Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking

Journal article


Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2022). Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. pp. 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12925
AuthorsGallow, J. Dmitri
Abstract

If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals appear true. And rejecting either one leads to trouble for philosophical theories which rely upon counterfactual conditionals—like, for instance, causal decision theory. Here, I outline a semantics for counterfactual conditionals which allows us to accept both (1) and (2). And I discuss how this semantics deals with objections to causal decision theory from Arif Ahmed.

Year2022
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Journal citationpp. 1-31
PublisherWiley Periodicals
ISSN0031-8205
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12925
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85142190939
Web address (URL)https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12925
Open accessPublished as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range1-31
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online14 Nov 2022
Publication process dates
Deposited23 May 2023
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8z0y9/causal-counterfactuals-without-miracles-or-backtracking

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