Logical pluralism without the normativity
Journal article
Blake-Turner, Christopher and Russell, Gillian. (2018). Logical pluralism without the normativity. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3
Authors | Blake-Turner, Christopher and Russell, Gillian |
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Abstract | Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals. |
Keywords | logical pluralism; normativity of logic; logical consequence; inference and implication; logic and reasoning; telic logical pluralism |
Year | 2018 |
Journal | Synthese |
Publisher | Springer Netherlands |
ISSN | 0039-7857 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3 |
Page range | 1 - 19 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | Netherlands |
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