A cumulative case argument for infallibilism

Book chapter


Climenhaga, Nevin. (2021). A cumulative case argument for infallibilism. In In Kyriacou, Christos and Wallbridge, Kevin (Ed.). Skeptical invariantism reconsidered pp. 57-79 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429353468-6
AuthorsClimenhaga, Nevin
EditorsKyriacou, Christos and Wallbridge, Kevin
Abstract

I present a cumulative case for the thesis that we only know propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this thesis can easily explain the truth of eight plausible claims about knowledge:

There is a qualitative difference between knowledge and non-knowledge.

Knowledge is valuable in a way that non-knowledge is not.

Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge.

If S knows that P, P is part of S’s evidence.

If S knows that P, ~P is epistemically impossible for S.

If S knows that P, S can rationally act as if P.

If S knows that P, S can rationally stop inquiring whether P.

If S knows each of {P1, P2, … P n }, and competently deduces Q from these propositions, S knows that Q.

I then argue that the skeptical costs of this thesis are outweighed by its explanatory power.

Page range57-79
Year2021
Book titleSkeptical invariantism reconsidered
PublisherRoutledge
Place of publicationNew York, NY
London, United Kingdom
SeriesRoutledge studies in epistemology
ISBN9780367370183
9781032027463
9780429353468
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429353468-6
Research or scholarlyResearch
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Print2021
Online2021
Publication process dates
Deposited07 Mar 2022
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