Epistemic modal credence
Goldstein, Simon. (2021). Epistemic modal credence. Philosophers' Imprint. 21(26), pp. 1-24.
Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state- world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization.
|Journal citation||21 (26), pp. 1-24|
|Web address (URL)||http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0021.026|
|Open access||Open access|
|Research Group||Dianoia Institute of Philosophy|
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