Intrinsic valuing and the limits of justice : Why the ring of gyges matters
Journal article
Paytas, Tyler and Baima, Nicholas R.. (2019). Intrinsic valuing and the limits of justice : Why the ring of gyges matters. Phronesis. 64(1), pp. 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341359
Authors | Paytas, Tyler and Baima, Nicholas R. |
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Abstract | Commentators such as Terence Irwin and Christopher Shields claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic 2 cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain. |
Keywords | Plato; Ring of Gyges; justice; Glaucon; republic |
Year | 2019 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Journal citation | 64 (1), pp. 1-9 |
Publisher | Brill |
ISSN | 0031-8868 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341359 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-85059550431 |
Research or scholarly | Research |
Page range | 1-9 |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 06 Dec 2018 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 13 Jan 2022 |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8x469/intrinsic-valuing-and-the-limits-of-justice-why-the-ring-of-gyges-matters
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