A bump on the road to presentism

Journal article


Baron, Sam. (2015) A bump on the road to presentism. American Philosophical Quarterly. 52(4), pp. 345 - 356.
AuthorsBaron, Sam
Abstract

Presentism faces a familiar objection from truthmaker theory. How can propositions about the past be made true if past entities do not exist? In answering this question, there are, broadly, two roads open to the presentist. The easy road to presentism proceeds by capitulating to the demands imposed by truthmaker theory and finding truthmakers for claims about the past. This road typically involves the invocation of controversial metaphysical posits that must then be defended. The hard road to presentism resists the demands of truthmaker theory by denying that all truths must be truth-made. The road is hard as it requires providing a principled restriction on the scope of truthmaker theory. In this paper, I argue that the hard road collapses back into the easy road; there is no hard road to presentism.

Year2015
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Journal citation52 (4), pp. 345 - 356
PublisherUniversity of Illinois Press
ISSN0003-0481
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84939630031
Web address (URL)https://www.jstor.org/stable/24475425
Page range345 - 356
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Place of publicationUnited States of America
Permalink -

https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8v6qq/a-bump-on-the-road-to-presentism

Restricted files

Publisher's version

  • 0
    total views
  • 0
    total downloads
  • 0
    views this month
  • 0
    downloads this month
These values are for the period from 19th October 2020, when this repository was created.

Export as

Related outputs

Counterfactual scheming
Baron, Sam. (2020) Counterfactual scheming. Mind. 129(514), pp. 535 - 562. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz008
Deflating deflationary truthmaking
Asay, Jamin and Baron, Sam. (2020) Deflating deflationary truthmaking. The Philosophical Quarterly. 70(278), pp. 1 - 21. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz036
Infinite lies and explanatory ties: Idealization in phase transitions
Baron, Sam. (2019) Infinite lies and explanatory ties: Idealization in phase transitions. Synthese. 196(5), pp. 1939 - 1961. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1678-y
How to endure presentism
Baron, Sam. (2019) How to endure presentism. Inquiry. 62(6), pp. 659 - 673. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1487883
Do not revise Ockham's Razor without necessity
Baron, Sam and Tallant, Jonathan. (2018) Do not revise Ockham's Razor without necessity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96(3), pp. 596 - 619. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12337
Do not revise Ockham's Razor without necessity
Baron, Sam and Tallant, Jonathan. (2018) Do not revise Ockham's Razor without necessity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96(3), pp. 596 - 619. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12337
How mathematics can make a difference
Baron, Sam, Colyvan, Mark and Ripley, David. (2017) How mathematics can make a difference. Philosophers' Imprint. 17(3), pp. 1 - 19.
Back to the unchanging past
Baron, Sam. (2017) Back to the unchanging past. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 98(1), pp. 129 - 147. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12127
Feel the flow
Baron, Sam. (2017) Feel the flow. Synthese. 194(2), pp. 609 - 630. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0964-1
Metaphysics as fairness
Baron, Sam. (2016) Metaphysics as fairness. Synthese. 193(7), pp. 2237 - 2259. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0842-x
Mathematical explanation and epistemology: Please mind the gap
Baron, Sam. (2016) Mathematical explanation and epistemology: Please mind the gap. Ratio. 29(2), pp. 149 - 167. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12101
The explanatory dispensability of idealizations
Baron, Sam. (2016) The explanatory dispensability of idealizations. Synthese. 193(2), pp. 365 - 386. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0517-z
Explaining mathematical explanation
Baron, Sam. (2016) Explaining mathematical explanation. The Philosophical Quarterly. 66(264), pp. 458 - 480. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv123
Our concept of time
Baron, Samuel and Miller, Kristie. (2015) Our concept of time. In In B. Mölder, V. Arstila and P. Øhrstrøm (Ed.). Philosophy and psychology of time pp. 29 - 52 Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22195-3_3
Et tu, brute?
Baron, Sam. (2015) Et tu, brute? In In C. Daly (Ed.). The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods pp. 258 - 281 Palgrave MacMillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_11
Temporal experience, temporal passage and the cognitive sciences
Baron, Sam, Cusbert, John, Farr, Matt, Kon, Maria and Miller, Kristie. (2015) Temporal experience, temporal passage and the cognitive sciences. Philosophy Compass. 10(8), pp. 560 - 571. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12244
Why do female students leave philosophy? The story from Sydney
Dougherty, Tom, Baron, Samuel and Miller, Kristie. (2015) Why do female students leave philosophy? The story from Sydney. Hypatia. 30(2), pp. 467 - 474. https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12150
Tensed truthmaker theory
Baron, Sam. (2015) Tensed truthmaker theory. Erkenntnis. 80(5), pp. 923 - 944. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9689-7
Causation sans time
Baron, Sam and Miller, Kristie. (2015) Causation sans time. American Philosophical Quarterly. 52(1), pp. 27 - 40.
What is temporal error theory?
Baron, Sam and Miller, Kristie. (2015) What is temporal error theory? Philosophical Studies. 172(9), pp. 2427 - 2444. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0419-4
The hard road to presentism
Asay, Jamin and Baron, Sam. (2014) The hard road to presentism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 95(3), pp. 314 - 335. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12029
Animal interrupted, or why accepting Pascal's Wager might be the last thing you ever do
Baron, Sam and Van Dyke, Christina. (2014) Animal interrupted, or why accepting Pascal's Wager might be the last thing you ever do. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 52(S1), pp. 109 - 133. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12069
Optimisation and mathematical explanation: Doing the Lévy Walk
Baron, Sam. (2014) Optimisation and mathematical explanation: Doing the Lévy Walk. Synthese. 191(3), pp. 459 - 479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0284-2
Can indispensability-driven platonists be (serious) presentists?
Baron, Sam. (2014) Can indispensability-driven platonists be (serious) presentists? Theoria. 80(2), pp. 153 - 173. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12031
Groundless truth
Baron, Sam, Miller, Kristie and Norton, James. (2014) Groundless truth. Inquiry. 57(2), pp. 175 - 195. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855652
Causation in a timeless world
Baron, Sam and Miller, Kristie. (2014) Causation in a timeless world. Synthese. 191(12), pp. 2867 - 2886. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0427-0