Aptness isn’t enough : Why we ought to abandon anger

Journal article


Paytas, Tyler. (2022). Aptness isn’t enough : Why we ought to abandon anger. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. pp. 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10317-5
AuthorsPaytas, Tyler
Abstract

According to the Fittingness Defense, even if the consequences of anger are overall bad, it does not follow that we should aim to avoid it. This is because fitting anger involves an accurate appraisal of wrongdoing and is essential for appreciating injustice and signaling our disapproval (Srinivasan 2018; Shoemaker 2018). My aim in this paper is to show that the Fittingness Defense fails. While accurate appraisals are prima facie rational and justified on epistemic grounds, I argue that this type of fittingness does not vindicate anger because there are alternative modes of recognizing and appreciating wrongdoing that can generate the benefits of anger without the harmful effects. Moreover, anger involves more than its appraisal of wrongdoing—it also consists of attitudes and motivations that are arguably of intrinsic disvalue.

Keywordsanger; fittingness; aptness; emotions
Year2022
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Journal citationpp. 1-17
PublisherSpringer
ISSN1386-2820
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10317-5
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85138301871
Web address (URL)https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-022-10317-5
Open accessOpen access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range1-17
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online14 Sep 2022
Publication process dates
Accepted01 Aug 2022
Deposited12 Jul 2023
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