Knowledge by indifference
Journal article
Russell, Gillian K. and Doris, John M.. (2008). Knowledge by indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 86(3), pp. 429-437. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802001996
Authors | Russell, Gillian K. and Doris, John M. |
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Abstract | Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about? Jason Stanley 2005 argues that whether or not the relational predicate ‘knows that’ holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as knowing that p. The evidence for Stanley's thesis includes a number of intuitive judgments about examples. In this paper we provide parallel examples for which Stanley's thesis requires unwelcome knowledge-attributions, and argue that this is possible because his thesis conflicts with familiar and plausible principles about knowledge. |
Year | 2008 |
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Journal citation | 86 (3), pp. 429-437 |
Publisher | Routledge |
ISSN | 0004-8402 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802001996 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-61149443144 |
Research or scholarly | Research |
Page range | 429-437 |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 22 Jul 2008 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 25 Oct 2021 |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8wxq9/knowledge-by-indifference
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