An Epistemology for Moral Naturalists
Book chapter
Perl, Caleb Herman. (2022). An Epistemology for Moral Naturalists. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 17 pp. 166-196 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192865601.003.0007
Authors | Perl, Caleb Herman |
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Abstract | This chapter introduces a new account of moral knowledge—an account of how we make or assess claims to moral knowledge. It explains three hallmarks of moral knowledge: its apriori nature, its autonomy from scientific inquiry, and its minimalist epistemology. These hallmarks all seem like evidence against moral naturalists. The chapter shows that this new account allows moral naturalists to capture all three hallmarks. Capturing the three hallmarks undercuts a central source of evidence against moral naturalism. |
Keywords | moral naturalism; moral knowledge; moral epistemology; contextualism; presupposition; apriori |
Page range | 166-196 |
Year | 01 Jan 2022 |
Book title | Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 17 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
Edition | 17 |
ISBN | 978-0-19-286560-1 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192865601.003.0007 |
Web address (URL) | https://academic.oup.com/book/41859/chapter/354664185 |
Open access | Published as non-open access |
Research or scholarly | Research |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | Apr 2022 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 24 Jan 2024 |
Additional information | © Caleb Perl, 2022. |
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