Skepticism about the a priori justification: Self-evidence, defeasibiity, and cogito propositions
Book chapter
Audi, Robert. (2008). Skepticism about the a priori justification: Self-evidence, defeasibiity, and cogito propositions. In In J. Greco (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism pp. 149 - 175 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0008
Authors | Audi, Robert |
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Editors | J. Greco |
Abstract | This article focuses on the cogito propositions and those propositions whose classification as a priori is disputed. It explains that a priori justification is commonly taken to be a kind of justification is based on reason rather than on experience and evaluates the skeptical view that no genuinely substantive proposition is a priori and that reason has far less power to reveal truth than has been supposed by a great many philosophers. It also discusses the domain of the a priori, empiricist skepticism about the a priori, and the case for a priori existential knowledge. |
Keywords | cogito propositions; a priori justification; experience; reason; truth; empiricist skepticism; existential knowledge |
Page range | 149 - 175 |
Year | 2008 |
Book title | The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
ISBN | 9780195183214 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0008 |
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