Some question-begging objections to rule consequentialism

Journal article


Perl, Caleb. (2022). Some question-begging objections to rule consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. pp. 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2056213
AuthorsPerl, Caleb
Abstract

This paper defends views like rule consequentialism by distinguishing between two sorts of ideal world objections. It aims to show that one of those sorts of objections is question-begging. Its success would open up a path forward for such views.

Keywordsrule consequentialism; ideal world; contractualism; cluelessness
Year2022
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Journal citationpp. 1-16
PublisherRoutledge
ISSN0004-8402
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2056213
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85136867858
Web address (URL)https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2022.2056213
Open accessPublished as green open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range1-16
Author's accepted manuscript
License
File Access Level
Open
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online29 Aug 2022
Publication process dates
Accepted02 Mar 2022
Deposited18 May 2023
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