Must phenomenology remain Cartesian?
Romano, Claude. (2012). Must phenomenology remain Cartesian? Continental Philosophy Review. 45(3), pp. 425 - 445. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-012-9229-6
Husserl saw the Cartesian critique of scepticism as one of the eternal merits of Descartes’ philosophy. In doing so, he accepted the legitimacy of the very idea of a universal doubt, and sought to present as an alternative to it a renewed, specifically phenomenological concept of self-evidence, making it possible to obtain an unshakable foundation for the edifice of knowledge. This acceptance of the skeptical problem underlies his entire conceptual framework, both before and after the transcendental turn, and especially the immanence/transcendence distinction, i.e., the very basis of intentionality. In taking as its starting point an analysis of perception, the article puts forth a certain number of phenomenological arguments in order to put into question the validity of the skeptical problem and, therefore, of the Husserlian conceptual framework; it defends, in the first place, a disjunctive conception of perception and, in the second place, a holism of experience.
|Journal||Continental Philosophy Review|
|Journal citation||45 (3), pp. 425 - 445|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI)||https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-012-9229-6|
|Page range||425 - 445|
File Access Level
|Place of publication||Netherlands|
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