Probability for epistemic modalities

Journal article


Goldstein, Simon and Santorio, Paolo. (2021). Probability for epistemic modalities. Philosophers' Imprint. 21(33), pp. 1-37.
AuthorsGoldstein, Simon and Santorio, Paolo
Abstract

This paper develops an information-sensitive theory of the semantics and probability of conditionals and statements involving epistemic modals. The theory validates a number of principles linking probability and modality, including the principle that the probability of a conditional If A, then C equals the probability of C, updated with A. The theory avoids so-called triviality results, which are standardly taken to show that principles of this sort cannot be validated. To achieve this, we deny that rational agents update their credences via conditionalization. We offer a new rule of update, Hyperconditionalization, which agrees with Conditionalization whenever nonmodal statements are at stake but differs for modal and conditional sentences.

Year2021
JournalPhilosophers' Imprint
Journal citation21 (33), pp. 1-37
PublisherMichigan Publishing
ISSN1533-628X
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85123508032
Web address (URL)https://www.philosophersimprint.org/021033/
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0021.033
Open accessOpen access
Page range1-37
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online2021
Publication process dates
Deposited18 Jan 2023
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