Are organizations’ religious exemptions democratically defensible?
Collins, Stephanie. (2020). Are organizations’ religious exemptions democratically defensible? Daedalus. 149(3), pp. 105-118. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_01806
Theorists of democratic multiculturalism have long defended individuals' religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Examples include Sikhs being exempt from motorcycle helmet laws, or Jews and Muslims being exempt from humane animal slaughter laws. This essay investigates religious exemptions for organizations. Should organizations ever be granted exemptions from generally applicable laws in democratic societies, where those exemptions are justified by the organization's religion? This essay considers four arguments for such exemptions, which respectively rely on the “transferring up” to organizations of individuals' claims to autonomy or recognition; organizations' own claims to autonomy or recognition; organizations' status in the accountability community; and organizations' procedural constraints. The essay concludes that only the last argument holds up – and then, only with caveats.
|Journal citation||149 (3), pp. 105-118|
|Publisher||MIT Press Journals|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI)||https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_01806|
|Research or scholarly||Research|
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|Deposited||28 Jul 2021|
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