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Where tracking loses traction
Barrington, Mitchell
Barrington, Mitchell
Author
Abstract
Tracking theories see knowledge as a relation between a subject's belief and the truth, where the former is responsive to the latter. This relationship involves causation in virtue of a sensitivity condition, which is constrained by an adherence condition. The result is what I call a stable causal relationship between a fact and a subject's belief in that fact. I argue that when we apprehend the precise role of causation in the theory, previously obscured problems pour out. This paper presents 13 distinct and original counterexamples to Nozick's tracking theory – many of which also constitute problems for more recent tracking theories. I begin by discussing how tracking relates to causation: Nozick invokes causation through conditions similar to those of Lewisian causal dependence. As a result, when causal dependence is not necessary for causation, Nozick fails to identify knowledge. I then address the inability of causation to capture epistemically important concepts, such as justification and truth. I conclude by discussing the underlying asymmetries between causation and knowledge that undermine any attempt to reduce knowledge to a purely metaphysical relation.
Keywords
tracking theory, causation, truth-tracking, Robert Nozick, epistemology
Date
2023
Type
Journal article
Journal
Episteme
Book
Volume
20
Issue
1
Page Range
1-14
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled