Absolutism and its Limits

Journal article

Hawthorne, John Patrick, Isaacs, Yoaav and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2023). Absolutism and its Limits. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 105(20), pp. 170-189. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233831
AuthorsHawthorne, John Patrick, Isaacs, Yoaav and Littlejohn, Clayton
Abstract

Many philosophers think that given the choice between saving the life of an innocent person and averting any number of minor ailments or inconveniences, it would be better to save the life. How, then, should one compare the risk of an innocent person’s life to such minor ailments and inconveniences? If lives are infinitely more important than insignificant factors then any risk cannot be outweighed, and that is untenable. An alternative approach seems more promising: let the values of such insignificant factors be bounded, as then there will be well-behaved tradeoffs between insignificant things and the risk to an innocent life. We argue, however, that bounding the values of insignificant factors poses myriad problems.

Keywordsphilosophy; deontology; absolutism; decision theory; moral philosophy
Year01 Jan 2023
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Journal citation105 (20), pp. 170-189
PublisherBrill
ISSN1745-5243
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233831
Web address (URL)https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/21/1-2/article-p170_007.xml
Open accessPublished as non-open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range170-189
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online05 Sep 2023
Publication process dates
Deposited13 Nov 2024
Additional information

© John Hawthorne et al., 2023

Published with license by Koninklijke Brill NV

Place of publicationNetherlands
Permalink -

https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/910x9/absolutism-and-its-limits

Log in to edit

Restricted files

Publisher's version

  • 1
    total views
  • 0
    total downloads
  • 1
    views this month
  • 0
    downloads this month
These values are for the period from 19th October 2020, when this repository was created.

Export as

Related outputs

Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo : Scepticism and via negativa knowledge
Spectre, Levi and Hawthorne, John Patrick. (2024). Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo : Scepticism and via negativa knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 108(2), pp. 360-373. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12974
Knowing the facts, alternative and otherwise
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2023). Knowing the facts, alternative and otherwise. In In Borges, Rodrigo and Schnee, Ian (Ed.). Illuminating Errors : New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge pp. 312 - 328 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003118701-25
Externalism explained
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2023). Externalism explained. In In Oliveria, Luis R.G. (Ed.). Externalism about Knowledge pp. 353 - 376 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866749.003.0014
The safety conception of knowledge
Hawthorne, John Patrick and Dietz, Christina. (2023). The safety conception of knowledge. In Externalism about Knowledge pp. 150-185 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866749.003.0007
Evidence, experience and decision
Hawthorne, John Patrick. (2023). Evidence, experience and decision. Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition. 180(8), pp. 2491-2502. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01930-w
What is rational belief?
Dutant, Julien and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2023). What is rational belief? Nous. pp. 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12456
Counterpart theory and counterfactuals
Hawthorne, John and Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani. (2023). Counterpart theory and counterfactuals. In In Bennett, Karen and Zimmerman, Dean W. (Ed.). Oxford studies in metaphysics ; volume 13 pp. 129-165 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192886033.003.0005
Inheritance : Professor Procrastinate and the logic
Blumberg, Kyle and Hawthorne, John. (2023). Inheritance : Professor Procrastinate and the logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 106(1), pp. 84-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12846
Knowledge-First Theories of Justification
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2022). Knowledge-First Theories of Justification. In Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance pp. 263-285 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003008101-20
Intensionalism and propositional attitudes
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Intensionalism and propositional attitudes. In In Kriegel, Uriah (Ed.). Oxford studies in philosophy of mind ; volume 2 pp. 114-174 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856685.003.0005
Non-measurability, imprecise credences, and imprecise chances
Isaacs, Yoaav, Hájek, Alan and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Non-measurability, imprecise credences, and imprecise chances. Mind. 131(523), pp. 894-918. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab031
Reply to Bourget and Mendelovici
Yli-Vakkuri, Tuomo Juhani and Hawthorne, John Patrick. (2022). Reply to Bourget and Mendelovici. Inquiry. pp. 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2129485
Desire
Blumberg, Kyle and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Desire. Philosophers' Imprint. 22(8), pp. 1-17. https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2116
A new hope
Blumberg, Kyle and Hawthorne, John. (2022). A new hope. Journal of Philosophy. 119(1), pp. 5-32. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil202211911
Being in a position to know
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Being in a position to know. Philosophical Studies. 179, pp. 1323-1339. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01709-x
Knowledge from multiple experiences
Goldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Knowledge from multiple experiences. Philosophical Studies. 179(4), pp. 1341-1372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01710-4
Counterfactual contamination
Goldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Counterfactual contamination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 100(2), pp. 262-278. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1886129
This is epistemology : An introduction
Carter, J.Adam and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2021). This is epistemology : An introduction Wiley-Blackwell.
The epistemic use of ‘ought’
Hawthorne, John Patrick. (2021). The epistemic use of ‘ought’. In Conditionals, Probability & Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington pp. 164-173 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0010
Knowledge, justification, belief, and suspension
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2021). Knowledge, justification, belief, and suspension. Philosophical Topics. 49(2), pp. 371-384. https://doi.org/10.5840/PHILTOPICS202149230
Justified belief and just conviction
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2021). Justified belief and just conviction. In In Hoskins, Zachary and Robson, Jon (Ed.). The social epistemology of legal trials pp. 106-123 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-7
Solving a paradox of evidential equivalence
Dorr, Cian, Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2021). Solving a paradox of evidential equivalence. Mind. 130(520), pp. 1159-1182. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa022
The rationality of epistemic akrasia
Hawthorne, John, Isaacs, Yoaav and Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. (2021). The rationality of epistemic akrasia. Philosophical Perspectives. 35(1), pp. 206-228. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12144
Wanting what’s not best
Blumberg, Kyle and Hawthorne, John. (2021). Wanting what’s not best. Philosophical Studies. 179(4), pp. 1275-1296. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01707-z
Neither/nor
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2021). Neither/nor. In In Doyle, Casey, Milburn, Joe and Pritchard, Duncan (Ed.). New issues in epistemological disjunctivism pp. 215-240 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-11
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false
Littlejohn, Clayton and Dutant, Julien. (2021). Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false. Philosophical Studies. 179(3), pp. 801-827. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01695-0
Eleven angry men
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2021). Eleven angry men. Philosophical issues. 31(1), pp. 227-239. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12197
The bounds of possibility : Puzzles of modal variation
Dorr, Cian, Hawthorne, John and Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani. (2021). The bounds of possibility : Puzzles of modal variation Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846655.001.0001
Scotus on universals
Hawthorne, John. (2021). Scotus on universals. In In Pasnau, Robert (Ed.). Oxford studies in medieval philosophy : Volume 4 pp. 64-77 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786368.003.0003
Reply to Speaks
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2021). Reply to Speaks. Philosophical Studies. 178(9), pp. 3061-3065. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01553-5
Reply to Pietroski
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2021). Reply to Pietroski. Philosophical Studies. 178(9), pp. 3055-3059. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01552-6
Reply to Byrne
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2021). Reply to Byrne. Philosophical Studies. 178(9), pp. 3049-3054. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01551-7
On what we should believe (and when (and why) we should believe what we know we should not believe)
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2020). On what we should believe (and when (and why) we should believe what we know we should not believe). In In McCain, Kevin and Stapleford, Scott (Ed.). Epistemic duties : New arguments, new angles pp. 191-207 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215-15
Defeaters as indicators of ignorance
Dutant, Julien and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2020). Defeaters as indicators of ignorance. In In Brown, Jessica and Simion, Mona (Ed.). Reasons, justification, and defeat pp. 223-246 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0010
Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2020). Should we be dogmatically conciliatory? Philosophical Studies. 177(5), pp. 1381-1398. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01258-4
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2020). Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law. Synthese. 197(12), pp. 5253-5286. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4
Justification, knowledge, and normality
Littlejohn, Clayton and Dutant, Julien. (2020). Justification, knowledge, and normality. Philosophical Studies. 177(6), pp. 1593-1609. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01276-2
Graded epistemic justification
Hawthorne, John and Logins, Artūrs. (2020). Graded epistemic justification. Philosophical Studies. 178(6), pp. 1845-1858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01512-0
Indexicality, de re belief, and narrow content : A reply to Sawyer
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2020). Indexicality, de re belief, and narrow content : A reply to Sawyer. Inquiry. pp. 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1831852
The necessity of mathematics
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2020). The necessity of mathematics. Noûs. 54(3), pp. 549 - 577. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12268
Being more realistic about reasons : On rationality and reasons perspectivism
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2019). Being more realistic about reasons : On rationality and reasons perspectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 99(3), pp. 605-627. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12518
Knowledge, practical adequacy and stakes
Anderson, Charity and Hawthorne, John. (2019). Knowledge, practical adequacy and stakes. In In Gendler, Tamar Szabó and Hawthorne, John (Ed.). Oxford studies in epistemology, Volume 6 pp. 234-257 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0010
Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure
Anderson, Charity and Hawthorne, John. (2019). Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure. In In B. Kim and M. McGrath (Ed.). Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology pp. 107 - 115 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315168197
Operator arguments revisited
Fritz, Peter, Hawthorne, John and Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani. (2019). Operator arguments revisited. Philosophical Studies. 176(11), pp. 2933 - 2959. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1158-8
Reasons and theoretical rationality
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Reasons and theoretical rationality. In In Star, Daniel (Ed.). The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity pp. 529-552 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.24
Objectivism and subjectivism in epistemology
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Objectivism and subjectivism in epistemology. In In Mitova, Veli (Ed.). The factive turn in epistemology pp. 142-160 Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316818992.009
Knowledge, reason, and errors about error theory
Côté-Bouchard, Charles and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Knowledge, reason, and errors about error theory. In In Kyriacou, Christos and McKenna, Robin (Ed.). Metaepistemology : Realism and anti-realism pp. 147-171 Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6
The right in the good : A defense of teleological non-consequentialism
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). The right in the good : A defense of teleological non-consequentialism. In In Ahlstrom-Vij, H. Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey (Ed.). Epistemic consequentialism pp. 23-47 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0002
Standing in a garden of forking
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Standing in a garden of forking. In In McCain, Kevin (Ed.). Believing in accordance with the evidence : New essays on evidentialism pp. 223-243 Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_13
Evidence and its limits
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Evidence and its limits. In In McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel (Ed.). Normativity : Epistemic and practical pp. 115-136 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0007
Knowledge and normativity
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Knowledge and normativity. In In Hetherington, Stephen and Valaris, Markos (Ed.). Knowledge in contemporary philosophy pp. 249-268 Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474258814.ch-013
Moore’s Paradox and assertion
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Moore’s Paradox and assertion. In In Goldberg, Sanford (Ed.). The Oxford handbook of Assertion pp. 707-725 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.12
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
Dutant, Julien and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do. Synthese. 195(9), pp. 3755-3772. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1220-z
Stop making sense? On a puzzle about rationality
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Stop making sense? On a puzzle about rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96(2), pp. 257-272. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12271
Possible Patterns
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Possible Patterns. In In K. Bennett and D. W. Zimmerman (Ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics pp. 149 - 193 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198828198.003.0005
Narrow content
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Narrow content Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.001.0001
Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons
Hawthorne, John and Magidor, Ofra. (2018). Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons. In In D. Star (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity pp. 113 - 142 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.6
Fine-tuning Fine-tuning
Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2018). Fine-tuning Fine-tuning. In In M. A. Bentone, J. Hawthorne and D. Rabinowitz (Ed.). Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology pp. 136 - 168 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0008
Narrow content and ur-content
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Narrow content and ur-content. In Narrow Content pp. 72 - 105 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0004
Quasi-internalism
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Quasi-internalism. In Narrow Content pp. 158 - 175 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0006
Rationality and narrow content
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Rationality and narrow content. In Narrow Content pp. 130 - 157 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0005
Truth-conditionality
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Truth-conditionality. In Narrow Content pp. 63 - 97 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0003
What is narrow content?
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). What is narrow content? In Narrow Content pp. 1 - 46 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0002
How and why knowledge is first
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2017). How and why knowledge is first. In Knowledge first : Approaches in epistemology and mind pp. 19-45 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0002
When ignorance is no excuse
Alvarez, Maria and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2017). When ignorance is no excuse. In In Robichaud, Philip and Wieland, Jan Willem (Ed.). Responsibility : The epistemic condition pp. 1-22 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001
Small stakes give you the blues: The skeptical costs of pragmatic encroachment
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2017). Small stakes give you the blues: The skeptical costs of pragmatic encroachment. Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofia. 40(4), pp. 31-38. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n4.cl
Knowledge and false belief
Hawthorne, John. (2017). Knowledge and false belief. In In Borges, Rodrigo, de Almeida, Claudio and Klein, Peter D. (Ed.). Explaining knowledge : New essays on the gettier problem pp. 325-344 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0020
Misapprehensions about the fine-tuning argument
Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2017). Misapprehensions about the fine-tuning argument. Religious Epistemology. 81, pp. 133 - 155. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246117000297
La verdad en el Gnosticismo : The truth in gnosticism
Littlejohn, Clayde. (2016). La verdad en el Gnosticismo : The truth in gnosticism. Análisis. 3(2), pp. 217-241. https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621568
Learning from learning from our mistakes
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2016). Learning from learning from our mistakes. In In Grajner, Martin and Schmechtig, Pedro (Ed.). Epistemic reasons, norms and goals pp. 51-70 Walter de Gruyter GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110496765-004
Do reasons and evidence share the same residence?
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2016). Do reasons and evidence share the same residence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 93(3), pp. 720-727. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12350
Pritchard's reasons
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2016). Pritchard's reasons. Journal of Philosophical Research. 41, pp. 201-219. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr201672277
Evil and evidence
Benton, Matthew A., Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2016). Evil and evidence. In In Kvanvig, Jonathan (Ed.). Oxford studies in philosophy of religion : Volume 7 pp. 1-31 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001
Higher-order free logic and the prior-Kaplan paradox
Bacon, Andrew, Hawthorne, John and Uzquiano, Gabriel. (2016). Higher-order free logic and the prior-Kaplan paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 46(4-5), pp. 493 - 541. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1201387
Belief is weak
Hawthorne, John, Rothschild, Daniel and Spectre, Levi. (2016). Belief is weak. Philosophical Studies. 173(5), pp. 1393 - 1404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0553-7
General dynamic trivality theorems
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford and Hawthorne, John. (2016). General dynamic trivality theorems. The Philosophical Review. 125(3), pp. 307 - 339. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3516936
Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox
Bacon, Andrew, Hawthorne, John and Uzquiano, Gabriel. (2016). Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 46(4-5), pp. 493 - 541. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1201387
Some remarks on imagination and convention
Hawthorne, John. (2016). Some remarks on imagination and convention. Mind and Language. 31(5), pp. 625 - 634. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12123
Who cares what you accurately believe?
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2015). Who cares what you accurately believe? Philosophical Perspectives. 29(1), pp. 217-248. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12064
Comments on transient truths: An essay in the metaphysics of propositions (Berit Brogaard)
Hawthorne, John. (2015). Comments on transient truths: An essay in the metaphysics of propositions (Berit Brogaard). Inquiry. 58(6), pp. 617 - 624. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1077014
Cretan deductions
Fraser, Rachel Elizabeth and Hawthorne, John. (2015). Cretan deductions. Philosophical Perspectives. 29(1), pp. 163 - 178. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12070
Groupthink
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford, Hawthorne, John and Buchak, Lara. (2015). Groupthink. Philosophical Studies. 172(5), pp. 1287 - 1309. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0350-8
Fake barns and false dilemmas
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2014). Fake barns and false dilemmas. Episteme. 11(4), pp. 369-389. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.24
Semantic plasticity and speech reports
Dorr, Cian and Hawthorne, John. (2014). Semantic plasticity and speech reports. The Philosophical Review. 123(3), pp. 281 - 338. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2683531
Semantic plasticity and speech reports
Dorr, Cian and Hawthorne, John. (2014). Semantic plasticity and speech reports. The Philosophical Review. 123(3), pp. 281 - 338. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2683531
Knowing against the odds
Dorr, Cian, Goodman, Jeremy and Hawthorne, John. (2014). Knowing against the odds. Philosophical Studies. 170(2), pp. 277 - 287. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0212-9