Fancy loose talk about knowledge

Journal article

Russell, Gillian Kay. (2022). Fancy loose talk about knowledge. Inquiry. 65(7), pp. 789-820. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990791

Publication dates
Authors	Russell, Gillian Kay
Abstract	This paper argues for a version of sceptical invariantism about knowledge on which the acceptability of knowledge-attributing sentences varies with the context of assessment.
Keywords	relativism; skepticism; context-sensitivity; loose talk; skeptical invariantism
Year	2022
Journal	Inquiry
Journal citation	65 (7), pp. 789-820
Publisher	Routledge
ISSN	0020-174X
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)	https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990791
Scopus EID	2-s2.0-85118470658
Open access	Published as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Page range	789-820
Publisher's version	OA_Russell_2022_Fancy_loose_talk_about_knowledge.pdf License CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 File Access Level Open
Output status	Published
Online	30 Oct 2021
Publication process dates
Accepted	09 Feb 2021
Deposited	06 Jan 2022

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