Logical pluralism without the normativity

Journal article


Blake-Turner, Christopher and Russell, Gillian 2018. Logical pluralism without the normativity. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3
AuthorsBlake-Turner, Christopher and Russell, Gillian
Abstract

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals.

Keywordslogical pluralism; normativity of logic; logical consequence; inference and implication; logic and reasoning; telic logical pluralism
Year2018
JournalSynthese
PublisherSpringer Netherlands
ISSN0039-7857
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3
Page range1 - 19
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Place of publicationNetherlands
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8qz87/logical-pluralism-without-the-normativity

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