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A stronger doctrine of double effect
Bronner, Ben Goldstein, Simon
Bronner, Ben
Goldstein, Simon
Author
Abstract
Many believe that intended harms are more difficult to justify than are harms that result as a foreseen side effect of one's conduct. We describe cases of harming in which the harm is not intended, yet the harmful act nevertheless runs afoul of the intuitive moral constraint that governs intended harms. We note that these cases provide new and improved counterexamples to the so-called Simple View, according to which intentionally phi-ing requires intending to phi. We then give a new theory of the moral relevance of intention. This theory yields the traditional constraint on intending harm as a special case, along with several stronger demands.
Keywords
Doctrine of Double Effect, disjunction, intention, permissibility, Simple View
Date
2018
Type
Journal article
Journal
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Book
Volume
96
Issue
4
Page Range
793-805
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Event URL
Open Access Status
License
File Access
Controlled