Expanding the situationist challenge to responsibilist virtue epistemology

Journal article


Alfano, Mark 2012. Expanding the situationist challenge to responsibilist virtue epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly. 62 (247), pp. 223 - 249. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00016.x
AuthorsAlfano, Mark
Abstract

The last few decades have witnessed the birth and growth of both virtue epistemology and the situationist challenge to virtue ethics. It seems only natural that eventually we would see the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology. This article articulates one aspect of that new challenge by spelling out an argument against the responsibilist brand of virtue epistemology. The trouble can be framed as an inconsistent triad: (non‐skepticism) many people know quite a bit; (responsibilism) knowledge is true belief acquired and retained through the exercise of intellectual virtue; (epistemic situationism) most people do not possess the intellectual virtues countenanced by responsibilism. Non‐skepticism is a Moorean platitude we should aim to preserve at most if not all costs. I muster evidence from cognitive and social psychology to argue for epistemic situationism. If my argument is correct, responsibilism must be revised or rejected, and reliabilists should avoid incorporating responsibilist components into their theories.

Year2012
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Journal citation62 (247), pp. 223 - 249
PublisherBasil Blackwell
ISSN0031-8094
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00016.x
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84859110805
Page range223 - 249
Research GroupInstitute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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