The anatomy of buyer–seller dynamics in decentralized markets

In this paper I investigate the nexus between buyer–seller dynamics, financial frictions and market efficiency in decentralized markets. To do so, I introduce financial frictions in a dynamic market with heterogeneous traders. Heterogeneously constrained buyers sequentially enter the market to acquire units of a generic good from heterogeneously endowed sellers. I characterize two closely related classes of equilibria, respectively called homogeneous equilibrium with no entry (HEWNE) and homogeneous equilibrium with entry (HEWE). Both equilibria prescribe a market where only the efficiently endowed type of seller exists in the limit. However, the two equilibria diverge in the specification of agents’ behavior subsequent to trade. In HEWNE, sellers and buyers exit the market upon successful trading. In HEWE, like in supply chains, in every period certain types of buyers replace exiting sellers, thus becoming potential sellers for subsequent waves of buyers. First, I identify the critical role of frictions in steering the complex evolution of market heterogeneity for both classes of equilibria. Secondly, I operationalize the combined study of HEWNE and HEWE to obtain sharp predictions on market efficiency for a range of empirically-relevant situations in which buyer–seller dynamics are decoupled, for example when entry of new sellers is delayed or stopped. Third, I test the theoretical findings against a simulated artificial market.

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