Do reasons and evidence share the same residence?

[Extract] It is striking fact that so many good people know to do the things that should be done even when they know very little about what ultimately makes these things the things to do.1 They know to call their parents (but not something insulting) and to feed their children (but not to tigers) without the benefit of the theoretical understanding they'd pick up in an ideal ethical theory class. How could this be?

Star suggests that this is largely down to two things. First, these good people are the good people because they are appropriately responsive to normative reasons (2015: 97). These agents are moved by good reasons, albeit derivative reasons that are distinct from the fundamental reasons that would figure in the right theory of the right. These derivative reasons reliably lead these agents to do the right thing because their status as reasons ensures that they are evidence that these agents ought to perform the relevant acts. Thus, while the good folk might not act for the reasons that figure in good theories of right action, it isn't an accident that they act as these theories tell us they ought to.