Crisis, division and ideology: a comparative study of populist radical right parties in Australia and the Netherlands

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Statement of Originality

This thesis contains no material that has been extracted in whole or in part from a thesis that I have submitted towards the award of any other degree or diploma in any other tertiary institution.

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Octavia Bryant
Abstract

In the contemporary political era, ‘populist’ parties have experienced a heightened degree of electoral prominence and success throughout a great number of Western liberal democracies. In particular, populist radical right parties have been especially successful, increasing their support and rising from the political fringes to holding positions of power. As these parties settle into being a permanent fixture of contemporary politics, it is necessary to better understand how they function. Specifically, the thesis contends that the role populism plays within populist radical right parties is not sufficiently understood. As such, this thesis asks, to what extent are so-called ‘populist’ parties actually populist? What role does populism play in the facilitation of these parties’ broader ideological agendas? And to what degree do these agendas differ between parties in different Western liberal democratic contexts?

Situated in the fields of political theory and comparative politics, the thesis explores these questions by examining populist radical parties from the supply-side. It does so from a multi-typological perspective, defining populism as a thin-centred ideology and a discourse, which in-groups and out-groups between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’, and propagates themes of crisis. Following in the ideational tradition, these features necessarily function alongside a ‘host’ ideology. Using a mixed quantitative content and qualitative research method, the thesis examines the extent to which these features are present and the role that they play in facilitating agendas in two populist radical right parties, operating in different Western liberal democracies: in Australia, One Nation (ON) and in the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (PVV).

The analysis found that both ON and the PVV were most prominently nativist, rather than populist. This was evidenced by the predominant ethno-cultural process of in-grouping and out-grouping, between a Judeo-Christian ‘people’ and a minority ethnic ‘other,’ and the high frequency of nativist policies in their policy documents. But while their nativism was the primary focus of the parties, the populist dimensions of the parties should not be underplayed and should be considered significant and fundamental to the parties’ overall agenda. Specifically, it found that themes of crisis, as a constituent feature of populism, were quantitatively and qualitatively significant for each party, and that themes of crisis facilitated each parties’ core, nativist political goals. In examining the supply-side presence of crisis in the case studies, the analysis was able to develop a greater appreciation for populism’s overall
role in the parties that are most commonly associated with the term. The empirical examination of crisis from the supply-side is the first of its kind, and supports the theory that crisis is not merely a demand-side, external trigger for the populist radical right, but sits at the centre of the antagonistic relationship between the ‘people’, the ‘elite’ and the ‘other’. The findings also suggest that populist radical right parties will modulate their key agendas, depending on political context and issue salience. For example, where the PVV generally conformed to received wisdom of the populist radical right party family, motivated primarily by post-materialist concerns, ON tended to balance their post-materialist focus with material issues. It also found that ON was comparatively more populist than the PVV, in part because of this balancing of material and post-material matters.

The overarching aim of this thesis is to forge a greater understanding of populist radical right parties, arguably the most prominent and successful populist party family of the contemporary era. Through this analysis, the thesis provides a fresh perspective on these parties and the role that populism plays within them.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Populist parties have long been a part of Western liberal democracies.¹ While the success of these parties was generally “episodic,”² with cyclical and fluctuating degrees of electoral prominence, this is no longer the case. In the post-9/11 era, in Western liberal democracies as well as in democracies in South East Asia and the Americas, populist parties have grown, reaching heightened degrees of electoral success and prominence.³ And this growth has been sustained. It now seems as though populist parties are everywhere—a normal part of contemporary politics.⁴ And while populist parties from along the political spectrum have certainly shared in this success,⁵ one populist party family has been particularly successful—the populist radical right. Throughout Western liberal democracies, populist radical right parties have experienced an expansion of their support, going from relatively fringe parties to in some cases even holding positions of power.⁶ As such, it is fair to say that the populist radical right are the most successful of the populist parties in the contemporary ‘populist zeitgeist.’⁷ But, to what extent are these so-called populist parties actually ‘populist’? What role does

¹ The earliest example of a ‘populist’ party is the People’s Party, an agrarian populist party in the United States in the 19th century, see: Robert C. McMath, American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993). Moreover, From the 1980s, Europe saw populist parties experience varying degrees of electoral success. For example, the Front National in France, founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972 (which would go on to be renamed the National Rally in 2018), the Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland, and the Freedom Party in Austria. See: Hans-Georg Betz, “Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe in the 1990s and Beyond: A Threat to Democracy and Civil Rights?” (paper presented at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, October 2004). It should also be noted that in Latin America there has been an “enduring and prevalent populist tradition,” in particular of populist leaders. See: Cas Mudde and Christóbal Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27.
⁴ For example, successful populist parties and figures include but are not limited to: Fidesz in Hungary (elected 2010); Italy’s populist coalition (2018); the Law and Justice Party in Poland (elected 2015); The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (2010, 2017); One Nation in Australia (2016); New Zealand First in New Zealand (coalition government, 2017); Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines (elected 2016); Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (elected 2019); and Donald Trump in the United States (elected 2016).
⁵ Successful left-wing populist parties include: Podemos in Spain (2014, 2015), and Syriza in Greece (elected 2015). See also: Zaslove.
⁷ Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist."
populism play in the facilitation of these parties’ agendas? And to what degree does this differ between parties in different Western liberal democracies? With a particular focus on the populist radical right, this thesis asks these questions to assess the actual role that populism plays in ‘populist’ parties.

In doing so, this thesis suggests we still fail to sufficiently understand populist radical right parties and the role that populism plays within them. Specifically, we lack an adequate appreciation of the degree to which populism is present in populist radical right parties, as well as the extent to which populism itself plays a role in facilitating the broader ideological agendas of these parties. Therefore, I propose that a re-evaluation of the degree of populism in populist radical right parties compared to the radical right ideology is needed, as well as an interrogation of the way that populism intersects with the radical right agendas of a party. This re-evaluation necessitates revisiting the conceptual features of populism and, as a result, the features that are used to assess its role in these parties. This thesis, which uses a multi-typological approach to conceptualising populism, and takes populism to be a thin-centred ideology and a discourse, stipulates that these features consist of an in-grouping and out-grouping process, between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ and, following Moffitt, a propagation of themes of crisis.\(^8\) Populism will also, following the ideational tradition,\(^9\) have a ‘host’ ideology, in this case the radical right ideology. The literature holds that the radical right host ideology will be more influential in a populist radical right party than their populism.\(^10\) I certainly do not suggest that this analysis is incorrect. But what I do propose is that we fail to sufficiently understand the *extent* to which populism is present in these parties, as well as populism’s contribution to populist radical right parties’ other agendas. I argue, therefore, that through analysing the presence of the aforementioned populist features and the way they intersect with the radical right ideology, we can arrive at a more sufficient understanding of populist radical right parties themselves.

For example, by including crisis as a constituent feature of populism and thus assessing its presence, we can develop a new appreciation for both the extent to which these parties are populist, and the way populism itself is used to facilitate the populist radical right’s non-

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populist agendas. Specifically, I propose that crisis is an ‘internal feature’\textsuperscript{11} of populist parties and plays a fundamental role in creating and propagating the central antagonisms and themes of the populist radical right (for example, its anti-immigrant, anti-Islam agenda). Therefore, analysing its presence can provide a more well-rounded appreciation of populism’s role. I also suggest, following in the vein of De Cleen and Stavrakakis,\textsuperscript{12} that a greater interrogation of the in-grouping and out-grouping process under the populist radical right is required. Specifically, the radical right ideology as host ideology to populism will result in another out-grouping process in conjunction with the ‘elite,’ that of a minority ethnic ‘other.’ Because of this, it is necessary to discern between an in-grouping and out-grouping process that is derived from a party’s populism (a ‘people’ constructed as “underdog” against the ‘elite,’\textsuperscript{13}) and one that is derived from their radical right ideology (a ‘people’ constructed ethno-culturally against an ‘other.’) Through this discernment, we can develop a better appreciation for the role that populism itself plays in a party, compared to their radical right ideology. I also propose that we should better understand the variations that exist between populist radical right parties in different political contexts. Much of the literature on the populist radical right has been written from European cases. While this research has been essential, I suggest that a greater interrogation of the extent to which this literature can be applied to populist radical right parties in non-European contexts is crucial, even when they exist in relatively similar, Western liberal democracies. As such, two populist radical right parties have been selected as case studies to examine the key issues outlined previously, one non-European and one European—the Australian One Nation party (ON), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). These parties have been chosen because they share core similarities as parties; but also have important differences, as determined by a set of variables. The populist radical right parties each grew from centre-right liberal parties; they are both personal parties with hierarchical leadership styles; they are relatively new parties; and they were also both relatively successful in elections during the period of analysis. They also both operate in Western liberal democracies, but with different institutional structures and geopolitical contexts (such frequency of terrorist incidents). I suggest that by comparing the two, we can further the literature on populist radical right parties.

\textsuperscript{11} Moffitt.


\textsuperscript{13} De Cleen, in \textit{Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum}; De Cleen and Stavrakakis.
Examining the actual role of populism in populist radical right parties, as well as the potential ways these parties differ between Western liberal democracies, is both timely and essential. The continued success of populist parties generally has meant observers now regard them as “here to stay,”\(^\text{14}\) a seemingly permanent fixture of contemporary democracies.\(^\text{15}\) This permanence means we must strive to have a more well-rounded understanding of these parties, the role that populism plays in their agendas, and how they balance their populism with their other ideological leanings. Through understanding the extent to which populism plays a role in these parties, we can also have a better appreciation for what this permanency means for our democracies. Populist parties, for example, are often held as partly responsible for destabilising or threatening democracies.\(^\text{16}\) Certainly, populism’s anti-establishment ethos means that populist parties are necessarily anti-status-quo. They aim to alter the long-established power dynamics, putting into question the competencies (and sometimes also the morality) of those who have been in charge, and shaking up the normal ways of going about things. Populism is certainly regarded as a “departure from ‘normal’ politics.”\(^\text{17}\) This is in part why populist parties are criticised. These criticisms are varied. Some of this criticism rests on the notion that these parties provide simplicity when nuance is required, such as a propensity to “offer simple solutions to complex problems.”\(^\text{18}\) Other criticisms rest on the supposedly anti-democratic tendencies of populism (“populism, the very opposite of democratic politics”),\(^\text{19}\) its capacity to “easily lead to autocracy,”\(^\text{20}\) as well as its illiberalism.\(^\text{21}\) Trump in particular is seen as


\(^{18}\) Flinders.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Yu Keeping, in Keane et al.

\(^{21}\) Mounk.
 emblematic of these criticisms. Of course fears about the health of democracy are not new. But anti-political sentiment, partly characterised by a disenchantment and “disaffection” with both the political establishment and more broadly ‘normal politics,’ is said to be on the rise. As Corbett notes, there is no widely agreed upon root cause of this anti-politics. Is it an expectation ‘gap’ “between what people want and what the system of political institutions we have can provide,” or something inherent within democracy that is unable to be overcome, an expectation ‘trap’? But regardless of cause, it is true that there is now a perception that there is a significant disconnect between government (and its politicians) and the people that it is meant to serve. Populism has certainly thrived in this environment.

However, I contend that a central problem with some of the above criticisms of populism and the supposedly detrimental impact that populist parties have on democracies is a crucial misunderstanding of populism specifically, as well a potentially insufficient appreciation for populism’s actual role in so-called populist parties. For example, in populism’s association with the rise of the radical right, there is sometimes a blurring of the lines between populism and the ‘sets of ideas’ that belong to the radical right ideology specifically. This conflation has also occurred where the term ‘populist’ is sometimes used to describe the dangers that are posed specifically by authoritarian populist parties or the populist radical right parties. In the vein of De Cleen et al., it is crucial to emphasise that populism is not a “synonym” for the radical right or for nationalism, and any judgments about populism’s impact must be sure to better distinguish between the two. But conversely, normative discussions on populism should also strive to better understand the potentially symbiotic relationship populism itself has with

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25 Ibid.
27 As Halikiopoulou notes in the introduction to Bonikowski et al., 59. “According to Bonikowski, suggesting that populism is necessarily predatory on democratic institutions would entail conflating it with authoritarianism.” See, for example: Mounk.
28 De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon, 653.
the other (more extreme and potentially dangerous) ideas of these parties, namely nativism or authoritarianism. Specifically, the point that I would like to stress here is that any discussion on the impact that populist parties are actually having on democratic (in)stability or the threats that it poses to liberalism must also ascertain the potentially instrumental role that populism itself plays in the facilitation of a party’s other agendas (for example, its nativist anti-immigration agenda). I suggest that it is only then can observers arrive at a fair position regarding the normative dimensions of populist parties and the potential consequences that their long-term presence will have on democratic practice.

Aims

As Hawkins and Kaltwasser note, “those studying populism should make a greater effort to examine the other ideational components that are used by populist forces in the real world, and how those components interact with populism.” Drawing on their latter point, this thesis speaks directly to the need to better understand populist radical right parties, both the extent to which they are actually ‘populist,’ and the actual role populism plays in the facilitation of a party’s other agendas. In failing to appreciate how these parties operate, we risk misunderstanding not just the parties themselves, but also the people who are increasingly voting for them. And if these parties are now indeed a permanent feature of politics, then we also risk misunderstanding the state of our democracies more broadly.

As such, the thesis has one overarching aim: to better understand populist radical right parties. Through analysing the extent to which populist radical right parties are ‘populist’ and populism’s capacity to be utilised alongside particular ideologies to facilitate agendas, I suggest this is possible. I specifically want to understand the potentially symbiotic relationship between populism and the radical right ideology, and how the features work together to facilitate a party’s core political goals. With this aim in mind, it is important to acknowledge the limits of the thesis. The thesis does not attempt to provide a definitive explanation for how populist parties operate, or how and why populism’s presence in a party’s agenda or program might

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lead to electoral success. Nor does it aim to make absolute assertions about populism’s character and thus claim to suggest that, in assessing populism through the two features outlined, this is the only way to assess populism. Instead, what the thesis aims to achieve is to provide a fresh perspective on populist radical right parties, which in turn can contribute to a greater understanding of the degree to which a party is actually populist, and how populism itself facilitates a party’s other agendas.

**Research Questions**

To explore populism’s role in populist radical right parties, the thesis asks three research questions:

1. To what extent are populist radical right parties ‘populist’?
2. How is populism used alongside the radical right ideology to facilitate a party’s agenda?
3. How do populist radical right parties, and their respective utilisation of populism, differ between Western liberal democratic contexts?

These research questions deal with three interrelated issues related to the role of populism in populist radical right parties: the degree of its presence, how its presence intersects with the other ideologies of a party, and the extent to which to which populist radical right parties, and their utilisation of populist ideas, differ between countries.

Question one explores the extent to which populist radical right parties are actually populist, and as such it assesses the degree of populist ideas in the parties. The ideas, or features, whose presence I suggest determines the degree of populism are:

- An in-grouping and out-grouping process, between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite.’
- A propagation of crisis.\(^{31}\)

In assessing these features in populist radical right parties, the thesis draws on the important work on measuring the populism of political parties and leaders that has been conducted in

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\(^{31}\) Moffitt.
recent years. But where the antagonistic relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ is a feature which has often been used to assess the presence of populism, the presence of crisis themes is novel. I define and conceptualise ‘themes of crisis’ as a process of characterising society as in crisis and/or decline, and then attributing blame for this crisis or decline on an out-group, and suggest that its inclusion provides a crucial perspective on populist parties that has hitherto been missing in populism studies. While the relationship between crisis and populism has often been commented upon, it is also similarly under-explored. The relationship has been mostly confined to the demand side, specifically focused on its role in triggering the electoral success of populist parties, leaders or movements. When it has been examined from a supply-side perspective, this has only been done theoretically, for example Moffitt’s foundational work on crisis as an “internal” feature of populism, and more recently Stavrakakis et al.’s research on the issue of crisis in populist discourse. But the empirical study of the presence of crisis on the supply side of populism has not been conducted. It is my suggestion that through including crisis as a feature of populism and therefore assessing its presence in populist parties, we can better comprehend the extent to which populism itself is actually present in populist parties.

Alongside the in-grouping and out-grouping process between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ and themes of crisis, following in the ideational tradition I also contend that these populist features

37 Moffitt.
38 Stavrakakis et al.
must also be accompanied or attached to another ideology, a host ideology.\textsuperscript{39} Populism, therefore, “is one set of ideas amongst others,”\textsuperscript{40} and consequently is only one element amongst other ideological features that will make up a populist party’s agenda. As such, while it might be the most publicised attribute of the parties with which it is most commonly associated, it will not be their only attribute, or even their most important or influential.\textsuperscript{41} This issue is central to the analysis. Because populist parties will necessarily have more to them than just their populism, and that populism “rarely travel[s] alone,”\textsuperscript{42} it is important to understand the extent to which so-called populist parties actually balance their different ideas. Moreover, there has been a propensity towards overstating the actual ‘populism’ in parties described as populist, where a party’s other ideological features (say, nativism or socialism) will be just as or even more influential.\textsuperscript{43} As Hawkins and Kaltwasser point out, “when reading about contemporary populism, it sometimes seems that [it] is the central ideational feature of politics.”\textsuperscript{44} This concern is echoed in Rydgren’s analysis, where he suggests that despite the populist radical right being more prominently ‘radical right’, they are “increasingly” just called populist.\textsuperscript{45} Given this, it is important to more sufficiently understand the extent to which these parties are in fact ‘populist,’ compared to radical right, and ultimately have a better appreciation for the way that populist radical right parties balance their different agendas. If we fail to appreciate this, then we risk conflating a populist radical right party’s different ideological tenets. The result would be a mischaracterisation of both populism and the parties themselves, and ultimately a misunderstanding of what makes these parties successful.

Question two draws on the previous and explores how the process of in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ and themes of crisis manifest in relation to the other ideological features of a party. Specifically, how populism intersects and ‘interacts’ with a party’s radical right ideology.\textsuperscript{46} As the ideational approach attests, populism is only one aspect of a ‘populist’ party, and therefore they will have other agendas, prompted by their host ideology. I argue that to understand the extent to which a party is ‘populist,’ assessing the

\textsuperscript{39}See: Stanley.  
\textsuperscript{40}Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t,” 532.  
\textsuperscript{41}Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.; Rydgren.  
\textsuperscript{42}Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t,” 532.  
\textsuperscript{43}Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.; Rydgren.  
\textsuperscript{44}Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t,” 532.  
\textsuperscript{45}Rydgren, 1.  
\textsuperscript{46}Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t.”
degree to which the populist features are present compared to their host ideology is only one aspect. We must also understand the role that these features play in specific relation to its host ideology. For example, I suggest that themes of crisis play a central role in the propagation of antagonism between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ but also in generating a fertile environment for the facilitation of the ethno-cultural divisions necessary for nativism and the normalisation of authoritarian law and order policies. 47 As such, I argue that the assessment of themes of crisis can better elucidate the role that populism specifically plays in the broader agendas of a populist radical right party.

I also contend that an analysis of how the process of in-grouping and out-grouping is achieved under the populist radical right is required if we are to sufficiently understand both the extent to which a party is populist, and the way populism intersects with a party’s nativism. Following De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 48 I argue that we can attain a greater understanding of the populism of a populist radical right party through a more thorough interrogation of the way that the ‘people’ are constructed under the populist radical right. Specifically, we must discern between a people-centrism constructed through populism, “as underdog,” and a people-centrism constructed ethno-culturally and thus through nativism. 49 Moreover, it is important to determine which out-group is positioned in opposition to this in-group people-centrism. Specifically, either an ‘elite,’ suggesting a populist out-grouping, or a minority ethnic ‘other,’ suggesting a nativist out-grouping. If we fail to discern the difference between the two types of in-grouping and out-grouping, we risk ‘conflating’ a party’s populism with their radical right ideology. Therefore, in the vein of De Cleen, it is crucial to “disentangle” the concepts. 50 Through this ‘disentangling’ we can have a more sufficient understanding of the degree of populism in a populist radical right party, as well as the way that populist ideas intersect with nativist ones.

Finally, question three concerns a comparative analysis of populist radical right parties in different Western liberal democratic countries. It looks at the role that populism and the radical

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48 De Cleen, in *Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum*.; De Cleen and Stavrakakis.
49 De Cleen and Stavrakakis.
right ideology plays in these parties, how context might alter their use of populism, the radical right ideology, and micro policy-level issues. Much of the rise of the populist radical right has occurred within Western liberal democracies, therefore I suggest that understanding the way that populism manifests and is utilised by parties in different Western liberal democratic contexts is crucial. Moreover, a great deal of the literature on the populist radical right is derived from European cases, with relatively little comparative analysis conducted on Australian cases. I suggest that through comparing these case studies, ON and the PVV, there is opportunity to better understand the degree to which the populist radical right ideology manifests differently in parties in different countries, such as the extent to which a party is ‘populist’ or the way that their respective agendas are propagated. Through this, we can have a more well-rounded appreciation for the divergent ways these parties might situate themselves for electoral success, as well as widening the scope of the literature on the party family more broadly.

Context

The success of populist parties in recent years has meant that populism as a field of research has received significant attention.\(^{51}\) This research has done much to contribute to our understanding of populism as a concept, particularly as it has manifested in the parties most commonly associated with the term in the post-9/11 era. However, it is crucial to emphasise that prior to this recent scholarly interest, significant and important work was conducted on developing a conceptual framework for understanding populism, a framework that the more recent analyses of populism has since built upon. Indeed, much of the early literature on populism focused on understanding what populism actually is, as well as how to classify the term.\(^{52}\) As a result of this important early work, there is now a broad consensus within the literature on at least one defining feature. Namely, the antagonistic relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ or as Canovan puts it, “an appeal to ‘the people’ against…the established structure of power.”\(^{53}\) Other definitions might also include extra defining elements. For example, Mudde argues that the ‘people’ must be “pure” and the ‘elite’ “corrupt,” hence

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\(^{51}\) Rooduijn, 362.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

emphasising a moralistic dimension; Moffitt includes the necessary presence of “bad manners” and a “performance of crisis” in his definition, and some definitions also include the presence of a charismatic leader. But despite the considerable variation between these ‘extra’ aspects of the definitions of populism, central to all reputable definitions is this people/elite binary.

However, debate still continues regarding how to categorise populism. Despite considerable discussion within the literature on the issue of categorisation, there is no widely agreed-upon label. However, in recent times, the various labels attributed to the concept have divided into three camps. The first, and arguably most prominent, is the ideational tradition, which takes populism to be a thin-centred ideology. Followers of this approach, most notably Mudde, but also Stanley and March, argue that populism is an ideology, albeit one that is unable to provide a comprehensive worldview, and consequently it is ‘thin’ rather than ‘thick.’ The second camp combines the discourse and style approaches. As Moffitt notes, these approaches are different, but united in the sense that they perceive populism as a thing that is done. These approaches see populism as either a type of discourse or a “performative” style. Proponents of the former include—but are not limited to—Laclau, and more recently Aslanidis, with Moffitt and Tormey advocating for the latter. The third camp conceives populism as a political strategy, with Weyland a notable proponent. Those who follow the strategic approach focus their study (often taking place within a Latin American context) on three different dimensions of the strategy, including political organisation, mobilisation, and actual

54 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
57 See: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Stanley; March.
party policies.\textsuperscript{63} As Weyland notes, central to the strategic approach is a personalistic leader,\textsuperscript{64} with Levitsky and Roberts also reiterating this emphasis on organisation, stressing that populism is a “top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo.”\textsuperscript{65} For Weyland, conceiving of populism as a strategy is the best way “to do justice” to the relationship that exists between the ‘people’ and their ‘leader.’\textsuperscript{66} Moreover, the issue of power is central here. As Weyland argues, the ‘populist strategy’ contains the “methods and instruments of winning and exercising power.”\textsuperscript{67}

There has also been a move towards a more open take on classification within the literature, seen in the work of van Kessel and Engesser et al., which takes the various labels attributed to populism, such as those above, as not necessarily mutually exclusive descriptors.\textsuperscript{68} Instead, they represent the different epistemological approaches of researchers, as well as the different ways populism might manifest in practice.\textsuperscript{69} It is this approach, while relatively under-utilised in the study of populism, that this thesis adopts. I argue that this approach is beneficial as it provides the flexibility to combine the different theoretical traditions above and the methodological implications of these traditions in the assessment and evaluation of populism. In particular, this thesis draws from the ideational and discourse traditions, combining them to argue, following in the vein of Hawkins,\textsuperscript{70} that the thin-centred ideology of populism, with its people-centrism, anti-elitism and propagation of themes of crisis, is operationalised in practice through discourse.

\textsuperscript{63} Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, \textit{Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda} (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 2013), 10.

\textsuperscript{64} Weyland, “Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach,” in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Populism}, 55.

\textsuperscript{65} Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., \textit{The Resurgence of Latin American Left} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{69} See: van Kessel; Engesser et al.

\textsuperscript{70} Kirk A. Hawkins, \textit{Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Assessing populism

While there might not be total agreement in defining populism or how to categorise it, what these discussions have each achieved is to create a framework of theory which researchers can use to test and assess the presence of populism in populist parties, as well as in ‘non-populist’ parties to determine the degree to which populism is in the ‘mainstream.’ As Rooduijn notes, where early research on populism emphasised the need to more sufficiently define and conceptualise the term, as these discussions have grown and developed and we move towards a more concrete definition of the concept, recent research has shifted towards determining, measuring or assessing its presence. As such, what was once a relatively limited research area, assessing and measuring populism, and ‘testing’ populist parties, has received increased scholarly attention in recent years. As the only defining feature of populism on which there is considerable consensus, research on this often assesses the presence of people-centric and anti-elitist themes, and will therefore take these as indicative of a presence of populism. But other features may also be tested, as such as themes of popular sovereignty, and the simplicity of the language used. To assess these themes, researchers will use different methods and different sources. Both the measurement of discourse and the assessment of party manifestos have been proven effective in testing the presence of populism. In the discourse camp, early researchers on the topic, Jagers and Walgrave, measured the presence of populist discourse in Belgian political parties through party broadcasts, and Hawkins measured the presence of populist discourse in party speeches. More recently Oliver and Rahn used a content analysis to measure the populist discourse of seven primary campaigners for the 2016 United States presidential election, and Hawkins and Kaltwasser also measured populist discourse in the United States presidential election and compared it with Greece and Venezuela. Sitting within the discourse camp but assessing the manifestos of Great Recession movements rather than

71 March.
72 Rooduijn, 364.
73 Rooduijn and Pauwels, 1272.
74 See, for example: ibid.
75 March.
76 Oliver and Rahn.
79 Oliver and Rahn.
80 Hawkins and Kaltwasser, "Measuring Populist Discourse in the United States and Beyond."
speeches, Aslanidis also used a semantic text analysis to measure populist discourse in grassroots movements.\textsuperscript{81} Other research has used a political parties’ policy manifestoes to determine and measure their populism.\textsuperscript{82} For example, Rooduijn and Pauwels, again early researchers on the issue of measurement, used a content analysis to analyse manifestos of populist parties in Western Europe to determine their populism,\textsuperscript{83} where March used the manifestos of left- and right-wing populist parties in Britain to measure and compare their respective degrees and types of populism.\textsuperscript{84} Another variety of research has also focused on the issue of social media. For example, Esser et al. measured the presence of populism in Facebook posts and Twitter posts and compared it with that on televised talk shows,\textsuperscript{85} and Engesser et al. similarly measured the presence of populist statements by politicians on Facebook and Twitter.\textsuperscript{86}

\section*{Opportunity for a new perspective}

The above research, which has assessed the presence of populism in practice, has done much to develop our understanding of how populist themes, such as the ‘people’ versus ‘elite’ binary, are used by parties and the degree to which they are present. As a result, we have some understanding on a couple of key issues related to the assessment and measurement of populism. For example, the research has been able to determine that populist parties and leaders are, perhaps unsurprisingly, ‘more’ populist than non-populist parties and leaders.\textsuperscript{87} Other research suggests that a populist party’s populism is generally less prominent than their other host ideology,\textsuperscript{88} and there is some comparative data on the degree to which populism is more or less present in different countries.\textsuperscript{89} Yet, while this research has been crucial, I argue that it has only provided a partial illustration of the degree to which ‘populist’ parties are actually

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{81} Aslanidis, "Measuring Populist Discourse with Semantic Text Analysis: An Application of Grassroots Populist Mobilization."
\bibitem{82} Rooduijn and Pauwels.
\bibitem{83} Ibid.
\bibitem{84} March.
\bibitem{85} Nicole Ernst et al., "Populists Prefer Social Media over Talk Shows: An Analysis of Populist Messages and Stylistic Elements across Six Countries," \textit{Social Media & Society} 5, no. 1 (2019).
\bibitem{86} Engesser et al.
\bibitem{87} See: Rooduijn and Pauwels.; March.; Oliver and Rahn.
\bibitem{88} March.
\bibitem{89} See: Hawkins and Kaltwasser, "Measuring Populist Discourse in the United States and Beyond."
\end{thebibliography}
populist and the extent to which populism itself plays a role in the facilitation of a party’s other agendas. As Rooduijn notes, “when it comes to measuring populism, a lot of work still needs to be done.” In this vein, I propose that there is more to know in the field of assessing and measuring populism and that there are some gaps in the literature; gaps that once filled can provide a more well-rounded picture of the issue of evaluating populism and consequently populism’s presence in political parties.

Specifically, in relation to the degree of populism in a populist party, I suggest that the addition of crisis themes as an assessment tool of populism provides nuance to debates regarding the extent to which populism is actually present in a particular party. Where much of the research on evaluation and measurement has focused on the degree of people-centric and anti-elitist themes, the introduction of crisis here adds a new and unexamined dimension to understanding the extent to which populism is present. I also suggest that a greater discernment between an in-grouping and out-grouping constructed either as “underdog” or ethno-culturally aids in a more well-rounded understanding of the degree to which populism is present in populist radical right parties. Moreover, through analysing both this and crisis themes, we can have a greater comprehension of another key issue that requires further examination: how populism intersects with the other ideological features of a party. I suggest that through assessing how in-grouping and out-grouping and themes of crisis are used by populist parties in specific relation to their other non-populist features, we can better understand how a party’s broader agendas are promoted. Therefore, it is important to determine populism’s presence in these parties in and of itself, but also the way in which it is used to facilitate a party’s other ideological features, and thus the other non-populist agendas of a party. This is essential if we are to actually understand populism’s place in populist parties. In other words, it is not enough to know just the degree to which populism is present, we should also aim to better understand how it intersects with the other features of a party. Only then we can actually appreciate populism’s function within the parties that are most often associated with the term.

90 Rooduijn, 364.
91 De Cleen and Stavrakakis.; De Cleen, “The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
92 Hawkins and Kaltwasser, "What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t."
Methodology

To examine populism’s role in populist radical right parties, an applied theoretical examination took place, testing the theoretical framework against two case studies from the populist radical right party family, the Australian One Nation Party (ON), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). These parties were chosen because they share important similarities as parties, such as they each belong to the populist radical right party family;⁹³ they are personal parties with hierarchical leadership styles;⁹⁴ they have both stemmed from centre-right liberal parties; and they have each experienced relative electoral success during the period of analysis.⁹⁵ Moreover, they are both parties in Western liberal democracies, where much (but not all) of the rise of the populist radical right has occurred. But the parties were also chosen for their different contexts. Points of difference include, but are not limited to, Australia’s relative geographic isolation compared to the Netherlands, which could alter the discourse on immigration, and the different rates of Islamic terrorism incidents both within and in close proximity to each country, which in turn could change the discourse on the issue of Islam. These differences provide scope for fruitful insights into how seemingly similar populist parties might modulate and change their use of populism depending on their context.

The first step in the analysis of these parties was the development of a conceptual framework to test the case studies against. This framework drew on key literature on populism and political theory to define and conceptualise populism broadly, and the populist radical right specifically. From this framework, outlined in Chapters Two and Three, a codebook was created which was used to conduct the empirical analysis, to test and evaluate the theory. A multi-typological approach to conceptualising populism was also used, drawing on two approaches in particular: the ideational approach, and the discourse approach, arguing that the thin-centred ideology of populism is operationalised in practice through discourse. A combination of these two approaches was chosen for their shared utility in assessing the presence of populism, as

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evidenced by the previous discussion on assessing and measuring populism. The empirical analysis itself was undertaken in two stages and used a mixed quantitative and qualitative research method. It combined a quantitative content analysis (Stage One) and a qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis (Stage Two), with the two variables used to conduct the analysis. The first variable—the discourse of the leaders of populist radical right parties examined in this study, Pauline Hanson (ON) and Geert Wilders (PVV)—drew on the discourse approach and assessed the presence of people-centrism, anti-elitism and the ‘othering’ of a minority ethnic group, and the presence of crisis themed language in their speeches. Stage One of the analysis of this variable assessed the quantitative presence of these features, determining the degree to which these features are present. Stage Two of the analysis qualitatively determined the type of language used to construct the features, and the key themes in the speeches. This stage determined, amongst other issues, how the ‘people’ are constructed, and the crises used to facilitate and frame the leaders’ agendas. The second variable, party policies, drew on the thin-centred ideological tradition and assessed the presence of the populist radical right ideology and three other policy issues in the policy documents of each party. The categories of analysis were: nativism, authoritarianism, populism, socio-economic, socio-cultural, and ‘general’. These categories assessed the manner in which the parties each relied on their populist radical right ideology over other policy concerns, and how the parties differed on a policy level. Stage One quantitatively assessed the degree to which nativism, authoritarianism and/or populism is present within the policies of the parties, as well as the other policy categories. Stage Two qualitatively assessed the language used to deliver the policies, and other policy-level issues.

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96 This thesis uses Mudde’s influential work on the populist radical right party family. He defines the populist radical right ideology as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. See: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

97 The three sub-categories (socio-economic, socio-cultural, ‘general’) will only be coded as such if they do not draw on either nativism, authoritarianism, or populism. For example, a socio-economic policy that would be considered nativist economic, e.g., welfare chauvinism, will be coded as nativist. It will only assess economic policies that do not draw on the populist radical right ideology. The purpose of this is to determine the degree to which economic issues are in fact a “secondary” and “instrumental” issue for the party family, per Mudde. Similarly, I want to determine the degree to which the PRR influences socio-cultural issues, so analysing the degree and manner in which non-PRR socio-cultural issues are present in the document will aid in this. Moreover, the socio-cultural category can elucidate differences between the parties on a policy level. The ‘general’ category will assess the presence of policies that do not draw on any of the above, such as traditional public policy areas like healthcare or education.
For each case study, a contextualisation of the findings was conducted. This included a shorter analysis, using the same methodology as above, of two mainstream parties for each country. For Australia, the centre-left Australian Labor Party (ALP) and centre-right Liberal Party, as part of the Coalition with the National Party (LNP). For the Netherlands, the centre-left Labour Party (PvdA), and the centre-left People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). The purpose of this was not to conduct a comprehensive analysis of these parties’ populism or policies, but to provide a yardstick of ‘mainstream-ness’ to contextualise the findings from the case studies and to assess the case-study data against. A further contextualisation also took place through a discussion of three demand-side conditions for each case study’s country: first, the politics of immigration and integration; second, economic conditions; third, opinion-poll data on key issues.

Key Findings

The quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis of the case studies drew three significant findings. Firstly, the analysis found that the parties were predominantly nativist, following previous literature. However, it also found that populism itself played a fundamental and essential role in the facilitation of this nativism, with populism underpinning the broader agendas of each party. The more prominent role of nativism was evidenced by the findings from the discourse analysis, specifically the in-grouping and out-grouping index, as well as the policy variable. The qualitative stage of the discourse analysis found that both leaders constructed their people-centrism predominantly in an ethno-cultural manner, not along anti-elitist lines. While the construction of the ‘people’ as “underdog” against an obstructive elite was still relatively significant, suggesting that both leaders are indeed populist, the most prominent construction was one based around a Judeo-Christian in-group. As such, following De Cleen, there was a “multi-layered meaning of ‘the people’ (as underdog and as nation)” in both Hanson’s and Wilders’ discourse. Further, the quantitative stage of the discourse

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98 Mainstream is defined here as: “the electorally dominant actors in the center-left, center, and center-right blocs on the Left-Right political spectrum,” per Meguid. See: Bonnie M. Meguid, “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 358.
99 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
100 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
analysis found that the most frequent out-grouping was the ‘othering’ of an ethnic minority out-group. These were those who sat outside the Judeo-Christian identity, specifically Muslims. While still relatively prominent, the second out-grouping was against the ‘elite,’ thus indicating that nativism is more prominent than populism in the process of out-grouping for both leaders. Following in the spirit of De Cleen, this suggests that nativism was the primary driving force in their out-grouping process, not populism. These findings support recent literature that calls for a greater precision in the analysis of how the ‘people’ are constructed discursively, which in turn would allow for a stronger and clearer distinction between a party’s populism and their nationalism (or nativism). The policy variable also reflected the in-grouping and out-grouping discourse results. It found that nativism, rather than populism (or authoritarianism) was most prominent in both platforms of the parties.

But where nativism was more prominent, evidenced by the above, the role that populism itself played in the agendas of the parties should not be underplayed. Specifically, themes of crisis were crucial in the facilitation of the parties’ nativist agenda. Importantly, these themes functioned to facilitate the leaders’ respective in-grouping and out-grouping process, with the antagonism created through the crisis discourse creating division between the ‘people’ and the minority ethnic out-group, the ‘other.’ Themes of crisis were also essential in facilitating the antagonistic relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite.’ Moreover, while the in-grouping and out-grouping was primarily ethno-cultural, the anti-elitist out-grouping process was still relatively prominent. Together, these findings suggest that the function that populism itself plays within the agendas of the populist radical right should not be considered significantly subordinate to the party family’s nativism, but seen as an essential ingredient to the facilitation of the party family’s key agendas. It is also important to note that Hanson’s higher quantitative presence of crisis themes suggests that ON is somewhat more populist than the PVV. This, paired with her use of materialist concerns to criticise the ‘elites,’ described below, indicates a partially stronger reliance on populist themes than Wilders. This demonstrates that political context will alter a populist radical right party’s degree of populism.

Related to this, the second significant finding applies to the issue of crisis specifically. Both ON and the PVV were found to have a fundamental relationship to crisis on the supply side.

102 De Cleen and Stavrakakis.
103 De Cleen, “The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
The leaders utilised themes of crisis differently, with Hanson recording a higher quantitative presence of crisis, but Wilders using stronger, more intense crisis discourse, discovered in the qualitative stage. But despite this difference in method, the results indicate a shared fundamental supply-side presence of themes of crisis in the discourse of each of the leaders, in line with the literature.\textsuperscript{104} As Moffitt argues, crisis should be seen as an “internal” feature of populism, an argument that is supported by these findings.\textsuperscript{105}

The third and final key finding from the analysis concerns the populist radical right’s relationship to materialist and post-materialist concerns, in particular for one case study, ON. For example, the qualitative stage of the discourse analysis indicated that Hanson utilised socio-economic concerns in her propagation of themes of crisis to a high degree, in particular to facilitate her anti-immigrant, anti-Islam and anti-elitist agenda. Moreover, the party also had a relatively significant number of non-nativist economic policies in their platform. Together, these findings suggest that while socio-economic issues were essentially “instrumental” and “secondary” for the party, following the literature,\textsuperscript{106} the party is perhaps not entirely post-materialist in focus. Indeed, I argue that the party essentially balances materialist and post-materialist issues, somewhat challenging the predominant narrative that parties that belong to the populist radical right party family are predominantly post-materialist.\textsuperscript{107} In this sense, these findings also support the fact that ON should be considered somewhat more populist than the PVV, in that ON’s wide usage of materialist concerns, while mostly tied to nativism, were also used to criticise the ‘elites’ from a non-nativist perspective. This was not found in the PVV’s analysis, where much of Wilders’ anti-elitism was tied to immigration critiques.

\textbf{Contributions to the Literature}

This thesis contributes to the literature on populist parties and populism generally in four areas: the way that populism is used alongside other ideologies in populist parties; populism’s

\textsuperscript{104} Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}.
relationship to crisis; post-materialist and materialist issues within populist radical right parties; and finally, methodologies for studying populism.

Firstly, this thesis draws on the important literature on assessing and measuring populism, but in utilising a new means to assess its role (such as through themes of crisis) it a has provided a unique approach to understanding the extent to which populist radical right parties are actually ‘populist,’ as well as the way that populism is used to facilitate the broader radical right agendas of a party. Through this, it also contributes to the relatively limited literature on the way that populism ‘interacts’ with other ideologies, and that way that it is used to facilitate a party’s agenda. The thesis argues that while ON and the PVV are most prominently nativist, their respective populism should not be underplayed. The literature on the populist radical right emphasises that the parties are radical right first, and populist second. While the findings from the analysis do not contradict this, they do suggest that the degree to which populism facilitates the overall agendas of the party family is consequential and significant. The findings, outlined above, suggest that while nativism might be more prominent for both parties, their populism is a crucial ingredient in their overall agenda. This means that as we contemplate the consequences of the ongoing presence of populist parties in our democracies, we must not exaggerate populism’s influence, but nor should we underestimate the potential role that it plays in facilitating the agendas of the populist radical right, and thus the role that it plays in the party family achieving electoral success. Moreover, in analysing the way that the ‘people’ are constructed through qualitative analysis and quantitatively examining the presence of the ‘othering’ of a minority ethnic group (and comparing the presence of ‘othering’ with the presence of anti-elitism) this thesis contributes to the growing literature which seeks further discernment, particularly on a discursive level, between the populism and the nationalism (or nativism) of the populist radical right party family. As De Cleen notes, “the discursively constructed character of ‘the people’ has been and continues to be ignored or under theorised

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109 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
111 See: De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum; Rydgren.
in much academic work on populism."\textsuperscript{112} As such, this thesis goes some way in contributing to the literature on this issue.

The second contribution relates to the supply-side presence of crisis in populist radical right parties. While populism’s relationship to crisis is one that is often commented upon, it is similarly under-examined. The thesis is the first to empirically examine crisis as a supply-side feature of populism, an issue that has hitherto only been examined theoretically.\textsuperscript{113} As the findings suggest, the leaders each had a significant utilisation of themes of crisis in their discourse. It was also found that these themes were not used merely as an end in and of themselves, but that they played an integral role in each leader’s people-centrism, anti-elitism, and their ‘othering’ of a minority ethnic group. This suggests that crisis, far from being merely just an external trigger for populist success, is also a necessary mechanism utilised by the leaders to ‘perform’ and facilitate their agendas. This is in line with Moffitt’s work on the issue.\textsuperscript{114} The analysis of the crisis themes also found that ON, while definitely more nativist than populist, should be considered somewhat more populist than the PVV. Hanson recorded a high quantitative presence of crisis themes, suggesting a strong use of populism, and some of her materialist concerns were anchored in criticising the ‘elites’ specifically, and did not draw on her nativism. This suggests that context alters the degree to which a populist radical right party is populist, even if only slightly. In assessing the party’s crisis themes, this thesis was able to discern this difference between ON and the PVV. I also argue that the findings from the analysis of crisis in the discourse of the leaders provides an essential nuance to the normative discussions on the continued presence of populism and the long-term impact it might have on our democracies. The findings suggest that crisis-themed discourse is a significant feature of populism. I propose that given this, and with the continued presence of populism in democracies, we might see a consequential continued presence of crisis-themed discourse in our politics. Indeed, this means that crises might be brought into the consciousness of the electorates more frequently,\textsuperscript{115} and consequently, following Moffitt, that populism itself will

\textsuperscript{112} De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in \textit{Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum}, 20.

\textsuperscript{113} See: Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”; Stavrakakis et al.

\textsuperscript{114} Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”

act as a “trigger” for crises in society more broadly. The anti-status-quo nature of populism and the fact that crisis is a key supply-side issue for populists suggests that this might be so. This adds another layer to the normative discussions on populism. As Kosselleck argues, crises are a “transition towards something better or worse or towards something altogether different.” This means that this could be good or bad for democracy, depending on one’s opinion on the status quo. It might provide positive opportunities for renewal and change. Or, in contrast, the possibility for the constant propagation of crisis in political discourse could be considered too great a threat to the continued stability of democratic systems of government.

The third contribution relates to the issue of materialist concerns for populist radical right parties. Previous research has emphasised that socio-economic concerns are an “instrumental” and “secondary” consideration for the parties. As such, the populist radical right are considered primarily post-materialist in focus, while left-wing populists are regarded as more concerned with materialist issues. But while the findings generally conform to the first point, specifically the economy’s instrumental nature, they somewhat gives pause in considering the second point, that the populist radical right are primarily post-materialist. Specifically, Hanson and ON used both materialist and post-materialist crises to frame and ground her anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-elite agenda. Wilders and the PVV, in contrast, used primarily post-materialist issues, namely the issue of identity. These findings suggest that further research is needed on how populist radical right parties differ between contexts, particularly in the antipodes where the party family remains relatively under-examined from a comparative perspective. It also suggests that the use of crisis as a means of assessment of populism was an effective means to recognise how a populist radical right party family might modulate their framing of key issues, depending on issue salience in their particular context, as well as the degree to which a party is indeed ‘populist.’

The fourth and final contribution relates specifically to methodology. The examination contributes to the relatively limited number of comparative studies of European populism and

116 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
118 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
119 Mudde and Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America.”
120 March.
populism in the antipodes. Because much of the important theoretical and empirical literature on the populist radical right is derived from European cases, I argue that there is scope for broadening our understanding of each phenomenon and challenging our preconceived notions on each through including and comparing data from an Australian case. For example, I contend that the choice of testing an Australian case against a European case was effective in unpacking the way in which materialist issues are used to facilitate the populist radical right agenda. It suggests that the populist radical right will modulate their specific crisis themes to issues salient to their given political context. Therefore, in better understanding the way that this plays out, we can also better understand how the populist radical right position itself for success in different contexts. The thesis also provides methodological contributions related to the codebook. Being the first of its kind to empirically examine crisis on the supply side, the codebook provides a framework for future examinations of the presence of crisis on the supply side of populism. Moreover, the mixed quantitative and qualitative method was also proven to be effective in assessing the given research goals. For example, it was able to discern a people-centrism constructed ethno-culturally, but also determine quantitatively which out-group was more prevalent. Similarly, the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods allowed the study to decipher the different ways the crisis manifested for each case study (i.e., more frequently used versus stronger language).

**Thesis Outline**

The thesis proceeds after this introductory chapter with six chapters, finishing with a brief concluding chapter. Chapter Two, titled *Conceptualising populism*, constitutes part one of the framework for analysis of the two case studies. It firstly makes the argument for a multi-typological approach to conceptualising populism, proposing that the various labels attributed to populism, such as ideology, discourse and strategy, are not mutually exclusive, but represent the various ways populism can manifest in democracy and the particular epistemological approaches of the given researcher.\(^{121}\) In conceptualising populism in the abstract, the chapter draws on the ideational tradition, favoured by Mudde and Stanley.\(^{122}\) This is also drawn on methodologically to assess the presence of the populist radical right in the policies of the case

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121 Engesser et al.; van Kessel.
studies in Chapters Five and Six. The second section of the chapter outlines my definition of populism: a process of in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’; and a reliance on themes of crisis, per Moffitt. These necessarily exist alongside a host ideology, which serves to provide the content of these features, per the ideational tradition. The presence of the case studies’ host ideology, the radical right, also results in an extra out-grouping process, that of a minority ethnic group. The presence of this extra group, termed the ‘other,’ is also assessed.

Chapter Three, titled Assessing populism and the populist radical right ideology, constitutes part two of the framework for the analysis. It firstly outlines the theoretical tradition of the discourse approach to conceptualising populism, drawing in particular on Laclau. It also makes the argument that the discourse approach is an effective way to assess the presence of the aforementioned features in the case studies at hand, through assessing how the features have manifested in the discourse of the party leaders. The second section of the chapter outlines the different ways populism can manifest in practice, depending on the host ideology. In particular, it focuses on the populist radical right, the host ideology of the case studies. Drawing on Mudde, I argue that this ideology is a combination of populism with nativism and authoritarianism. A brief discussion on populism as it manifests on the left and the centre also takes place, for the purpose of comparison.

Chapter Four, titled Methodology: A multi-typological, mixed-method approach, outlines the methodological framework used to analyse the case studies, as described on page 26. Chapter Five, titled Case Study One: One Nation, outlines the results from the first empirical examination of the case studies, One Nation. A contextualisation of the findings also takes place, through a discussion on three demand-side conditions: a history of the politics of immigration in Australia; economic conditions in areas with One Nation candidates for the election, and opinion-poll data from the Australian public on key issues for the party. The results from examination of ON found that ON is predominantly a nativist party, but it also had a strong and distinct presence of populism, with high rates of crisis discourse. It also found that

123 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
124 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
126 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
the party balances their materialist and post-materialist concerns, rather than being essentially post-materialist in nature. Hanson utilised materialist problems, like the supposed detrimental impact of immigration on the economy and standards of living, to facilitate her anti-Islam and anti-elite agenda. She also used post-materialist issues like identity to achieve the same goals. This, paired with a relatively high presence of socio-economic policies in the party’s policy document, suggests that ON are not entirely post-materialist in focus and that materialist concerns are relatively important to the party.

Chapter Six, titled Case Study Two: The Party for Freedom, outlines the results from the second empirical examination, the Party for Freedom. As with Chapter Four, a contextualisation of the findings also takes place, through a discussion on three demand-side conditions: a history of the politics of immigration and integration in the Netherlands; economic conditions in areas with a high vote-share for the PVV, and opinion-poll data from the Dutch public on key issues for the party. The results from the analysis of the PVV found that the party generally conform to the literature on the party family. The PVV is primarily nativist. However, themes of crisis were a central means with which Wilders framed and grounded his nativist agenda. Moreover, Wilders primarily used post-materialist, identity-based crisis issues to propagate his anti-Islam, anti-elite agenda, rather than materialist issues.

Chapter Seven, titled Significant findings, details the key comparative findings from the empirical examination, described in detail above. The thesis concludes with a brief concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, which summarises the key issues drawn from the analysis, outlines the central contributions to the literature, and makes recommendations for future research.

**Concluding Remarks**

This thesis explores the role that populism plays in the political parties that are most commonly associated with the term, with a specific focus on the populist radical right party family. As observers and scholars contemplate the ongoing presence of both populist parties generally and populist radical right parties specifically, and the impact that their continued presence might

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127 Mudde and Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America."
128 Ibid.
have on democratic practice, it is essential that we understand the extent to which these parties are indeed ‘populist,’ but also the actual role their populism plays in facilitating the party family’s agendas. This thesis, which empirically examines these issues, goes some way in contributing to our knowledge on this important topic. Together, the findings from the analysis provide a fresh perspective on the features that constitute populism, the role that populism plays in populist parties, as well contributing to a more sufficient understanding of populist parties specifically, and the mapping of the way the populist radical right party family manifests differently depending on context.
Chapter Two: Framework for analysis, part one - Conceptualising populism

This chapter discusses the theoretical foundations for my conceptualisation of populism. It also constitutes part one of the framework for the analysis of the case studies, One Nation and the Party for Freedom, with the following chapter constituting part two of the framework. These chapters have been divided between discussing populism in the abstract, and then discussing populism as it is enacted in practice, through discourse and alongside the radical right ideology. This chapter proceeds in two sections. Firstly, it makes the argument that the most appropriate way to categorise the concept of populism is through a flexible, multi-typological approach. This approach, which follows in the vein of van Kessel and Engesser et al., argues that the various labels so far attributed to populism (such as ideology, discourse, style, strategy or logic) and the theoretical traditions that follow them are not mutually exclusive and in fact represent the different ways populism can manifest in practice, as well as the particular epistemological approaches of the researchers. I argue that combining two approaches in particular is advantageous to the research purposes of this thesis. The first, outlined in detail below, is the ideational tradition that argues that populism is an ideology, albeit a thin-centred one that is unable to provide a complete worldview. From this perspective, I conceptualise and unpack the features that make up populism, also outlined below. I also draw on this approach to test the presence of the populist radical right ideology in the policy documents of the case studies.

The second approach utilised in the thesis is the discourse approach, to be described in detail in the following chapter. The discourse approach, which takes populism to be a form of discourse, one which is “predicated” on the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, is utilised to conceptualise and assess another way populism can be operationalised in practice: through the discourse of the leaders of the case-study parties.

The second section of the chapter concerns my definition of populism. I argue that it has two constituent features: a process of in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people’ and an ‘elite’; and a reliance on themes of crisis, drawing on the work of Moffitt. Importantly,

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129 van Kessel; Engesser et al.
130 See: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.; Stanley.
132 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”
following the ideational tradition, because of its thin nature populism will also necessarily be attached to a host ideology. For the case studies at hand, this ideology is the radical right, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. In short, however, this research follows Mudde who argues that the populist radical right is a combination of “nativism, authoritarianism and populism,” with nativism the primary feature.\textsuperscript{133} I also argue that the presence of this ideology with populism results in an extra out-grouping process, which I refer to as ‘othering’. As such, this thesis takes the position that populism is a thin-centred ideology and discourse whereby a political actor, party or movement will divide society between an in-group, the ‘people,’ and an out-group, the ‘elite’ (with the potential ‘othering’ of another out-group); and propagate themes of crisis. It will also exist alongside a host ideology that provides subject and content for its political pursuits.

I argue that analyses of these interconnecting features against the case studies achieves three goals. Firstly, through testing the presence of crisis themes and the manner in which the case studies each construct their in-grouping and out-grouping, I am able to determine the degree of populism present in the case studies, and how these features work alongside the radical right ideology. Secondly, through testing the theory and literature outlined to follow the analysis contributes to furthering the theoretical understanding of the populist radical right party family specifically. In particular I want to determine two specific issues related to our theoretical and empirical understanding of the populist radical right. The first is the degree to which crisis is an “internal” feature of the party family, per Moffitt.\textsuperscript{134} This thesis is the first of its kind to empirically analyse the supply-side nature of crisis and populism, and will thus go some way towards filling the gap in the literature in this research area. The second issue relates to the way each party constructs their in-group and the degree to which they out-group either the ‘elite’ or the extra out-group, the ‘other.’ In elucidating the degree to which each party prioritises either their populism or their nativist ideology to construct their in-grouping and out-grouping and thus divide society, this thesis will contribute to the growing literature on the potential need to distinguish more fully between a people-centrism constructed along populist lines, and one constructed ethno-culturally.\textsuperscript{135} Third, and relatedly, it will reveal how the operationalisation

\textsuperscript{133} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}.

\textsuperscript{134} Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."

\textsuperscript{135} See: De Cleen and Stavrakakis.; De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in \textit{Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum}; De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon.; Rydgren.
of populism, in particular as it manifests alongside a radical right ideology, is influenced by geographical and political context.

**Typologising the Concept of Populism**

*Argument for a multi-typology approach*

While there is some overlap between definitions of populism, such as the aforementioned people-centric/anti-elitism binary, many definitions tend to diverge at the point of categorisation and typology. As a result, despite attempts by researchers to provide a definitive label, there is no widely agreed upon way of classifying populism. There are several ways to categorise the concept, with the thin-centred ideology approach arguably the most dominant, described in detail below. Along with ideology, populism has also been understood to be a style, as seen in Moffitt and Tormey’s work, a logic and a discourse, as seen in the work of Laclau, and a strategy as seen most prominently within the Latin American context. As such, despite the general dominance of the ideational tradition, there is still incongruity within populism studies on how to label and categorise the term. I hold that one unintended result of this debate is a confusion amongst public and lay understandings of an increasingly important political concept. However, this is not inevitable and can be overcome through rethinking both the labelling process and the way populism itself is conceptualised. I propose that a solution to this is to utilise the aforementioned multi-typology approach of populism, one that takes the above divergent labels of populism as not necessarily mutually exclusive. Instead, these labels actually represent the different aspects of populism’s character and the divergent ways that it can manifest in democracies. The multi-typology approach I propose, while generally underutilised in populism studies, draws from previous work conducted by van Kessel, as well as Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson. Their respective research frames populism as having the potential to exist in many forms and categories, depending on the context, actor or

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136 Moffitt and Tormey.
138 Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept. Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics."
139 van Kessel.
circumstance. As Engesser et al. note, the labels that scholars have utilised to describe populism merely reflect the different stages of populism, the different ways it manifests in democracies, and the differing epistemological approaches of its authors.\(^{141}\) My specific combination of the ideational and discourse approaches also follows Hawkins, who argues that populism as ideology is disseminated through discourse,\(^{142}\) although I diverge from Hawkins in arguing that the other labels are equally correct in different research contexts. As such, the thesis argues that in taking populism as a thin-centred ideology, it represents what constitutes populism’s features, then as a discourse, it is one way of communicating and operationalising these features.

“The label debate,” which I contrast with a multi-typology methodology, broadly concerns the various debates on the categorisation of populism. Each of the analyses that have emanated from the label debate has done much to unpack the peculiarities of the populist character. However, I propose that despite the value of these studies in building a strong foundation for interpreting populism, collectively they have also inhibited the development of workable theories with potential for practical application. Across epistemological divides there has been a lack of consensus about what form populism takes, and the aforementioned theorists have a tendency to frame and then compartmentalise populism within their own sets of essential categories that then veer off into isolated directions. With reluctance to draw on the ideas of others, the work of one theorist can often tend to focus on discounting the conclusions of another. The result is for theories of populism to be entrapped in contentious debates about how to fix and name the phenomenon, and with this a related problem has arisen over a perceived lack of clarity. This is outlined by van Kessel, who claims that much of the apparent vagueness surrounding populism’s nature stems from the fact that even when a clear definition is provided, researchers are imprecise in their application of the concept.\(^{143}\) If the purpose of labelling populism as ‘this’ or ‘that’ is to develop a greater understanding of the character of populism itself and, more broadly, the way populism functions within democracies, then we should refrain from dogmatism and simplification by being open to varied and different epistemological approaches used by other researchers. In other words, by remaining too rigidly in one camp—for example, purely the ideational approach—there is a risk of potentially being cornered into that specific camp’s ideas alone, meaning we could lose much of the important

\(^{141}\) Ibid., 1280.
\(^{142}\) Hawkins, *Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*.
\(^{143}\) van Kessel.
and varied analyses done by researchers who conform to approaches that sit outside our own. However, this is not simply a plea for greater academic fellowship and cooperation; there are practical reasons why overly rigid labelling becomes potentially unworkable. The process of over-labelling has a tendency to blind observers to subtle shifts and nuances, to shifts in the lived and evolving forms of political movements. In other words, over-labelling can lead to over-simplifications, while lack of clarity over how to understand populism inhibits the possibility of developing a practical tool for comprehending populist agendas. I contend that this is risky, in that we are possibly condemning ourselves to an incapacity for recognising when populism arises in ways that sit outside our restrictive categorisation. It is thus restrictive not just in its inability to draw from other epistemological approaches, as outlined below, but in its inability to conceive of populism in transformative and new ways. A multi-typological approach, which does not dismiss any of the labels hitherto attributed to populism and is thus conversely open to new ways of conceptualising the concept, is able to allow for the latter and any transformations populism may take in the future. I thus contend that a clearer, more widely accessible and flexible understanding of populism is possible. But what is needed is a method agile enough to appreciate what falls outside existing categories, one sensitive to the evolving forms of populist movements as they operate in the context of a lived politics.

The multi-typology method allows for the incorporation of the varied and important work hitherto conducted on populism regardless of its epistemological origins. As has been noted, this research draws in particular from the theoretical and empirical traditions of the ideational and discursive approaches. This is not to dismiss the validity of other approaches. Indeed, as I have outlined, these labels merely reflect particular epistemological approaches and the particular context in which populism manifests. But given the focus of this thesis—on populism’s constituent features and how these features are operationalised in the discourse of populist leaders and the policies of the parties—the two aforementioned approaches are most applicable in the context of this research. Thus, while my research follows the ideational tradition when discussing what constitutes populism, it also draws from the theoretical roots of the discourse/logic approach when it utilises Schmitt’s writing on the friend/enemy distinction.144 Schmitt’s work provides crucial theory to elucidate the dynamic between the

144 Chantal Mouffe’s work has been influential on populism research that sits within the discourse camp. Mouffe’s work draws heavily on Schmitt, where she, following Schmitt, argues that conflict is the ontological condition of the political. Schmitt’s belief that the political sphere is inherently antagonistic led him to conceive ‘the political’ in terms of the friend/enemy distinction, discussed in detail in the body below. He saw this as defining all political relationships.
The populist construction of ‘the people’ and their relationship to out-groups—the ‘elites’ and the ‘other.’ Furthermore, the empirical work in this thesis rests on assessing the degree to which the populist features of in-out groupings and crisis manifest in the discourse of speeches of populist leaders, thus analysing populism as discourse, again drawing from the discursive approach. This method, therefore, acknowledges that there are concrete limitations in conceiving populism as wholly falling into one category or another, and that utilising work from various camps can provide significant benefits to both theoretical and empirical studies. Indeed, many of the weaknesses or limitations of each approach that scholars have noted (see Moffitt and Tormey)\(^\text{145}\) stem from an attempt to confine ‘populism’ within one classification.

That is not to say that there are not hurdles in combining the different approaches to populism. While across the label divide there is agreement on populism’s core features, there remains significant differences between the two approaches in question. These differences are informed by the different ontological and epistemological positions of those who work under the different banners. Most notably, where the ideational approach posits that populism is an attribute,\(^\text{146}\) the discourse approach sees populism as a practice,\(^\text{147}\) something that is ‘done’,\(^\text{148}\) Some important issues result from this different position. The first is that, within ideational approaches populism, as a fixed attribute, is framed in binary-oppositional terms—you are populist or you are not populist.\(^\text{149}\) Whereas, from a discourse perspective, a party or leader’s populism can be measured along a gradational scale. As something that is ‘done’, it can be ‘done’ to a lesser or greater extent. The second related issue is that in conceiving populism as something fixed, then the types of actors, parties or movements that are studied under the ideational tradition are necessarily going to more limited than an approach that takes that populism can manifest to differing degrees in actors perhaps not generally considered ‘populist.’\(^\text{150}\) In other words, an approach which sees populism as something ‘done’ means that populism can be ‘done’ by any actor or party, and thus examining populism is not restricted to parties that are already considered ‘populist’. This also means, as Moffitt notes, that those

\(^{145}\) Moffitt and Tormey.
\(^{149}\) Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism," 53.
\(^{150}\) Moffitt, Populism.
researching under the ideational banner tend to focus on populist actors, and tend to be empirically focussed. In contrast, discourse approaches are more theoretically minded, and with their broader focus, tend to be populism focused. Together, it means that efforts to combine the approaches need to take a flexible approach to the binary/gradational divide, and the resulting methodological implications. I suggest that, while important, these differences can be overcome in pursuit of an approach which accepts that populism can mean different things to different actors in different contexts, following van Kessel.\textsuperscript{151} In other words, in taking a multi-typological approach, it opens up the possibility that an actor can \textit{be} populist, per the ideational tradition, but a different actor can also use populism to a greater or lesser degree, per the discourse approach. For example, van Kessel advocates for a framework of populism that incorporates the idea of it being both an ideology and a discourse, depending on circumstances and levels of abstraction, arguing that it is certainly “most fruitful to be open to the idea that populism can manifest itself as a more loosely applied discourse, as well as an essential feature of certain populist politicians and parties.”\textsuperscript{152} In this vein, then, some actors can exhibit consistent and high levels of populism, and thus could be considered ‘populist,’ but similarly, some actors may utilise elements of populism to a greater or lesser degree during different times, and thus may be only partly populist during a given period, as measured along a continuum. This approach hopes to reflect recent literature on the topic, seen in both Moffitt’s\textsuperscript{153} and Aslanidis’ work,\textsuperscript{154} as well as the work of Bonikowski and Gidron,\textsuperscript{155} which emphasises the need to acknowledge the gradational character of populism itself, but which also acknowledges the point highlighted by van Kessel that some political parties are consistently populist and thus can be labelled as such.\textsuperscript{156} As such, this approach avoids the wholly insufficient conclusion drawn from a purely ideational research method that posits populism in a binary-oppositional relation with ‘the rest,’ which necessarily precludes analyses into the ways in which traditionally non-populist actors may utilise populist discourse.

A multi-typology approach can provide a framework that avoids the more cumbersome aspects of the label debate by reaching out to a range of populism studies, whilst still providing a

\textsuperscript{151} van Kessel. Van Kessel 2014
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism."
\textsuperscript{154} Aslanidis, "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and New Perspective."
\textsuperscript{156} van Kessel.
thorough and fresh perspective on how to better understand the concept, and as a result better understand how populist actors position themselves to get the effective leverage with their projected constituents. Far from detracting from any definitional precision, I argue that this method for conceiving populism is able to provide a more thorough engagement with the divergent strands of populism that have emerged and are continuing to emerge across the world in various democracies. In this spirit, and with the above benefits in mind, I contend that the utilisation of the multi-typology approach will lead to a clearer and more adaptable understanding of a topic whose core ideas, I argue, have thus far been obscured by too much debate amongst expert researchers on categorisation, which has resulted in a confusion amongst a lay public.

*The ideational approach*

This chapter, which details how to conceptualise and define populism, is looking at populism as a set of ideas and concerns itself with the characteristics that make up the concept. In this respect, I argue that utilising the ideational approach is the most appropriate means to achieve this. It draws from the ideational tradition in that it understands populism to have components that constitute a particular way of conceiving the political world; and that populism requires another host ideology to fill in the subject of its political preferences and antagonisms. Thus, the characteristics highlighted above and described in more detail below reflect populism in its ideational form, as a thin-centred ideology.

The concept of thin and thick ideologies was a concept initially developed by Freeden, and applied to populism by the likes of Mudde and Stanley. Where thick or comprehensive ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, consist of core features that are “unique to itself alone,” and are able to “provide a reasonably broad, if not comprehensive, range of answers to the political questions that societies generate,” thin ideologies are incapable of doing so. Examples of thin ideologies include feminism or ecologism. As Freeden notes, thin-centred

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159 Stanley.
160 Freeden, "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?,” 750.
ideologies contain: “…a structural inability to offer complex ranges of argument, because many chains of ideas one would normally expect to find stretching from the general and abstract to the concrete and practical, from the core to the periphery, as well as in the reverse direction, are simply absent.”161 The thin-centred ideological tradition of populism, favoured by Mudde and others,162 follows in this vein. It takes that populism is an ideology, but a ‘thin’ one. From this perspective, populism’s ability to “convey a particular way of construing the political in the specific interaction of its core concepts”163 means that it should be considered an ideology. But where the core concepts of ‘thick’ ideologies, such as the above, are able to provide “programmatic” and “coherent” answers to political questions, populism and other ‘thin’ ideologies are unable to do so.164 In other words, it is populism’s inability to singularly inform or fill in the content of its particular interpretation of the political sphere that makes it ‘thin’.

But irrespective of this thinness, I follow Canovan who once noted that populism is the ideology of democracy,165 in arguing that to deny that populism is an ideology is to deny that it contains within it a distinct way of conceiving the political sphere—that the people are the true democrats who have been increasingly divorced from the goings on within their own democracies. This conception of the political, while unable to provide a completeness of worldview in the fashion of comprehensive ideologies, is still pronounced enough to provide an anchor to which populist parties can root and ground their respective motivations and antagonisms, as per their host ideology. This worldview and the ideas associated with it—specifically the people/elite binary—are at the heart of populism as thin-centred ideology. Through conceiving of ideas, we construct a way of understanding the world in which we live. As Stanley notes, this ideational approach involves the intersection of ideas with action, and with the necessary correlation between “having ideas” and “interpreting the world.”166 As he states: “If ideas are individual interpretations, ideologies are interpretive frameworks that emerge as a result of the practice of putting ideas to work in language as concepts.”167 Populism,

161 Ibid.
162 Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," 543. See also: Stanley.: March.
163 Stanley, 95.
164 Ibid.
166 Stanley, 98.
167 Ibid.
in these terms, is a set of ideas that constructs and expresses a specific understanding of the political.\textsuperscript{168} However, it cannot exist as a stand-alone ideology. Its core features are able to project a notion of the political and a framework for understanding the world, but these core features do not provide answers to actual political problems,\textsuperscript{169} whereas ideologies such as socialism can provide a comprehensive worldview that attempts to solve political issues. However, as Stanley has contended, populism should still be regarded as an ideology, albeit a thin one, because while its core features do provide a (limited) distinct political worldview, that worldview is unable to provide answers to distinct issues. Its thin nature means populism can also cohabitate with other, ‘thicker,’ more comprehensive ideologies. This research directly draws on this idea, elaborated to follow, by acknowledging that while populism indeed has core features—its in-out grouping and its reliance on crisis—these features are content-less without a host ideology to fill in the subject matter. This is why populism, whilst most often associated with the far right in the United States, parts of Europe and Australia, can also belong to the far left as exemplified in Latin America, and other parts of Europe such as Spain or Greece. Whilst the core features of populism remain the same, it is ideologically morphological.\textsuperscript{170} It is its thin nature that directly facilitates this.

There has been considerable debate about the merits of labelling populism as a thin-centred ideology. For example, Freedden himself has recently questioned his original thin-centred thesis’s applicability to populism.\textsuperscript{171} For Moffitt, at the heart of its inapplicability is its “methodological inconsistencies” deriving from its “you are populist or you are not” construction.\textsuperscript{172} He also claims that Freedden’s attempt to distance his own thin-natured ideological thesis from populism is a “damning rebuke” of the approach as a whole.\textsuperscript{173} Indeed, there are reasons to re-analyse the approach. But rather than discarding it altogether, as Moffitt and others would have,\textsuperscript{174} I argue that it should instead be a catalyst for reconceptualising the ideological approach: to incorporate, in other words, a more flexible take on typology and thus understanding that a conceptualisation of populism as ideology merely represents a specific

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{168} Ibid., 95.
\bibitem{169} Ibid.
\bibitem{170} Ibid.
\bibitem{172} Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism," 53.
\bibitem{173} Ibid.
\bibitem{174} See also: Aslanidis, "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and New Perspective."
\end{thebibliography}
aspect of populism (its worldview), and that populism’s other conceptualisations (as style, discourse, strategy, or logic) reflect the myriad other ways populism can manifest in democracies.\textsuperscript{175} Indeed, Freeden himself claims that “the usual perspectives on populist ideology are not incorrect, but they require refinement.”\textsuperscript{176} I contend that the multi-typological approach is the refinement it requires to remain a suitable and beneficial framework for conceptualising populism. As briefly outlined above and per van Kessel, in taking that populism can be an ideology, and thus an actor can be labelled populist or not-populist, as well as a discourse, and thus be something that is used to a greater or lesser degree by populist or non-populist, we can overcome what is, I argue, the ideational approach’s biggest flaw—its binary nature. The result is that this thesis can incorporate the important work already done on populism in the ideational tradition, but also acknowledge an important point: that populism, as a discourse, can be gradational rather than situated in a binary-oppositional structure.\textsuperscript{177} This gradational point allows for a more robust analysis of the operationalisation of populism within democracies, because it opens up a space for including actors who are to some degree populist, but who may fall out of the more rigid categories. By acknowledging this aspect of populism, we can conduct an analysis of specific variables to evaluate the degree to which political actors utilise features of populism. Through this multi-typological method, we can retain many of the benefits of the ideological approach, but also acknowledge its limitations.

The specific framework of populism that I propose consists of two interconnected features, which both necessarily work alongside the given host ideology of the actor, party or movement. These are: the in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people,’ the ‘elite’ (and in the case of the populist radical right, another ‘other’);\textsuperscript{178} and propagation of themes of crises.\textsuperscript{179} These features work in symbiosis. For example, where crisis enables the creation and facilitation of the in-grouping and out-grouping, the host ideology will dictate how and why a populist actor may utilise a specific type of crisis for such ends. The proceeding sections will discuss each of the two features: the way in-grouping and out-grouping works under populism, and its relationship to crisis, as well as the role played by the host ideology.

\textsuperscript{175} Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson.
\textsuperscript{176} Freeden, “After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,” 2.
\textsuperscript{177} Moffitt, “The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism,” 56.
\textsuperscript{178} I draw on Mudde for this people/elite binary, but have not included his moral dimension (i.e., the ‘people’ are pure, the ‘elite’ corrupt) for my definition of populism. This is because I do not regard it as absolutely constitutive of all types of populism, for example left-wing populism.
\textsuperscript{179} Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”
Populism’s Features

Despite populism having long been a presence within democratic politics, as with many political terms, an absolute definitive consensus on what populism actually is has not materialised. However, most definitions of the term agree that for populism to be populism it must have at least two attributes: it must advocate on behalf of ‘the people,’ and rally against an elite establishment who are obstructing the people from obtaining their political preferences. This is often described as people-centrism and anti-elitism, respectively. This research builds on these two ideas to argue that while populism indeed contains both people-centric and anti-elitist foci, it also has another necessary element, which should not be overlooked if populism is to be adequately understood. Specifically, a fundamental relationship to themes of crisis. This follows Moffitt, who argues that crisis is an “internal” feature of populism. Moreover, as I have noted, the presence of a host ideology will influence how these features operate. It will, I argue, influence what fills in the content of these features (for example, the type of crisis that is articulated), with the presence of a host ideology providing the locus of the given actor, party or movement’s political desires, motivations and antagonisms. Importantly for the context of this research, which is analysing populism as it manifests on the radical right, it also means that there is likely to be another out-group positioned in opposition to the ‘people,’ which I refer to as the ‘other’. Indeed, this out-group might even feature more prominently than their anti-elitist out-group, suggesting populism specifically may be less influential than the presence of their host ideology for a given party.

The degree to which this is true for the case studies at hand will be assessed in the empirical examination.

In-grouping and out-grouping

181 Bonikowski and Gidron, "Multiple Traditions in Populism Research: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis."
182 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
183 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
Political identities will always rely on the construction of in-groups and out-groups for their respective political processes. Under populism, the process of in-grouping and out-grouping is widely considered to be between a ‘people’ centric in-group and an ‘elite’ out-group, with the antagonistic relationship between the two groups crucial here. Indeed, per the populist mentality, the ‘people’ are characterised as inherently good, against a bad ‘elite’ who are characterised as obstructing the ‘people’s’ true political preferences. As I have noted, while definitions of populism tend to vary between the literature, and some may contain extra constituent features in addition to this (such as in this thesis), the closest we have to a consensus on a definition lies here at the people/elite nexus.

Before I engage with who and what actually constitutes these in-groups and out-groups in more detail, it is important to unpack this binary mentality under populism. Indeed, Schmitt’s work on the political is widely acknowledged as important to the populist ‘us versus them’ process, and a brief discussion of his ideas can unpack the dynamics at play here. Schmitt’s belief that politics is about power and “domination,” and that the political is also necessarily a space of antagonism and conflict, lends itself to a political environment of division. For Schmitt, the only way to understand the “phenomenon” that is the political is through the construction of political identities within the antagonism of politics. In other words, politics is conflict and politics is the antagonism that exists between identities. These identities are dichotomous and the polarity of the two lies at the heart of Schmitt’s understanding of politics, namely that one is either a political friend, or a political enemy. For Schmitt, “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be traced is that between friend and enemy.” This pairing is innately political and embodies the intense antagonism that exists within the political sphere. For Schmitt:

The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions...But he is, nevertheless, the

184 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
188 Ibid., 35.
189 Ibid., 26.
other, the stranger and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.\footnote{Ibid., 27.}

Political identities are, for Schmitt, always constructed in these two terms, and Schmitt’s concept of the political is always “concerned with [the] collective forms of identification,”\footnote{Mouffe, \textit{On the Political}, 11.} between the two, and thus for Schmitt, the friend/enemy distinction is the ontological condition of the political sphere. The antagonism that necessarily exists between populist identities directly concerns this understanding of political relations. In the context of populism, this is between the ‘people,’ against the ‘elite.’ The moralistic, Manichaean construction of the ‘us’ (the people) as necessarily good, elevates the ‘them’ of populism to absolute ‘enemy.’ As Mudde notes, it is “transformed into a Schmittian friend–foe distinction in which the ‘Other’ is demonized.”\footnote{Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}, 63.}

\textit{The ‘us’}

But who actually constitutes the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ in this dynamic and how is it constructed? The ‘us,’ of course, is the ‘people.’ Indeed, the use of the term ‘the people’ and language that connotes this idea is a definitional feature consistently present amongst academic studies of populism. As Laclau points out, while definitions of populism can vary in content, it is “certainly true that references to ‘the people’ occupies a central place.”\footnote{Ernesto Laclau, \textit{Politics & Ideology in Marxist Theory} (London: Verso, 1977), 165.} The evoking of the ‘people’ is important in a number of ways. Firstly, through claiming to be speaking on behalf of the ‘people’ and claiming an association with this group and their political interests, populists can assert democratic legitimacy.\footnote{Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” 4.} The political interests of the ‘people,’ according to the populists, are being obstructed by the elite, who stand in opposition to both the ‘people’ and the populists themselves. The populists posit themselves the “true democrats” fighting a democratic system distorted by elite power structures against ‘the people’ and their political “grievances.”\footnote{Ibid., 2.} The role of popular sovereignty—the idea that democracy is legitimated through the power of the people—is also crucial to this dynamic. The populists will characterise those in power (the elite) as being too divorced from the people’s true political
desires, preferences and goals. With this, the political preferences and legitimacy of the elite are thus also put into question. If the people are the true democrats (and thus their political preferences necessarily correct), and because the populists claim to advocate on their behalf, then any non-populist politician (or any stance advocated by these non-populist politician) is necessarily illegitimate.

While Canovan, for example, posits that the term the ‘people’ is so empty as to be meaningless, following Laclau I consider this emptiness as particularly important, because it enables a degree of identity formation. While all political actors will to some degree attempt to create identity amongst their supporters, for populists, because of populism’s thin nature, the given identity is not so clearly defined. While the role of a host ideology will play a part here, connecting those followers who sit on familiar ideological lines—the malleability of the term ‘the people’ will contribute to the identity creation. By appealing to the people rather than to a more defined demographic, the populist is able to construct a cohesive entity amongst divergent groups. The construct of the people, therefore, as an apparently solid and cohesive bloc, aids in the creation of a shared identity that otherwise may not exist.

Importantly, the particular host ideology of a leader or party will not only influence the potential presence of an additional out-group, but it may also impact the manner in which their people-centrism is constructed. For example, while populism specifically will frame the ‘people’ in vague terms against the ‘elite,’ and thus construct a people-centrism along anti-elitist lines, populists with a radical right host ideology may also construct a people-centrism along ethno-cultural lines. It is important to note, however, that an ethno-culturally constructed ‘people’ is not necessarily populism, and thus interrogating whether the ‘people’ is in fact constructed ethno-culturally (as opposed to along anti-elitist lines) is crucial. Alongside this tendency towards ethno-cultural identity creation, I also argue that the presence of a right-wing ideology, such as the radical right, will add a nostalgic, moralistic dimension to the people-centrism. Moreover, drawing on Taggart, there might also be a reference to a ‘heartland’ or

197 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of 'the People' and 'the Elite'," in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
idealised society in populist radical right people-centrism. 199 It is important to note that Taggart is writing about populism in a general sense here, rather than the specific type of populism that manifests on the populist radical right, and I do not necessarily regard it as constitutive of all types of populism (for example, left-wing populism). However, I do believe that it is applicable to the populist radical right. Indeed, for Taggart, the role of community and the relationship the people have to a “heartland” is also important. 200 As he notes, “populists tend to identify themselves with a ‘heartland’ that represents an idealised conception of the community they serve.” 201 While he claims that the role of the people is nothing more than their association to this heartland, a claim with which I disagree, his work on the role of an idealised society within populist agendas more broadly is important. An idealised society plays a role not only with regards to the populist radical right’s relationship to the ‘people,’ but also to its connection to crisis. He notes that the society the populist constructs is one that is “constructed retrospectively from the past,” then “projected onto the present.” 202 This nostalgic take on the past is then compared to what the populists characterise as a frightening future brought about by crisis. Only the populist, as representative of the ‘people,’ can prevent or alleviate the crisis and return them back to this idealised version of society.

The ‘them’

Against this ‘us’ is a necessary ‘them.’ Under populism specifically, as I have noted, this will be the ‘elite’ establishment. These can be those in political or cultural power. Following Schmitt, any antitheses can be transformed into political ones, but only if the antagonisms reach the development of a friend and enemy grouping: “every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy.” 203 The populist will characterise the elite as distinctly in opposition to the people, and as a result also to the populist who claims to represent these people. The populist will articulate that the elite are obstructing the people from achieving their political preferences and consequently portray democracy as poorly functioning as a

200 Ibid., 274.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 37.
result. Relatedly, the populist will also portray the elite as inherently “corrupt.”204 Again, a moral binary—between the good people and the bad elite—is constructed in which the populist becomes associated with the inherent virtuousness of the people, and will save the people from the corruption and immorality of the establishment. As has been noted above, they also lay the blame for society’s failings and the potential disintegration of their idealised community at the feet of this elite who have either caused the crisis or been unable to fend it off. In their criticisms of the elite out-group, the populist creates political enemies often out of cultural and economic targets. The “intensity…of dissociation”205 of the ‘other’ by the populist brings about the political dimension.

According to the populist, the elite, who are increasingly divorcing themselves from the true meaning of democracy and who have failed to protect the people and their homeland, are only interested in maintaining the status quo of elite dominance, politically, economically and culturally. As discussed above, the populist utilises a crisis to position themselves in opposition to these elites, ready and willing to drastically shatter this status quo in order to get ‘the people,’ or at least their representative, ‘back’ in power. For this to work, the populist needs to frame the status quo as inherently wrong, bad and not working for ‘the people.’ The populist utilises crises here to implicate the elite in the apparent undoing of society that is unfolding. Through this process, which frames the elite as inept and/or morally questionable, the populist positions themselves as a feasible and needed alternative.

But as I have argued, populism does not exist in a vacuum and the host ideology will alter how the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality plays out in practice. While the central in/out grouping for populism specifically is indeed that of the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ the populist radical right is characterised by a process of another out-grouping. They will also out-group a minority ethnic group, fuelled by their nativist agenda (which will be explained in detail in the following chapter). Indeed, as I have noted, this may even be the primary out-grouping mentality for a populist radical right actor, suggesting a greater reliance on their host ideology than their populism for this process specifically. This will be tested against the case studies at hand. As such, for the populist radical right, there will a tripartite process of in-grouping and out-grouping, between ‘the people,’ ‘the elite’ and an ‘other.’ As de la Torre notes, a “‘people’ is

204 Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 543.
205 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 38.
defined in contrast to other peoples,”206 and where populism will specifically frame their people along anti-elitist lines, per De Cleen,207 the populist radical right may also utilise a people-centrism hinged upon ethno-cultural lines. Indeed, the ambiguity and emptiness of the people enables the in-group to shift, and consequently also enables the shifting of antagonisms depending on the ideological leanings of the given party. As such, for the populist radical right, depending on the political atmosphere at the time, the ‘other’ can be any ethnic or cultural group that finds itself on the outer. The ‘other’ are merely those that do not belong to the populist’s in-group—the virtuous ‘people.’ The populist, through this vague and ambiguous in-grouping, and propelled by ‘a performance of crisis,’208 is able to divide society into two separate and conflicting worlds where the in-group needs to be protected from the out-group. A crisis is able to pit the ‘people’ against an ‘other’ that does not belong. As Milstein notes, it is likely “for participants in the crisis community to use extant divides and boundaries strategically to privilege the voices of some over others, forcing the latter to experience the crisis through the lens of social domination.”209 This binary is crucial—those who are subjugated by the crisis and thus must be helped, versus those symbolically responsible for the crisis at hand. Relatedly, the ‘elite’, the other out-group, also play a part in this, where they are characterised as having failed to protect the people from the crisis.

In analysing how the above process of in-grouping and out-grouping manifests in the case studies, three particular sub-categories of analysis will be utilised: ‘people-centrism,’ ‘anti-elitism,’ and ‘othering.’ Through analysing these against the case studies, I want to determine how the ‘people’ are constructed, and the degree to which anti-elitism or ‘othering’ is the primary out-grouping process. This will determine the degree to which the parties prioritise their populism or their host ideology. Assessing the way the ‘people’ are constructed and the presence of this extra out-group (the ‘other’) are crucial, because recent research has argued that there is a tendency to conflate populism with the radical right ideology because of an

207 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
208 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
209 Milstein, 154.
imprecision in the discursive construction of the ‘people’ and their out-group. In other words, in many cases of the populist radical right, the in/out grouping is constructed ethnoculturally and not along anti-elitist lines. This would indicate a greater reliance on the radical right ideology rather than on populism specifically. It is important to assess the degree to which this is true for the case studies, because through a conflation of populism and its host ideology we risk misunderstanding what populism actually is, as well as exaggerating the influence it has had on the political climate. I argue that through the inclusion of both anti-elitist and ‘othering’ out-groups in the empirical assessment, as well as assessing how the in-group is constructed (i.e., either along anti-elitist or ethno-cultural lines) we can assess the degree to which this is true for the case studies at hand, and consequently contribute to the growing literature that calls for a tighter precision in the categorising of parties or leaders that espouse populism.

Crisis

In this section, I make the argument that themes of crisis are a constituent feature of populism on the supply side, and that through a re-examination of the relationship between crisis and populism, it is possible to more adequately understand the populism of populist radical right parties, and the way that populism functions alongside the radical right ideology.

While the relationship between populism and crisis is often observed in research, it has arguably been considerably underdeveloped, and generally remains isolated to the demand-side. As Stavrakakis et al. note, “brief references to the connection between crisis and populism abound in the relevant bibliography.” But these references and observations fall short of providing a sufficient dissection of the relationship between the two. Apart from Stavrakakis et al.’s recent work on the role of crisis in populist discourse, and Moffitt’s important foundational work regarding a “performance” of crisis as an “internal core feature of populism”

210 De Cleen and Stavrakakis.; De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
211 Rydgren.
213 Stavrakakis et al., 5.
214 Ibid.
itself, the intricacies of the relationship are considerably underexamined. I assert that by unpacking crisis as a concept, and thus conceiving it as something that can act as both an objective, empirically examinable event, such as an economic recession, as well as something less tangible that can be propagated and manufactured by political actors, parties and movements, we can create a more rounded and sufficient framework through which to theoretically and empirically examine both the relationship and populism itself. Importantly, each way crisis manifests—e.g., as the empirically measurable event, and the manufactured, less tangible ‘sense’ of crisis—is politically experienced and modulated and is open to the manipulations of political actors. It is this point that is important to populism’s relationship to crisis, described in detail below. Furthermore, through a brief discussion on the nature of democracy and its subsequent relationship to crisis, we can also more fully comprehend populism’s tendency to appear cyclically in democracies.

To fully explore populism and crisis, a brief overview of previous considerations on the relationship is needed. It has been noted that the relationship between populism and crisis is one that, though much studied, “remain[s] under-theorised and underdeveloped.” This is in part due to the fact that, as Stavrakakis et al. have noted, the literature has mostly remained one-dimensional by focusing only on the connection between specific crisis events and populist activity. In other words, it theorised the relationship as causal and, importantly, one-way. As Moffitt discusses, these perspectives on the relationship mostly divide into three camps: those that posit a direct relationship (Laclau, Mouffe or Stavrakakis); those who object to there being a direct relationship but concede that one can exist (Mudde or March); and those who are doubtful that any link exists at all (Knight or Arditi). Of course, understanding this aspect of the relationship is important. Work such as the comprehensive empirical analysis undertaken by Pappas and others in European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, provides a thorough empirical analysis of the influence of crisis (in this case economic) on the electoral success of populist parties in Europe. It finds that, indeed, in countries in which the recession

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215 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
216 Taggart, Populism.
217 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism," 189.
218 Stavrakakis et al.
219 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism," 192.
220 Kriesi and Pappas.
impacted most significantly, populist parties made the most gains electorally and in polls.\textsuperscript{221} However, it also claims that the relationship is “fuzzy,” with other findings, such as the relative lack of populist-party presence in Ireland despite considerable economic downturn, resulting in a less clear causal relationship between the two.\textsuperscript{222} I posit that this this ‘fuzziness’ is inevitable when we characterise the relationship just in this one-way causal manner, and when we underestimate the capacity of crisis to exist as a politically experienced and manufactured moment. As such, to fully understand the connection between crisis and populism, both theoretically and empirically, we need to widen the scope for analysis to include this dimension. Incorporating this fuller appreciation to an analysis of the relationship is crucial, and is something missing from much of the literature on the topic.

Achieving this fuller appreciation starts with understanding the important dynamic of crisis highlighted above: it is both an empirically examinable event, such as a recession, and something less tangible—an affect, an atmosphere, a sensational experience. As Milstein notes, crisis is a “concept that bridges our traditional distinctions between objective phenomena and normative experience.”\textsuperscript{223} There is an opaqueness to the term that allows this bridging to occur. The term itself has been used to mark a “decisive point,”\textsuperscript{224} to connote a “transitional period,”\textsuperscript{225} and as a vehicle for people’s “wishes and anxieties, fears and hope.”\textsuperscript{226} Crisis has been “used interchangeably with revolution,”\textsuperscript{227} as well as “unrest,” and “conflict.”\textsuperscript{228} This means the term has come to connote both optimism and fear, and crises themselves can signal a “transition towards a better future,”\textsuperscript{229} and can be “transformed to fit the uncertainties of whatever might be favoured at a given moment.”\textsuperscript{230} Moreover, crises are political. As Milstein notes:

\begin{quote}
…however else we might think to characterise crisis—be it as a time of radical disruption, a moment of epochal transition, the detonation of systematic societal contradictions, or a state of emergency, and be
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Milstein, 141.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Koselleck, 369.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Ibid., 371.
\item \textsuperscript{226} Ibid., 372.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 376.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Ibid., 398.
\item \textsuperscript{229} Ibid., 378.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 399.
\end{itemize}
it of the state, the economy, the environment, or the international sphere—a crisis is always in the last instance a political phenomenon.231

Even when used in the context of labelling certain empirically measurable events, such as the Global Financial Crisis (2007/8), crises are experiential, with the capacity for subjective emotions to be projected onto these political experiences and embedded into historical moments. Crises are experienced normatively and require the participation and acknowledgment of the community in which they impact. Crises require the “active participation of those involved in [them].”232 To call something a crisis, a judgment is required that something is not right, measured against some sort of idea of normalcy. This judgment does not always require supporting evidence. The crisis does not have to exist in objective measurable reality, just in the minds of those it impacts. Even for a crisis like a recession, where an evaluating mechanism like the market can be employed to assess it, there is opportunity for interpretation and political influence and manipulations. Because crises are “never neutral events,” they should be seen as “mediated,”233 as well as politically experienced and constructed, even when they take an empirically measurable form.

Importantly, crises need participants and actors to experience them.234 As Milstein notes: “‘Crisis’ enters the definition of a situation when a speaker declares and her addressees affirm the existence of an object that is in crisis, and, in so doing, they accept a mutual commitment to recognise the crisis and take (or possibly delegate) action in response to it.”235 It needs to be acknowledged by a group and experienced by a group. Utilising the language used by Milstein, I refer to these as ‘crisis consciousness’ and the ‘crisis community’ respectively.236 Envisaging crisis as a normative experience that is also participatory is crucial to understanding its relationship to populism. A crisis is a political experience and exists through the way it is experienced by those it affects. The crisis community, that is, those impacted by the given crisis, needs to affirm that something is out of the ordinary. The populist construction of the people, and the way that populist actors, parties and movements claim to represent the people’s
interests, is crucial here. A populist can be instrumental in the declaring or the reaffirming of crises. “There is no such thing as a crisis that simply exists ‘of itself’.”\(^{237}\) Crisis requires participation: a declarer and an acknowledger, and the community itself will become “self-generating, self-selecting.”\(^{238}\) The populist acts as the declarer, ‘the people’ as the crisis community. Whoever resonates with the populist’s crisis declaration becomes the crisis community, and thus the populist ‘people.’ By announcing crises, populist leaders position themselves as voices of the communities they target. It adds gravitas to their program, for, as Milstein states, the “one who deploys the concept of crisis…is already effectively assuming for oneself the role of a citizen authorized to participate in a political public and lay claim to the public object of crisis.”\(^{239}\) This is a process that, as Moffitt notes, entails the “‘spectacularisation’ of failure to propagate a sense of crisis.”\(^{240}\) Moffitt claims that this process, which he calls the “performance of crisis,” is an “internal core feature” of populism itself.\(^{241}\)

Moreover, alongside its effect on in-grouping, crisis aids in the construction of the populist out-groups. Firstly, it allows the elite to appear as having failed in their duties and being inherently ‘bad’ as a result. The populist can characterise the elite has having failed to protect the people from a crisis, or having caused the crisis themselves. Populists position themselves as separate and different to the existing order, but they will struggle to frame this difference as a positive attribute unless the existing order is widely perceived as insufficient or poorly functioning by the community. A crisis, with its ability to signal renewal and its emancipatory potential provides this,\(^{242}\) with the populists also able to position themselves as able to solve or alleviate the crisis at hand. Moreover, a crisis can open up cultural and economic fissures, allowing populists to characterise other out-groups as also being responsible for a crisis. A broad perception that society is in decline can also be important to this process. Populists positioned on the right of the political spectrum may construct a distinction between a glorified past and a frightening future,\(^{243}\) which further contributes to a crisis atmosphere. All the

\(^{237}\) Ibid., 147.
\(^{238}\) Ibid., 151.
\(^{239}\) Ibid., 155.
\(^{240}\) Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”
\(^{241}\) Ibid.
\(^{242}\) Milstein, 144.
\(^{243}\) See: Betz and Johnson.; which discusses the role of nostalgia within the radical populist right ideology.
populists require to do this is a “sense” of crisis, or a “perception of decline,” (or ‘declinism’) in the state of society. While within the context of demand-side examinations of populist support, it is worth noting that the correlation between people who believe society is in decline and support for populist politics is strong. In their recent study on the role of ‘declinism’ in support for populist politics, Elchardus and Spruyt found that “people who believe that society is caught in a downward spiral apparently blame the political elite for that state of affairs and react with populism.” The role of blame also plays an important part in the crisis-populism dynamic. As Hameleers, Bos and De Vreese assert, blame attribution for a perceived wrong is a central component to the populist communication logic. While the way that language intersects with the constituent features of populism will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, in short, Hameleers et al. found that populists utilise emotional language to attribute blame and to create identity formation, and that “populist messages are characterised by assigning blame to elites in an emotionalised way.” As Jagers and Walgrave point out, the overarching ‘populist master frame,’ is “the distinction between the blameless people and the corrupt elites,” and crisis plays a crucial role in this process. In times of crisis populists utilise blame attribution to clearly demarcate who belongs to their ingroup, and who does not—either the elite establishment or another ‘other.’ As such, blame attribution is crucial to the operationalisation of populism within democracies, in particular the dynamics created during crises between the people, the elite and the ‘other.’

Finally, an important point lies within the way crises manifest within democracy, and the resultant impact this has on populism. As Runciman articulates, democracies struggle to anticipate oncoming crises. Democracies are adaptable and it is not common for democracies to succumb to the crises that have hit them, but this capacity for stability causes “blind spots, which cause them to drift into disaster.” The perception that democracies are successful has

244 Taggart, Populism.
245 Elchardus and Spruyt, 117.
246 Ibid., 125.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid., 125.
249 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese, 874.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid., 871.
252 Jagers and Stefaan.
253 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese, 874.
254 Runciman.
255 Ibid., xv.
resulted in a lack of self-awareness. As Runciman points out, “democracy has triumphed, but it has not grown up.” 256 Democracies do not learn from the past. Crises hit democracies, and they “stumble their way through…groping for a way out.” 257 For Runciman, echoing Tocqueville, democracies suffer from a type of fatalism that causes them to get stuck. 258 Democracies tend towards stagnation. They “fixate on the surface activity of political life…while beneath the surface nothing is really changing.” 259 Instead of anticipating crises, and therefore potentially avoiding them, democracies only realise they are happening after it is too late. The “excessively complacent” 260 nature of democracies means that there is a lag between crises occurring and action taken. This lag—between occurrence and action—allows populists the space for their ‘performance’ of crisis. They can elicit within the crisis community, or the ‘people,’ the acknowledgement of crisis consciousness before the establishment can enact their own form of action. In other words, the very nature of democracy allows populists to utilise crises in a specific way. Runciman’s work is important in our understanding of how populists can embed themselves within the political sphere, seemingly appearing as the only saviours to the ordinary people. The populist can then exploit a notion of crisis, and the language that it conjures, to “circumvent established procedures to pursue ambitious ends, either by conjuring an idea of a crisis outright or manipulating the public’s perceptions of the options available.” 261 In declaring a ‘crisis,’ the speaker creates a situation where ‘normal’ ways of going about fixing things seem bureaucratic, stale and slow. A crisis necessitates urgency, or emergency, and thus regular, more deliberative ‘fixes’ are disparaged. Through declaring a crisis, the populist is granting themselves “a license to a certain degree of freedom from the established social order.” 262 This is important for populist politics, which dismisses slow deliberative discussion.

Because populism requires themes of crisis to delegitimate and destabilise the existing political order, and to create its necessary in-grouping and out-grouping, it might be concluded, in Moffitt’s words that, populism’s “existence and continued success is reliant on the continued

256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid., 16.
259 Ibid.
261 Milstein, 149.
262 Ibid.
propagation and perpetuation of crisis.” Populism’s success, then, requires a successful acknowledgment by the community that a crisis exists. This must either be continually perpetuated, resulting in continued success for populist actors success might be experienced cyclically with peaks and troughs. The fact that crises cannot exist forever, in that they are measured against some sort of normalcy, means that the populist will need to shift or change the focus of crisis, to ensure a continual perpetuation of a sense of crisis. Otherwise, the groundwork for the populist’s demise might be laid, whether that be into electoral decline or a trajectory into more traditional or mainstream political forms. But Runciman’s point that democracies are poor at providing solutions to the problems that crises provide means that there is always space for populist renewal. It should be noted, of course, that not all crises will lead to this ‘renewal’. In other words, crises will not necessarily always trigger populism or lead to the success of populist parties. Instead, crises provide the opportunity or space for populism, without which populism cannot exist.

If populism’s relationship to the concept of crisis is to be fully understood, the political, normative aspect must be considered. The failure of past empirical research to incorporate the normative aspect of crisis into populism studies, and the resulting underestimation of a key part of crises themselves—that they exist not only as external, objective events like recessions, but also as moments that are atmospheric, subjective and intangible, and innately political—means that we generally conceptualise crises as being something external to the populist. The important consequence of this is that what remains is a theoretical and empirical understanding of the relationship that is incomplete and insufficient. The empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis tests the degree to which the above is reflected in the case studies at hand. Two subcategories of analysis are tested in this analysis: the presence of discourse that paints society as in decline and/or crisis; and the presence of discourse that attributes blame for said decline and/or crisis, therefore testing the theory outlined by Moffitt, and Hameleers et al.

Through this, I argue we can empirically determine the supply-side nature of the crisis in the case studies at hand, and as a result further both the empirical and theoretical literature on the relationship, in particular how crisis plays out in the party family as a supply-side condition.

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263 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism," 209.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese.
Alongside the above, I have argued that populism will also necessarily exist alongside a host ideology. This follows in the ideational tradition, which takes that populism’s thin nature—its inability to provide concrete answers to particular political problems—means that while it can provide a framework for understanding the political world, it cannot provide the content for such framework. Populism requires another driving force, a thicker ideology to push it along its political trajectory, fill in the content of its in-grouping and out-grouping and its utilisation of themes of crisis. In other words, the thicker ideology should be seen as providing the locus of the populist’s antagonisms, and it provides the framework for its relationship to crisis and the groups it decides to out-group. As I have noted, the thin-ideology of populism is indeed able to “convey a particular way of construing the political.” However, where comprehensive ideologies (like, for example, conservativism or liberalism) are able to “put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to crucial political questions,” populism and other thin-ideologies, like feminism, nationalism or ecologism, are unable to do so, because they are narrower and less far-reaching in scope. Populism itself is distinct in that it expresses a certain worldview—the friend/enemy distinction between the people and the elite à la Schmitt; and that society is in crisis. But this worldview does not provide answers or solutions, and does not provide a locus for the necessary antagonisms that populism requires. Populism is, as Stanley has put it, “diffuse in its lack of a programmatic centre of gravity.” This is exactly what makes it so compatible with ideologies that are more extensive and wide reaching in their programs and why populism “tends to be so highly chameleonic.” Because of this, populism can and does exist along the political spectrum, not inherently related to the left or right. As Gidron and Bonikowski state, populism “cuts not

267 Stanley, 95.
268 Ibid.
270 Laclau, On Populist Reason.
271 Stanley, 99-100.
272 Taggart, "Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe," 275.
just across geographical borders and historical eras, but also ideological cleavages.”

Moreover, many parties labelled ‘populist’ may also claim to be beyond left and right, or beyond ideology, as France’s National Rally (previously known as the National Front) and Spain’s Podemos have asserted at times. But even in these instances, the parties have clear belief systems and frameworks that drive their political programs.

Despite populism’s lack of ‘thickness’, and the fact that the literature suggests that the host ideology tends to be the more influential feature of populist parties, there has been a tendency to just call these parties ‘populist’, a habit which fails to acknowledge the potentially influential role the host ideology has in the agendas of these parties. For this reason, it is important to more fully understand the extent to which these parties are actually ‘populist,’ as well as how the populism of these parties intersects and “interacts” with the host ideology.

The following chapter, which concerns the way populism is operationalised in practice, both through discourse and through party policies, will outline the literature on the varieties of populism practiced when attached to a particular host ideology, including left and centre varieties. Of particular focus, however, will be the party family of the case studies, i.e., the populist radical right, utilising the work of Mudde to unpack the ideology.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has outlined my argument for conceptualising populism and constitutes part one of the framework for analysing the case studies. It firstly made the argument for a multi-typology approach to categorising populism, in the vein of previous work by van Kessel, and Engesser et al., which puts forward that the diverging typologies of populism that have emerged in past and recent research are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, reflect the differing ways populism can manifest within democracies, as well as the particular purposes or contexts of the research. It also argued that a thin-centred ideological approach is the best approach for

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274 Gidron and Bonikowski, 4.
275 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
276 Rydgren.
277 Hawkins and Kaltwasser, "What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t."
278 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
279 Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson.
unpacking populism’s features, which constitute: a process of in-grouping and out-grouping between a ‘people’ and the ‘elite’; an essential reliance and propagation of themes of crisis; and the presence of a host ideology which will influence the content of these features, and the potential presence of an extra out-grouping. The following chapter will constitute part two of the framework for analysis. It will outline the discourse-theoretical tradition and make the argument that analysing the discourse of the leaders of the case studies is an appropriate means to assess the above features. It will also outline the literature on the populist radical right party family, drawing on the work of Mudde,\(^{280}\) and make the argument that party policy is an appropriate means to assess the presence of the populist radical right ideology in policy documents/manifestos of the case studies.

\(^{280}\) Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
Chapter Three: Framework for analysis, part two – Assessing populism and the populist radical right

This chapter constitutes the remaining foundations of the framework for analysis used to empirically examine the two case studies, One Nation (ON) and the Party for Freedom (PVV). It makes the argument for testing and assessing populism and the populist radical right ideology through two variables, respectively. Firstly, the discourse of the party leader. Here, I argue that an effective way to assess and test the presence of the constituent features of populism generally (people-centrism, anti-elitism and crisis) and the populist radical right specifically (an additional out-grouping of an ‘other’), as described in detail in the previous chapter, is through conceptualising populism as a form of discourse. So, whereas the previous chapter looked at populism as a set of ideas, this section of the chapter looks at populism as a thing that is done, as a means of communicating, as a discourse and style that leaders, parties and movements use. This conceptualisation allows for the empirical assessment of this discourse to test the above features against the two case studies. I also outline the reasons why the speeches of the party leaders are the most appropriate source from which to assess this discourse, namely the leader being emblematic of the party as a whole, and the relatively significant place leadership has within the literature on populism.

The second variable, party policy, will be used to assess the presence of the case studies’ populism, host ideology and other issues. This section draws from the ideational tradition, per Mudde and Stanley and outlined in detail in the previous chapter. I discuss the populist radical right family, the party family of ON and PVV, per Mudde, who argues the ideology has three constituent features: nativism, authoritarianism and populism, with nativism being the primary ideological feature. I further argue that party policy is an effective way to assess how these features have manifested in the policy documents of the case studies. Mudde’s theoretical work on the party family will be used to test and assess the degree to which the case studies prioritise populism, nativism and authoritarianism, and whether or not nativism (as the most dominant feature) influences wider policy-level issues. I will also evaluate the ways in

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281 Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism," 54.
282 See: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.; Stanley.
283 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
which policy-level issues differ between parties belonging to the populist radical right party family depending on context.

The chapter concludes with a synthesis of this theory in the form of a framework for the analysis. This framework is drawn from the theory outlined in this and the previous chapter. A table of the framework is provided at the conclusion of this chapter. This framework provides the foundations upon which the codebook for the analysis (described in detail in the methodology chapter) will be constructed.

**Populism and Discourse**

*The discursive approach*

As the previous chapter discussed, this thesis conceives of populism through a multi-typological lens. For the purposes of this thesis, I have highlighted two particular ways to approach the concept. Firstly, as an ideology, which pertains to a core set of beliefs that make up a worldview: in-grouping and out-grouping between a ‘people’ and an ‘elite’ and, in the case of the populist radical right, another ‘other,’ and a propagation of themes of crisis. Secondly, as a discourse, and therefore “something that is done, embodied and enacted.”\(^\text{284}\) This ideational and discourse approach follows Hawkins, who argues that populism is a combination of both ideology and discourse.\(^\text{285}\) He argues that populism is a “worldview and expressed as a discourse.”\(^\text{286}\) In this vein, I argue that we can assess and test the in/out grouping and crisis themes of the case studies through analysis of the party’s language. However, I depart from Hawkins in also arguing that the other ways in which theorists might conceptualise populism (such as a strategy) are equally valid in other research contexts. For example, the different labels discussed in the literature have been found to be more applicable in some contexts than others. As Bonikowski and Gidron note:

\(^{284}\) Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism," 53.

\(^{285}\) Gidron and Bonikowski.

\(^{286}\) Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*, 10.
Theoretical orientations that prove insightful in one region are often found wanting when applied to structurally disparate cases, leading to the proliferation of definitional approaches and empirical strategies.287

The strategic label, as espoused by Weyland and others,288 is an example of this. It is said to be particularly applicable to a Latin American context but has “little travelability”289 beyond that context. Given this, while a strategic approach may not be suitable for this research, it could be highly effective in studies focused within Latin America, and as a result the approach should not be wholly dismissed. Moreover, another argument in favour of a multi-typological approach is that, as Gidron and Bonikowski highlight in their review of the different approaches to populism, while there are important differences between all of the approaches, there are also distinct similarities and “overlaps,” particularly between the ideational and the discourse and style approaches.290 This is all to say that a flexible and malleable approach to typology is sometimes required and indeed beneficial to certain research purposes. This research also follows recent literature that has broadly coalesced the discourse, style and logic approaches to conceiving populism into one approach.291 Therefore, this thesis argues that, along with the ideational approach described previously, the discursive approach provides an effective conceptual and empirical framework to examine both the quantitative presence of the features outlined in the previous chapter, and the particular ways each leader utilises them, determined qualitatively.

As Poblete argues, despite considerable conceptual development in understanding populism as a discourse, “the meaning of discourse can be different” depending on the particular approach or researcher.292 Moffitt and Tormey have divided these different approaches into two strains.293 The first draws from the theoretical work of Laclau.294 Laclau took populism to be

289 Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism," 386. See also: Moffitt and Tormey.
290 Gidron and Bonikowski, 14.
291 See: Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism."; Gidron and Bonikowski.
293 Moffitt and Tormey, 385.
the political logic, with the antagonistic construction of ‘the people’ and an enemy ‘other,’ à la Schmitt, which is important here. There is, for Laclau, as described by Gidron and Bonikowski, a “symbolic distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that constitutes populist discourse.” The us, ‘the people,’ is an ‘empty signifier’ and can therefore change, “depending on social context.” In other words, the ‘us’ is open, a construct which can be fashioned and moulded differently depending on the actor utilising it. Moreover, as Laclau articulates:

…we only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject, and the precondition of the emergence of such a subject is, as we have seen, the building up of an internal frontier dividing the social space into two camps.

The antagonistic relationship between these two ‘camps’ is important here. As Gidron and Bonikowski note, for Laclau: “populism is therefore an anti-status-quo discourse: it is part of a struggle over hegemony and power.” And as I have noted, this anti-status-quo discourse is “exclusively related to a specific mode of articulation” rather than tied to a particular content. Laclau purposefully construed populism in a way that was distinct from a specific empirical, ‘ontic’ content. The reason for this being that, as Moffitt and Tormey note, Laclau saw “prior attempts to define populism” as having “necessarily failed” because of a preoccupation with this ‘ontic’ content of populism. For Laclau, this failure rests on the premise that it is a “self-defeating exercise” to define and understand populism by anchoring it in a necessary specific content. The ‘ontic’-focused process is self-defeating because, in his words, it is an:

…exercise whose two predictable alternative results have been either to choose an empirical content which is immediately overflowed by an avalanche of exceptions, or to appeal to an ‘intuition’ which cannot be translated into any conceptual content.

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296 Gidron and Bonikowski, 10.
297 Ibid.
298 Laclau, "Populism: What’s in a Name?," in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, 43.
299 Gidron and Bonikowski, 10.
300 Laclau, "Populism: What’s in a Name?," in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, 44.
301 Laclau, On Populist Reason.
302 Moffitt and Tormey. 384.
303 Laclau, "Populism: What’s in a Name?," in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, 44.
304 Ibid.
For Laclau, then, a more fruitful route to understanding the concept was through “capturing...its ontological status.”305 In part because of this specifically ontological rather than ontic focus, its take on populism can be very broad, in that it can be applicable to many, if not all, examples of politics.306 If populism is the logic of the political, the end result is that “all politics is populism.”307 Empirically, the consequences of this are a degree of “vagueness” and a potentially wide-ranging applicability to many if not all forms of politics.308 This can render it difficult to utilise. As Moffitt has noted, there have been significant developments recently in the use of Laclau’s approach in comparative politics, particularly by those researching under the ‘performative style’ label (which I outline briefly to follow).309 However, with this in mind and emphasising that this strain has provided important conceptual foundations for understanding populism as a discourse, there remains a degree of abstraction that means that it is potentially not wholly effective in the actual assessment and testing of the populist discourse specifically.310

The second strain is more ‘traditional’ in its understanding of discourse.311 Whereas the former is effective in discussing populism in the abstract, this take on discourse is specifically focused on empiricism and the actual measurement of populism in practice.312 Given the aims of this research (i.e., assessing and testing the features of populism) it is predominantly this strain of the discourse approach that informs my underlying epistemological foundations. This approach understands that because populism is a form of discourse, this discourse can necessarily be measured and tested to determine the “level” or degree of populism in the speech giver.313 It also has empirical and methodological implications,314 including obviously the way a researcher will actually ‘measure’ populism (i.e., as a discourse), but also the type of source and units of assessment that could be analysed. Indeed, those who follow this approach have used a variety of both quantitative and qualitative methods, including but not limited to

305 Moffitt and Tormey, 384.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid., 385.
310 Moffitt and Tormey, 384.
312 Moffitt and Tormey, 385.
313 Ibid.
314 Gidron and Bonikowski, 8.
automated text analysis, semantic textual analysis, and classical content analysis to conduct their respective assessments and measurements of the populist discourse.

The ‘style’ approach

While the focus of this research is on the specific language of populism (and therefore its discourse), it is important to briefly outline what constitutes the ‘style’ approach to populism, as recent research has come to include the style and discourse approaches under a broad discursive-stylistic banner. While the style approach is different to discourse in the sense that it encompasses other, more ‘performative’ and ‘stylistic’ elements (i.e., not just discourse) of populism, as Moffitt notes, these approaches are similar in the sense that they are “united” under the idea that populism is something that is “done,” rather than it being a static idea or worldview of a given populist actor. Per Moffitt and Tormey, the style approach draws on previous research that considers populism as a political style, but “attempt[s] to move beyond the purely communicative and rhetorical elements that these authors discuss, and emphasise the performative and relational elements of political style.” As such, the style approach not only looks at the way that populism behaves discursively, but also its “performative” and “aesthetic” dimensions. With this in mind, Moffitt defines populism as a political style with three features: “appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’”; “bad manners” and “the performance of crisis, breakdown, or threat.” Importantly, the approaches that see populism as a thing that is ‘done’ all conceptualise populism as something that can be performed in a gradational manner. Where ideological approaches, like Mudde’s, necessarily

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317 Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective.
320 Moffitt and Tormey. 387.

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see populism as binary (i.e., you are either a populist or not a populist), these approaches accept that populism can be utilised to a greater or lesser degree by all political actors.

**Examples of a populist discourse**

In delivering their ‘anti-status quo’ discourse, research has found that political actors can use a variety of different forms of language to align themselves with the ‘people,’ and pit these ‘people’ against the ‘elite’ establishment. For example, Canovan has argued that the populist language is often oversimplified and “tabloid.”[^323] It has also been found to be emotional[^324] and often negative[^325] and attempts to appeal to “common sense,”[^326] shying away from technocratic, policy detail. Relatedly, Bonikowski and Gidron also found that populists tend to rely on “emotionally charged frames,” over policy orientated ones.[^327] In their analysis of populism as a political style, Moffitt and Tormey claim that much of the language associated with populism is indicative of its compulsion for “bad manners.”[^328] As they highlight in their analysis of Ostiguy’s work,[^329] populists utilise language that demonstrates their ‘low’ positioning on a ‘low-high’ axis (one that “runs orthogonal to the traditional left-right axis”).[^330] They found that populists will utilise “slang, swearing, political incorrectness and…overly demonstrative and ‘colourful’,”[^331] which is the antithesis of much of the language embodied by the ‘elite,’ the mainstream counterparts. These mainstream politicians will often espouse “‘high’ behaviours of rigidness, rationality, composure and technocratic language.”[^332] This is one way that populists will solidify their outsider credentials and position themselves as counter to the elites that they distain, while also attempting to seem relatable to a lay audience. As Canovan notes, the populists capitalise on the “popular distrust of politicians’ evasiveness

[^325]: Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson.
[^326]: Moffitt and Tormey, 392.
[^328]: Moffitt and Tormey, 392.
[^330]: Moffitt and Tormey, 392.
[^331]: Ibid.
[^332]: Ibid.
and bureaucratic jargon [and] pride themselves on simplicity and directness.” With oversimplified, tabloid language, the populist can distance themselves and ‘the people’ from the elites, whom they claim are too disassociated from the people they represent.

Alongside the above language, which serves to create attachment between the populist and the people, there is also evidence that populists utilise particular forms of language that are representative of their respective needs to propagate and facilitate a sense of crisis in broader society. This serves not only to create the impression that society is under threat, but also to create a further division between the populist in-group and out-groups. As Hameleers, Bos and De Vreese’s found in their research on the role of blame in the populist communication logic, populists utilise language that is highly emotive to attribute blame for problems in society and contribute to identity formation. They argue that blame attribution is a “core feature of populist communication” and that central to this is attributing blame while emphasising “fear towards the culprit out-group.” Populists will use language that evokes danger and fear to create a broader sense that society is in crisis and under threat. Alongside this fear and threat-inducing language, Hameleers et al. argue that the populist communication process utilises language that evokes anger. This ‘angry’ language is directed towards the out-group, either the ‘elite’ for “blocking the goals of the people,” or towards another out-group for changing society or causing problems (i.e., immigrants), and is thus used to create further division between the populist’s in-groups and out-groups. In this sense, because the overarching ‘populist master-frame’ is “the distinction between the blameless people and the corrupt elites,” blame attribution has been found to be crucial to the facilitation of the populist anti-elitism. Moreover, it not only aids in propagating anti-elitist out-grouping, but in times of crisis the populist radical right can utilise blame attribution to clearly demarcate who belongs to their in-group, and who is their enemy ‘other.’ The populists will “emphasize anger and fear,” attributing blame to those who do not belong, whilst also “highlighting the purity of the

334 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese.
335 Ibid., 892.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid., 876.
338 Ibid.
339 Jagers and Stefaan.
340 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese, 874.
341 Ibid., 871.
people,” and absolving them of guilt. Therefore, blame attribution functions both to create a sense of crisis and danger, and to divide society into the Schmittian friend/enemy distinction. Hameleers et al. discuss this divide with reference to social identity theory. They explain that social identity is crucial to one’s attitudes towards in-grouping and out-grouping. Because people want to maintain a positive ‘self-concept,’ they will attribute positive qualities to those that serve as their in-group, and will consequently attribute negative qualities and blame to those with whom they do not align—the out-group. The utilisation of angry language has been found to be particularly useful in eliciting these negative sentiments towards outsiders and consequently attributing blame to those outsiders. Moreover, not only is this type of language effective in creating and perpetuating division between in-groups and out-groups, it is regarded as particularly convincing. As Hameleers et al. note, the combination of language that generates ‘threat’ and then blame for that ‘threat’ has been found to trigger an “increased [...] likelihood of a threatening message’s acceptance.” As a result of the above, “populist messages are argued to be highly persuasive,” as well as the fact that they target and respond to, “ordinary people’s hopes and fears,” and seemingly provide “easy solutions to important societal problems.”

Leadership and speeches

As the previous section illustrates, the use of language that is over-simplified, emotional, and negative can all play a part in the populist’s process of in-grouping and out-grouping and the propagation of themes of crisis. In empirically examining how these examples as well as other types of language play out in the case studies at hand, there are a variety of fruitful sources that can be utilised. As Aslanidis notes in his argument for conceptualising populism

342 Ibid.
343 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*.
344 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese, 875.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid., 890.
348 Ibid., 877. See:
349 Ibid., 871.
352 Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson. 1286.
as discourse, given “populism is discourse…its traces should thus be accessible within various
types of text produced by these agents (speeches, interviews, manifestos, tweets, slogans,
editorials, etc.).” Indeed, the particular tools a populist may use to deliver their discourse
have been widely discussed. For example, the ways in which populists have utilised traditional
media vehicles has been empirically studied (see studies on news broadcasts, talk shows, and
the press more generally), as well as theoretically examined. And more recently, the
role of social media as a means of disseminating the populist language is something that has
captured the attention of researchers. For example, Engesser et al. have argued that populists
utilise social media to “spread their fragmented ideology” and “disseminate their political
ideas.” Indeed, it is worth briefly acknowledging the issue of social media, because there is
a common, if not somewhat mistaken, belief that it is a tool that is particularly advantageous
to populists, and indeed even to ‘blame’ for populism’s recent prominence. For example,
Hameleers and Schmuck claim that social media provides “an attractive environment for both
politicians and ordinary citizens,” and its use directly “contributes to the success of
populism.” Moreover, as the argument goes, traditional mass media must “adhere to
professional norms and news values,” and “must comply with mass media logic.” Social
media, by contrast, can “circumvent the journalistic gatekeepers,” and provide a “direct linkage
to the people.” Moreover, it has been argued that through circumventing traditional channels,

353 Aslanidis, "Measuring Populist Discourse with Semantic Text Analysis: An Application of Grassroots
Populist Mobilization." 1243.
354 Linda Bos, Wouter dan der Brug, and Claes de Vreese, "How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing
355 Linda Bos and Kees Brants, "Populist Rhetoric in Politics and Media: A Longitudinal Study of the
356 Tjitske Akkerman, "Friend or Foe? Right-Wing Populism and the Popular Press in Britain and the
357 Werner Wirth et al., The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Styles: A Theoretical Model and Research
Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication (Zurich: National Centre of Competence in Research
358 Sven Engesser et al., "Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology,"
359 Ibid., 1425.
360 Benjamin Moffitt, "Populism 2.0, Social Media and the False Allure of ‘Unmediated’ Representation,’” in
361 Michael Hameleers and Desiree Schmuck, "It's Us against Them: A Comparative Experiment on the Effects
of Populist Messages Communicated Via Social Media," Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9
(2017): 1425.
362 Engesser et al., 1110.
363 Ibid., 1113.
364 Ibid., 1110.
the populist can achieve their ‘othering’ of the elite mass media, by discrediting their usefulness and reaching their followers directly. 365 However, as Moffitt argues, while there is a degree of truth in much of this discussion, the relationship between populism and social media is perhaps over-stated. 366 As he notes, while there is “some kernel of truth” in the way that social media operates on behalf of populists, the fact is it is only true of “some” populists. 367 Where some populists are indeed very proficient in their use of social media, others do not engage with it in the same manner and to the same extent. 368 Moreover, he argues that we should be careful not to make mass generalisations about all populists and their use of, and relationship to, social media from just a small number of cases who are particularly adept at it (for example, Donald Trump). 369

Therefore, while there has been plenty of scholarly attention directed towards the way that populists might use the Internet and social media to deliver their message and spread their discourse, it is important to avoid getting mired in what is a potentially over-blown relationship. Therefore, I argue that a more fruitful, consistent and reliable source of analysis lies in a more traditional area: in the speeches of populist leaders. As Bonikowski and Gidron argue, for those who conceptualise populism as a discourse, it makes sense that “the starting point for analysis should be distinct speech acts,” 370 of which speeches are an obvious example. This also follows recent literature on assessing and measuring populism, which has used speeches as the source of analysis, with speeches proving to be an effective way to capture the quantitative and qualitative presence of populism. 371 Moreover, leaders are often the most important members of populist parties, sometimes to the extent that populist parties are also sometimes considered ‘personal parties,’ with ON and the PVV examples of this. 372 As Moffitt argues, populist leaders are “clearly the central performers and ‘embodiments’ of populism (as a distinct

367 Ibid., 31.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
political style),” and, I argue, of populism as discourse. Relatedly, the relationship between populism and a particular type of leadership style (i.e., strong and/or charismatic) is one that is often discussed in the literature, to the point where some researchers argue that it is a constitutive feature of populism itself. I do not agree with the inclusion of leadership style as a defining feature per se. However, following Moffitt, in many cases (such as with the case studies) leaders are representative of their parties broadly, so it is an issue nevertheless worth examining briefly. In general, populism has been widely associated with a certain type of power structure; one that tends to be quite vertical, with personalised leadership styles that depend significantly on a ‘strong’ leader with Weberian ‘charismatic’ qualities. As McDonnell notes, there exists a considerable amount of research on populism that asserts that populist parties are both “dominated by ‘charismatic leaders,’” and that ‘charismatic leadership,’ is in fact a “cornerstone” of populist parties generally. As I have noted, analysis of the relationship between leadership style and populism often utilises the Weberian understanding of charisma. Charisma in this sense, rather than being an innate quality of the specific leader, concerns “an intimate and direct communion between leader and followers.” This forms one third of his tripartite classification of authority. As van der Brug and Mughan have noted:

One of the ways in which support for right-wing populist parties is held to be distinctive from that for other kinds of political parties is that their leaders are alleged to be ‘charismatic’ figures who play a crucial role in the electoral success their parties have enjoyed.

However, Weber did not provide clear characteristics or qualities of charisma in his work that could provide a framework for empirical analysis of actual leaders. Instead of following Weber’s work directly, then, which would remain unfruitful in any real-world application

373 Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism," 54.
375 See: Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept. Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics."
379 Ibid.
381 Ibid., 29.
because of its “vagueness,” many researchers have sought to utilise the vast research done on this topic to come up with their own, unique classification of charisma whilst still staying true to Weber’s ethos. Two recent examples of such attempts within the context of populism studies are Pappas and McDonnell, who provide two very different versions of a charismatic framework. Pappas’s understanding of charisma, framed within a liberal democratic context, rests on two principles: “the nature of rulership,” which concerns the manner in which the leader rules over their actual party organisation as well as their followers; and “the aims of rule,” which involves the revolutionary capacity of the leader (or his or her ability to instil normative change within the political order). Consequently, Pappas’s definition of charisma is: “a distinct type of legitimate leadership that is personal and aims at the radical transformation of an established institutional order.” McDonnell’s definition differs from Pappas’s, in that he remains focused on the coterie’s relationship to and perception of the leader, rather than, say, the leader’s capacity for revolutionary change. McDonnell utilises the work of Weber, but also Eatwell and Willner, to create a two-tiered framework for charisma. For McDonnell, following Eatwell, a leader is charismatic when: firstly, “followers believe that ‘the leader is driven by a special mission and/or is invested with unique powers’”; and secondly, following Willner, “followers express ‘unconditional acceptance of the personal authority of the leader’.” The literature (including that of Pappas, McDonnell and indeed Weber) also notes that charisma is not a permanent, static characteristic—charisma may be gained or lost by a leader. Moreover, while it is true that a particular leadership style should not be seen as a defining feature of populism broadly or the populist radical right specifically, when ‘charisma’ in a leader is present, it has been found to be beneficial to the party. As Pappas found, despite charismatic leadership being quite rare amongst populist leaders, when it is present it correlates strongly in success for populist parties. With all this

384 Ibid., 379.
385 Ibid., 380.
389 Pappas, 380.
392 Pappas, 386.
in mind, and because so much research on populism claims to make this link—between a particular type of leadership and populism—\textsuperscript{393} I argue that the discourse of the leaders is the most representative of a party as a whole.

In summary of the above, this research argues that: a) conceptualising populism as a discourse is an effective way to assess and test the populism of populist parties; b) the speeches of the party leader are an appropriate source to conduct the examination. The following section will assess the different ways that populism can manifest along the political spectrum, with particular attention paid to the host ideology of the case studies at hand: the populist radical right, per Mudde.\textsuperscript{394} As the literature notes, nativism is seen as the core feature of the party family. This claim, as well as the role that populism plays alongside the radical right ideology, will be tested against the case studies in the proceeding empirical chapters, with a further exploration into how this ideology manifests differently in different contexts on a policy-level. It will also argue that party manifestoes are an effective source to use for the analysis.

\textbf{Populism, Ideology and Policy}

\textit{The populist radical right}

Populism is not confined to any particular ideology. It can be associated with leaders, parties and movements from all along the political spectrum, from the far-left to the far-right, as well as the political centre.\textsuperscript{395} Indeed, populisms along the political spectrum can differ greatly in attitudes as well as policies, which I will discuss for the purpose of comparison below. However, this research is looking at one particular ideological type of populism, namely that which manifests alongside the radical right ideology. Utilising the theoretical work of Mudde on the party family,\textsuperscript{396} I will test the presence of the populist radical right ideology as it manifests through the policies of the party. The purpose of this is to determine both the quantitative and qualitative degree to which each case study utilises each constituent feature of the ideology (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) more or less than another, and how

\textsuperscript{393} See Zaslove, 324. See also Weyland
\textsuperscript{394} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}.
\textsuperscript{395} Laclau, "Populism: What’s in a Name?," in \textit{Populism and the Mirror of Democracy}.
\textsuperscript{396} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}.
this may differ depending on context. Research has found that the populist radical right are primarily radical right parties, with populism a secondary consideration.\textsuperscript{397} I test this, along with other policy-level issues, on the case studies at hand. As De Cleen and others have noted,\textsuperscript{398} there has been a tendency by observers to conflate populism with what is actually nationalism (or nativism). It is important to explore this potential conflation empirically, because through this conflation there is a possibility for a broad misunderstanding with regards to two interrelated and timely issues. Firstly, a mischaracterisation of what constitutes the actual character of populism (i.e., the belief that populism is inherently nativist, or that it is a “synonym for the radical right”).\textsuperscript{399} Secondly, an over-estimation regarding the degree to which populism specifically has actually influenced or changed the contemporary political landscape (i.e., rather than, say, nativism or the radical right broadly).\textsuperscript{400} As De Cleen, Glynos and Mondon note, “we should guard against temptations to explain the events of our ‘populist times’ only through the prism of populist reason.”\textsuperscript{401} As such, this policy variable, as well as the sub-categories of the language variable related to in/out grouping, will determine the degree to which this is reflected in the case studies at hand and thus contribute to the growing literature exploring this issue. Importantly, I also want to assess if and how these features are utilised in different or similar manners between the case studies to see if political and/or geographical context significantly alters the way the ideology is employed by parties that belong to the party family. In other words, are the parties more radical right than they are populist, per the theory? And does this change, depending on context? Given the electoral success and prominence of this party family in democracies throughout the world at the time of writing, and the related discussion on the potential conflation of populism with what might be actually more accurately be called nativism, this is important to determine.

The most prominent and influential definition of populism as it exists with the radical right ideology is found in Mudde’s important work on the subject.\textsuperscript{402} He defines the ideology of the

\textsuperscript{397} Mudde and Kaltwasser, \textit{Voices of the Peoples: Populism in Europe and Latin America Compared}.
\textsuperscript{398} See: De Cleen, ”The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in \textit{Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum}.; Rydgren; De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon.
\textsuperscript{399} De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon, 653.
\textsuperscript{401} De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon.
\textsuperscript{402} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}.
populist radical right as a combination of “nativism, authoritarianism and populism.” This definition of the party family will form the theoretical underpinnings of the analysis of the role of the ideology and policy in the case studies. Importantly, Mudde, following his belief that populism is a ‘thin-centred’ ideology and thus necessarily less influential than the ‘thicker’ ideological companion, argues that nativism is the “key” ideological driving force in the party family, more important than both populism and authoritarianism. Indeed, he argues that the party family are primarily radical right first, and populist second. As a result, he chooses to call the party family the populist radical right, rather than radical right populists. He states: “Given that nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of this party family, radical right should be the primary term in the concept.” Indeed, the party family is a populist version of the radical right, not the other way round, with nativism seen as the most dominating and influential ideology within the party family. Nativism, which is a form of nationalism, holds that “states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.” Importantly, the threatening non-native can change depending on the political and social context. As Higham argues:

...[nativism] should be defined as intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections. Specific nativistic antagonisms may, and do, vary widely in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting conditions of the day.

In the post-9/11 populist radical right in Western Europe, North America and Australia, the predominant ‘nativistic antagonism’ has been towards Muslims, but the degree to which this plays out in the case studies at hand will also be examined. Relatedly, as the literature notes,

405 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 19.
406 Ibid., 26.
because of this nativism, the populist radical right are considered exclusionary,\textsuperscript{411} in that they perceive all ‘non-natives’ as a “threat” to their mono-cultural nation-state ideal.\textsuperscript{412} These beliefs, which draw on their nativism, are reflected in their policy choices on immigration,\textsuperscript{413} which are generally restrictive. The second ideological feature of the party family, per Mudde, is authoritarianism, which he outlines as “the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely.”\textsuperscript{414} As Mudde discusses, he follows in the tradition of the Frankfurt School and the likes of Theodore Adorno et al., who define authoritarianism as: “a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority.”\textsuperscript{415} Importantly, this authoritarianism does not require anti-democratic leanings or sentiments, but it also does not exclude the possibility for it.\textsuperscript{416} A party belonging to this party family may be more or less anti-democratic, depending on the proclivities of the party and the political context at hand. The final feature of the party family, according to Mudde, is populism. As has been discussed, Mudde follows in the ideational tradition, arguing that populism is a ‘thin-centred’ ideology, so it is necessarily not as influential as the host ideology, in this case the radical right. He defines the populist ideology as one that “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”\textsuperscript{417} Given the fact he sees populism as necessarily less influential than the other ideological features, he sees that it is the nativism which dictates the populism and not the other way round. An example of how these three ideological features might be reflected in the actual policies of the populist radical right can be seen in the 2017 French Presidential Election manifesto of the National Rally (known at the time as the Front National). This is not an exhaustive list, but a sample of some of the policies of the party that reflect the above. These policies include: restricted and reduced immigration; policies to “combat multiculturalism and reinforce secularism”; and a referendum on

\textsuperscript{411} Mudde and Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America."
\textsuperscript{414} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}, 22.
\textsuperscript{415} Theodore Adorno et al., \textit{The Authoritarian Personality} (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 228.
\textsuperscript{416} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe}, 23.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid.
France’s membership within the European Union; the “restoration of French prestige” through increased military spending.  

Given the main themes of the core ideological features of the party as outlined above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the literature notes that the populist radical right tend to be fairly congruent when it comes to socio-cultural issues. Moreover, the party family is also seen to prioritise these socio-cultural issues over considerations that other, more mainstream parties may give greater weighting to, namely socio-economic concerns. Indeed, it is believed that socio-economic issues are not significantly important to the party family. As Mudde notes, “populist radical right parties do not focus primarily on socio-economic issues, as most mainstream parties do, but on socio-cultural issues.” This distinguishes the party family from the populist left, who are regarded to be primarily focused on socio-economic issues. In their comparative analysis of populism in Latin America and Europe, Mudde and Kaltwasser found that “the European populist radical right is in essence…a post-material phenomenon, based first and foremost on identity rather than (material) interest.” As Mudde has illustrated, historically the populist radical right were widely regarded as neoliberal economically, in part due to the association of right-wing politics with neoliberal economics. But has he notes, this was a claim rarely interrogated empirically. Recent literature has further fleshed out the economic positions of the party family, although there is still some disagreement on how to categorise it. For example, some authors argue that the populist radical right fits relatively neatly into the left-right economic spectrum. These authors see the party family as being on the economic right, and even at times the economic left. Others argue that this is not a sufficient way to understand how economic concerns play out within the party family. Those

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419 Otjes and Louwerse.
421 Otjes and Louwerse.
423 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 119.
424 Ibid.
427 See: Jan Rovny, "Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand? Position Blurring in Multidimensional
who follow this latter approach tend to see the economic concerns of the party family as highly influenced by its core ideological features (i.e., their nativism, authoritarianism and populism). For example, welfare chauvinism—the idea that welfare is to be celebrated and supported but only for natives—is a prominent economic policy espoused by some populist radical right parties, drawing on their nativism. Indeed, Mudde argues that research indicates that the populist radical right’s economic positions could be considered ‘nativist economics.’ As Otjes et al. argue, from this perspective the ‘core’ idea is:

…that these parties may diverge on a traditional economic left-right dimension that divides between those which favour government intervention and those which support market-based solutions, but that they share a commitment to economic nativism, economic populism and economic authoritarianism.

In general, then, whilst the populist radical right can be fairly easily categorised by their core ideological features (nativism, authoritarianism and populism), and therefore tend to be similar when it comes to both the supremacy of the socio-cultural issues that relate to those features within their agenda as well as the policies that make up that agenda (for example, restrictive immigration policies), there can be a greater variance in attitudes and on a policy level regarding the economy. This is particularly so if these are measured along the left-right political and economic spectrum. Importantly, however, what informs much of the literature on the role of the economy within the populist radical right is the idea that economic issues are not considered a primary consideration for the party family, but merely act as an extension of their core ideological concerns. As such, there is a belief within the literature that economic issues are “secondary” and “instrumental” for the party family.


431 Otjes et al., 271.

Relatedly, some scholars have debated the role of materialism and post-materialism in the emergence of the populist radical right party family. Ignazi, for example, has suggested that the populist radical right itself manifested as a reaction to the rise of post-materialist parties in the 1970s. So the thinking goes, as post-materialist parties like the Greens began to emerge during this period, the populist radical right later emerged as their “antithesis.” This thinking argues that these parties arose because they were able to “mobilise” support around the notion that post-materialist values were inflicting monumental damage on society, in that they were supposedly going to “destroy traditional communities, depersonalise society, and contribute to a general moral breakdown”). However, it is generally considered that this thesis, known as the modernisation thesis, provides a fairly limited explanation for the initial rise of the populist radical right in the 20th century. As Zaslove concludes in his analysis of the modernisation thesis, “claiming that voters vote for right-wing parties in order to oppose the rise of post-materialist values does not sufficiently address the causes behind the rise of these new parties on the right.” In part, this is because it assumes a primacy of cultural issues and ignores other factors like structural economic changes and class cleavages.

Relatively, Betz has similarly suggested that populist radical right parties emerged as a ‘material’ response to the post-materialism of parties like the Greens, with a focus on neoliberal economic policies. However, for all the reasons outlined above – namely, that there is a distinct incongruence between populist radical right parties’ economic policies (i.e. only some contain neoliberal economic stances) and that economic concerns are considered a secondary concern for the party family – this too does not provide a distinct enough picture of the party family’s roots and how the parties’ themselves manifest.

More generally, it is also important to note that the far-right have not always been so closely associated with populism. Prior to the mid-1980s, the far-right had been on the political fringes.

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435 Ibid.
437 Ibid., 67.
438 Ibid.
As Rydgren argues, the outcome of World War II and its associated events resulted in the far-right being marginalised politically. The master frame of the far-right during the early-to-mid 20th century—namely biological racism, antisemitism and anti-democracy—had been “rendered impotent” by the atrocities conducted under the banner of National Socialism. In the post-war era, with their association to Nazism and genocide, as well as the relative economic prosperity and political stability of the time, the far right had little appeal outside a small base of supporters. To combat this political ostracisation, the far right needed to appeal to a wider net of voters and shed its association with Nazism. No longer tied to a “defeated ideology”, some on the far-right, as Rydgren argues, moulded a new identity, with a new “potent master frame.” This master frame was no longer about biological racism, but cultural racism, and it was no longer anti-democratic, but anti-elite. The result was a new type of far-right party family, sufficiently distinct from their old identity as to be able to appeal to a new set of voters. As Rydgren notes:

> With the innovation of a new potent master frame combining ethnonationalism based on ‘cultural racism’ (the so-called ‘ethno-pluralist’ doctrine) and a populist (but not antidemocratic) anti-political establishment rhetoric, the extreme right was able to free itself from enough stigma to be able to attract voter groups that never would have considered voting for an ‘old’ right-wing extremist party promoting biological racism and/or antidemocratic stances.

By the 1980s, the party family that emerged from this specific shift in master frame – the populist radical right – was the most “dominant ideology” within the far-right umbrella in Europe. As Mudde notes, “almost all relevant far-right parties combined nativism, authoritarianism and populism.” Despite some parties on the far-right still harbouring some of the more elitist strains of the pre-populist era, the term ‘populism’ is now often used to describe all manners of far-right or radical right parties. In part, this labelling sloppiness is can be attributed to the aforementioned dominance of the populist radical right party family over

442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
446 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
other far right variants. But what also plays a part is the conceptual overlaps that exist between the ideological features of the populist radical right, in particular nativism, or nationalism, and populism.

In recent years these conceptual overlaps between nativism and populism have begun to be explored in the literature, most prominently by De Cleen and others in several works, as well as Breeze. For example, as De Cleen and Stavrakakis highlight, the term ‘the people’ can refer both to a “demos”—and therefore imply populism—or an “ethnos”—and imply nativism. For De Cleen and Stavrakakis, a populist claim centred around ‘the people’ will necessarily be structured along an up/down axis—with ‘the people’ as underdog and the elite as the oppressive ‘other’. A nationalist claim to ‘the people’ will be centred around space—a contained, limited sovereign community, whereby ‘the people’ and its culture, and associated language and values, are the insiders. The ‘other’ are necessarily those that sit outside that imagined community, who do not inhabit the culture, language and values of ‘the people’. In other words, while ‘the people’ are at the centre of both populist and nationalist or nativist claims, the direction of its operationalisation—either up against ‘the elite’ or outwards against a non-native ‘other’ will determine its categorisation as either populist or nativist. As Breeze outlines:

In both cases, there is a clear “other” that threatens the people’s “space,” but the metaphorical organisation of the situation is different, and may prime entailments that prompt differing social reactions: for example, populism is more likely to favour action against elites, while nationalism tends to be associated with xenophobia and jingoism.

Clearly demarcating between this up/down or in/out claim-making is not necessarily a simple process. The conceptual blurring of populism and nativism means that, as Breeze notes in her discussion of De Cleen and Stavrakakis’ work, “populism and nationalism are often tightly woven together, and separation of the strands is a delicate operation.” But, as Breeze’s work

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451 De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 303.

452 Ibid.

453 Ibid.

454 Breeze.

455 Ibid., 100.
proves, it can be done and this thesis follows in that vein. Moreover, in doing this, it should also be considered what it means when these ‘tightly woven’ concepts are combined in the way that they are under the populist radical right, such how these tenets actually manifest together and what it means when nativism ‘hosts’ populism. Again, Breeze’s work goes some way furthering our understanding in this matter. In her analysis of two European populist radical right parties, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and how they each operationalised a vertical (populist) and horizontal (nationalist) axis, she concluded that the parties’ nationalism (the horizontal axis) was “particularly powerful” but that their populism (the vertical axis) played a crucial part in the facilitation of this agenda. In short, their use of populism “activated” and propelled their nationalism, by “destabilis[ing] the political landscape” and discrediting ‘the elites’ in power. By undermining ‘the elites,’ the parties were able to position themselves as viable alternatives, and therefore also frame their nativism as more legitimate. In other words, the populism of AfD and UKIP was able to “boost” support for the parties and their respective nativism. In ‘hosting’ populism, therefore, the ideology of nativism (and more broadly the radical right) is able to undermine the status-quo power relations, ensure the parties in question are more viable, and therefore secure a wider appeal for their nativist (and, we can assume, their authoritarianist) stances. Understanding the connection between nativism and populism is essential, as is understanding how they are combined. This thesis contributes to the important work already conducted on this matter, but from an antipodean perspective.

*Left and centre populism*

While the focus of this research is on the populist radical right, I want to briefly outline what constitutes other ideological varieties of populism to provide a point of comparison between these and the case studies. Left-wing populism has most often been associated with Latin America. Indeed, Latin America is known for a prevalence of both right- and left-wing populism. As Stavrakakis et al. note: “Latin America has been a historical cradle of populism in the twentieth century and a key influence in the construction of its ‘ideal type’ by dint of the

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456 Ibid.
457 Ibid.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid., 89.
protagonistic role of charismatic leaders…,” including Juan Perón in Argentina on the right, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela on the left. As with left-wing populism in Europe, discussed briefly to follow, left-wing populism in Latin America is generally socio-economically focused, with policy initiatives including: “health care programmes, expansion of primary education, distribution of subsidized food and housing provision services.” As Mudde and Kaltwasser note, in part because of the focus on “improv[ing] the life of weak socio-economic groups” populism in Latin America is generally considered inclusionary (rather than the exclusionary type performed by the populist radical right in Europe).

Left-wing populism in Europe is regarded as similarly economic-focused, with some of the most prominent examples of European left-wing populism either emanating from or reaching heightened electoral success in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007/08. As Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis note, the most “paradigmatic” examples of the “new strand of Left-wing populism in today’s Europe” are the Greek Syriza and Spanish Podemos, which have each received relative electoral success in recent years. The authors see the parties as part of a “new wave” of radical left parties in Europe “who present strong populist characteristics, significant links with anti-austerity social movements and grassroots protests, as well as charismatic leaders.” The parties drew on their leftism and their populism to advocate for anti-austerity policies and policies that opposed neoliberalism in the aftermath of the recession. Moreover, as they note, Podemos also attempted to “connect with popular sentiments and common notions…and has put forward policy alternatives…using a plain, ‘ordinary’ language.” In their analysis of the radical left in Europe, March and Mudde argue that the

462 Ibid., 159.
463 Otjes and Louwerse.
populist left are, at their core, ideologically similar to democratic socialists, but incorporate the populist characteristics of people-centrism and anti-elitism. For March, their democratic socialist ideology is:

...overlaid with a stronger anti-elite, anti-establishment appeal, greater ideological eclecticism and emphasis on identity rather than class concerns (especially regionalism, nationalism or law-and-order issues).

These parties are distinctly left wing, closely resembling the attitudes of the non-populist, democratic socialist parties in Scandinavia and Iceland. These parties accept parliamentary democracy, and are anti-capitalist but not overtly Marxist. As has been noted, whilst left-wing populism is “characterised by an emphasis on socio-economic issues,” these parties also include New Left and other social movement concerns like environmentalism and feminism within their agendas. Their policies reflect these attitudes, including opposition to neo-liberalism, anti-austerity measures, and the democratisation of the European Union.

As the above illustrates, one of the key differences noted in the literature between the populist left and the populist right is the perceived primacy of economic issues within the party programs, with socio-economic issues seen as primarily the domain of left-wing populism, and socio-cultural issues primarily the domain of the right. Relatedly, Mudde and Kaltwasser have also noted that a distinguishing feature between left- and right-wing populism is the relative prominence and influence of their host ideology on a party’s agenda.

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469 Ibid.
470 Ibid.
471 March and Mudde, 35.
472 Otjes and Louwerse, 61.
474 March and Mudde, 42.
475 Ramiro and Gomez, 5.
476 March and Mudde, 42.
477 Mudde and Kaltwasser, *Voices of the Peoples: Populism in Europe and Latin America Compared.*
literature finds that the populist radical right are predominantly nativist, with populism acting as a secondary consideration for the party family. In contrast, Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that left-wing populists actually give greater weighting to their populism than their leftism. For example, while a left-wing populist may be socialist and populist, their populism will be the more influential ideological driving force.\textsuperscript{478}

Lastly, a centrist form of populism, while less prominent, retains the people-centrism and anti-elitism of populism but lacks the so-called ‘extremist’ policies that are associated with the radical left and right varieties.\textsuperscript{479} In his analysis of centrist populists in East Central Europe, Učeň, argues that these parties distance themselves from partisanship and mainstream ideologies, whilst at the same time also attack and criticise the elites who fail to look after people’s needs.\textsuperscript{480} Moreover, these parties also “offer easy solutions to complex problems…[and] offered themselves as the alternative and remedy to these troubles.”\textsuperscript{481} In their analysis of centrist populism in Central and Eastern Europe (what the authors call ‘anti-establishment reform parties’) Hanley and Sikk outline that these parties:

…have combined classically populist characteristics such as anti-elitist, anti-establishment rhetoric, espousal of direct democracy, a stress on moral renewal or technocratic expertise with moderate, pro-market policies and a liberal or relatively neutral stance on sociocultural questions.\textsuperscript{482}

\textit{Assessing policies}

To test and assess the degree to which the above is reflected in the case studies, the policies of the parties will be examined. A party’s policies, as found in the manifestos and policy documents of political parties, have been found to be an effective way to assess a party’s

\textsuperscript{478} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{481} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{482} Seán Hanley and Allan Sikk, "Paths to ‘Centrist Populism’? Explaining the Emergence of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties" (paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Madrid, 8-12 July 2012), 1.
ideology. As Rooduijn and Pauwels note in their study of methods for measuring populism from an ideological perspective: “an election manifesto can be seen as the document that gives the clearest overview of what a party stands for at a certain point in time.” Researchers on populism, in particular those utilising a ‘thin-centred’ ideological approach, have used party policies as a means to assess both populism specifically, as well as the degree to which a populist party might prioritise (or not) their thicker, non-populist host ideology (such as socialism, or the radical right). Moreover, as the previous discussions illustrates, whilst certain attitudes are associated with populist parties and actors generally—namely an antagonism towards the ‘elite’—the actual policies held by parties considered populist will very much depend on the ideological leanings of the given party. Therefore, the policies of populist parties can obviously aid in identifying where populist parties sit within party-family categories (and thus also help clarify the stance of parties that claim to be beyond the confines of the left-right paradigm, which is common amongst populist parties who are attempting to exist outside of normal political paradigms) but it can also determine the degree to which certain ideological tenets (say, nativism) dominate a party’s program over others (say, populism or authoritarianism).

Framework for Assessing and Analysing the Populist Radical Right

I have synthesised the above discussion and the analysis from the previous chapter, which outlined the constituent features of radical right populism (people-centrism, anti-elitism, ‘othering’ and crisis), into an analytical framework for the proceeding analysis of the case studies, with a tabled summary of this framework found in the concluding section of this chapter. This framework will be used to construct two codebooks, described in detail in the following chapter (and provided in Appendix A and B), to conduct the analysis. Importantly, I not only want to test and contribute to the theory outlined above, but I also want to decipher

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483 The Manifesto Project, for example, which collates and analyses political manifestos and programs, is considered an excellent source for determining the ideology of a political party. For an in-depth study of the methods used by the Manifesto Project, the “prima facie method of estimating policy positions of political parties using their manifestos,” see: Elias Dinas and Kostas Gemenis, Measuring Parties’ Ideological Positions with Manifesto Data: A Critical Evaluation of the Competing Methods (Newcastle: Keele University, 2009).
484 Rooduijn and Pauwels, 1274.
485 See: ibid.
486 March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."
the different ways these features play out in different political contexts, and therefore how context influences the utilisation of the populist radical right ideology.

By taking populism as a form of discourse, I take that the discourse of the leaders of the case-study parties is representative of the party’s populism as a whole.\textsuperscript{487} I will therefore assess the discourse manifest in their speeches to assess the presence of the aforementioned constituent features: in-grouping and out-grouping, and crisis. In assessing how these features manifest in the case studies at hand, there will be three specific areas of interest. Firstly, to what degree are the parties more or less populist, and what role does their populism play in their broader ideological agendas? Secondly, to what degree do these parties conform to the previous theory on populism and the populist radical right party family? Secondly, to what degree has the particular geo-political context of the case study influenced the way the party’s populism and radical right ideology is utilised? For example, through analysing the various processes employed by the leaders to propagate people-centric, anti-elitist and ‘othering’ themes, we can elucidate the degree to which nativism or populism is the primary means used to divide society into binary groups. Per De Cleen and Stavrakakis,\textsuperscript{488} it is important to distinguish between an in-grouping and out-grouping that is based on populism (i.e., a people against a corrupt elite), or that which is derived actually from nativism (i.e., a people against a non-native ‘other’). Moreover, through analysing the presence of crisis in the leaders’ speeches, I can determine the degree of populism in the parties, the degree to which crisis is indeed an “internal feature” of populism, per Moffitt,\textsuperscript{489} and how the employment of crisis themes may differ depending on the party at hand. Within this, I also assess the degree to which blame for a crisis plays a role in the leaders’ language, in denigrating and discrediting an out-group, per Hameleers et al.\textsuperscript{490}

Secondly, from an ideational perspective, I assess how the populist radical right ideology is utilised by each of the case studies, per their policy manifesto and/or documents. Again, as with the above, there are three areas of interest. Firstly, the degree to which populism or the radical right is manifest in the case studies’ policies, and whether it conforms to the theory. Specifically, I assess the degree to which nativism is the primary ideological driving force of

\textsuperscript{487} It is important to note that the discourse of a leader may not always be representative of a party as a whole. For example, Trump’s speeches are not necessarily representative of the Republican Party’s broader agenda. However, it is appropriate for the case studies at hand, ON and the PVV, given they are essentially ‘personal’ parties.

\textsuperscript{488} De Cleen and Stavrakakis.

\textsuperscript{489} Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."

\textsuperscript{490} Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese.
each case study, over both authoritarianism and populism, per Mudde, and how the parties differ on a policy level. This also draws on the call for researchers and observers broadly to more fully distinguish between populism and its ideological bedfellows, in this case nativism or nationalism, per De Cleen, Rydgren and others. Secondly, I want to test the degree to which socio-economic issues are really a ‘secondary’ and ‘instrumentalised’ consideration for the case studies. Given that this idea informs much of the literature on socio-economic issues and the party family, it is important to determine whether this is true of all parties within the family, even in different geopolitical contexts. Relatedly, the third focus is again the way this ideology is employed differently in different contexts.

Through this empirical examination, whose methods will be explored in detail in the following chapter, I want to achieve three goals. Firstly, to determine the degree to which the parties are populist, and how their populism functions alongside their host ideology to facilitate agendas. Secondly, to test the above theory to further the theoretical and empirical understanding of the party family. Thirdly, to contribute to the literature on how the party family differs between contexts. Through this, my hope is that we can also better understand and map the divergent ways the party family positions itself for success in different contexts. The following chapter will constitute the methodological framework for the proceeding empirical examination of the case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>What is being tested</th>
<th>Theory tested</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse, as found in the speeches of the party leader</td>
<td>People-centrism</td>
<td>What constitutes the ‘people’</td>
<td>Nativism or populism The ‘people’ constructed as ‘underdog’ against the ‘elite’</td>
<td>Mudde De Cleen; De Cleen and Stavrakakis; De Cleen et al.; Rydgren</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

491 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
492 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in *Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum*.
| As above | Anti-elitism | Presence of anti-elitist discourse | Nativism or populism  
The ‘people’ positioned in opposition to an ‘elite’ out-group | As above |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| As above | ‘Othering’ | Presence of discourse that ‘others’ a non-elite out-group | Nativism or populism  
‘The people’ positioned in opposition to a non-elite out-group | As above |
| As above | Societal declinism/crisis | Presence and type of crisis | Crisis as an ‘internal’ feature of populism | Moffitt |
| As above | Blame | Presence of blame | Blame attribution main ‘populist’ frame  
Crisis and its role in ‘othering,’ anti-elitism | Hameleers et al. |
| Policy of party | Nativism | Role of PRR ideology | Nativism as primary ideological feature of party family  
Nativism/nationalism v populism | Mudde |
| | | | | De Cleen; De Cleen and Stavrakakis; De Cleen et al.; Rydgren |
| As above | Authoritarianism | As above | As above | Mudde |
| As above | Populism | As above | As above | Mudde |
| As above | Socio-economic | Role of socio-economic issues in the party family | Socio-economic issues purview of left populism, PRR prioritise post-materialist issues | Mudde  
Otjes et al. |
Chapter Four: Methodology - A multi-typological, mixed-method approach

This chapter outlines the methodology used to test the framework in the empirical analysis. This thesis examines how the constituent features of populism outlined in the previous chapters—its necessary in-grouping and out-grouping and an ‘internal’ relationship to crisis—and the presence of a host ideology, namely the radical right, manifest in practice in different contexts, thus determining the degree of populism present, and the role that populism plays alongside the radical right ideology. Two widely considered populist radical right parties were chosen as case studies to examine this: the Australian One Nation Party (ON) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). This research employed a mixed quantitative and qualitative method to assess these case studies, conducted in two stages, outlined to follow. Two supply-side variables were chosen to assess the respective constituent features of populism against the case studies: the discourse of the party’s leader, which test the presence and type of in-grouping and out-grouping and themes of crisis; and the party’s policies, which tested the presence of the populist radical right ideology, amongst other issues. These variables were chosen for their respective applicability for assessing populism and ideology, respectively. Discourse has been found in previous research to be a valid way of assessing populism, whereas the analysis of party manifestos/policies are effective in assessing the ideology of a party. Two codebooks which drew from the theoretical framework outlined in Chapters Two and Three were constructed and are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. These codebooks were followed to conduct the quantitative stage and qualitative stage of the analysis, respectively. The first stage was a quantitative content analysis, and was used to assess the frequency and degree of populism and radical right in the case studies. The second stage of the analysis involved conducting a qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis. The data drawn from this stage allowed for analysis into the particular ways the populist features and the radical right ideology manifest


496 Dinas and Gemenis, 2.

497 Sources are discussed in the body to follow and an index is provided in the Appendix. Sources include a series of speeches given by the leader of the given party, and the policy document/manifesto for the party for the election that falls during the period of analysis.
in the discourse and programs of the given party, how populism intersects with the other agendas of a party, and other policy-level issues. This stage was operationalised by a set of questions, and assessed, for example (but not limited to), the type of language that was used to facilitate the party’s respective crisis themes and create binaries between the people, the elite and the ‘other’. The qualitative nature of this stage also allowed for analysis into which particular groups the party ‘othered’ in particular sources, and the particular policies the party chose to include in their programs. Furthermore, while it has been noted in previous research that the policies of the populist radical right tend to congregate around socio-cultural policies and diverge more on socio-economic issues, there was still scope for analysis in assessing the differences and similarities between each case study at the policy level. For example, even within socio-cultural areas there is scope for assessing the differences between the radical right parties, such as within LGBTQ+ policy agendas. Furthermore, within policy areas where one would expect similarity, such as immigration, there is scope for discussion regarding the particularities of the specific policy chosen to implement the party’s anti-immigrant stance. Therefore, Stage Two not only allowed for analysis into the different language utilised by the parties to construct their policies, but also how the policies of radical right populist parties vary, coalesce, and generally manifest in different contexts, e.g. Australia and the Netherlands, and thus why the party may have chosen that particular policy to achieve their political goals.

Along with the empirical mixed-method methodology, this research utilised a multi-typology methodology. It takes that the labels that have been so far attributed to populism—ideology, style, logic, discourse, strategy—are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they represent the different ways populism can manifest in practice, depending on context and the actor, party or movement that utilises it. This multi-typology methodology also allowed for the utilisation of the different epistemological approaches used by researchers who traditionally sit in different camps. This research draws from two theoretical camps in particular to conceptualise populism: the ideational tradition, which takes populism to be a thin-centred ideology; and

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498 Mudde and Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America."

499 The PVV is known for having liberal positions in some socio-cultural areas, such as on LGBTQ+ issues. As Moffitt notes, “Wilders has also been keen to paint himself as an ally of the LGBTQ community.” See: Benjamin Moffitt, "Liberal Illiberalism? The Reshaping of the Contemporary Populist Radical Right in Northern Europe," Politics and Governance 5, no. 4 (2017): 115.

500 See: Engesser et al.

the discourse tradition, which takes populism to be a form of language and rhetoric. Drawing on these, this research takes that populism as a thin-centred ideology represents what constitutes populism’s features, its particular way of construing the political. As a discourse, it is one way of communicating and operationalising these features. In this sense, populism as discourse can be employed to greater or lesser degrees, by traditionally ‘populist’ actors as well as by those who are widely considered mainstream or ‘non-populist’. By embracing these respective approaches, we can acknowledge that populism indeed presents a particular way of conceiving the political world—that the people are the true democrats who have had their political preferences obstructed by an elite establishment, and that society is persistently in crisis—but it also exists as a form of discourse and communication. In the latter, there is also a methodological benefit, where we can utilise the assessment of discourse as a means of evaluating and analysing how populism manifests in particular contexts.

A three-year time-period, from December 2014 until December 2017, was chosen as the period of analysis for both the quantitative and qualitative stages for each case study. This three-year period was chosen for methodological reasons. This length of time provides sufficient scope to capture modulations in the discourse used by each party’s leader over time and context. In particular, within this period there was an election held in each country (Australia, June 2016; the Netherlands, March 2017) and it also captures the occurrence and aftermath of significant events in each country, the Sydney Siege (December 2014) in Australia, and the European Migrant Crisis (beginning January 2015) in the Netherlands, which relate to the key themes of the party family, suggesting the parties could have received increased prominence as a result of these events. As such, these events acted as salient events to begin the analysis. The events are significant within the context of each party’s agenda because of their respective connection to issues like immigration, Islam, terrorism and national security. These interrelated issues hold significant importance within the programs of populist radical right parties in general. Immigration, for example, has long been a prominent aspect of the programs of the populist

502 The discourse-theoretical approach draws from the early work by Ernesto Laclau, as well as Chantal Mouffe, with an intersect with the logic approach. See: Laclau, Politics & Ideology in Marxist Theory.; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985). For empirical examinations of populism as discourse, see footnote 2.

503 See: Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective.

504 There is no precise beginning for the Migrant Crisis. As such, while it is widely considered to have culminated in mid-2015, it is prudent to begin the period of analysis earlier than this point.
radical right,\textsuperscript{505} and more recently an anti-Islam ethos has also become a more pronounced part of that restrictive immigration ethos and as such a cornerstone of the populist radical right agenda generally.\textsuperscript{506} These events also symbolise the rising importance of Islam in the broader socio-political consciousness in Australia and the Netherlands. Analysing this period, which contains events that relate back to the fundamental themes of each party’s programs as well as significant elections, means that we can assess the way in which the discourse of each party’s leader might be impacted by external events, and furthermore, how the party frames their respective policy pursuits within changing contexts. In addition, utilising the same time frame of analysis for each party allowed for a consistent comparative data analysis.

Finally, the sources that were subjected to the above mixed-method analysis were selected because they each fell during this period, and the fact that each source drew on similar themes (immigration, Islam, terrorism and national security), with these factors facilitating a degree of consistency amongst the sources. The sources, described in more to follow, are a selection of speeches by ON leader Pauline Hanson and the PVV leader Geert Wilders, and the election policy manifestos/documents for their respective elections. A list of these sources are provided in Appendix C (ON) and Appendix D (PVV). While this research is an examination of populist parties on the supply-side, three demand-side conditions are discussed in relation to the findings to contextualise the results. These are: the broader socio-cultural and socio-political environment in each country related to immigration; economic conditions; and opinion polling data. Also, as part of this contextualisation, two mainstream parties in Australia and the Netherlands are included in the discussion of the findings from ON and the PVV. In doing so, these parties provide opportunity to unpack the different approaches to discourse and policy taken by leaders and parties of the same context.

The empirical methods utilised in this thesis build on previous research conducted by March. His chosen methodology for his analysis of left-wing and right-wing populism in Britain, “Left and Right Populism Compared: the British Case,”\textsuperscript{507} provides the foundation upon which this method is based, although it is adapted to suit the purposes of this analysis. His process of


\textsuperscript{506} Ulrike M. Vieten and Scott Poynting, "Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe," \textit{Journal of Intercultural Studies} 37, no. 6 (2016): 533.

\textsuperscript{507} March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."
combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods, conducted in two distinct stages, builds and improves on previous research on assessing and measuring populism, which has mainly prioritised quantitative content analyses over qualitative approaches.\textsuperscript{508} The benefits he highlights of this approach include the fact that it is able to provide data that is quantifiable, thus is able to assess degree of populism, but can also provide a more nuanced, “fine-grained” analysis that is able to discern more clearly between types of populism and the particularities of each party’s “specific ideological components.”\textsuperscript{509} For these reasons, March’s inclusion of qualitative methods in addition to quantitative studies provides a significant benefit to strategies for assessing degree of populism.

This chapter, which further explores the methodological framework briefly summarised above, will proceed in three sections: first, an examination of the respective case studies; second, a review of the methods that will be utilised to undertake the supply-side analysis; finishing with a brief conclusion. The codebooks used for the analysis, alongside the table of sources, are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.

\textbf{The Case Studies}

This thesis is an applied theoretical analysis that involves the application of theory to empirical examination against real-world case studies.\textsuperscript{510} This comparative study determined how the principles of in/out grouping, crisis utilisation, and the role of a companion ideology, specifically the radical right, are operationalised in different democracies by two parties widely considered ‘populist’. While the theoretical underpinnings of this research outlined (i.e., in-grouping between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’; and crisis) are applicable to populism in general—that is, the varieties of populism that can appear along the ideological spectrum—the empirical examination in this research is specifically focused on the particular iteration


\textsuperscript{509} March, ”Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case.”

\textsuperscript{510} For a discussion on theoretical analysis and its relationship to empirical analysis within the field of sociology, see: Guillermina Jasso, ”Principles of Theoretical Analysis,” \textit{Sociological Theory} 6, no. 1 (1988); for a discussion on applied political theory for migration studies, see: Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ”Applied Political Theory and Qualitative Research in Migration Studies,” in \textit{Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies}, ed. Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Evren Yalez (Springer Open, 2018).
highlighted above: how populism operates when combined with a radical right ideology, and how this type of populism manifests in different geographical contexts. One Nation and the Party for Freedom have been chosen as case studies to examine this due to the fact they share considerable similarities as parties, but also share important differences which provide the scope for analysis. In particular, these differences – related to their different geographic and resultant political contexts – are key to understanding how the populist radical right manifest differently depending on context. This approach, whereby cases are selected due to sharing a requisite number of similarities and differences, follows in the spirit of the ‘most similar’ method, defined whereby “cases (two or more) are similar on specified variables other than X and/or Y.” The variables utilised to determine similarity are ideology, party structure, electoral success, and age of party. The variables utilised to determine difference are geography and political system.

First and foremost, underscoring the decision to analyse these parties was that they both shared the same ideology, in that they belong to the populist radical right party family. The decision to confine the examination to the populist radical right, rather than left-wing populism, or a combination of both, was driven by the research goal – to better understand populism as it is attached to the radical right. But underpinning this decision to focus on the radical right was that right-wing populist parties and movements have experienced a growth in support throughout the world in recent years and as a consequence have faced an increased degree of success electorally, as exemplified in the increase in support for right-wing wing populists in various countries in Europe, as well as the Brexit referendum result, the election of Donald Trump in the United States, and the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, all in 2016. While some left-wing populist parties have experienced some electoral success in recent years, for example the Greek Syriza, and the Spanish Podemos, left-wing populism in general

513 Syriza was in government between 2015 (when they gained 78 seats to overthrow the liberal-conservative New Democracy party) to 2019.
has not experienced the same levels of notoriety or success in recent years as its right-wing counterparts. As observers contemplate the impact of the electoral success of the former on liberal democracies, it is crucial to unpack the degree to which populism or the host ideology that accompanies it (i.e., the radical right) is responsible for the widely perceived challenges currently facing liberal democracy.\(^5\) It is therefore increasingly important to understand the nature of populism, particularly as it is attached to the radical right, the different ways it can manifest depending on geographical context, and, ultimately, map the various ways these parties can position themselves for success electorally.

ON and the PVV are also both relatively new populist radical right parties, emerging in similar fashions and from similar ideological roots. For example, ON and PVV both grew out of centre-right liberal parties. ON was formed by current leader Hanson in 1997 after the Liberal Party disendorsed her for expressing racist opinions, whereas Wilders formed the PVV in 2006 after he left the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). A disagreement had ensued between Wilders and the VDD regarding Turkey’s potential membership of the European Union, and Wilders had generally become disaffected with the party.\(^6\) This relative newness has partly meant that their respective ideology, and the stances that go along with that, have been relatively consistent. In particular, it means that, unlike some other PRR parties like National Rally (formerly known as Front National), there has not necessarily been the need for image changes in order to shed associations to a more overt type of racism seen in generations past.\(^7\) ON and the PVV also share structural similarities, in that they are both considered personal parties, with hierarchical leadership structures.\(^8\)

Finally, both ON and the PVV experienced relative electoral success in the elections of the time frame of analysis, in June 2016 and March 2017 respectively. ON won four seats in the Australian Senate, and a total of 4.28 percent of the vote in the election,\(^9\) which is a significant

\(^5\) Mudde, "How Populism Became the Concept That Defines Our Age."


\(^7\) Jens Rydgren, "Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark," *West European Politics* 27, no. 3 (2004).


\(^9\) Kefford and McDonnell.

gain for a minor party within the Australian electoral context. The PVV gained five seats in the 2017 election, finishing second to the centre-right VVD. However, despite this second place, the party did form part of the coalition to form government. As such, given that the purpose of focusing on the populist radical right as case studies was the electoral prominence of the party family in recent years, analysing parties that have shared in this prominence is important.

In pursuing a goal to understand the different ways that the populist radical right manifests in different contexts, it was important that one area of difference between the parties was geographic. In choosing Australia and the Netherlands, the balance was met between ON and the PVV sharing significant similarities as parties, but the geopolitical contexts were different enough to provide ample scope for a robust comparative analysis. The different geographical conditions of each country are particularly relevant. Australia is relatively isolated compared to the Netherlands, being an island nation. The Netherlands, in contrast, is situated in Western Europe, shares land borders with two countries, Germany and Belgium, and as part of the Schengen area has a free movement of people policy with 26 other countries. The different demand-side socio-cultural and socio-political conditions that these issues create, and the consequential impact these can have on the supply-side decisions made by each party, make for fruitful opportunity for comparison for populist radical right parties. For example, the Netherlands has a higher frequency of terrorist related incidents. There are also differences in the electoral systems in each country—Australia has an ingrained two-party system and single-member seats, whereas the Netherlands has a multi-party, proportional system reliant on coalition building—but with enough sufficient similarities to ensure a valid comparison. These include the fact that Australia and the Netherlands are both Western, liberal, representative, parliamentary democracies, and both are constitutional monarchies, and while


522 The Schengen Area is an area in Europe where there is legal, free movement of persons between 26 member states. The area: "entitles every EU citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities. Schengen cooperation enhances this freedom by enabling citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks. The border-free Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens, as well as to many non-EU nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on the EU territory." See: European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, "Schengen Area," accessed February 28, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en.

Australia is generally a two-party system with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and Liberal Party dominating, rarely resulting in the need to form coalitions with minor parties to form government, multiple minor political parties still exist in the Australian system and experience a degree of prominence. Thus, the different broader societal and political contexts in Australia and the Netherlands provide opportunity for a fertile examination into the various ways populism can manifest in different cultural and political climates.

There is another final, important reason that these two parties were chosen as cases over other populist radical right parties. The goals of the research required analysing parties that shared enough similarities but existed in different geographic and political contexts. But in ensuring that the result of the analysis was the widening of our understanding of how the populist radical right manifests in different contexts, one case study needed to be located in a context that has hitherto had little empirical or comparative examination. Conversely, I also considered it necessary that the other case study be the opposite in this regard. With much of the literature on the populist radical right party family having been derived from European examples, and little drawn from the antipodes, ON and the PVV fitted this brief suitably. Therefore, through this comparison, I argue that there is scope to challenge grow our knowledge of the part family as well as challenge preconceived notions.

Underscoring the decision to analyse ON and the PVV was the determination to confine the examination to two case studies and thus a small-N analysis, rather than conducting a comparative analysis of many populist radical right parties. This was taken for two reasons. Firstly, to ensure a high level of precision in the analysis. By analysing fewer cases, and therefore devoting a larger proportion of one’s time and focus to the specific case study parties, rather than a larger number of parties, I was able to ensure a greater degree of accuracy and precision in the analysis; but also, importantly, go more deeply into the case study, ensuring that nuances are taken into account. Examining fewer cases also avoids the issue that Sartori notes whereby analysing a large number of cases leads to “conceptual stretching.” As Sartori argues, the confinement of an analysis to a small number of cases avoids the issue of “conceptual stretching” that can arise when you apply a concept to a broad range of cases. As Collier discusses in relation to Sartori’s work, as one applies a concept to a broader range

525 Ibid.
of cases, “some of the meaning associated with the concept [may] fail to fit new cases.” This ‘stretching’ can lead to imprecision and inaccuracies. Collier suggests that “from this perspective it may be argued that the most interesting studies will often be those that focus on a smaller number of cases.” Secondly, given the dearth of research on populism in the antipodes, I suggest that a more in-depth analysis of such parties is required before larger scale comparative studies can be undertaken. In this sense, this second reason draws on the first, whereby I argue that a precise and close analysis of one party, which is able to delve more deeply and draw out the nuances that necessarily exist within party families, is a necessary first step before large scale examinations can take place. And given that much of the research on the populist radical right is drawn from European cases, the role of the PVV serves two purposes. Firstly, to provide a nuanced, deep analysis of the party itself, in relation to the variables (per the above); and secondly, to also provide new insights, via comparison, into the populism that exists in regions lesser studied. The small-N analysis, therefore, is both practical and necessary to the end goals of this research. And while the weaknesses of a small-N comparative analysis are acknowledged (namely, the issue of “many variables, small number of cases,”) I argue that the precision required to understand a party, with nuance and depth, necessitates a small-N analysis.

Arguably, one setback of conducting a small-N case study analysis is that the findings from the case studies are not going to be generalisable due to the small sample size. However, I argue that this concern is overblown. While small-N analyses have the potential to be less generalisable and predictive as those derived from a large-N analysis, this is a problem that can be mitigated to an extent through case-study selection, as well as through ensuring that any generalisations made from a small-N analysis are applied to similar cases only. Steinberg has also gone as far as to make the argument that, in fact, not only can we generalise from case studies, but case studies can also be as generalisable as large-N analyses. As he puts it:

527 Ibid.
530 Paul F. Steinberg, “Can We Generalize from Case Studies?,” Global Environmental Politics 15, no. 3 (2015).
Ironically, when critics claim that one cannot generalize from case studies because these break the conventions of statistical analysis, they are committing an error of generalization—extending conclusions beyond the boundary conditions of their subject matter without offering a logical justification.\textsuperscript{531}

Moreover, as I argue above, the newness of some of the research topics—crisis and the antipodean case—required a deep analysis that was necessary before large scale analyses can be conducted. By limiting the analysis to two populist radical right parties, the capacity for fine-grained analysis is retained. The result of which is a more sufficient understanding of how, for example, crisis is utilised within the case-studies’ program. From this, a larger-scale analysis can be undertaken which leans on this initial early work. Additionally, a small-N analysis is still able to provide important elucidations about the party family as well as generate tentative generalisations,\textsuperscript{532} contingent on cases being similar to those under study.\textsuperscript{533} Therefore, by conducting a small-scale analysis, the balance between the “deep and narrow” of case studies and the “broad and shallow” of large-N is appropriately met.\textsuperscript{534} In other words, the capacity for generating tentative generalisations remain, but so too is the capacity for the sufficient depth of analysis that were necessary for the research goals.

While this analysis is focused on the supply-side, it is nevertheless important to contextualise the findings drawn from ON and the PVV. This contextualisation takes place through a discussion in the respective case study chapters which situates the findings within the broader geopolitical contexts of Australia and the Netherlands. Three demand-side factors (politics of immigration; economic conditions; opinion-polling data) are discussed to achieve this. In addition to this societal contextualisation, a party system contextualisation takes place through a discussion of two mainstream parties from each country in relation to the findings from ON and the PVV: the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party (as part of the Coalition with the National Party, LNP); and the Labour Party (PvdA) and The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in the Netherlands. A shorter analysis of the leaders’ speeches was undertaken, as well as a policy analysis, using the same methods as the case studies. The purpose of this was to provide some comparative discussion points in relation to the case studies. As such, it should be noted that the findings from the mainstream parties were not used

\textsuperscript{531} Ibid., 172.
\textsuperscript{532} Gerring.
\textsuperscript{534} Steinberg. 158.
to provide a comprehensive analysis of these parties’ populism. Indeed, this thesis does not seek to determine the degree of populism in mainstream parties in Australia and the Netherlands, and the analysis undertaken was not undertaken with this in mind. Instead, findings from this briefer analysis were used to provide a sample of how discourse and policy can be used or implemented by different actors and parties and allow for a further fleshing out of the case studies’ own populism, nativism and authoritarianism. For example, the presence of the mainstream parties provided opportunity for comparing the variety of ways certain populist discourse, such as the term ‘the people,’ can be constructed, and in doing so explores how the case studies themselves chose to achieve that construction in comparison. While many authors use the term mainstream, it is not often defined. ‘Mainstream’ is therefore defined here as electorally prominent parties which are considered ideologically centre-left, centrist, or centre-right. The parties were chosen because they represent the largest mainstream parties in each country during the period of analysis and the respective centre-left and centre-right parties are ideologically comparable with each other. The centre-left ALP and the centre-right Liberal Party in Australia are the two most dominant parties in the Australian electoral landscape. The country’s two-party system means that coalitions are rarely needed to form government, so the governing party generally alternates between these two parties. In the Netherlands, the centre-left PvdA and centre-right VVD provide similar benefits for analysis. While the PvdA experienced a significant electoral decline in the 2017 general election, losing 29 seats, they were the second-largest party in the governing coalition during the 2012-2017 period, second only to the VVD, and thus during most of the period of analysis.

One Nation

Formed in 1997, the Australian One Nation (ON) party is widely considered a populist radical right party. Hanson established ON with then advisors David Ettridge and David Oldfield in the wake of her 1996 election to the Australian federal parliament. Hanson had originally run

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535 Meguid, 358.
536 The Liberal Party has been in a long-standing coalition with the rural, centre-right conservative National Party since 1946, with alliances between each party’s respective previous iterations reaching as far back as 1923. They are collectively known as the Coalition. The Liberal Party is the larger, more dominant party of the Coalition, and will remain the focus of this control-group analysis.
537 van Holsteyn.
for parliament during this election under the centre-right Liberal Party but was disendorsed for espousing racist views about the Australian Indigenous population. Because of this disendorsement, Hanson was forced to run as an independent candidate for the federal Queensland seat of Oxley, and following this formed ON. Having been successful in 1996, Hanson lost the seat in 1998. The party failed to reach similar success on a federal level in subsequent years, despite having significant success at the 1998 Queensland state election. After a period of decline which saw unsuccessful election campaigns, by February 2000 the last of the Queensland state members of ON defected to alternative parties. During this period ON had been prone to instability, experiencing internal disputes amongst its founders and its own senators, lawsuits against Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield by former members, and consequential party splits. During the late 1990s period, ON was accused of lacking “ideological unity, organisational infrastructure and political skills necessary to unify a disparate collection of individuals into a modern political party.” These reasons, as well as the “discrepancy between Hanson’s autocratic style and her populist rhetoric,” are said to have contributed to the party’s initial decline in the late 1990s. ON had “publicly imploded,” and by 2004 support for the party had dissipated. Its position as a “political force,” had ‘disappeared’ as “dramatically” as it had arrived. However, this decline was only temporary as the party re-emerged in 2015, now styled as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. The 2016 federal election saw a “revival” of ON’s successes, and the party elected four senators in total, including leader Pauline Hanson, with two emanating from the state of Queensland, and one each from New South Wales and Western Australia. The return of ON to Australian federal politics was said to have “rocked Australian politics.”

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540 DeAngelis, 16.
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid., 193.
544 Ibid.
545 Ibid.
546 Forrest et al., 458.
547 Rutherford, 193.
548 Forrest et al., 458.
549 Australian Electoral Commission.
550 McSwiney and Cottle, 27.
2000s, the party remains riddled with disunity and internal disputes.\textsuperscript{551} Since the 2016 election, ON has had a rotation of senators resign or be disqualified,\textsuperscript{552} one of whom was in an open feud with leader Hanson.\textsuperscript{553}

Ideologically, the party has remained relatively consistent. Since its inception in the mid-1990s, in-grouping and out-grouping of demarcated groups, the impending decline of Australia’s way of life, and a distinctly right-wing ideology have all been mainstays of ON’s image. The party is broadly perceived as nativist and xenophobic, supporting an anti-immigration position and holding a perception of non-whites as a threat to ‘Australian’ culture,\textsuperscript{554} and the party is known for its “preoccupation with a fear of invasion.”\textsuperscript{555} The party also divides society into two groups—the ‘everyday’ Australians they claim to represent,\textsuperscript{556} and an ‘other’ of non-white ‘invaders,’ all the while “rejecting a ‘political class’” they claim is “overrun by ‘vested interests.’”\textsuperscript{557} From its founding, the ON has consistently ‘othered’ specifically demarcated minority ethnic groups, but the party’s focus has shifted. Currently, Islam and Muslims are the focus of the party’s ire. However, during its initial period of success in the mid-1990s the locus of ON’s antagonisms was not Islam, as it is now,\textsuperscript{558} but Asian immigration, along with the Australian Indigenous population.\textsuperscript{559} In their 90s heyday, the party articulated a fear that Australia would be “swamped,” by Asians, and that the white majority in Australia “would be imperilled.”\textsuperscript{560} The party was also “hostile towards Aboriginal reconciliation,” and multiculturalism generally.\textsuperscript{561} More recently, the party shifted their antagonism towards Islam as the broader cultural zeitgeist and norms also shifted, which relates back to the populist reliance on crisis. A state of general crisis cannot last forever—e.g., the fear that Australia will be overrun by Asian immigration—as a crisis needs to be measured against an idea of normalcy

\textsuperscript{552} This includes the replacement senators who were implemented after previous senators resigned.
\textsuperscript{553} See: Green. See also: Amy Remeikis, “Brian Burston Responds to Pauline Hanson: ‘She Has Had a Massive Dummy Spit’,” \textit{The Guardian}, 1 June, 2018.
\textsuperscript{554} McSwiney and Cottle, 89.
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{556} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{557} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{558} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{559} Ben-Moshe, 24.
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid., 24.
or non-crisis, so the evolution of crisis, in the form of a shift in locus of antagonism, is crucial for ON’s continued subsistence and relevance.

It is worth noting that although disendorsed by the Liberal Party in 1996 because of her racist comments, Hanson’s anti-Asian agenda was not isolated to her or ON generally. As Richard DeAngelis notes, in the decade leading up to the 1997 formation of ON, there had been comments by prominent Australians, like academic and commentator Geoffrey Blainey, about the state of immigration policy in Australia at the time, questioning “the size and ethnic and racial makeup of recent Australian” immigrants.\footnote{DeAngelis, 2.} Moreover, then opposition leader and leader of the Liberal Party, John Howard, who was leader of the party when Hanson was disendorsed, also “warned of ‘excessive’ Asian immigration levels.”\footnote{Ibid.} Despite criticisms at the time of such anti-Asian rhetoric,\footnote{Ibid., 3.} it is important to note that ON’s attitudes towards Asian immigration were also prominent amongst some mainstream commentators during this period.\footnote{Ibid., 2.} Despite Asian immigration no longer being a locus of ON’s antagonisms, anti-immigration is still a central component of the party’s platform.\footnote{McSwiney and Cottle, 89.} As has been noted, now in its place is Islam and its ‘incompatibility’ with Australian culture and institutions.\footnote{Ibid.}

Islam, and the related issues of immigration, assimilation, and fears surrounding terrorism have played an important role in ON’s image in the 21st century. Moreover, the Sydney Siege in particular marks a turning point in Australia’s broader awareness regarding the latter point. In December 2014, Man Haron Monis, a Muslim man, enacted a terrorist attack in Sydney, Australia. The Sydney Siege involved the perpetrator, Monis, taking several citizens hostage in a Lindt Café in the central business district of Sydney.\footnote{Binoy Kampmark, "Releasing the "Terror Genie": Man Haron Monis and the "Sydney Siege"", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, no. 4 (2017): 496.} Two hostages and Monis were killed as a result of the event. The event, which “placed Australia on the global terrorist map,”\footnote{Ibid.} brought what had long been a threat internationally to Australian consciousness. As Binoy Kampmark notes, the incident:

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\footnote{DeAngelis, 2.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., 3.}
\footnote{Ibid., 2.}
\footnote{McSwiney and Cottle, 89.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Binoy Kampmark, "Releasing the "Terror Genie": Man Haron Monis and the "Sydney Siege"", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, no. 4 (2017): 496.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
...confirmed an important transformation of the Australian response to Islamic radicalisation, setting the precedent for the modern Weltanshauung of counter-terrorist approaches. It also affirmed the fear of imminent terrorist attack in Australia, feeding persistent assumptions that Australia was a credible target of Islamic terrorism.\textsuperscript{570}

Importantly, this event also coincided with the revival of both Hanson’s political career and ON as a party. Shortly after the Sydney Siege in January 2015, after a period which saw unsuccessful attempts to regain her political success of the 1990s, the newly returned leader of ON contested, and nearly won, the seat of Lockyer in the Queensland state election of that year.\textsuperscript{571} This period marked the return of ON and Hanson to the Australian political scene, with the 2016 federal election resulting in a relative success for the party, as already discussed. Therefore, understanding how ON has facilitated its re-emergence within this context is important.

\textit{The Party for Freedom}

The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV) was formed in 2006 by former People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) member Geert Wilders, following his departure from the centre-right VVD in 2004. Wilders held onto his parliamentary seat, forming the Wilders Group and thus becoming an independent, in the intermediary years before the founding of the PVV.\textsuperscript{572} The 2006 general election, the PVV’s first, saw some limited success for the party, winning nine out of 150 seats.\textsuperscript{573} The party then experienced a general incline in support over the next two elections, with the 2009 European election seeing the party become the second largest (four out of 25 seats), and the 2010 general election becoming the third-largest Dutch party gaining 15 seats.\textsuperscript{574} The 2012 general election, which was called early, saw the PVV drop nine seats, however still remaining the third-largest party. The 2017 general election saw PVV become the second-largest party in the Netherlands, gaining back five of the lost seats from the previous general election to have 20 of the 150 seats in the Dutch parliament. The multiparty

\textsuperscript{570} Ibid., 497.
\textsuperscript{572} Groshek and Engelbert,  188.
\textsuperscript{573} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{574} Ibid.
structure of the Dutch political system means that coalitions are needed for parties to form government.\textsuperscript{575} Despite PVV being the second-largest party after the 2017 general election, all other major parties refuse to form coalitions with them.\textsuperscript{576} On Monday October 9, 2017, a coalition agreement was met, with VVD, Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Democrats 66 (D66), and Christian Union forming a coalition government.\textsuperscript{577} As such, Wilders and the PVV were locked out of power.

As with ON, the PVV has been criticised for lacking party organisation.\textsuperscript{578} This is due in most part because Wilders is its only official member, and consequently exerts “tight control” over the party.\textsuperscript{579} He “dominates the PVV in terms of selection and training of candidates, planning political strategy and articulating the party’s programme and ideology.”\textsuperscript{580} Wilders began his political career with the liberal, centre-right VVD. During this period, Wilders was a pupil to VVD leader Frits Bolkestein, who espoused an increasingly more “confrontational political style,” and “offensive conservative liberal ideology,”\textsuperscript{581} than was common at the time in Dutch politics. Bolkestein was also critical of multiculturalism, embraced neoliberal economic policies and espoused realist foreign policy.\textsuperscript{582} The roots of Wilders’ anti-multiculturalism and neoliberal economic attitudes can be found in much of Bolkestein’s philosophy. As Vossen notes, “Wilders could be regarded as a studious pupil of Bolkestein both in ideological and in stylistic terms.”\textsuperscript{583} Having at one period been seen as a potential successor to the VVD leadership, by 2002 Wilders was increasingly becoming a political outsider due to his shift in political ideology.\textsuperscript{584} By 2002 Wilders was becoming more right wing,\textsuperscript{585} evidenced by his anti-Islam agenda becoming more vocal and far-reaching in scope, and his support for the Bush administration’s war on terror.\textsuperscript{586} Although some of his conservative liberalism remained, such

\textsuperscript{575} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{578} Vossen, 180.
\textsuperscript{579} Groshek and Engelbert, 188.
\textsuperscript{580} Vossen, 180-81.
\textsuperscript{581} Ibid., 181.
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{584} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{585} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid., 183.
as his support for many neoliberal economic policies, his support for an interventionist style of foreign policy was at odds with the mainstream of the VVD. By 2004, Wilders had left the VVD after a dispute over Turkey’s potential membership of the European Union. Having remained in parliament under the Wilders Group, he formed the PVV in 2006. As with ON, the PVV’s right-wing ideological agenda is characterised by the principles of populism as outlined above. The PVV in-group those they claim to represent—the non-Muslim Dutch population—and out-group Muslims and immigrants that are perceived as not assimilating satisfactorily, as well as the ‘elite’ politicians and bureaucrats perceived as upholding the European Union order. Since its founding, anti-Islamic attitudes and anti-immigration have been central to the party’s agenda, as well as an important part of the party’s identity.

Moreover, the party stokes crisis themes through accentuating fears of invasion and the colonisation of Dutch culture by Islam. Wilders, for example has “repeatedly assert[ed] that the widespread immigration of Muslims is part of an Islamist strategy to colonise Europe.” Indeed, this sentiment touches upon the ideology of the PVV, in particular their nationalism and nativism, as well as their populism—the dangerous ‘other’ of Islamic migrants coming to invade their ‘heartland.’

Given the above, it is unsurprising that the European Migrant Crisis, with its relationship to issues of immigration, Islam and national security, plays a notable role within the PVV’s political agenda. The ‘crisis’ broadly references the influx of refugees from countries including, but not limited to, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, into Western Europe. While the issue is broadly considered to have culminated in mid-2015, it has been noted to have begun as early as the mid-2000s. It is considered the “worst crisis in immigration” since World War II, with a “massive increase of displaced persons” aiming to seek asylum in Europe. Utilising “numerous migration corridors,” the refugees moved through the Mediterranean, Turkey and other countries with the ultimate goal of reaching Western Europe. The issue has opened up

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587 Ibid.
588 Groshek and Engelbert, 188.
589 Andrea L.P. Pirro and Stijn van Kessel, “Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises,” Politics Special Issue (2018).
590 van Gent, Jansen, and Smits, 1778.
591 Taggart, "Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe."
593 Ibid.
594 Ibid., 1370.
racial and cultural fissures, stoking concerns not only regarding immigration, but also concerning globalisation, and security and terrorism. For the PVV, which has always been a proponent of strict immigration laws, the crisis served as a symbolic event through which to channel its anti-Islam and anti-immigration agenda:

The asylum-tsunami from Islamic countries threatens the Netherlands. Everything is at stake: our security, freedom and future. These migrants are not concerned with safety. They were safe already in the countries they passed through. The sheltering of one asylum seeker costs us 36,000 euro per year. Billions of euros are at stake. Money that we can’t spend for the benefit of the Dutch anymore. (PVV newsletter)

The crisis “bridge[d] the issue of security—now escalated from criminality to terrorism—with immigration,” and as such also bridged the anti-immigration and pro-law-and-order attitudes of the PVV. Consequently, the crisis has played a significant role within the PVV’s agenda since at least 2015. Because of this, as well as the importance of the issue not just in the Netherlands but also throughout Western Europe, and the implications it has had on immigration policies and politics within the area broadly, the migrant crisis remains the most fruitful focal point for analysis of Islam and immigration within a European context. Given the importance of the crisis, analysing how the PVV has positioned themselves for success within this context is fitting.

Methods

This research utilised a multi-typological, mixed-method methodology to conceptualise populism in the abstract, and then empirically examine populism in practice, with the multi-typology approach drawing on the ideational and discursive traditions. This multi-typological approach followed in the vein of previous work, such as van Kessel’s article, “The Populist Cat-Dog: Applying the Concept of Populism to Contemporary European Party Systems,” which argues that research on populism has a tendency towards an imprecise application of the

595 Pirro and van Kessel, 9.
596 Ibid., 10.
598 PVV, Preliminary Election Program Pvv 2017-2021 (2016).
599 Pirro and van Kessel.
concept. For van Kessel, conceptualising populism as able to exist as both ideology and discourse is key to resolving this imprecision.\textsuperscript{600} Similarly, Engesser et al.’s work, “Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology” proposes a similar flexibility with regards to the labelling of the concept.\textsuperscript{601} They argue that populism can manifest in different forms and thus a more flexible take on its categorisation is appropriate.

The mixed-method approach builds on the work of March, adapted to suit the purposes of this research. His chosen methodology for the 2017 article, “Left and Right Populism Compared: the British Case,”\textsuperscript{602} provides the broad framework on which this research’s methodology is based. His work utilised a two-staged, mixed-method approach, to quantitatively and qualitatively assess the party manifestos of British political parties, from 1999-2015, to assess the degree of populism and the type of populism of each party tested during this period. With this approach, he was able to provide a “holistic” comparison of populist and mainstream parties, thus distinguishing between populist and non-populist parties, and also analyse the degree of populism of the parties “in depth.”\textsuperscript{603} Through utilising this approach, he found that left-wing populists are, confirming previous research, “more socio-economically focused, more inclusionary,” but also, interestingly, “less populist” than their right-wing contemporaries.\textsuperscript{604} March also notes that this methodology is appropriately transportable to different geographies, and can likewise be suitably applied to different types of textual sources, like speeches.\textsuperscript{605}

Drawing on this foundation, this research similarly utilised a two-staged, mixed-method approach, using speeches by the case-study party’s leader as well as the party’s policy manifesto/document as sources. A quantitative content analysis (Stage One) and a qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis (Stage Two) was conducted. Using sentences and single policies as the unit of assessment, respectively, Stage One assessed the frequency of populist sentences and populist radical right policies within the sources, and thus determined the degree of populism and populist radical right ideology of each party. This ascertained the degree to which one party is more or less populist and radical right than the other case study. The second stage

\textsuperscript{600} van Kessel.
\textsuperscript{601} Engesser et al.
\textsuperscript{602} March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."
\textsuperscript{603} Ibid., 300.
\textsuperscript{604} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{605} Ibid., 300.
allowed for a more nuanced analysis into the populism and radical right ideology of the parties, and assessed the way populism is used alongside the radical right ideology. In March’s research he compared both left and right populism, and thus Stage Two within his approach elucidated the differences between these ideologies. However, within the context of this research this stage discerned the differences that exist between populist parties with the same host ideology, the radical right. Such points of interest and analysis include, but are not limited to, the way each leader constructs their people-centrism, the particular groups the case study targets in given sources, the type of crises they spotlight and utilise, the type of language that is used to communicate their respective concerns, the particular policies the party proposes to implement their populist radical right agenda.

As discussed in Chapter Three, two variables were used to carry out this analysis: the discourse in the speeches given by the party’s leader, and the policies of the party. As such, the sources (outlined to follow) constituted a selection of speeches by the leader of the party, and policy documents for the election that fell during the period of analysis. The discourse variable was utilised to assess the two populist features of in/out grouping and crisis, with sub-categories of analysis. These sub-categories have been constructed to allow for greater specificity and depth of analysis. Drawn from discussion found in Chapter Two, the sub-categories for in/out grouping are people-centrism (serving as in-group), anti-elitism (out-group), and ‘othering’ (out-group). Again, drawn from discussion in Chapters Two and Three, the sub-categories for the crisis themes index are: crisis and societal declinism, and blame attribution. The policy variable is utilised to assess the presence of the populist radical right ideology in the case study, and as with variable one, sub-categories have also been constructed. These sub-categories for the radical right ideology draw on Mudde’s theoretical work on the party family, discussed in detail in Chapter Three. These sub-categories are: nativism, authoritarianism, populism. Three other sub-categories for the policy variable are also analysed. Firstly, non-nativist socio-economic policies, to determine the degree to which the economy is a ‘secondary’ and ‘instrumental’ issue for the party family. Secondly, non-nativist socio-cultural policies, to determine the post-materialist issues of the party family that do not draw on their radical right ideology. Thirdly, ‘general’ policies, to assess the presence of traditional public-policy areas. These categories elucidated the degree to which the case studies are motivated by nativism.

606 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
607 Ibid.
over other concerns, per the theory. A summary of this is provided in Table 4.1, with the analysis conducted by the following of two codebooks, described to follow (and provided in Appendix A and Appendix B).

Table 4.1: Summary of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Feature tested</th>
<th>Sub-category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>In-grouping / out-grouping</td>
<td>People-centrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>In-grouping / out-grouping</td>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>In-grouping / out-grouping</td>
<td>Othering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Themes of crisis</td>
<td>Crisis and/or societal declinism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Themes of crisis</td>
<td>Blame attribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>PRR Ideology</td>
<td>Nativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>PRR Ideology</td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>PRR Ideology</td>
<td>Populism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>PRR Ideology</td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>PRR Ideology</td>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>PRR Ideology</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The method utilised by March and within this thesis has distinct “advantages over existing methods” because it not only allows for the analysis of the degree of populism present, but also a more fine-grained analysis to decipher the language used to facilitate the agendas of a party. In other words, through utilising a mixed method, I was able to embrace the benefits that quantitative and qualitative analysis can provide. Such benefits of the quantitative method, for example, include being able to provide numerical and thus quantifiable data, which can allow for a degree of comparative analysis that may elude qualitative methods. However, while quantitative methods indeed have a reputation for verifiability and consistency, there are drawbacks to this approach. Criticisms include the idea that quantitative methods, relying too much on the tenets of positivism, represent a potentially distorted, “incomplete” reality, lacking

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608 Ibid.; Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?.”
609 March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case,” 283.
nuance and context.\textsuperscript{610} Meanwhile, the researchers who favour a purely quantitative research method may frame the inherent subjectivities within qualitative research as a weakness.\textsuperscript{611} But within a mixed-method approach, its these subjectivities that are able to alleviate the above “incomplete[ness]” tabled at quantitative methods. Qualitative methods’ ability to account for the context and meaning behind data allows for an added degree of depth to the analysis of data conducted through purely positivist approaches. Indeed, qualitative methods have been found to be both suitable and advantageous for the analysis of populism specifically,\textsuperscript{612} as well as political language and ideology broadly.\textsuperscript{613} As John Gerring notes in relation to his choice of qualitative methods for his study of American political ideologies:\textsuperscript{614}

> To make claims about party ideologies one must involve oneself in the meat and gristle of political life, which is to say in language. Language connotes the raw data of most studies of how people think about politics, for it is through language that politics is experienced.\textsuperscript{615}

Therefore, the utilisation of a qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis can be greatly beneficial for this type of research because of the nature of the content analysed. As this thesis involved the application of a pre-conceived theory to practice, it must utilise an approach that acknowledges that “preconceived notions and assumptions”\textsuperscript{616} of a text’s meaning are relevant and important to the analysis. Given that both the variables to be assessed involve the analysis of language and communication, and the meaning behind said communication, it is important to ensure that the subjectivities, nuances and context of the language are taken into account. The hermeneutic method, which “emphasises the sociocultural and historic influences on qualitative interpretation,”\textsuperscript{617} was appropriate in this regard. The hermeneutic approach “use[s]
words or narrative[s] as the basis to gain understanding." Consequently, through subjecting the selected texts to this type of analysis, we can find "meaning in [their] written word."

It is also worth noting that in analysing the discourse of these parties through a hermeneutic textual analysis, the thesis draws on the discourse analysis method. The history of examining populism through the lens of discourse has been discussed, with its noted strengths, but discourse analysis has been employed widely to analyse a variety of political and non-political phenomena. There is "not a single method of discourse analysis." Instead, it is an umbrella term that can refer to a wide range of discourse-analytical tools "employed by scholars—some more loosely and illustratively, others more systematically—and while doing so, operat[ing] from different theoretical vantage points."

Discourse analysis has been developed and used within a range of disciplines like linguistics, philosophy, sociology and literary theory, and perhaps most prominently within the theoretical tradition of post-structuralism. As such, the term ‘discourse analysis’ encompasses many approaches to analysing the discourse of actors and deciphering its meaning, and the result is that there can be significant differences between methodological approaches taken by researchers under its banner. As Potter points out, discourse analysis is a “contested disciplinary terrain,” with clearly competing practices.

Despite this ‘contestation’, at its core the method is about the study of language. As such, it is worth articulating the noted strengths and weaknesses of the method as a whole, many of which reflect some of the same strengths and weaknesses noted above about qualitative analysis more generally. The weaknesses of discourse analysis tend to rest on ideas of reliability and a perceived lack of objectivity in the data derived from the method. For example, one criticism of the discourse method relates to its status as a mostly qualitative method. In its qualitative nature, the data derived from its application potentially lacks the reliability and

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618 Ibid.
619 Ibid.
621 Aydin-Düzgit and Rumelili, 1.
623 Ibid.
624 Ibid., 608.
validity of quantitative approaches. Discourse analysis approaches have also been criticised for a perceived lack of objectivity in the analysis of data. In other words, “discourse analysis produces interpretations, not facts.” The assumption inherent in this criticism is that objectivity is a possible and realistic goal in social science research. Another related criticism is that the findings derived from discourse analysis do not “have practical applications.” This criticism has much to do with the others—that discourse analysis’ qualitative nature means that it tells only subjective interpretations of the world, and therefore deriving lessons about the ‘real world’ from such research is flawed. In response to this claim, although it can apply to all three, proponents of discourse analysis methods would argue that quantitative and qualitative researchers have different goals. Where quantitative researchers might want to “set out to develop predictive models which enable practical interventions, discourse researchers are interested in exploring complex aspects of society and social life which in the first instance are more likely to enhance understanding than interventions.” Relatedly, the strengths of the discourse analysis method lie in exactly this capacity to embrace complexity and nuance in the written word. It is a method which “appreciates the messy and complex interactions” of the political world, and in doing so enables interpretation and meaning. As Hajer and Wytske outline: “the first strength of discourse analysis is its capacity to illuminate the central role of language in politics, its second strength is to reveal the embeddedness of language in practice.”

With these strengths and weaknesses in mind, this research adopted a mixed-method approach. As Gerring has pointed out, the “multimethod ideal”—that is, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative research styles into research methodologies—allows a researcher to overcome the conflict between the two schools and combines the strengths of each approach while also “avoiding their respective weaknesses.” So, while the quantitative method in Stage One

626 Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili, 16.
627 Ibid., 17.
629 Ibid.
630 Ibid., 84.
631 Ibid.
632 Ibid.
634 Ibid.
created a comparative, quantifiable numerical data, through the counting of the frequency of sentences to create inferences, the qualitative approach in Stage Two was more able to account for the broader context of the sentence, and can consequently more thoroughly provide the full scope of meaning behind the words or phrases in the selected sources. As such, the inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative approaches is indeed advantageous. This research proceeded in two stages, outlined to follow. Also provided are the codebooks, which was followed to conduct the data analysis. The sources to be subjected to the mixed-method analysis were chosen for methodological and practical reasons. For both the case studies (as well as the mainstream parties), all speeches and policies fell into the relevant time period of analysis for the given case study. The sources for the language variable are selection of speeches from that period, and do not constitute the entirety of all speeches made by each leader during this period. However, these speeches in particular were selected because of the nature of their content and their suitability in assessing the research goals. Each speech contains within it themes that tie back to the core issues that are important to the populist radical right: immigration, Islam, terrorism and national security. And while each speech was given in a different context, with a correspondingly different audience, I argue that this issue is mitigated through confining the speeches to these consistent themes. In doing so, while the audience may change, the potential for significant differences in tone and theme is minimised. The policy documents for each party were chosen because they represent the policy agendas of the parties for the particular election in focus. Given this, both the selected speeches and the policy documents were considered appropriate for assessing the case studies’ respective agendas and how they utilised their particular take on populism and the radical right ideology to position themselves for success during this period.

For ON, the speeches were sourced from the parliament of Australia’s website, which transcribes all proceedings in the Senate and House of Representatives. The policy document for ON was sourced from One Nation’s official website at the time of the 2016 federal election. The National Library of Australia’s web archive, Pandora, was used to source this material from the 2016 period. As with ON, the speeches from the leaders of the mainstream parties at the time of analysis, Bill Shorten636 and Malcolm Turnbull,637 were similarly found on the

636 Bill Shorten was the leader of the ALP from 2013 to 2019, serving as Leader of the Opposition in parliament.
637 Malcolm Turnbull was leader of the Liberal Party from 2008 to 2009, and 2015 to 2018. He served as Prime Minister of Australia from 2015 to 2018.
parliament website. The ALP’s National Platform was sourced from the Australian parliament website, whereas the Liberal Party policies were sourced from their website, again using the National Library of Australia’s web archive, Pandora. For the PVV, the speeches were sourced from two locations: Wilders’ official blog; and the website of the Gatestone Institute, a far-right organisation with anti-Muslim beliefs. For all speeches, the speech was either originally given in English, or an English translation was already provided. The PVV’s policy manifesto for the 2017 general election was also sourced from Wilders’ official blog, with an English translation provided. The speeches of the leaders of the mainstream parties, Mark Rutte of the VVD and Diederik Samsom of the PvdA, were sourced from the Dutch government website and the PvdA official website respectively, with English translations of each speech provided. Official English translations of the manifestos for these parties were not available. Instead, I utilised a translation of the manifestos conducted by European Movement Netherlands, an international lobbying association. An index of the sources tested are provided in Appendix C (ON) and Appendix D (PVV).

Stage One: Quantitative content analysis

As has been outlined above, Stage One of the mixed-method analysis involved a quantitative content analysis of the discourse and policy variables, conducted on a selection of speeches by the party leader and the policy document/manifesto for the election during the period of analysis. The process involved a coder, in this case myself, utilising a codebook constructed a priori to quantitatively analyse the speeches and policy document/manifesto using the categories of populism and the radical right ideology outlined in previous chapters, with sub-

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638 I acknowledge that this source is problematic, due to its far-right, anti-Islamic position. However, it has been used as a source for the speech because of the availability of English translations of Wilders’ speeches/transcribed speeches given in English by Wilders for the period of analysis and with the relevant themes. While I was able to access most from Wilders’ blog, not all were available.

639 Mark Rutte has been the leader of the VVD since 2006, and Prime Minister of the Netherlands since 2010 (correct as of November 2019).

640 Diederik Samsom was leader of the PvdA from March 2012 to December 2016. He was replaced during the period of analysis in December 2016 by current leader Lodewijk Asscher (correct as of November 2019).

641 I emailed both the VVD and PvdA offices to source an official translation of the manifestos, however they each advised that none existed.

642 To supplement this, I utilised Google Translate, which has been found to be a “useful tool” for comparative researchers. See: Erik de Vries, Martijn Schoonvelde, and Gijs Schumacher, “No Longer Lost in Translation: Evidence That Google Translate Works for Comparative Bag-of-Words Text Application,” Political Analysis 26, no. 4 (2018).
categories to narrow the analysis. The unit of assessment for the discourse variable was single sentences, and for policy it was single policies, both coded only once. The indices were operationalised by identifying specific sentences or policies that correlated with a given feature. I then calculated the number of these sentences/policies and then the percentage of these sentences/policies that correlated with a given index. This determined the frequency of populist and radical right frames within the speech or document and consequently determined the degree of populism and radical right manifest. Where, for example, a sentence could have been coded as both ‘people centrism’ and ‘anti-elitism,’ the sentence was only coded once and was attributed to the index that it more overtly aligned. The results from the tested case studies were compared with each other, and the mainstream parties for each context (i.e., ALP, Liberal, and VVD, PvdA).

The following entails a description of the sub-categories for the codebook used for the quantitative analysis.

**In-grouping and Out-grouping**

*People-centrism*

1. Identify sentences that refer to a homogenous group of ‘people,’ with which the speaker aligns.
2. Identify sentences that include positive references to ‘the people.’
3. Identify sentences that outline that politics and democracy must represent the will of the people.
4. Identify sentences where there is reference to some sort of idealised ‘heartland’ or community/society that this group inhabits, and which is constructed to reflect the homogeneity of the ‘people’ (e.g., Australian society is Christian, is white, participates in particular cultural traditions).

This includes instances in which the speaker constructs a group with which they necessarily both align and represent, and in which this group is constructed as being virtuous. The speaker may also articulate that politics and democracy must necessarily represent the will and preferences of this group, thus drawing on the populist belief in popular sovereignty. The word ‘people’ does not necessarily need to be used to construct this group. Sentences
are identified as correlating with these indices when they include the use of proper nouns like ‘Australians’ or ‘Dutch’ or the use of pronouns like ‘we,’ ‘our,’ ‘us’ when used in the context of creating a homogenous self-identifying group (e.g., our country, our culture).

It also includes instances in which the speaker constructs the image of a ‘regular’ Australian or Dutch citizen, and where the speaker constructs a particular image of society, i.e., the ‘heartland,’ which corresponds with their image of the ‘people.’ This could include references to activities that are usually associated with Australian or Dutch ways of life. This serves to demarcate between Australians or Dutch who identify with these ‘ways of life’ and those who do not, thus distinguishing between those whom the speaker wishes to represent and those whom they do not (the out-group[s]). This could include references to Christianity or other cultural images.

Anti-elitism

1. Identify sentences that refer to an ‘elite.’
2. Identify sentences in which there is a distinction made between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite.’
3. Identify sentence in which there is a distinction made between the speaker and the ‘elite.’

This includes instances in which the speaker constructs a group that stands in opposition to the ‘people’ and that is in a position of perceived political or cultural power. Sentences are identified as correlating with these indices when they include instances in which the elite are characterised as being in opposition to the ‘people,’ the speaker and/or their party, including not representing the people’s will. Following March, this critique of the elite had to be general, and not isolated to a critique of one particular party or leader. In other words, a singular criticism of the Greens or the Liberal Party was not coded as anti-elitism, as criticism of one party alone does not constitute anti-elitism generally. However, if there was a criticism of both Liberal and the ALP, then this could be interpreted as a criticism of the major parties in total and thus could be interpreted as anti-elitism. It also includes references to financial and cultural elites, in which they are characterised as also having failed the ‘people’ or are characterised as being ‘out of touch’ with ‘regular’ citizens’ needs and wants.
**Othering**

1. Identify sentences that make reference to a category of people who are distinct from and/or in opposition to the ‘people’ (does not include the ‘elite’).
2. Identify sentences which make reference to this out-group with the function of denigrating said out-group

This includes instances where the speaker makes reference to a group which stands in opposition to the ‘people’ but that is not characterised as being part of the ‘elite.’ Sentences are identified as correlating with these indices when they include instances where a social category of people is constructed and is positioned as distinct from the ‘people’. Out-groups could include any group who the speaker positions as being separate from those they wish to represent, such as ethnic or religious minorities. Consequently, sentences correlate with this index if they include words like Islam, Muslim, halal, burqa, or other religiously affiliated words, as well as terms like migrant or immigrant, but only when either positioning this group as different to the norm, and/or denigrating said group.

Sentences which include reference to an out-group are not categorised as correlating with this feature if they also aim to characterise society as being in decline in relation to this out-group and/or where they attribute blame for said decline to this out-group. During the process of testing this method it was found that there were many instances where references to an out-group were accompanied with language that aimed to attribute blame for a broader societal problem. Some instances where an out-group was denigrated through the use of accompanying negative language went beyond denigration and functioned to create the sense that this out-group was responsible for an overarching problem in society. In these instances, where the negative characterisation goes beyond: a) demarcating between an in-group and out-group; b) denigrating said out-group, they fall into the crisis category (either societal declinism or blame attribution). In other words, sentences which demarcate an out-group and also include a negative characterisation of this out-group with the function of either creating a sense of crisis or attributing blame for said crisis are cited as correlating with other features (societal declinism and blame attribution). Sentences that merely criticise the out-group but do not aim to attribute blame correlate with this index.
Themes of Crisis

Crisis and societal declinism

1. Identify sentences which characterise society as being in crisis.
2. Identify sentences which characterise society as being in decline.

This includes instances where the speaker characterises society as being in crisis and/or decline. Sentences are identified as correlating with this feature when the sentence creates the impression that society is changing for the worse, that aspects of said society are in danger of being ‘lost,’ and that society is either currently experiencing a crisis or there is a crisis soon approaching. This includes where the speaker highlights particular problems society is experiencing or that must be fixed, and where language is used that aims to evoke fear or demarcates between a glorified past and a frightening future. The speaker may also position themselves or their party as the only body able to alleviate the decline/crisis. This category is distinct from blame attribution in that the sentence does not need to reference a particular out-group, it must only give the impression that society in general is experiencing problems. Where the sentence aims to attribute blame for the decline, it is characterised as correlating with the ‘blame attribution’ indices.

Crisis and societal declinism must also be isolated to nearby geographies. For example, a sentence discussing the tragedies of the war in Syria is not considered societal declinism, despite the context as potentially being considered a crisis. However, if the speaker discusses the way this is detrimentally impacting their own country or society, then that would be considered a sentence that could be coded as societal declinism and/or crisis.

Blame attribution

1. Identify sentences where blame for a crisis and/or decline is attributed an out-group (i.e., the ‘other,’ the ‘elite’)
2. Identify sentences that include negative references to this social category of people with the specific purpose of attributing blame.

This includes instances where the speaker attributes blame for the crisis or problems to a particular group. Sentences are identified as correlating with this feature when the sentence
attempts to attribute the responsibility for society’s change or decline or some other problem to either the above aforementioned elite or another ‘othered’ group. It is distinct from societal declinism in that the sentence must include reference to an out-group that is responsible for the decline.

Blaming ‘terrorists,’ ‘Isis’ or ‘Isil’ for a terrorist attack does not constitute sufficient blame attribution of an out-group. However, blaming ‘Muslims’ or ‘Islam’ generally for said terrorist attack is sufficient to constitute being coded as blame attributive.

The Populist Radical Right

Nativism

1. Identify policies where there is a distinction made between natives and non-natives
2. Identify policies that delineate a particular ethnic or religious group, with negative policy implications for said group.
3. Identify policies that make references to the inherent value of the nation, its language, its culture.

This includes instances where the document references policies that draw on their nativism. These include policies where there is an explicit mention of a minority ethnic or religious group and where there are negative policy implications for said group. Policies that make a distinction between natives and non-natives are also characterised as conforming to the radical right ideology. For Australia, ‘native’ correlates not with the Australian Indigenous population, but Australians with Anglo-European ancestry, in line with the populist radical right’s nativism. Policies that make references to the inherent value of the nation, its language, and its culture are also coded as nativist.

Authoritarianism

1. Identify policies that emphasise strong law and order principles.

This includes instances where the document references policies that draw on their authoritarianism. Policies correlate with this feature when they seek to impose a strict culture
of law and order. This includes policies that make reference to the introduction of more stringent sentencing for offenders.

*Populism*

1. Identify policies that draw on populism.

This assesses the presence of populist policies in the document. These may include policies that seek to implement popular sovereignty measures that seek to directly empower ‘the people,’ like referendums or plebiscites.

*Socio-economic*

1. Identify socio-economic policies.

This includes instances where the document references socio-economic policies. This does not include policies that are nativist and socio-economic, for example welfare chauvinism policies. The reason for this is that I want to determine the degree to which a party has economic policies that are not related to their nativist ideology, thus determining the degree to which the economy is actually following Mudde, a ‘secondary’ consideration for the party family. This may include policies that refer to tax or employment.

*Socio-cultural*

1. Identify socio-cultural policies.

This includes instances where the document reference policies that are related to socio-cultural issues, which do not draw on the party’s radical right ideology. These may include policies towards the LGBTQ+ community or policies related to the arts.

*General*

1. Identify policies that do not draw on any of the above.
This includes instances where the policy document references policies that do not draw on any of the above. In particular, these might relate to traditional public policy areas, like healthcare or education.

*Stage Two: Qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis*

Stage Two of this mixed-method analysis involved a qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis of the same sources as Stage One. As with Stage One, the process involved a coder, myself, following a codebook constructed a priori to qualitatively analyse the speeches and party document/manifesto using the categories of populism outlined in Chapter Two (in-out, crisis, ideology), with sub-categories to narrow the analysis. This stage involved the interpretation of the sources to unpack the particularities of each party’s populism and radical right ideology. The constitutive, defining features of populism—in-grouping and out-grouping, crisis—and radical right ideology—are operationalised by a set of questions. These questions qualitatively assess the type of language that is used to construct the given case-study’s populism; the particular groups and crises the party emphasises, and manner in which the party constructs their in-grouping and out-grouping, and the party’s policy preferences. This allows for an analysis of any differences between these parties as manifest in these documents, and thus provides space for the analysis of the specific similarities and/or differences between the two parties with regards to their particular take on populism and their particular take on the radical right ideology.

The following entails the guiding questions for the sub-categories in the codebook used for the qualitative analysis (descriptions as above).

**In-grouping and Out-grouping**

*People-centrism*

1. Which social category of citizens is depicted as the ‘people’?
2. In what way are they constructed as a ‘homogenous’ group?
3. What language is used to categorise the ‘people’?
4. What language is used by the speaker to create the impression that they speak on behalf of said ‘people’?
5. What language is used to construct a particular image of ‘society’ in the speech?

Anti-elitism

1. Which social category(s) are depicted as the ‘elite’?
2. What language is used to depict the ‘elite’?
3. What are the depicted grievances between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’?
4. How are these elites characterised as being in opposition to the ‘people’?

Othering

1. Aside from the elite, which other social category(s) is depicted as standing in opposition to the ‘people’?
2. What language is used to demarcate this group and the ‘people’?
3. What are the depicted grievances between the ‘people’ and this group?
4. How is this group characterised as being in opposition to the ‘people’?

Themes of Crisis

Crisis and/or societal declinism

1. Is society characterised as being in flux or decline and/or in or approaching crisis? If so, how does the speaker depict this?
2. Does the speaker make a distinction between a good past and a bad present and/or future? If so, how does the speaker achieve this?
3. What is/are the overarching problem(s) in society as depicted by the speaker?
4. What language is used to depict this crisis?
5. Does the speaker attempt to characterise themselves as able to ‘fix’ this decline/crisis? If so, what language is used to achieve this?

Blame attribution
1. Which groups are depicted as responsible or as the ‘cause’ of the crisis in society or its decline?
2. What language is used to attribute this blame?

**Populist radical right ideology**

*Nativism*

1. What policies proposed in the document draw on the party’s nativism?
2. How do these above policies achieve this?

**Authoritarianism**

1. What policies proposed in the document draw on the party’s authoritarianism?
2. How do these above policies achieve this?

**Populism**

1. What policies proposed in the document draw on the party’s populism?
2. How do these above policies achieve this?

**Socio-economic**

1. What are the socio-economic policies in the policy documents?

**Socio-cultural**

1. What socio-cultural policies are in the document?

**General**

1. What are the policies in the document that do not draw on the above?
Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined the methodological foundations for this research. Utilising a multi-typology, mixed-method methodology, the thesis determines the degree and manner in which the populist features of in-grouping and out-grouping and a relationship to crisis, along with the radical right ideology, manifest within the speeches and policy documents of two examples of the populist radical right: the Australian One Nation; and the Dutch Party for Freedom. It also qualitatively assesses, among other points, the type of language used to operationalise these features, the particular crises facilitated, and the specific antagonisms utilised by the party to achieve their goals. Through determining this, the thesis will establish the degree to which populism itself is manifest in the case studies. The proceeding chapter is the first of the two empirical examinations, the analysis of ON.
This chapter discusses the results from the empirical examination of One Nation’s (ON) populism and radical right ideology. The chapter proceeds in two sections. Firstly, it outlines the findings from the two-staged, mixed quantitative and qualitative examination of speeches given by the party leader, Pauline Hanson, and the party’s 2016 federal election policy handout. Utilising the codebooks derived from the theoretical discussions in previous chapters and found in Appendix A and Appendix B, these sources were used to determine: the degree and manner in which ON relied on the sub-categories of populism and their radical right ideology; and the particular policies, and within that the language and themes manifest in the policies, utilised to facilitate the party’s agenda. Two examples of mainstream parties in Australia, the ALP and the LNP, were also subjected to the quantitative and qualitative analysis, to provide a yardstick of ‘mainstream-ness’ to contextualise the findings. The discourse analysis found that, of the sub-categories, Hanson utilised ‘othering’ most frequently, and that her primary in-grouping and out-grouping was constructed along ethno-cultural lines, predicated on a distinction between a Judeo-Christian-centred people-centrism and a Muslim out-group. Anti-elitism, whilst still relatively significant, was a secondary out-grouping process. It also found that themes of crisis were central to Hanson’s discourse, with a quantitatively high presence of the category overall. Moreover, a characterisation of Australia in crisis and attributing blame for this crisis was crucial in the facilitating of her in-out grouping (between all three groups). The policy analysis found that ON is primarily a radical right party first, and populist second, with economic policies also relatively prominent. Together, the quantitative and qualitative findings suggest that ON are primarily nativist, but that populism plays a fundamental and facilitatory role in the propagation of their core nativist agendas. The findings more broadly show that Hanson utilised each of the sub-categories relatively prominently, particularly compared to the mainstream leaders, and thus it is the combination of all sub-categories that distinguishes her discourse from the mainstream leaders.

The second section of the chapter concerns a contextualisation of the above findings. While the findings are in part contextualised through the aforementioned testing of mainstream parties, the findings will also be situated within the broader socio-political and socio-cultural climate of Australia. In particular, this will be achieved through a discussion on the country’s
politics of immigration, socio-economic conditions of electorates with ON candidates in the 2016 federal election, and opinion polling on the issues of immigration and Islam.

**Variable One: Discourse**

*Quantitative results*

This stage entailed the quantitative analysis of the sub-categories (people-centrism, anti-elitism, ‘othering,’ crisis/declinism, blame attribution) of the speeches of Hanson, with Figure 5.1 showing the aggregated populist score and the disaggregated indexes for Hanson (and the leaders of the mainstream parties). It shows that Hanson’s speeches displayed high levels of populist discourse when compared to the mainstream party leaders, Shorten and Turnbull. A significant minority of her sentences (46.45 percent) correlated with the populist categories. Both Turnbull and Shorten scored significantly lower than Hanson for their aggregated populism score, at 12.21 and 21.92 percent respectively. Hanson’s most utilised overall index of populism was in-out grouping. Across the sources, she utilised in-out grouping at a rate of 26.45 per cent. But while this was most prominent, crisis themes were still significant, scoring 20.18 percent. The most utilised of all sub-categories was language that ‘othered’ an out-group, scoring 12.72 percent. This is high, particularly when we contrast her score with the other leaders: zero percent for Turnbull and 0.87 percent for Shorten. Hanson’s second most utilised sub-category was discourse that evoked a sense of crisis and/or constructed an image of society that is in decline, using this type of discourse only slightly less than language that ‘othered,’ at 11.33 percent. Crisis and/or societal declinism was also Turnbull’s and Shorten’s second most frequently utilised language, at 3.18 percent and 6.14 percent respectively.
The presence of crisis and/or societal declinism within mainstream leaders’ speeches was anticipated, given the topic of each of the speeches was national security in the wake of Islamic terrorism in Europe. But the fact that Shorten and Turnbull displayed significantly fewer instances of this sub-category than Hanson—when her speeches touched on similar themes—indicates the increased importance of this type of discourse and themes within Hanson’s overall agenda. Moreover, when we look at the quantitative findings of the other crisis sub-category—blame attribution—the difference between Hanson compared with Shorten and Turnbull is even more pronounced. While both Shorten and Turnbull displayed some societal declinism, as noted, neither Turnbull nor Shorten displayed any blame attribution, both scoring zero for this index. This is contrasted with Hanson’s relatively high score of this category, with a mean of 8.84 percent, the fourth most utilised overall. We can thus conclude that while mainstream actors may construct a sense of crisis or declinism, they do not necessarily seek to blame particular out-groups for this crisis, whereas this was a significant part of Hanson’s overall agenda.

People-centrism was Hanson’s third most utilised sub-category of the five sub-categories, at 9.54 percent. Following previous research on measuring populism that found that mainstream parties often scored highly on people-centrism scores but low on other assessments of populism, a significant majority of Shorten’s and Turnbull’s populism scores was made up of people-centrism language, at 8.38 percent for Turnbull and 14.91 for Shorten. Indeed,

643 March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."
Shorten’s people-centrism is very high, higher even than that of Hanson. However, it is important to note that the necessary antagonistic construction between the people and an elite is wholly absent from both the mainstream leaders. They both scored zero for any presence of anti-elitist language. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that they are leaders from the mainstream parties and thus could be considered by observers as part of the ‘establishment.’ Anti-elitism was Hanson’s least utilised index of all the sub-categories at 4.18 percent. Given the important, often constituent, role granted to anti-elitism within populism studies, for example most definitions of the term supplied by scholars include the necessary oppositional relationship between the people and the elite, it is interesting to note the relatively low anti-elitism score for Hanson compared to the other sub-categories. This shows that while anti-elitism is relatively important to Hanson, it is less important to her than the process of out-grouping a minority ethnic group, the ‘other.’ This follows previous literature on the primacy of nativism over populism for the populist radical right.

It is also interesting to note that Hanson scored lower on both the traditional features of populism (people-centrism and anti-elitism) than the other sub-categories not traditionally used to assess the populist radical right (‘othering,’ presence of crisis/societal declinism). Indeed, the disaggregated scores for the sub-categories indicate that while people-centrism and anti-elitism are important to Hanson, of equal or more importance is the role of crisis and the process of ‘othering’ non-elite out-groups. These findings thus support the inclusion of the crisis sub-categories as an effective assessment of Hanson’s and ON’s populism. Moreover, these findings also support the inclusion of these sub-categories in any future studies of the party family, to determine if this is a feature just of this party, or is more widely spread in the party family. The findings also suggest that what distinguishes Hanson from more mainstream leaders is not necessarily the presence of a particular, singular sub-category, but the utilisation of these sub-categories in conjunction with one another. This is evidenced by Shorten’s and Turnbull’s high people-centrism but correspondingly low and non-existent ‘othering’ and ‘anti-elitism,’ and their relatively high societal declinism language but zero blame attribution language. This indicates that Australian mainstream parties may display elements of populism (people-centrism, crisis) or radical right populism (‘othering’) within their programs, but this is not evidence that the parties are necessarily either radical right or populist. Instead, it is the

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644 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
utilisation of all these factors in concert with one another that constitutes radical right populism, as seen in Hanson.

Qualitative results

This stage of the analysis interrogated the manner in which Hanson constructed her people-centrism, the particular groups she out-grouped, and the particular type of language she used to construct these groups and illustrate a picture of Australian society in crisis and/or decline. It firstly found that, following from the above quantitative findings which saw ‘othering’ as her primary out-group, her people-centrism was most prominently (although not entirely) constructed ethno-culturally, and while there was at times a similar use of discourse by all three leaders in their people-centrism, the combined use of language that out-grouped an ‘elite’ and ‘othered’ a minority ethnic group set Hanson apart from Shorten and Turnbull. It also found that Hanson utilised a scattered and haphazard approach to characterising Australian society in crisis or decline, articulating that Australia was experiencing a great variety of problems. That said, of particular note was the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity in the public sphere and the economic impact of immigration, which she blamed on immigrants, Muslims, and past and current governments.

People-centrism

As the quantitative stage shows, each of the three politicians had relatively high people-centrism. Indeed, the discourse utilised by each of the speakers for this sub-category had some similarities. They each used ‘Australian/s’ and ‘Australian people’ very frequently, and only used the term ‘the people’ sparingly (e.g., ‘to the people of Australia/Queensland’). Their respective people-centric language was also generally anchored in the frequent use of collective pronouns. The word ‘our’ was particularly recurrent in all of the speeches, with ‘we’ and ‘us’ also often used. However, this language was used by each of the speakers to different ends and its use resulted in a different construction of people-centrism. For example, while Turnbull and Shorten would often utilise ‘our’ (e.g., ‘our borders,’ ‘our values,’ ‘our fellow Australians’), this utilisation was done without the corresponding use of out-group language (both ‘othering’
and anti-elitist). For Turnbull and Shorten, their use of people-centric language was utilised in a way that did not delineate between types of Australians, often speaking of ‘Australians’ in a general sense. Moreover, both Turnbull and Shorten discussed Australian society in terms of multiculturalism, with Shorten citing diversity in particular as important to Australia. In contrast, Hanson would pair her people-centrism with a juxtaposing construction of those that did not belong. She would couple her construction of ‘regular Australians’ against, for example, a sentence that would ‘other’ a minority or critique the elite. In other words, where Turnbull’s and Shorten’s language attempted to include all Australians within their ‘our,’ Hanson’s ‘our’ was utilised to exclude and delineate between an in-group and out-groups. A common technique used by Hanson to achieve this in-out grouping was her characterisation of Australian culture as necessarily drawing from one cultural tradition in particular, Judeo-Christianity. She would depict Australian culture and society as necessarily Judeo-Christian and English speaking, with references to Christian symbols (the Bible, Christmas) as the default Australian way of life. She would combine this characterisation with use of the phrases ‘our country,’ ‘our culture’ and/or ‘our society’ to construct the ‘our culture’ as necessarily Judeo-Christian. This served to create a distinction between the ‘normal’ Australian culture with which Hanson aligns (‘our’ by default being Judeo-Christian) and those that sit outside this identity construction, thus excluding Australians and minority groups who do not align with this default culture, and thus delineating between groups that related to her own image of what Australia is and those that did not. Turnbull and Shorten, contrastingly, never delineated between groups of Australians or ways of being, speaking only in a general sense to ‘Australians’ and often emphasising unity.

The phrase “our way of life” was often utilised by the speakers in a similar fashion. Both Hanson and Shorten used the phrase often, but where Shorten utilised it as a means of discussing the threat that terrorism had on Australia, Hanson utilised it to also further distinguish between ‘Australian’ and non-Australian culture. Turnbull used this phrase only once, again with the purpose of emphasising unity. Hanson used the phrase, contrastingly, in such a way as to frame Australian culture—the Australian way of life—as being in the process of being lost or changed for the worse. She achieved this through using this phrase alongside ‘othering’ language that cast outsider cultures as less tolerant and free. She would thus contrast the Australian way of life as necessarily ‘freer’ and ‘more tolerant’ against this outsider culture, serving to create the sense that Australian culture was being colonised by unwelcome and distasteful cultural norms. Discourse that connoted a sense of invasion through immigration
was often used to achieve this, drawing on both ‘othering’ and crisis themes discussed further to follow. Her use of this type of language was also designed to create a sense of shared experience between herself and the Australian constituents, which she combined with references to the Australian people as not having had ‘a say’ on particular issues, for example immigration. This draws on the populist sentiment of popular sovereignty, and combined with ‘our’ constructs a shared experience between Hanson and Australians that enables Hanson to frame herself as being more suitably positioned to speak on behalf of these constituents. This also serves to create the impression that Hanson’s beliefs are necessarily also the beliefs of the broader Australian voters—the silent majority who share Hanson’s ideas on what constitutes Australia and ways of being.

**Othering**

As is evidenced by Hanson’s high score for ‘othering’ during the quantitative stage of analysis, the process of distinguishing between ‘regular’ Australians and other groups, and the consequent antagonism she creates between her in-group and out-groups, plays a central role in Hanson’s discourse. Hanson’s main out-group that she ‘othered’ in the sources was the Australian Muslim population, with the additional but less frequent ‘othering’ of other migrants, such as permanent migrants and international students. Her ‘othering’ of Muslims was centred on the denigration of their religion, the threat they pose on Australian safety, and the frequent citing of the need to ban Muslim immigration entirely. She also argued that Australia needs to greatly reduce immigration generally and questions the loyalty of migrants to the Australian nation. The frequency of her discussions on the need to ban Islamic immigration and reduce immigration more generally served to alienate Muslim and non-Muslim migrants already in Australia by positioning them as outsiders and a burden to the broader Australian population.

She frequently positioned the Australian Muslim population group as distinct from ‘regular’ Australians, juxtaposing her use of people-centric language against various comments on the supposed problematic nature of Islam and its followers. She often used the word ‘most’ or ‘majority’ when discussing how Australians favour bans on Muslim immigration and the wearing of the burqa. For example, she would articulate that ‘most Australians’ or the ‘majority of Australians’ desire a ban on these issues, thus positioning those who follow Islam or wear
the burqa as distinct from ‘most’ of the country and Australia in general. She would cite polling data on these issues to support her contention that large portions of Australian society are critical of Islam. As noted above, she also frequently articulated the incompatibility of Islam with the Australian way of life. She characterised Australia as a place of tolerance, that is ‘open,’ ‘cohesive’ and ‘secular,’ and claimed that the presence of Islam in Australia necessarily prohibited this type of society flourishing. She claimed that Islam is totalitarian and that it conflicted with a secular state. The above aforementioned articulation that Judeo-Christianity is the default Australian way of life also served to ‘other’ those who do not align with this tradition. Indeed, in arguing that Australia is both necessarily Judeo-Christian and secular, Hanson is drawing on a trope often used by the right in Europe. As Brubaker notes, “a new form of assertive secularism” is now utilised to criticise the supposed emergence of Islam in the public sphere, one that necessarily frames Judeo-Christianity as the default cultural norm.645

She also articulated disapproval at examples of broader Australian society making allowances for Islamic cultural traditions. For example, she decried the presence of Muslim-only bathing times at public swimming pools and the presence of prayer rooms at universities, hospitals and other public venues. She contrasted this with lamenting the declining influence of Christianity in the public sphere, with bibles no longer “found in most hospitals” and Christmas carols “no longer sung at most schools.” Although a significant majority of Hanson’s ‘othering’ was isolated to Muslims, she also ‘othered’ other permanent migrants and international students attending university in Australia. She articulated that these groups were taking jobs from unemployed Australians and utilising public services, concerns also reflected in her discussion of Muslims. She also articulated that international students were using their temporary study visas to gain permanent residency, which she implied was unfair.

Assimilation and integration are also important themes raised in the speeches and Hanson gives great prominence to these ideas throughout the sources. She discusses the conditions which new migrants need to meet to ‘become Australian,’ including respecting ‘our way of life’ and ‘our culture,’ again drawing on her Judeo-Christian-based people-centrism. It is worth noting that the use of the term Judeo-Christianity here and above is arguably acting as a de-facto code for ‘whiteness’ for Hanson. Where in the 1990s Hanson would frame her discriminatory agenda around race (in particular, Asians and the Australian Indigenous population), now she frames it around religion, in part because as cultural norms have shifted, openly racist and ethnic

claims are considered more fringe and therefore politically risky. This all serves to create the impression that conforming to her own construction of the Australian way of life (with its roots in Judeo-Christianity) is the only way to be truly Australian. Hanson often articulates the need for migrants, in particular Islamic migrants, to successfully assimilate to the Australian way of life. Integration, for Hanson, is “the central issue” in relation to Islamic immigration. She claims that Islamic countries are “organised” differently, and thus their people necessarily hold beliefs that are “different” on issues such as “equality between the sexes, homosexuality and the role of religion in society.” Hanson does not articulate to whom these views are different, leaving the audience to interpret that it must mean the default Australian society often illustrated by Hanson—that of the Judeo-Christian variety. This emphasis on the supposed difference between the beliefs of Muslims and non-Muslims serves to further ‘other’ the Muslim population by necessarily placing them outside the ‘norm’ of the default society.

_Anti-elitism_

Hanson’s other out-group, the elite, scored the lowest of the sub-categories for the quantitative stage, however its presence nevertheless played an important role within Hanson’s discourse overall. As outlined previously, the presence of out-group language which ‘others’ and which critiques the elite is in part what distinguishes her from the other leaders. Hanson never used the term ‘the elite,’ but often criticised the ‘major parties’—the ALP and LNP, sometimes joined by the left-wing Greens—as being out of step with voters and having failed to represent regular voters’ interests, such as the supposed public desire to ban Islamic immigration, as well as greatly reduce immigration generally. She also sarcastically noted that “governments…believe they know what is best for the uninformed voter.” She at times questioned who the government was serving, argued it was on “steroids,” and claimed that it, and the ‘parliamentarians’ within it, were ‘rorting’ the system and failing the tax-payers. She talked of back-room deals, “politicians’ lurks and perks,” governments that “turn a blind eye” to problems and claimed that “if they [governments] cannot rein in the budget…then get out of the job of running this country.” She contrasted this corrupt image with hard-working Australians whose tax dollars were being exploited for government self-interest and whose government was not looking after them during “tough times.” She further criticised the elites for their ‘political correctness’ (they do not have the “intestinal fortitude to cast aside political correctness”), which has led to poor policy decisions regarding Australia’s “sovereignty, rights,
jobs and democracy.” Relatedly, a frequent theme present within Hanson’s speeches was the notion of unfairness. This theme bridged the sub-categories. Although the world ‘unfair’ was never used, she would often frame immigrants, welfare recipients and the elite as utilising finite economic resources and “rorting” the system. This would be juxtaposed against ‘regular Australians’ seemingly unable to enjoy the same opportunities. She also characterised her own political experiences in a similar fashion, whereby the mainstream politicians and the establishment have kept her out of power, positioning herself as the political under-dog. She also criticised university elites, tying them in with her ‘othering’ when she argued that international students were “good for the remuneration packages” of vice-chancellors but bad for regular people.

Crisis and/or societal declinism and blame attribution

As evidenced by Hanson’s high score on the crisis category in the quantitative stage, she frequently utilised sentences in her speeches that characterised Australia as being in a stage of crisis and decline. She achieved this through characterising Australia as experiencing a great number of societal problems, rather than just one overarching one (e.g., Islamic terrorism). In contrast, both Shorten and Turnbull both isolated their crisis-related language to that specific issue. The problems articulated by Hanson that contributed to her broad characterisation of an Australia ‘in crisis’ ranged from the tangible and measurable (high unemployment, ‘out-of-control debt,’ and inadequate infrastructure) to the more abstract (loss of social cohesion, degradation of the ‘Australian way of life’). She also cited the supposed detrimental economic impact of immigration, the destruction of the farming sector, declining standard of living, road congestion, long waits for seeing doctors, lack of water, Australians being “forced out” of their towns and suburbs, and foreign takeover of Australian land as causes for concern. As was expected, fears surrounding Islamic terrorism were also frequently articulated. She also claimed that there are crises occurring related to the welfare system, the health budget, and suicides related to the family court. It is important to note that Hanson only very rarely provided data to support these claims.

Hanson framed Australian culture and society as changing for the worse as a result of “indiscriminate immigration” and “aggressive multiculturalism,” with immigration isolated as the primary cause of Australian society’s ills. She also often utilised blame attributive sentences
alongside the language that frames Australian society as in decline. This distinguishes her from both the other leaders. Both Turnbull’s and Shorten’s crisis language lacked any blame attribution. Hanson’s blame attribution was mostly isolated to the immigrants themselves, but she also often blamed the elites—the major parties and past governments—for their various immigration policies that opened up the borders and instigated Australia’s slide into multiculturalism. As is noted above, immigration generally and immigrants in particular were frequently blamed for the many societal problems outlined previously. For example, she simultaneously blamed immigrants both for overburdening the welfare system and the declining employment prospects for other Australians. At the same time, she also blamed immigration for creating economic growth “for the wrong reason,” claiming it is masking other problems in the economy, as well as decreasing the standard of living of Australians. She said that migrants were a “drain on our society,” blamed multiculturalism for Australia’s social cohesion being “in decline,” and blamed the presence of immigrants themselves for the changing nature of Australian society more broadly. While she frequently cited immigration generally as being a problem, Muslim immigrants were the migrant group most often blamed. Hanson claimed that Muslims were bringing “intolerance” and changing the make-up of Australian suburbs, and she often associated this group with crime, terrorism and violence. She blamed, without evidence, Muslim Australians for a myriad of societal problems, including welfare dependency, organised crime, “anti-social behaviour fuelled by hyper-masculine and misogynistic culture” and civil tension. She also used language that evokes invasion and colonisation by outsider cultures. Using the same language she used in her 1996 maiden speech in the Australian parliament, where she claimed Australia was in “danger of being swamped by Asians,” Hanson claimed that in 2016 Australia was then “in danger of being swamped by Muslims, who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own.” She also claimed that Australia would soon be “living under Sharia Law” and non-Muslim Australians would be second-class citizens. She cited high Muslim birth-rates and Islam’s supposed incompatibility with Australian culture as evidence that the cultural make-up of Australia, and with it Australia’s ‘way of life,’ was changing for the worse as result of the presence of Muslims.

Hanson also uses language that is ‘negative’ to achieve her construction of Australia in crisis. She does this alongside discussions of societal problems to create the image that Australian society is declining or in the process of changing for the worse. For example, she claimed towns were starting “to die” or be “destroyed” by foreign ownership, and she used words like “rorted,” “scammed” and “abused” to describe issues related to Australia’s welfare system. She also
used language that evoked corruption, deception or incompetence in relation to the government, with anti-elitist language present, and positioned her party as being able to alleviate the problems created by the government. For example, she called government immigration and population policies “ponzi schemes,” claimed other parties were like “drunken fools” in relation to immigration and without intervention from “adults in the room” it would “blow up in our faces.” Language that evokes danger and fear was also often utilised, with the word “fear” itself very often used. For example, she said that Australians are “more fearful,” were “very afraid,” “live in fear” and were “in fear” in general. However, she also used language that evoked fear in general to create the sense that Australian society is getting more dangerous. She claimed that Australians were scared because of increased rates of crime and threats of terrorism. She articulated that Australians are “afraid to walk alone at night in their neighbourhoods,” “afraid to go on trains,” “shopping centres” and “sporting venues.” Hanson utilised this language to perpetuate the idea that everyday life in Australia is changing as a result of both immigration generally and the presence of Muslims in Australia specifically. She said that “radicalisation is happening on our streets, in our suburbs” and she paired this language with language critical of Muslims, blaming them for this decline in safety.

The above indicates that Hanson utilised each of the sub-categories of analysis in a symbiotic manner, in that her crisis discourse played a crucial role in facilitating her people-centrism, anti-elitism, and ‘othering,’ and vice versa. It also found that her primary in-grouping and out-grouping was ethno-cultural, rather than anti-elitist. While her anti-elitism remained a crucial ingredient to her overall agenda, it was secondary to her denigration of Muslims and anti-immigrant stance. This suggests that Hanson is primarily nativist, but that populism is also a significant feature within her agenda. This follows previous literature on the primary role of nativism, rather than populism, in the populist radical right. Moreover, as I have noted, crisis should be seen as instrumental in her in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people’ and both the ‘elite’ and the ‘other’. This is in line with recent scholarship that argues that crisis is a supply-side condition of populism.

646 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
647 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
Variable Two: Policy

Quantitative results

This stage analysed the degree to which the populist radical right ideology, per Mudde (nativism, authoritarianism and populism), was manifest in the policy document of the party. It also examined the degree to which the party held non-nativist economic policies, to determine the degree to which economic concerns are indeed “instrumental” and “secondary” to the party; the degree of policies that relate to traditional public policy areas (such as education and healthcare); and the degree of socio-cultural policies that do not draw on their populist radical right ideology. These latter categories are, again, used to illustrate the degree to which nativism is present in the overall policy document. Figure 5.5 shows the aggregated and disaggregated quantitative score for the policy documents for each of the parties. It outlines that ON’s primary policy concerns are nativist (37.50 percent), with fewer policies drawing on both authoritarianism (10 percent) and even fewer on their populism (6.25 percent), thus suggesting that nativism is the primary ideology for ON. This follows Mudde, as well as reflecting the findings from the discourse variable, that the populist radical right are radical right first, populist second. The quantitative findings also indicate that non-nativist economic policies are also relatively important to the party, making up 30 percent of the document. This is interesting, as along with Hanson’s use of the economy to frame her anti-immigrant agenda, it suggests that the party is not entirely interested in post-materialist issues. Moreover, socio-cultural policies that do not draw on the party’s nativism make up 13.75 percent of the document, and the party only nominally acknowledges traditional public policy areas in the document (i.e., healthcare or education), at 2.5 percent.

648 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
649 Ibid.
By point of comparison, the majority of the mainstream parties’ documents are either socio-economic (LNP: 43.95 percent; ALP 39.97 percent); or traditionally public policy related, scoring 40.32 percent and 42.64 percent respectively. The LNP, the party most ideologically similar to ON, does have policies that are categorised as authoritarian (7.25 percent), but scored zero for any nativist policies. This score for nativism is interesting to note given the party is known for implementing very strict policies regarding asylum seekers, described in more detail in the context section. But, in short, the reason for this nativist score is because the document analysed lacks the explicit acknowledgment of these harsh policies.650 Thus, we can conclude from this that for their actual policy document, the LNP only partially relied on radical right principles, but a further exploration and unpacking of their positions will be conducted below. The ALP, contrastingly, scored zero for any presence of policies that could be categorised as drawing on a radical right ideology.

From this data we can conclude that, as I have noted, ON are primarily concerned with nativist issues, but socio-economic issues also play a relatively prominent role in the document. It also suggests that the party somewhat values non-nativist socio-cultural issues but is relatively unconcerned with traditional public policy issues like healthcare or education. Indeed, while the findings suggest that economic issues are a priority for each of the parties, and thus there

650 For example, while the document did discuss ‘stopping the boats,’ which means stopping the supposed ‘illegal’ arrival of asylum seekers via boat to Australian shores, it couched this with arguing that through this ‘stopping of the boats’ they are able to increase the number of asylum seekers accepted through other channels. Other harsh policies of the LNP regarding asylum seekers include the policy of offshore detention. Again, this policy was not present in the document. Both these issues will be outlined in detail in the context section.
is some synthesis here amongst the parties with regards to policy focus, ON’s other policy priorities differ significantly from mainstream interests. Indeed, ON was the only party to score significantly on the radical right category, and we can also infer from this that ON does not prioritise policies that are traditionally important to mainstream political parties, such as education and healthcare.

**Qualitative results**

While the quantitative data allows for analysis into the degree to which ON prioritises particular ideological concerns (i.e., nativist or populist), and materialist and post-materialist matters, it only tells part of the story. The qualitative stage allows an analysis of the particular policies that make up the above data, and the language chosen by the party to deliver its policies. This stage provides scope for a more detailed analysis into the ON’s particular worldview and thus the character of ON as a party.

As the quantitative stage suggests, ON’s radical right policies are centred on their nativism, with fewer policies that drew on authoritarianism. These nativist policies are primarily focused on an anti-Islamic ethos and anti-immigrant attitude. For example, the party proposes a reintroduction of discriminatory immigration policies. The party outlines that while they support a “sustainable refugee programme,” this does not extend to Muslims. The party proposes a total ban on Muslim refugees, as well as a ban on Islamic immigration generally. The party also proposes a zero-net immigration policy, where “those who leave Australia are replaced with migrants who are actually culturally cohesive with Australia and will assimilate.”

ON also has an entire sub-category to dedicated to Islam and Halal certification. In this section, they advocate a ban on certain Islamic clothing items (the burqa and “other full-face coverings”) in public and government buildings, a ban on Australian companies paying the Halal certification tax, and propose “no more building of mosques & Islamic schools” until an inquiry takes place on whether or not Islam is a religion or a “totalitarian political ideology.” In a similar fashion to Hanson’s speeches, the document also claims Islam is “undermining our democracy and way of life.” References to Muslims and Islam are absent from both the LNP and ALP documents. Where ON and LNP do have policy similarity related to the radical right
ideology it is isolated to authoritarian policies that focus on tougher law-and-order stances on issues like crime, drugs and illegal guns.

Socio-economically, ON and the other parties have policy similarity in some areas. Both ON and the ALP make reference to the need for “fair” changes to the tax system, and the LNP infers a similar need. All three parties also emphasise the need to build infrastructure projects to facilitate job creation and economic growth. But where the parties differ sits within ON’s attitude towards international trade. Indeed, both the LNP and ALP emphasise trade as a crucial aspect of Australia’s future economic prosperity. Where the LNP’s document articulates that the various trade deals that either have already been implemented or will be implemented in the future (e.g., the China-Australia Free-Trade Agreement or the Trans-Pacific Partnership) would aid in Australia’s economic growth and create employment, ON’s document implies a concern that such trade deals are not necessarily in the country’s best interest. ON’s document argues that these agreements must be “reviewed and revoked” if found to not be in Australia’s interest, citing the Trans-Pacific Partnership in particular. This also draws on the party’s nationalism and their scepticism of inter-governmental organisations. As such, these policies were coded as nativist. Relatedly, in their section on trade, the ON’s document outlines: “We will not let the United Nations dictate to our politicians how to run our country.” The section also says the party “upholds the Australian constitution.” Both ON and the ALP explicitly object to any increase to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and ON proposes an increase to the old-age pension.

ON’s policies that draw on their populism relate to the introduction of direct-democracy initiatives. They also draw on their conservatism regarding post-materialist issues, in advocating for a plebiscite vote on same-sex marriage. The party also emphasises the need for family-law reform. It claims inequities within the system are leading to suicides. Furthermore, the party supports responsible gun ownership. The ALP has many socio-cultural policies, largely focused on tackling inequality, and ranging from a policy to implement marriage equality, implementing a timeline for making Australia a republic and tackling domestic violence. The majority of the LNP’s socio-cultural policies relate to the issue of domestic violence, with no reference to issues like same-sex marriage. ON’s policy document also has far fewer policies on issues of education, healthcare and the environment than the mainstream parties. As the quantitative stage shows, ‘general’ policies, including healthcare, education and the environment make a significant portion of both the LNP and ALP documents. These
policies are widespread, and included hospital funding, school and higher education funding, and various policies to alleviate environmental degradation and “tackle” climate change. Even the LNP, which includes within its ranks climate sceptics, acknowledges the need to implement policies to mitigate climate change. Contrastingly, ON’s policy document only makes passing reference to the environment and only in relation to farming and water. ON’s document also contains no reference to healthcare, except in relation to the issue of “foreigners, illegal immigrants and Australians” supposedly “rorting the healthcare (and welfare) system, and contains a minimal reference to higher education.

In summary, the policy variable finds that ON is primarily nativist, with populism only partially present in the policy document. This follows previous literature on the party family, and reflects the findings from the discourse variable, which found that the primary in-out grouping was ethno-culturally drawn, rather than anti-elitist. The policy variable also suggests that while the party is indeed nativist, it is also partially interested in materialist issues, a finding also reflected in the way that Hanson framed her core anti-immigrant, anti-Islam agenda. While this follows Mudde’s claim that economic concerns are an “instrumental” and “secondary” matter, it also partially challenges the claim that the party family are primarily a “post-materialist phenomenon,” suggesting that ON at least balances post-materialist and materialist issues.

Situating the Findings within the Australian Context

This thesis explores the supply-side features of the populist radical right and how the utilisation of these features may differ between contexts. As such, it is important to situate the above quantitative and qualitative findings within the particular socio-cultural and socio-political climate of the particular country from which the case study operates. To achieve this contextualisation, a set of demand-side conditions will be considered in relation to the above findings: the politics of immigration and refugees; the economic conditions in electorates with high ON vote; and some opinion polling data of Australians on key issues. These will be used

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Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

to illustrate the macro political and economic conditions within which ON operates, and the receptiveness to, and appeal of, populist and radical right frames amongst the Australian population. Through analysis of these issues, we can better situate the discourse of Hanson, and the political decisions of ON generally, within a broad socio-political and cultural context. These conditions reflect some of the themes brought up by Hanson in her speeches, such as that the impact of immigration on the economy, Australia’s changing socio-cultural make-up, and the Australian public’s attitudes towards immigrants and Islam.

Politics and immigration

It is important to situate Hanson’s anti-Islam and anti-immigrant discourse, her fears surrounding the colonisation and ‘loss’ of Australia’s ‘way of life,’ and her discriminatory immigration policies within the broader socio-political and socio-cultural climate. Australia’s history of British colonial immigrants, forced convict migrants and large post-war immigration means that it is widely “considered to be one of the world’s major ‘immigration nations’,” and has historically been “profoundly influenced by international migration.” Since 1945, Australia has settled 7.5 million people, and compared to other OECD countries the number

653 See the following example of research on the demand-side considerations of populist success, which utilises macro immigration data to predict right-wing populist support in Europe: Boris Podobnik et al., “Predicting the Rise of E.U. Right-Wing Populism in Response to Unbalanced Immigration,” Complexity 2017 (2017). See the following example of research on the demand-side considerations of populist success, which utilises economic data to contextualise populist electoral success in Europe: Kriesi and Pappas. See the following example of research on the demand-side considerations of populist support which examines macro immigration and unemployment data to contextualise extreme-right support in Western Europe: Kai Arzheimer, “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009).


657 Phillips and Simon-Davies.
of foreign-born residents is high. But despite what the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) calls the “rich mix” of cultures that exists within Australia, Australia’s relationship with immigration has been complicated and politically fraught. ON’s advocation for a zero-net immigration policy and the proposal for a reintroduction of discriminatory immigration and asylum-seeker policies, while not reflected in the mainstream party’s respective 2016 policy proposals, do sit within a broader cultural hostility towards both migrants and refugees.

This broader cultural hostility towards immigration has roots in past discriminatory immigration policies and a more recent antagonism towards asylum seekers. Australia has two programs in place to facilitate immigration, the migration program and the humanitarian program for those seeking asylum. It is important to note that Islamic immigration to Australia predominantly draws from the latter. Indeed, Islamic migrants make up only a small proportion of those seeking to migrate to Australia through the migration program. In 2014/15, only two Muslim-majority countries were among the top ten source countries for the migration program: Pakistan at 4.4 percent, and Malaysia at 2.1 percent. Accordingly, immigration to Australia from Muslim-majority countries within the migration program remains relatively low compared to non-Muslim-majority countries. Conversely, the majority of humanitarian program resettlements drew from Muslim-majority countries (69 percent), specifically Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. The fact that those from Muslim-majority countries make up a relatively small number of migration-program places but make up a significantly large number of humanitarian-program places is important, due to the vulnerability of those who seek humanitarian visas and the fact that Australia’s policies towards asylum-seeker migrants has been widely criticised, both domestically and internationally. Moreover, much of the contemporary concern regarding migration within Australia has stemmed from concerns regarding refugees seeking asylum via boat.

658 Ibid.
While there are indeed examples of governments that have been particularly welcoming to refugees (see the Liberal Fraser government, 1975–1983), other governments have been more hostile (see the Liberal Howard government 1996–2007). With a rise in people seeking asylum by boat (as opposed to through official channels), and some of those people dying as a result, there was both an attitudinal shift in the way refugees were discussed by the government and a policy shift with regards to the procedures for processing their applications. This shift arguably began in 2001 with the Tampa crisis. The Tampa, a boat filled with men, women and children from Afghanistan seeking asylum from the Taliban, was refused entry to Australia by the Howard government and their arrival (and consequently their plight) was “misrepresented to the public as a threat to our national sovereignty.” This misrepresentation instigated a broad cultural hostility towards those who sought asylum by arriving by boat on Australian shores. While seeking asylum is not illegal, the issue was framed as one where those seeking asylum without a visa were cast as ‘cutting the line’ and acting illegally. This framing has since dominated political discourse on the topic and consequently resulted in the introduction of more hostile asylum-seeker policies by mainstream parties, such as indefinite mandatory detention and the creation of offshore detention centres where many asylum applicants must reside while their applications are being processed. The government has also banned those who seek asylum by boat from ever being able to enter Australia. The policy of processing asylum seekers offshore remains controversial due to the noted poor living conditions, reports of physical and sexual abuse, and the indefinite nature of the detention. The centres themselves have been labelled “terrible” by the initial architect of the system, and the policy in general has been called “brutal” and “obscene” by critics. Twelve asylum seekers have died while

However, there remains official bipartisan support for the policy of offshore detention by the LNP government and opposition ALP. Those who support the policy argue that it acts as a deterrent for ‘people smugglers’ who attempt to smuggle asylum seekers by boat to Australia and that the policy of offshore detention consequently reduces the number of deaths occurring during the smuggling process. Indeed, while ON is the only larger party to advocate for a discriminatory refugee program, the LNP’s and ALP’s respective policies towards asylum seekers—a group predominantly made up of Muslims—acts as a de facto deterrent for Muslim refugees wanting to seek asylum via boat.

Indeed, this policy hostility towards asylum seekers reflects a broader cultural hostility towards immigration in Australia. As Junanker notes, hostility towards immigration can stem from a mix of fears, which draw from both economic and xenophobic concerns. Economic fears include the impact that immigration can have on the job supply, or migrants being dependent on government welfare (‘welfare cheats’). This fear is reflected in Hanson’s language throughout her speeches, where she characterises both Islamic and non-Islamic immigrants as taking jobs from Australians as well as ‘rorting’ the welfare system. This belief is prevalent despite evidence suggesting that immigration can have a distinct benefit on the economy and aid with issues such as an aging population and a decreased fertility rate. Xenophobia is has also been noted to be at the root of government opposition to immigration, with a fear “of ‘coloured’ people…and more recently, fears of Muslims ‘invading’ their country” underlying much of the discussion on the issue. Indeed, this is again reflected in Hanson’s speeches, with fears surrounding the loss of the Australian ‘way of life’ often articulated in a way that indicates invasion and colonisation by outsider cultures. Moreover, Australia’s historic ties with Britain as its colonial power, as well as the fact that British migration “became the foundation of Australia’s post-war immigration,” has led to the “Australian national identity [being] confirmed as an essentially British Christian population.” This identity alignment with Britain, and the reluctance by governments for any shift in that identity to occur,

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670 Ibid., 2.
671 Ibid.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid., 2.
led to the introduction of discriminatory immigration policies which sought to restrict immigration to Australia to whites only. The White Australia Policy (officially in place from 1901 to 1973) operated under the assumption that “non-white immigrants would harm Australian society.”\(^{675}\) Hanson’s construction of the default Australian culture as necessarily Judea-Christian, and ON wanting to re-introduce discriminatory immigration policies banning Islamic people from migrating to Australia through both the migrant program and the humanitarian program draws on this history. It is also worth noting here that despite Hanson’s rhetoric about Australia being “swamped by Muslims” and the resulting loss of the “Australian way of life,” \(^{675}\) 2016 Australian census data outlines that Christianity is still by far the most dominant religion in Australia (51.1 percent).\(^{676}\) In contrast, only a small proportion of Australian residents identified as Muslim (2.6 percent),\(^{677}\) with only a small increase of 0.4 percent since 2011.\(^{678}\)

Moreover, ON’s emphasis on assimilation and integration—both as it manifests in Hanson’s speeches as well as in their policy document—is not reflected officially in the Coalition or ALP policies but is not necessarily out of place within the broader Australian cultural and political climate. It has been noted that migrants still face challenges upon their settlement within the country, with many “racial and ethnic minorities…experienc[ing] some form of discrimination in the course of settlement in Australia.”\(^{679}\) And while there is an official policy of non-discrimination within immigration procedures, there is evidence that a culture of prioritising those who fit the historic British/white Australian identity still permeates within government. The former Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Immigration and Border Patrol, Peter Dutton, made a declaration in March 2018 that there should be a prioritisation of white South African farmers for refugee intakes,\(^{680}\) a statement which exemplifies this concern, particularly if we contrast it with Dutton’s past determination that asylum seekers who arrive by boat, who are predominantly non-white and many of whom draw from Muslim majority countries, must remain in offshore detention centres despite the humanitarian concerns. This belief, which has

\(^{675}\) Junankar, 14.
\(^{677}\) Ibid.
\(^{679}\) Kabir, 16.
been argued to be a “throwback” to Australia’s “long, racist history,”\textsuperscript{681} is mirrored in much of Hanson’s language and ON’s demand that only migrants who are “culturally cohesive” should be allowed into Australia.

\textit{Economic conditions}

The economic conditions of electorates with high ON vote in 2016 can help situate the language and themes found in Hanson’s speeches and the broader policy decisions of the party. Indeed, there persists the idea that immigration can drain a country’s economic resources (welfare dependence, job supply),\textsuperscript{682} and consequently the health of an economy is often cited as a reason to limit the migration intake. Indeed, this a point often cited by Hanson herself in the speeches analysed, as found in the qualitative stage of the discourse variable. Moreover, research has noted that there exists an intersect between those experiencing economic insecurity and a predilection for experiencing a cultural backlash against post-materialist values,\textsuperscript{683} or an “Authoritarian Reflex,” articulated by Inglehart and Norris.\textsuperscript{684} As the quantitative stage of the policy variable found, ON highly values both socio-economic issues and issues related to their radical right ideology. Together, these reasons mean that reflecting on the economic conditions in which ON voters live is important to fully contextualise the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam rhetoric of Hanson, and as well as the political motivations of the party more generally. While this category will not assess the economic insecurity of ON voters specifically, it will examine the degree of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage in the electorates where ON ran candidates in the 2016 federal election,\textsuperscript{685} the purpose of which is to determine whether these areas are more economically disadvantaged than other electorates. This follows previous research on the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and


\textsuperscript{682} Junankar.


\textsuperscript{684} Inglehart and Norris, "Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse,” 443.

\textsuperscript{685} I have chosen to focus on these electorates in order to contextualise ON’s decision to run candidates in these areas. For example, what are the economic conditions that might lead ON to believe an electorate will be receptive to their political agenda.
populist support, such as that conducted by Gidron and Hall,\textsuperscript{686} as well as other work conducted on the broader relationship between the economy and populist success, such as found in Pappas and Kriesi’s comprehensive compilation of studies on the various impacts of, and correlates between, the Great Recession and electoral success of populist parties in Europe.\textsuperscript{687}

Utilising the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage (IRSAD) data from the ABS’s Socio-Economic Indexes for Australia we can determine the degree to which the electorates where ON ran candidates in the 2016 federal election experience relative economic deprivation or prosperity. As has been outlined above, we can illustrate this through determining the number of SA1s, or statistical areas, that fell into a particular decile, which indicates relative socio-economic advantage or disadvantage. The more SA1s in lower deciles, the more disadvantaged the electorate is. Conversely, the more SA2s in higher deciles, the more advantaged the electorate is. ON ran candidates in 15 electorates in the election. Of those 15, six had over 50 percent of SA1s in the lowest three deciles.\textsuperscript{688} That means that within those six electorates, over 50 percent of the areas within the electorates experienced relative socio-economic disadvantage. In the electorate of Hinkler in the One Nation stronghold of Queensland (QLD), which had the second-highest first-preference votes for ON (19.16 percent),\textsuperscript{689} 75 percent of SA1s were in the lowest three decile groups.\textsuperscript{690} Hinkler had zero SA1s in deciles nine and ten, and only 0.87 percent in decile eight.\textsuperscript{691} This made Hinkler one of the most disadvantaged electorates in the country. Another electorate with a high percentage of ON first-preference votes was Flynn (17.15 percent),\textsuperscript{692} also in QLD. Of this electorate, 51.45 percent had SA1s in the bottom three deciles, with only 5.8 percent in decile eight, and zero in both deciles nine and ten. Maranoa (QLD), Wide Bay (QLD), Blair (QLD) and Paterson (New South Wales, or NSW) made up the remaining electorates with over 50 percent of SA1s

\textsuperscript{686} See Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall, ”The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right,” \textit{British Journal of Sociology} 68 (2017); and Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall, ”Populism as a Problem of Social Integration” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association (APSA) Conference, San Francisco2017).

\textsuperscript{687} Kriesi and Pappas.


\textsuperscript{690} Statistics, \textit{Commonwealth Electoral Division (Ced) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 2016}.

\textsuperscript{691} Ibid.

in the lower deciles, with 54 percent, 56 percent, 61 percent, 53 percent respectively.\(^{693}\) None of these electorates had more than 10 percent of their SA1s in the top three deciles.\(^{694}\) This again indicated a high degree of socio-economic disadvantage in these electorates.

However, other IRSAD data somewhat goes against this trend. The electorate of Wright (QLD) had the highest percentage of ON first-preference votes (20.90 percent),\(^{695}\) but the SA1s within the electorate were relatively evenly spread. In Wright, 58 percent of SA1s were in deciles four, five, six and seven.\(^{696}\) However, it is worth noting that only 14 percent of SA1s in Wright were in the top three deciles, compared to 27 percent in the bottom three.\(^{697}\) There were also four electorates with over 20 percent of SA1s in the top three deciles. Oxley (QLD), where ON leader Pauline Hanson was first elected to parliament in 1996,\(^{698}\) had 26 percent of SA1s in the top three deciles, the highest of all electorates where ON ran candidates. However, 36 percent of SA1s in Oxley were in the bottom three deciles. Other electorates with over 20 percent in deciles eight, nine or ten were: Leichardt (QLD), with 25 percent, Fadden (QLD) with 22 percent, and Fairfax (QLD) with 21 percent.\(^{699}\) Richmond in NSW,\(^{700}\) which had the lowest first-preference vote of the fifteen electorates (6.26),\(^{701}\) had 37 percent of SA1s in deciles one, two and three, and 11 percent in the top deciles.\(^{702}\) For context, other electorates in 2016 that have been noted by observers utilising IRSAD data to be particularly disadvantaged (but where ON did not run candidates) were the Labor-held Braddon (Tasmania),\(^{703}\) which had 69 percent of their SA1s in the bottom three deciles, and the Labor-held Wakefield (South Australia).\(^{704}\)

\(^{693}\) Statistics, Commonwealth Electoral Division (Ced) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 2016.

\(^{694}\) Ibid.

\(^{695}\) Commission, "House of Representatives - Final Results."

\(^{696}\) Statistics, Commonwealth Electoral Division (Ced) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 2016.

\(^{697}\) Ibid.

\(^{698}\) Senator Pauline Hanson (Canberra: Parliament of Australia).

\(^{699}\) Statistics, Commonwealth Electoral Division (Ced) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 2016.

\(^{700}\) It is worth noting that the electorate of Richmond (NSW) had a high progressive Green vote in the 2016 federal election, with 20.44 percent of first-preference votes.

\(^{701}\) Commission, "House of Representatives - Final Results."

\(^{702}\) Statistics, Commonwealth Electoral Division (Ced) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 2016.


which had 62 percent of their SA1s in deciles one, two and three.\textsuperscript{705} Contrarily, the electorate of Wentworth in NSW, a Liberal seat, was the most socio-economically advantaged electorate with 98.2 percent of SA1s in deciles eight, nine and ten.\textsuperscript{706} Wentworth had zero SA1s in deciles one, two, three, four, five and six.\textsuperscript{707}

These findings demonstrate that the electorates where ON ran candidates were relatively socio-economically disadvantaged compared to other electorates in the country, although the severity of the disadvantage ranged between the electorates. This indicates that these electorates could be fertile ground for Hanson’s discussions on the supposed detrimental impact of immigration on the economy (that it is masking an economic downturn, that immigrants are taking jobs from Australians, and draining the welfare system which could be used by more needy Australians). Moreover, following Inglehart and Norris, the relative socio-economic deprivation found in these electorates could also facilitate a “cultural backlash” against minority groups and progressive ideals generally,\textsuperscript{708} again indicating that Hanson and ON’s anti-Islam, anti-immigrant and general socially conservative beliefs could be received well by these groups. The findings also situate the quantitative policy results of socio-economic policies being the most present in ON’s document within a broader context.

\textit{Public opinion}

Moreover, the empirical findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis should be considered against the Australian public’s general attitudes towards these issues during the period of analysis. Overall, it can be concluded that the Australian public’s perspectives on issues regarding Islam and immigration are mixed. While Hanson and ON’s anti-Islamic and anti-immigration beliefs are not necessarily widespread amongst the broader population nor can it be said that these attitudes are necessarily fringe. Evidence suggests while Australians “welcome diversity” within their country, there is also some apprehension towards immigration

\textsuperscript{705} Statistics, \textit{Commonwealth Electoral Division (Ced) Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 2016}. \\
\textsuperscript{706} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{707} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{708} Inglehart and Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash."
and Muslims, although evidence of this apprehension is conflicting. For example, a widely cited August 2016 report by Essential Research claimed that 49 percent of Australian’s supported a ban on Muslim immigration to Australia. The main reasons cited for this ban was a lack of Muslim integration (41 percent) and the threat of terrorism (27 percent). In terms of the respondents’ party preferences (out of LNP, ALP, the Greens and ‘Other’), the largest amount of support for the ban was contained to supporters of the LNP (60 percent) and ‘other’ (58 percent). Interestingly, a significant minority of those with centre-left and left-wing voting preferences also supported the ban (ALP 40 percent, the Greens 34 percent). As evidenced above, the apprehension towards Muslim immigration experienced by Australians partly stems from fears of Islamic terrorism. Research has noted that the Sydney Siege, an act of terrorism that took place at Martin Place, Sydney, in December 2014, encouraged the idea that “Australia was a credible target of Islamic terrorism.” Indeed, as the Lowy Institute has noted, polling data research conducted in the aftermath of the terrorist incident in Martin Place found that “fewer Australians feel safe now than at any time in our history of polling, and terrorism ranks high in Australians’ threat perceptions.” However, as critics of the Essential report have noted, opposition to Muslim immigration evidenced in the polling is “exaggerated” due to methodological issues. These include the “all-or-nothing” question posed (“Would you support or oppose a ban on Muslim immigration to Australia?”), and the fact that those responding were participating within an online commercial panel. Online panel respondents have been found to provide a more negative response to social issues than randomised phone-call polling, and yes/no questions can lead to an oversimplification of the issue at hand. Further polling on the issue of Muslim immigration conducted in the months following the release of the Essential Report by Roy Morgan Research in October 2016 found

711 Ibid.
712 Kampmark, 497.
714 Michael Levine, Australian Opposition to Muslim Immigration Exaggerated (Melbourne: Roy Morgan Research, 2016).
716 Levine.
717 Markus.
that a “clear majority of Australians” support Muslim immigration (58 percent). Another Roy Morgan Research poll conducted in 2015 found that 55 percent of Australians supported Muslim immigration. More broadly, as research conducted by the Pew Research Center has noted, Australians are “divided” on issues such as Muslim assimilation. When asked “whether Muslims in their country want to adopt Australian customs and way of life,” 46 percent of the respondents believed that Muslims do not wish to adopt Australian customs, contrasting with 42 percent believing that they do. In the same poll, it was noted that “half of Australians say that sharing the customs and traditions of the country is very important for anyone to be considered ‘truly’ Australian,” and 69 percent believed that speaking English is very important if one is to be considered a “true national.” Just less than half of Australia (49 percent) believed that cultural diversity makes Australia a “better place.”

In general, research conducted by the Lowy Institute found that a growing number of Australians believe that the rate of immigration is too high, from 37 percent in 2014 to 54 percent in 2018. Those who believe the immigration rate is ‘about right’ have fallen from 47 percent in 2014 to 30 percent in 2018. While the Lowy Institute found that Australians’ attitudes towards immigration are indeed shifting, this is mostly concentrated to sentiment towards the rate of immigration. With regards to Australians’ perception of the contribution of migrants generally, Australians “remain positive.” Other research confirms these trends. The Australian Election Study found that those who believed immigration was too high had increased steadily since 2007 to 2016 from 15 percent to 26 percent. Conversely, however, those who agreed immigrants made a positive contribution to Australia (immigrants improved the economy, 54 percent; or made Australia “more open to ideas or culture,” 70 percent), outweighed those who believed that immigrants made a negative contribution (immigrants

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718 Majority of Australian's Support Muslim & Asylum Seeker Immigration; and 58% Want Australia's Population Kept under 35 Million (Melbourne: Roy Morgan Research, 2016).
720 Poushter.
721 Ibid.
722 Ibid.
723 Ibid.
724 Rate of Immigration (Sydney: Lowy Institute 2018).
725 Ibid.
726 Ibid.
727 Sarah M. Cameron and Ian McAllister, Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from the Australian Election Study 1987-2016 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2016), 100.
increase the crime rate, 37 percent; or take jobs away from natives, 30 percent). With regards to the policy of the forced turning back of boats of asylum seekers arriving on Australian shores, the Australian Election Study found that Australians were increasingly sceptical of the policy, but the majority still believed that boats should be returned. In 2001, 62 percent of responders believed that boats should be turned back, down to 48 percent in 2016. Conversely, in 2001, 20 percent of responders believed that boats should not be turned back, up to 33 percent in 2016. It is also widely perceived by constituents that the LNP and ALP policies on asylum seekers are not that dissimilar. As the Australian Election Study (2016) found, 31 percent of respondents believed there was no difference between the two policies. Of those who did perceive a difference between the policies, 34 percent of respondents preferred the LNP policy, and only 19 percent preferred the ALP’s.

Moreover, the discourse utilised by Hanson, particularly the crisis-themed discourse, should be considered in relation to ON’s supporters and their general attitudes towards politics and society. As the 2017 Mapping Social Cohesion survey notes, ON “attracts a heightened level of discontented supporters.” For example, when asked about whether they had a sense of optimism or pessimism regarding Australia’s future, 34.9 percent of ON supporters cited being “very pessimistic,” contrasted with the relatively low pessimism in ALP (10.2 percent), LNP (6.5 percent) and Greens (5.6 percent) supporters. Furthermore, ON voters have the lowest trust in government, with 8.8 percent of ON voters believing that those in parliament can be trusted “to do the right thing for the Australian people.” This is reflected in Hanson’s use of anti-elitist language in her speeches which questioned the government’s priorities, and the policies in their 2016 document focusing on uncovering politicians’ ‘perks and entitlements.’ This is compared to 21.6 percent of ALP voters, 44.2 percent of LNP voters, and 14.3 percent of Greens voters. Additionally, when questioned on the efficacy of the Australian political system, ON supporters overwhelmingly (80 percent) believed that it “should be replaced” or “needs major change.” This contrasts with 52 percent of Greens, 36 percent of ALP, and 29

728 Ibid., 101.
729 Ibid., 41.
731 Ibid., 82.
732 Ibid., 38.
733 Ibid.
734 Ibid., 84.
percent of LNP supporters who believed the same.\textsuperscript{735} ON supporters not only do not trust Australian political institutions, but they are also more wary of other people in general than their political counterparts. When asked “…would you say that most people can be trusted?,” ON voters were amongst the lowest level of agreement with 22 percent.\textsuperscript{736} This contrasts with Greens voters who were amongst the highest level of agreement with 67 percent.\textsuperscript{737} Furthermore, ON supporters are also sceptical that Australia is a country that can provide economic opportunities for its residents. When asked whether “Australia is a land of economic opportunity where hard work is rewarded,” ON voters had the highest level of disagreement with 33 percent, followed by Greens (27 percent), ALP (22 percent), and LNP (10 percent). These findings reflect the themes brought up by Hanson in her speeches, in particular her emphasis on fairness, distrust of elites, and the general pessimism of her language.

Overall, it can be surmised from the above that while Australians increasingly believe that the rate of immigration is too high, they are conversely open to the concept of immigration broadly. There is also evidence that some Australians are optimistic about the contribution immigrants themselves can have on Australia and Australian culture. The cited methodological concerns aside, there is evidence that some Australians are apprehensive about Muslim immigration, with increased terrorism cited as a cause for this apprehension. Furthermore, it can be surmised that ON supporters are distinctly more pessimistic about Australian political institutions than supporters of other political parties, and that they have a lower level of trust both in government and in society in general. These findings are reflected in the language utilised by Hanson, whose speeches overwhelmingly focused on various problems in society and the how government has let Australians down.

\textbf{Concluding Remarks}

This chapter has outlined the empirical findings of the two-staged, mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis of ON. The analysis found that the process of ‘othering’ and characterising society as in crisis and/or decline was most prominent within the speeches, and anti-elitism

\textsuperscript{735} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{736} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{737} Ibid.
least prominent. It also found that what facilitated and distinguished ON’s discourse was the utilisation of each of the sub-categories in combination with one another. For example, Hanson’s crisis discourse played a core role in the way she constructed her people-centrism, and the way she pitted this group against the ‘elite’ and the ‘other.’ It also found that, on a policy-level, the party are primarily nativist, with populism only partially present in their document. Together, these findings suggest that ON is primarily nativist, following previous literature, but that populism is also significant feature of the party, and its presence in facilitating the party’s agenda is consequential.

The findings found that, following Moffitt, themes of crisis played a central supply-side role in the discourse of Hanson. She characterised Australian society as experiencing a great variety of problems, including the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity in the public sphere, blaming both Muslims for the supposed increased presence of Islam and the ‘elite’ for facilitating unfettered immigration programs that allowed this dynamic to occur. As such, the process of characterising society as in crisis and changing for the worse, and attributing blame for this crisis and change, was crucial to her overall agenda. The findings from the discourse analysis also determined that Hanson’s primary in-grouping and out-grouping was between a Judeo-Christian people against a Muslim ‘other,’ with an ‘underdog’ people against the ‘elite’ a secondary in-out grouping. This suggests that the primary in-out grouping was constructed ethno-culturally, and was thus nativist. While anti-elitism (and thus populism) was still relatively significant, it was a secondary consideration. These findings were also reflected in the policy variable, which determined that nativism, rather than authoritarianism and populism, was the most significant presence. This follows previous literature that argues that the populist radical right are radical right first, populist second. However, these findings should be considered against the very high quantitative presence of crisis discourse in Hanson’s speeches. Together, these findings suggest that while nativism is a central theme for Hanson, crisis is also significant. As crisis is a constituent feature of populism, per the findings, this suggests that despite ON being predominantly nativist, populism is a significant and fundamental component to the party’s agenda. Moreover, socio-economic policies were found to be

739 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
740 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in *Imagining the Peoples of Europe: Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.*
741 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
relatively significant for the party. This, paired with Hanson’s use of economic issues to facilitate her anti-immigrant and anti-Islam agenda in her speeches, suggests that while economic concerns should be seen as “instrumental” to ON’s broader program, following the literature, they are still relatively important to the party. Moreover, through a discussion on the broader socio-political and socio-cultural climate on immigration in Australia, I also determined that while ON was the only party with significant levels of the populist radical right ideology in their document, the party’s attitudes and policies are not markedly fringe. Australia’s historically fraught politics on immigration and the country’s recent hostility towards asylum seekers, as well as the mixed public opinions on immigration and Islam, indicate that while the mainstream parties do not officially facilitate the populist radical right ideas found in ON’s program, there is potentially a broader cultural and public acceptance of such beliefs. Moreover, following previous research, we can conclude that the relative socio-economic deprivation in electorates where ON ran candidates in 2016 makes ON’s policies appeal to voters both on a socio-economic level and also socio-culturally. We can furthermore note that Hanson’s frequent utilisation of crisis language also finds a more welcome home amongst her supporters than amongst supporters of other parties, as evidenced in the public-opinion section, which showed that ON supporters had high degrees of societal pessimism. The proceeding chapter outlines the empirical examination of the Party for Freedom (PVV), followed by a discussion chapter on the key comparative findings from the analysis of ON and the PVV, which will situate the results within the broader literature on populism and the party family, ending with a brief conclusion chapter of the thesis overall.

742 Ibid.
Chapter Six: Case Study Two – The Party for Freedom

This chapter discusses the findings from the empirical examination of the Party for Freedom (PVV). The chapter proceeds in two sections. Firstly, it outlines the results from the analysis of the PVV and its leader Geert Wilders, as well as the shorter analysis of the two mainstream parties in the Netherlands: the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and leader Prime Minister Mark Rutte; and the Labour Party (PvdA) and former leader Diederik Samsom.

The first stage of the analysis was the quantitative content analysis of Wilders’ speeches, used to determine the degree to which the five sub-categories of radical right populism—people-centrism, anti-elitism, ‘othering,’ societal declinism and blame attribution—are manifest in Wilders’ language. This was followed by the qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis of the speeches, used to determine the particular constituents of Wilders’ in-groups and out-groups, and the particular crises he constructed. The types of language utilised to facilitate this, such as specific words and phrases, were also analysed. This stage found that Wilders relied most heavily on a people-centrism constructed ethno-culturally and the ‘othering’ of a minority out-group in his speeches. The findings thus illustrated the degree to which Wilders prioritised his nativism over his populism in his in-grouping and out-grouping, in that his primary in-out grouping was along ethno-cultural lines, not along anti-elitist lines. Furthermore, this stage found that although used less often than the process of in-out grouping between ‘the people’ and an ‘other,’ crisis themes were actually crucial to Wilders’ discourse broadly, in that they grounded and facilitated his use of the other sub-categories of analysis. Indeed, his characterisation of a loss of Dutch identity and the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity provided the foundation upon which Wilders’ grounded his people-centric language, his ‘othering’ and his criticisms of the elite. The analysis found that while both the mainstream leaders utilised people-centric themes and characterised society as experiencing a variety of problems, Wilders was the only leader to rely on attribution of blame to minority and elite out-groups. As such, the data found that, following previous literature, Wilders is primarily nativist, but that populism was also crucial to his overall agenda. Moreover, it is the utilisation of all five sub-categories of radical right populism in concert with one another, rather than their distinct use, that distinguished Wilders from the mainstream parties. This is in line with the literature, such as that outlined by Moffitt, which sees crisis as not merely just an external trigger for populists like Wilders, but in fact at the very core of their antagonistic relationship between the people, the elite, and the ‘other.’ Crisis and the attributing of blame for crisis
provide the groundwork for Wilders to project his worldview. The analysis also involved an examination of the PVV manifesto for the 2017 general election. This stage found that the PVV is radical right first, populist second, with nativism their primary ideology, following previous literature. Non-nativist socio-economic issues were also relatively prominent, with comparatively little concern for traditional policy areas like education and healthcare. The qualitative stage of the policy analysis, which utilised a qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis, found that the PVV’s policies were more ‘extreme’ than the VVD and PvdA—for example, the PVV was the only party to want to introduce discriminatory immigration policies against Muslims—but that an anti-Islam, nativist ethos was still manifest in the VVD’s document. For example, as part of their integration policy, the VVD proposed a ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves.

As I have argued previously, crucial to this analysis is the process of contextualisation. The above findings will be situated within the broader Dutch context in section two. As with the previous case-study chapter, three issues in particular will be discussed to achieve this contextualisation: the politics of immigration and integration in the Netherlands, economic data, and opinion polling data of the Dutch public.

**Variable one: Discourse**

**Quantitative results**

This stage of the mixed-method empirical analysis entailed the quantitative examination of variable one, the discourse of the PVV leader, Wilders. Here, utilising a quantitative content analysis method, I assessed the degree to which the five sub-categories of the populist radical right outlined in previous chapters manifested in the selected sources. This stage therefore provided a quantifiable and comparative assessment of the degree to which the specific features of populism were present within Wilders’ language.

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744 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
Figure 6.1 shows the aggregated quantitative populist score and the disaggregated sub-categories for Wilders and the two mainstream party leaders, Mark Rutte and Diederik Samsom. It shows that Wilders scored highly for the aggregated populist score, with 39.96 percent of sentences in his speeches correlating with one of the populist indices outlined. When compared to the mainstream parties, Wilders’ high score is even more pronounced, with Rutte and Samsom each scoring relatively low aggregated populist scores, at 10.30 percent and 12.17 percent respectively. Wilders’ most utilised category of populism was the process of in-grouping and out-grouping, which he utilised at a rate of 27.97 percent. This is considerably higher than both the mainstream leaders. Rutte and Samsom only used in-out grouping infrequently, scoring 4.12 percent and 6.95 percent respectively. Indeed, while still quite prominent, crisis language occurred much less frequently in Wilders’ speeches than his in-out grouping. Wilders utilised language that evoked crisis and attributed blame at a rate of 11.99 percent, with Rutte and Samsom each utilising this category less frequently, at a rate of 6.18 percent and 5.21 percent respectively.

Wilders’ most utilised sub-category overall was people-centrism, which he used at a rate of 12.66 percent. Both Rutte and Samsom utilised people-centric language less frequently than Wilders, at 4.12 percent and 6.95 percent, but its presence is still relatively significant. Indeed, people-centrism made up the entirety of both Rutte’s and Samsom’s in-out grouping, with no corresponding ‘othering’ or anti-elitist language found in the sources. From this we can
conclude that, following previous research, while mainstream leaders may utilise the populist feature of people-centrism to some degree, they do not utilise the necessary binary out-grouping that constitutes populism generally (anti-elitism) and in particular radical right populism (anti-elitism and ‘othering’). Wilders, contrastingly, utilised both these sub-categories alongside his people-centrism. Indeed, language that ‘othered’ an out-group was his second-most utilised sub-category. He used this language at a rate of 9.41 percent across his speeches. Anti-elitism, while utilised less often than the other in-grouping and out-grouping language, was still used relatively often, at a rate of 5.89 percent. It was his fourth-most utilised sub-category overall. While relatively low when compared to his use of people-centrism and ‘othering,’ Wilders’ anti-elitism is high compared to the mainstream leaders, both of whom scored zero for this sub-category.

Crisis language, while less utilised than in/out grouping, was still a significant presence throughout Wilders’ speeches. He utilised language that evoked a crisis and/or societal decline to a similar degree to language with which he aimed to attribute blame for said crisis and/or decline, scoring 5.85 percent and 6.14 percent respectively. This indicates that the process of characterising society in crisis and attributing blame go hand in hand for Wilders. This is more pronounced when we compare it to the mainstream leaders, who both scored relatively significant rates of societal declinism (Rutte, 6.18 percent; Samsom, 5.21 percent), but scored zero for any presence of language that aimed to attribute blame for a crisis on out-groups, either minority ‘othered’ groups or the elite. Indeed, Rutte actually scored higher than Wilders for societal declinism, but the corresponding blame attribution language was not present. From this we can conclude that while mainstream leaders may discuss the various problems experienced by society and articulate fears surrounding the future, they do not aim to attribute blame for said problems to the same degree as populist leaders. Therefore, we can conclude here that it is the utilisation of these two sub-categories of crisis in concert with one another that distinguishes radical right populism from the mainstream parties in the Netherlands. While the mainstream leaders may utilise language that constructs society as being in crisis or experiencing some sort of decline, they do not necessarily seek to attribute blame for this decline to an out-group. In contrast, this pairing of crisis and blame is crucial to Wilders’ overall agenda.

March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."
Qualitative results

This stage of the empirical analysis was a qualitative examination of variable one, the discourse of Wilders. In this stage, utilising a hermeneutic textual analysis method, I analysed both the language used by Wilders to facilitate his agenda, and the particular social groups, grievances and overall themes utilised to formulate his in-out grouping and crisis construction. As the quantitative stage illustrates, it is the utilisation of all five categories in conjunction with one another that distinguishes Wilders from the mainstream parties’ leaders, rather than the use of any single category in isolation. Furthermore, while the mainstream leaders’ speeches contained elements of populist language, such as people-centrism and themes of crisis, the broader context of the speeches further distinguished Rutte’s and Samsom’s use of this type of language from that of Wilders. Indeed, the qualitative stage found that while all three leaders utilised people-centrism and societal declinism language relatively often, the language used by Wilders to facilitate these was both different in tone and used to different ends than that of both the mainstream leaders.

People-centrism

At the core of Wilders’ most utilised sub-category, people-centrism, was a prolific and frequent reference to Judeo-Christianity and Western cultural traditions and norms. Emphasising the “Judeo-Christian roots of our civilisation,” he utilised these themes to frame Dutch and European (as well as American) society broadly as being necessarily and singularly Judeo-Christian and Western. Through the use of the term “Judeo-Christian,” Wilders draws on a history of European politicians, such as Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, using the term in a secular fashion to connote both Enlightenment values and, importantly, an anti-Islam ethos. The use of this term along with notions of Western-ness served to create and frame an in-group, specifically those people that identified with these cultural traditions, as well as those who believe Dutch and European society must remain solely influenced by those traditions. Central

to this Judeo-Christian and Western in-grouping was a prolific utilisation of collective pronouns. For example, he frequently referred to “our society,” “our country,” “our values,” “our homeland,” “our freedoms” and “our identity” in relation to Judeo-Christianity and Western values. This served to necessarily construct society as belonging to these traditions at the expense of other cultural influences. Wilders combined his use of Judeo-Christianity and Western values with a utilisation of a variety of phrases to connote the ‘regular person.’ These ranged from the term “the people,” to “ordinary people,” “ordinary Dutch,” “the voter,” “Dutch people,” “Dutch citizen,” “we the Dutch,” “patriots,” and “the free men and women of the West.” Wilders’ use of these phrases as well as the use of collective pronouns around notions of society, identity and values not only served to delineate between those that align with Judeo-Christianity and Western values and those that do not, but it also served to create a sense of shared experience and values between himself and the voters. He often cited the fact that he had been elected to speak on behalf of voters. He claimed that “my voice is the voice of the many,” that “they [the people] have elected me to speak on their behalf,” and that he was “their spokesman.” The PVV voters, he claimed, were regular people that “you meet every day…perhaps your driver, your gardener, your doctor or your domestic aid…they are ordinary people, ordinary Dutch.” Through this he draws on both his own supposedly unique position to speak on behalf of regular voters and notions of popular sovereignty, framing himself as a vehicle for the people’s true wishes.

While articulating that Dutch and European society was necessarily rooted in Judeo-Christianity and Western values, Wilders also often emphasised the superiority of these traditions over other cultural influences, in particular Islam. Indeed, it was Wilders’ consistent ‘othering’ of Muslims and his denigration of Islam generally that in part distinguished his people-centrism, in particular his reverence for particular values and norms, from the mainstream leaders. For example, Samsom’s people-centric language contained similar words and emphasised respect for particular cultural norms. Samsom also used collective pronouns in a similar fashion to Wilders, and often cited phrases like “our values,” “our societies,” “our ideals.” However, while they each shared a frequent use of collective pronouns and discussions of shared ideals and values, the speakers constructed their specific notions of shared cultural norms in different ways and used them to different ends. The broader context of the speech is important here, as is the use, or lack thereof, of out-group language. Samsom indeed utilised collective pronouns to create the impression of shared ideals and values, but these ideals were not necessarily tied to notions of Judeo-Christianity, or any particular culture at the expense of
another. Instead, these shared ideals and values were those centred on “respect” and “freedom” and “security” in a more general sense. Moreover, he framed these shared ideals around notions of empathy for the ‘other’ and human rights, specifically those of refugees seeking asylum in European countries. Rutte, meanwhile, contained his people-centrism to broad notions of the people in general, using terms like ‘citizens,’ and ‘people.’

Indeed, as the above illustrates, Wilders’ people-centrism was primarily constructed ethnoculturally (Judeo-Christian), with an ‘underdog’ people-centrism (against the ‘elite’) as a secondary construction, therefore suggesting it is nativism, not populism, primarily driving Wilders’ in-grouping. Importantly, as discussed below, it is not the reference to particular cultural norms or traditions, or drawing on themes of citizenship or the people, that necessarily means this is nativist, but the use of these themes in an exclusionary and binary-corresponding fashion. Where the mainstream party leaders both used people-centrism to a degree, and where Samsom in particular utilised language that was somewhat similar to Wilders’, the mainstream leaders’ respective construction of people-centrism lacked a corresponding explicit binary out-group. Furthermore, Samsom’s language, unlike Wilders’, did not tie notions of shared values to a particular ethnicity or religious culture. Thus the result of Samsom’s people-centrism was one of inclusivity and protection of the ‘other,’ where Wilders’ was in part focused on denigrating said ‘other.’

**Othering**

Wilders’ ‘othering’ was primarily isolated to those that were situated outside his particular construction of Dutch and European society, in particular Moroccans and followers of Islam in general. His construction of Dutch society as necessarily Judeo-Christian and Western, to the exclusion of other influences, served to create a division between those that align with this identity and those that do not—in particular the followers of Islam. He constructed Islam as necessarily atypical compared to the ‘norm’ of Judeo-Christianity. He did this both

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747 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in *Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum*.

748 While any identity construction involves in-groups and out-groups, mainstream parties are less explicit in targeting who their out-groups actually are.
implicitly—through his people-centrism and a more subtle use of collective pronouns such as “our” and “we” in relation to Judeo-Christian and Western cultural norms, and very explicitly. For example, he claimed that “our identity is not Islamic but based on Judaism, Christianity and humanism.”

Wilders ‘othered’ through the denigration of Islam, as well as criticising the actions of Moroccans and Muslims specifically. While he acknowledged that not all Muslims were extremist, he said that Islam as a religion was extreme. He argued that Islam is incompatible with Judeo-Christian traditions and Western values, and thus Dutch culture in general. In particular, he frequently articulated that Islam was antithetical to notions of freedom. Again, he did this both implicitly, through the framing of freedom as necessarily a Western value, and explicitly, though the frequent juxtaposing of Islam with freedom (the “choice is between Islam and freedom,” “liberty or Islam). He framed Islam and its influences as “inherently dangerous” and argued that “not all cultures are created equal,” in relation to the supposed inferiority of the Islamic faith. He also frequently associated Islam with terrorism, crime and violence, called it a totalitarian ideology and claimed that it is ready to “kill us.” He claimed that Islam is a culture that “refuses to assimilate” and it aims to “dominate.”

He also characterised Muslims, in particular Moroccans, as violent and criminal, saying “we have a huge problem with Moroccans in this country.” He frequently cited the fact that there are too many Moroccans in the Netherlands (“we want fewer Moroccans”) and their supposed relationship to crime. He also demands of Muslims that they must “renounce the hateful doctrine and texts of Islam” and assimilate through “adopting our values.” Those that do not would be “expel[led]” from the country.

Anti-elitism

The quantitative stage of analysis found that the process of ‘othering’ a minority out-group, rather than the elite out-group, was most prominent in the discourse of Wilders. However, his use of anti-elitist discourse was still significant. While not necessarily frequently utilised compared to other sub-categories, the language he chose to advance his anti-elitism was strong and provided a consistent structural frame for his general antagonisms towards migrants, Islam and the European Union. This suggests that while Wilders is more prominently nativist (per
the people-centrism and ‘othering’ findings), populism is still an important component to his overall agenda.

Wilders used the term “the elites” very frequently, as well as the term “the establishment,” to facilitate his anti-elitism, using these terms to criticise political leaders in the Netherlands and the West in general. He criticised “political leaders,” the “political establishment,” the “government parties,” “Western leaders” and the “established order” in general for various mistakes, including having promoted pro-migration policies that have led to the loss of Dutch and Western European identity. He argued that these political leaders have not been working on behalf of voters and have “fled from their duty.” Alongside these more general descriptions of ‘leaders’ and their failures was a more targeted criticism of the European Union. He used terms like “bureaucrats in Brussels,” “European establishment” and “Europhiles in Brussels” to criticise its leaders, the institution itself (which he said resembles a “cartel”) as well as the values the institution holds and the policies it chooses to implement. His anti-elitism was not just isolated to those in political office. He also criticised “media elites,” the “elite universities” and the church, alongside political elites, which he lumped in together as the “entire establishment,” for facilitating “politically correct doctrines” (such as believing that Islam “is a religion of peace”) and for generally allowing the degradation of traditional Western values in Europe. The Dutch judicial court, and system generally, was also a focus of his ire; he claimed it was a “puppet” of the Dutch government, which he characterised as having a vendetta against him.

Wilders also often combined his anti-elitism with people-centric language to create division between the elite and regular citizens. He argued that the elites have “failed the people,” that “the elites have abandoned the people,” and that the “battle of the elite against the people will be won by the people.” Indeed, the use of the word “battle” contains violent undertones, likening the antagonistic relationship between the elite and the people as akin to a war. He also utilised collective pronouns in his criticisms of the elites, such as claiming that the elites have “silenc[ed] us” and that “our rulers are cowardly,” with the effect of creating a solidarity between the people and himself in their respective ‘battles’ against the elite. This further enabled Wilders to position himself as being more appropriately able to speak on behalf of regular people and advocate for their respective concerns. It also enabled Wilders, who is a long-standing member of Dutch parliament, to position himself as distinct from other, more ‘elite,’ political leaders in the Netherlands and Europe.
Crisis and/or societal declinism and blame attribution

As is evidenced in the quantitative stage of analysis, crisis themes were less prominent in Wilders’ speeches than in-grouping and out-grouping. However, crisis and the portrayal of society as changing for the worse remained at the core of his overall message, enabling the facilitation of in/out grouping and his agenda generally. Moreover, the process of attributing blame for this decline was integral to his overall construction of society in crisis. He also used very strong discourse to facilitate his crisis themes.

Wilders’ crisis and/or societal declinism was characterised by an overarching fear of the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity and Western culture in the Netherlands, Europe and the United States, thus facilitating his anti-Islam, anti-immigrant nativism. As Klueveld points out, the fear that Judeo-Christianity is under threat is a crisis often articulated by right-wing politicians and parties in Europe, and Wilders draws on this history to frame Dutch and European society as currently undergoing a profound cultural shift away from the positive influence of Judeo-Christianity and Western values and being under threat from the influence of Islam. This broad fear formed the foundation upon which he based his more concrete concerns: the increasing influence of Islam, such as the imposition of Sharia Law, the loss of freedoms associated with Western culture as a result of this influence, and fears surrounding Islamic terrorism and crime related to migrants. He used these problems, alongside particular forms of language that connote danger and fear, to create an overarching sense that society, both Dutch specifically and Western society in general, were on the brink of crisis.

Two central fears articulated by Wilders were the loss of Dutch and European identity, including the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity and Western cultural norms and values; and the danger that lay ahead if Islam was to become a more prominent feature of Dutch and Western society. The perceived loss of freedom was an integral part of his fears surrounding the declining influence of the West, as he characterised freedom as a value necessarily associated with Western traditions. With the increasing influence of Islam, which he holds as antithetical to freedom, the Netherlands, and Western society in general, would be beholden to

the unpalatable and restrictive values that he argued Islam holds. As he stated, it was a matter of “resistance or submission. Freedom or slavery. Liberty or Islam.” Along with notions of freedom generally, Wilders articulated that freedom of speech and tolerance for others, in particular women and homosexuals, would also be threatened if Islam takes a significant hold in Western countries. The invocation of the need to protect marginalised groups (women, homosexuals) from the threat of a dangerous ‘other’ and the reverence for liberal notions such as freedom of speech reflect what Moffitt calls Wilders’ “liberal illiberalism.” As Moffitt notes, “these parties [Northern European radical right populist parties] tend to selectively pick-and-choose the most appropriate and useful parts of liberalism and refashion them for their own illiberal means.” In Wilders’ case, he utilised notions surrounding gender equality, discrimination based on sexuality and the loss of freedom of speech as a vehicle to criticise Islam for a perceived lack of progressivism and to frame any influence the religion may have on Dutch culture as necessarily harmful and a threat to Dutch liberal values.

Related to this, underscoring much of Wilders’ crisis language is the language of colonisation. He frequently likened the presence of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands as a colonising force. He claimed that “we must realize that every halal shop, every mosque, every Islamic school, and every burqa is regarded by Islam as a step towards the ultimate goal of our submission.” Islamic extremists and the terrorist incidents that have occurred were also frequently cited as a cause of existential concern, along with crime. He argued that Islam wants to impose Sharia Law on Western society and that Islam is taking over areas throughout Europe. He cited the popularity of the name Muhammad as evidence for this take over. He also claimed that “Europe is becoming a continent of head scarves and mosques.” He framed this fear of Islamic colonisation as a war, not just regarding Islamic terrorism, but an existential war of values. He used a variety of phrases and forms of language to evoke society being on the brink of catastrophe. He claimed that “we are at war,” “we are all under threat,” and that “our existence is at stake.” He also utilised language that connoted fear and anxiety to create the impression that society is on the brink of a catastrophe. Such language included the frequent use of the word “catastrophe,” and using phrases like “time is running out” to create a further sense of urgency about the issue. He said that Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilisations was incorrect—“there is no clash of civilisations but a clash between our civilisation and

751 Ibid., 17.
barbarity.” The mainstream leaders each talked of crises experienced by the Netherlands and Western Europe, and there is indeed some overlap between the broad concerns of each of the leaders. Each described the impact that mass migration has had on the region. Rutte talked of the “urgent” challenges and problems faced by Europe, including the refugee crisis and the threat of Islamic terrorism. He also cited Brexit as a cause for concern, with the “consequences” of the referendum yet to be known, and that Europe is in “uncharted territory.” As with Wilders, Samsom talked of a ‘loss’ of ideals. But as has been noted, where Wilders cited the loss of values and ideals in relation to the threat of the colonising cultural influence of Islam, Samsom’s concern was the loss of universal ideals which sought to protect the ‘other,’ in particular relation to refugees.

It is important to note that although the overarching themes of Wilders’ speeches were antagonism towards out-groups and the catastrophising of societal problems, his speeches were also punctuated at times with a sense of hopefulness and optimism for the future. He drew on the state of international politics, both in Europe (“France, Italy, Austria, throughout Europe”) as well as the United States, where the populist radical right had experienced a high degree of prominence and electoral success, to articulate that he perceived a shift had taken place where political correctness was in the decline and Western values were being advocated (“the patriots are winning”). He claimed that despite his characterisation that freedoms were being taken away and society was changing for the worse at the hands of Islam and politically-correct elites, “there is reason for hope. There is light at the end of the tunnel. Better times will come.”

As is evidenced by the above, blame attribution played an important role within his crisis language. Wilders’ overarching blame frame was towards Islam and its influence on Dutch and Western society in general, with the elites also a focus of his ire. Where all three leaders articulated that Europe was undergoing immense challenges and problems, it was only Wilders who aimed to attribute blame for crises to a minority out-group and the elite. Both Rutte and Samsom lacked the corresponding blame attributive language to go alongside their crisis language. Wilders blamed Islam and its followers for a loss of freedom and identity in the Netherlands, and the West generally. He claimed that Islam is “aimed at establishing tyrannical power over non-Muslims.” He also claimed that “Sharia Law is a mortal danger to our way of life, our constitution, our laws and our liberties,” and that in general the sheer presence of Islam is changing Western culture for the worse. For Wilders, Islam “indoctrinates” people against Western society and eats away at “our freedom.” Indeed, according to Wilders, “Islam wants
to enslave us all.” He argued that Islam is anti-free speech, and that “when Islam becomes a major force, it is going to be hell for everyone,” and the more “Islam we get in society, the less free we become.” He also blamed Islam for facilitating a culture of crime, extremism and violence. He claimed Islamic migrants are inciting violence and terrorism, and claimed Islam has turned Europe into a war zone and that it is taking over Europe. He also blamed Islam for instilling fear in regular people, “changing our societies,” and that the Netherlands is unable to preserve its identity because of the presence of migrants. While he frequently blamed Islam as a general category, he also specifically blamed Moroccans for a variety of societal problems, including crime, violence, terrorising neighbourhoods and benefit dependency. Related to this, he also blamed the elites for various historical and contemporary immigration policies that allowed for growth in the Muslim population both within the Netherlands and in Western European countries more broadly. This growth has led to the increased influence of Islam in Western countries, resulting in the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity, as well as the increased danger of Islamic extremism. He blamed the elites for threatening Europe’s future and for creating conditions where terrorism has been able to thrive and grow. He claimed that by “making no assimilation demands,” for “refusing to impose a leitkultur,” and for showing no leadership, governments have allowed Islamic extremism to flourish.

The above findings indicate that Wilders primarily utilised an ethno-cultural process of in-grouping and out-grouping, with an anti-elitist in/out grouping a secondary consideration. The research also found that themes of crisis played a central role in this process, thus suggesting that populism was integral in the facilitation of Wilders’ nativism. Moreover, while mainstream parties in the Netherlands may at times utilise particular features of the populist radical right, it is the utilisation of all features in conjunction with one another that distinguished Wilders from the mainstream leaders. In other words, while Rutte and Samsom both utilised people-centrism and crisis themes relatively often, Wilders paired his utilisation of these features with other sub-categories. His people-centrism was coupled with the ‘othering’ of out-groups and anti-elitist themes, and his description of society as being in crisis was also paired with the corresponding blame for such crisis on his out-groups. Therefore, the act of speaking to and on behalf of a people is not enough to constitute populism, nor is the act of discussing society as being in crisis or decline. These must be coupled with the corresponding act of out-grouping an ‘other’ and critiquing the elite, and attributing blame to these groups. Indeed, at the root of Wilders’ people-centrism, ‘othering,’ and his anti-elitism was the crisis of the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity and the colonising force of Islam. These crises lay at the heart
of Wilders’ in-grouping and out-grouping. Without them, Wilders’ agenda would lack what is widely agreed to be the most basic populist feature—an antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite (whom he blames for facilitating the growth of Islam in Europe). The crisis provided a needed potency to his antagonism and allowed him to position himself as, acting on behalf of the people, more able to guide society through its problems. Moreover, without crisis, Wilders’ second most utilised form of language, ‘othering,’ would also be without the needed antagonism. Wilders would struggle to criticise a minority effectively without some overarching problem on which to ground his anger and base his criticism. Without crisis there is no antagonism, and without antagonism there is no out-grouping.

Variable Two: Policy

Quantitative results

This stage of the analysis entailed the examination of the second variable, the policies of the PVV as found in the party’s manifesto for the 2017 general election, utilising a quantitative content analysis method. As with the discourse variable, the manifestos of two mainstream parties were also tested to provide a yardstick of ‘mainstream-ness’ to assess the PVV’s policies against. This stage allowed for the analysis of data on the degree to which the PVV relies on particular tenets of their populist radical right ideology to facilitate their policy concerns, and thus the degree to which the party is either populist or radical right. As well, it determined the degree to which the party contains other, non-radical right policy concerns, such as non-nativist socio-economic policies, socio-cultural policies, and policies that relate to traditional public policy areas. Importantly, this stage lays the groundwork for the comparative analysis conducted in the following chapter, which compares and contrasts the different (or similar) ways the party family manifests in different geographical contexts (Australia and the Netherlands).
Figure 6.5 shows the aggregated and disaggregated quantitative score for the respective manifestos of the PVV, the VVD and the PvdA taken to the 2017 general election. It shows that the PVV’s primary policy concerns draw from their radical right ideology, with over half of their policies being coded as radical right (55.55 percent). The PVV was indeed the only party to score significantly for this policy category. A significant majority of these policies were nativist (50 percent), with only 5.55 percent of policies considered authoritarian. Similarly, only 5.55 percent of the party’s manifesto drew on its populism. From this we can conclude that nativism, rather than authoritarianism or populism, is the most important single attribute that makes up the PVV’s policy program, following previous literature.752

Despite what has been characterised as a general move towards the right during this period, as evidenced by the 2017 Coalition agreement discussed further in the discussion section,753 the radical right ideology itself is only partially present in the VVD and PvdA manifestos compared to other polices. The manifesto of the VVD, the party most ideologically similar to the PVV of the mainstream parties, contained 10.05 percent radical right policies (the PvdA scored only 1.92 percent for this policy category). Moreover, socio-economic policies constituted a significant minority of all three manifestos. The PVV’s document contained 25 percent socio-economic, the VVD’s 34.78 percent and the PvdA’s 21.87 percent. The mainstream parties’ main policy concerns were related to traditional policy areas, such as healthcare and education (along with environmental protection and climate-change policies), coded as ‘general.’ These

752 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
policies constituted half and the majority of policy concerns for the VVD and PvdA, respectively (50 percent and 57.93 percent). In contrast, these policies constituted a relatively small minority of the PVV’s manifesto (11.11 percent). This indicates that while all three parties value socio-economic issues at least to some degree, it is only the mainstream parties that give weight to the traditional policies areas of education, the environment and healthcare. Indeed, the PVV’s main policy focus is isolated to policies that relate directly to their nativism and nationalism. The data also finds that, socio-culturally, the PVV’s manifesto for this period relied very heavily on their radical right ideology to drive their concerns, such as those coded as ‘nativist.’ The socio-cultural policies of the PVV that did not draw on the radical right made up only 2.78 percent of the document. The VVD document had similarly few socio-cultural policies, at 5.17 percent, whereas they made up a significant portion of the PvdA document (17.78 percent). Finally, the VVD’s document contained zero policies that were considered ‘populist,’ with the PvdA scoring 0.48 percent on this category.

**Qualitative results**

The second stage of the policy analysis was a qualitative examination of the manifestoes, utilising the same hermeneutic textual analysis method from the discourse variable. The PVV’s manifesto was considerably shorter than both the VVD’s and PvdA’s. Indeed, as the quantitative stage highlights, the PVV’s policy focus was concentrated mainly in areas directly related to the radical right ideology and to a lesser degree the economy. The VVD and PvdA, meanwhile, had much broader policy concerns, drawing on several areas. For example, both the VVD’s and PvdA’s respective manifestos contained many policies focused on mitigating climate change and protecting the environment generally. Moreover, both the mainstream parties had many policies concerning primary, secondary and higher education, and both party manifestos contained sections that described their anti-discriminatory positions towards minority groups. The PvdA’s manifesto particularly emphasised this. Another overarching theme of the VVD’s document was de-regulation and the importance of trade and a strong European internal market. The PVV’s manifesto, meanwhile, was mostly isolated to discriminatory policies towards Muslims, and lacked both the policy variety and detail of the mainstream parties.
As suggested in the quantitative stage, which found that the PVV’s manifesto was primarily nativist, the overarching theme of the document was Islam, which has its own policy section titled “De-Islamize the Netherlands.” This section had nine policies attached, each drawing on the party’s nativism. The main purpose of the “De-Islamize” policies was the halting of further Islamic migration into the Netherlands and the assimilation of Muslims already in the Netherlands into Dutch culture and society. Such policies included the introduction of discriminatory immigration policies that excluded Muslims from migrating to the Netherlands, and the banning of Islamic cultural and religious symbols from the public sphere. This included the banning of Islamic headscarves, banning the Koran, the closing of all mosques and the closing of all Islamic schools. The document also proposed the “prohibition of other Islamic expressions which violate public order.” Other policies in the document that drew on the radical right ideology, specifically nativism, included the proposal to make “the Netherlands independent again,” which advocated that the Netherlands left the European Union. The document also proposed “a lot of extra money for defense and police,” drawing on the party’s authoritarian law and order ethos. The party’s socio-economic policies focused on cutting taxes (income and car), and “lowering housing fees,” and the party’s ‘general’ policies were healthcare related. They advocated for “abolishing” the healthcare deductibles and “rollback” cuts to care for the elderly. The party’s only mention of the environment came in the form of proposing “no public money” for windmills. The PVV’s non-nativist socio-cultural concerns related to public funding for the arts. They advocated for “no public money” for cultural institutions and issues such as art and broadcasting, as well as innovation and aid. The party drew on their populism in one policy only, in advocating for an introduction of popular sovereignty measures, giving “power to the citizens,” in the form of a binding referendum.

While the PVV’s main policy focus was issues related to their radical right ideology, the VVD also had a relatively significant presence of the radical right in their document. The VVD’s radical right policies, for example, drew from various policy areas, mostly under the ‘security and freedom’ umbrella, which includes immigration, integration, safety, defence and justice. Nativism and nationalism were particularly present in the party’s integration and immigration policies. The party’s integration policies were couched in the language of tolerance and equality, and pressed that Dutch society was built on Enlightenment values. However, the policy details belied this tone. It emphasised the need to adopt Dutch cultural norms and the Dutch language, and pressed the importance of migrant integration and participation in Dutch society. Importantly, the policies emphasised that integration was the responsibility of the
migrant, which they would need to pay for themselves (rather than the Dutch tax-payer), although loans would be available. The document outlined the requirement to adopt the Dutch language and integrate into society, which would alleviate the need to rely on welfare benefits. Migrants that did not meet the integration requirements would face punitive consequences, such as potentially losing their resident status. The document also outlined that Dutch nationality must be ‘earned’ through a period of concerted efforts to contribute to society, with a period of naturalisation extended to ten years. Along with a requirement to learn Dutch, the document emphasised that sufficient integration meant adopting Dutch values and norms. Specifically, it claimed that the wearing of a burqa infringed on the Dutch value of openness. Therefore, the document proposed a ban on face-covering clothing in public. The VVD immigration policies emphasised the pressure of mass migration on Dutch society, claiming that the current migration flow was unsustainable. The policies acknowledged that some refugees might need to stay in the Netherlands, but that this number must be reduced. Unlike the PVV, the VVD’s proposed immigration policies made no reference to any particular religion or ethnicity, and thus did not explicitly propose an introduction of discriminatory immigration policies.

The VVD’s policies that drew on authoritarianism were mostly isolated to policy areas related to security, defence and justice. While the document did acknowledge that certain crimes have decreased, it also emphasised tougher law-and-order policies. The document argued for a greater investment in law-and-order organisations and standing behind police and front-line workers who use force to “de-escalate” situations. It also emphasised the need to “follow rules” and to provide local authorities with power and resources to maintain public order. Measures such as searches and camera surveillance were suggested. The document also proposed more severe penalties for illegal gun ownership and cyber-crime. The document also proposed the renunciation of Dutch citizenship for citizens who joined terrorist groups. The VVD also argued that penalties were too low for various crimes like murder and manslaughter, and proposed an increase to such penalties and changes to early-release policies. As the quantitative stage illustrated, there were fewer examples of the radical right in the PvdA’s manifesto compared to both the PVV’s and the VVD’s. However, there were a small number of radical right policies that, while couched in softer language, indicated the slight presence of the radical right ideology. For example, there were elements of authoritarianism in the party’s law and order policies, such as prison time for those who avoided community service. The PvdA also emphasised that integration is crucial for a migrant’s successful life in the Netherlands. The
document included a requirement to learn Dutch, which it stated is crucial for participation in Dutch life and society.

While the PVV’s focus on immigration and assimilation might be more targeted towards Islam specifically and contain arguably harsher policies (for example, the introduction of discriminatory immigration policies), the general idea of migrant integration is fairly mainstream in the Netherlands, as evidenced by the presence of such policies in both the mainstream parties’ manifestos. In particular, both the PVV and VVD had policies that propose the banning of Islamic headscarves in public, and all parties demanded the acquisition of the Dutch language by migrants to fully integrate into Dutch public life. Moreover, there were elements of authoritarianism throughout the manifestos, in particular stricter law-and-order policies. This indicates that particular elements of the populist radical right ideology are relatively mainstream in the Netherlands. Moreover, this section found that nativist policies were the most prominent policy area for the PVV, more than authoritarianism or populism. It also found that the PVV’s manifesto spent little time on traditional policy concerns, like healthcare, and contained no education policies.

Situating the Findings within the Dutch Context

In the same vein as the previous chapter, which contextualised the findings on ON within the broader socio-political and cultural climate of Australia, here too it is important to situate these supply-side quantitative and qualitative findings on PVV within the broader cultural and political climate of the Netherlands. To achieve this contextualisation the same set of demand-side conditions from the previous chapter will be discussed in relation to the data: the politics of immigration and integration in the Netherlands; the economic conditions in municipalities with high PVV vote; and opinion-poll data of the Dutch public on relevant issues. These demand-side conditions will be used to situate both Wilders’ chosen language and themes as manifest in his speeches and the PVV’s policies within the broader socio-political and socio-cultural Dutch context, as well as determine how receptive the Dutch public are to the party’s stances and attitudes.
Politics, immigration and integration

This section will contextualise Wilders’ main concerns—Islam, migration, the loss of a national Dutch identity, the declining influence of Judeo-Christian and Western values, and his emphasis on issues surrounding assimilation and integration, within the broader Dutch cultural and political climate. Of particular focus will be the cultural shift that took place in the Netherlands (and Europe broadly) away from multicultural migration policies towards those that emphasised integration; the overarching emphasis of the 2017 general election being one of national identity; and the changing demographic make-up of Dutch society.

Indeed, while Wilders’ discourse was found to be more ‘othering’ than both Rutte’s and Samsom’s and the PVV’s manifesto contained more radical right policies than both the VVD’s and the PvdA’s, there is evidence that some of Wilders’ and the PVV’s beliefs are not fringe. While Wilders talked of assimilation specifically, integration on the other hand is a widely accepted term used by Dutch parties across the political spectrum to describe the process of migrants adopting the Dutch language and taking part in Dutch public life. Indeed, migrant integration is now a mainstream ideal in the Netherlands and Western Europe broadly. During the latter part of the 20th century there was a cultural shift away from prioritising multiculturalism as an ideal for migration, towards one of integration. Underscoring this shift was a debate regarding how “best to reconcile political unity with ethnic and religious difference.”754 Multiculturalism was seen as having to some degree failed to achieve this reconciliation, and thus during this period there began a “reorientation” of immigration policies, away from an ethos of multiculturalism towards one of integration.755 The much-discussed “retreat of multiculturalism”756 signalled a distinct shift away from liberal multicultural ideals towards an acceptance of policies that emphasised the need for integration.757 The Netherlands was a so-called “paradigmatic example” of this retreat, which in the 1980s began to shift away from official immigration policies of multiculturalism towards

755 Ibid., 702.
policies of integration.\textsuperscript{758} Notions surrounding the potential need for, or role of, a guiding culture, or \textit{leitkultur}, in Western European countries also proliferated.\textsuperscript{759} \textit{Leitkultur}, a German notion, seeks to unify citizens under liberal values and traditions. Indeed, its ethos is reflected in much of the discussion surrounding integration, and Wilders himself criticised European leaders for not instilling such a culture in Europe broadly, in speech five. Where multiculturalism sought a “retention of…culture”\textsuperscript{760} and was seen as “a model of inclusion,”\textsuperscript{761} integration sought to integrate migrants into Dutch society through instigating a “formal obligation for immigrants to acquire the language of the host society and to familiarise themselves with its political institutions, history, and culture (‘civics’).”\textsuperscript{762} As such, the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘integration’ began to represent in official Dutch discourse “significantly different political agendas.”\textsuperscript{763} Indeed, the move towards integration was underpinned by a belief that a certain degree of cultural homogeneity was required for migrants to be successful in their new countries. It should be noted that some, including Joppke, hold that the dichotomous categorisation of policy—multiculturalism versus integration—is unhelpful, and that civic integration does not necessarily “imply a return to cultural assimilation.”\textsuperscript{764} As Joppke notes, liberal values are still arguably the “benchmark” for Dutch ‘integration’ policy,\textsuperscript{765} including the notion of “respect for the Netherlands’ freedom and equalities.”\textsuperscript{766} But for others, the term integration did begin to represent assimilation.\textsuperscript{767} They argued that the move towards integration policies basically characterised non-Dutch cultural identities “as an impediment to civic participation.”\textsuperscript{768} The acquisition of Dutch culture, “signals integration into society’s mainstream institutions, especially the labour market,”\textsuperscript{769}
with sometimes punitive consequences for refusing to meet these obligations.\textsuperscript{770} As such, amongst critics there was an overarching belief that the “Dutch identity must ‘cannibalize’ other identities in order to turn immigrants into reliable citizens.”\textsuperscript{771} They argue that the process of civic integration not only aims to ensure the amalgamation of migrants within Dutch culture to enable their long-term prosperity, an altogether positive objective, but it also necessarily “targets unwanted family migration from less developed, mostly Muslim countries.”\textsuperscript{772} In other words, civic integration’s generally “obligatory and punitive character,” and its targeting of certain groups perhaps unable to achieve the desired integration, results in the policy acting as a “selection mechanism,”\textsuperscript{773} for immigration control.\textsuperscript{774} Indeed, the “fus[ing] of immigration integration and immigration control” has been openly characterised in the Netherlands as a “welcome side effect.”\textsuperscript{775} So, while the PVV’s anti-Muslim immigration policy and Wilders’ use of the word “assimilation” rather than integration is on the surface more extreme than what is generally accepted in the Netherlands, the process of integration itself can sometimes function in a similarly discriminatory manner to the more explicit policies advocated by the PVV.

Concerns regarding the integration model aside, it can be widely agreed that there has certainly been a cultural shift towards an emphasis on civic integration policies, as well as hostile tone towards migrants generally. The Dutch coalition agreement formed after the 2017 election is evidence of this. The government is a coalition of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Democrats 66 (D66) and Christian Union (CU). These parties formed a centre-right majority government, which “includes social conservatives from two Christian parties, a large pro-business bloc and a party with socially liberal credentials.”\textsuperscript{776} The Coalition Agreement for 2017-2021, a document that outlines the policy plans for the Dutch coalition government for that period, has been characterised as a move to the right.\textsuperscript{777} This “embracing” of right-wing policies is said to have been for the

\textsuperscript{770} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{771} Geschiere, 166.
\textsuperscript{772} Joppke, “Civic Integration in Western Europe: Three Debates,” 1155.
\textsuperscript{774} Joppke, "Civic Integration in Western Europe: Three Debates," 1155.
\textsuperscript{775} Bonjour, in The Others in Europe, 57-8.
\textsuperscript{776} Rubin and Schuetze.
\textsuperscript{777} Ibid.
purpose of “fending off challenges” from Wilders and the PVV. Consequently, the immigration and asylum-seeker policies contained within the document reflect that shift, also emphasising integration as a cornerstone of immigration policy. This is reflected in the tone of the opening paragraph of the section on migration policy:

The influx of asylum seekers and issues with reception, combined with integration difficulties, have heightened tensions within Dutch society and between EU member states. If the impact of migration becomes too severe, trust and social cohesion could begin to crumble.

Generally, the document illustrates that while the Netherlands acknowledges its obligations in accepting refugees as part of international agreements, the policies put in place to process applications and facilitate settlement will be more restrictive and hostile than in the past. It emphasises the need for investing in both mechanisms that alleviate the “root causes of migration,” and in countries and regions that “shelter a large number of refugees.” The document also states that while “refugees are entitled to protection,” it “does not mean they have the right to choose which country is to offer them protection.” Furthermore, asylum seekers who are granted refugee status will now only be granted three-year residency permits, as opposed to five, with the opportunity to apply for a two-year extension at the end of the three-year period. There is also an emphasis on stopping ‘people smuggling’ and boat arrivals with asylum seekers. The document puts forward that European Union borders must be more effectively controlled in order to “stop to tragedies at sea and the growth of people smuggling.” The document also outlines that there is “little sympathy” within the Netherlands for asylum seekers from ‘safe countries.’ As has been highlighted above, integration is a core component of immigration and asylum-seeker policy within the document. The document outlines that “integration into society is…essential, both for the sake of individuals themselves and for Dutch society as a whole.”

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778 Ibid.
779 (VVD) et al., 55.
780 Ibid., 56.
781 Ibid.
782 Ibid., 56.
783 Ibid., 57.
784 Ibid.
785 Safe countries are countries the Dutch government claims do not persecute on the grounds of race, religion etc., do not torture, and do not practice inhumane treatment of their inhabitants.
786 Rubin and Schuetze; (VVD) et al., 59.
on personal responsibility, active participation, and respect for Dutch institutions.\textsuperscript{787} As integration is “essential” for asylum seekers, it must be done “quickly,” and they are “expected to do everything they can to integrate.”\textsuperscript{788} Consequences for non-compliance include: “loss of residence permits for regular migrants or denial of more secure residence permits for holders of asylum residence permits”; and a cut to welfare benefits.\textsuperscript{789} The document also outlines that there will be new restrictions to welfare allowances for refugees, with refugees with residency permits now unable to claim welfare benefits for two years.\textsuperscript{790} Instead, local authorities collect the benefits on their behalf, “issuing these benefits and support in kind to them, along with a subsistence allowance.”\textsuperscript{791} Refugees who are able to prove that they are not a burden on the system, and who are able “fend for themselves on the labour market,” will have the opportunity to leave the system earlier.\textsuperscript{792} It should be noted that despite this shift to the right with regards to migration and asylum-seeker policy, the document refrains from discussing any move towards a discriminatory migration policy, and makes no reference to Muslims or Islam except for a statement regarding anti-discrimination. Indeed, the document outlines that “there is no room in our society for…Islamophobia,” along with other discriminating practices such homophobia, anti-Semitism, and honour killings.\textsuperscript{793}

Some of the hostility in the document is arguably reflective of the concerns held by some Europeans on migration issues stemming from the European Migrant Crisis.\textsuperscript{794} The populist radical right in Europe, including the PVV, has capitalised on this concern and utilised this ‘crisis’ as means to propagate their anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim agenda. The Dutch government’s move towards a more hostile immigrant and asylum-seeker policy, then, can be seen as a means of appeasing the concerns of voters who may otherwise vote for PVV or other far-right candidates. However, the PVV’s outright anti-Islamic position, as reflected in their manifesto and in Wilders’ speeches, is not necessarily mainstream, policy-wise, in the Netherlands. Wilders’ concerns regarding the loss of a Dutch national identity was reflected more broadly in the overall themes of the 2017 general election. As Holsteyn notes, what

\textsuperscript{787} (VVD) et al., 59.
\textsuperscript{788} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{789} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{790} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{791} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{792} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{793} Ibid.
exactly constitutes a Dutch national identity was a crucial theme of the election. The PVV, of course, were among the most vocal. Their election slogan “The Netherlands Ours Again” reflects both their people-centrism and a desire to return to a glorified past (“again”), and is reminiscent of another radical right populist, Donald Trump and his “Make American Great Again” slogan. But as Holsteyn notes, other parties also played on notions of identity. The VVD’s slogan “Be Normal” necessarily makes a distinction between the norm and that which sits outside it. The CDA also took part. The party propagated the idea that the Netherlands was undergoing a “moral crisis,” and that a “reinvigoration of traditional norms and values” and singing the Dutch national anthem would solve this. Furthermore, both Prime Minster Rutte and the PvdA leader who replaced Samsom, Lodewijk Asscher, wrote public letters drawing on notions of national identity. Rutte’s letter, entitled ‘To all Dutch persons,’ “emphatically appealed to feelings of nationalism and Dutch identity.” Rutte’s letter emphasised that migrants must accept the Dutch way of life, and accept Dutch values, or leave. The notion of ‘normal’ was also stressed by Rutte, pressing the need to distinguish what is “normal, and what is not normal, in our country.” Meanwhile, Asscher also emphasised the importance of a national identity. In his letter, framing his discussions on identity as “progressive patriotism,” he argued against “politics that ridicules or even throws suspicion on the longing for community or national identity.” Thus, while Wilders and the PVV focused much of their identity construction around Judeo-Christianity and were explicit in their distaste for the influence of Islam (as evidenced in the qualitative stage of analysis), the general notion that Dutch identity must be preserved and revered was clearly an issue for parties along the political spectrum during this period.

Partly due to the influx of migrants during the crisis, Wilders is correct to some degree that the demographics in Europe are shifting. Europe’s Muslim population is growing, and even if Wilders’ discriminatory policies are implemented broadly and all future Muslim immigration

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795 van Holsteyn.
797 van Holsteyn.
798 Ibid., 1366.
800 Ibid.
801 van de Ven.
802 Ibid.
halts, it is still projected to grow even further. As of 2017, compared to the rest of Europe, the Netherlands is among a set of countries with a relatively high percentage of Muslims within their population, at 7.1 percent, along with France (8.8 percent), Sweden (8.1 percent) and Germany (6.1 percent). However, despite these numbers, Wilders’ claim that Europe is “becoming a continent of headscarves and mosques” is overblown. As the Pew Research Center found, “despite [the] concerns of some” in Europe, this growth of the Muslim population will only be “modest.” It is expected that by 2050, 10 percent of Europe will be Muslim, from 6 percent in 2010. Moreover, despite the fact that the number of Europeans who identify as Christian is in decline, and is projected to decline even further with an expected drop of roughly 100 million by 2050, Europe will still “retain its Christian majority.” As such, Wilders’ fears surrounding the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity are again overblown. The drop in Christians is thought to be caused by two factors, the death of elderly Christian identifying residents, and other Christians switching to identify as non-religious, rather than a colonisation of other religions. Moreover, utilising data from the Netherlands bureau of statistics (CBS), we can conclude that immigration rates are down in the Netherlands, from 17,580 in January 2017 to 13,854 in December 2017. Asylum-seeker requests have also been dropping. In 2015, there were 43,095 requests for asylum in the Netherlands, compared to 16,145 in 2017. The majority of these requests are Syrian. To reiterate, the catastrophising language used by Wilders to describe the changing demographics of the Netherlands and the impacts this has on Dutch identity are not necessarily reflected in the data.

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804 Ibid.
807 Masci.
808 Ibid.
811 Ibid.
The previous illustrates that the while Wilders’ language and the PVV’s policies may be more extreme than the mainstream parties, the general ethos of the preservation of Dutch identity and the integration of migrants into the Dutch way of life is fairly mainstream in the Netherlands. However, it also finds that explicit Islamophobia is not so widespread. While Rutte and other leaders may discuss notions of national identity, the explicitness of Wilders’ anti-Islam language is still fringe and not widely accepted as the norm. Moreover, it finds that Wilders’ concerns regarding the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity and the Islamisation of the Netherlands are not grounded in fact, but rather utilised as a means of propagating his nativism. So, while the particular language Wilders chooses to articulate his anti-Islamic and anti-migrant stance, and the severity of some of the party’s policy preferences, might be singularly the realm of the populist radical right, the ethos and themes behind the language and policies are fairly mainstream in the Netherlands.

Economic conditions

The previous chapter argued that it is crucial to contextualise the quantitative and qualitative findings from the analysis within the broader socio-economic landscape for two overarching reasons: the common belief of the negative influence of migration on the economy, and previous research which outlines the relationship that exists between experiencing relative economic deprivation and a “cultural backlash” against post-materialist, progressive values. In the PVV’s case, as the above qualitative discourse data finds, the economic impact of migration is not a pervasive concern for Wilders, although the he does claim Moroccans are “overrepresented in…benefit dependency.” Indeed, Wilders’ primary concerns regarding the impact of migration on the Netherlands and Europe broadly were overarchingly post-materialist and cultural. They related to the increased influence of non-Judeo-Christian and non-Western traditions and values. Indeed, he claims that “the problems Europe face are existential. Not economics but Islamisation, terrorism and mass-migration….” As such, the former reason—the negative impact of migration on the economy—is not the primary concern in this section. However, the cultural impact of migration and the relationship between individual-level economic deprivation and antagonism for progressive values remains and, as such, determining the socio-economic picture of a PVV voter remains important to fully

812 Norris and Inglehart.
contextualise Wilders’ chosen language, his primary antagonisms and the PVV’s policies as found in the manifesto. Through examining the economic conditions where the PVV received relatively high percentages of the vote in the 2017 general election, we can elucidate the receptiveness to Wilders’ and the PVV’s anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant stances within these municipalities, and thus situate Wilders’ and the PVV’s radical right populism within the broader socio-economic and socio-cultural context.

Harteveld and de Lange, as part of the Sub-national Context and Radical Right Support in Europe (SCoRE) project, examined data from the 2017 Dutch general election to determine a profile of PVV supporters. They found that in contrast to other populist radical right parties in Europe, such as in France, support for the PVV is “not primarily non-urban.” Indeed, as the research shows, the PVV draws support mainly from three regions: the southern provinces of Brabant and Limburg; municipalities surrounding Rotterdam; and the north-eastern border region. Harteveld and de Lange then calculated the socio-economic demographics of these areas through combining this information with data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) to determine the degree to which socio-economic disadvantage was associated with support for the PVV. Their research found that, indeed, high unemployment and a low average income were among the “best predictors” of PVV support, along with “a declining” number of young people. As Harteveld and de Lange state, this data “suggests that the PVV thrives in economically deprived areas,” as well as areas that are “demographically stagnating.” Following Inglehart and Norris and their “cultural-backlash” thesis, this means that the relative economic deprivation of these areas with high PVV support could facilitate a “cultural-backlash” against post-materialist values generally, and against minority groups like migrants and Muslims specifically. This indicates that Wilders’ and the PVV’s anti-migrant, anti-Islam language and their reverence for traditional, Judeo-Christian values would be well received by voters in these areas.

Public opinion

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814 Ibid.
815 Ibid.
To fully contextualise the PVV’s positions outlined above, it is also important to assess the broader Dutch public’s stances on these issues during the period analysed. Overall, it can be concluded that polling data in the Netherlands related to the issues of immigration, Muslims, and Islamic terrorism provides a seemingly conflicting picture. On the one hand, research indicates that the perception of the Netherlands as “among the most open of European countries” holds true. As the research noted, the Dutch are “less concerned” with a migrant’s ethnicity than their European counterparts. Furthermore, despite the migrant crisis, attitudes towards immigration in the Netherlands have in fact quite “stable,” and “have actually become more positive throughout the 21st century.”

On the other hand, there is evidence that while many Dutch people are relatively open to migrants, there is indeed some hostility towards Muslims specifically. Research by the Pew Research Center in 2016 found that a significant minority of Dutch people had unfavourable views of Muslims (36 percent), as well as other minorities such as Roma (37 percent). The Pew Research Center also found that there is a “pervasive” fear regarding Islamic extremism and terrorism throughout Europe (as well as in North America). A significant majority of Dutch people (76 percent) are at least ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ concerned about the issue. Furthermore, those who are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned about Islamic extremism were found to predominantly align with a right-wing ideology. Age was also a determining factor for whether or not one was concerned about the issue. Of those aged 50 years or older, 84 percent cited a concern about Islamic extremism, compared to 62 percent of those aged between 18 and 29. The Dutch are also relatively more concerned about immigration than their European counterparts. Research found in the Spring 2017 Eurobarometer conducted by the European Commission indicated that 37 percent of Dutch people cited immigration as one of

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818 Ibid.
819 Ibid.
822 Ibid.
823 Ibid.
824 Ibid.
the two most important issues facing their country, compared to 22 percent of other Europeans.\(^{825}\) Nineteen percent of Dutch people cited terrorism as a significant issue facing their country. This was comparable to other EU nationals (19 percent).\(^{826}\) Furthermore, in relation to which two issues are important to the EU broadly, again most Dutch people cited immigration (51 percent) as their primary concern (terrorism was second at 34 percent), compared to 38 percent of non-Dutch Europeans.\(^{827}\)

It should also be noted, however, that despite the relative importance the Dutch placed on immigration compared to other Europeans in the *Spring 2017 Eurobarometer*, the issue is actually gradually becoming less important to the Dutch over time. Indeed, the *Autumn 2015 Eurobarometer* found that 56 percent of Dutch people cited immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the Netherlands,\(^{828}\) 46 percent in *Spring 2016*,\(^{829}\) and then as has been noted, 37 percent in *Spring 2017*. This is a 19 percent decrease from *Autumn 2015* to *Spring 2017*. Concerns regarding terrorism, however, have increased since *Autumn 2015*, with 12 percent citing terrorism as an issue facing the Netherlands,\(^{830}\) compared to the aforementioned 19 percent in *Spring 2017*. Furthermore, a majority of Dutch also believe that the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU is important (67 percent),\(^{831}\) and 71 percent of Dutch people also identify as EU citizens.\(^{832}\) This indicates that while Wilders’ anti-immigrant rhetoric and his fears surrounding Islamic terrorism might be received well by some voters, the former’s appeal could be somewhat waning. Moreover, his anti-European stance is decidedly less popular amongst the general population than his other positions.

Research also indicates that immigration and integration policies that emphasised the preservation of particular Dutch values, such as those that “safeguard a liberal, tolerant lifestyle,”\(^{833}\) would be supported by the broader Dutch public. Other research supports this. Sobolewska et al., found in their study of public opinion on Muslim integration in the UK and the Netherlands that, indeed, “culture is the most common deciding factor in determining how

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\(^{826}\) Ibid.

\(^{827}\) Ibid.


\(^{830}\) Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015*.

\(^{831}\) Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 87 Spring 2017*.

\(^{832}\) Ibid.

\(^{833}\) Dennison, Geddes, and Talò.
well integrated the immigrant is thought to be,” but that “not all cultural indicators were equally valued.” Specifically, religiosity is “comparatively unimportant” for those polled. Wilders’ assimilation rhetoric and the party’s policy of introducing a discriminatory immigration policy are clearly out of step with most of the Dutch public. While they may be receptive to notions of preserving liberal ideals of freedom of speech, and freedom generally, Wilders’ narrow focus on Islam and its incompatibility with the Dutch way of life is less appealing to the majority of Dutch people.

Wilders’ chosen discourse and the party’s stances, in particular his crisis themes, his anti-elitism, anti-EU and anti-Islam positions, should also be considered against the views specifically held by PVV supporters. Research by Steenvoorden and Harteveld found that voters of radical right populist parties, including the PVV, are more pessimistic about society compared to centre-left, centre-right and radical-left voters. The research found that “all other voters, as well as non-voters, are significantly less societally pessimistic compared to PRR voters.” They note that the degree of societal pessimism found in voters is a strong predictor of one’s propensity to vote for a radical right populist party, particularly when compared to mainstream parties. Relatedly, research by Harteveld and de Lange as part of the SCoRE project also found that PVV voters were more likely to say “the situation in my neighbourhood had become worse” compared to other voters, and were more likely to think that the Netherlands was going in the “wrong direction.” Wilders’ crisis discourse, therefore, would resonate with these voters. Moreover, other research found that PVV supporters are also more distrusting of political elites than supporters of other Dutch political parties. The research found that 80.70 percent of PVV supporters believe political elites are untrustworthy, compared to 40 percent of VVD supporters and 53 percent PvdA supporters. PVV supporters were also found to be much more likely to be critical of the presence of foreigners in their country than other voters. Eighty-seven percent of PVV voters “think there are too many

835 Ibid.
836 Steenvoorden and Harteveld.
837 Ibid., 39.
838 Ibid.
839 Harteveld and De Lange.
841 Ibid.
foreigners in the Netherlands,” compared to 53 percent of VVD supporters and 32 percent of PvdA supporters. Research by Harteveld and de Lange confirms this. They also found that in regard to political concerns, the two biggest predictors of PVV voting were anti-immigrant stances and anti-elitism. This was followed by Euroscepticism, and “a preference for law and order.” Indeed, PVV voters were more critical of the European Union than other voters, with only 10 percent of PVV voters citing satisfaction with EU policy and 30 percent wanting to remain in the EU. These themes are all reflected in the discourse and policy positions of Wilders and the PVV outlined previously, and thus this data suggests that such discourse and positions will be received well by these voters. Importantly, Harteveld and de Lange also found that PVV voters “do not differ from other voters in their stances on the economy or LGTB and female emancipation.”

Overall, we can conclude from this data that while some of Wilders’ main concerns—such as Islamic terrorism and the preservation of a liberal culture, like the values of freedom of speech—are in line with public opinion on the Netherlands, his absolute focus on Islam and its followers is not as widely accepted. Indeed, there is evidence that some Dutch are concerned about Muslims, but there is also the belief that religion is not necessarily an impediment to migration to the Netherlands. Moreover, the data found that PVV supporters are overall more pessimistic about the state of society and they are sceptical about the trustworthiness of politicians and the EU. Wilders’ catastrophising language in his speeches, which characterise society as changing for the worse, would be well received by these voters, who already perceive society to be in decline. Moreover, his anti-EU and anti-elitism language would also be received well by these voters.

842 Ibid.
843 Harteveld and De Lange.
844 Ibid.
845 de Vries and Hoffmann.
846 Harteveld and De Lange.
Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined the empirical findings from the quantitative and qualitative examination of the PVV. It found that the PVV and its leader Geert Wilders relied heavily on people-centrism and the ‘othering’ of a minority out-group. Wilders utilised notions of Judeo-Christianity and Western-ness in a three-fold manner: to facilitate the creation of an in-group of people who identify with those traditions and believe that Dutch society must remain solely influenced by the those traditions; to create an out-group of those that do not identify with those traditions, in particular followers of Islam; and to facilitate his characterisation of society in crisis and decline, while also attributing blame for said decline on both the ‘elite’ and the ‘other.’ Indeed, the declining influence of these traditions in the Netherlands and in Europe broadly, and the supposedly increased influence of his minority out-group—Islam and Muslims—were the central crisis themes found in his speeches. He also blamed the elites for facilitating the rise of Islam in the West and for preventing the assimilation of Muslims into Western culture.

These findings are line with the literature outlined in Chapter Two, which argued that crisis is a supply-side condition of populism. This suggests that crisis is not merely an external, objective event that triggers the populist radical right in the Netherlands, but a subjective experience integrated within the discourse and programs of the PVV. Indeed, not only does it perform a function in and of itself (appealing to voters who are pessimistic, making the populist seem necessary and needed as the only figure able to fix said crisis), it also facilitates the facilitation of Wilders’ anti-elitism through critiquing those in power, and his people-centrism through evoking a sense of shared experience, as well as his nativism (‘othering’). Indeed, the combined process of catastrophising events and attributing blame appears to be central here. Moreover, the contextualisation of the findings further confirms that crisis does not need to be a measurable, ‘objective’ event to play a role. The declining influence of Judeo-Christianity is not necessarily grounded in empirical fact (see Pew Research data) and the growth of the European Muslim population is actually relatively minimal. But it remains a crucial trope for Wilders regardless, functioning to ground his people-centrism, his ‘othering’ and his anti-elitism. The crisis of the loss of Judeo-Christianity in Western society is at the core of each of

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848 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
these processes. Without this ‘crisis,’ people-centrism would lack the corresponding antagonistic relationship with an out-group, both an elite and an ‘other.’ Without this antagonistic relationship, it would remain just people-centrism and thus not populism. Secondly, the findings demonstrate that Wilders’ primary in/out grouping was constructed along ethno-cultural, not anti-elitist lines, suggesting that nativism, not populism, was most important here.849 This is also reflected in the policy variable that found that the PVV’s main policy concerns drew on their nativism, per the literature.850 As such, the PVV is radical right first, and populist second, when it comes to the process of in-grouping and out-grouping, and in policy motivation. While these findings suggest that the PVV is primarily nativist, the degree to which Wilders utilised crisis themes also suggests a high presence of populism within his agenda. Together, I suggest that these findings indicate that populism is an essential element to the PVV’s agenda, aiding and facilitating the party’s primary feature, its nativism. Moreover, there is also evidence that elements of the radical right are found in the VVD’s program, indicating that the ideology has become moderately mainstream in the Netherlands. The analysis also found that despite recording the second largest voter share in the 2017 general election,851 the PVV have very limited policy concerns outside those that reflect on their nativism.

In summary, these findings support the inclusion of crisis themes and ‘othering’ in future codebooks for empirical analysis of populist radical right parties. They show that the sub-categories all had a significant presence within Wilders’ language, with blame attribution scoring higher than the traditional populist assessment of anti-elitism. Thus, the findings provide a justification for a new framework for assessing and measuring the populist radical right, one that includes crisis and is able to distinguish between an ethno-culturally constructed in-out grouping, and an anti-elitist one. The proceeding final chapter will compare and contrast the findings from the PVV and ON and situate the comparative findings within the broader literature.

849 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
850 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
851 van Holsteyn, 1365.
Chapter Seven: Significant findings

This comparative chapter makes the argument that there are three significant theoretical and empirical findings derived from the analysis of the case studies, One Nation and the Party for Freedom. These relate specifically to the degree that each party balances their populism and their nativism; each of the case studies’ relationship to crisis; and the role of socio-economic issues within the programs of ON. Firstly, it argues that the case studies are primarily nativist, rather than populist. The analysis found that nativism played a dominant role within the discourse of both Hanson and Wilders, and in the policies of their parties. This follows previous literature that argues that nativism is the primary feature of the party family. These findings are important because they support recent literature that calls for a greater and more precise distinction to be made between populism and its ideological bedfellows, so as to ensure observers and researchers do not conflate populism with what is actually nativism, nationalism or another ideology entirely. Secondly, this chapter also contends that while Hanson and Wilders utilised themes of crisis in different ways, crisis itself remained a central, supply-side issue for both the case studies. These findings are in line with Moffitt, who argues that crisis is an “internal” feature of populism. This chapter also suggests that populism, assessed through the presence of crisis, plays a significant role in the discourse of the leaders. Together, these findings suggest that while ON and the PVV are primarily nativist, populism is also an important component in the facilitation of both parties’ respective agendas. Finally, this chapter makes the argument that socio-economic issues were relatively important to one of the case studies, ON, somewhat challenging the idea that the interests of the populist radical right are primarily post-materialist as well as the notion that socio-economic issues are the purview of left-wing populism. The chapter argues firstly that the findings reflect the literature, in that economic issues were indeed “instrumental” and “secondary” in the sense that they were used by Hanson to facilitate her anti-immigrant and anti-Islam agenda. But it also argues that the way in which Hanson utilised materialist concerns to facilitate her agenda, paired with

852 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
853 Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?"
854 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
855 Mudde and Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America."
856 Otjes and Louwerse.
the relative prominence of non-nativist economic policies in the party’s policy document, suggests that further research is needed to assess the degree to which the populist radical right in Australia is in fact “post-materialist.” Indeed, while Wilders’ use of identity to critique and denigrate Muslims as well as the ‘elite’ follows the received wisdom on the party family, Hanson’s use of the economy to facilitate the same criticisms indicates that context will influence the manner in which materialist concerns are utilised by the different parties belonging to the populist radical right party family. The findings also suggest that ON is somewhat more populist than the PVV. This is evidenced by the more frequent use of crisis themes, and the use of materialist issues to criticise the ‘elites.’ These three key findings from the comparative analysis are outlined in detail to follow, and summarised in a table provided in the appendix of the chapter.

The populist Radical Right: Nativist or Populist?

The most significant take-away from the analysis is that Hanson and Wilders were found to be predominantly nativist, rather than populist. This follows previous literature, which argues that the populist radical right is radical right first, populist second. The findings from the comparative analysis of Hanson’s and Wilders’ discourse found that both leaders utilised the process of in-grouping and out-grouping to a high degree, but that the primary in/out grouping was nativist, rather than populist. In other words, for both leaders, the most prominent in/out grouping was not between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ but between the ‘people’ and a minority ‘other.’ Moreover, not only was there a greater quantitative frequency of out-grouping of a minority ‘other’ compared to the ‘elite,’ but the qualitative stage found that the in-group most prominently constructed was along ethno-cultural lines. Mudde notes that, “whereas the defining features of the ingroup identity remain vague or unspecified those of the ‘anti-figure’ are described very clearly and explicitly.” But the findings indicate this is only

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859 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.; Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?"
partially true of Hanson and Wilders. For both leaders, there was a coherent and clear process of creating an in-group that, while also having benefited from the construction of a clearly demarcated out-group, was distinct in and of itself. This, I argue, is in part because of the fact that the in-grouping constructed by Hanson and Wilders was primarily ethno-cultural, one that hinged upon a construction of society and its inhabitants as necessarily Judeo-Christian and Western. For example, both Hanson and Wilders framed Australian and Dutch/European society as necessarily drawing from Judeo-Christian traditions, Western values and necessarily English or Dutch speaking. Each leader paired this with a prolific use of collective pronouns like “our” with words like “culture” or “society” to achieve an illustration of what the default society should be—Judeo-Christian, Western and English/Dutch. This frequent characterisation of ‘regular’ society as necessarily Judeo-Christian, Western and English or Dutch speaking alongside the utilisation of collective pronouns served to clearly in-group those who aligned with this identity creation. This act, described in detail in the previous chapters, draws on a long history in right-wing circles of evoking Judeo-Christianity to facilitate inclusion and exclusion between groups.862

Mudde also notes that the Schmittian “enemy”863 or out-group of the populist radical right may change depending on the context of the given party or leader.864 But for both Hanson and Wilders, the most significant out-grouping was those who sat outside the Judeo-Christian tradition, namely the Australian and Dutch Muslim communities, respectively, as well as followers of Islam in general. Both leaders frequently cited the incompatibility of Islam with the Australian and Dutch ways of life, the intolerance of Islam and its followers. Importantly, they also utilised themes of crisis here to create an association between Islam and danger, serving to create the antagonism between their ethno-cultural in-group and out-group. They argued that the religion of Islam is a dangerous threat to Australia, and the Netherlands and Europe, and claimed that the presence of the religion within the public sphere was detrimental to the ongoing peace of Western liberal democracies. The leaders also associated Muslims with crime and violence, again drawing on crisis themed language to do so. Wilders also often criticised Dutch Moroccans, specifically. Importantly, anti-elitism played a secondary role to ‘othering’ in each leader’s out-grouping. The criticisms levelled at the elites, and therefore the antagonistic relationship created between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ while not insignificant,

862 Kluveld, in Is There a Judeo-Christian Tradition? A European Perspective.
863 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political.
864 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 64.
quantitatively played second fiddle to the criticisms of their main, minority out-grouping—Muslims. For both leaders, their anti-elitism was structured around the idea that those in power were out of synch, or touch, with ‘regular’ people, with Hanson frequently emphasising the notion of “unfairness” in relation to the supposed gap between Australians and their politicians. Hanson spoke frequently of “hardworking Australians” being “rorted” by the political system. She framed politicians from the government and major parties as corrupt, and claimed they were using “regular” Australians’ tax dollars for their own “perks.” She also cited their failure to take into account Australians’ attitudes on immigration, and cast aside “political correctness,” and their ultimately risking Australian “sovereignty” and “jobs.” Similarly, Wilders’ main criticism of the ‘elites’ related to their supposed role in enabling immigration, for allowing Muslims into Europe and for their political correctness. Hanson’s and Wilders’ criticism of the ‘elite’ for their role in allowing migrants into Australia and the Netherlands follows previous literature, which points out that the populist radical right frequently characterises immigration as a “left-wing conspiracy” and frames the so-called “progressive” ‘elite’ as the “true culprits of mass immigration.”

Wilders also characterises himself as the under-dog figure and representative of the regular Dutch citizen, against the politically correct and out of touch elite, particularly in his characterisation of the unjust Dutch judicial system.

These findings from the discourse analysis are also reflected in the policy analysis, where nativism was found to be quantitatively and qualitatively significant for both parties. For example, the documents were both relatively limited in scope, with a significant minority (ON: 47.50 percent) and majority (PVV: 55.55 percent) of the parties’ documents drawing on the radical right ideology, with relatively few policies related to traditional public-policy areas like healthcare or education (ON: 2.50 percent; PVV: 11.10 percent) and populism (ON: 6.25 percent; PVV: 5.55 percent). Of the radical right policies, most were nativist (ON: 37.50 percent; PVV: 50 percent) rather than authoritarian (ON: 10 percent; PVV: 5.55 percent), and again, following the literature, the parties shared many similarities on a policy level related to their nativism. For example, both parties proposed an introduction of discriminatory immigration policies based on religion, banning Muslim immigration entirely, including asylum seekers. Moreover, both parties proposed policies that specifically restricted the activities and prominence of Islam in the public sphere. For example, the parties wanted to “ban the burqa” (ON) and “headscarves” (PVV) in public, ON wanted to ban companies paying

865 Ibid., 66.
for Halal certification and the PVV wanted to prohibit “other Islamic expressions which violate the public order.” ON wanted to stop the future construction of Mosques and Islamic schools “until an inquiry is held into Islam, to determine whether it is a religion or totalitarian political ideology, undermining our democracy and way of life.” While similar, the PVV’s policies were actually stricter on this issue specifically. Rather than just halting future construction of mosques and schools, they wanted to close all current mosques and schools. The PVV also wanted to ban the Koran. When the parties did draw on their populism in their documents, this was related specifically to proposing an introduction of direct democracy initiatives, like referenda to give more electoral power to citizens.

From these findings, and following previous literature, we can infer that despite electoral success and prominence, the populist radical right tend to have fairly limited policy concerns, drawing heavily from their nativism. Compared to mainstream parties, the case studies did not give significant weighting to policy areas that sat outside their core base concerns (immigration, Islam). This suggests that the populist radical right do not seek to gain widespread appeal to the same degree as other parties. But the PVV’s success in 2017, with the party placing second overall after the VVD, indicates that a comprehensive and wide-ranging policy document, such as that found in the manifestos provided by the VVD and PvdA, is not required for radical right parties to actually reach heightened levels of success in elections. Similarly, the success of ON in 2016, although more muted than the PVV’s in 2017 (in part due to the particularities of the Australian electoral system), supports this conclusion. Therefore, a limited-ranging policy document, which significantly relies on nativism over more mainstream issues, is not an impediment for success in either Australia or the Netherlands. From this we can infer that similar findings may be replicated in other geographical contexts with other radical right parties.

These findings from the discourse and policy analysis reflect previous literature on the populist radical right which argues that nativism plays the most significant role in the agendas of the populist radical right party family. As Mudde noted, “the key ideological feature of the parties in question is nativism,” rather than populism (and authoritarianism). More recently, Rydgren has argued that: “the ethnic nationalism of European radical right-wing parties is more

866 Ibid.
867 Ibid., 22.
important to their discourse and tends to influence the populist elements,”868 a claim clearly supported by the above findings. While Hanson and Wilders both undoubtedly utilised anti-elitism out-grouping, it remained a secondary out-grouping to their criticisms of Muslims. Moreover, many of the criticisms of the ‘elite,’ in particular for Wilders, stemmed from their immigration policies that allowed the ‘other’ out-group, Muslims, into the respective countries, and the primary in-grouping construction was along ethno-cultural lines. Relatedly, these findings also support recent scholarship, such as that by De Cleen,869 which calls for a tighter precision on the discursive construction of the ‘people’ in studies of populism. While the role of the ‘elite’ in Hanson’s and Wilders’ discourse should not be overlooked, with its presence sufficiently weighty, anchoring many of the leaders’ broader themes, it was not the primary binary-opposition found in the speeches. The ‘people’ themselves were most clearly and prominently defined and constructed along ethno-cultural lines, rather than along anti-establishment lines. This is important because as De Cleen and Stavrakakis articulate, there is a capacity within populism studies to conflate populism with nationalism (or nativism).870 Indeed, as De Cleen notes, “The construction of a political frontier between a nationally defined ‘people’ and its outsides, for example, is not in itself populist.”871 In other words, the mere presence of an in-group, broadly articulated as the ‘people’ but against a non-elite out-group, does not necessarily equate to populism. Therefore, in this spirit and drawing from De Cleen, the findings support the notion that a more thorough interrogation of how the ‘people’ is constructed within radical right populist discourse is perhaps needed. For populism to be populism, even as it functions alongside a radical right ideology, the antagonistic relationship between a people and the elite must be present. As De Cleen states: “Indeed, for the concept of populism to work, it needs to focus only on the particular way of claiming to represent ‘the people’ as an underdog, discursively constructed against an illegitimate ‘elite’.”872 Given this, it is important to fully distinguish between populism and the ideology that accompanies it, such as nativism or nationalism, and for the presence of populism not to be overblown or “reified” due to, among other things, imprecise and ill-defined notions of what constitutes the

868 Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?,” 485.
869 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
870 De Cleen and Stavrakakis.
871 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum, 31.
872 Ibid.
Through the combined analysis of the role of the ‘elite’ and the ‘other,’ and the use of qualitative textual analysis of the language used by Hanson and Wilders to construct their people-centrism, this research was able to achieve this distinction. This suggests that future empirical examinations of the populist radical right should also include a framework for assessing the presence of both out-groups (the ‘elite’ and the ‘other’), as well as for assessing the degree to which the ‘people’ are constructed either as ‘underdog’ or ethno-culturally.

The prominent role of the ‘other’ over anti-elitism, and thus the importance of nativism rather than populism in Hanson’s and Wilders’ speeches, also demonstrates a potential variability noted in the literature between the way populism can manifest differently on the left and the right of the political spectrum. For example, Mudde and Kaltwasser found that populism is less important to right-wing populists than their right-wing ideology, compared to populists on the left who will, for example, prioritise their populism over their socialism. As discussed previously, this research did find that Hanson’s and Wilders’ nativism was more prominent than their populism in the construction of the out-group. However, March’s research has noted that left-wing populists also tend to prioritise their leftism over their populism. In fact, he found that in the United Kingdom left-wing populists were actually less populist than their right-wing counterparts, contradicting Mudde and Kaltwasser’s theory. He ultimately concluded that for populism broadly, not just the radical right variety, “ideology trumps populism,” meaning that the host ideology of the leader, party or movement will be stronger and more pronounced than its populism. Moreover, Judis has also proposed that the distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism lies in their “dyadic” and “triadic” out-groupings, respectively. He argues that where the left isolate their criticisms to the ‘elite,’ the right also critique another out-group. The findings in this research support the idea of a tripartite right-wing antagonism of a ‘people’ against an ‘elite’ and an ‘other’. But as March notes, this is potentially an “oversimplification” of the differences that exist between left and right populists. Given all this, more comparative studies of the role of ideology in left-wing and

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873 March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case,” 300. See also: Teun Pauwels, Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 185.
874 Mudde and Kaltwasser, Voices of the Peoples: Populism in Europe and Latin America Compared.
875 March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case.”
876 Ibid.
877 Ibid.
879 Ibid., 284.
right-wing populisms are needed here to fully explore both Mudde and Kaltwasser’s theory regarding the prioritisation of ideology in left and right populism,\(^{880}\) and the other features that distinguish these party families from each other more broadly.

In summary, the findings from the analysis suggest that ON and the PVV are both predominantly nativist parties, with populism a secondary but nevertheless important consideration. It found that both Hanson and Wilders constructed their people-centrism along ethno-cultural lines, ones that were necessarily Judeo-Christian. Conversely, their predominant out-groups were those that sat outside that religious tradition, specifically Muslims. While an anti-elitist in-out grouping was present and relatively significant, it was not constructed to the same degree as the ethno-cultural in-out grouping. Further, nativism was significantly present in both the parties’ policy documents, compared to both authoritarianism and populism. This is important because it supports the calls in the literature that suggest that there has been a tendency towards imprecision when describing the populist radical right as ‘populist parties’ only, when in fact they are primarily nativist or nationalist.\(^{881}\) As I have argued, we must avoid conflating populism with what is actually nativism or nationalism because if we do not, we risk misunderstanding the nature of our changing political landscape. As commentators contemplate the supposed challenges facing Western liberal democracy as a result of the electoral success of the populist radical right, in particular the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in 2016, it is crucial we diagnose these potential challenges correctly. To do so means fully distinguishing between populism and the ideologies that accompany it, and as such avoiding misattributing ‘blame’ for these challenges and any ills that result on an incorrect cause.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the focus of this thesis is primarily the populism of populist parties, and the findings suggest that the case studies at hand are primarily nativist, rather than populist. However, as the following discussion indicates, the parties each maintained a significant reliance on crisis-themed discourse (as well as a relatively prominent use of anti-elitism), suggesting that despite the parties’ nativism being more pronounced, both parties should also be considered populist. It is this thesis’ argument that despite the primacy

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\(^{880}\) Mudde and Kaltwasser, *Voices of the Peoples: Populism in Europe and Latin America Compared*.

\(^{881}\) See: Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?."; De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in *Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum*.; De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon.; De Cleen and Stavrakakis.
of nativism, it remains crucial to understand the populist dimensions of these predominantly nativist parties and leaders, because in doing so we can more sufficiently understand the way that populism is used alongside other ideologies, and the impact that this may have on our contemporary democratic landscape. Namely, I suggest that the populism of each party, specifically themes of crisis, played a fundamental role in the facilitation of the nativist agendas. This is explored further below.

Crisis and the Populist Radical Right

The second important finding from the comparative analysis of the case studies is that themes of crisis were quantitatively and qualitatively significant for both Hanson and Wilders. Moreover, these themes underpinned and facilitated the broader agendas of the parties, in particular their nativism. Each leader used themes of crisis to generate a fertile environment for their anti-immigrant, anti-Islam agendas, through fostering antagonism between their ethno-cultural in-groups and out-groups. The same was also used for their in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people’ as “underdog” and the ‘elite.’ This suggests that, following Moffitt,883 crisis is not merely an external, demand-side condition for the case studies, but an “internal” supply-side feature. It also suggests that while the parties are primarily nativist, their populism is still significant to their overall agendas and thus should not be dismissed as an overly subordinate feature of the parties or inconsequential to their processes. Themes of crisis, which describes the process of depicting society as being in crisis and/or decline, as well as the process of attributing blame for said decline or crisis, remained at the very centre of both Hanson’s and Wilders’ respective brand of radical right populism, albeit with each leader propagating these themes in distinct and different ways. For example, quantitatively, Hanson utilised crisis themes significantly more frequently than Wilders (Hanson: 20.18 percent; Wilders: 11.99 percent), seemingly indicating that for Hanson, cultivating crisis themes is a more important aspect of her discourse compared to Wilders. However, the qualitative stage of the analysis found that Wilders’ crisis discourse was, while less frequently used, more intense and catastrophic. In other words, where Hanson would frequently characterise society as being

882 De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
883 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
in crisis or decline, attributing blame for said decline on a particular out-group, she would do so with language that was tamer than Wilders’. In contrast, Wilders utilised crisis themes less frequently, but when he did so he did so with language that was stronger. For example, Hanson used strong language that evoked danger and the idea that Australia was in the process of being colonised by a culture that was bringing intolerance and violence (Islam), and thus Australia was changing for the worse as a result of the presence of Islam. But even so, it remained milder than the language Wilders chose to evoke a similar fear. For example, Wilders also evoked colonisation themes, but used them alongside battle-like, violent imagery and characterised the situation between Muslims and non-Muslims as akin to a war. He claimed that “we are at war,” that “our (Judeo-Christian, Western society) existence is at stake” and that it was a “clash between civilisation and barbarity.” Overall, while Hanson’s language characterised Australian society as experiencing many problems and crises, attributing blame for these crises at the feet of Muslims and the ‘elites,’ the degree to which her language catastrophised these problems was not as strong as Wilders.

In addition to this difference in frequency and potency between the leaders, Hanson also employed themes of crisis in a more scattered and less focused manner. Her speeches cited a great variety of problems that were apparently impacting Australia, from the potentially ‘measurable’ (e.g., high unemployment, ‘out-of-control debt’), to the more abstract (e.g., loss of the Australian ‘way of life,’ ‘loss of social cohesion’). While fears surrounding Islamic terrorism and the influence of Islam on the public sphere were also cited, Hanson did not limit her crisis themes to these particular topics. In other words, rather than focusing on one overarching theme, say Islamic immigration, she utilised crisis in a wide-ranging, unfocused manner. Her predominant blame attribution for such problems was Muslims, but she also blamed other forms of immigrants like international students, as well as non-immigrants like mothers within the family court context, other welfare recipients and foreign owners of Australian land. She also blamed the ‘elites,’ specifically the major parties (the ALP, the LNP and also the Greens) for allowing these problems to proliferate. In contrast to this wide-ranging characterisation of crisis in Australia, Wilders was more discriminate and targeted. Wilders’ use of crisis themes was more focused, with his primary crisis theme centred upon the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity and the corresponding increased prominence of Islam within the public sphere. As noted, while Hanson also spoke of these problems, other crisis issues abounded Hanson’s speeches and hers was a more scattered approach. Wilders’ central blame attribution for these problems was the Dutch Muslim population, Muslim immigrants
(including Moroccans), as well as the ‘elites.’ The elites Wilders criticised ranged from the parties belonging to the coalition government, those in power within the Dutch judicial system and the European Union. Interestingly, Wilders also tinged his catastrophising and hateful language with a degree of optimism for the future. Drawing on a sense of internationalism also absent from Hanson’s speeches, Wilders cited the success of other radical right populists internationally, from Donald Trump in the United States, to Marine Le Pen in France, as well as the Brexit referendum result in the United Kingdom, to illustrate that there was a changing political landscape in democracies throughout the world, one more receptive to the PVV’s worldview. Contrastingly, Hanson’s speeches lacked optimism and were more parochial in focus, refraining from references to international political allies.

These differences can in part be explained by the different geographical and political landscapes of the parties. The Netherlands is in Western Europe, a member of the European Union, shares land borders with Belgium and Germany, and is in a free-movement agreement with 26 other countries. This is reflected in the particular way Wilders goes about his agenda. Because of the Netherlands’ membership in the European Union, and the PVV’s taking part in the European Parliament, Wilders is tied more strongly to other radical right populists like Le Pen (as evidenced by their “failed attempt…to form a populist Eurosceptic bloc in 2014”). Wilders also styles himself as an ‘international’ figure. As Moffitt notes in his discussion of transnational populism and drawing on the work of De Cleen, Wilders “harbours significant transnational ambitions.” He participates in speaking tours throughout a variety of Western countries, “warn[ing]…of the ‘dangers’ of Islamisation.” Wilders’ international focus in his speeches reflects this, making connections between his own politics and the politics of other countries and leaders, and making “representative claims on behalf of a transnational ‘people’ who are scattered across the globe.”

884 At the time of writing, the PVV holds no seats in the European Parliament, after losing the four seats it had previously held in the 2019 election.
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid.
In contrast, Australia is relatively geographically isolated. Australia is an island nation and does not share a border with another country. Australia’s relative isolation is reflected in Hanson’s rather insular and parochial language, and the scattered, unfocused nature of Hanson’s crisis themes may also be reflective of both Australia’s geographical and political contexts. Firstly, while Australia has had some instances of Islamic terrorism, these instances have not occurred to the degree (in both frequency and death toll) they have in both the Netherlands and Western Europe broadly. For example, the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician, and Theo van Gogh, a Dutch film director (“two of the most vocal peddlers of anti-Islam sentiment in the Netherlands”), by a left-wing activist and a Dutch Moroccan Muslim respectively have left a mark on the Netherlands’ political and cultural psyche. Moreover, where the Netherlands and Western Europe broadly have experienced a large influx of Islamic migrants in recent years, as part of the so-called ‘Migrant Crisis,’ immigration statistics indicate that this has not occurred in Australia to the same degree. As such, Hanson’s more scattered and less focused characterisation of crises compared to Wilders’ is perhaps reflective of the degree to which Islamic migration (and terrorism) have actually impacted Australian voters (compared to the Dutch). In other words, the way that Hanson chose to apply her crisis themes is perhaps an acknowledgement that putting all her eggs in one basket—the problems associated with the religion of Islam—is not going to be as effective as it might be for, say, other radical right populists like Wilders. Crisis themes are only effective electorally if voters are receptive to them, so for Hanson a wider-ranging depiction of problems—from the family court to foreign ownership of Australian land—is arguably going to be more effective in drawing in concerned voters. In contrast, the Netherlands’ geographical location in Western Europe places it in close proximity to a number of terrorist events, and the Migrant Crisis is a broadly publicised and much discussed issue effecting the Netherlands and Europe broadly. As such, Wilders can focus specifically on these issues with a higher likelihood that voters will accept his crisis themes as an accurate depiction of the situation, and consequently will be more effective than if done by a radical right populist doing this in a context where these issues are less pronounced.

Despite these differences in style, explained in part by the different political and geographical context, the findings indicate a fundamental relationship to themes of crisis in both case studies. Both leaders cultivated a sense of crisis or that society was in decline or changing for the worse,

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and then attributed blame for said crisis/decline on an out-group. This achieved two goals: it facilitated the in/out grouping between the ‘people,’ and the ‘elite’ and the ‘other’; and it put into question both the competency and the morality of those in power, who have facilitated the colonisation of society by outsiders through immigration policies, and jeopardised the people’s “way of life.” These findings have implications for future examinations of the role that crisis plays in populist discourse. Firstly, it gives weight to the theory initially outlined by Moffitt and further explored in this thesis that crisis is not just an external, demand-side condition of populism (at least as it manifests on the radical right) but in fact plays a prominent internal, supply-side role.\textsuperscript{891} It also supports Hameleers et al.’s argument that blame attribution is a central communication logic for populists.\textsuperscript{892} Drawing on the work of Milstein as well as Moffitt, described in detail in Chapter Two, this thesis took crisis to be an “inherently reflexive concept.”\textsuperscript{893} It is something always “mediated” and “performed,”\textsuperscript{894} and it “blurs the usual dichotomies between fact and value, observer and participant, and theory and practice.”\textsuperscript{895} The role of participation is important here. There must be a declarer of crisis, in this context Hanson or Wilders, but there must also be an audience—a ‘people’ which acknowledges and accepts that something is “radically out of synch with the community’s expectations,”\textsuperscript{896} for example the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity in the public sphere. Importantly, as the findings suggest, this cultivation of crisis themes should also not necessarily be seen just as an end in and of itself, but as a mechanism through which the leaders enact their particular agendas. A crisis, such as the supposed declining influence of Judeo-Christianity in the public sphere and the converse increased presence of Islam, provides the focal point of antagonism which is able to stoke the division between the groups, with blame attribution towards both the ‘elites’ and Muslims playing a central role here. Without the evocation of crisis, the relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ and the ‘people’ and the ‘other’ would lack the necessary antagonism that necessitates populism broadly, and radical right populism specifically. The declaring of a crisis ”evokes demand for immediate action,”\textsuperscript{897} which enables the criticisms of those in power (anti-elitism) and makes the populist seem necessary, provides a crisis

\textsuperscript{891} Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”
\textsuperscript{892} Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese.
\textsuperscript{893} Milstein, 143.
\textsuperscript{894} Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism," 189.
\textsuperscript{895} Milstein, 143.
\textsuperscript{896} Ibid., 150.
\textsuperscript{897} Ibid., 148.
community or victim of a crisis (the people), who stands in opposition to those who are blamed for creating or perpetuating the crisis (either an ‘other’ or the ‘elite’). In Hanson’s and Wilders’ language we can see all of these different dynamics in play. For example, each leader used language that evoked danger and fear to create the impression that society was changing for the worse. They then tied this language in with ‘othering’ language to denigrate an out-group, ultimately attributing blame for the changing conditions of society on this group and the ‘elite’ for, amongst other things, allowing the ‘other’ into their respective countries through immigration programs. The fearful, crisis-laden language serves to create division between the groups, but also serves to create a sense of urgency for change, which, according to the populist, only they can bring about. As Moffitt explains: “the performance of crisis allows populist actors to pit ‘the people’ against a dangerous other, radically simplify the terrain of political debate and advocate strong leadership.”

What is also crucial here is the point that crisis is a normative experience, not always measurable and verifiable and that can be something cultivated by the declarer. This is significant for the analysis of the relationship between crisis and populism because if we understand crisis purely as, say, something only akin to an external, so-called ‘objective’ event (like an economic recession) we will still only understand one aspect of the relationship: how crisis generates populism, which has already been studied extensively. To move the scholarship forward and to understand something new about the relationship, namely how, as Moffitt puts it, “populism…attempts to act as a trigger for crisis”898 we must also understand crisis as something less tangible, less ‘verifiable,’ acknowledging that it can be merely a “sense” of something out of step with the norm.899 Through this acknowledgment we are no longer confined to merely examining how a particular crisis, like the Global Financial Crisis, has impacted the success of populist parties (thus consigning crisis to the demand-side of populism studies and characterising the relationship as necessarily one-way), but can understand how crisis is utilised and performed on the supply side for electoral gain. As evidenced in the discourse findings and the corresponding contextualising of demand-side data, the crises that the leaders articulated were not necessarily supported by the data. For example, Hanson’s fears surrounding the influx of Muslims in Australia—“we are in danger of being

898 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism,” 189.
899 Taggart, "Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics,” in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, 69.
swamped by Muslims”—is not reflected in immigration and ABS data, yet Muslim immigration and the increasing presence of Islam in the public sphere are frequently cited as a cause of concern for Hanson in her speeches. Similarly, Pew Research data finds that Wilders’ discussion on the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity and increased influence of Islam in the Netherlands is also overblown. While the Netherlands indeed has more Islamic migration than Australia, the “existential” crisis facing non-Muslims in the Netherlands is not borne out in the data for the period of analysis. As such, this indicates that crisis themes do not need to be tied to an ‘objective’ event per se, which can be measured empirically, to play a role in populist radical right discourse. It can also be a feeling conjured by a leader for politically advantageous goals. This comparative research, which has empirically assessed the presence of these themes as a supply-side condition and found that the leaders actively cultivated crisis themes in their speeches, is the first step in understanding the supply-side nature of crisis and populist parties. Through understanding this, we can better conceptualise the role that crisis has in populist radical right agendas, and thus more sufficiently understand the party family as a whole.

In summary, the findings from the analysis of the presence of crisis themes in the discourse of Hanson and Wilders indicate a fundamental and central relationship to crisis. These themes were indeed used in different ways, with Hanson recording a higher quantitative presence of crisis, but Wilders recording a stronger, more intense use of the discourse, found through the qualitative analysis. However, despite these differences in style, they were used to promote similar goals for each of the leaders: to generate antagonism and bring about their respective in-grouping and out-grouping between the ‘people’ and a minority ‘other,’ and thus facilitate their nativism, and also put into question the competencies of those in power and alter the status-quo power dynamics through attributing blame for said crisis or decline. These findings therefore go some way in demonstrating that, following Moffitt, crisis is a supply- and demand-side issue for populists, with the caveat that this research remained focused on the populist radical right specifically. While these findings provide the first step in developing a broader framework for understanding the supply-side nature of crisis and populism, because of its focus on the populist radical right only I suggest that further research is needed to understand how the relationship plays out within populism more broadly.

900 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
The Populist Radical Right: A Post-materialist Phenomenon?

The third important point drawn from the analysis is the use of material issues in one of the case studies in particular, ON. Indeed, the way in which Hanson used economic concerns to facilitate her agenda set her apart from Wilders, who utilised primarily post-materialist, identity frames. Hanson was found to frequently use socio-economic issues in her discourse to propagate themes of crisis as well as to facilitate her in-grouping and out-grouping. While these findings do reflect previous literature which argues that economic concerns are “instrumental” and “secondary” to the populist radical right, I also argue that the degree to which Hanson cites and utilises economic issues in her speeches, paired with the relative prominence of non-nativist economic policies in the ON document (30 percent), gives pause to the notion that the populist radical right are essentially a “post-material phenomenon based first and foremost on identity rather than (material) interest.” I also suggest that these findings, together with the high quantitative presence of crisis themed language in Hanson’s discourse, suggest the ON are somewhat more populist than the PVV.

Where Wilders’ primary concern in his speeches was the declining influence of Judeo-Christianity, thus framing his anti-Islam and anti-immigration agenda around the issue of identity, Hanson also frequently cited material concerns to achieve the same agenda. Where Wilders did mention the economy, it was done only briefly and mainly regarding the supposed over-representation of Moroccans in welfare dependency. The primacy of socio-cultural issues for Wilders ties in with the general consensus that culture, rather than the economy, is the primary concern for the populist radical right. This is not to say that socio-cultural issues were not important to Hanson and ON. We cannot underestimate the significance of the supposed degrading influence of Islam on Australian culture and society within Hanson’s discourse. For example, the degradation of the Australian “way of life” was something often cited by Hanson, and the party’s policy document reads “Bringing back Australian values.” But the degree to which Hanson used economic issues alongside socio-cultural ones to propel

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901 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
her anti-immigrant and anti-Islam views compared to Wilders is worth noting. For example, Hanson frequently used economic issues as a means to characterise an Australia in crisis and to criticise the ‘elites’ and immigrants. She would claim that the ‘elites,’ welfare recipients and immigrants were using up a supposed finite amount of economic resources, at the expense of hard-working, “regular” Australians. Ultimately, she framed immigration as something that is detrimental not just to the Australian “way of life” but also to the socio-economic health of Australia (and non-immigrant Australians) broadly. She also argued that immigration was masking broader problems or declines within the Australian economy. She also criticised the health of the economy distinct from immigration, using it as a means to criticise the ‘elites’ specifically, thus drawing on her populism. As noted, Wilders framed his anti-immigration and anti-Islam agenda mostly around the issue of identity and the socio-cultural impact of Islam and migration on the Netherlands and Europe. As Wilders himself outlined in one speech, the issues that Europe was experiencing were not economic, but “existential” and related specifically to “Islamisation, terrorism and mass-migration.”

It is important to situate these differences in style, framing and policy within the broader Australian and Dutch contexts. For example, the ways the leaders each chose to frame their primary concerns—immigration and Islam—is reflective of the prominence of particular themes in each country’s election during the period of analysis. For example, economic issues were a prominent feature of the 2016 Australian federal election, with these issues “featur[ing] heavily in the election campaign.” Specifically, as Gunn and Mintrom found, debate during the election was centred around which of the major parties (the ALP or the LNP) could best manage the Australian economy, with issues related to economic management and tax policy being prominent themes. Other research also noted that ahead of the 2016 election, Australian voters cited economic issues as the most important issue facing Australia. In contrast, as described in Chapter Six, the most significant concern with the 2017 Dutch general election was not the economy, but the issue of what constitutes Dutch ‘identity.’ As van Holsteyn notes, identity was perhaps the “central theme” of the election, with even mainstream

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906 Gunn and Mintrom,  57.
907 Economic Issues the Key to the Federal Election (Melbourne: Roy Morgan Research, 2016).
leaders utilising identity issues for political advantage. Therefore, given these different thematic focuses of the Australian and Dutch elections, it makes sense that each leader would choose to filter their nativist, anti-immigrant, anti-Islamic concerns through broader issues that are particularly important in their respective political contexts. Through anchoring their anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim positions through issues that were salient in their respective countries, the leaders were better able to argue that these problems will have a detrimental impact amongst a wide-ranging group of constituents and consequently potentially achieve greater electoral success.

The qualitative findings from Hanson’s speeches, paired with the relatively high presence of policies related to the economy in ON’s policy document, are interesting because they somewhat challenge two prominent narratives: firstly, that socio-economic issues are mainly the purview of left-wing populists; secondly, that the populist radical right are post-materialist parties. This is not to say that socio-economic issues were not used in an “instrumentalised” manner to propel the anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agendas of the party, but the degree to which they were used by Hanson in comparison to Wilders indicates that the economy is a relatively important issue more broadly for the ON party. In particular, these differences between Hanson and Wilders in their framing of key core issues should not be overlooked if we are to fully understand the divergent ways the party family manifests in different contexts, and thus ultimately the different ways it can position itself for success. This follows Zaslove, who argues that economic concerns should not be disregarded in analyses of the populist radical right party family. He notes that: “despite the importance of cultural issues (such as immigration, multiculturalism and national identity), it is important not to disregard either the economic platform of the populist radical right or the link between economic grievances and support for the parties in question.” Importantly, there is a risk in

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908 van Holsteyn, 1365.
911 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 167; Mudde and Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America.”
912 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 133.
914 Ibid.
ignoring the prevalence of economic concerns within the radical right because we may, as a result, misunderstand how and why the populist radical right connect with their voters and ultimately situate themselves for success in elections. As Zaslove points out, “the danger in pursuing this strategy [including economic platforms under nativism] is that the success of the populist radical right is reduced to cultural grievances.” Indeed, Mudde has also noted that research on the party family must “move beyond the dominant focus on the two issues of immigration and European integration,” to include and “reflect the broader range of issues the populist radical right parties present to the voters.” This includes socio-economic issues. Therefore, these findings support this call and indicate that further examination into the role of socio-economic issues is needed in relation to the party family. In particular, a further exploration into how economic issues may be used as a vehicle to propel their base anti-immigration, anti-Islam positions would be fruitful. I also suggest the findings regarding the degree to which ON balances materialist and post-materialist concerns, paired with the high presence of crisis themed language, suggests ON is somewhat more populist than the PVV. Hanson’s use of materialist concerns to criticise the ‘elites,’ and her frequent characterisation of society in crisis, as well as her frequent use of themes of ‘unfairness,’ outlined further below, indicate a strong reliance on populist features, despite the party predominantly being nativist.

It is worth noting some of the key post-materialist differences found in the qualitative analysis between the parties that were also, arguably, influenced by the respective contexts of the case studies. As was noted above, both parties proposed anti-Islam and anti-immigrant policies in their respective documents. However, Islam was a more significant theme in the PVV’s manifesto compared to ON’s document (44 percent of the manifesto constituted anti-Islamic policies specifically, under the banner of “De-Islamize [sic] the Netherlands”). Moreover, the specific policies related to Islam were more severe (e.g., the proposal to ban the Koran and close mosques that already existed). As well, a further distinction between the parties can be found in the slightly more conciliatory tone of ON to non-Islamic asylum seekers. ON, for example, claims that it “supports a sustainable refugee program,” but only wants to ban Muslim refugees. In contrast, the PVV wants zero asylum seekers, seemingly regardless of religious affiliation, and wants to “withdraw all asylum residence permits which have already been granted for specific periods, close the asylum centers” But where the PVV should be

915 Ibid.
considered more extreme and harsher in tone with regards to immigration and Islam, ON is perhaps less liberal when it comes to post-materialist, non-nativist socio-cultural issues when compared to the PVV. As discussed in the previous chapter, the PVV, along with other Northern European radical right populists, should be considered “liberal[ly] illiberal.” While anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic, the PVV is liberal and progressive on other social issues, such as those related to the LGBTQ+ community. Contrastingly, ON is not considered progressive with regard to these issues, as exemplified by their opposition to same-sex marriage. The party, drawing on their populism, stated in their policy document that the issue should be put to a referendum and decided by citizens. The idea of a referendum to decide the issue was a widely accepted alternative to supporting marriage equality in Australia at the time. Moreover, another distinction between the parties lies in the prominence of the theme of ‘unfairness’ in ON’s policy document, specifically related to the “perks” that politicians receive, the “rorting” of services like welfare by immigrants, foreigners and citizens, and the apparent imbalance in the family court. The party proposes various policies to rectify these ‘unfair’ issues. The issue of ‘unfairness’ is also reflected in Hanson’s speeches, as outlined in the previous chapter. In contrast, while Wilders does touch on under-dog-like motifs and themes of unfairness in his speeches, the PVV’s manifesto does not address issues like politician’s entitlements or welfare fraud.

Again, context goes some way in addressing these post-materialist differences between the parties on a policy level. ON’s conservatism is reflective of not just a wider acceptance of anti-marriage-equality positions in Australia specifically, but also of a broader disparity between radical right populists around the world in their attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ community. As Mudde notes, “homophobia is part of many, but by no means all populist radical right parties.” In the Northern European context, which is widely perceived as socially progressive, populist radical right parties frequently cite the need to protect the LGBTQ+

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917 Moffitt, "Liberal Illiberalism? The Reshaping of the Contemporary Populist Radical Right in Northern Europe."
918 In 2017, Australia held a plebiscite (a non-binding alternative to a referendum) on the issue of marriage equality. ON and Hanson campaigned on the “No” side, opposing marriage equality. The plebiscite, however, was successful and marriage equality became law later that year.
920 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 67.
921 Moffitt, "Liberal Illiberalism? The Reshaping of the Contemporary Populist Radical Right in Northern Europe."
community, while using it as a vehicle to criticise supposedly intolerant Muslims. In other contexts widely perceived as less progressive, like Hungary, radical right populists like Viktor Orbán use homophobia as a means to stoke division and criticise liberal institutions like the European Union, and in Poland, the Law and Order party also vilifies the LGBTQ+ community for similar ends. So, where in these contexts homosexuals and the LGBTQ+ community broadly are perceived as, in Mudde’s term, “part of the perverted internal enemy” who pose a “threat to the survival of the nation” and its people, in other contexts, like Northern Europe, the LGBTQ+ community plays the opposite role. Here, it acts as part of the in-group that requires protection from an enemy ‘other,’ the Muslim. While Hanson and ON do not exhibit such openly homophobic rhetoric found in Hungary or Poland, their conservativism towards social issues such as marriage-equality is reflective of a broader trend within non-Northern European populist radical right parties. Finally, ON’s emphasis on the issue of ‘unfairness’ is reflective of the broader idea that permeates the Australian imagination that Australia is the ‘land of the fair go,’ a term that “generally stands for whatever the person using the term regards as fair or just, [and] has an egalitarian flavour.” Hanson’s more frequent utilisation of fairness as a theme through which to frame her agenda makes sense then, given the prominence of this national myth in Australia.

In summary of the above, while the presence of socio-economic issues in the case studies generally conformed to the literature, in particular Mudde’s argument that the economy is “instrumental” and “secondary,” I contend that the degree to which Hanson utilised materialist issues to achieve her respective in-out grouping and propagate crisis themes, paired with the relative prominence of socio-economic policies in the party’s policy document, indicates that


925 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 68.

926 Ibid.


ON balances both material and post-material interests. While the populist radical right are argued to be primarily concerned with identity and post-material concerns, with the PVV as exemplars of this, it is clear that this is not the case for all parties belonging to the party family. Political context, such as the different thematic focuses of the Australian and Dutch elections for the timeframe of analysis, have clearly influenced the way the parties framed their core issues, choosing issues found to be particularly salient in their own constituencies. I also suggest that context impacts the degree to which a party balances their primary nativism over their populism, with ON drawing somewhat more heavily on populist themes than the PVV. Context has also impacted the parties on a policy level with regards to post-material issues like those related to the LGBTQ+ community. Together, therefore, these findings suggest that context can alter how the populist radical right balance materialist and post-materialist issues, and will also have an influence on a policy level. I suggest that there are two fruitful areas of research that would be beneficial here, particularly in relation to the relatively under-examined populisms in the antipodes. Firstly, further examination of the role of socio-cultural and socio-economic issues for the populist radical right in Australia and New Zealand would be fruitful. Through this we could better understand how post-materialist issues like identity play out in the populist radical right in relatively isolated geographies (i.e., with no shared borders and consequently more restricted immigration), compared to materialist issues. Secondly, further comparative research between the populist radical right in Europe, and Australian and New Zealand would be beneficial to further the theoretical understanding of the party family. While much of the literature on the party family has been constructed using European examples, I argue we could learn much from further comparing these parties with the relatively less examined antipodean examples. Through this we can more sufficiently understand and map how the party family manifests differently in different contexts, and therefore understand the party family on the whole more comprehensively.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has made the argument that there were three central findings drawn from the comparative analysis of the case studies, ON and the PVV, with a summary of the findings found in Table 7.1. Firstly, it concluded that ON and the PVV are primarily nativist. However, it also stressed that their respective populism should not be underplayed. Moreover, of the
parties, ON is somewhat more populist than the PVV. The parties’ nativism was evidenced by the fact that while anti-elitism was found to be a relatively prominent presence in the discourses of both the leaders, the most significant in-grouping and out-grouping was found to be ethnocultural, between a Judeo-Christian-constructed ‘people’ and a non-Judeo-Christian, Muslim ‘other,’ with an anti-elitist in-out grouping a secondary consideration. This suggests that nativism, not populism, was the primary focus of the leaders for their in-grouping and out-grouping, a point also reflected in the policy analysis. These findings support recent literature on the need to distinguish between an in-grouping and out-grouping constructed along populist lines and that which is constructed along nationalist lines, so as to not conflate populism with nativism or nationalism and therefore mischaracterise populism’s character and exaggerate the influence populism specifically has had on the contemporary political landscape.929

The findings also suggest, however, that despite the supremacy of nativism, populism was still a significant presence within the leaders’ discourses. Despite the leaders of the parties, Hanson and Wilders, utilising themes of crisis in their discourse in distinct manners, they each relied on a fundamental relationship to crisis to facilitate their agendas. Through a construction of society in crisis and/or decline and through attributing blame for said crisis and/or decline on their two out-groups, the leaders were able to facilitate their people-centrism, their criticisms and denigrations of Muslims and the ‘elite,’ and put into question the latter’s competency for governing and their moral fortitude. These findings are in line with recent literature, such as the work of Moffitt who argues that crisis is not merely a demand-side condition that can trigger populism, but an “internal feature” of populism itself.930 It also follows Hameleers et al.’s argument that blame attribution is a central theme of the populist communication logic,931 in that the attributing of blame for crisis was central to the leaders’ process of in-out grouping and anti-elitism broadly. However, it is crucial to note that because this thesis is confined to the populist radical right only, further research is required to examine how crisis plays out within the context of other types of populism. While the findings indicate that crisis played a crucial role in the leaders’ criticisms of the ‘elite’ (thus suggesting it may also be present in the

929 De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon.; De Cleen, "The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’," in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.; De Cleen and Stavrakakis.; Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?;"

930 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism;"

931 Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese.
discourse of the populist left), it is important to further explore the relationship between crisis and populism without the role of nativism present. As well, given the findings are drawn from two comparisons only, a larger comparative analysis would also be beneficial.

The third and final take-away from the findings is the issue of socio-economic concerns for one of the case studies, ON. The findings from the discourse analysis found that Hanson utilised economic issues to facilitate her anti-immigrant, anti-Islam agenda. This follows previous literature that argues that economic issues are “instrumental” to the party family. However, the degree to which Hanson utilised material concerns to frame her key issues, paired with the relative prominence of economic policies in the party document, suggests that the party is not wholly a post-materialist party. This indicates that further research on the populist radical right in Australia and the role that economic concerns play in their overall agenda would be constructive, not only to better understand the populist radical right in Australia specifically, but to more fully map how the party family differs between geographical and political contexts.

The following chapter will comprise of a short conclusion.

Table 7.1: Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>What was tested</th>
<th>Theory tested</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse, as found in the speeches of the party leader</td>
<td>People-centrism</td>
<td>What constitutes the ‘people’</td>
<td>Nativism or populism</td>
<td>Mudde</td>
<td>Primary: ethnocultural (Judeo-Christian)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The ‘people’ constructed as ‘underdog’ against the ‘elite’</td>
<td>De Cleen; De Cleen and Stavrakakis; De Cleen et al.; Rydgren</td>
<td>Secondary: the ‘people’ as underdog to the ‘elite’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Or, against a different ‘other’ out-group</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
<td>Presence of anti-elitist discourse</td>
<td>Nativism or populism</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Secondary out-grouping</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The ‘people’ positioned in opposition to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political, judicial elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As above</td>
<td>‘Othering’</td>
<td>Presence of discourse that ‘others’ a non-elite out-group</td>
<td>Nativism or populism</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Primary out-group</td>
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<td>The ‘people’ positioned in opposition to a non-elite out-group</td>
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<td>Muslims, non-Judeo-Christians</td>
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<tr>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Societal declinism/crisis</td>
<td>Presence and type of crisis</td>
<td>Crisis as an ‘internal’ feature of populism</td>
<td>Moffitt</td>
<td>Crisis themes enacted differently, but played a core role in discourse</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>ON and PVV both used declining influence of J-C in the public sphere as a ‘crisis’ theme</td>
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<td>ON also used economic ‘crisis’ themed issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Blame</td>
<td>Presence of blame</td>
<td>Blame attribution main ‘populist’ frame</td>
<td>Hameleers et al.</td>
<td>Blame central role in discourse, primarily attributed to the ‘other,’ secondarily towards the ‘elite’</td>
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<td>Crisis and its role in ‘othering,’ anti-elitism</td>
<td>Moffitt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy of party</td>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>Role of RR ideology</td>
<td>Nativism as primary ideological feature of party family</td>
<td>Mudde De Cleen; De Cleen and Stavrakakis;</td>
<td>Nativism primary feature</td>
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<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Nativism/nationalism vs populism</td>
<td>De Cleen et al.; Rydgren</td>
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<tr>
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<td>As above</td>
<td>Mudde</td>
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<td>Populism</td>
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<td>As above</td>
<td>Mudde</td>
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<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Role of socio-economic issues in the party family</td>
<td>Socio-economic issues purview of left populism, PRR prioritise post-materialist issues</td>
<td>Mudde; Otjes et al.</td>
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<td>Mixed results.</td>
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<td>ON results indicate a strong use of materialist issues, but do remain mostly tied to nativist agenda (see crisis)</td>
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<td>PVV conforms to theory</td>
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion

Populist parties are now a perennial presence in contemporary democracies. And while populist parties from the left and right have experienced electoral success in the contemporary era, populist radical right parties have distinguished themselves in terms of success and prominence. This success, which has occurred throughout Europe as well as other Western liberal democracies, has resulted in the populist radical right going from fringe parties to positions of power. These parties are ‘here to stay.’\textsuperscript{932} Because of this, it is pertinent to ensure we have a fuller appreciation of populist radical right parties, the extent to which they are populist, and the way that populism facilitates their broader ideological agendas. Through assessing the presence of the features of in-grouping and out-grouping, crisis themes, and the host ideology, the thesis aimed to determine the degree to which ON and the PVV balance their populism with their radical right ideology. In testing the theoretical framework developed against two case studies in different Western liberal democracies, the thesis also sought to understand how populist radical right parties manifest differently, depending on political context.

The thesis found firstly that nativism was a significant presence within the discourse and policies of ON and the PVV, but that, importantly, the parties’ populism should be considered an essential and consequential feature of their overall agenda. Specifically, while nativism was most prominent, populism (i.e., themes of crisis) facilitated this nativism through generating antagonism between the ethno-culturally constructed in-group and out-groups. The parties’ nativism was evidenced most strongly in the way they constructed their respective in-grouping and out-grouping. Specifically, there was a primarily ethno-cultural people-centrism and a higher quantitative presence of out-grouping a minority ethnic group than anti-elitism. There was also a higher quantitative presence of nativist policies in the parties’ policy documents compared to populist policies. This follows previous literature.\textsuperscript{933} However, themes of crisis were also found to play a significant role in the discourses of each of the case studies. This follows Moffitt, who argues that crisis is an “internal feature” of populism,\textsuperscript{934} and suggests that

\textsuperscript{932} Zaslove, “Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type.”; Mudde, \textit{Cas Mudde - Populism in the Twenty-First Century: An Illiberal Democratic Response to Undemocratic Liberalism.}

\textsuperscript{933} Mudde, \textit{Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.}; Keane et al.

\textsuperscript{934} Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
populism itself is a significant presence in the discourse of each leader. The analysis also found that the parties were similar on core issues, such as sharing anti-immigrant, anti-Islam sensibilities, but that context altered the way that the leaders framed their key crisis issues. For example, where Hanson used materialist and post-materialist issues as a vehicle for crisis and to criticise immigrants and Muslims, Wilders’ primary focus was on the issue of identity and thus post-materialist in focus. Moreover, ON was comparatively more populist than the PVV, in part because of this materialist focus.

Summary of the Research

To reach these findings, a re-evaluation of the conceptual features of populism took place, through a discussion on typology and the theoretical literature on populism and the populist radical right. It argued that the ideational and discursive approaches to populism were the most fitting approaches for the purposes of this research, which aimed to assess populist radical right parties’ populism through discourse and policy. As such, it argued that as a thin-centred ideology, populism concerns a set of ideas that make up its worldview, with discourse being one way that it can be operationalised in practice. Chapter Two focused on the ideational approach and discussed populism in the abstract, outlining populism’s core features of in-grouping and out-grouping, between a ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ and made the argument that crisis should be considered a constituent of populism, with the findings from the analysis proving that it was an effective means to assess the presence of populism in the case studies. Chapter Three looked at populism as it is operationalised in practice. It outlined the discursive approach, as well as the theoretical underpinnings of the populist radical right party family, per Mudde. It also made the argument for assessing populism and the radical right ideology through the variables of discourse and policy, respectively. The use of the two variables together proved fruitful in providing a layered, two-pronged analysis of the case studies’ populism and radical right ideology. For example, where the discourse analysis was beneficial in elucidating the presence of crisis in the case studies, the policy variable was able to discern the degree to which nativism influences the parties’ policy preferences, per the theory. Moreover, many of the findings were reflected in both variables, such as the supremacy of

935 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
936 Ibid.
nativism over populism (as seen in the discourse variable in the in-grouping and out-grouping index and the policy variable), providing a degree of verifiability that the use of one variable would have been unable to achieve. Chapter Four outlined the methodology used to undertake the empirical analysis. The mixed quantitative and qualitative research method was found to be particularly advantageous in assessing the different ways the populist features outlined in Chapter Two manifested in different contexts. To name one example, through using both quantitative and qualitative methods, the analysis was able to decipher the different ways each leader utilised themes of crisis (i.e., more frequently versus more strongly). Chapters Five and Six outlined the results from the empirical analysis for each case study, with a situating of the findings within the political contexts of Australia and the Netherlands, respectively, taking place. The discussion of the demand-side conditions proved to be a strength of the overall analysis. For example, the demand-side discussion was able to contextualise some of the themes derived from the discourse analysis, such as the prominent use of socio-economic issues for Hanson, within the broader Australian election landscape, thus elucidating the degree to which the populist radical right might alter their agenda depending on issue salience in their particular context. The final chapter, Chapter Seven, discussed the three significant findings from the comparative analysis. The chapter compared the key findings from ON and the PVV to determine the broader implications of the analysis on the study of populism as a whole. The contribution that these findings will make to the literature is outlined below.

**Contribution to the Literature**

This thesis has provided four central contributions to the literature, which will have implications for future theoretical and empirical studies of both the populist radical right specifically, and research on populism generally. The first main contribution relates to the degree to which the parties are actually populist. I argue that the findings suggest that while ON and the PVV are nativist first, populism second, following the literature, the significant role that populism actually plays in their agendas should not be underplayed. Specifically, while the findings from the in-grouping and out-grouping analysis found a greater reliance on nativism than populism, the fundamental role that crisis played in both leaders’ discourses indicates an important and integral use of populism.

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937 See: ibid.; Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?."
The findings from the in-grouping and out-grouping index suggest that both Hanson and Wilders were primarily nativist in the way that they divided society between an in-group and an out-group. For both leaders, the ‘people’ were most frequently constructed along ethno-cultural lines, with a Judeo-Christian people-centrism playing a significant role in the way that the leaders in-grouped. The analysis also indicated a greater reliance on ‘othering’ a minority out-group, namely Muslims, compared to the process of criticising and out-grouping the ‘elites,’ with a people-centrism heavily constructed along ethno-cultural lines. Similarly, the people-centrism constructed as “underdog” was similarly less frequently utilised. The policy variable also reflected this strong use of nativism in the discourse, with a high quantitative presence of nativist policies recorded, particularly when compared to the policies that drew on the parties’ populism, like direct democracy measures, which were only a small proportion of the policy documents overall. As I have noted, these findings support previous literature that argues that populism is a secondary consideration for the party family, with nativism or ethno-nationalism often the primary driving force behind the populist radical right. Moreover, the Judeo-Christian basis of Hanson’s and Wilders’ people-centrism also supports recent scholarship on a greater precision in determining how the ‘people’ is discursively constructed within populist radical right discourse, so as to not conflate populism with what might actually be nativism (or nationalism).

There is also another contribution related specifically to the parties’ nativism, namely the high presence of nativism in the policy document and how it illustrates the degree to which the radical right ideology may benefit or detract from success in elections. The success of ON and PVV in 2016 and 2017 and their respectively limited policy documents indicate that the radical right do not need a significant number of mainstream policies to enjoy electoral success. Both parties relied heavily on nativist themes in their respective documents, with mainstream issues like healthcare and education not constituting a significant portion of the documents. The degree to which nativist policies constituted the documents indicates that these types of policies are not an impediment to achieving electoral success. This is particularly relevant in the Netherlands, where the multi-party coalition system allows for smaller parties to gain electoral

938 De Cleen, “The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
939 See: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.; Rydgren, “Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?”
940 De Cleen, “The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
prominence. In addition, the differences between the parties on a policy-level were also revealing. The PVV’s policies were more heavily weighted towards Islam, as well as more severe. ON’s document, in contrast, was slightly more conciliatory in tone. For example, the party did not want to close current mosques or Islamic schools, just to stop future construction pending an inquiry. They also claimed to support the refugee program, but did want to restrict Muslim applicants. But ON’s document also indicated a conservatism towards social issues like marriage equality that is not reflected broadly in the PVV’s program. These findings suggest that geographical and political context does impact the way the radical right ideology manifests. Context has an effect on the specific themes emphasised by the given radical right party (e.g., Islam, the economy), the degree of severity of the policies, and on the party’s positions on post-materialist issues such as marriage equality.

While the parties are each primarily nativist, the findings also suggest that they are both undoubtedly populist, evidenced specifically by the substantial presence of crisis in their discourse, as well as the presence of anti-elitism. The findings suggest that while each leader utilised crisis themes in different ways, the process of characterising society as being in decline or crisis, and then attributing blame for the crisis on an out-group, played a fundamental role in the way that each leader facilitated their respective agendas. Similarly, while the above in-grouping and out-grouping findings suggest that nativism was most significant, there was still a relatively frequent quantitative presence of both anti-elitism and qualitatively present ‘underdog’ people-centrism. Together, these findings suggest that while ON and the PVV are more prominently nativist, their populism still plays a significant role in their overall agendas. I also suggest that findings suggest that ON is somewhat more populist than the PVV, evidenced by the high quantitative presence of crisis, the materialist-based themes used to criticise the ‘elite,’ and her frequent citing of issues of ‘unfairness.’ The testing of these two populist features—in-grouping and out-grouping, and crisis—was able to illustrate the degree to which the parties actually balance their respective nativism and populism, and thus their combined utilisation was proven to be effective. These findings therefore suggest that while it is important that scholars and observers do not exaggerate populism’s influence in both the populist radical right party family specifically, 941 and on the broader political climate, 942 it is

941 See: March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."; Pauwels, Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
942 Mudde, "Why Nativism, Not Populism, Should Be Declared Word of the Year."
also similarly important to not underestimate the significant role that populism itself plays in facilitating the agendas of these parties.

The second significant contribution relates specifically the issue of crisis. The thesis is the first empirical study of its kind, assessing and determining the presence of crisis on the supply side. As the above outlines, the findings indicate that crisis plays a significant role in the discourse of populism. The results suggest that crisis is not merely an external demand-side condition that might trigger electoral success, as is usually hypothesised, but that it is an “internal” feature of the case studies.\textsuperscript{943} That both Hanson and Wilders anchored their people-centrism, anti-elitism and ‘othering’ in the language of crisis, albeit in different ways, suggests that it is not just isolated to one party or leader, and that it could be a core feature of the populist radical right party family more broadly. It is important to emphasise that these findings were drawn from a small comparison and isolated to the populist radical right only, so indeed further research is needed here to fully explore the relationship. However, despite the limited nature of the study, I argue the results could have implications for the study of populism broadly. Firstly, they indicate that a more flexible approach to conceptualising crisis is required to develop a sufficient understanding of its relationship to populism, one that accepts that a crisis is not necessarily always a tangible event, but can also be a “sense” of something out of the norm,\textsuperscript{944} and as such an atmosphere that can be conjured on the supply side. Secondly, and most importantly, they provide a solid theoretical and empirical foundation upon which to further explore the relationship between crisis and populism, both of the radical right variety but also of other political affiliations. Finally, these comparative findings also give credence to including crisis as a defining feature of populism itself, as seen in this thesis as well as in Moffitt’s work.\textsuperscript{945} Relatedly, I argue that these crisis findings add a fresh perspective to the normative discussions of populism and the impact its continued presence might have on democracies. Specifically, if we acknowledge that populism is now seemingly a permanent feature of contemporary democracies,\textsuperscript{946} and that themes of crisis are a central component to populist parties on the supply side, then we must consider the potential that exists for crisis-

\textsuperscript{943}Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
\textsuperscript{944}Taggart, "Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics," in \textit{Democracies and the Populist Challenge}.
\textsuperscript{945}See: Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."; Moffitt, "The Performative Turn in the Comparative Study of Populism."; Moffitt, \textit{The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation}.
\textsuperscript{946}See: Keane et al.; Mudde, interview.
themed discourse to similarly be a more prominent feature within our democracies. As this discourse brings crisis themes into the consciousness of the ‘crisis community,’ per Milstein, then it could in turn, following Moffitt, “trigger” crisis more frequently in broader society. Depending on one’s perspective, this may have negative implications for democratic stability, or also, following the idea that crisis provides opportunity for renewal and change, enable and facilitate positive changes to the status quo.

The third contribution from the findings relates to the relatively prominent role of socio-economic issues within Hanson’s speeches, with materialist concerns used as a key crisis theme. This, alongside the relative prominence of socio-economic policies in ON’s policy document, suggest that economic issues are relatively valuable to the party. They played an important role in Hanson’s anti-immigrant, anti-Islamic discourse, as well as her criticisms of the ‘elite’. While these findings follow the traditional view on the role of socio-economic issues in the populist radical right party family, namely that they are “instrumental” and “secondary,” the degree to which they have been used by ON suggests that they are not entirely a post-materialist party. While socio-cultural issues are already considered significant for the party family, it is important that we broaden our understanding of the party family to include analysis of the variety of other issues and concerns they may advocate for on behalf of their supporters. It is clear from these findings regarding socio-economic issues, as well as the policy-level differences found, that context changes the way that the populist radical right manifests. Here lies another important point, specifically regarding the choice of case studies. Through comparing a European and an Australian case study, contexts that were noted to have distinctly different themes in their respective elections during the period of analysis, the thesis was able to unpack the different ways the populist radical right might frame their concerns, depending on what is salient in their particular context. Moreover, because most of the literature on the populist radical right is derived from European cases, comparing this with less-studied examples (i.e., an Australian case) provides scope for broadening our understanding of the party family and how it differs between contexts. Through this we can

947 Milstein.
948 Moffitt, "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism."
951 van Holsteyn.; Gunn and Mintrom.
better understand party differences and therefore better understand how the party family positions itself for success.

Finally, the fourth contribution relates to methodology. Firstly, the comparative findings indicate that a mixed quantitative and qualitative method was particularly advantageous for understanding the way crisis played out in different contexts, as well as the way the leaders each constructed their people-centrism (i.e., mostly along ethno-cultural lines). Where the quantitative findings indicated a greater reliance on crisis on behalf of Hanson, with a greater frequency of crisis themes recorded, the qualitative findings provided a different, more nuanced picture. Wilders, while less reliant on frequent characterisations of crisis than Hanson, was more focused and targeted with his crisis themes. In other words, his chosen language was stronger, but less frequent. Moreover, where the quantitative stage illustrated a high reliance on people-centrism for both leaders, that data alone would not have been able to sufficiently illustrate the degree to which the leaders relied on their nativism over their populism for this process. Therefore, in order to: a) fully understand how crisis plays out in different contexts; b) more sufficiently distinguish between a populist people-centrism and one drawn more from nationalism, per De Cleen, a flexible approach to assessment and analysis is needed; one that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative methods. Purely determining the frequency of crisis themes or of people-centric sentences would only tell part of the story of how these populists utilised and constructed their discourse.

Moreover, the codebook, which was the first of its kind to empirically explore the presence of crisis themes on the supply side of populism was found to be effective in the assessment of crisis themes, as well as in assessing the presence of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and/or ‘othering.’ It is also indicated that the codebook would be similarly applicable to testing the presence of these features in mainstream parties, movements and leaders’ discourse. The multi-typological take of populism used in this thesis allows for a conceptualisation of populism that understands that populist parties exist, indicated by a consistent and high-degree use of the populist features, but also that mainstream, non-populist parties may also use these features, although perhaps only sporadically and to a lesser degree. In other words, parties can undoubtedly be populist (despite a potentially greater reliance on a host ideology) but populism

952 De Cleen, “The Populist Political Logic and the Analysis of the Discursive Construction of ‘the People’ and ‘the Elite’,” in Imagining the Peoples of Europe. Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum.
can also be used in a degree-ist fashion more intermittently by leaders, parties and movements without necessarily being labelled ‘populist.’ The codebook utilised in the empirical examination allows for this, in that it is able to assess the degree to which populism manifests in speeches of leaders, as the shorter analysis of mainstream leaders in this thesis exemplifies.

In summary, the analysis of Hanson and ON and Wilders and the PVV has provided a number of findings that may have implications for future research on the populist radical right specifically, and populism more broadly. Most notable is that ON and the PVV are primarily nativist, but populism is a central and significant feature of the parties. The use of crisis themes served to create a potentially fertile environment for their nativist agenda, through generating antagonism between their Judeo-Christian in-group and their immigrant, Muslim out-group. It also found that ON was somewhat more populist than the PVV. It suggests that populist radical right parties will modulate their core agendas, depending on issue salience, such as ON’s materialist focus and their somewhat stronger use of populism. Therefore, while limited in comparative scope and confined to just the populist radical right, these findings go some way to developing a stronger understanding of the populism of ‘populist’ parties, the role populism itself plays in relation to host ideologies, and how populist parties differ between contexts. It also supports recent calls for the widening of our understanding of the variety of issues important to the populist radical right party family. As such, taken together, these findings can also contribute to the variety of scholarship that aims to map the strategies for success used by the populist radical right specifically, and populists more broadly, to secure electoral power.

We might also conclude from the findings that because ON and the PVV have been found to be quantitatively more nativist than populist, that we should conceive of these parties through a nationalist lens, not a populist one. However, I argue that despite the dominance of nativism, the function of populism within the parties’ respective agendas is so significant that a populism lens is most appropriate. As the findings suggest, populism underlies and fuels the parties’ more visceral nationalism. It is the parties’ populism, despite being a more inconspicuous presence in their respective agendas, which makes their nativism viable. The populist discourse undermines the status-quo power relations and opens up the political space for these parties to operate and in turn opens up the space for their nativism. As Breeze articulates, the populism

953 See: Rydgren, "Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?"; De Cleen and Stavrakakis.; March, "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case."
of these parties is “essential to their self-preservation.”\textsuperscript{955} By framing ‘the people’ as victims against an establishment facilitator of immigration and destroyer of Judeo-Christian values, the populism of these parties offers a “discursive, if not logical, justification” for the anti-Islamic positions of the populist radical right.\textsuperscript{956} Populism, both as a discursive justification as well as the role that crisis plays in the facilitation of anti-migrant discourse, ‘othering’ discourse, is integral and inherent to these functioning of these parties, and, importantly, the successful dissemination of their messages. It is the parties’ populism that essentially makes their nativism a plausible stance, and, arguably, the reason for the parties’ success. The anti-elitism and crisis discourse of populist radical right parties functions to undermine those in power, all the while making the party themselves seem like a legitimate and plausible alternative ‘the elites’. In doing so, it similarly acts to legitimises a party’s nativist intentions. As such, while populism may be quantitatively less prominent than nativism, it is no less important. For this reason, a populist lens, and consequently populist literature, is both appropriate and necessary mode through which to analyse these parties.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

The findings from the analysis have led to four recommendations for future research in relation to the study of populism and populist parties. The first three relate to populism’s relationship to crisis. Firstly, as I have argued, the results give credence to the inclusion of crisis as a defining feature of populism, per Moffitt.\textsuperscript{957} Relatedly, future examinations of the relationship between populism and crisis would benefit from the inclusion of crisis as a supply-side condition of populism, rather than it merely existing as an external demand-side trigger for electoral success. Secondly, research on the relationship between crisis as a supply-side condition of populist success would also be fruitful, in the form of a longitudinal study. For example, the assessment of themes of crisis in the speeches of populist leaders, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and comparing this with data on electoral success, could be fruitful in determining a relationship between the presence of this discourse and electoral

\textsuperscript{955} Breeze, 101.
\textsuperscript{956} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{957} Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.”
success. Third, this research was restricted to the way the populist radical right manifested in different contexts, and as such the role of crisis as a supply-side condition of populism broadly (i.e., the varieties of populism that exist along the political spectrum) remains unverified and unexplored. Therefore, further research on the supply-side presence of crisis within left-wing and centrist populist discourse would be fruitful.

Finally, the findings indicate that further analysis into the ways the populist radical right balance their materialist and post-materialist concerns would be advantageous. While the findings generally conformed to the literature on the fact that socio-economic issues were “instrumental” and “secondary,” it is worth further exploring the degree to which parties belonging to the party family are entirely post-materialist in leanings. The themes of the 2016 election in Australia suggest that economic issues were particularly salient amongst the electorate, and this is reflected in the degree to which Hanson used these issues as a crisis theme. This indicates that context alters the degree to which populist radical right parties weigh their materialist and post-materialist concerns. As such, further research in mapping this in different geographies would be beneficial.

**Concluding Remarks**

I conclude this thesis with a short comment on the overall impact of the findings. Specifically, while the literature on the populist radical right presses the influence of nativism over populism in the party family’s agendas,958 and indeed the findings do support this position, I propose that in this emphasis we do risk underestimating the actual influence the populist dimensions of the party family have had on the facilitation of nativist agendas and thus the electoral success of the party family more broadly. Indeed, nativism is the most prominent feature in question, as evidenced by the in-grouping and out-grouping index and the policy analysis. However, the presence of crisis in the discourse of the leaders is significant and played a central role in facilitating the nativism of the case studies. Secondly, there now exists empirical data on the manner in which crisis manifests on the supply-side of populism, and thus a more thorough understanding of an often commented-upon, but under-explored relationship now exists. This is significant, as we can better understand the way that crisis, and thus populism, is used

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958 Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.*
alongside particular host ideologies to facilitate agendas and how it positions these parties for success, as the findings illustrate. Finally, the findings suggest that the parties modulated their crisis themes to issues salient to their contexts, which in turn influenced the degree to which they balanced their materialist and post-materialist concerns, thus somewhat challenging the notion that the party family are primarily post-materialist in nature. The analysis also determined that ON is moderately more populist than the PVV, suggesting that context influences the extent to which a populist radical right party is actually ‘populist.’ Together, I propose that these findings contribute to the creation of a more sufficient mapping of the divergent ways the populist radical right manifests in different contexts, the tools populists might use to position themselves for success, and, importantly, the role that populism itself plays in the agendas of one of the most prominent and successful populist party families of the contemporary era.
### Appendix A: Quantitative content analysis codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Populist feature/indices</th>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>In/out</td>
<td>People-centrism</td>
<td>Identify sentences which refer to a homogenous group of ‘people’, with which the speaker aligns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identify sentences that include positive references to the ‘people.’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify sentences that outline that politics and democracy must represent the will of the ‘people.’</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify sentences where there is reference to some sort of idealised ‘heartland’ or community/society that this group inhabits, and which is constructed to reflect the homogeneity of the ‘people.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>In/out</td>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
<td>Identify sentences which refer to an ‘elite.’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify sentences where there is a distinction made between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite.’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify sentences in which there is a demarcation made between the speaker and the ‘elite.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>In/out</td>
<td>‘Othering’</td>
<td>Identify sentences that refer to another social category(s) of people that is characterised as being in opposition to the ‘people’ (does not include the ‘elite.’)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify sentences in which there is a demarcation made between the in-group (the ‘people’) and a non-people out-group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Crisis and/or societal declinism</td>
<td>Identify sentences that characterise society as being in decline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Blame attribution</td>
<td>Identify sentences in which blame for the decline is attributed to an out-group (i.e., the ‘other’, the ‘elite.’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Single policy</td>
<td>Policy document</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>Identify policies in which there is a distinction made between natives (non-Indigenous natives) and non-natives.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Identify policies that delineate a particular ethnic group, with negative policy implications for said group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Populism</td>
<td>Identify policies that make references to the inherent value of the nation, including its language and its culture.</td>
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<td>Identify policies that emphasise strong law-and-order principles.</td>
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<td>Identify policies that draw on populism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Single policy</td>
<td>Policy document</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Identify policies that do not draw on the above.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B: Qualitative hermeneutic textual analysis codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Populist feature/indices</th>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>In/out</td>
<td>People-centrism</td>
<td>Which social category of citizens is depicted as the ‘people’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>In what way are they constructed as a ‘homogenous’ group?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What language is used to categorise the ‘people’?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What language is used by the speaker to create the impression that they speak on behalf of said ‘people’?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What language is used to construct a particular image of ‘society’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>In/out</td>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
<td>Which social category(s) are depicted as the ‘elites’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What language is used to depict the ‘elites’?</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the depicted grievances between the ‘people’ and the ‘elites’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>How are these elites characterised as being in opposition to the ‘people’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>In/out</td>
<td>‘Othering’</td>
<td>Aside from the elites, which other social category(s) is depicted as standing in opposition to the ‘people’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What language is used to demarcate between this group and the ‘people’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the grievances depicted between the ‘people’ and this group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Crisis and/or societal declinism</td>
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<tr>
<td>How is this group characterised as being in opposition to the ‘people’?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is society characterised as being in flux or decline and/or in the midst of or approaching crisis? If so, how does the speaker depict this?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the speaker make a distinction between a good past and a bad present and/or future? If so, how does the speaker achieve this?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is/are the overarching problem(s) in society as depicted by the speaker?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What language is used to depict this crisis?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the speaker attempt to characterise themselves as able to ‘fix’ this decline/crisis? If so, what language is used to achieve this?</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Blame attribution</th>
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<tr>
<td>Which groups are depicted as responsible or the ‘cause’ of society’s decline?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What language is used to attribute this blame?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do these above policies achieve this?</td>
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<td>What policies proposed in the document draw on the party’s authoritarianism?</td>
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<td>How do these above policies achieve this?</td>
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<td>What policies proposed in the document draw on the party’s populism?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do these above policies achieve this?</td>
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What policies proposed in the document draw on the party’s populism?

How do these above policies achieve this?

What policies proposed in the document draw on socio-economic issues?

What non-populist radical right socio-cultural policies are in the document?

What policies are proposed in the document that do not draw on the above?
## Appendix C: Sources used for Case-study one (ON)

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<td>Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) Second Reading Speech, Senate</td>
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### Appendix D: Sources used for Case-study two (PVV)

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<td>Speech, The Conservative Forum</td>
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<td>Sat 2/9/17 Villa d’Este, Italy</td>
<td>‘The Europe We Want,’ Ambrosetti Conference</td>
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<td>2017 general election manifesto</td>
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