The hard road to presentism

Journal article


Asay, Jamin and Baron, Sam. (2014) The hard road to presentism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 95(3), pp. 314 - 335. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12029
AuthorsAsay, Jamin and Baron, Sam
Abstract

It is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.

Year2014
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Journal citation95 (3), pp. 314 - 335
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
ISSN0279-0750
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12029
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84926122022
Page range314 - 335
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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