Intrinsic valuing and the limits of justice : Why the ring of gyges matters

Journal article


Paytas, Tyler and Baima, Nicholas R.. (2019). Intrinsic valuing and the limits of justice : Why the ring of gyges matters. Phronesis. 64(1), pp. 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341359
AuthorsPaytas, Tyler and Baima, Nicholas R.
Abstract

Commentators such as Terence Irwin and Christopher Shields claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic 2 cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain.

KeywordsPlato; Ring of Gyges; justice; Glaucon; republic
Year2019
JournalPhronesis
Journal citation64 (1), pp. 1-9
PublisherBrill
ISSN0031-8868
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341359
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85059550431
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range1-9
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online06 Dec 2018
Publication process dates
Deposited13 Jan 2022
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