Can we know God? New insights from religious epistemology

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Climenhaga, Nevin. (2019). Can we know God? New insights from religious epistemology United States of America: John Templeton Foundation.
AuthorsClimenhaga, Nevin
Abstract

[Extract] This report reviews research supported by two recent Templeton research grants focused on religious epistemology. New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology, led by John Hawthorne, explores the implications of recent work in epistemology on questions in the epistemology of religion. Knowing in Religion and Morality, led by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, focuses on skeptical challenges to moral and religious beliefs based on the presence of disagreement about moral and religious questions and the evolutionary origins of moral and religious beliefs.

Keywordsreligion; epistemology; morality; religious belief; rational belief; Christianity
Year2019
PublisherJohn Templeton Foundation
Place of publicationUnited States of America
Page range1-38
Web address (URL)https://www.templeton.org/religious-epistemology
https://www.templeton.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Religious-Epistemology-PDF-Formatted.pdf
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All rights reserved
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Output statusPublished
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OnlineSep 2019
Publication process dates
Deposited03 May 2022
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