Solving the ideal worlds problem

Journal article


Perl, Caleb Herman. (2021). Solving the ideal worlds problem. Ethics. 132(1), pp. 89-126. https://doi.org/10.1086/715289
AuthorsPerl, Caleb Herman
Abstract

I introduce a new formulation of rule consequentialism, defended as an improvement on traditional formulations. My new formulation cleanly avoids what Parfit calls “ideal world” objections. I suggest that those objections arise because traditional formulations incorporate counterfactual comparisons about how things could go differently. My new formulation eliminates those counterfactual comparisons. Part of the interest of the new formulation is as a model of how to reformulate structurally similar views, including various kinds of contractualism.

Year2021
JournalEthics
Journal citation132 (1), pp. 89-126
PublisherThe University of Chicago Press
ISSN0014-1704
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1086/715289
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85115626488
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range89-126
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication process dates
Deposited17 Dec 2021
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