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Reasons-based moral judgments and the erotetic theory
Koralus, Philipp Alfano, Mark
Koralus, Philipp
Alfano, Mark
Author
Abstract
We argue that moral decision making is reasons-based, focusing on the idea that people encounter decisions as questions to be answered and that they process reasons to the extent that they can see them as putative answers to those questions. After introducing our topic, we sketch the erotetic reasons-based framework for decision making. We then describe three experiments that extend this framework to moral decision making in different question frames, cast doubt on theories of moral decision making that discount reasons and appeal, and replicate our initial finds in moral contexts that do not involve direct physical harm. We conclude by reinterpreting Stanley Milgram’s studies in destructive obedience in our new framework.
Keywords
Date
2017
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Moral inferences
Volume
Issue
Page Range
77-106
Article Number
ACU Department
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Open Access Status
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Controlled