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Psychology, Equality, and the Forgetting of Motivations
Vincent, M.
Vincent, M.
Author
Abstract
I hope to demonstrate the value of a close reading Williams’s ‘Internal and External Reasons’, and to provide a theory of error regarding the substantial body of work which seeks to, in various ways, defang the essay. I do this by providing some historical context for the paper, and sketching where, historically, internalism and certain sorts of moral realism became separated. It will likely not surprise the reader when I suggest that the modern scientific worldview has an important place in the discussion of the notion of external reasons. As mind, motivation, and perception have become less opaque to us, certain avenues for explaining our reasons have come closer to relying on hypotheses which may turn out to be falsifiable, and have thus been abandoned. What may come as more of a surprise is my suggestion that modern egalitarianism is an important factor as well. I suggest that impersonal reason has been used as an (implausible, but perhaps well-intentioned) alternative to the practice of some inflicting their reasons on others.
Keywords
Reason internalism, Hume, Bernard Williams, Metaethics, Normativity
Date
2024
Type
Journal article
Journal
Book
Volume
43
Issue
2
Page Range
469-477
Article Number
ACU Department
School of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled
Notes
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023.