General dynamic trivality theorems
Journal article
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford and Hawthorne, John. (2016). General dynamic trivality theorems. The Philosophical Review. 125(3), pp. 307 - 339. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3516936
Authors | Russell, Jeffrey Sanford and Hawthorne, John |
---|---|
Abstract | Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments of the project of dynamic semantics. |
Keywords | probability; conditionals; epistemic modals; subjective value; dynamic semantics; commutativity; idempotence |
Year | 2016 |
Journal | The Philosophical Review |
Journal citation | 125 (3), pp. 307 - 339 |
Publisher | Duke University Press |
ISSN | 0031-8108 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3516936 |
Page range | 307 - 339 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | United States of America |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/875xz/general-dynamic-trivality-theorems
Restricted files
Publisher's version
111
total views0
total downloads0
views this month0
downloads this month