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Knowledge, practical adequacy and stakes
Anderson, Charity Hawthorne, John
Anderson, Charity
Hawthorne, John
Author
Abstract
Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on p and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate notion of stakes are indicated, and some troubling cases for pragmatic encroachment raised.
Keywords
knowledge, action, stake, pragmatic encroachment
Date
2019
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Oxford studies in epistemology, Volume 6
Volume
Issue
Page Range
234-257
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled