Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists (and others)
Journal article
Perl, Caleb. (2019). Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists (and others). Analysis. 79(1), pp. 62-72. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any003
Authors | Perl, Caleb |
---|---|
Abstract | This paper develops an argument that, if rule consequentialism is true, it’s not possible to defend it as the outcome of reflective equilibrium. Ordinary agents like you and me are ignorant of too many empirical facts. Our ignorance is a defeater for our moral intuitions. Even worse, there aren’t enough undefeated intuitions left to defend rule consequentialism. The problem I’ll describe won’t be specific to rule consequentialists, but it will be especially sharp for them. |
Year | 2019 |
Journal | Analysis |
Journal citation | 79 (1), pp. 62-72 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISSN | 0003-2638 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any003 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-85063479956 |
Research or scholarly | Research |
Page range | 62-72 |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 19 May 2018 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 01 Sep 2021 |
Permalink -
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8wv0q/empirical-ignorance-as-defeating-moral-intuitions-a-puzzle-for-rule-consequentialists-and-others
Restricted files
Publisher's version
(1 files)
65
total views0
total downloads0
views this month0
downloads this month