Evil and evidence

Book chapter


Benton, Matthew A., Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2016). Evil and evidence. In In Kvanvig, Jonathan (Ed.). Oxford studies in philosophy of religion : Volume 7 pp. 1-31 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001
AuthorsBenton, Matthew A., Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav
EditorsKvanvig, Jonathan
Abstract

The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access), epistemic appearances, ‘gratuitous’ evils, ‘levering’ evidence, and the representativeness of goods. This chapter aims to dispel some confusions about these notions, in particular by clarifying their roles within a probabilistic epistemology. In addition, the chapter develops new responses to the problem of evil from both the phenomenal conception of evidence and the knowledge-first view of evidence.

Keywordsevil; evidence; probabilistic epistemology; skeptical theism; knowledge-first
Page range1-31
Year2016
Book titleOxford studies in philosophy of religion : Volume 7
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationUnited States
ISBN9780198757702
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001
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Output statusPublished
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OnlineMar 2016
Publication process dates
Deposited29 Nov 2021
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