The Nietzschean precedent for anti-reflective, dialogical agency
Journal article
Alfano, Mark. (2018). The Nietzschean precedent for anti-reflective, dialogical agency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 41, pp. 12 - 13. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000620
Authors | Alfano, Mark |
---|---|
Abstract | Nietzsche anticipates both the anti-reflective and the dialogical aspects of Doris's theory of agency. Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power presupposes that agency does not require reflection but emerges from interacting drives, affects, and emotions. Furthermore, Nietzsche identifies two channels through which dialogical processes of person-formation flow: sometimes a person announces what she is and meets with social acceptance of that claim; sometimes someone else announces what the person is, and she accepts the attribution. |
Year | 2018 |
Journal | Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Journal citation | 41, pp. 12 - 13 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
ISSN | 1469-1825 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000620 |
Open access | Published as green open access |
Page range | 12 - 13 |
Research Group | Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry |
Author's accepted manuscript | License File Access Level Open |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
Permalink -
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/89z04/the-nietzschean-precedent-for-anti-reflective-dialogical-agency
Download files
Author's accepted manuscript
AM_Alfano_2018_The_Nietzschean_precedent_for_anti_reflective_dialogical.pdf | |
License: CC BY-NC-ND | |
File access level: Open |
Restricted files
Publisher's version
(1 files)
167
total views78
total downloads1
views this month1
downloads this month