An argument for temporalism and contingentism

Journal article


Perl, Caleb. (2015). An argument for temporalism and contingentism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 172(5), pp. 1387-1417. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0355-3
AuthorsPerl, Caleb
Abstract

Aristotle and Aquinas may have held that the things we believe and assert can have different truth-values at different times. Stoic logicians did; they held that there were “vacillating assertibles”—assertibles that are sometimes true and sometimes false. Frege and Russell endorsed the now widely accepted alternative, where the propositions believed and asserted are always specific with respect to time. This paper brings a new perspective to this question. We want to figure out what sorts of propositions speakers believe. Some philosophers have argued that we must take agents to believe temporalist propositions—propositions that are inspecific with respect to time—if we’re to explain the agent’s own thoughts and inferences. I’ll explore another strategy. I’ll focus on our ability to think and reason about the beliefs that other people have. I’ll suggest that an adequate account of that ability requires that we take others to believe some temporalist propositions. I also ask whether all propositions can be specific with respect to worlds, and close by exploring some general issues.

Keywordstemporalism; eternalism; contingentism; necessitarianism; propositions; truth
Year2015
JournalPhilosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Journal citation172 (5), pp. 1387-1417
PublisherSpringer Netherlands
ISSN0031-8116
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0355-3
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84939893421
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range1387-1417
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online03 Aug 2014
Publication process dates
Deposited09 Sep 2021
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