Knowledge and normativity

Book chapter


Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Knowledge and normativity. In In Hetherington, Stephen and Valaris, Markos (Ed.). Knowledge in contemporary philosophy pp. 249-268 Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474258814.ch-013
AuthorsLittlejohn, Clayton
EditorsHetherington, Stephen and Valaris, Markos
Abstract

[Extract] ...it might seem that the part of the epistemology that has to do with appropriate belief and addresses questions about what we should believe will have little if anything to do with the part of epistemology that has to do with questions about the nature and extent of knowledge. 3 This chapter addresses questions that have recently come to the fore in contemporary discussions about the relationship between these two parts of epistemology. If these two parts of epistemology truly are distinct, we shouldn’t have to draw on the theory of knowledge in offering a theory of justified or normatively appropriate belief. The recent discussions of knowledge- first epistemology show that it will be incredibly difficult to maintain this separation. I shall point to some difficulties that arise for the standard story, starting with the Necessity Thesis and turning to an extended discussion of the Sufficiency Thesis.

Page range249-268
Year2018
Book titleKnowledge in contemporary philosophy
PublisherBloomsbury Publishing
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
Edition4
SeriesThe philosophy of knowledge : A history ; volume 4
ISBN9781474258791
9781474258814
9781474258807
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474258814.ch-013
Publisher's version
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All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online30 Jul 2018
Print2018
Publication process dates
Deposited31 May 2022
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