Methods, methodology, and moral judgement: Sidgwick on the nature of ethics
Crisp, Roger. (2013). Methods, methodology, and moral judgement: Sidgwick on the nature of ethics. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 2013/4(266), pp. 397 - 419.
This paper is an attempt to explain and criticize Sidgwick’s views on the nature of ethics and normativity. It begins by comparing his distinction between juridical and teleological conceptions of ethics, before moving on to Sidgwick’s conception of the practicality of ethics. The methodological issues behind Sidgwick’s decision to restrict his argument to just three methods are examined, before a discussion of Sidgwick’s position on the autonomy of ethics, the notion of ‘ought’, and moral motivation.
|Journal||Revue Internationale de Philosophie|
|Journal citation||2013/4 (266), pp. 397 - 419|
|Publisher||Association Revue Internationale de Philosophie|
|Web address (URL)||https://www.cairn-int.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=E_RIP_266_0397&DocId=63644&hits=11084+11083+11082+11081+11080+11079+11078+11077+11075+11074+11+10+9+8+7+6+5+4+2+1+|
|Page range||397 - 419|
|Research Group||Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry|
File Access Level
|Place of publication||Belgium|
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