Varieties of moral encroachment

Journal article


Jorgensen Bolinger, Renée. (2020) Varieties of moral encroachment. Philosophical Perspectives. 34(1), pp. 5-26. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12124
AuthorsJorgensen Bolinger, Renée
Abstract

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms ‘encroach’ on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed ‘moral encroachment views’. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

Keywordsmoral encroachment; pragmatic encroachment; generalization; justified belief
Year2020
JournalPhilosophical Perspectives
Journal citation34 (1), pp. 5-26
PublisherWiley-Liss Inc.
ISSN1520-8583
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12124
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85085561916
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range5-26
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online27 May 2020
Publication process dates
Deposited15 Jul 2021
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