Fake barns and false dilemmas
Journal article
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2014). Fake barns and false dilemmas. Episteme. 11(4), pp. 369-389. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.24
Authors | Littlejohn, Clayton |
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Abstract | The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try to rectify here. |
Keywords | robust virtue epistemology (RVE); knowledge; belief; ability |
Year | 01 Jan 2014 |
Journal | Episteme |
Journal citation | 11 (4), pp. 369-389 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
ISSN | 1742-3600 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.24 |
Web address (URL) | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/fake-barns-and-false-dilemmas/D3129E49BD7FE4ED1D7B72B807A2D304 |
Open access | Published as non-open access |
Research or scholarly | Research |
Page range | 369-389 |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 05 Sep 2014 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 16 May 2024 |
Additional information | Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
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