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Strictly speaking
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen Sandgren, Alexander
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen
Sandgren, Alexander
Abstract
A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpretations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail.
Keywords
Date
2020
Type
Journal article
Journal
Analysis
Book
Volume
80
Issue
1
Page Range
3-11
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled