An Epistemology for Moral Naturalists

Book chapter

Perl, Caleb Herman. (2022). An Epistemology for Moral Naturalists. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 17 pp. 166-196 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192865601.003.0007

Publication dates
Authors	Perl, Caleb Herman
Abstract	This chapter introduces a new account of moral knowledge—an account of how we make or assess claims to moral knowledge. It explains three hallmarks of moral knowledge: its apriori nature, its autonomy from scientific inquiry, and its minimalist epistemology. These hallmarks all seem like evidence against moral naturalists. The chapter shows that this new account allows moral naturalists to capture all three hallmarks. Capturing the three hallmarks undercuts a central source of evidence against moral naturalism.
Keywords	moral naturalism; moral knowledge; moral epistemology; contextualism; presupposition; apriori
Page range	166-196
Year	01 Jan 2022
Book title	Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 17
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Place of publication	United Kingdom
Edition	17
ISBN	978-0-19-286560-1
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192865601.003.0007
Web address (URL)	https://academic.oup.com/book/41859/chapter/354664185
Open access	Published as non-open access
Research or scholarly	Research
Publisher's version	License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled
Output status	Published
Online	Apr 2022
Publication process dates
Deposited	24 Jan 2024
Additional information	© Caleb Perl, 2022.

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