Epistemic situationism: An extended prolepsis

Book chapter

Fairweather, Abrol and Alfano, Mark. (2017). Epistemic situationism: An extended prolepsis. In In A. Fairweather and M. Alfano (Ed.). Epistemic situationism pp. 44 - 66 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0003
AuthorsFairweather, Abrol and Alfano, Mark
EditorsA. Fairweather and M. Alfano
Abstract

This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, and 4) that weakening the reliability requirement through epistemic dependence or abilism means that common inferential strategies really are virtues. The paper concludes with reflections on the replication crisis in psychological science.

Keywordsvirtue epistemology; epistemic situationism; knowledge; C.A.P.S; Big Six; epistemic dependence
Page range44 - 66
Year2017
Book titleEpistemic situationism
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
ISBN9780199688234
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0003
Research GroupInstitute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
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