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Perceptual knowledge of nonactual possibilities
Strohminger, Margot
Strohminger, Margot
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Abstract
It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge of nonactual (metaphysical1) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to know that a proposition p is necessary or that p is possible (if p is false) by sense perception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception is not so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception. While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency, others concern necessity and impossibility. The possibility of a perceptual route to some modal knowledge is not as radical as it may at first sound. On the contrary, acknowledging it has benefits.
Keywords
Date
2015
Type
Journal article
Journal
Philosophical Perspectives
Book
Volume
29
Issue
1
Page Range
363-375
Article Number
ACU Department
School of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled