Distributing states' duties

Journal article


Collins, Stephanie 2016. Distributing states' duties. Journal of Political Philosophy. 24 (3), pp. 344 - 366. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12069
AuthorsCollins, Stephanie
Abstract

We tend to think states have moral duties: duties to alleviate global warming, protect citizens' moral rights, admit asylum seekers, or wage only just wars. This common‐sense view accords with a growing philosophical consensus that states are corporate moral agents, able to bear duties as entities conceptually distinct from—though supervenient upon and constituted by—their members. States have clear membership rules and decision‐making procedures that are distinct from the decision‐making procedures of members. States are able to act on their decisions, through the actions that their decision‐making procedures authorise members to take. States may therefore bear prospective and retrospective responsibility for their decisions and actions. In what follows, I will assume this view is sound.

Year2016
JournalJournal of Political Philosophy
Journal citation24 (3), pp. 344 - 366
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN0963-8016
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12069
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84940676430
Open accessOpen access
Page range344 - 366
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Publisher's version
License
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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