Dependence and a Kantian conception of dignity as a value

Journal article


Byers, Philippa. (2016). Dependence and a Kantian conception of dignity as a value. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 37(1), pp. 61-69. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-016-9351-2
AuthorsByers, Philippa
Abstract

Kantian moral concepts concerning respect for human dignity have played a central role in articulating ethical guidelines for medical practice and research, and for articulating some central positions within bioethical debates more generally. The most common of these Kantian moral concepts is the obligation to respect the dignity of patients and of human research subjects as autonomous, self-determining individuals. This article describes Kant’s conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values, and draws on the work of several contemporary Kantian philosophers who employ the distinction to make sense of some common moral intuitions, feelings, and norms. Drawing on this work, the article argues that the conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values is indispensable in the context of considering our obligations to those who are dependent and vulnerable.

Keywordsdependence; dignity; existent end; expressive duty; Kant; respect
Year2016
JournalTheoretical Medicine and Bioethics
Journal citation37 (1), pp. 61-69
PublisherSpringer
ISSN1386-7415
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-016-9351-2
PubMed ID26906557
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84959129212
Page range61-69
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online23 Feb 2016
Publication process dates
Deposited17 Aug 2023
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8z899/dependence-and-a-kantian-conception-of-dignity-as-a-value

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