Loading...
Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists (and others)
Perl, Caleb
Perl, Caleb
Author
Abstract
This paper develops an argument that, if rule consequentialism is true, it’s not possible to defend it as the outcome of reflective equilibrium. Ordinary agents like you and me are ignorant of too many empirical facts. Our ignorance is a defeater for our moral intuitions. Even worse, there aren’t enough undefeated intuitions left to defend rule consequentialism. The problem I’ll describe won’t be specific to rule consequentialists, but it will be especially sharp for them.
Keywords
Date
2019
Type
Journal article
Journal
Analysis
Book
Volume
79
Issue
1
Page Range
62-72
Article Number
ACU Department
School of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled