The explanatory dispensability of idealizations
Journal article
Baron, Sam. (2016). The explanatory dispensability of idealizations. Synthese. 193(2), pp. 365 - 386. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0517-z
Authors | Baron, Sam |
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Abstract | Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific theories. And yet, idealizations are not the sorts of things that are supposed to attract a realist attitude. I argue that the explanatory symmetry between idealizations and mathematics can potentially be broken as follows: although idealizations contribute to the explanatory power of our best theories, they do not carry the explanatory load. It is at least open however that mathematics is load-carrying. To give this idea substance, I offer an analysis of what it is to carry the explanatory load in terms of difference-making and counterfactuals. |
Keywords | idealization; explanation; indispensability; difference-making; counterfactuals |
Year | 2016 |
Journal | Synthese |
Journal citation | 193 (2), pp. 365 - 386 |
Publisher | Springer Netherlands |
ISSN | 0039-7857 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0517-z |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-84957940630 |
Page range | 365 - 386 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | Netherlands |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/87491/the-explanatory-dispensability-of-idealizations
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