Epistemic situationism: An extended prolepsis
Book chapter
Fairweather, Abrol and Alfano, Mark. (2017). Epistemic situationism: An extended prolepsis. In In A. Fairweather and M. Alfano (Ed.). Epistemic situationism pp. 44 - 66 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0003
Authors | Fairweather, Abrol and Alfano, Mark |
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Editors | A. Fairweather and M. Alfano |
Abstract | This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, and 4) that weakening the reliability requirement through epistemic dependence or abilism means that common inferential strategies really are virtues. The paper concludes with reflections on the replication crisis in psychological science. |
Keywords | virtue epistemology; epistemic situationism; knowledge; C.A.P.S; Big Six; epistemic dependence |
Page range | 44 - 66 |
Year | 2017 |
Book title | Epistemic situationism |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
ISBN | 9780199688234 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0003 |
Research Group | Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/88181/epistemic-situationism-an-extended-prolepsis
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