Deviance and vice: Strength as a theoretical virtue in the epistemology of logic
Journal article
Russell, Gillian. (2019). Deviance and vice: Strength as a theoretical virtue in the epistemology of logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 99(3), pp. 548 - 563. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12498
Authors | Russell, Gillian |
---|---|
Abstract | This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength , as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well‐defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of scientific strength , and the third is that many modern logics are on a par—or can be made to be on a par—with respect to scientific strength. |
Year | 2019 |
Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Journal citation | 99 (3), pp. 548 - 563 |
Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. |
ISSN | 0031-8205 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12498 |
Page range | 548 - 563 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | United States of America |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/899z3/deviance-and-vice-strength-as-a-theoretical-virtue-in-the-epistemology-of-logic
Restricted files
Publisher's version
122
total views0
total downloads9
views this month0
downloads this month