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The epistemic use of ‘ought’
Hawthorne, John Patrick
Hawthorne, John Patrick
Author
Abstract
A good deal of Dorothy Edgington’s work has involved fruitful applications of the probability calculus to philosophical subject matters—notably, conditionals and vagueness. This chapter forms part of a project of exploring the relevance of probability to various epistemic phenomena, including knowledge and epistemic modality. Its focus here is on certain epistemic uses of ‘ought’ and ‘should’. The chapter argues against flat-footed ways of grounding those concepts in the ideology of probability, although it makes room for certain other, less reductive, structural relationships between the two. The discussion involves various idealizations and simplifications. Nevertheless, it argues that flattened ordering sources are a useful tool for developing a broadly Kratzer-style treatment of least some uses of ‘ought’.
Keywords
Edgington, probability, epistemic modals, knowledge, Kratzer
Date
2021
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Conditionals, Probability & Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington
Volume
Issue
Page Range
164-173
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled
Notes
© John Patrick Hawthorne, 2021.