Molinism : Explaining our freedom away

Journal article


Climenhaga, Nevin and Rubio, Daniel. (2022). Molinism : Explaining our freedom away. Mind. 131(522), pp. 459-485. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab042
AuthorsClimenhaga, Nevin and Rubio, Daniel
Abstract

Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will.

Year2022
JournalMind
Journal citation131 (522), pp. 459-485
PublisherOxford University Press
ISSN0026-4423
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab042
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85130138644
Open accessPublished as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range459-485
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online06 Oct 2021
Publication process dates
Deposited30 May 2022
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