Das Argument verliert aber vollends sein Gewicht, wenn wir beachten, daß auch Cyprian Daniel nach beiden Übersetzungen zitiert. Wahrscheinlich benützten beide Schriftsteller einen Text, in dem die zwei Übersetzungen bereits kontaminiert waren.³⁹

If Tertullian did use the phrase it creates some problems, but if he did not use the phrase it creates other problems. As Montgomery has stated so succinctly:

This development [Christian interpretation of Daniel], when it came in, was encouraged by the false interpretation in Θ , 'unto Christ the chief 7 weeks and 62 weeks,' which made the calculation up to Christ's advent somewhat more plausible.⁴⁰

The second part of Tertullian's interpretation is the locating of the birth and anointing of the Christ within the 62½ weeks (8,8a). With this Tertullian had created something new, for the Masoretic interpretation has the first anointed appearing *after* seven weeks and the second anointed being cut off *after* the following sixty-two weeks. This contrasts also with the impression created by θ' that the anointed one came *after* sixty-nine weeks. For Tertullian

³⁸ To make this point clearly: in θ' at Dan 9:25a the two temporal points of reference are the going forth of the word about the rebuilding and the coming of the Christ (ἀπὸ ἐξόδου λόγου τοῦ ἀποκροθῆναι, καὶ τοῦ οἰκοδομηθῆσαι Ἱερουσαλήμ, ἕως Χριστοῦ ἡγουμένου...), separated by sixty-nine weeks. There is no actual mention of the temple being built until 9:25b where there is mention of what will take place - the return of exiles and rebuilding of the city (καὶ ἐπιστρέψει, καὶ οἰκοδομηθήσεται...). What is unclear in θ' is whether this activity takes place after the sixty-nine weeks or during it (and if during it, at what point?).

³⁹ H. Tränkle, Kommentar (see note 2), xii.

⁴⁰ J. A. Montgomery, Daniel (see note 6), 398. Earlier, on 392, he had stated: "The Christian interpretation of the chronology in v 25 was sadly misled by the original error of Θ in constructing the '7 Weeks' with the following '62 Weeks,' as though 69 Weeks were the first figure intended."

there was only one messiah and he appeared *within* the 62½ weeks (8,8 - ... *et recapitulavit et dixit intra LX et II et dimidiam ebdomadas nasci illum...*; 8,9 - *Unde igitur ostendemus, quonian venit Christus intra LXII et dimidiam ebdomadas?*)⁴¹ The answer Knowles provided to his own question has to be modified:

What part of the prophecy does Tertullian conceive of as referring to this period, i.e., to the internal events of this period? The answer is that he refers none of it to the time within the era covered by the sixty-two and one-half weeks.⁴²

Knowles almost seemed to accept such a modification:⁴³ the Christ came *within* that time-frame, not at the end of it.

The key to Tertullian's interpretation of this passage of Daniel and the basis of his division into two periods of time comes from Dan 9:26a (Καὶ μετὰ τὰς ἑβδομάδας τὰς ἑξήκονταδύο, ἐξολοθρευθήσεται χρίσμα,...). For Tertullian this meant that the coming of the Christ had to be in the first period and in the remaining time would be the suffering of the Christ (and the destruction of Jerusalem):

*... ebdomades autem VII et dimidia cum implerentur, pati habere et civitatem exterminari*⁴⁴ *post I et dimidiam ebdomadam, quo scilicet VII et dimidia ebdomades completae sunt.*⁴⁵

⁴¹ (1358, 48-9; 1359, 55-6 Kroy.). Although Kroymann accepts *ostendemus* in 8,9 from Jerome, φ (q)TPNFR and Petrus Venerabilis have *ostendimus*.

⁴² L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 23), 146.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 147: "The exception to this statement should be noticed, however, that several things are regarded as being brought to completion at the moment of the birth of Christ." However, Knowles did not acknowledge specifically that all of this fell inside the 62½ weeks.

⁴⁴ A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera* (see note 2), 1358, emends the text to read *... pati habere, et civitatem et sanctum exterminari cum duce venturo, et destrui pinnaculum usque ad interitum post unam et dimidiam ebdomadam, quo scilicet tempore septem et dimidia ebdomadae completae sunt.*

⁴⁵ Tert., *Iud.* 8,8b (16, 18-20 Tränkle): "... but that when vii hebdomads and an half were fulfilling, He had to suffer, and the holy city had to be exterminated after one and an half hebdomad - whereby namely, the seven and an half hebdomads have been completed."

There are three points that need to be made here briefly with reference to this extract. One is that in some versions of *adversus Iudaeos* at 8,8 the first period is listed as sixty-two weeks rather than 62½, although both Kroymann and Tränkle prefer 62½⁴⁶. Tränkle accounts for variations as follows:

Da diese Textform aber von Theodotion, der Vetus Latina (cf. [Cypr.] De pascha comp. 13 [261,12 H.]) und der Vulgata abweicht, konnte leicht *et dimidia* getilgt werden. *semis* (T) is nicht ursprünglich, sondern eine späte Verbesserung.⁴⁷

However, he does not ask the more fundamental question: why has Tertullian converted sixty-two weeks into 62½? Knowles seemed to be aware that Tertullian's addition of the extra half week was unique but did not ask the reason for the change⁴⁸. Given that Tertullian only had a twofold division and included the events that completed the seventy weeks as part of the preceding 7½ weeks (8,8) rather than as additional to those weeks, as did other near-contemporary interpretations, it was obvious that sixty-two and seven would not add up to seventy without the addition to each of half a week.

The second brief point is that Tertullian has, by his interpretation of the translation he used, inverted the seven weeks and sixty-two weeks when compared with the Masoretic interpretation of the Hebrew text of Daniel. Here Tertullian stands in stark contrast to other early Patristic interpreters by putting the sixty-two (and a half) *before* the seven (and a half)⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ PNF read sixty-two, while φ (q), Φ (Q) and T have 62½. Interestingly, back at Iud. 8,6, T has *semis* while φ (q)PNF omit any reference to the half.

⁴⁷ H. Tränkle, Kommentar (see note 2), 72.

⁴⁸ L. E. Knowles, The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks (see note 23), 145-6, refers to more than just the addition of the half week.

⁴⁹ T. E. McComiskey, The Seventy Weeks (see note 10), 20-1, although he does not refer to the inversion of weeks, does note that Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius and Hilarius were in agreement with the Masoretic interpretation: "In the light of this it is difficult to understand the structure of the weeks in the Massoretic tradition as late, anti-Christian interpretation. Rather, the division of the numerical elements in this

Although this point is made only briefly here it is of profound significance in making Tertullian a singular interpreter of Daniel, whether Jewish, Patristic or modern.

The third point is that most commentators understand Daniel's reference to events within the time-frame as punctiliar, i.e., the weeks measure time between the events. The appearance of the first anointed is at the end of the seven week period (which has to be the same time as the rebuilding of the temple, which then is to last for the whole sixty-two weeks) and the cutting off of the second anointed is at the end of the following sixty-two weeks. For Tertullian the time-frame is more 'inclusive', i.e., the weeks measure time within which the events occur. At 8,9 we find *intra LX et II et dimidiam ebdomadas* for the coming of the Christ and at 8,8 *ebdomades autem VII et dimidia cum implerentur* as the time within which the Christ suffered and Jerusalem was destroyed. Thus he understood *et post ebdomadas has sexaginta et duas et dimidiam* of Dan 9:26 (8,6a) to mean not that the Jewish ritual or priesthood⁵⁰ would be terminated *at* that point but *during* the time (7½ weeks) after that point.

The third part of Tertullian's interpretation concerns the death of Jesus and the destruction of the temple (8,8b). Here again we need to look back to the text of Daniel he

way appears to have been the dominant view in the early church." This would have to qualify somewhat the view of Montgomery (note 40). Jerm., Dan. proph. (PL 25,694 Migne) referred to a supposed Jewish tradition that explained why the seven weeks were mentioned before the sixty-two, viz., it was idiomatic Hebrew to mention the smaller number first. Whatever one may make of Jerome's source (see J. Braverman, Jerome's Commentary (see note 12), 106-9. On 109 he concludes: "In light of Jerome's remarks, citing the Jews on biblical Hebrew style, giving the smaller number before the larger, it seems quite plausible that in Jerome's time a Hebrew tradition did indeed exist placing the 62 weeks prior to the seven weeks. Unfortunately it has not been preserved in other sources."), it would seem that both Jerome and his source were aware that an order of seven followed by sixty-two needed some justification, an awareness not found in Tertullian and one can only speculate about a reason. One can only speculate as well about any connection between Tertullian and Jerome's Hebrew source. Tertullian's position makes R. T. Beckwith's statement (Daniel 9 [see note 1], 521 and *idem*, Calendar and Chronology [see note 1], 260): "the messianic interpretations of the prophecy have certain characteristics in common" inaccurate through over-generalisation.

⁵⁰ Tertullian's *exterminabitur unctio et non erit* at Iud. 8,6a was obviously dependent here on *χρίσμα* in *θ'* (and OG) and understood, thereby, as a reference to Jewish ritual or priesthood rather than to a person, as the Hebrew would indicate. That this is so is confirmed by Tertullian's phrase *nam et unctio illic exterminata est post passionem Christi* (Iud. 8,17) as noted by J. A. Montgomery, Daniel (see note 6), 382.

provided. Here θ' is quite clear and consistent with the Hebrew of Dan 9:27: the last period of time (third for the Masoretic and second for θ') is one week and in the midst of that week sacrifice and libation would cease and the temple be desecrated until, at the end, that desolation would cease. What is of particular interest is the time-frame (Καὶ δυναμώσει διαθήκην πολλοῖς ἑβδομάς μία· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τῆς ἑβδομάδος...). Tertullian's text of Daniel is significantly different:

*et confirmabit testamentum in multis; ebdomada una et dimidia ebdomadis..*⁵¹

He saw the half week not as part of the final week, but added it to that week, and, further, that the 1½ weeks were part of, not in addition to, the 7½ weeks⁵². Although he has provided another unique interpretation, the 1½ weeks went on to play no further part in Tertullian's calculations. It really was the 7½ weeks only that interested him.

III. Conclusion

Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos* is a work too much neglected. Here it is argued that the work had a rhetorical purpose and that chapter 8 was part of the *confirmatio* of the treatise. From this rhetorical perspective a structure for the argumentation found in that chapter was offered. The evidence Tertullian offered to prove his point that the old law had been replaced by the new began with a piece of Scripture: Dan 9:24-27. He was not writing a commentary on Daniel nor interpreting the prophecy and determining the chronology for its own sake; Daniel was evidence to prove another point. He constructed a conjectural argument about the

⁵¹ Tert., *Iud.* 8,6b (1358, 38-9 Kroy.): "And he shall confirm a testament in many. In one hebdomad and the half of the hebdomad..."

⁵² See note 45.

time of the sending of the new law-giver around that evidence.

The interpretation Tertullian offered of the third vision of Daniel was unique. The MT divided the seventy weeks into three periods: seven, sixty-two and one. θ' divided the seventy into two: sixty-nine and one. Tertullian's two periods ($62\frac{1}{2}$ and $7\frac{1}{2}$) offer an inverted order of the first two units found in the MT, expanded to make a complete seventy. This can be explained through Tertullian's dependence on θ' , which was itself a misinterpretation of the MT, which he has interpreted to suit himself.

This paper has examined questions both of the text of Dan 9:24-27 used by Tertullian in 8,3-6 and his interpretation of that text in 8,7-8. In a following paper I shall examine how Tertullian argued that the dates of the birth and death of Jesus and the destruction of Jerusalem were the only ones that could fulfil Daniel's prophecy.

APPENDIX E

Probabimus venisse eum iam - The Fulfilment of Daniel's Prophetic Time-Frame in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*

IN an earlier article I investigated the manner in which Tertullian turned to the prophecy in Dan 9:24-27 as part of his *confirmatio* in *adversus Iudaeos*. In chapter 8 of that work he cited the prophecy (8,3-6) and offered his own interpretation of what the prophecy meant in its own terms (8,7-8). In the remainder of chapter 8 (8,9-18) he attempted to prove that the birth and death of Jesus and the destruction of Jerusalem were the events that fulfilled the prophecy of Daniel. He did this by presenting a chronology of political dynasties. All of this was part of his rhetorical interest in the *topos* of time as an argument to establish that, because of the fulfilment of God's promise of sending a new law-giver the Christians had supplanted the Jews as the recipients of God's grace. His interest in political dynasties was not antiquarian but was part of his rhetorical argument to prove that the new law-giver had come (8,2 - *probabimus venisse eum iam*).

I. Early Christian Use of Dan 9:24-27

Of Tertullian's near contemporaries who utilised Dan 9:24-27, Hippolytus did not calculate the time-frame in great detail¹. He mentioned that the seventy weeks were divided into two parts²,

¹ For the brief references in Barn. 16,6 and Iren., Haer. V 25,4 (both concerned only with the last week of the seventy) see L.E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks in Daniel in the Early Fathers*, WTJ 7, 1944, 137-9.

yet provided discussion about three³. Hippolytus stated his purpose in commenting on Daniel to be one of showing that, because Daniel's exactness could be trusted with regard to prophecies that have been fulfilled already, the readers of Daniel ought be prepared to believe the prophecies about things yet to happen⁴. In Hippolytus can be found an attempt to preserve both the literal and figurative seventy years of Jeremiah: the prophecy given to Daniel in the first year of Darius was in the twenty-first year of exile, so that when added to the seven weeks (49 years) there would be seventy years between exile and restoration⁵. That restoration was to be under the first Christ, whom Hippolytus identified as Jeshua, son of Josedech⁶. From that point to the birth of the Christ the Saviour was sixty-two weeks (434 years) and this paralleled the 434 years that led to the giving of the first covenant⁷. The last week for Hippolytus was not so much concerned with the destruction of Jerusalem as with the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the world⁸. Hippolytus did not seek to prove these points of history as the fulfilment of the prophecy; they were accepted in order to convince the reader that the apocalyptic visions of the future were also

² Hipp., frag. Dan. 13.

³ Ibid., 13-14 (seven weeks), 15-21 (sixty-two weeks), 22 (one week). T. E. McComiskey, *The Seventy Weeks of Daniel against the Background of Ancient Near Eastern Literature*, WTJ 47, 1985, 20, has noted already that Hippolytus did not accept the joining together of the seven and sixty-two weeks as found in Theotion (θ').

⁴ Hipp., frag. Dan. 8.

⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁶ Ibid., 14.

⁷ Ibid., 15-16.

⁸ Ibid., 22. L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 1), 141, noted that Hippolytus posited a period of time between the sixty-ninth and seventieth weeks.

to be trusted⁹. His focus was the future and for him the seventy weeks had not yet drawn to a close.

Clement of Alexandria also made use of this part of Daniel. He dated the beginning of the seventy weeks from the captivity at Babylon which took place in the time of the prophet Jeremiah (Strom. I 21,125,1) and, a little later, he identified that as being in the beginning of the twelfth year of Jehoiakim over the Jews, in the seventh year of Nebuchadnezzar over the Assyrians, in the second year of Vaphres over the Egyptians, in the archonship of Philip at Athens and the first year of the 48th Olympiad¹⁰. He seems to have accepted a threefold division in Daniel's time-frame: a seven week period in which the temple was rebuilt and Christ became king of the Jews, reigning in Jerusalem in the fulfilment of the seven weeks¹¹; a sixty-two week period in which there was peace¹²; and a final week, in the first half of which Nero held sway and in the second half of which there were Otho, Galba, Vitellius and the destruction of Jerusalem under

⁹ Hipp., frag. Dan. 38-44. B. Croke, Porphyry's Anti-Christian Chronology, *JTS* ns 34, 1983, 174-5, draws attention to the fact that locating the birth of the Christ in the year 5,500, Hippolytus allowed the fourth beast (the Roman Empire) a rule of 500 years until the vanquishing of the Antichrist. L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 1), 141, was aware that Hippolytus had not demonstrated (proven) that the Christ had been born at the end of the sixty-two weeks but, rather than concluding that Hippolytus was more interested in making other points, concludes that "connected argument is not characteristic of the early patristic writings."

¹⁰ Clem., Strom. I 21,127,1 (GCS Clemens Alexandrinus 2, 79, 8-13 Stählin). Unfortunately Clement was muddled. The twelfth year of Jehoiakim and the seventh year of Nebuchadnezzar coincide in 597 BC, while the first year of the 48th Olympiad was 588/7 BC. See J. Finegan, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology. Principles of Time Reckoning in the Ancient World and Problems of Chronology in the Bible*, 2nd ed., Peabody (Mass.) 1998, 254. Given that earlier Clement had mentioned the going into exile in the twelfth year of Zedekiah in 587 BC (Strom. I 21,122,1 [76, 23 Stäh.]), it would seem that he has blended the two sieges of Jerusalem into one. R. T. Beckwith, *Daniel 9 and the Date of the Messiah's Coming in Essene, Hellenistic, Pharisaic, Zealot and Early Christian Computation*, *RevQ* 10, 1981, 539-40; idem, *Calendar and Chronology, Jewish and Christian. Biblical, Intertestamental and Patristic Studies*, Leiden 1996, 272, believes Clement began from the rebuilding of the temple. L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 1), 143: "It is obvious that there was some confusion in the mind of Clement about the exact time of the beginning of the weeks."

¹¹ Clem., Strom. I 21,126,1 (78, 26-29 Stäh.). T. E. McComiskey, *The Seventy Weeks* (see note 3), 21, believes Clement used the word "Christ" from Dan 9:25 as a collective term for the priesthood.

¹² Clem. Strom. I 21,126,1-2 (78, 29-32 Stäh.).

Vespasian¹³. Straddling the last two periods was Christ the Lord¹⁴.

In the course of chapter 21 of the first book of *Stromata* Clement provided many chronologies, but, in connection with Dan 9:24-27, his chronology concerned the Persian rulers following Cyrus, Alexander of Macedon and the Ptolemies¹⁵. When he came to calculating the time of the birth and death of Jesus, Clement did so in the context of the Roman emperors and with reference back to Dan 8:13-14 and 9:27¹⁶.

Clement was drawing upon sources (note his use of *τινές... ἀναγράφουσι* at Strom. I 21,144,4) and, as Ferguson has asked: “one wonders what tradition Clement had access to.”¹⁷ He is mentioned here in a little more detail than Hippolytus because Tertullian, while not concerned with the issue of the priority of Moses and, hence, uninterested in Clement’s other extensive chronologies, like Clement, used the same eras when working with Dan 9:24-27: Persian, Macedonian, Ptolemaic and Roman Imperial. While it still is maintained that Clement’s chief interest in the chapter was to establish the priority and antiquity of Jewish thought and that the material from Daniel 9 served but a small part in that overall objective, the point made by Knowles also may be accepted and applied equally to Tertullian: “that Clement is the first to introduce into the patristic literature the concept of the Seventy Weeks as a limit placed upon the

¹³ Ibid., I 21,126,3 (79, 1-5 Stäh.).

¹⁴ Ibid., I 21,126,2 (78, 30-1; 79, 1-2 Stäh.): *καὶ ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Χριστός, ἅγιος τῶν ἀγίων, ἐλθὼν καὶ πληρώσας... ταῖς ἐξήκοντα δύο ἑβδομάσι, καθὼς εἶπεν ὁ προφήτης· καὶ ἐν τῇ μιᾷ ἑβδομάδι...*

¹⁵ Ibid., I 21,128,1 - I 21,129,2 (79,21 - 80,7 Stäh.).

¹⁶ Ibid., I 21,144,1-5 (89,11 - 90,3 Stäh.).

¹⁷ J. Ferguson, *Clement of Alexandria*, New York 1974, 117.

national existence of Israel.”¹⁸

Accepting a near contemporaneous dating for *Stromata* and *adversus Iudaeos* would lead to the reasonable conclusion that neither Clement nor Tertullian borrowed directly from each other. Following from that, one would not be too bold in suggesting a common source rather than coincidence. That must remain speculation and one must wonder with Knowles and Tränkle about Tertullian’s source¹⁹. One would have to ask the question why a western, Latin-speaking north African would include a chronology involving Ptolemaic pharaohs unless it were in his source. It is understandable that, because the starting point was the prophecy in Daniel, anyone’s chronology would progress through the Persian rulers to Alexander, but why, at that point, did Tertullian not convert to the Roman consular *fasti* or to some familiar fixed-point in Carthaginian history? It is safe to assume therefore that these figures for the reigns of rulers were not Tertullian’s own, but derived from a source.

II. Tertullian’s Political Chronologies

Now let us consider the figures, which Tränkle believes present “ein unlösbares Problem.”²⁰

Persian

Darius	19 years ²¹
--------	------------------------

¹⁸ L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 1), 144-5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 145-6. On 148 he suggested that current Jewish interpretation, first mentioned by Josephus, that saw the seventy weeks terminate with the destruction of Jerusalem, was probably the common source. He was adamant that there was no dependency between the two. H. Tränkle, *Q. S. F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos. mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar*, Wiesbaden 1964, lxxv.

²⁰ H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 19), 73.

²¹ T has *XIII*.

Artaxerxes	41 years ²²
Cyrus	24 years
Argus	1 year
Darius Melas	21 years ²³
Macedonian	
Alexander	12 years ²⁴
Ptolemies	
Soter	35 years
Philadelphus	38 years
Euergetes	25 years
Philopator	17 years ²⁵
Epiphanes	24 years
Euergetes	27 years ²⁶
Soter	38 years ²⁷
Ptolemy	37 years ²⁸
Cleopatra	20 years and 5 months ²⁹

²² TPNFX and Jerm., Dan, have *XL*. (According to A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera, Pars II, CChr.SL 2*, Turnhout 1954, 1359, T and Jerome have *quadraginta* while PNF have *LX*.)

²³ Petrus Venerabilis, *adversus inveteratam duritiam Iudaeorum* 4 (PL 189, 564 Migne) has *XXII*.

²⁴ F has *XI*, TPN have *X*. (H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* [see note 19], 17, notes that the consensus between Q and q is for *XI* and the consensus between TPNFX is for *X*.)

²⁵ T has *XVIII*.

²⁶ Jerm., Dan. has *XX et VIII*.

²⁷ The consensus of P and N is *XXX et III*.

²⁸ Petrus Venerabilis has *XXX et VIII*. $\phi(q)$ and $\Phi(Q)$ have *XX et II*.

²⁹ The 1579 edition of Jacob Pamelius has *mensibus VI*.

Cleopatra with Augustus 13 years³⁰

Roman Imperial

Augustus (total) 56 years³¹

Tiberius 22 years 7 months 28 days³²

Caius 3 years 8 months 13 days³³

Nero 11 years 9 months 13 days³⁴

Galba 7 months 6 days³⁵

Otho 3 months³⁶

Vitellius 8 months 27 days³⁷

Vespasian 11 years³⁸

Tertullian certainly did not consider Darius the Mede in Daniel to be a fictitious or symbolic character³⁹. Probably on the basis of the mentioning of Xerxes as his father (Dan 9:1), Tertullian identified him as Darius II (423-404 BC). He began the first week of the time-frame in the first

³⁰ T has *XIII*.

³¹ Φ (q) and Φ (Q) have *XXX et III immo XL et II*.

³² Φ (q) has *XXVIII* and Φ (Q) has *XX* years. Φ (Q) also has *diebus XX*.

³³ Petrus Venerabilis has *mensibus VII*.

³⁴ Jerm., Dan. has *annis novem*, while Petrus Venerabilis has *annis VIII*.

³⁵ Jerm., Dan. has *diebus viginti octo* while Petrus Venerabilis has *diebus VIII*.

³⁶ Φ (Q) has *otho tribus diebus*.

³⁷ Φ (q) has *dies XX et VIII*, Jerm., Dan. has *diebus viginti octo*, Petrus Venerabilis has *diebus XVIII*, F has *diebus XX et X*, T has *diebus X*.

³⁸ Φ (q), Φ (Q) and Petrus Venerabilis have *annis XII*.

³⁹ For a modern argument that Darius will never be identified see L. L. Grabbe, Another Look at the *Gestalt* of "Darius the Mede", CBQ 50, 1988, 46-54.

year of Darius' reign (8,9), a much later *terminus a quo* than Daniel seemed to suggest and one determined on the basis of the name (Dan 9:1) rather than on the event (the going forth of the word that Jerusalem would be rebuilt - Dan 9:25). In this identification either Tertullian or Clement departed from their source, for Clement identified the *terminus a quo* with the capture of Jerusalem⁴⁰. Such a late point of departure suited Tertullian's purpose well and thus Daniel's literal inaccuracy about Darius, son of Xerxes, could be used to his advantage.

III. The Persians

The period of the Achaemenids from the accession of Darius II to the death of Darius III is 94 years (424 to 330 BC). Tertullian, if we ignore the textual variations, provided a period of 106 years. Neither Tertullian nor Clement provided a completely accurate list of the Persian kings. Comparing Tertullian and Clement on the Persian kings, it would be difficult to conclude that here they used the same source. In the sixteenth century, the chronographer, Joseph Scaliger, had seen the similarity between Tertullian's Argus and Achos (Artaxerxes III)⁴¹, yet Artaxerxes III reigned for 21 years (359/8 - 338 BC) not the mere 1 year attributed to him by Tertullian. That length would more closely approximate to Artaxerxes IV (338 - 336 BC) (Arses), whom Tertullian did not mention (unless one were to equate Tertullian's Argus with Arses rather than Achos, which is possible). The king whom Tertullian listed as reigning for something like the 21

⁴⁰ L. E. Knowles, *The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks* (see note 1), 143. It has been noted above that Clement has combined the captures of Jerusalem into one. He does not seem to have been too concerned with the seven weeks, it being the time it took for the reconstruction of the temple. At Strom. I 21,127,2 (79, 13-15 Stäh.) his only concern seems to have been the exile which lasted seventy years and ended in the second year of Darius Hystaspes (c. 521/0 BC), during whose reign the rebuilding of the temple was completed (Strom. I 21,124,3 [77,27-8 Stäh.]). J. A. Montgomery's statement (*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, ICC, Edinburgh 1927, 398): "... the *term. a quo* was found by Clem. Alex. in year 2 of Cyrus..." does not seem sustainable.

⁴¹ J. Scaliger, *de Emendatio Temporum*, 1583. See A. Grafton, Joseph Scaliger. *A Study in the History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. 2: *Historical Chronology*, Oxford 1993, 305-12.

years of Artaxerxes III, and in the correct position after Artaxerxes II, was Cyrus. Could Tertullian or his source have mistaken Cyrus, son of Darius II and brother of Artaxerxes II, and who led a revolt against his brother, for Artaxerxes III, the son of Artaxerxes II? Darius III (Melas) was given a 21 year rule, which does not seem to correlate at all with the 6 years he actually ruled. A little over a century later when Eusebius wrote his *Chronicle* the details of the Achaemenid era were presented more accurately⁴².

IV. The Ptolemies

Alexander the Great is given a 12 year reign⁴³, which corresponds to the 12½ years of Alexander after the death of Philip II (336 BC), but which would then overlap with the entire actual rule of Darius III. At this point also Tertullian mentioned Alexandria (8,10) and, given that he would turn next to follow a Ptolemaic chronology, could lead one to suggest that Tertullian's source was Alexandrian.

The Ptolemies ruled Egypt for a total of 293 years (323 - 30 BC). Tertullian accounted for 274 years. If we count the rule of the Ptolemies according to a nonaccession- year system that counted the part-year of a new king as their first and the next, whole calendar year as their second, and did not count as part of their reign the part-year in which they died, which operated in Egypt at the time⁴⁴, the following points emerge: Ptolemy I (Soter) reigned for 23 years, not 35 (and even if we add the years from 323 to 305 BC, we get a total of 41 years); Ptolemy II (Philadelphus) reigned for 36 years not 38; Ptolemy III (Evergetes) reigned for 24 years not 25;

⁴² See J. Finegan, *Handbook* (see note 10), 183.

⁴³ Clem., *Strom.* I 21,128,3 (79, 28 Stäh.) gave Alexander an 18-year rule.

⁴⁴ J. Finegan, *Handbook* (see note 10), 70.

Ptolemy IV (Philopator) reigned 16 rather than 17 years; Ptolemy V (Ephphanes) reigned 25 rather than 24 years; Tertullian has omitted Ptolemy VI (Philometor) (180 – 145 BC) and Ptolemy VII (Neos Philopator) (145 BC)⁴⁵; he allowed Ptolemy VIII (Euergetes II) 27 years rather than 29 (from 145 - 116 BC), although Ptolemy himself calculated his reign from 170 BC, giving 53 years;⁴⁶ Ptolemy IX (Soter II) ruled for 36 rather than 38 years; Ptolemy X (Alexander I), a joint ruler, and Ptolemy XI (Alexander II) (80 BC) were omitted; Ptolemy XII (Neos Dionysus or Auletes) (80 - 51 BC) ruled for 29 years rather than 37. Although most of these discrepancies are quite minor, the most glaring is Tertullian's omission of Ptolemy VI. Clement and Tertullian agree on Euergetes (25), Philopator (17) and Epiphanes (24). Clement includes Philometor (35). Clement is correct in giving Physcon (Ptolemy VIII) 29 years, Lathurus (Ptolemy IX) 36 years and Dionysus (Ptolemy XII) 29 years, unlike the slightly more inaccurate Tertullian.

Tertullian was not quite correct in assigning Cleopatra VII a reign of 20 years and 5 months if he were calculating according to the Egyptian nonaccession-year system. 51 BC would have counted for a whole year, giving a reign of 21 years (and seven months, given that she died at the beginning of August, 30 BC, not that they would have been counted).

V. Augustus and the Birth of Jesus

A fixed point in the chronology is offered by correlating the reign of Cleopatra with that of Augustus. He had a total of 56 years, 13 years with Cleopatra and 43 after her. When did

⁴⁵ Ibid., 71 notes that Claudius Ptolemaeus, the second-century AD Alexandrian astronomer who used the Egyptian system outlined, omitted in his *Canon* those like Ptolemy VII who reigned for less than a year.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 143.

Tertullian consider the reign of Augustus to have begun? Finegan has highlighted the problem of how to determine the length of Augustus' reign because of the variety of calculation methods available:

Instead of counting factual regnal years, however, it was also possible... to reckon regnal years as equivalents of calendar years. To use the Julian calendar in initial example, this would mean counting the regnal years as coterminous with the calendar year which extends from Jan 1 to Dec 31. If the reckoning was by what we have called the nonaccession-year system, the first regnal year of Augustus in Rome comprised the period from Mar 17 to Dec 31, 44 B.C., the second regnal year was the calendar year from Jan 1 to Dec 31, 43 B.C., and so on... If the reckoning was by what we have called the accession-year system, the period from Mar 17 to Dec 31, 44 B.C., was only an "accession year," and the first regnal year of Augustus in Rome was the ensuing calendar year, namely the year from Jan 1 to Dec 31, 43 B.C., and so on...⁴⁷

Eusebius, who accorded Augustus a reign of fifty-six years and six months, dated the first (full) year of Augustus to 43 BC (accession-year system)⁴⁸. In this system the 13 years Augustus shared with Cleopatra would take us to the end of 31 BC (and the months of 30 BC they shared would be ignored). Continuing on, taking 30 BC as the first year, 43 more years would take us to the end of AD 13. The problem is that in this system AD 14 ought be counted as the year 57 of Augustus and AD 15 as year one of Tiberius.

Josephus, who accorded Augustus a reign of 57 years, 6 months and 2 days⁴⁹, probably reckoned from March, 44 BC (factual year system) (allowing for a copying error with regard to the number of months)⁵⁰. In this system the 13 years Tertullian had Augustus share with

⁴⁷ Ibid., 282.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 289. See also 163-5 where he notes the whole matter can be complicated further depending upon when one considered the new year to start and E. J. Bickerman, *Chronology of the Ancient World*, London 1968.

⁴⁹ Jos., j.w. II 9,1 § 168; Jos., ant. XVIII 2,2 § 32.

⁵⁰ J. Finegan, *Handbook* (see note 10), 281, gives the factual regnal years of Augustus, starting from 17th March, 44 BC, as 57 years, 5 months, and 2 days.

Cleopatra would take us to March, 31 BC. That there is another complete year (March, 31 - March, 30 BC) between that date and the death of Cleopatra suggests that Tertullian was not using this system (unless he began Augustus at a later date, like April, 43 BC, when Octavian was proclaimed *imperator* for the first time. There is no reason, however, even though it works, why this date should have preference over March, 44 BC). The factual year system, though, is the most accurate way of calculating the 43 years, for from the death of Cleopatra to the death of Augustus (August, 30 BC - August, AD 14) is 43 years precisely.

The nonaccession-year system presents the problem of Augustus dying in his 58th year and Cleopatra dying in Augustus' 15th year.

The same problems remain when we come to the timing of the birth of the Christ (8,11). Here Tertullian began to achieve his purpose for this part of the treatise, by making use of Daniel: to prove that the Christ had been born within the time-frame set out by the prophet. He gave what appeared to be precise figures:

*... in quadragesimo et primo anno imperii Augusti, quo post mortem Cleopatra vicesimo et octavo anno imperavit...*⁵¹

According to the factual year system, the 41st year is March, 4 - March, 3 BC, while the 28th year is from August, 3 - August, 2 BC. These dates could be reconciled somewhat more if the 41st year was calculated from April, 43 BC (April, 3 - April, 2 BC). That these dates are more in line may be an argument in favour of calculating the start of Augustus' reign as being April, 43 BC

⁵¹ Tert., Iud. 8,11 (1360, 79-81 Kroy.): "... in the forty-first year of the empire of Augustus, when he was reigning for XX and viii years after the death of Cleopatra..."

(which would make the total length of his reign 56 years and 4 months). According to the accession-year system, the 41st year is 3 BC and the 28th year is 2 BC (if we do not count August - December, 30 BC, treating it as though it were like an accession year), although, because it was not strictly an accession, perhaps the 28th year should still be calculated according to the factual year system (August, 3 - August, 2 BC). Although the nonaccession-year system does not seem likely for the reign of Augustus, it could be more likely to have been used in calculating the time since the death of Cleopatra, particularly if one only knew the year but not the month of her death.

If one takes an accession-year system for determining the length of Augustus' reign and a nonaccession-year system for calculating the time after Cleopatra, Tertullian's years coincide in 3 BC.

Tertullian provides us with another piece of information about Augustus: he survived after the birth of the Christ another 15 years (8,16). This makes sense when we see Tertullian dividing Augustus' 43 years after the death of Cleopatra into 28 to the birth of the Christ and 15 following. This means that Tertullian meant 15 full years after the completion of the 28th. If the 28th year were 3 BC, then 15 full years after that takes us to the end of AD 13⁵².

Having established when the Christ was born Tertullian had completed a part of his argument - the birth occurred within the 62½ hebdomads (437½ years) (8,11). Tertullian only provided 420 years (106 for the Persians, 12 for Alexander, 274 for the Ptolemies and 28 for Augustus after Cleopatra until the birth of the Christ). Looking at the textual variants does not

⁵² J. Finegan, Handbook (see note 10), 280.

help close the 17 year gap, many of the variants having a lower (not higher) figure than what is in the text. Those variations that have a higher figure only provide an extra 5 years⁵³. Tertullian's figure of 420 years, however, while it may have internal inconsistencies, does match the 420 years from the accession of Darius II (423 BC) to the 41st year of Augustus (3 BC). The only problem was that his arithmetic did not enable him to fill 437½ years.

Here two suggestions may be made. Either Tertullian really did believe that he had added up to 437½ years correctly and it was this figure that determined the birth of the Christ, or he already had a figure for the birth of the Christ from elsewhere and a figure for the beginning of the reign of Darius and had to hope that the interval between the two was close enough to 437½ to be acceptable. The latter seems more likely, for Clement also stated that the Christ was born in the 28th year, Irenaeus had stated that the Christ was born in Augustus' 41st year and Origen, a little later, would repeat many of Tertullian's fixed points as well. This also suggests the likelihood of a shared source between Tertullian and Alexandria⁵⁴. The third option would be, taking *intra* at 8,9 seriously, that Tertullian allowed some years after the birth of the Christ to the end of the 62½ weeks. The problem, though, is that the following 7½ weeks begin at the birth, not some years later.

It would be interesting to know Irenaeus' source, but this early Patristic testimony does little to resolve the relationship between the death of Herod the Great, the census under Quirinius of Syria and the birth of Jesus⁵⁵.

⁵³ An extra 2 for Ptolemy VIII (Euergetes II), 1 for Ptolemy XII (Neos Dionysus) and 2 for Cleopatra VII.

⁵⁴ Clem., Strom. I 21,145,1-2 (90, 4-5 Stäh.); Iren., Haer. III 21,3; Orig., frag. 82 on Luke 3:1.

⁵⁵ See e.g., R. E. Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah. A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke*, New York 1993, 2nd ed., 547-56, 607-8, 610-613, 666-8; J. P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew*.

At 8,11, Tertullian concluded the 62½ hebdomads with the birth of the Christ. This seems at odds with his earlier statements that the birth would be *within* the 62½ hebdomads (8,8.9). The anointing of the Christ was also within those 62½ hebdomads according to the earlier statement (8,8), but if the 437½ years come to an end at the birth of the Christ (8,11), then the anointing of the Christ at his baptism (8,12-14) cannot be within the 62½ hebdomads⁵⁶. There seems to be a simple, internal inconsistency.

VII. The Romans, the Death of Jesus and the Destruction of Jerusalem

The final part of Tertullian's argument in chapter 8 is the calculation of the time-frame for the death of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem and the proof that those events took place within that parameter. Tertullian allowed himself 7½ hebdomads (52 years) from the birth of the Jesus to the destruction of Jerusalem and the time-frame he presented was presented as one that did fit into that constraint.

If we calculate the reigns of the early emperors from death of predecessor to death of successor, according to the Julian calendar, we achieve the following results:

Tiberius	22 years 6 months 24 days	(Augustus d. 19 August, AD 14)
----------	---------------------------	--------------------------------

Rethinking the Historical Jesus, New York 1991, 205-52; C. F. Evans, Tertullian's References to Sentius Saturninus and the Lukan Census, JTS n.s. 24, 1973, 24-39.

⁵⁶ L. E. Knowles, The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks (see note 1), 147, intimated an awareness of some confusion at this point.

Caius	3 years 10 months 8 days ⁵⁷	(Tiberius d. 16 March, AD 37)
Claudius	13 years 8 months 19 days ⁵⁸	(Caius d. 24 January, AD 41)
Nero	13 years 7 months 27 days ⁵⁹	(Claudius d. 13 October AD 54)
Galba	7 months 6 days ⁶⁰	(Nero d. 9 June, AD 68)
Otho	3 months 1 day ⁶¹	(Galba d. 15 January, AD 69)
Vitellius	8 months 4 days ⁶²	(Otho d. 16 April, AD 69)
Vespasian	9 years 6 months 3 days	(Vitellius d. 20 December, AD 69) (Vespasian d. 23 June, AD 79)

⁵⁷ Jos., ant. XVIII 6,9 §219 - XVIII 6,10 §224 has Tiberius appoint Caius as his successor. At XIX 2,5 §201 Josephus gave Caius a reign of 4 years less 3 months, equivalent to the 3 years and 8 months he mentioned in j.w. II 11,1 §204. Suet., Caligula LIX gave him 3 years 10 months and 8 days (which matches the calculation I have given), Tac., dial. XVII 3 gave him nearly four years; and Dio LIX 30,1 gave him 3 years 9 months and 28 days. See A.A. Barrett, *Caligula. The Corruption of Power*, London 1989, 53.

⁵⁸ Jos., ant. XIX 2,1 §162-5 and XIX 4,3 §248 - XIX 4,6 §273 was so aware that the basis of Claudius' power was military that there is no actual mention of the Senate's election or confirmation of Claudius taking place. At XX 8,1 §148, Josephus gave Claudius a reign of 13 years 8 months and 20 days (correct if one counts the day of accession and day of death as two full days, as Josephus typically did). This is the same figure in j.w. II 12,8 §248 and Dio LXI 34,3. Suet., Claudius XLV wrote only that he was in his 14th year and Tac., dial. XVII 3 gave the rounded figure of 14 years. See B. Levick, *Claudius*, London 1990, 33.

⁵⁹ Tac., dial. XVII 3 simply gave 14 years; Suet., Nero XL was no more specific than to say *principem paulo minus quattuodecim annos*; Jos., j.w. IV 9,2 §491 gave the length of Nero's reign as 13 years and 8 days (although H. St. J. Thackeray, the translator of the Loeb edition, along with B. Niese, suggest that Josephus originally also mentioned 8 months); Dio LXIII 29,3 has 13 years and 8 months. See M.T. Griffin, *Nero. The End of a Dynasty*, London, 1984, 244, n.91.

⁶⁰ Suet., Galba XXIII: *imperii mense septimo*; Tac., hist. I 37: *septem a Neronis fine menses sunt*; Jos., j.w. IV 9,2 §499 gave Galba 7 months 7 days; Dio LXIII 6,5 (2) gave him 9 months and 13 days. See K. Wellesley, *The Long Year A.D. 69*, 2nd ed., Bristol 1989, 6.

⁶¹ Tac., hist. I 47; Suet., Otho VII, XII (where Suetonius gave Otho's reign as being 95 days); Jos., j.w. IV 9,9 §548 gave him 3 months 2 days; Dio LXIII 15,2 gave him 90 days. See K. Wellesley, *The Long Year* (see note 60), 56.

⁶² Jos., j.w. IV 11,4 §652 gave him 8 months 5 days; Dio says his reign was a year minus 10 days. See K. Wellesley (see note 60), 88.

It is interesting to note that from this point Tertullian was obviously attempting some type of factual year system in precise detail rather than the more general accession-year or nonaccession-year systems.

We shall leave aside the vexed question of when exactly Tiberius began his rule for the moment, for it will be of no little importance for other matters. If we alter the above table by replacing the date of the predecessor's death with the day the Senate confirmation or the day the emperor himself proclaimed, as the commencement date, matters are not changed significantly.

When Tertullian's figures are added together from the birth of Jesus to the accession of Vespasian, we reach a total of $54\frac{1}{2}$ years (less if we accept either $\phi(q)$ or $\Phi(Q)$ for Tiberius' reign)⁶³. Yet from 3 BC to the end of AD 69 is a period of 72 years. How has Tertullian achieved the impossible of compacting this into his time-frame? How has he managed to cut out $17\frac{1}{2}$ years? The answer is that by omitting Claudius he managed to save nearly 14 years. Nero's reign of 11 years rather than 13 saves another 2, and the months of AD 14 before the death of Augustus add almost another year. A comparison between Tertullian and Clement's second list of emperors would not suggest they shared a common source for this particular information. The only exact match is Galba. In Clement's list Caius is correct, Claudius is given 28 days rather than 17, Nero is given 7 months rather than 8, and 28 days rather than 27, Otho is given 5 months rather than 3, Vitellius 7 months 1 day rather than 8 months 4 days. Only the figure for Tiberius (26 years 6 months 19 days) seems wildly inaccurate.

⁶³ If we were to use $\Phi(Q)$ the overall figure would be $52\frac{1}{2}$ years, which almost matches the $7\frac{1}{2}$ hebdomads Tertullian allowed himself. This could be an argument in favour of adopting this textual variant.

Although a number of manuscripts of *adversus Iudaeos* have a figure for Claudius⁶⁴ and Kroymann accepted it as part of his text⁶⁵, other manuscripts did not⁶⁶ and Tränkle did not accept it as part of his text⁶⁷. I would suggest that Claudius was indeed omitted from Tertullian's list. Without him the figures are approximately right and Tertullian's point was proven: Daniel is an accurate guide for information about the ending of the old law and the beginning of the new.

The final topic to consider briefly is the death of the Christ. Tertullian provided two pieces of information in *adversus Iudaeos* about it:

*...huius quintodecimo anno imperii patitur Christus annos habens quasi XXX cum pateretur—*⁶⁸

*... perfecta est sub Tiberio Caesare, consulibus Rubellio Gemino et Fufio⁶⁹ Gemino mense Martio temporibus paschae, die octava kalendarum Aprilium, die prima azymorum, qua agnum occiderunt ad vesperam;...*⁷⁰

Tertullian has given a very precise date: 25 March, AD 29. The year the two Gemini were *consules ordinarii* coincided in part with the 15th factual regnal year of Tiberius (August, AD 28 -

⁶⁴ TPNFX, the consensus between the first (1521) and third (1539) editions Beati Rhenani, Basil (R) and Petrus Venerabilis have *tiberius claudius annis XIII, mensibus VII, diebus XX*.

⁶⁵ A. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera* (see note 22), 1362.

⁶⁶ ϕ (q) and Φ (Q).

⁶⁷ H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 19), 19.

⁶⁸ *Tert. Iud.* 8,16 (1362, 120-1 Kroy.): "In the fiftieth (sic!) year of his empire Christ suffered being about XXX years of age when he suffered."

⁶⁹ ϕ (q) and Φ (Q) have *rufio*, while T has *fuvio*. H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 19), 77: "Zwar ist *Fufio* (IUN. fuvio T) die richtige Form des Namens..." See Tac., *ann.* V 1. The year AD 29 was significant for him because it was the year in which Livia died.

⁷⁰ *Tert. Iud.* 8,18 (1363, 138-41 Kroy.): "... was perfected... under Tiberius Caesar, in the consulate of Rubellius Geminus and Fufius Geminus, in the month of March, at the times of the passover, on the eighth day before the calends of April, on the first day of unleavened bread, on which they slew the lamb at even..."

August, AD 29). How reliable is this date? Finegan has looked at Luke 3:1 and offered a number of alternatives for when the 15th year of Tiberius might have been, depending on whether a factual regnal, accession-year or nonaccession-year system is employed, depending on whether one calculates from the time when Tiberius held joint power with Augustus (AD 12) or from the death of Augustus (AD 14), and depending on whether one uses the Julian, Egyptian, Jewish or Syro-Macedonian calendar⁷¹. Quite a number of Scripture scholars also have looked at this question. Here one can do little more than to raise a couple of issues that may rehabilitate some of the Patristic evidence.

It would seem that Tertullian either accepted that Jesus' ministry began and ended in the same 15th year (Tertullian knew Luke 3:1 that the ministry of Jesus began in the 15th year of Tiberius - Marc. IV 7,1) or somehow was confused and applied the phrase that identified the beginning of his ministry to the end of his ministry. Whatever, it is clear from the two extracts above that Tertullian identified Tiberius' 15th year as AD 29 (i.e., he started from AD 14 not 12). A number of Scripture scholars who turn their attention to Luke 3:1 consider the possibility that the counting could have begun from AD 12⁷². The opportunity is taken here to take a determined stance against such an option. The evidence of Tertullian just mentioned is a major piece of second-century literature that definitively dates the 15th year of Tiberius from AD 14. Roman literary evidence of the first and second centuries is further proof that Tiberius' rule was reckoned

⁷¹ J. Finegan, *Handbook* (see note 10), 330-1.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 331, accepts the 15th year as being AD 26 (i.e., from AD 12). J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, AB 28, New York 1981, 455; R. E. Brown, *The Death of the Messiah. A Commentary on the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels*, New York 1994, 1373-6; I. H. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, NIGTC, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 1978, 133; C. F. Evans, *Saint Luke*, TPI New Testament Commentaries, Philadelphia 1990, 232; W. Hendriksen, *The Gospel of Luke*, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 1978, 198.

only from the death of Augustus, even though some were aware of a period of shared power⁷³. The Roman world of the late first century had become used to quasi-hereditary monarchy and the subtleties of the constitutional basis of the Augustan settlement and the first transfer of power (to Tiberius) would have been forgotten as those who lived later judged earlier events in the light of their own later experience (when an emperor came to power on the death of a predecessor). Documentary evidence for the first century, on the whole, does not mention years of reign but tribunician power, salutations as *imperator* and consulships⁷⁴.

One has to ask about the two consuls. No other Christian writer in the first two centuries identified the year of Jesus' death with the Gemini. Has Tertullian or his source calculated that for himself from a pre-existing belief that the death was in the 15th year, or has Tertullian preserved some otherwise forgotten, independent tradition about the date of Jesus' death⁷⁵? The second cannot be ruled out *a priori*. Even if it were an independent tradition it would not put an end to the controversy about the date of Jesus' death, because although Tertullian's date was a Friday it certainly was neither Nisan 14 or 15.

There remains one vital issue to address now that the question of how Tertullian interpreted Daniel's prophecy has been investigated and that is the matter of why Tertullian interpreted the

⁷³ Dio LVIII 27,1 - LVIII 28,5 stated that Tiberius had been emperor for 22 years 7 months 7 days (taking into account that Dio believed Tiberius died on 26 March, AD 14); Tac., ann. IV 1 placed the 9th year of Tiberius in AD 23 and at VI 51 he wrote that Tiberius ruled for nearly 23 years; Suet., Tiberius, 73 gave him a reign of nearly 23 years; Jos., j.w. II 9,5 § 180 gave Tiberius 22 years 6 months 3 days; Jos., ant. XVIII 6,5 § 177 mentioned that Tiberius was emperor for 22 years while at XVIII 6,10 § 224 he mentioned 22 years 5 months 3 days. All this argues for beginning Tiberius' reign in AD 14.

⁷⁴ P.Oxy. 2353 is an exception, mentioning the 19th year of Tiberius.

⁷⁵ J. Finegan, Handbook (see note 10), 364, suggests the possibility that Tertullian may have derived his date from Basilides.

prophecy as he did. The suggestion advanced here has to do with the rhetorical nature of the treatise. It was written as a response, or as though it were a response, to an earlier debate that had involved Jews and Christians (or their sympathisers) (Iud. 1,1). The audience whom Tertullian sought to persuade were the Jews in that supposed gathering, the Christians, presumably, already adherents to his position. Tertullian was too skilled an orator to use such partisan, and therefore suspect, testimony as the Christian Scriptures to win a theological argument with Jews. In the *confirmatio* of his work he had to prove his point with testimony his opponents could not challenge. Daniel was such a piece of testimony and through his interpretation of this acceptable piece of Jewish Scripture he would show that someone like Jesus fitted the precise demands of the prophetic chronology. Indeed, Tertullian's argument that since Jesus prophecy had ceased (8,13-15) was to demonstrate that only Jesus could fit those precise demands. References to the reigns of world figures lends to his argument an air of objectivity, independence from partisan propaganda and unquestionable authority. Given the facts presented in Daniel, it was Tertullian's contention that, on the question of time, as it would be for other questions throughout the treatise as well, only Jesus met those conditions.

VIII. Conclusion

The arithmetic of chronologies may seem tedious and pointless and the risk that those who delve into the world of chronography run is that their work may also seem tedious and pointless. I hope this will not be said of this paper for a number of reasons.

It was in the late second century AD that Christian writers turned to Daniel 9 with particular relish. Each of three near contemporaries who did, did so with their own particular purpose in

mind: Hippolytus to convince readers that Daniel provided accurate information about the future Antichrist, Clement to prove the priority of Moses against Greek philosophy, and Tertullian, as has been mentioned, to show that the old law had been exterminated through the coming of the Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem.

A prophecy that looked forward to a positive future for the Jews had become, in the hands of Tertullian, the instrument for their relegation. Daniel looked forward to a moment of eschatological salvation, Tertullian looked back to a moment of eschatological judgement.

In this paper the suggestion has been made that Tertullian understood Dan 9:25 to refer to a rebuilding of the temple post-AD 70, a possibility he believed the Jews themselves removed through their refusal to acknowledge Jesus. The suggestion has been made also that Tertullian's source for his chronology was Alexandrian, though there are enough differences in detail between Tertullian and Clement to raise some doubt.

Tertullian's figures are not entirely accurate in detail, though the overall picture tends to be fairly accurate. From the accession of Darius II to the destruction of Jerusalem was 493 years, very close to the 490 years that constitute the seventy weeks. Ptolemy VI and Claudius were omitted altogether, the latter being particularly necessary for Tertullian to fit 72 years into 52½. He also provided specific information about the dates of the birth and death of Jesus (3 BC and AD 29). It is just possible that in giving the names of the consuls during whose year Jesus died, Tertullian has preserved an independent piece of evidence about the date of Jesus' death not found in the New Testament, though such an idea is speculative.

William Adler, who has investigated the Second Temple Jewish and early Christian use of this prophecy in Daniel 9, in an otherwise masterly treatment, omits any reference to Tertullian's treatment at all⁷⁶. Likewise, John Gammie, in an article surveying Christian use of Daniel, when he considers how Tertullian used Daniel, omits any reference to Daniel 8 in *adversus Iudaeos*⁷⁷.

Tertullian would be amused to find us in 1998 still waiting to celebrate the beginning of the third millennium, yet, if required, perhaps he would not find it too much of a challenge to fit 2,003 years into 2,000. Mind you, like Ptolemy VI and Claudius, perhaps many other world leaders would have to be omitted along the way.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ W. Adler, *The Apocalyptic Survey of History Adapted by Christians. Daniel's Prophecy of 70 Weeks*, in *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity*, ed. J. C. VanderKam and W. Adler, vol. 4 of *Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum*, Section III, Minneapolis 1996, 201-38. On 223-4 Adler notes that most early Christian interpretations follow θ' in seeing sixty-nine weeks as a single block, although some like Clement, Hippolytus and Eusebius depart from it. Tertullian's division into $62\frac{1}{2}$ weeks followed by $7\frac{1}{2}$ weeks makes an interesting addition.

⁷⁷ J. G. Gammie, *A Journey Through Danielic Space. The Book of Daniel in the Theology and Piety of the Christian Community*, Interpretation 39, 1985, 146.

⁷⁸ An abbreviated form of this and the previous paper was presented at the 21st Conference of the Australian Society for Classical Studies in Brisbane, Queensland, in July, 1998. I am grateful for the valuable comments of Assoc. Prof. Pauline Allen of the Australian Catholic University who read earlier drafts of these papers.

APPENDIX F

Two Goats, Two Advents and Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*

TERTULLIAN'S *adversus Iudaeos* is a treatise which displays the influence of classical rhetoric. The main body of the work contains a *refutatio* (2.1b – 6.1) and *confirmatio* (7.2 – 14.10), as one would expect from a forensic piece of oratory,¹ which together attempt to help prove the work's *propositio* that the Christians had replaced the Jews as the recipients of God's grace (1.8). The *confirmatio* is dedicated to demonstrating that the promised new lawgiver, who would suppress the old law, had come (6.2b) and it was divided originally into four issues (7.1): the time when the Christ was prophesied to come, the fulfilment of those promises of time, other prophetic themes relating to the Christ, and the giving of the new law. The first two issues occupy chapter 8 and the third occupies chapters 9 to 10. The fourth issue does not feature in the treatise. This could have to do with the fact that along the way Tertullian reorganised the structure of the *confirmatio*. In 8.2 we read:

*Venturi itaque Christi ducis sunt tempora requirenda, quae investigabimus in Danielo; quibus computatis probabimus venisse eum iam et ex temporibus praescriptis et ex signis competentibus et ex operationibus eius, quae probabimus et ex consequentibus, quae post adventum eius futura adnuntiabantur, uti iam adimpleta omnia praecepta credamus.*²

¹ *ad Her.* 1.10.18; *Quint. Inst.* 5.pr.4-5.

² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 8.2 (CCSL 2, 1356-1357): "And so the times of the coming Christ, the Leader, must be inquired into, which we shall trace in Daniel; and, after computing them, shall prove Him to be come, even on the ground of the times prescribed, and of competent signs and operations of His. Which matters we prove, again on the ground of the consequences which were ever announced as to follow His advent; in order that we may believe all to have been as well fulfilled as foreseen." (English trans. by S. Thelwall in A. Roberts and J. Donaldson [rev. A. C. Cox], eds., *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 3: *Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian*, Grand Rapids, Mich.

Tertullian acknowledged three *topoi* that would now shape the *confirmatio*: time, actions and consequences. His interest in consequences begins with chapter 11 and continues to the end of the *confirmatio*.³ It is the last of the consequences, or events subsequent to the coming of the Christ, that will be the focus of this paper. In 14.1-10 Tertullian examined the second coming of the Christ.

Until this point there had been no mention of the second coming in any of the editorial comments offered by Tertullian, except in the brief comment in 13.8. Among the pieces of Scripture Tertullian employed to support his argument that two comings of the Christ were prophesied and that Jesus was the one to fulfil those prophecies was Lev. 16:5-28 (*adv. Iud.* 14.9). The sacrifice of the two goats on the Day of Atonement becomes a typological reference to the two comings of the Christ. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the rhetorical use Tertullian made of this piece of Scripture and to see how original his interpretation was.

It would be profitable to begin with some comment about Leviticus 16, a passage about which Martin North wrote that, because of its lengthy history and development, there is a lack of continuity and unity in the passage and an inability to provide convincing analysis on the part of scholars.⁴ This is obviously not the place to attempt a convincing factual and literary analysis of this passage. All that is attempted here is a brief outline of what the chapter says about the two goats (Lev. 16:5-10, 15-22). North, who sees in this description of the post-exilic cult of the Day

1885.)

³ *Ibid.*, 11.12 (CCSL 2, 1383-1384): “*Ne <c haec enim expuncta invenirentur>, nisi ille venisset, post quem habebant expungi quae nuntiabantur. Quae quomodo impleta sunt, ut iam probentur...*”

⁴ M. North, *Leviticus: A Commentary* [Old Testament Library], London 1977, rev. Eng. ed., p.117.

of Atonement both pre-literary cultic traditions and early literary traditions as well as the post-exilic one, considers 16:7-10 and the connected verse 5 about the two goats to be secondary and a later accretion.⁵

It would seem from the text of Leviticus as we have it now that the animals involved were: a bull as a sin offering for the priests (Lev. 16:3,6,11-14), a ram as a burnt offering for the priests (Lev. 16:3,24), two male goats as a sin offering or purification offering for the people (Lev. 16:5,7-10,15-22)—although only one of the goats really is a sin offering⁶—and a ram as a burnt offering for the people (Lev. 16:5,24). Through the offering of these animals there would be an atoning of the priesthood and of the Temple itself, although, as North suggests, the cleansing of the holy place was most likely an intrusion or later addition.⁷

One of the goats, dedicated to Yahweh by lot (Lev. 16:8), like the bull, was slaughtered in sacrifice as a sin offering⁸ (Lev. 16:9,15) and its blood was sprinkled upon the propitiatory (the mercy seat or cover) (Lev. 16:14-15) and upon the horns of the altar (Lev. 16:18), thus atoning for the sins of the priests and of the holy place (Lev. 16:16) and for the sins of the people

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.121. Cf. Th. C. Vriezen, *The Term Hizza: Lustration and Consecration in Old Testament Studies 7* (1950), p.224, who believed vv. 3, 5-11, 14f, 17b-18, and 20b-22 formed the original text (which on p.229 he described as being a combination of two independent texts).

⁶ J. R. Porter, *Leviticus*, Cambridge 1976, p.127.

⁷ M. North, *Leviticus* (see note 4), p.122. Th. C. Vriezen, *The Term Hizza* (see note 5), p.223, went further: "The literary analysis of Lev. xvi shows a line of fracture in this chapter, and this fracture demonstrates that the two ideas of the lustration of the sanctuary and the expiation of the sins of the people are only secondarily and artificially bound together." A little later he stated: "The text of Lev. xvi aimed originally at the description of the purification of the priests and of the people (and not of that of the sanctuary)."

⁸ See N. H. Snaith, *The Sin-offering and the Guilt-offering*, in *Vetus Testamentum* 15 (1965), pp.73-80.

(Lev. 16:19).⁹ The other goat, dedicated to Azazel (Lev. 16:8), was driven into the wilderness (Lev. 16:10,21) after the priest had laid hands on its head and transferred the sins of the people of Israel into it (Lev. 16:21-22). Roland Faley describes the ritual attached to the scape-goat as “[s]till another rite... of unquestionably ancient vintage, [which] was blended into the Day of Atonement liturgy.”¹⁰

The identification of Azazel remains, as North states, an enigma.¹¹ Hayim Tawil has canvassed the various scholarly opinions (that Azazel was a rough and difficult place or was the name of a demon inhabiting the desert) and concludes, on philological grounds, through a comparison with Akkadian and Ugaritic texts, that it was the equivalent of the Canaanite god Môt.¹² Crocker notes, with seeming approval, a Jewish view from earlier this century that Azazel as a reference to a foreign god would be untenable.¹³

Early Christian theology saw a connection between the offering of the goats and Jesus,

⁹ The point of J. Milgrom, *Studies in Priestly Theology and Terminology*, Leiden 1982, that the ritual of the Day of Atonement was for the purification of the sanctuary alone has been expanded by N. Zohar, *Repentance and Purification: The Significance and Semantics of תַּמְטַח in the Pentateuch*, in *Journal of Biblical Literature* 107 (1988), pp.609-618, to include the direct purification of people as well. See also G. J. Wenham, *The Book of Leviticus* [New International Commentary on the Old Testament], Grand Rapids, Mich. 1979, p.233.

¹⁰ R. Faley, *Leviticus* in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, ed. R. E. Brown, J. A. Fitzmyer and R. E. Murphy, Engelwood Cliffs, N.J. 1990, p.71. For the relationship between the two parts of the Day of Atonement ceremony see P. P. Jenson, *The Levitical Sacrificial System [= System]*, in *Sacrifice in the Bible*, ed. R. T. Beckwith and M. J. Selman, Grand Rapids 1995, pp.33-36.

¹¹ M. North, *Leviticus* (see note 4), p.125. See G. Deiana, *Azazel in Lv. 16*, in *Lateranum* 54 (1988), pp.16-33, M. Görg, *Beobachtungen zum sogenannten Azazel-Ritus*, in *Biblische Notizen* 33 (1986), pp.10-16; B. Janowski and G. Wilhelm, *Der Bock, der die Sünden hinausträgt in Religionsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen Kleinasien, Nordsyrien und dem Alten Testament*, ed. B. Janowski, K. Koch and G. Wilhelm, Göttingen 1993, pp.109-169.

¹² H. Tawil, *'Azazel the Prince of the Steepe: A Comparative Study* in *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 92 (1980), pp.43-59.

¹³ P. Crocker, *Some Near Eastern Parallels to Rites in Leviticus* in *Buried History* 32 (1960), pp.6-7, referring to *The Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, vol. 3: *Leviticus*, ed. J. H. Hertz, London 1936.

but it was a negative one. The author of Hebrews compared Jesus with the Jewish high priest: Jesus offered sacrifice once, the high priest daily (Heb. 7:27), Jesus was perfect, the high priest weak (Heb. 7:28), Jesus achieved redemption with his own blood, not with the blood of bulls and goats (Heb. 9:12), and Jesus cleansed the conscience, the high priest only the flesh (Heb. 9:13-14). According to this New Testament author, it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins (Heb. 10:4).¹⁴ In the New Testament Jesus was identified with the spotless lamb offered for sacrifice¹⁵ but never with the goats of Leviticus 16. At least in the Matthean community, sheep and goats represented entirely different things (Mt. 25:32).

When we turn to consider Leviticus 16 in early Christian literature outside the New Testament, a different approach emerges. In *Barnabas*, a treatise that may indeed be contemporary with some of the late New Testament texts or only a generation later,¹⁶ there is an

¹⁴ L. Goppelt, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 2, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1982, p.256, calls this an extremely radical judgement about the value of Israel's sacrificial cult.

¹⁵ Jn. 1:29,36; Acts 8:32; 1 Pet. 1:19; Rev. 5:6-8,12-13; 6:1,3,5,7,9,12; 7:10,14,17; 8:1; 17:14.

¹⁶ For a date during the reign of Vespasian see J. A. T. Robinson, *Redating the New Testament*, London 1976, pp.313-319; for a date during the reign of Nerva see P. Richardson and M. B. Shukster, *Barnabas, Nerva and the Yavnean Rabbis* in *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 34 (1983), pp.31-55; *idem*, *Temple and Bet Ha-midrash in the Epistle of Barnabas* in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. S. G. Wilson, Ontario 1986, pp.17-31; J. Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas [=Barnabas]* [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 64], Tübingen 1994, pp.9-28; W. Horbury, *Jewish-Christian Relations in Barnabas and Justin Martyr*, in *Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways, A. D. 70 to 135 [=Jewish-Christian]*, ed. J. D. G. Dunn, Tübingen 1992, pp.319-321; S. G. Wilson, *Related Strangers: Jews and Christians 70-170 C.E. [=Strangers]*, Minneapolis 1995, p.133-136; A. L. Williams, *The Date of the Epistle of Barnabas* in *Journal of Theological Studies* 24 (1933), pp.337-346; for a date under Trajan see B. A. Pearson, *Earliest Christianity in Egypt: Some Observations [=Earliest]*, in *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, ed. B. A. Pearson and J. E. Goehring [Studies in Antiquity and Christianity, 1], Philadelphia 1986, pp.150-151; R. M. Grant, *Theological Education at Alexandria* in *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, ed. B. A. Pearson and J. E. Goehring [Studies in Antiquity and Christianity, 1], Philadelphia 1986, p.181; R. S. MacLennan, *Early Christian Texts on Jews and Judaism* [Brown Judaic Studies, vol. 194], Atlanta 1990, p.21; for a date under Hadrian see W. H. C. Frend, *The Rise of Christianity*, London 1984, p.121; K. Wengst, *Schriften des Urchristentums: Didache, Barnabasbrief, zweiter Klemensbrief, Schriften an Diognet [=Schriften]*, Darmstadt 1984, pp.114-115; L. W. Barnard, *The Date of the Epistle of Barnabas* in *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 44 (1958), pp.101-107; E. M. Smallwood, *The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian* [Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity, vol.20], Leiden 1976, p.435; H. Schrekenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1.-11. Jh.) [=Texte]*, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p.174; R. Hvalvik, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant: The Purpose of the Epistle of Barnabas and Jewish-Christian Competition in the Second Century*

identification between Jesus and the goats. We find this in chapter 7, part of the section from chapters 7 to 12 which Williamson describes as “typological exegesis of the Hebrew Bible.”¹⁷ While this provides material for a discussion about the ethnic origins of the anonymous author,¹⁸ the place of these chapters in the epistle,¹⁹ and the author’s use of sources,²⁰ our concern must remain focused on the interpretation of the references to the two goats. The only point that will be made in passing here is that those who incline to the view that the author was ethnically Jewish use these chapters as evidence of that belief while those who argue the author was of Gentile origin tend to suggest that these chapters are a later interpolation or reflect the attitude of the author’s sources.²¹

[= *Struggle*] [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 82], Tübingen 1996, p.23.

¹⁷ C. M. Williamson, *The “Adversus Judaeos” Tradition in Christian Theology*, in *Encounter* 39 (1978), p.276.

¹⁸ The comments of J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 16), pp.7-9, which conclude with his statement that “[t]he epistle is strongly Jewish in character, but this observation does not allow us to state that the author himself was Jewish.” (p.9) seem balanced. L. W. Barnard, *A Note on Barnabas 6,8-17* [= *Note*], in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 4 [papers presented to the Third International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1959], Berlin 1961, p.263; *idem*, *The Epistle of Barnabas and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Some Observations* [= *Scrolls*], in *Scottish Journal of Theology* 13 (1960), p.45; *idem*, *St. Stephen and Alexandrian Christianity*, in *New Testament Studies* 7 (1960), p.37, *idem*, *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background*, Oxford 1966, p.74; R. Wilde, *The Treatment of the Jews in the Greek Christian Writers of the First Three Centuries*, Washington D.C. 1949, believe the author was a converted Jew. Others reject this: A. Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius I*, pt.2, Leipzig 1893, p.411; H. Windisch, *Die Barnabasbrief*, in *Handbuch zum NT. Ergänzungsband: Die Apostolischen Väter III* [= *Barnabasbrief*], Tübingen 1920, p.413; H. Schreckenberg, *Texte* (see note 16), p.174; S. Lowy, *The Confutation of Judaism in the Epistle of Barnabas* [= *Confutation*], in *Journal of Jewish Studies* 11 (1960), p.11, n.68; J. Alvarez, *Apostolic Writings and the Roots of Anti-Semitism*, in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 13, Berlin 1975, pp.72-74 (implicitly); H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law*, Philadelphia, 1986, p.220; S. G. Wilson, *Strangers* (see note 16), p.128; G. Stanton, *Other Early Christian Writings: ‘Didache’, Ignatius, ‘Barnabas’, Justin Martyr*, in *Early Christian Thought in its Jewish Context*, ed. J. Barclay and J. Sweet, Cambridge 1996, p.181.

¹⁹ While L. W. Barnard, *Scrolls* (see note 18), p.45, sees the mention of the ritual of the Day of Atonement as evidence for the author’s Jewish origins, others like H. Windisch, *Barnabasbrief* (see note 18), p.343, see chapters 7 and 8 as interpolations, while others like R. A. Kraft, *The Epistle of Barnabas: its Quotations and their Sources* [unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard 1961], p.169, see in these chapters the author’s dependence on Jewish midrashic commentary.

²⁰ See O. Skarsaune, *Baptismal Typology in Barnabas 8 and the Jewish Background* [= *Baptismal Typology*], in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 18, part 3 [papers presented at the 1983 Oxford Patristic Conference] 1989, pp.221-228. B. A. Pearson, *Earliest* (see note 16), pp.150-151, notes that the epistle contains Jewish halachic and haggadic traditions edited with an anti-Jewish bias, but says nothing about the origins of the author.

²¹ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), pp.7-8, 134-135; W. Horbury, *Jewish-Christian* (see note 16), pp.321-323; P. Prigent, *Les Testimonia dans le christianisme primitif: l’Épître de Barnabé I-XVI et ses sources* [=

Chapter 7 opens with a statement that God had prefigured more recent events in the Hebrew Scriptures (*Barn.* 7.1). The event that is believed to have been prefigured is the suffering of Jesus (*Barn.* 7.2). The Gospel statements about the crucified Jesus being offered vinegar to drink ²² are understood as the fulfilment of several passages or types: Lev. 23:29 about the sacrifice of the one who did not fast, ²³ the offering of Isaac, and the consumption of the goat washed only with vinegar ²⁴ (*Barn.* 7.3-4). As many have noted, there is no such reference to the consumption of a goat in such a manner in the Hebrew Scriptures, ²⁵ and even *M. Menahoth* 11.7 provides no exact parallel. Carleton Paget's comment seems most reasonable:

This is not a strict parallel to what we find in *Barn*, for it does not contain the words: "The entrails were unwashed with vinegar," but it at least gives us some evidence of a midrashic expansion of the actions of the priest on the Day of Atonement against which *Barn* 7:4 receives some illumination. The possibility therefore exists that either B., or a Christian source to which he had access, has combined the tradition of Jesus drinking vinegar with gall on the cross with a Jewish tradition about the sin-offering goat being consumed by the priests. Tertullian also knew of the same tradition. ²⁶

Testimonia], Paris 1961, pp.84, 145-146, sees chapter 7 derived not from anti-cultic *Testimonia* but from some midrastic sources; O. Skarsaune, *Baptismal Typology* (see note 20), esp. p. 224; L. W. Barnard, *Note* (see note 18), pp.263-264; *idem*, *Scrolls* (see note 18), p.45; K. Wengst, *Schriften* (see note 16), p.112; S. Lowy, *Confutation* (see note 18); H. Windisch, *Barnabasbrief* (see note 18), p.343.

²² Mt. 27:34,48; Mk. 15:36; Lk. 23:36; Jn. 19:29-30.

²³ Only in John is there any indication that Jesus drank what was offered and hence broke a fast.

²⁴ Several English translations of τὸ ἔντερον ἀπλυτον μετὰ ὄξους (*Barn.* 7.4b – SCh 172, 130) are unhelpful when they offer this as "the entrails unwashed with vinegar" or something similar (see K. Lake, *Apostolic Fathers*, vol. 1 [LCL], Cambridge, Mass. 1912, p.365; J. A. Kleist, *The Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Epistles and the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, the Fragments of Papias, the Epistle to Diognetus* [ACW 6], New York 1948, p.47; A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, eds. [rev. A. C. Coxe], eds., *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 1: *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1885, p.141). More helpful is J. B Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer (rev. M. W. Holmes), *The Apostolic Fathers*, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1989 (2nd ed.), p.171: "the unwashed entrails with vinegar."

²⁵ E.g., H. Windisch, *Barnabasbrief* (see note 18), p.344; P. Prigent and R. A. Kraft, eds., *Épître de Barnabé* [=Épître] [SCh, 172], Paris 1971, pp.130-131, n.3.

²⁶ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), p.136.

That the author was referring to the first goat, the one offered to Yahweh on the Day of Atonement, and not some other unfortunate goat offered up at another festival, seems clear not from anything thus far presented but from the text cited a little further along:

Λάβετε δύο τράγους καλοὺς καὶ ὁμοίους καὶ προσενέγκατε, καὶ λαβέτω ὁ ἱερεὺς τὸν ἕνα εἰς ὀλοκαύτωμα ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν.²⁷

The next sentence (*Barn.* 7.7) turns attention to the second goat, clearly indicating that what the author had discussed thus far had been concerned with the first goat. Most commentators turn their attention to the contrast between the passage from *Barn.* 7.6 and the LXX in terms of that second goat. I would like to make the point simply, with regard to the first goat, that not only do we not find the text cited in *Barn.* 7.6 in the LXX, but Lev. 16:27 seems to suggest, on first reading, that the first goat was not consumed by the priests, but burnt completely, except for the fact that with every offering except the burnt offering the priest was entitled to a share (Num. 18:8-10).²⁸ Thus *Barnabas* seems to have had a more accurate understanding of Jewish practice than one would obtain simply from reading the passage from Leviticus.

With regard to the second goat, the scapegoat, it has been noted that some of the detail in *Barn.* 7.6-11 comes from extra-biblical sources, and is very similar to *M. Yoma*.

²⁹ The statement is made that the second goat is accursed (ἐπικατάρατος) and that it is ὄ

²⁷ *Barn.* 7.6a [Sch 172, 132]: “Take two goats of goodly aspect, and similar to each other, and offer them. And let the priest take one as a burnt-offering for sins.” (English translation in A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, eds. *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 1: *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1885.)

²⁸ P. P. Jenson, *System* (see note 10), p.27.

²⁹ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), p.137: *Barn.* 7.6 and *M. Yoma* 6.1 – the two goats being alike in appearance; *Barn.* 7.8 and *M. Yoma* 6.4 – the scapegoat is ill-treated; and *Barn.* 7.8 and *M. Yoma* 4.2 – the

τύπος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ (*Barn.* 7.7).³⁰ Carleton Paget and Prigent believe that the author of *Barnabas* knew of two traditions with regard to the two goats: in the first tradition, the first goat is a typological reference to the first advent and the second goat to the second advent, and in the second tradition, the first goat represents Christ in the eucharist and the second goat Christ crucified.³¹

However, the words of Lester Grabbe are, in this instance, more precise and accurate:

The two goats are two symbols for Christ. The sacrificed goat is a picture of the crucifixion while the goat sent away seems to be used for both the suffering and the exalted Christ, though the distinction is not always clear.³²

Certainly, in *Barnabas* the first goat may well have eucharistic references—the goat washed only in vinegar, eaten by the priests, set aside ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον (*Barn.* 7.9)—and it was mentioned as the example to prove the point mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, which was to show that in the Hebrew Scriptures God prefigured the suffering of the Son (*Barn.* 7.2). One cannot agree with those who find in *Barnabas* a tradition that identified the first goat (or the second goat for that matter) with the first coming of Christ. Perhaps Carleton Paget is so concerned to compare *Barnabas* with Justin

scapegoat is bound in scarlet wool.

³⁰ The LXX refers to the scapegoat as “... ἐφ’ ὃν ἐπῆλθεν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ὁ κληῖρος τοῦ ἀποπομπαίου...” (Lev. 16:10) without reference to mistreatment.

³¹ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), p.140 (yet he goes on to write later on this page: “... though this [reference to the eucharistic implications of the first goat] is not... limited to the advent motif...”); P. Prigent, *Testimonia* (see note 21), p.109, P. Prigent and R. A. Kraft, *Épître* (see note 25), p.135, n.3.

³² L. L. Grabbe, *The Scapegoat Tradition: A Study in Early Jewish Interpretation [= Scapegoat]*, in *Journal in the Study of Judaism* 18 (1987), p.162.

and Tertullian that he has seen in the earlier piece of literature something which is only really there in the latter (and later) pieces. While we may accept that in *Barnabas* there is some identification between the scapegoat and the second coming of Jesus,³³ this idea is not to the fore. Rather, the second goat is a type for the rejected status of the suffering Jesus.³⁴ Even though there is mention of the second coming, it is subordinate to the fact that the rejection and suffering of even the exalted one was prefigured in the Hebrew Scriptures. I do not think we can see a passage like Mt. 24:30 (which focuses on the second coming of the exalted one) being behind *Barn.* 7.9, but rather Jn. 19:37 and, in that connection, Rev. 1:7 (both of which focus on the second coming involving one who was rejected and pierced; the latter being the emphasised point). Even though there is mention of the second coming, the focus is on how Jesus was the one rejected, spat upon and pierced. Thus the typological focus for the author of *Barnabas* was not the two comings of Jesus but the suffering of Jesus—both as sacrificial victim (seen in the first goat) and as rejected and tormented one (seen in the second goat). I believe we see this in the key citation of the chapter:

³³ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), p.137, refers to *Barn.* 7.9 as a “potentially confusing piece of exegesis” because the first goat has here become the accursed one. I must reject this. *Barnabas* remains consistent: the accursed goat is the one crowned (with the scarlet wool, which makes it the scapegoat). I agree with O. Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study of Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile [=Proof]*, Leiden 1987, p.309, that it was the scapegoat that was accursed and crowned. It is this goat that will be seen on that day (τότε τῆ ἡμέρα : a clear reference to the parousia—Mt. 7:22; 10:15; 11:22,24; 12:36,42; 25:13; Mk. 13:32; Lk. 10:12; 17:24,30-31; Jn. 6:39-40,44,54; 11:24; 12:48; 14:20; 16:23; Acts 2:20; 1 Cor. 5:5; 2 Cor. 1:14; 1 Thess. 5:2; 2 Thess. 2:2; 2 Pet. 3:10), dressed in the long scarlet robe still and still with the marks of piercing (Rev. 1:7,13—although with no mention of the colour of the robe being scarlet) and people will comment on the fact that he was pierced, rejected and spat upon (Zech. 12:10; Jn. 19:37). That the focus with the author was on the scapegoat representing the suffering of Jesus more than the second coming (without denying that this was art of the representation) is found in the emphasis on the scapegoat being bound in scarlet (*Barn.* 7.8,11). L. W. Barnard, *The ‘Epistle of Barnabas’*, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.27, Berlin 1993, p.183, suggests that the author was dependent here on the Tannaitic catechism which emphasised heavily the element of suffering.

³⁴ See *Barn.* 7.10b: “οὐκοῦν ἴδε τὸν τύπον τοῦ μέλλοντος πάσχειν Ἰησοῦς.” (SCh 172, 134).

Τὸν μὲν ἕνα ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον, τὸν δὲ ἕνα ἐπικατάρατον,...³⁵

The trouble I have with Carleton Paget is that he has made too simple an identification between the idea of two advents and the death and glorious return of Jesus. As a theological term, the first advent of Jesus does not refer only to his death. *Barnabas* displays an interest in his suffering and death but nowhere does the author use the idea or the language of the “first advent” to explain it. I would agree with the statement of Skarsaune with regard to the lack of terminology and strained logic of references to two advents, and would express it even more strongly than he does:

The terminology of two *parousias* is not found in *Barnabas* but the idea is contained in *Barn. 7*. Let us notice that Barnabas’ logic is somewhat strained here. It seems that both goats serve as types of Christ’s suffering, while the scapegoat also typifies Christ in his return.³⁶

To it I would add the qualification that the idea of the two comings of the Christ is contained in *Barnabas 7* only implicitly.

What do we find in Justin?³⁷ The mention of the two goats of Leviticus 16 occurs

³⁵ *Barn. 7.9* (Sch 172, 134): “...‘one upon the altar, and the other accursed;’...” K. Wengst, *Tradition und Theologie des Barnabasbriefes* [Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 42], Berlin 1971, p.31, notes the sentence at the end of *Barn. 7.10* as being important in establishing that the author’s focus was on the suffering of Jesus: “Am Ende von v 10 steht eine zusammenfassende Bemerkung, die von Barnabas ad hoc formuliert worden ist: ‚Siehe also den Typus des leidenden Jesus!‘ Denn obwohl im Vorangehenden von Jesus auch als dem Weltenrichter die Rede war, wird hier in einer Zusammengassung allein sein Leiden herausgestellt, woran Barnabas vom weiteren Briefkontext her interessiert war. Indem aber das Stück vv6-10 über des Barnabas eigene Zusammenfassung hinauschießt, erweist es sich als traditionell.” See R. Hvalvik, *Struggle* (see note 16), p.183.

³⁶ O. Skarsaune, *Proof* (see note 33), p.310.

³⁷ For discussion about the destination of *Dialogus* see: E. R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr*, Jena 1923, pp.96-100; N. Hyldahl, *Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins*, Copenhagen 1966, pp.16-22; T. Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law* [SBL Dissertation Series, 20], Missoula, Mont. 1975, pp.169-170; J. Nilson, *To Whom is Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho Addressed?* in *Theological Studies* 38 (1977), pp.538-546; C. H. Cosgrove, *Justin Martyr and the Emerging Christian Canon*, in *Vigiliae Christianae* 36 (1982), pp.209-232.

in chapter 40 of *Dialogus*. Skarsaune relates the material, such as that found in this chapter, which he describes as cultic typology, with the anti-cultic testimonies, even though they sound contradictory.³⁸ This is a reminder that we need to read this chapter in a wider context. In *Dial.* 13.1 there is reference to Heb. 9:13.

Further, in Justin, unlike in *Barnabas*, there is more of an interest in the two advents. Chapter 31 is, for the most part, the quoting of Dan. 7:9-28 about the coming of the Son of Man. Justin included this extract in order to make the point that as great as the power of Jesus was, through his suffering, to overcome the demons, even greater will his power be in his glorious advent (... ἐν τῇ ἐνδόξῳ γινομένη αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ...).³⁹ It is to be noted that, in this instance, as in *Barnabas*, there is, in the text, a contrast between the suffering of Jesus and his return in glory, but this return is not described in the language of a *second* advent. In the next chapter, though, in response to Trypho's statement that Jesus was a dishonourable figure who suffered the indignity of crucifixion, Justin warmed to the task and mentioned explicitly two advents of Christ: the first, inglorious and ending in a redemptive death, the second, the moment when the Jews will recognise him whom they had pierced:

Εἰ μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν Γραφῶν ὧν προαιστόρησα, τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἄδοξον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ ἀδιήγητον, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ τοὺς πλουσίους θανατωθήσεσθαι, καὶ τῷ μῶλωπι αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς ἰάθημεν, καὶ ὡς πρόβατον ἀχθήσεσθαι

³⁸ O. Skarsaune, *Proof* (see note 33), pp.295-298. The relationship is based on Justin's belief that cultic practices prior to Jesus were acceptable and served as types for Jesus, but in the time after him they were no longer relevant.

³⁹ Jus. *Dial.* 31.1 (PG 6, 540). See A. J. B. Higgins, *Jewish Messianic Beliefs in Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho [=Justin]*, in *Novum Testamentum* 9 (1967), p.301.

ἐλέγετο, καὶ δύο παρουσίας αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι ἐξηγησάμην, μίαν μὲν ἐν ἧ
ἐξεκευτήθη ὑφ' ὑμῶν, δευτέραν δὲ ὅτε ἐπιγνώσεσθε εἰς ὃν ἐξεκευτήσατε, ...⁴⁰

In order to prove the two advents, Justin made use of Ps. 109(110):7, where the drinking from the brook by the wayside was an allegorical reference to the first advent in humility and the lifting up of the head referred to the exalted advent (*Dial.* 33.2). Following this, Justin moved away from the specific topic of the two advents of Christ to discuss how no figure from the Jewish past could have been seen as the fulfilment of the promises of the Hebrew Scriptures.⁴¹ Justin turned to the allegorical typology of the sacrificial lamb and then the two goats in chapter 40. Here the two goats were linked explicitly to the two advents of Christ:

Καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ νηστεία δὲ τράγοι δύο ὅμοιοι κελευσθέντες γίνεσθαι, ὧν ὁ εἰς ἀποπομπᾶτος ἐγίνετο, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος εἰς προσφορὰν, τῶν δύο παρουσιῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ καταγγελία ἦσαν...⁴²

⁴⁰ Jus. *Dial.* 32.2 (PG 6, 544): “If, sirs, it were not said by the Scriptures which I have already quoted, that His form was inglorious, and His generation not declared, and that for His death the rich would suffer death, and with His stripes we should be healed, and that He would be led away like a sheep; and if I had not explained that there would be two advents of His,—one in which He was pierced by you; a second, when you shall know Him whom you have pierced...” (English translation in A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, eds, *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 1: *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1885.)

⁴¹ At the end of ch. 35 of *Dial.*, Justin offered another mention of the second advent but in the context of it being the final opportunity for the Jews to receive salvation and at 36.1 and 38.1 Trypho mentioned the two advents almost as a credal statement of Christian blasphemy. B. Z. Bokser, *Justin Martyr and the Jews I* [= *Justin*], in *Jewish Quarterly Review* 64 (1973), p.109, explains that Justin mentioned the two advents of Jesus in order to address Trypho’s concern that the Messiah would be a victorious figure not a crucified one. A. J. B. Higgins, *Justin* (see note 39), pp.304-305, points out that the close link between the two advents and the suffering of Jesus may be so strong in Christian thinking as to cast doubt on the authenticity of Trypho’s admission that the Jews expected the Messiah to suffer (*Jus. Dial.* 90.1). For other references in *Dialogus* to the two advents, see G. N. Stanton, *The Two Parousias of Christ: Justin Martyr and Matthew*, in *From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology in Honour of Marinus de Jonge*, ed. M. C. de Boer [JSNT Supplement Series, 84], Sheffield 1993, p.184, n.3. There is a brief mention of the two goats and the two advents in *Dial.* 111.1.

⁴² Jus. *Dial.* 40.4 (PG 6, 564): “And the two goats which were ordered to be offered during the fast, of which one was sent away as the scape (goat), and the other sacrificed, were similarly declarative of the two appearance of Christ...” The English translation fails to pick up on the point that, as in *Barnabas*, the two goats must be alike. Cf. H. P. Schneider, *Some Reflection on the Dialogue of Justin Martyr with Trypho* [= *Reflections*], in *Scottish Journal of Theology* 15 (1962), p. 169, who claims that Justin’s insistence on the goats being alike was an inaccurate quoting of *Haggadah*.

Others have noted, though, that, unlike *Barnabas*, Justin identified the scapegoat, the second goat, with the first advent of Jesus because he was seized by the priests, put to death and sent away, and the first goat with the second advent because it would be in Jerusalem that he who was dishonoured would be recognised as the one who was an offering for all sinners.

⁴³ This fact, together with a number of other details (Justin's focus on Jerusalem, the laying on of hands on the scapegoat by the elders and priests, the lack of reference to the scarlet wool), has led to the conclusion that Justin had no direct dependence upon *Barnabas*. ⁴⁴

Perhaps this conclusion is reinforced further if one accepts the view, which Carleton Paget and Skarsaune do not quite accept, that, at most, any reference to the two advents of Jesus in *Barnabas* is merely implicit. This would mean that Justin's reference to the two advents would be something else not borrowed directly or explicitly from *Barnabas*, but something Justin derived himself or from his other sources. What both these commentators also fail to point out is that Justin's identification of the scapegoat with the first advent of Jesus and his death, on the basis, in part, of his being put to death, does an injustice to what we find in Leviticus 16. There the scapegoat is not killed but sent out alive (Lev. 16:10,20 emphasise this point) into the desert (Lev. 16:21-22). ⁴⁵ It seems clear that Justin was relying upon some interpretation of Leviticus rather than upon Leviticus itself. Tränkle

⁴³ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), p.138; O. Skarsaune, *Proof* (see note 33), p.310: "On the other hand, Justin shares with *Barnabas* the somewhat strained logic of the argument on the two advents. But he has reversed the goats: For Justin the *sin-offering goat* is a type of Christ in his passion and return."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* H.P. Schneider, *Reflections* (see note 42), p.172, on the contrary, argues that the exegesis of Justin and *Barnabas* is the same, only in different language.

⁴⁵ L. W. Barnard, *The Old Testament and Judaism in the Writings of Justin Martyr*, in *Vetus Testamentum* 14 (1964), p.401, noted that there is nothing in Lev. 16:21 to suggest that anyone other than the high priest laid hands on the scapegoat. He did not note how unwell Justin's identification of the first advent with the scapegoat worked because the scapegoat was not put to death. What he did note, on p.402, was the parallel between Justin and *M. Yoma* 6.6, unmentioned in *Barnabas*, where, in the midrashic text, the goat is led into the desert and thrown down a ravine.

points out the problem Justin faced in identifying the first goat, the sin-offering goat, with the second coming: the sin-offering goat is sacrificed, and this would make a connection with the first coming more obvious than with the second coming.⁴⁶ What Tränkle does not point out is that Justin's connection was not on the basis of sacrifice but of Jerusalem (the first goat was sacrificed in Jerusalem and the second coming will be seen in Jerusalem), even though one would have to admit that this is a somewhat strained connection.

We may now return to Tertullian's use of the typological interpretation of the two goats. This appears not only in *adv. Iud.* 14.9 but in *adv. Marc.* 3.7.7 as well. In the latter work Tertullian felt able to accuse Marcionites and Jews of the same mistake and he described that mistake in both his works in a way similar to Justin:

*Atque ita in hodiernum negant venisse Christum suum, quia non in sublimitate venerit, dum ignorant in humilitate primo fuisse venturum.*⁴⁷

The "two advent theory" was a response to the charge that, as the Messiah was to be a majestic figure, Jesus could not be that figure. Furthermore, such a theory was not merely a Christian invention but was prefigured in the Hebrew Scriptures, according to Tertullian. As Osborn suggests, here we see an example of Tertullian's love of paradox and contrast.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ H. Tränkle, *Q. S. F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos: mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar [= Kommentar]*, Wiesbaden 1964, p.lxxviii: "Aber er [Justin] hat nicht nur alle farbigen Einzelheiten preisgegeben, der Versuch ist auch sonst seltsam schief geraten; denn auch die προσφορά Christi gehört ja zur ersten Ankunft und nicht zur zweiten, und so weiß er eigentlich nichts Rechtes zu sagen..."

⁴⁷ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.10 [CCSL 2, 1394]: "And thus to the present moment they affirm that their Christ is not come, because He is not come in majesty; while they are ignorant of the fact that He was first to come in humility." Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.8 is almost verbatim, reading "*etiam in humilitate*" [CCSL 1, 518] rather than "*in humilitate primo*."

⁴⁸ E. Osborn, *Tertullian: First Theologian of the West*, Cambridge 1997, pp.106-107.

With regard to the first advent, Tertullian, like Justin, focused on the humility or lowliness of Jesus (*in humilitate*).⁴⁹ Reference is made to the speechless lamb (Is. 53:7), the ordinary appearance and avoidance by others (Is. 53:2-3), a stone or stumbling block for Israel (Is. 8:14), being little less than the angels (Ps. 8:6),⁵⁰ and a worm despised by the people (Ps. 21[22]:7).⁵¹ With regard to the second advent, the emphasis was on majesty (*sublimitatis secundo*).⁵² Reference is made to the cornerstone of the temple (Ps. 117[118]:22; Is. 28:116), the stone that crushes the secular kingdoms (Dan. 2:34), the Son of Man coming on the clouds (Dan. 7:13-14), the one blooming in beauty (Ps. 44[45]:3-5), the crowned one with all things under his feet (Ps. 8:6b-7), and the one mourned for by those who pierced him (Zech. 12:10,12).⁵³ This list certainly reads as though Tertullian was citing from *testimonia*.

The reference to Zechariah led Tertullian to mention, for the first time in extant Patristic literature, the point which was to be made again at the end of the section (and which has been mentioned in this paper above), that a second advent was necessary because Jesus had not been recognised by the Jews (and the Marcionites) in his first coming. Further references were made to Jer. 17:9; Is. 53:8 and Zech. 3:3-5 and the last of these three—the sordid and the priestly, festal garments—was seen as a typological reference to both advents

⁴⁹ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.1 [CCSL 2, 1391]; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.1 [CCSL 1, 516].

⁵⁰ Though how this reference actually emphasises *humilitas* is unclear.

⁵¹ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.2 [CCSL 2, 1392]; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.2 [CCSL 1, 516].

⁵² Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.3 [CCSL 2, 1392]; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.3 [CCSL 1, 516].

⁵³ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.3-6 [CCSL 2, 1392-1393]; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.3-6 [CCSL 1, 516-517].

and proof of the contrast between them.⁵⁴ In the same vein, the two goats were taken as proof there were two advents.⁵⁵ The textual differences between the two treatises of Tertullian with regard to the passages on the two goats are not great.⁵⁶

Carleton Paget comments “that material similar to that found in this chapter [7 of *Barnabas*] appears in Justin and Tertullian.”⁵⁷ He notes that both *Barnabas* and Tertullian’s treatises refer to the scapegoat being cursed, spat on and physically abused (κατακεντήσατε in *Barn.* 7.8; *consputatus et convulsus* in *adv. Iud.* 14.9 and *adv. Marc.* 3.7.7), being bound in scarlet, and being similar to the other goat which was eaten by the priests.⁵⁸ Even though Carleton Paget recognises some differences between *Barnabas* and Tertullian (the latter, like Justin but unlike the author of *Barnabas*, saw the scapegoat as a type for the first advent, and Tertullian did not do much with the references to the scarlet

⁵⁴ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.6-7 [CCSL 2, 1393]; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.6 [CCSL 1, 517]. Interestingly, Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.8 [CCSL 2, 1393-1394] does not appear in *adversus Macionem*. R. L. Zell, *The Priesthood of Christ in Tertullian and St. Cyprian*, in *Studia Patristica* 11 [Papers of the 5th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford 1967], Berlin 1972, pp.283-284, notes this as well, although he believes *adv. Iud.* to be written later than *adv. Marc.* Zell accepts that *adv. Iud.* 14.8 may have been taken from a now-missing parallel in *adv. Marc.* The reference to Josedech may have been Tertullian’s attempt to counter a Jewish argument that sought to find the fulfilment of the Joshua prophecy in Zech. 3:3-5 in Joshua, son of Jehozadak, mentioned in Zech. 6:11.

⁵⁵ Tert. *adv. Iud.* 14.9 [CCSL 2, 1394]; Tert. *adv. Marc.* 3.7.7 [CCSL 1, 517-518].

⁵⁶ Although Kroymann prefers *faciamus* [CCSL 2, 1394, 58] and *ad salutem* [CCSL 2, 1394, 72], following the codex Trecensis 523, H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 46), p.40, lines 3 and 13 respectively, prefers *faciam* and *a salute*, which is what is found in *adversus Marcionem*. The other differences are: *qui iam venit, ostendunt* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 59] and *figurant* in *adv. Marc.* [CCSL 1, 517, 387, 28]; *habet* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 62] and *habeat* in *adv. Marc.* [CCSL 1, 517, 388, 3]; *unus* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 62] and *alter* in *adv. Marc.* [CCSL 1, 517, 388, 3]; *Christi* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 65] and *dominicae* in *adv. Marc.* [CCSL 1, 517, 388, 6]; the inclusion of *qui coccinea circumdatus veste et consputatus et convulsus et compunctus et omnibus contumeliis adflictus extra civitatem crucifixus est* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 66-67]; the inclusion of *tantum* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 68]; and *quia* in *adv. Iud.* [CCSL 2, 1394, 70] and *qua* in *adv. Marc.* [CCSL 1, 517, 388, 8].

⁵⁷ J. Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 33), p.138.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.139.

wool),⁵⁹ he believes that there is substantial agreement between them and remains open to the possibility that Tertullian borrowed directly from *Barnabas*. It would seem to me, on the contrary, that different typological referents for the two goats in terms of the two advents of Jesus, in *Barnabas*, on the one hand, and in Justin and Tertullian, on the other, is not just one difference outweighed by a number of similarities, but is the major obstacle in the way of saying that the latter two borrowed from the former. If, as I have argued, the idea of the two advents is only a minor or implicit idea in *Barnabas* (if really present at all), then it may be suggested that even if Justin and Tertullian made use of *Barnabas* their typological arguments about the two advents (as opposed to their typological arguments about suffering, exaltation, and the Eucharist) are their own creation or derive from a source which the author of *Barnabas* did not know or chose to ignore. Although there are similarities between the material used by these three authors, the use they make of that material in the overall arguments of their treatises is different and this needs to be understood as the most significant factor.⁶⁰

Tränkle has argued for such dependence, arguing that Tertullian altered the *Barnabas* material to make it coherent, succinct and less confused.⁶¹ Yet changing the typological references seems to be doing more to source material than merely making it more coherent. Whereas in *Barnabas* the scapegoat is a figure for the crucified and exalted

⁵⁹ H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 46), p.lxxviii also draws attention to the fact that Tertullian makes no mention of the unwashed intestines eaten with vinegar and the thornbush.

⁶⁰ Although on p.139, n.186, Carleton Paget, *Barnabas* (see note 18), says “that Tertullian is reliant on *Barn* for at least some of his details, with which I can agree, what he does not say with sufficient clarity nor emphasis is that there is a great difference between borrowing some details and the use to which one puts those details.

⁶¹ H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 46), p.lxxviii: “Erst bei Tertullian Iud. 14,9f. (=Marc. 3,7,7f.) bekommt die Deutung Klarheit und Überzeugungskraft.”

Jesus who will be seen on that day (the second advent), in Tertullian the scapegoat has no association with the exalted Christ or the second advent, only with the suffering of Jesus. In *Barnabas* also the first goat is a type for the suffering of Jesus sacramentalised in the Eucharist (and, according to Carleton Paget, though only implicitly according to me, a reference to the first advent), while in Tertullian the first goat, which is also understood in eucharistic sacramental images, is a figure for the second advent when people who have feasted on him will experience salvation. It must be said that the linkage in *Barnabas*, with regard to the first goat, seems more natural and reasonable than that in Tertullian, which seems only to work when one has an eschatological understanding that the Christian praxis of celebrating the Eucharist in the time after the death of Jesus was until he comes again (1 Cor. 11:26). The idea of the sacrificed, first goat being a type for the second advent, which we find in Tertullian, seems a little strained without realising that Pauline connection.⁶² It would seem to me that what Tertullian has done is not merely to draw out the implications of *Barnabas* and tidy them up as Tränkle suggests when he writes that:

... alles nebensächliche oder unerquickliche Detail ist verbannt, die wesentlichen Züge sind knapp zusammengefaßt und zu einem einprägsamen Bild gestaltet.⁶³

⁶² I have mentioned already Carleton Paget's point (see note 31) that he finds two traditions in *Barnabas*: the first about the two advents and the second about the crucified Christ and the eucharistic Christ. He goes on to suggest that Justin had knowledge of the first tradition and Tertullian knowledge of the second. While I agree with him with regard to the point about Justin, I would have to say, with reference to Tertullian, that Tertullian's texts give evidence of knowledge of *both* traditions not simply the second.

⁶³ H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 46), p.lxxviii.

Rather, like Justin, ⁶⁴ I believe Tertullian has offered a very different insight into a typological reference. Hence, although I must disagree with the impression given by Grabbe when he states that “Tertullian gives a similar interpretation [to *Barnabas*] in two separate places,” ⁶⁵ I do agree with his conclusion, based on Prigent and Kraft, but in opposition to Windisch, that Tertullian did not borrow directly from *Barnabas* but that they had access to common material. ⁶⁶

Thus, for the author of *Barnabas*, the first goat, the sin-offering goat, was a typological reference to the sacrificial suffering of Jesus (quite possibly with eucharistic overtones) while the second goat, the scapegoat, was a typological reference to the rejection of Jesus who would come again. In Justin and Tertullian, though, it was the second goat, the scapegoat, which was a typological reference to the first coming of Jesus (which culminated in his suffering and death), while the first goat referred to the second coming of Jesus (because of the connection with Jerusalem for Justin and because of the eschatological eucharistic reference for Tertullian).

I should like to conclude where I began, viz., the rhetorical purpose to which Tertullian utilised this typological interpretation of the two goats in *adversus Iudaeos*. This has not been a concern for other modern authors. What I am suggesting here is that, on the

⁶⁴ On the question of whether Tertullian borrowed from Justin see T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study*, Oxford 1985, pp.106-108; H. Tränkle, *Kommentar* (see note 46), p.lxxviii; A. L. Williams, *Adversus Iudaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance*, Cambridge 1935, p.52; W. Horbury, *Jewish-Christian* (see note 21), p.317.

⁶⁵ L. L. Grabbe, *Scapegoat* (see note 32), p.162.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.164, although I do not necessarily agree with him that the source material was Jewish-Christian rather than Jewish. See P. Prigent and R. A. Kraft, *Épître* (see note 25), pp.135-137; H. Windisch, *Barnabasbrief* (see note 18), pp.343-345.

micro scale, Tertullian and Justin both made use of this material to prove wrong the Jewish argument, which was that Jesus could not be the Messiah because he did not come victoriously, by showing that he will come victoriously in the second advent, and on the macro scale Tertullian linked this passage in *adv. Iud.* 14.10 with the wider rhetorical arguments of the third *topos* of 8.2 in the *confirmatio*, which arguments began in 11.11b. This third *topos* involved the events that were subsequent to the birth and death of Jesus. This was discussed in terms of the Gentiles coming to faith (12.1-2), the destruction of Jerusalem (13.1-10), the fate of the Jews (13.24-29) and the second coming of Christ (14.1-10). The arguments from subsequent events, which dominates chapters 12 to 14 of *adversus Iudaeos*, all helps to prove the work's *propositio* that the Christians had replaced the Jews. This *topos* demonstrated, at least according to its proponent, that later events prove that the earlier event under dispute (whether Jesus was the promised one) must be the case.

This argument from rhetorical structure and argumentation which I have suggested here may also make a small contribution to the question of the treatise's unity, integrity and authorship. That chapters 12 to 14 can be seen to be the detail of what had been announced in 8.2 (a part of the treatise not generally held by scholars to be non-authentic), tends to suggest that these later chapters may also be authentic. The fact that this passage in *adversus Iudaeos* is almost identical to the unquestionably authentic passage of Tertullian in *adversus Marcionem* need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that someone else has copied it; it may simply mean that Tertullian himself found it convenient to reuse earlier material. The minor differences between the passages examined from the two treatises look as though Tertullian has removed segments from *adversus Iudaeos* for the later *adversus Marcionem* to make his work a little better.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

... et tamen quam multorum ad eam librorum necessaria lectio est...

Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 12.11.17

ANCIENT SOURCES

ad Herennium in H. Caplan, trans., [*Cicero I*]: *Ad Herennium*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1954).

Apuleius in Paul Vallette, ed., *Apulée: Apologie, Florides*,
(Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1960 [2nd ed.]).

Aristides in C. A. Behr, trans., *Aristides I: Panathenaic Oration and In Defence of Oratory*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1973).

Aristotle in J. H. Freese, trans., *Aristotle XXII: The 'Art' of Rhetoric*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1926).

Aristotle in G. A. Kennedy, trans., *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

Aristotle in H. Lawson-Tancred, trans., *Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric*,
(London: Penguin, 1991).

Aristotle in H. Rackman, trans., *Aristotle XIX: The Nicomachean Ethics*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1934 [2nd ed.]).

Epistle of Barnabas in James A. Kleist, trans., *The Didache; the Epistle of Barnabas; the Epistles and the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp; the Fragments of Papias; the Epistle to Diognetus*,
ACW, vol. 6,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1948).

Epistle of Barnabas in Kirsopp Lake, trans., *The Apostolic Fathers* (2 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1912-1913).

Epistle of Barnabas in J. B. Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer (ed. and rev. Michael W. Holmes), trans., *The Apostolic Fathers*,
(Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Baker House, 1989 [2nd ed.]).

Epistle of Barnabas in Pierre Prigent and Robert A. Kraft, ed., *Épître de Barnabé*,
SC, t.172,
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1971).

Epistle of Barnabas in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (rev. A. Cleveland Coxe), ed., *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*,
ANF, vol. 1,
(Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Eerdmans, 1885).

Cicero in G. L. Henderson, trans., *Cicero V: Brutus and Orator*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1962 [rev. ed.]).

Cicero in H. M. Hubbell, trans., *Cicero II: De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1949).

Cicero in H. Rackham, trans., *Cicero IV: De Oratore, Book III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, and De Partitione Oratoria*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1942).

Cicero in E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, trans., *Cicero III: De Oratore, Books I - II*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1942).

Clement of Alexandria in Otto Stählin (rev. Ursula Treu), ed., *Clemens Alexandrinus, erster Band: Protrepticus und Paedagogus*,
GCS, vol. 12,
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1972 [3rd ed.]).

Clement of Alexandria in Otto Stählin (rev. Ludwig Früchtel and Ursula Treu), ed., *Clemens Alexandrinus, zwiter Band: Stromata Buch I-VI*,
GCS, vol. 52,
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985 [4th ed.]).

Damascus Document in Florentino García Martínez, trans., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated*,
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

Didache in Kirsopp Lake, trans., *The Apostolic Fathers* (2 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1912-1913).

Dio Cassius in Earnest Cary, trans., *Dio's Roman History* (9 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1914 -1927).

Eusebius in Kirsopp Lake and J. E. L. Oulton, trans., *Eusebius: Ecclesiastical History* (2 vols.),

- LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1926-1932).
- Fronto in C. R. Haines, trans., *Marcus Cornelius Fronto* (2 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1928-1929 [rev. ed.]).
- Aulus Gellius in J. C. Rolfe, trans., *The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius* (3 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1946-1952 [rev. ed.]).
- Hippolytus in G. Brady and M. Lefèvre, ed., *Hippolyte: Commentaire sur Daniel*,
SC, t.14,
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1947).
- Historia Augusta* in David Magie, ed., *The Scriptores Historiae Augustae* (3 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1921-1932).
- Ignatius of Antioch in Kirsopp Lake, trans., *The Apostolic Fathers* (2 vols.),
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1912-1913).
- Irenaeus in Joseph P. Smith, trans., *St. Irenaeus: Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*,
ACW, vol.16,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1952).
- Irenaeus in A. Rousseau et al., ed., *Irénée de Lyon: Contre les hérésies* (4 vols.),
SC, t.264, 294, 211, 100,
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969-1974.)
- Jerome in J.-P. Migne, ed., *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi: Opera omnia*,
PL, vol. 25,
(Paris: Garnier Fratres et J.-P. Migne Successores, 1884).
- Josephus in H. St. J. Thackeray et al., trans., *Josephus IV-X: Jewish Antiquities*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1930-1965).
- Josephus in H. St. J. Thackeray, trans., *Josephus I-III: The Jewish War*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1926-1928).
- Book of Jubilees in Florentino García Martínez, trans., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated*,
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).
- Justin Martyr in Leslie William Barnard, trans., *St. Justin Martyr: The First and Second Apologies*,
ACW, vol.56,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1997).
- Justin Martyr in J.-P. Migne, ed., *S. P. N. Justini: Opera qua existant omnia; necnon Tatiani, Hermiae, Athenagoras et S. Theophili quae supersunt*,
PG, vol. 6,

(Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1857).

Justin Martyr in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (rev. A. Cleveland Coxe), ed., *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, ANF, vol. 1, (Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Eerdmans, 1885).

Juvenal in

11Q Melchizedeck in Florentino García Martínez, trans., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

Origen in

Petrus Venerabilis in J.-P. Migne, ed., *Petri Venerabilis: Opera omnia, accedunt Wibaldi Abbatis Stabulensis necnon Ernaldi Abbatis Bonaevallis*, PL, vol.189, (Paris: Garnier Fratres et J.-P. Migne Successores, 1890).

Philostratus in Wilmer Cave Wright, trans., *Philostratus and Eunapius: The Lives of the Sophists*, LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1921).

Plutarch in B. Perrin, trans., *Plutarch's Lives II: Themistocles and Camillus, Aristides and Cato Major, Cimon and Lucullus*, LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1914).

Quintilian in H. E. Butler, trans., *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian* (4 vols.), LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1920-1922).

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum in W. S. Hett and H. Rackham, trans., *Aristotle XVI: Problems, Books XXII-XXXVIII and Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1957 [rev. ed.]).

Seneca in Michael Winterbottom, trans., *The Elder Seneca: Controversiae and Suasoriae* (2 vols.), LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1974).

Shepherd of Hermas in Kirsopp Lake, trans., *The Apostolic Fathers* (2 vols.), LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1912-1913).

Suetonius in R. A. Kaster, ed., *C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

Suetonius in J. C. Rolfe, trans., *Suetonius*, (2 vols.), LCL, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1914).

Tacitus in W. Peterson (rev. Michael Winterbottom), *Tacitus I: Agricola, Germania, Dialogus*,

- LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1970 [2nd ed.]).
- Tacitus in Clifford H. Moore, trans., *Tacitus II: The Histories, Books I-III*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1925).
- Tacitus in Clifford H. Moore and John Jackson, trans., *Tacitus III: The Histories, Books IV-V; The Annals, Books I-III*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1931).
- Tacitus in John Jackson, trans., *Tacitus IV: The Annals, Books IV-VI, XI-XII*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1937).
- Tacitus in John Jackson, trans., *Tacitus V: The Annals, Books XIII-XVI*,
LCL,
(Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1937).
- Tertullian in Braun, René, ed., *Tertullien, Contre Marcion*, t.3,
SC, t.399,
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1994).
- Tertullian in Ernest Evans, ed. & trans., *Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem*, vol. 1: *Books 1 to 3*,
OECT,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
- Tertullian in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (rev. A. Cleveland Coxe), ed., *Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, and Tertullian, Part Fourth; Minucius Felix; Commodian; Origen, Parts First and Second*,
ANF, vols.3 and 4,
(Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Eerdmans, 1885).
- Tertullian in William P. LeSaint, trans., *Tertullian: Treatises on Marriage and Remarriage*,
ACW, vol.13,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1951).
- Tertullian in William P. LeSaint, trans., *Tertullian: Treatises on Penance*,
ACW, vol.28,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1959).
- Tertullian in *Tertulliani Opera*, pars I and II,
CCSL, vols.1 and 2,
(Turnhout: Typograph Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1954).
- Tertullian in J. H. Waszink, trans., *Tertullian: The Treatise Against Hermogenes*,
ACW, vol.24,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1956).
- Testament of Levi in Florentino García Martínez, trans., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated*,
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

Theophilus of Antioch in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (rev. A. Cleveland Coxe), ed., *Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria*, ANF, vol.2, (Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Eerdmans, 1885).

MODERN SOURCES

A) CLASSICAL RHETORIC

Adamik, Tamás, "Aristotle's Theory of the Period,"
Philologus 128 (1984), pp.184-201.

Ahl, Frederick, "The Art of Safe Criticism,"
AJPh 105 (1984), pp.174-208.

Anderson, Graham, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire*,
(London: Routledge, 1993).

Anderson, Graham, "The Second Sophistic: Some Problems of Perspective," in
Antonine Literature, ed. D. A. Russell,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.91-110.

Barnes, Jonathan, "Rhetoric and poetics," in
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.259-285.

Barwick, Karl, "Die Gliederung der Rhetorischen TEXNH und die Horazische Epistula ad Pisones,"
Hermes 57 (1922), pp.1-62.

Benoit, William Lyon, "Aristotle's Example: The Rhetorical Induction,"
QJS 66 (1980), pp.182-192.

Benoit, William Lyon, "On Aristotle's Example,"
Ph & Rh 20 (1987), pp.261-267.

Berry, D. H. and Heath, Malcom, "Oratory and Declamation," in
Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter,
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp.393-420.

Bickel, E., "Die Echtheit von Cic. De opt. gen. or.,"
RhM 98 (1955), pp.....

Blair, Carole, "Contested Histories of Rhetoric: The Politics of Preservation, Progress, and Change,"
QJS 78 (1992), pp.403-428.

Bonner, Stanley F., *Education in Ancient Rome: from the elder Cato to the younger Pliny*,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

Bonner, Stanley F., *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire*,
(Liverpool: University Press, 1949).

Braet, Antoine, "The Classical Doctrine of *status* and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation,"
Ph & Rh 20 (1987), pp.79-93.

- Brink, C. O., "Quintilian's *de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae* and Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus*," *CQ* 30 n.s. (1989), pp.472-503.
- Brinton, Alan, "Pathos and the 'Appeal to Emotion': An Aristotelian Analysis," *HPhQ* 5 (1988), pp.207-219.
- Brunschwig, Jacques, "Aristotle's Rhetoric as a 'Counterpart' to Dialectic," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.34-55.
- Bryant, Donald C., "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," *QJS* 39 (1953), reproduced in *The Province of Rhetoric*, ed., Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga, (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), pp.3-36.
- Burnyeat, M. F., "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion," in *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*, ed. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.3-55.
- Burnyeat, M. F., "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.88-115.
- Calboli Montefusco, Lucia, "Aristotle and Cicero on the *officia oratoris*," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 6, (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1994), pp.66-94.
- Carter, Michael F., "The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates' Funeral Oration," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991), pp.209-232.
- Chase, J. Richard, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic," *QJS* 47 (1961), pp.293-300.
- Clark, Donald Lemen, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).
- Clarke, Martin Lowther, *Rhetoric at Rome: A Historical Survey*, rev. D.H. Barry, (London: Cohen & West, 1996 [3rd. ed.]).
- Conley, Thomas M., "The Enthymeme in Perspective," *QJS* 70 (1984), pp.168-187.
- Conley, Thomas M., "The Greekless Reader and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *QJS* 65 (1979), pp.74-79.
- Conley, Thomas, "Πάθη and πίστεις: Aristotle 'Rhet'. II 2-11," *Hermes* 110 (1982), pp.300-315.
- Consigny, Scott, "Dialectical, Rhetorical, and Aristotelian Rhetoric," *Ph & Rh* 22 (1989), pp.281-287.
- Consigny, Scott, "Transparency and Displacement: Aristotle's Concept of Rhetorical Clarity," *RSQ* 17 (1987), pp.413-419.

Cooper, John M., "An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.238-257.

Cope, E. M., *Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1867).

Dihle, A., "Ein Spurious unter den rhetorischen Werken Ciceros," *Hermes* 83 (1955), pp.303-314.

Dixon, Peter, *Rhetoric*, (London: Methuen, 1971).

Dominik, William J., ed., *Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature*, (London: Routledge, 1997).

Dominik, William J., "The style is the man: Seneca, Tacitus and Quintilian's canon," in *Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature*, ed. William J. Dominik, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.50-68.

Douglas, Alan Edward, "A Ciceronian Contribution to Rhetorical Theory," *Eranos* 55 (1957), pp.18-26.

Douglas, Alan Edward, "The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorica: A Study in Method," *ANRW* I.3, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973), pp.95-138.

Douglas, Rodney B., "An Aristotelian Orientation to Rhetorical Communication," *Ph & Rh*, 7 (1974), pp.80-88.

Duffy, Bernard K., "The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric," *Ph & Rh* 16 (1983), pp.79-93.

Engberg-Pedersen, Troels, "Is There an Ethical Dimension to Aristotelian Rhetoric?" in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.116-141.

Fairweather, Janet, *Seneca the Elder*, Cambridge Classical Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Fantham, Elaine, "Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos," *Phoenix* 27 (1973), pp.262-275.

Fantham, Elaine, "Imitation and Decline: Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the First Century After Christ," *CPh* 73 (1978), pp.102-116.

Fantham, Elaine, "Imitation and Evolution: The Discussion of Rhetorical Imitation in Cicero *De Oratore* 2. 87-97 and some Related Problems of Ciceronian Theory," *CPh* 73 (1978), pp.1-16.

Fantham, Elaine, "*Varietas and Satietas: De oratore* 3.96-103 and the limits of *ornatus*," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.275-290.

- Fortenbaugh, William W., "Aristotle on Persuasion Through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992), pp.207-244.
- Fortenbaugh, William W., "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude Toward Delivery," *Ph & Rh* 19 (1986), pp.242-254.
- Fortenbaugh, William W., "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *AGPh* 52 (1970), pp.40-70.
- Fortenbaugh, William W., "*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*: Some remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178-216," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.259-273.
- Fortenbaugh, William W., "Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus," in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and Peter Steinmetz, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 4, (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1989), pp.39-60.
- Fortenbaugh, William W., "Persuasion Through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's Rhetoric," *RhM* n.f. 134 (1991), pp.152-156.
- Fortenbaugh, William W. and Mirhady, Davic C. ed., *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 6, (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1994).
- Fortenbaugh, William W. and Steinmetz, Peter, ed., *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 4, (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1989).
- Fowler, R.L., "Aristotle on the Period (*Rhet.* 3.9)," *CQ* n.s. 32 (1980), pp.89-99.
- Frede, Dorothea, "Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.258-285.
- Furley, David J. and Nehamas, Alexander, ed., *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- Gabin, Rosalind J., "Aristotle and the New Rhetoric: Grimaldi and Valesio. A Review Essay," *Ph & Rh* 20 (1987), pp.171-182.
- Garver, Eugene, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
- Gill, Christopher, "The *Ēthos/Pathos* Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism," *CQ* n.s. 34 (1984), pp.149-166.
- Giuliani, Alessandro, "The Aristotelian Theory of Dialectical Definition," *Ph & Rh* 5 (1972), pp.129-142.
- Görler, W., "From Athens to Tusculum: Gleaning the Background of Cicero's *De oratore*,"

Rhetorica 6 (1988), pp.215-235.

Gotoff, H. C., "The Concept of Periodicity in the *ad Herennium*,"
HSCPh 77 (1973), pp.217-223.

Gotoff, Harold, "Oratory: The Art of Illusion,"
HSCPh 95 (1993), pp.289-313.

Green, Lawrence D., "Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of 'Αντίστροφος,'" *Rhetorica* 8 (1990), pp.1-27.

Grimaldi, William M. A., *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary*,
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1980).

Grimaldi, William M. A., *Aristotle, Rhetoric II: A Commentary*,
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1988).

Grimaldi, William M. A., "The Aristotelian Topics,"
Traditio 14 (1958), pp.1-16.

Grimaldi, William M. A., *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric*,
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972).

Grube, G. M. A., "Educational, Rhetorical, and Literary Theory in Cicero,"
Phoenix 16 (1962), pp.234-257.

Gruen, Erich S., "Cicero and Licinius Calvus,"
HSCPh 71 (1967), pp.215-233.

Heath, Malcolm, "The Substructure of *Stasis*-Theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes,"
CQ n.s. 44 (1994), pp.114-129.

Hendrickson, G. L., "Cicero's Correspondence with Brutus and Calvus on Oratorical Style,"
AJPh 47 (1926), pp.234-258.

Hendrickson, G. L., "Cicero De Optimo Genere Oratorum,"
AJPh 47 (1926), pp.109-123.

Hendrickson, G. L., "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style,"
AJPh 26 (1905), pp.249-290.

Hendrickson, G. L., "The Peripatetic Mean of Style and the Three Stylistic Characters,"
AJPh 25 (1905), pp.125-146.

Hill, Forbes I., "Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory. With a Synopsis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in
A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula,
(Davis [Calif.]: Hermagoras Press, 1995 [2nd ed.]), pp.51-109.

Hinks, D. A. G., "*Tria Genera Causarum*,"
CQ 30 (1936), pp.170-176.

Hubbell, Harry M., "Cicero on Styles of Oratory,"
YCS 19 (1960), pp.173-186.

Huseman, Richard C., "Aristotle's System of Topics,"
Southern Speech Journal 30 (1965), pp.243-252.

Innes, Doreen, "Cicero on Tropes,"
Rhetorica 6 (1988), pp.307-325.

Innes, Doreen, "Period and Colon: Theory and Example in Demetrius and Longinus," in
Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady,
Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 6,
(New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1994), pp.36-53.

Irwin, T. H., "Ethics in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Ethics*," in
Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.142-174.

Jordan, Mark D., "Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,"
Rhetorica 4 (1986), pp.309-333.

Kennedy, George A., "Aristotle on the Period,"
HSCPh 63 (1958), pp.283-288.

Kennedy, George A., *Aristotle: On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

Kennedy, George A., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

Kennedy, George A., *The Art of Persuasion in the Roman World, 300 B.C. - 300 A.D.*,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

Kennedy, George A., "The Composition and Influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in
Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.416-424.

Kennedy, George A., "An Estimate of Quintilian,"
AJPh 83 (1962), pp.130-146.

Kennedy, George A., *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Kennedy, George A., "Theophrastus and Stylistic Distinctions,"
HSCPh 62 (1957), pp.93-104.

Kennedy, George A., "The Rhetoric of Advocacy in Greece and Rome,"
AJPh 89 (1968), pp.419-436.

Kennedy, George A., "Theophrastus and Stylistic Distinctions,"
HSCPh, 62 (1957), pp.93-104.

Kinneavy, James L., "William Grimaldi—Reinterpreting Aristotle,"
Ph & Rh 20 (1987), pp.183-200.

Kirby, John T., "Ciceronian rhetoric: theory and practice," in

Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature, ed. William J. Dominik,
(London: Routledge, 1997), pp.13-31.

Leddy, J. F., "Tradition and Change in Quintilian,"
Phoenix 7 (1953), pp.47-56.

Leeman, A. D., *Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators Historians and Philosophers*, vol. 1,
(Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1963).

Leighton, Stephen R., "Aristotle and the Emotions," in
Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.206-237.

Levi, Samuel R., "Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor,"
Ph & Rh 15 (1982), pp.24-46.

Levine, Philip, "Cicero and the Literary Dialogue,"
CJ 53 (1957/8), pp.146-151.

Lord, Carnes, "The Intention of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric',"
Hermes 109 (1981), pp.326-339.

McBurney, James H., "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory,"
Speech Monographs 3 (1936), pp.49-74.

May, James M., "The Rhetoric of Advocacy and Patron-Client Identification: Variation on a Theme,"
AJPh 102 (1981), pp.308-315.

Meador, Prentice A., "Rhetoric and Humanism in Cicero,"
Ph & Rh 3 (1970), pp.1-12.

Mirhady, D., "Non-Technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes,"
AJPh 112 (1991), pp.5-28.

Mirhady, D. C., "A Note on Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1.3 1358b5-8,"
Ph & Rh 28 (1995), pp.405-407.

Moran, Richard, "Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the *Rhetoric*," in
Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

Murphy, James J., "The Codification of Roman Rhetoric. With a Synopsis of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*," in
A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula,
(Davis [Calif.]: Hermagoras Press, 1994 [2nd ed.]), pp.111-127.

Murphy, James J., "The End of the Ancient World: The Second Sophistic and Saint Augustine," in
A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula,
(Davis [Calif.]: Hermagoras Press, 1994 [2nd ed.]), pp.205-211.

Murphy, James J. and Katula, Richard A., ed., *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*,
(Davis [Calif.]: Hermagoras Press, 1994 [2nd ed.]).

Nadeau, Ray, "Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes," *GRBS* 2 (1959), pp.53-71.

Nussbaum, Martha Craven, "Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.303-323.

Oates, Whitney J., "Aristotle and the Problem of Value," in *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, ed. E. Erikson, (Metuchen [N.J.]: Scarecrow Press, 1974), pp.

Ophuijsen, Jan M. van, "Where Have the Topics Gone?" in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 6, (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1994), pp.131-173.

Oravec, Christine, "'Observation' in Aristotle's Theory of Epideictic," *Ph & Rh* 9 (1976), pp.162-174.

Pernot, Laurent, *La Rhétorique de L'Éloge dans le Monde Gréco-Romain*, tome 1: *Histoire et Technique*, (Paris, Institut d' Études Augustiniennes, 1993).

Porter, Stanley E., ed., *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Age, 330 B.C - A.D. 400*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997).

Prill, Paul, "Cicero in Theory and Practice: The Securing of Good Will in the *Exordia* of Five Forensic Speeches," *Rhetorica* 4 (1986), pp. 93-109.

Ricoeur, Paul, "Between Rhetoric and Poetics," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.324-384.

Robinson, Edward A., "The Date of Cicero's *Brutus*," *HSCPh* 60 (1951), pp.137-146.

Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

Rosenfield, L., "The Practical Celebration of Epideictic," in *Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of Rhetoric*, ed. E. E. White, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), pp.131-155.

Rowe, Galen O., "Style," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Age, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400*, ed. Stanley E. Porter, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), pp.121-157.

Russell, D. A., "Rhetoric and Criticism," *G & R* 14 n.s. (1967), pp.130-144.

Ryan, Eugene E., "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Ethics* and the Ethos of Society," *GRBS* 13 (1972), pp.291-308.

Satterthwaite, Philip E., "The Latin Church Fathers," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400*, ed. Stanley E. Porter, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), pp.671-694.

Schenkeveld, Dirk M. "Judicia vulgi: Cicero, *De Oratore* 3.195ff. and *Brutus* 183ff.," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), pp.291-305.

Schütrumpf, Eckart, "Non-Logical Means of Persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *De oratore*," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 6, (New Brunswick [N.J.]: Transaction, 1994), pp.95-110.

Sinclair, Patrick, "The *Sententia* in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: A Study in the Sociology of Rhetoric," *AJPh* 114 (1993), pp.561-580.

Smith, Robin, "Logic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.27-65.

Solmsen, Friedrich, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJPh* 62 (1941), pp.35-50, 169-190.

Solmsen, Friedrich, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing Upon the Feelings," *CPh* 33 (1938), pp.390-404.

Solmsen, Friedrich, "Cicero's First Speeches: A Rhetorical Analysis," *TAPhA* 69 (1938), pp.542-556.

Sprott, S. E., "Cicero's Theory of Prose Style," *PhQ* 34 (1955), pp.1-17.

Stanton, G. R., "Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification," *AJPh* 94 (1973), pp.350-364.

Striker, Gisela, "Emotions in Context: Aristotle's Treatment of the Passions in the *Rhetoric* and His Moral Psychology," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp.286-302.

Sullivan, Dale L., "The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter," *Ph & Rh* 26 (1993), pp.113-133.

Thonssen, Lester and Baird, A. Craig, *Speech Criticism - The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal*, (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), reproduced in, *The Province of Rhetoric*, ed. Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga, (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), pp.137-157.

Usher, S., "Occultatio in Cicero's Speeches," *AJPh* 86 (1965), pp.175-192.

Winterbottom, Michael, "Quintilian and Rhetoric," in *Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin II*, ed. T. A. Dorey,

(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp.79-97.

Winterbottom, Michael, "Quintilian and the *Vir Bonus*,"
JRS 54 (1964), pp.90-97.

Winterbottom, Michael, "Schoolroom and Courtroom," in
Rhetoric Revalued: Papers from the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, ed. Brian Vickers,
Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, vol. 19,
(Binghamton [N.Y.]: Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), pp.59-70.

Wisse, Jakob, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero*,
(Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989).

Worthington, Ian, ed., *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*,
(London: Routledge, 1994).

Wuellner, Wilhelm, "Arrangement," in
Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter,
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), pp.51-87.

B) TERTULLIAN

Åkerman, M., *Über die Echtheit der letzteren Hälfte von Tertullians Adversus Iudaeos*,
(Lund, 1918).

Aziza, Claude, *Tertullien et le judaïsme*,
Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Nice, vol. 16,
(Nice, 1977).

Balfour, I. L. S., "Tertullian's Description of the Heathen," in
Studia Patristica, vol. 17, no. 2, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone,
papers of the 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1979,
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), pp.785-789.

Barnes, Timothy D., *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study*,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985 [2nd ed.]).

Barnes, Timothy D., "Tertullian's *Scorpiace*,"
JTS n.s. 20 (1969), pp.105-132.

Barnes, Timothy D., "Tertullian the Antiquarian,"
Studia Patristica, vol. 14, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone,
papers presented to the 6th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1971, part 3,
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), pp.3-20.

Becker, C., *Tertullians Apologeticum: Werden und Leistung*,
(Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1954).

Braun, René, *Aux origines de le chrétienté d'Afrique: un homme de combat, Tertullien*,
dans *BAGB* 4^e série (1965), pp.

Claesson, Gösta, *Index Tertullianus, A-E*,
(Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1974).

Claesson, Gösta, *Index Tertullianus, F-P*,
(Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975).

Claesson, Gösta, *Index Tertullianus, Q-Z*,
(Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975).

Countryman, L. Wm., "Tertullian and the Regula Fidei,"
The Second Century 2 (1982), pp.208-227.

Dunn, Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Pro temporum condicione: Jews and Christians as God's People in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*," in
Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church, vol. 2, ed. Pauline Allen et al.,
(Brisbane: Watson Ferguson, 1999), pp.315-341 (forthcoming).

Dunn, Geoffrey D., "Tertullian and Rebekah: A Re-Reading of an 'Anti-Jewish' Argument in Early Christian Literature,"
VC 52 (1998), pp.119-145.

Dunn, Geoffrey D., "Two Goats, Two Advents and Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*,"
Augustinianum (forthcoming).

Dunn, Geoffrey D., "The Universal Spread of Christianity as a Rhetorical Argument in Tertullian's *adversus Iudaeos*,"
J ECS (forthcoming).

Efroymsen, David P., "Tertullian's Anti-Jewish Rhetoric: Guilt by Association,"
USQR 36 (1980), pp.25-37.

Efroymsen, David P., "Tertullian's Anti-Judaism and its Role in his Theology,"
(unpub. Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1976).

Evans, C. F., "Tertullian's References to Sentius Saturninus and the Lukan Census,"
JTS n.s. 24 (1973), pp.24-39.

Evans, R. F., "On the Problem of Church and Empire in Tertullian's *Apologeticum*,"
Studia Patristica, vol. 14, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone,
papers presented to the 6th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1971, part. 3,
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), pp.21-36.

Fredouille, Jean-Claude, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique*,
(Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1972).

Frend, W. H. C., "A Note on Tertullian and the Jews,"
Studia Patristica, vol. 10, ed. F. L. Cross,
papers presented to the 5th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1967, part 1,
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1970), pp.291-196.

Frend, W. H. C., "Tertulliano e gli Ebrei,"
RSLR 4 (1968), pp.3-10.

- Gero, Stephen, "*Miles Gloriosus*: The Christian and Military Service according to Tertullian," *Church History* 39 (1970), pp.285-298.
- Guerra, Anthony J., "Polemical Christianity: Tertullian's Search for Certitude," *The Second Century* 8 (1991), pp.109-123.
- Hanson, R. P. C., "Notes on Tertullian's Interpretation of Scripture," *JTS* n.s. 12 (1961), pp.273-279.
- Hoppe, H., *Syntax und Stil des Tertullian*, (Leipzig: G. B. Teubner, 1903).
- Horbury, William, "Tertullian on the Jews in the Light of *De Spectaculis* XXX.5-6," *JTS* n.s. 23 (1972), pp.455-459.
- Kaufman, Peter Iver, "Tertullian on Heresy, History, and the Reappropriation of Revelation," *Church History* 60 (1991), pp.167-179.
- Keresztes, Paul, "Tertullian's *Apologeticus*: A Historical and Literary Survey," *Latomus* 25 (1966), pp.124-133.
- LeTourneau, Mark, "General and Special Topics in the *De Baptismo* of Tertullian," *Rhetorica* 5 (1987), pp.87-105.
- Mohrmann, Christine, "Observations sur la langue et le style de Tertullien," in *Études sur le latin des chrétiens*, t. 2: *Latin chrétien et médiéval*, (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1961), pp.235-246.
- Monceaux, P., *Historie littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, t.1: *Tertullien et les origines*, (Paris, 1901).
- van der Nat, P. G., "Tertullianae I," *VC* 18 (1964), pp.14-31.
- van der Nat, P. G., "Tertullianae II," *VC* 18 (1964), pp.129-143.
- Neander, Augustus, *Antignostikus, Geist des Tertullianus und Einleitung in dessen Schriften*, (Berlin, 1949 [2nd ed.]).
- Noeldechen, E., *Die Abfassungszeit der Schriften Tertullians*, TU V.2, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1888).
- Noeldechen, E., *Tertullians Schrift gegen die Juden auf Einheit, Echtheit, Entstehung geprüft*, TU XII.2, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1894).
- O'Malley, T. P., *Tertullian and the Bible: Language-Imagery-Exegesis*, (Utrecht: Dekker & van de Vegt, 1967).
- Osborn, Eric, "The Conflict of Opposition in the Theology of Tertullian," *Augustinianum* 35 (1995), pp.623-639.

Osborn, Eric, "The Subtlety of Tertullian,"
VC 52 (1998), pp.361-370.

Osborn, Eric, *Tertullian: First Theologian of the West*,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Osborn, Eric, "Tertullian as Philosopher and Roman," in
*Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche: Festschrift für Ulrich Wickert zum siebzigsten
Geburtstag*,
Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, band 85,
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), pp.231-247.

Petzer, Jacobus H., "Tertullian's Text of Acts,"
The Second Century, 8 (1991), pp.201-215.

Quacquarelli, A., *Q. S. F. Tertulliani ad martyras*,
(Rome: Desclée, 1963).

Quacquarelli, A., *Q. S. F. Tertulliani ad Scapulam*,
(Rome: Desclée, 1957).

Quispel, G., "African Christianity before Minucius Felix and Tertullian," in
Actus: Studies in Honour of H.L. W. Nelson, ed. J. den Boeft and A. H. M. Kessels,
(Utrecht: Instituut voor Klassieke Talen, 1982), pp.257-335.

Quispel, Gilles, *De bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem*,
(Utrecht: Burgersdijk en Niemans, 1943).

Rankin, David I., "Was Tertullian a Jurist?"
Studia Patristica, vol. 31, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone,
papers presented to the 12th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1995,
(Leuven: Peeters, 1997), pp.335-342.

Rebillard, Éric, "Les *Areae* Carthagoines (Tertullien, *Ad Scapulam* 3,1): Cimetières Communautaires au
Enclos Funéraires de Chrétiens?"
MEFRA 108 (1996), pp.175-189.

Roebeck, Cecil M., *Prophecy in Carthage: Perpetua, Tertullian and Cyprian*,
(Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1992).

Säflund, Gösta, *De pallio und die stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians*,
Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom, 8, VIII,
(Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1955).

Scholer, D. M., "Tertullian on Jewish Persecution of Christians,"
Studia patristica, vol. 17, no.2, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone,
papers presented to the 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1979,
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), pp.821-828."

Sider, Robert Dick, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian*,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Sider, Robert Dick, "On Symmetrical Composition in Tertullian,"

JTS n.s. 24 (1973), pp.405-423.

Sider, Robert Dick, "Structure and Design in the 'de Resurrectione Mortuorum' of Tertullian," *VC* 23 (1969), pp.177-196.

Sider, Robert Dick, "Tertullian *On the Shows*: An Analysis," *JTS* n.s. 29 (1978), pp.339-365.

Swift, Louis J., "Forensic Rhetoric in Tertullian's *Apologeticum*," *Latomus* 27 (1968), pp.864-877.

Tränkle, Hermann, *Q. S. F. Tertulliani, Adversus Iudaeos: mit Einleitung und kritischem Kommentar*, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964).

Ugenti, Valerio, "Norme Prosodiche nelle Clausole Metriche del *De Idololatria* di Tertulliano," *Augustinianum* 35 (1995), pp.241-258.

Waszink, J. H., "Tertullian's Principles and Methods of Exegesis," in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition: In Honorem Robert M. Grant*, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken, (Paris, 1979), pp.17-31.

Zell, R. L., "The Priesthood of Christ in Tertullian and St. Cyprian," in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 11, ed. F. L. Cross, papers presented to the 5th International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford, 1967, part 2, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972), pp.282-288.

C) CHRISTIANITY AND JUDAISM

Adler, William, "The Apocalyptic Survey of History Adapted by Christians: Daniel's Prophecy of 70 Weeks," in *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity*, ed. James C. VanderKam and William Adler, *Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum*, section III, vol. 4, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), pp.201-238.

Alvarez, J., "Apostolic Writings and the Roots of Anti-Semitism," *Studia Patristica*, vol. 13, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, papers presented to the 6th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1971, part 2, (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975), pp.69-76.

Aune, David E., "Justin Martyr's Use of the Old Testament," *BETS* 9 (1966), pp.179-197.

Barclay, John and Sweet, John (eds.), *Early Christian Thought in its Jewish Context*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Barnard, L. W., "The Epistle of Barnabas and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Some Observations," *SJT* 13 (1960), pp.45-59.

Barnard, L. W., "The Old Testament and Judaism in the Writings of Justin Martyr," *VT* 14 (1964), pp.395-406.

Beckwith, Roger T., *Calendar and Chronology: Jewish and Christian, Biblical, Intertestamental and Patristic Studies*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).

Beckwith, Roger T., "Daniel 9 and the Date of Messiah's Coming in Essene, Hellenistic, Pharisaic, Zealot and Early Christian Communities," *RevQ* 10 (1981), pp.521-542.

Beker, J. C., "The Faithfulness of God and the Priority of Israel in Paul's Letter to the Romans," in *Christians Among Jews and Gentiles: Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. George W. E. Nickelsburg and George W. MacRae, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), pp.10-21.

Bokser, Ben Zion, "Justin Martyr and the Jews," *JQR* 64 (1973), pp.97-122, 204-211.

Boyarin, Daniel, "Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism," *J ECS* 6 (1998), pp.577-627.

Braverman, J., *Jerome's Commentary on Daniel: A Study of Comparative Jewish and Christian Interpretations of the Hebrew Bible*, CBQMS 7, (Washington D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1978).

Carleton Paget, James, "Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity," *ZAC* 1 (1997), pp.195-225.

Chazan, Robert, "Daniel 9:24-27: Exegesis and Polemics," in *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews*, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa, *Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism*, vol. 10, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996), pp.143-159.

Davies, W. D., "Paul and the People of Israel," *NTS* 24 (1978), pp.4-39.

Dunn, James D. G., ed., *Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways, A.D. 70 to 135*, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1992).

Efroymsen, David P., "The Patristic Connection," in *Anti-Semitism and the Foundation of Christianity*, ed. Alan T. Davies, (New York: Paulist, 1979), pp.98-117.

Evans, Craig A., "Faith and Polemic: The New Testament and First-century Judaism," in *Anti-Semitism and Early Christianity: Issues of Polemic and Faith*, ed. Craig A. Evans and Donald A. Hagner, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), pp.1-17.

Evans, Craig A. and Hagner, Donald A., *Anti-Semitism and Early Christianity: Issues of Polemic and Faith*, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).

Frend, W. H. C., "Jews and Christians in Third Century Carthage," in

Paganisme, Judaïsme, Christianisme: Influences et affrontements dans le monde antique, ed. A. Benoit, (Paris: De Boccard, 1978), pp.185-194.

Frend, W. H. C., "A Note on Jews and Christians in Third-Century North Africa," *JTS* n.s. 21 (1970), pp.92-96.

Frend, W. H. C., "The Persecutions: some Links between Judaism and the Early Church," *JEH* 9 (1958), pp.141-158.

Gager, John G., *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Gaston, Lloyd, "Judaism of the Uncircumcised in Ignatius and Related Writers," in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. Stephen G. Wilson, Studies in Judaism and Christianity, no. 2, (Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), pp.33-44.

Gaston, Lloyd, "Retrospect," in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. Stephen G. Wilson, Studies in Judaism and Christianity, no. 2, (Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), pp.163-174.

Georgi, Dieter, "The Early Church: Internal Jewish Migration or New Religion?" *HTR* 88 (1995), pp.35-68.

Hare, Douglas R. A., "The Relationship between Jewish and Gentile Persecution of Christians," *JES* 4 (1967), pp.446-456.

von Harnack, Adolf, *Die Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani nebst Untersuchungen über die antijüdische Polemik in der alten Kirche*, TU I/3, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1883).

von Harnack, Adolf, *Judentum und Judenchristentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho*, TU XXXIX, (Leipzig, 1913).

Higgins, A. J. B., "Jewish Messianic Beliefs in Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*," *NT* 9 (1967), pp.298-305.

Hirsham, Marc, "Polemic Literary Units in the Classical Midrashim and Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*," *JQR* 83 (1993), pp.369-384.

Horbury, William, "Jewish-Christian Relations in Barnabas and Justin Martyr," in *Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways, A.D. 70 to 135*, ed. James D. G. Dunn, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1992), pp.315-345.

Hulen, B., "The Dialogues With the Jews as Sources for the Early Jewish Argument Against Christianity," *JBL* 51 (1932), pp.58-70.

Hvalvik, Reidar, *The Struggle for Scripture and Covenant: The Purpose of the Epistle of Barnabas and Jewish-Christian Competition in the Second Century*,
WUNT: 2. Reihe 82,
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996).

Johnson, Luke T., "The New Testament's Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic,"
JBL 108 (1989), pp.419-441.

Judant, D., *Judaïsme et christianisme, Dossier patristique*
(Paris, 1969).

Katz, Steven T., "Issues in the Separation of Judaism and Christianity after 70 C.E.: A Reconsideration,"
JBL 103 (1984), pp.43-76.

Klijn, A. F. J., "Jewish Christianity in Egypt," in
The Roots of Egyptian Christianity, ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring,
Studies in Antiquity and Christianity, vol.1,
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), pp.161-175.

Klijn, A. F. L., "The Study of Jewish Christianity,"
NTS 20 (1974), pp.419-431.

Krauss, Samuel, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers, part 1"
JQR 5 (1893), pp.122-157.

Krauss, Samuel, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers, part 2,"
JQR 6 (1894), pp.82-99.

Ladner, Gerhart B., "Aspects of Patristic Anti-Judaism,"
Viator 2 (1971), pp.355-363.

Langmuir, Gavin, "Anti-Judaism as the Necessary Preparation for Anti-Semitism,"
Viator 2 (1971), pp.383-389.

Lieu, Judith, "History and Theology in Christian Views of Judaism," in
The Jews Among Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire, ed. Judith Lieu, John North and Tessa
Rajak,
(London: Routledge, 1994 [rev. ed.]), pp.79-96.

Lieu, Judith, *Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century*,
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996).

Limor, Ora and Stroumsa, Guy G., eds., *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics between
Christians and Jews*,
Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism, vol. 10,
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996).

Lowy, S., "The Confutation of Judaism in the Epistle of Barnabas,"
JJS 11 (1960), pp.1-33.

Mach, Michael, "Justin Martyr's *Dialogus cum Tryphone* and the Development of Christian Anti-Judaism,"
in

Contra Iudaeos: *Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews*, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa,
Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism, vol. 10,
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996), pp.27-47.

MacLennan, Robert S., *Early Christian Texts on Jews and Judaism*,
Brown Judaic Studies, vol. 194,
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).

Malina, Bruce J., "Jewish Christianity or Christian Judaism: Toward a Hypothetical Definition,"
JSJ 7 (1976), pp.46-57.

McDonald, Lee Martin, "Anti-Judaism in the Early Church Fathers," in
Anti-Semitism and Early Christianity: Issues of Polemic and Faith, ed. Craig A. Evans and Donald A. Hagner,
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), pp.215-252.

Moore, George Foot, "Christian Writers on Judaism,"
HTR 14 (1921), pp.197-254.

Murray, Robert, "Defining Judaeo-Christianity,"
Heythrop Journal 15 (1974), pp.303-310.

Nilson, Jon, "To Whom is Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* Addressed?"
TS 38 (1977), pp.538-546.

Petuchowski, Jakob J., "Halakhah in the Church Fathers," in
Essays in Honor of Solomon B. Freehof, ed. Walter Jacob, Frederick C. Schwartz and Vigdor W. Kavalier,
(Pittsburgh: Rodef Shalom Congregation, 1964), pp.257-274.

Quispel, G., "The Discussion of Judaic Christianity,"
VC 22 (1968), pp.81-93.

Remus, Harold, "Justin Martyr's Argument with Judaism," in
Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. Stephen G. Wilson,
Studies in Christianity and Judaism, no.2,
(Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), pp.59-80.

Richardson, Peter and Shukster, Martin B., "Barnabas, Nerva, and the Yavnean Rabbis,"
JTS n.s. 34 (1983), pp.31-55.

Riegel, Stanley K., "Jewish Christianity: Definitions and Terminology,"
NTS 24 (1978), pp.410-415.

Rokeah, David, "Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity,"
Immanuel 16 (1983), pp.50-64.

Rokeah, David, *Jews, Pagans and Christians in Conflict*,
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982).

Rowland, Christopher, "Apocalyptic, God and the world. Appearance and Reality: Early Christianity's Debt to the Jewish Apocalyptic Tradition," in
Early Christian Thought in its Jewish Context, ed. John Barclay and John Sweet,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.238-249.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford, "The *Adversus Judaeos* Tradition in the Church Fathers: The Exegesis of Christian Anti-Judaism," in *Aspects of Jewish Culture in the Middle Ages*, ed. Paul E. Szarmach, Papers of the 8th Annual Conference of the Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1974, (Albany [N.Y.]: State University of New York Press, 1979), pp.27-50.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974).

Rutgers, Leonard Victor, *The Jews in late Ancient Rome: Evidence of Cultural Interaction in the Roman Diaspora*, Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, vol. 126, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

Sanders, Jack, *Schismatics, Sectarians, Dissidents, Deviants: The First One Hundred Years of Jewish-Christian Relations*, (London: SCM Press, 1993).

Schneider, H. P., "Some Reflections on the Dialogue of Justin Martyr with Trypho," *SJT* 15 (1962), pp.164-175.

Schrekenberg, Heinz, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (1.-11.Jh.)*, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982).

Shukster, Martin B. and Richardson, Peter, "Temple and *Bet Ha-midrash* in the Epistle of Barnabas," in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. Stephen G. Wilson, Studies in Christianity and Judaism, no.2, (Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), pp.17-31.

Sigal, Phillip, "An Inquiry into Aspects of Judaism in Justin's Dialogue with Trypho," *Abr-Nahrain* 18 (1978-79), pp.74-100.

Simon, Marcel, *Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire (AD 135,- 425)* (trans. H. McKeating), The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1996 [2nd Eng. ed.]).

Stanton, G. N., "Aspects of Early Christian-Jewish Polemic and Apologetic," *NTS* 31 (1985), pp.377-392.

Stroumsa, Guy G., "From Anti-Judaism to Antisemitism in Early Christianity," in *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews*, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa, Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism, vol. 10, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996), pp.1-26.

Stylianopoulous, Theodore, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law*, Dissertation Series, vol. 20, (Missoula: Society of Biblical Literature, 1975).

Taylor, Miriam S., *Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity: A Critique of the Scholarly Consensus*, *Studia Post-Biblica*, vol. 46, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

Wilde, Robert, *The Treatment of the Jews in the Greek Christian Writers of the First Three Centuries*, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1949).

Wiles, M. f., "The Old Testament in Controversy with the Jews," *SJT* 8 (1955), pp.113-126.

Williams, A. Lukyn, *Adversus Judaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935).

Williamson, Clark M., "The 'Adversus Judaeos' Tradition in Christian Theology," *Encounter* 39 (1978), pp.,273-296.

Wilson, Stephen G., ed., *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, (Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1986).

Wilson, Stephen G., "Gentile Judaizers," *NTS* 38 (1992), pp.605-616.

Wilson, Stephen G., "Marcion and the Jews," in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity*, vol. 2: *Separation and Polemic*, ed. Stephen G. Wilson, *Studies in Christianity and Judaism*, no.2, (Waterloo [Ontario]: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), pp.45-58.

Wilson, Stephen G., *Related Strangers: Jews and Christians 70-170 C.E.*, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995).

D) GENERAL

Allenabch, J. et al., *Biblia Patristica: Index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la littérature patristique*, tome 1: *Des origines à Clément d'Alexandrie et Tertullien*, (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche scientifique, 1975).

Altaner, B., *Patrologie: Leben Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter*, rev. Alfred Stuiber, (Freiburg: Herder, 1978 [8th ed.]).

Bacq, P., *De l'ancienne nouvelle alliance selon S. Irénée: Unité du livre IV de l'Adversus Hareses*, (Paris, 1978).

Barnard, L. W., "The Date of the Epistle of Barnabas—A Document of Early Egyptian Christianity," *JEA* 44 (1958), pp.101-107.

Barnard, L. W., "The Epistle of Barnabas," in *ANRW* 2.27, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993), pp.159-207.

Barnard, L. W., "A Note on *Barnabas* 6,8-17," *Studia Patristica*, vol. 4,

papers presented to the 3rd International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1959, part 2, (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), pp.263-267.

Barnard, L. W., *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966).

Barrett, Anthony A., *Caligula: The Corruption of Power*, (London: B. T. Batsford, 1989).

Barthélemy, D., *Les devanciers d'Aquila*, *VTSup* 10, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963).

Barton, I. M., *Africa in the Roman Empire*, (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1972).

Bickerman, E. J., *Chronology of the Ancient World*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968).

Bouchier, E. S., *Life and Letters in Roman Africa*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1913).

Brown, Raymond E., *The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke*, (New York: Doubleday, 1993 [2nd ed.]).

Brown, Raymond E., *The Death of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels*, (New York: Doubleday, 1994).

Brown, Raymond E., Fitzmyer, Joseph A. and Murphy, Roland E., eds., *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, (Englewood Cliffs [N.J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990).

Brown, Raymond E., Johnson, D. W., and O'Connell, Kevin G., "Texts and Versions," in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Roland E. Murphy, (Englewood Cliffs [N. J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.1083-1112.

Bruce, F. F., "The Earliest Old Testament Interpretation," *OTS* 17 (1972), pp.

Bruce, F. F., "Josephus and Daniel," *ASTI* 4 (1965), pp.148-162.

Bulka, Reuven P., "The Selling of the Birthright: Making Sense of a Perplexing Episode," *JBQ* 9 (1990-91), pp.100-104.

Byrne, Brendan, *Reckoning with Romans: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Gospel*, Good News Studies, vol.18, (Wilmington [Del.]: Michael Glazier, 1986).

Cameron, Averil, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse*,

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

Caplan, Harry, "The History of the Jews in the Roman Province of Africa: A Collection of the Sources," (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1921).

Carleton Paget, James N. B., "Barnabas 9:4: A Peculiar Verse on Circumcision," *VC* 45 (1991), pp.242-254.

Carleton Paget, James, *The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background*, WUNT: 2. Reihe 64, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1994).

Chadwick, Henry, *The Early Church*, Pelican History of the Church, vol. 1, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).

Champlin, Edward, *Fronto and Antonine Rome*, (Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, 1980).

Clark, Kenneth W., "Worship in the Jerusalem Temple after A.D. 70," *NTS* 6 (1959-60), pp.269-280.

Clifford, Richard J., "Genesis 25:19-34," *Interpretation* 45 (1991), pp.397-401.

Cohen, Shaye J. D., "The Significance of Yavneh: Pharisees, Rabbis, and the End of Jewish Sectarianism," *HUCA* 55 (1984), pp.27-53.

Collins, John J., *Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).

Collins, John J., "The Jewish Apocalypses," *Semeia* 14 (1979), pp.21-49.

Colson, F. H., "Two Examples of Literary and Rhetorical Criticism in the Fathers," *JTS* 25 (1924), pp.364-377.

Conzelmann, Hans, *Acts of the Apostles*, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).

Corsen, P., *Die altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani*, (Jever, 1890).

Cosgrove, C. H., "Justin Martyr and the Emerging Christian Canon," *VC* 36 (1982), pp.209-232.

Couturier, Guy P., "Jeremiah," in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Roland E. Murphy, (Engelwood Cliffs [N. J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.265-297.

Cranfield, Charles Ernest Burland, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, vol. 2,

ICC,
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1970 [6th ed.]).

Cranfield, Charles Ernest Burland, "Romans 9:30 - 10:4,"
Interpretation 34 (1980), pp.70-74.

Crocker, P., "Some Near Eastern Parallels to Rites in Leviticus,"
Buried History 32 (1960), pp.6-7.

Croke, Brian, "Porphyry's Anti-Christian Chronology,"
JTS n.s. 34 (1983), pp.168-185.

Deiana, Giovanni, "Azazel in Lv 16,"
Lateranum 54 (1988), pp.16-33.

Dekkers, Eligius, ed., *Clavus Patrum Latinorum, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*,
(Steenbrugge: Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1995 [3rd ed.]).

Dillon, Richard J., "Acts of the Apostles," in
The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Roland E. Murphy,
(Englewood Cliffs [N.J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.722-767.

Donovan, Mary Ann, "Irenaeus in Recent Scholarship,"
The Second Century 4 (1984), pp.219-241.

Doukhan, Jacques, "The Seventy Weeks of Dan. 9: An Exegetical Study,"
AUSS 17 (1979), pp.1-22.

Elliott, Neil, *The Rhetoric of Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy in Paul's Dialogue with Judaism*,
JSNT Supplement Series, no.45,
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990).

von Engelhardt, M., *Das Christentum Justins des Märtyres. Eine Untersuchung über die Anfänge der katholischen Glaubenslehre*,
(Erlangen, 1978).

Evans, C. F., *Saint Luke*,
TPI New Testament Commentaries,
(Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990).

Faley, Roland J., "Leviticus," in
The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Roland E. Murphy,
(Englewood Cliffs [N.J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.61-79.

Ferguson, John, *Clement of Alexandria*,
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974).

Finegan, Jack, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology: Principles of Time Reckoning in the Ancient World and Problems of Chronology in the Bible*,
(Peabody [Mass.]: Hendrickson, 1998 [2nd ed.]).

Fishbane, Michael, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

Fisher, J. A., "Dissent Within a Religious Community: Romans 9-11,"
BTB 10 (1980), pp.105-110.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A., *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*,
AB 28,
(New York: Doubleday, 1981).

Fitzmyer, Joseph A., "The Letter to the Romans," in
The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Roland E.
Murphy,
(Englewood Cliffs [N.J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.830-868..

Ford, J. Massingberd, "Was Montanism a Jewish-Christian Heresy?,"
JEH 17 (1966), pp.145-158.

Frend, W. H. C., *The Rise of Christianity*,
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984).

Frend, W. H. C., "The *Seniores laici* and the Origins of the Church in North Africa,"
JTS n.s. 12 (1961), pp.280-284.

Froehlich, Karlfried, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church*,
Sources of Early Christian Thought,
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).

Gamble, Harry Y., *Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts*,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

Gammie, John G., "A Journey Through Danielic Spaces: The Book of Daniel in the Theology and Piety
of the Christian Community,"
Interpretation 39 (1985), pp.144-156.

Gilbert, M., "La prière de Daniel: Dan 9:4-19,"
RTL 3 (1972), pp.284-310.

Goodenough, E. R., *The Theology of Justin Martyr*,
(Jena, 1923).

Goppelt, Leonhard, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 2,
(Grand Rapids [Mich.]: W. B. Eerdmans, 1982).

Görg, Manfred, "Beobachtungen zum sogenannten Azazel-Ritus,"
BN 33 (1986), pp.10-16.

Grabbe, Lester L., "Another Look at the *Gestalt* of 'Darius the Mede',"
CBQ 50 (1988), pp.198-213.

Grabbe, Lester L., "The Scapegoat Tradition: A Study in Early Jewish Interpretations,"
JSJ 18 (1987), pp.152-167.

Grafton, Anthony, *Joseph Scaliger: A Study in the History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. 2: *Historical Chronology*,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

Grant, Michael, *The Antonines: The Roman Empire in Transition*,
(London: Routledge, 1994).

Grant, Robert M., *Irenaeus of Lyons*,
The Early Church Fathers,
(London: Routledge, 1997).

Grant, Robert M., "Theological Education at Alexandria," in
The Roots of Egyptian Christianity, ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring,
Studies in Antiquity and Christianity, vol.1,
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), pp.178-189.

Grelot, P., "Les versions grecques de Daniel,"
Bib 47 (1966), pp.381-402.

Grelot, P., "Soixante-dix semaines d'années,"
Bib 50(1969), pp.169-186.

Griffin, Miriam T., *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*,
(London: B. T. Batsford, 1984).

Groningen, B. A. van, "General Literary Tendencies in the Second Century A.D.,"
Mnemosyne Series 4, 18 (1965), pp.41-56.

Gruenthaner, Michael J., "The Seventy Weeks,"
CBQ 1 (1939), pp.44-54.

Hammer, R., *The Book of Daniel*,
CBC,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

von Harnack, Adolf, *Geischichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, Teil II: *Die Chronologie*, vol.
2,
(Leipzig, 1904).

Hartman, Louis F. and Di Lella, Alexander A., *The Book of Daniel*,
AB 23,
(New York: Doubleday, 1978).

Hartman, Louis F. and Di Lella, Alexander A., "Daniel," in
The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Roland E.
Murphy,
(Englewood Cliffs [N. J.]: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.406-420.

Hendriksen, W., *The Gospel of Luke*,
(Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Baker House Books , 1978).

Herr, Moshe David, "Persecutions and Martyrdom in Hadrian's Day,"
Scripta Hierosolymitana 23 (1972), pp.85-125.

- Hinze, Bradford E. "Reclaiming Rhetoric in the Christian Tradition," *TS* 57 (1996), pp.481-499.
- Hopkins, Keith, "Christian Numbers and Its Implications," *J ECS* 6 (1998), pp.207-213.
- Hyldahl, N., *Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins*, (Copenhagen, 1966).
- Isaac, Benjamin, "Judaea after AD 70," *JJS* 35 (1984), pp.44-50.
- Jacob, Benno, *The First Book of the Bible: Genesis*, abr. ed. & trans. E. I. Jacob and W. Jacob, (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974 [Eng. ed.]).
- Janowski, Bernd and Wilhelm, Gernot, "Der Bock, der die Sünden hinausträgt," in *Religionsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen Kleinasien, Nordsyrien und dem Alten Testament*, *Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis* 29, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp.109-169.
- Jeansomme, S. P., *The Old Greek Translation of Daniel 7-12*, CBQMS, vol.19, (Washington D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1988).
- Jensom, Philip P., "The Levitical Sacrificial System," in *Sacrifice in the Bible*, ed. Roger T. Beckwith and Martin J. Selman, (Grand Rapids [Mich.]: Baker House Books, 1995), pp.25-40.
- Johnson, D. G., "The Structure and Meaning of Romans 11," *CBQ* 46 (1984), pp.91-103.
- Johnson, Luke T., *The Acts of the Apostles*, Sacra Pagina 5, (Collegeville [Minn.]: Liturgical Press, 1992).
- Jones, B. W., "The Prayer in Daniel IX," *VT* 18 (1968), pp.488-493.
- Käsemann, Ernst, *Commentary on Romans* (trans. G. W. Bromiley), (London: SCM Press, 1980 [Eng. ed.]).
- Kirschner, Robert, "Apocalyptic and Rabbinic Responses to the Destruction of 70," *HTR* 78 (1985), pp.27-46.
- Knowles, Louis E., "The Interpretation of the Seventy Weeks of Daniel in the Early Fathers," *WTJ* 7 (1944), pp.136-160.
- Kraabel, A. Thomas, "The Roman Diaspora: Six Questionable Assumptions," *JJS* 33 (1982), pp.445-464.
- Kraemer, Ross S., "On the Meaning of the Term 'Jew' in Greco-Roman Inscriptions," *HTR* 82 (1989), pp.35-53.

- Kraft, Robert A., *The Apostolic Fathers*, vol. 3: *Barnabas and the Didache*, (New York, 1965).
- Kraft, Robert A., "The Epistle of Barnabas: its Quotations and their Sources," (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1961).
- Kraft, Robert A., "Review of Pierre Prigent, *Les Testimonia dans le christianisme primitif*," *JTS* n.s. 13 (1961), pp.401-408.
- Kratz, R. G., *Translatio Imperii Untersuchungen zu den aramäischen Danielerzählungen und ihrem theologiegeschichtlichen Umfeld*, WMANT 63, (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1991).
- Kugel, James L. and Greer, Rowan A., *Early Biblical Interpretation*, Library of Early Christianity, vol. 3, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986).
- Laato, Antti, "The Seventy Yearweeks in the Book of Daniel," *ZAW* 102 (1990), pp.212-225.
- de Labriolle, Pierre, *Histoire de la Littérature latine chrétienne*, (Paris, 1947 [3 ème éd.]).
- Lacocque, A., "The Liturgical Prayer in Daniel 9," *HUCA* 47 (1976), pp.119-142.
- LeBohec, Yann, "Inscriptions juives et judaïsantes de l'Afrique romaine," *Ant Afr* 17 (1981), pp.165-207.
- LeBohec, Yann, "Juifs et Judaïsants dans l'Afrique romaine: Remarques onomestiques," *AntAfr* 17 (1981), pp.209-229.
- Levick, Barbara, *Claudius*, (London: J. T. Batsford, 1990).
- Lindner, Amnon, *The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987).
- Maher, Michael, "The Transfer of a Birthright: Justifying the Ancestors," *PIBA* 8 (1984), pp.1-24.
- Mantel, Hugo, "The Causes of the Bar Kokba Revolt," *JQR* 58 (1967-68), pp.224-242, 274-296.
- Marache, R., *La critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du goût archaïsant au II^e siècle de notre ère*, (Rennes, 1952).
- Marshall, I. H., *The Gospel of Luke*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids [Mich.]: W. B. Eerdmans, 1978).

McComiskey, Thomas Edward, "The Seventy 'Weeks' of Daniel Against the Background of Ancient Near Eastern Literature,"
WTJ 47 (1985), pp.18-45.

Milgrom, Jacob, *Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology*,
Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity, vol. 36,
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983).

Montgomery, J. A., *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel*,
ICC,
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1927).

Neusner, Jacob (trans.), *Genesis Rabbah: The Judaic Commentary to the Book of Genesis—A New American Translation*, vol. 2: *Parashiyyot Thirty-Four through Sixty-Seven on Genesis 8:15 to 28:9*,
Program in Judaic Studies, Brown University, no.105,
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985).

Neusner, Jacob, *The Midrash: An Introduction*,
(Northvale [N.J.]: J. Aronson, 1990).

Neusner, Jacob, *What is Midrash?*
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).

Newman, Robert C., "Daniel's Seventy Weeks and the Old Testament Sabbath-Year Cycle,"
JETS 16 (1973), pp.229-234.

Norden, E., *Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*, vol. 2,
(Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909).

North, Martin, *Leviticus: A Commentary*,
Old Testament Library,
(London: SCM Press, 1977 [rev. Eng. ed.]).

Osborn, Eric, *The Emergence of Christian Theology*,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Pearson, Birger A., "Earliest Christianity in Egypt: Some Observations," in
The Roots of Egyptian Christianity, ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring,
Studies in Antiquity and Christianity, vol. 1,
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), pp.132-159.

Pearson, Birger A. and Goehring, James E., eds., *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity*,
Studies in Antiquity and Christianity, vol. 1,
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986).

Perry, B.E., "Literature in the Second Century,"
CJ 50 (1955), pp.295-298.

Porter, J. R., *Leviticus*,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

Powell, Mark Allen, *What is Narrative Criticism?*
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).